Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 6

Common Carriers

1.

De Guzman v. CA
December 22, 1988

2.

First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. CA


December 29, 1998

Facts

Facts

Private respondent Ernesto Cendaa is engaged in buying used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan
for resale in Manila. He utilizes two (2) 6-wheeler trucks which he owned in hauling metals to Manila. On the
trip to Pangasinan, private respondent would load the trucks with cargoes which various merchants wanted
delivered to Pangasinan. For that service, respondent charged freight rates which were commonly lower than
regular commercial rates.
Petitioner Pedro de Guzman transacted with pr for the transport of 750 cartons of Liberty filled milk
from his warehouse in Makati to Pangasinan. 150 cartons were loaded in the truck driven by pr, while the 600
cartons were in the other truck driven by prs helper/employee Manuel Estrada.
Only 150 cartons were delivered to petitioner because the truck which carried the 600 was hijacked
along MacArthur Highway in Paniqui, Tarlac, by armed men who took with them the truck, its driver, his helper
and the cargo.
Petitioner commenced a suit against pr demanding payment of P22,150.00, the claimed value of the
lost merchandise, plus damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner argued that private respondent, being a common
carrier, and having failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of him by the law, should be held
liable for the value of the undelivered goods.
The trial court ruled that pr is a common carrier and holding him liable therefore. The CA, reversed
the judgment and held that respondent had been engaged in transporting return loads of freight "as a casual
occupation -- a sideline to his scrap iron business" and not as a common carrier.

Petitioner was a grantee of pipeline concession under Republic Act No. 387, as amended, to contract,
install and operate oil pipelines. As such, it applied for a mayors permit but the same cannot be issued without
paying the assessed business tax based on gross receipts for the fiscal year 1993 pursuant to the LGC. Petitioner
paid them under protest.
Petitioner sent a letter-protest to respondent City Treasurer asserting that it is exempt from paying
tax on gross receipts under Section 133 of the Local Government Code, that transportation contractors are not
included in the enumeration of contractors under Section 131 of the same code and therefore the authority to
impose tax 'on contractors and other independent contractors' under Section 143 thereof does not include the
power to levy on transportation contractors.
The City Treasurer denied the protest contending that petitioner cannot be considered engaged in
transportation business.
Petitioner commenced a suit for tax refund. Respondents assert that pipelines are not included in the
term "common carrier" which refers solely to ordinary carriers such as trucks, trains, ships and the like.
Respondents further posit that the term "common carrier" under the said code pertains to the mode or manner by
which a product is delivered to its destination.

Issue

Ruling
Is private respondent a common carrier? Is he liable for the lost goods?

Ruling
Private respondent is a common carrier. Article 1732 of the NCC makes no distinction between
one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as "a sideline"). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making
any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general public," i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general
population.
The concept of common carrier coincide with public service in the public service act (CA 1416, as
amended)
Private respondent is not liable for the lost goods. In these circumstances, we hold that the
occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier and
properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not made
absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for acts or events
which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence.

Issue
Is petitioner a common carrier?
Yes. Article 1732 makes no distinction. It is engaged in the business of transporting or carrying
goods, i.e. petroleum products, for hire as a public employment. It undertakes to carry for all persons
indifferently, that is, to all persons who choose to employ its services, and transports the goods by land and for
compensation. The fact that petitioner has a limited clientele does not exclude it from the definition of a
common carrier.

3.

Calvo v. UCPB
GR No. 148496 March 19, 2002

Facts
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) transacted with petitioner for the transport of 114 reels of semichemical fluting paper and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMCs warehouse at
the Tabacalera Compound, Romualdez St., Ermita, Manila. The cargo was insured by respondent UCPB
General Insurance Co., Inc.
The cargoes arrived in Manila on board M/V Hayakawa Maru and, after 24 hours, were unloaded
from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator, Manila Port Services, Inc. Petitioner, pursuant to her
contract with SMC, withdrew the cargo, without exception, from the arrastre operator and delivered it to
SMCs warehouse in Ermita, Manila. The goods were inspected by Marine Cargo Surveyors, who found that 15
reels of the semi-chemical fluting paper were wet/stained/torn and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise
torn. The damage placed thereto was collected by SMC from respondent UCPB.
UCPB as subrogee brought suit against petitioner. Petitioner contends that she is not a common
carrier but a private carrier because, as a customs broker and warehouseman, she does not indiscriminately hold
her services out to the public but only offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract in the
conduct of her business.

1 of 5

Common Carriers

Issue
Issue

Is petitioner liable for the value of the damaged goods (tablets)?


Is petitioner liable for the damaged goods?
Ruling

Ruling
Yes. Petitioner is a common carrier because Article 1732 makes no distinction.
Art. 1733 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
In Compania Maritima v. Court of Appeals, the meaning of extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over goods was explained thus: The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for
shipment requires the common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or
destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to render
service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and
characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling and stowage, including
such methods as their nature requires.
Art. 1734(4), which provides Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or
deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only:
xxx
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers.
xxx
For this provision to apply, the rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the
container, is/are known to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he
nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not
relieved of liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, petitioner accepted the cargo without
exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. Hence, for failure of petitioner to prove
that she exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in this case or that she is exempt from
liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under Art. 1735 holds.

Yes. Article 1732 of the NCC does not distinguish between one whose principal business activity is
the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. The contention, therefore, of
petitioner that it is not a common carrier but a customs broker whose principal function is to prepare the correct
customs declaration and proper shipping documents as required by law is bereft of merit. It suffices that
petitioner undertakes to deliver the goods for pecuniary consideration. Thus, petitioner as a common carrier is
mandated to observe, under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods it transports according to all the circumstances of each case. In the event that the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that
it observed extraordinary diligence.
Further, petitioner posits that they were damaged due to the fault or negligence of the shipper for
failing to properly pack them and to the inherent characteristics of the goods; and that it should not be faulted
for following the instructions of Calicdan of Wyeth-Suaco to proceed with the delivery despite information
conveyed to the latter that some of the cartons, on examination outside the PSI warehouse, were found to be
wet. While paragraph No. 4 of Article 1734 of the Civil Code exempts a common carrier from liability if the
loss or damage is due to the character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers, the rule is that
if the improper packing is known to the carrier or his employees or is apparent upon ordinary observation, but
he nevertheless accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved
of liability for the resulting damage.
5.

Schmitz Transport and Brokerage v. Transport Venture, Industrial Insurance Co, Black Sea
Shipping and Dodwell now Inchcape Shipping Services
GR No. 150255 April 22, 2005

Facts
4.

Sanchez Brokerage v. CA, et.al.


GR No. 147079 December 21, 2004

Facts
Oral contraceptives obtained by Wyeth-Suaco Laboratories arrived at NAIA and without exception,
was discharged and delivered to the warehouse of Philippine Skylanders, Inc. (PSI) located also at the NAIA for
safekeeping. In order to release the goods from the PSI and Bureau of Customs and deliver the goods to Manila,
Suaco engaged the services petitioner as customs broker. Suaco insured the shipment with respondent FGU
insurance Corp.
Morales and Mendoza, representatives of petitioner paid PSI for storage fee and another
representative M. Sison acknowledged that he received the cargoes consisting of three pieces in good condition.
Upon instruction by Suaco, the goods were delivered to Hizon Laboratories Inc. in Antipolo City for quality
control check. Thereupon, it was found out by the Ronnie Likas together with Ruben Alonzo of Elite Surveyors,
discovered that 44 cartons containing Femenal and Nordiol tablets were in bad order. He thus placed a note
above his signature on the delivery receipt stating that 44 cartons of oral contraceptives were in bad order. The
remaining 160 cartons of oral contraceptives were accepted as complete and in good order.
Suaco demanded payment from petitioner representing the value of the damaged tables but the latter
refused, thus an insurance claim was filed by Suaco to FGU, which it paid and is now subrogated.

Petitioner, who was in charge of securing requisite clearances, receive the cargoes from the shipside
and deliver it to the consignee Little Giant Steel Pipe Corporation warehouse at Cainta, Rizal, hired the services
of respondent Transport Venture Incorporation (TVI)s tugboat for the hot rolled steel sheets in coil. Coils were
unloaded to the barge but there was no tugboat to pull the barge to the pier. Due to strong waves caused by
approaching storm, the barge was abandoned. Later, the barge capsized washing 37 coils into the sea. Consignee
was executed a subrogation receipt by Industrial Insurance after the formers filing of formal claim. Industrial
Insurance filed a complaint against both petitioner and respondent herein. The trial court held that petitioner and
respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the subrogation.
Issue
Was the loss of the cargoes due to fortuitous event?
Ruling
No. In order, to be considered a fortuitous event: (1) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen it must be
impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor.
Petitioner and respondent TVI were jointly and severally liable for the amount of paid by the
consignee plus interest computed from the date of decision of the trial court.

2 of 5

Common Carriers

6.

Phil. Charter Insurance Corp. v. Unknown Owner of the Vessel M/V National Honor, Natl.
Shipping Corp of the Phils and Intl. Container Services, Inc.
GR No. 161833 July 8, 2005

However, under Article 1734 of the New Civil Code, the presumption of negligence does not apply
to any of the following causes:
1. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
2. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
3. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
4. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;
5. Order or act of competent public authority.

Facts
Petitioner Philippine Charter Insurance Corporation (PCIC) is the insurer of a shipment on board the
vessel M/V National Honor, represented in the Philippines by its agent, National Shipping Corporation of the
Philippines (NSCP).
The M/V National Honor arrived at the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT). The
International Container Terminal Services, Incorporated (ICTSI) was furnished with a copy of the crate cargo
list and bill of lading, and it knew the contents of the crate. The following day, the vessel started discharging its
cargoes using its winch crane. The crane was operated by Olegario Balsa, a winchman from the ICTSI,
exclusive arrastre operator of MICT.

It bears stressing that the enumeration in Article 1734 of the New Civil Code which exempts the
common carrier for the loss or damage to the cargo is a closed list. To exculpate itself from liability for the
loss/damage to the cargo under any of the causes, the common carrier is burdened to prove any of the aforecited
causes claimed by it by a preponderance of evidence. If the carrier succeeds, the burden of evidence is shifted to
the shipper to prove that the carrier is negligent.

Denasto Dauz, Jr., the checker-inspector of the NSCP, along with the crew and the surveyor of the
ICTSI, conducted an inspection of the cargo. They inspected the hatches, checked the cargo and found it in
apparent good condition. Claudio Cansino, the stevedore of the ICTSI, placed two sling cables on each end of
Crate No. 1. No sling cable was fastened on the mid-portion of the crate. In Dauzs experience, this was a
normal procedure. As the crate was being hoisted from the vessels hatch, the mid-portion of the wooden
flooring suddenly snapped in the air, about five feet high from the vessels twin deck, sending all its contents
crashing down hard, resulting in extensive damage to the shipment.

Defect is the want or absence of something necessary for completeness or perfection; a lack or
absence of something essential to completeness; a deficiency in something essential to the proper use for the
purpose for which a thing is to be used. On the other hand, inferior means of poor quality, mediocre, or second
rate. A thing may be of inferior quality but not necessarily defective. In other words, defectiveness is not
synonymous with inferiority.

PCIC paid the damage, and as subrogee, filed a case against M/V National Honor, NSCP and ICTSI.
Both RTC and CA dismissed the complaint.

In the present case, the trial court declared that based on the record, the loss of the shipment was
caused by the negligence of the petitioner as the shipper:

xxx

Issue

The same may be said with respect to defendant ICTSI. The breakage and collapse of Crate No. 1
and the total destruction of its contents were not imputable to any fault or negligence on the part of
said defendant in handling the unloading of the cargoes from the carrying vessel, but was due solely
to the inherent defect and weakness of the materials used in the fabrication of said crate.

Is the presumption of negligence applicable in the case at bar?


Ruling
No. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that common carriers, from the nature of their
business and for reasons of public policy, are mandated to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case. The Court has defined extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods as follows:
The extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the
common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or
destruction of the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage and delivery. It requires common carriers to
render service with the greatest skill and foresight and to use all reasonable means to ascertain the
nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care in the handling
and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.
The common carriers duty to observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the
time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier
for transportation until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their acceptance, by the person
entitled to receive them. When the goods shipped are either lost or arrive in damaged condition, a presumption
arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an express finding of
negligence to hold it liable. To overcome the presumption of negligence in the case of loss, destruction or
deterioration of the goods, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence.

The crate should have three solid and strong wooden batten placed side by side underneath or on the
flooring of the crate to support the weight of its contents. x x x
7.

Lea Mer Industries v. Malayan Insurance


GR No. 161745 Sept. 30, 2005

Facts
Ilian Silica Mining entered into a contract of carriage with Lea Mer Industries, Inc., for the shipment
of 900 metric tons of silica sand. Consigned to Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation, the cargo was to be
transported from Palawan to Manila. During the voyage, the vessel (Judy VII) sank, resulting in the loss of the
cargo. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., as insurer, paid Vulcan the value of the lost cargo. To recover the amount
paid and in the exercise of its right of subrogation, Malayan demanded reimbursement from Lea Mer, which
refused to comply. Consequently, Malayan instituted a Complaint.
Lea Mer claimed that the loss of the cargo was due to the bad weather condition brought about by
Typhoon Trining. Evidence was presented to show that Lea Mer had not been informed of the incoming
typhoon, and that the Philippine Coast Guard had given it clearance to begin the voyage.

3 of 5

Common Carriers

Issue

8.
Is petitioner a common carrier? Is it liable?

Cebu Salvage v. Phil. Home Assurance


GR No. 150403 Jan. 25, 2007

Ruling

Facts

Yes, it is a common carrier and is liable. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods, or bothby land, water,
or air when this service is offered to the public for compensation. Lea Mer is clearly a common carrier,
because it offers to the public its business of transporting goods through its vessels.
The Contract in the present case was one of affreightment, as shown by the fact that it was Lea
Mer'ss crew that manned the tugboat M/V Ayalit and controlled the barge Judy VII. Necessarily, Lea Mer was a
common carrier, and the pertinent law governs the present factual circumstances.
Common carriers are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods and
the safety of the passengers they transport, as required by the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy. Extra-ordinary diligence requires rendering service with the greatest skill and foresight to avoid damage
and destruction to the goods entrusted for carriage and delivery. Common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently for loss or damage to the goods that they have transported. This presumption
can be rebutted only by proof that they observed extraordinary diligence, or that the loss or damage was
occasioned by any of the following causes: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or
calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper
or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order
or act of competent public authority.

Petitioner Cebu Salvage Corp. (as carrier) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Inc. [MCCII] (as
charterer) entered into a voyage charter where petitioner was to load 800-1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on
board M/T Espiritu Santo for transport and discharge from Negros Occidental to Misamis Oriental, to consignee
Ferrochrome Phils., Inc.-However, the shipment never reached its destination because the vessel sank resulting
in the total loss of the cargo.-MCII filed a claim for the loss of the shipment with its insurer, respondent
Philippine Home Assurance Corp.-Respondent paid the claim and was subrogated to the rights of MCCII,after
which it filed a case against petitioner for reimbursement of theamount it paid MCCII.-TC and CA: ordered
petitioner to pay respondent.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event
which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Thus, if the loss or damage was due to
such an event, a common carrier is exempted from liability. Jurisprudence defines the elements of a fortuitous
event as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtors to
comply with their obligations, must have been independent of human will; (b) the event that constituted the caso
fortuito must have been impossible to foresee or, if foreseeable, impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must
have been such as to render it impossible for the debtors to fulfill their obligation in a normal manner; and (d)
the obligor must have been free from any participation in the aggravation of the resulting injury to the creditor.
To excuse the common carrier fully of any liability, the fortuitous event must have been the proximate and only
cause of the loss. Moreover, it should have exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before,
during and after the occurrence of the fortuitous event.
Lea Mer presented no evidence that it had attempted to minimize or prevent the loss before, during
or after the alleged fortuitous event. The alleged fortuitous event was not the sole and proximate cause of the
loss. There is a preponderance of evidence that the barge was not sea-worthy when it sailed for Manila.
Respondent was able to prove that, in the hull of the barge, there were holes that might have caused or
aggravated the sinking. Because the presumption of negligence or fault applied to Lea Mer, it was incumbent
upon it to show that there were no holes; or, if there were, that they did not aggravate the sinking.
The submission of the Philippine Coast Guards Certificate of Inspection of Judy VII did not
conclusively prove that the barge was seaworthy. The regularity of the issuance of the Certificate is disputably
presumed. It could be contradicted by competent evidence, which respondent offered. Moreover, this evidence
did not necessarily take into account the actual condition of the vessel at the time of the commencement of the
voyage.

Issue
Can a carrier be held liable for the loss of cargo resulting from the sinking of a ship it doesnt own?
Ruling
Yes. Petitioner argues the agreement was just a contract of hire where MCCII hired the vessel from
its owner, ALS Timber. Since it wasnt the owner of the vessel, it didnt have control and supervision over it and
its crew. Thus,it shouldnt be held liable.
1.

Petitioner and MCCII entered into a voyage charter, a.k.a contract of affreightment where the ship
was leased for a single voyage for the conveyance of the goods, in consideration of the payment of
freight. Under a voyage charter, the ship owner retains possession, command and navigation of the
ship, the charterer/freighter just has the use of the space in the vessel in return for his payment of
freight. An owner who retains possession of the ship remains liable as carrier and must answer
forloss or non-delivery of the goods received for transportation.

2.

The agreement parties signed was a contract of carriage under which the petitioner was a common
carrier. From the nature of their business and reasons of public policy, common carriers are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence over the goods they transport according to the circumstances of each
case . In case of loss of the goods, the common carriers are responsible, unless they can prove the
causes under Art. 1734 CC or that they observed extraordinary diligence.

3.

In this case, Petitioner was the one which contracted with MCCII for the transport of the cargo. It
had control over what vessel it would use. The fact that it did not own the vessel it decided to use to
consummate the contract of carriage didnt negate its character and duties as common carrier. The
bill of lading issued by ALS was just a receipt to evidence the fact that the goods have been received
for transportation. It is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract of carriage between the
parties but it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter. The voyage charter
stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterers account. This just means that the charterer
would have the goods insured. It couldnt exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its
contract of carriage.

MCCII never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCII should sue ALS for reimbursement for
its loss.
To permit a common carrier to escape its responsibility for the goods it agreed to transport would derogate
from the carriers duty of extraordinary diligence.

4 of 5

Common Carriers

9.

Sps. Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Inc.


GR No. 186312 June 29, 2010

Facts
The newly wed Ruelito and his wife stayed at San Holidays Resort by virtue of a tour packagecontract with respondent that included transportation to and from the Resort and the point of departure in
Batangas. Although it was sindy, Ruelito C. Cruz, his wife and 25 other resort guests boarded M/B Coco Beach
III, which was to ferry them to Batangas. Shortly after the boat sailed, it started to rain. As it moved farther
away from Puerto Galera and into the open seas, the rain and wind got stronger, causing the boat to tilt from
side to side and the captain to step forward to the front, leaving the wheel to one of the crew members. After
getting bit by two big waves which came one after the other, M/B Coco Beach III capsized putting all
passengers underwater.
Help came after 45 minutes when two boats owned by Asia Divers in Sabang, Puerto Galera passed
by the capsized M/B Coco. Eight passengers including Ruelito and his wife, died during the incident.
Petitioners, by letter demanded indemnification from respondent for the death of their son in the
amount of at least P4M. respondent denied any responsibility for the incident which it considered as fortuitous
event. It nevertheless offered, as an act of commiseration, the amount of 10K to petitioners upon their signing of
a waiver.
Petitioners declined respondents offer, they filed a complaint, alleging that respondent as a common
carrier, was guilty of negligence.
Issue
Is respondent a common carrier?
Ruling
Yes. Art 1732 makes no distinction.
PLANTERS PRODUCERS v. CA
G.R. No. 101503 September 15, 1993
FACTS

June 16 1974: Mitsubishi International Corporation (Mitsubishi) of New York, U.S.A., 9,329.7069 M/T of
Urea 46% fertilizer bought by Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) on aboard the cargo vessel M/V "Sun Plum"
owned by private Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from Kenai, Alaska, U.S.A., to Poro Point,
San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, as evidenced by Bill of Lading

May 17 1974: a time charter-party on the vessel M/V "Sun Plum" pursuant to the Uniform General
Charter was entered into between Mitsubishi as shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo,
Japan

hatches remained open throughout the duration of the discharge

Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin before it was
transported to the consignee's warehouse located some 50 meters from the wharf

Midway to the warehouse, the trucks were made to pass through a weighing scale where they were
individually weighed for the purpose of ascertaining the net weight of the cargo.

The port area was windy, certain portions of the route to the warehouse were sandy and the weather was
variable, raining occasionally while the discharge was in progress.

Tarpaulins and GI sheets were placed in-between and alongside the trucks to contain spillages of the
fertilizer

It took 11 days for PPI to unload the cargo

Cargo Superintendents Company Inc. (CSCI), private marine and cargo surveyor, was hired by PPI to
determine the "outturn" of the cargo shipped, by taking draft readings of the vessel prior to and after
discharge

shortage in the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea fertilizer approximating 18 M/T was
contaminated with dirt

Certificate of Shortage/Damaged Cargo prepared by PPI

short of 94.839 M/T and about 23 M/T were rendered unfit for commerce, having been polluted with sand,
rust and dirt

PPI sent a claim letter 1974 to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the carrier,
KKKK, for P245,969.31 representing the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods shipped and the
diminution in value of that portion said to have been contaminated with dirt

SSA: what they received was just a request for shortlanded certificate and not a formal claim, and that
they "had nothing to do with the discharge of the shipment

RTC: failure to destroy the presumption of negligence against them, SSA are liable

CA: REVERSED - failed to prove the basis of its cause of action

Before loading the fertilizer aboard the vessel, 4 of her holds were all presumably inspected by the
charterer's representative and found fit

ISSUE

The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the entire voyage

HELD

July 3, 1974: PPI unloaded the cargo from the holds into its steelbodied dump trucks which were parked
alongside the berth, using metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the
charter-partly

W/N a time charter between a shipowner and a charterer transforms a common carrier into a private
one as to negate the civil law presumption of negligence in case of loss or damage to its cargo
NO. petition is DISMISSED.
When PPI chartered the vessel M/V "Sun Plum", the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under
the employ of the shipowner and therefore continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly

5 of 5

Common Carriers

then can we charge the charterer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of caring for his
cargo when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so

carrier has sufficiently overcome, by clear and convincing proof, the prima facie presumption of
negligence. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the ship was in transit as the weight of the
steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without the use of the ship's boom.

bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage. More so,
with a variable weather condition prevalent during its unloading

This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has to face. Clearly, KKKK has sufficiently proved the
inherent character of the goods which makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration; as well as the
inadequacy of its packaging which further contributed to the loss.

On the other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner showing that the carrier was remise in the
exercise of due diligence in order to minimize the loss or damage to the goods it carried.

6 of 5

Вам также может понравиться