Miller v.

California
The Supreme Court case of Miller v. California, 1973, was an attempt by the Court to
define the scope and nature of obscenity, and to create a principle that can apply to
future cases. The result was known as the three-prong standard, generally called
the Miller test.

Background
Marvin Miller operated a mail-order business in California in 1971. His company
primarily distributed pornographic books and films, and that year he sent out a
brochure advertising his products which contained graphic depictions of sex acts. By
mistake, five of the brochures were mailed to a restaurant, whose owner, upon
opening the envelope, called the police.

Miller was charged with violating a California law against 'obscene matter.' Under
that law, the legal definition of 'obscene' was based on two previous Supreme Court
decisions which had narrowed the meaning to materials that were 'utterly without
redeeming social value.' Miller was convicted, and his appeal quickly moved to the
Supreme Court.

What is Obscenity?
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court at that time was Warren Burger, and during
his term the Court had struggled several times with the legal definition of obscenity.
The problem was that if the definition was too broad, indisputable works of art (by
figures like D.H. Lawrence and James Joyce) could hypothetically be banned, while if
the definition was too narrow, it could hardly be applied at all. But more importantly,
the question was whether or not the sale and purchase of obscene material was a
protected form of expression, under the First Amendment. Of course, the Court
couldn't figure that out until it figured out what obscenity was.
2

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Fernando V. CA (1992)

G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992
Lessons Applicable: Experts and Professionals (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a
requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the reemptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank.
The bodies were removed by a fireman.
The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to
the Regional Hospital but he expired there.
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic
tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market
master.
Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were presumed to be the
ones who did the re-emptying.
Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order
RTC: Dismissed the case
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the
ignorant and the indigent
ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause
therefore can be liable for damages

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation?
If not, then he is guilty of negligence
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
familias of the Roman law
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor
would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given
situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and
in view of the facts involved in the particular case
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of
this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors,

he can not recover
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he
may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for
such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the
New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the
public
While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with
safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of
those requirements
accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless
one removes its covers
Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which
has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be
aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards
of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures
for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident.
proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.

Soriano vs. La Guardia

G.R. No. 164785. April 29, 2009
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang
Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after,
before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged
by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the above broadcast.
Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue:
Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan part of
the religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III.

Held:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and considering the
adverse effect of petitioners utterances on the viewers fundamental rights as well
as petitioners clear violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months. Furthermore,
it cannot be properly asserted that petitioners suspension was an undue
curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent
punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the paramount of viewers
rights, the public trusteeship character of a broadcasters role and the power of the
State to regulate broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use
of less offensive language.

Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge
of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that
Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had
eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman,
died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still
legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or
Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the
complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary
for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio
is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she
executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was
approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding
minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for
executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios

in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch
Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of

gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be
kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free
Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court
that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the
state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the
government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold
in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral
and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could
not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it,
since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious
freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondents
claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the
opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed
religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling
interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that
the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.