Advanced LWRs

Jacopo Buongiorno
Associate Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering

22.06: Engineering of Nuclear Systems

Outline

Performance goals for near-term advanced LWRs

Technical features of advanced LWRs:

LWRs:
- US-EPR (Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor)

- US
US-APWR
-APWR (Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor)

Reactor)
- AP1000 (Advanced Passive 1000)
- ABWR (Advanced BWR))
- ESBWR (Economic Simplified BWR)

Summaryy of common characteristics

Conclusions

Nuclear Reactor Timeline

Mission/Goals for Advanced LWRs

Baseload generation of electricity (hydrogen is not emphasized)
Improved economics. Targets:

- Increased plant design life (60 years)

- Shorter construction schedule (36 months

months*)

)
- Low overnight capital cost ($1000/kWe** for NOAK plant)
- Low O&M cost of electricity ( 1/kWh)
* First concrete to fuel loading (does not include site excavation and pre-service testing)
** Unrealistic target set in early 2000s. Current contracts in Europe, China and US have overnight capital costs
>$3000/kWe

Improved safety and reliability

reliability
- Reduced need for operator action

- Expected to beat NRC goal of CDF<10-4/yr

- Red
duced
d l
large rellease prob
babilit
bility
- More redundancy or passive safety

U.S
S. NRC Certifi
tificatition off Ad
Advanced
d LWRs
WR
Design

Applicant

Type

AP1000

WestinghouseToshiba

Advanced Passive PWR

1100 MWe

ABWR

GE-Hitachi

Advanced BWR
1350 MWe

ESBWR

GE-Hitachi

US-EPR

AREVA

US APWR
US-APWR

Mit bi hi
Mitsubishi

Advanced Passive BWR

1550 MWe
Advanced PWR
1600 MWe
Ad
Advanced
d PWR
1700 MWe

Status
Certified,
amendment under
review
Certified,
Constructed in
Japan/Taiwan
Under review
Under review
U d review
Under
i

U.S. Economic Pressurized

Reactor (US
(US-EPR)

EPR)
b A
by
Areva

US-EPR Overview
1600 MWe PWR
Typical PWR operating
conditions in primary
system, pressure,
temperatures linear power
temperatures,
power,
etc.
4 loops
Hi h pressure iin SG
Higher
SGs
results in somewhat higher
efficiency (35% net)
Safety systems are active
High redundancy

US EPR Parameters
US-EPR
Parameter
Design life,
life yrs
Net electric output, MWe
Reactor power, MWt
Plant efficiency,
y, %
Cold/hot leg temperature, C
Reactor pressure, MPa
Total RCS volume, m3
Number of fuel assemblies
Type of fuel assemblies
Active length, m
Li
Linear
power, kW/m
kW/
Control rods
Steam pressure, MPa
Radial reflector
SG secondary inventory, ton

Current 4-loop PWR

40
1100
3411
32.2
292/325
15.5
350
193
17x17
3.66
18 3
18.3
53
6.7
No
46

EPR
60
1600
4500
35.6
296/329
15.5
460
241
17x17
4.20
16 4
16.4
89
7.7
Yes
83

US-EPR Safetyy
Four identical diesel-

driven trains, each

100%, provide

redundancy for

maintenance or single-

failure criterion (N+2)

Physical separation

against internal hazards

(e.g. fire)
Shield building extends

airplane crash and

external explosion

protection to two

safeguard buildings and

fuel building (blue walls)

US-EPR Safetyy (2)

U.S. NRC
Safety Goal

1 x 10-4

Current U.S.
LWR Plants

5 x 10-5

EPRI Utility
Requirement

1 x 10-5

4 x 10-7

Core Damage Frequency Per Year

10

US-EPR Containment

Inner wall pre-stressed

concrete with
i h steell liner
li

Outer wall reinforced concrete

Protection against airplane
crash
Protection against external
explosions
Annulus sub-atmospheric and
filtered to reduce radioisotope
release

11

US-EPR
US
EPR Severe Accidents Mitigation
IRWST

Corium
Spreading Area

Ex-vessel core catcher

concept (passive)
- Molten core is assumed
to breach vessel
- Molten core flows into
spreading area and is
cooled by IRWST water
- Hydrogen recombiners
ensure no detonation
within container

12

EPR is being
g built now

Olkiluoto September 2009

Taishan September 2009

Olkiluoto 3 (Finland) - construction start 2004

Flamanville 3 (France) - construction start 2007
Taishan (China) construction start 2008

Flamanville October 2009

source unknown. All rights reserved. This content is excluded from our Creative Commons license. For more information, see http://ocw.mit.edu/fairuse.

U.S. Advanced PWR (US-APWR)

by Mitsubishi

14

US-APWR Overview
(fundamentally similar to US-EPR)

1700 MWe PWR

Typical PWR operating conditions

in primary system, pressure,

temperatures etc

temperatures,
etc.
Long (14 ft.) fuel assemblies with

reduced power density for 24

months operation
operation

4 loops
High efficiency turbine (70" blades)

results in >35% thermal efficiency

of plant

RPV with no bottom penetrations

Safety systems are active with high
high

redundancy

15

US-APWR Safety
y

HP

16

US-APWR Safetyy (2)

( )
Accumulator design with flow damper eliminates need for
active high-pressure injection system

Severe accid
identts miti
itigatition based
d on core-cattcher
h conceptt
similar to US-EPR
17

Advanced Passive 1000

(AP1000)
(AP1000)

b W
by
Westingh
ti house-Toshiba

T hib

18

AP1000 Overview
1100 MWe PWR
Typ
ypical PWR op
perating
g

conditions, pressure,

temperature, flow rates,

linear power, etc.

RPV with no bottom

penetrations

2 loops, 2 SGs
4 recirculation pumps

(canned motor pumps, no

shaft seals)

Large pressurizer
50% larger than

operating plants

All safety-grade systems

are passive

19
Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.

AP1000 Passive Core Cooling System

PRHR HX

Natural circ. heat removal

Passive Safety Injection

Core Makeup Tanks (CMT)

Accumulators

Kick in at intermediate pressure

IRWST Injection

Full press, natural circ. inject

Replaces HPCI pumps

Low press (replaces LPCI pumps)

Automatic RCS Depressurization

Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.

20

AP1000 Passive Containment Cooling

gS yystem

21

Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.

AP1000 Severe Accidents Mitigation

Core-Concrete Interaction

In-Vessel Retention (IVR) / ex-vessel

cooling

cooling

Means of cooling damaged core

REACTOR VESSEL

Tests and analysis of IVR reviewed by

U S NRC

U.S.
NRC

High Pressure Core Melt

REACTOR VESSEL
SUPPORT STEEL

STEAM VENTS
TYPICAL 4 PLACES

CORE

Eliminated by redundant, diverse ADS

SHIELD WALL

Hydrogen Burn, Detonation

Hydrogen vent paths from RCS kept

away from containment shell
shell

Redundant, diverse igniters

4.8 m

Vessel

INSULATION

Water

Corium melt

WATER INLET

Steam Explosions

Ex-vessel prevented by IVR

22 cm

W
Water

Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.

22

AP1000 videos

ECCS
http://www.ap1000.westinghousenuclear.com/ap1000_psrs_pccs.html
PCCS
http://www.ap1000.westinghousenuclear.com/ap1000_psrs_pcs.html
IVR
http://www.ap1000.westinghousenuclear.com/ap1000_safety_ircd.html

AP1000 Safety Margins and Risk

Typical Plant

AP1000

Loss Flow Margin to

DNBR Limit

~ 1 - 5%

~16%

o
Feedline Break ( F)
Subcooling Margin

>0o F

~140o F

Operator actions
required in 10 min

Operator actions
NOT required

Small LOCA

3 LOCA
3"
core uncovers
PCT ~1500oF

<8
8" LOCA
NO core
uncovery

o
Large LOCA PCT ( F)
with uncertainty

2000 - 2200o F

<1600o F
(1)

SG Tube Rupture

Core Damage Frequency

At-Power
Shutdown
Internal Events
Internal Floods
Internal Fires
Sub-Totals
Grand-Totals
NRC Safety Goals

Large Release Frequency

At-Power
Shutdown

2.41E-07 /yr
8.80E-10 /yr
5.61E-08 /yr

1.23E-07 /yr
3.22E-09 /yr
8.52E-08 /yr

1.95E-08 /yr
7.10E-11 /yr
4.54E-09 /yr

2.05E-08 /yr
5.40E-10 /yr
1.40E-08 /yr

y
2.98E-07 /yr

2.11E-07 /yr
y

2.41E-08 /yr
y

3.50E-08 /yr
y

5.09E-07

5.92E-08

1 E-4

1 E-6

24

Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.

Use of passive safety systems simplifies the plant

plan

plant

Safety Valves

Pumps

Safety Pipe

Seismic Building Volume

Cable

Reduced Number of Components:

1000 MW Reference
Safety Valves

AP 1000

Reduction

2844

1400

51%

Pumps

280

184

34%

Safety Piping

11.0 x 104 feet

1.9 x 104 feet

83%

Cable

9.1 mil. feet

1.2 mil. feet

87%

Seismic Building Volume

12.7 mil. ft3

5.6 mil. ft3

56%

Image by MIT OpenCourseWare.

25

and
dR
Reduces
d
S
Safety/Seismic
f t /S i i B
Building
ildi V
Volume

LEGEND:
1. CONTAINMENT/ SHIELD BUILDING
6

2. SAFEGUARD BUILDING
3. FUEL BUILDING
4. AUXILIARY BUILDING
5. DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING
6. ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER/
CIRCULATINGWATER PUMP HOUSE
7. LIQUID RADWASTE BUILDING
2

2
2 4
5

5
1

4
3

EPR
Safet
Saf
et y / Seismic
Sei smi c St
Structures
r ct res
0

20

40

60

80

100M

3 7

AP1000
Safety
S
f
/ Seismic Structures
S
Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.

26

AP1000 Construction

Simplification of Systems

Reduction in bulk materials and field labor

Maximum Use of Modularization

300 rail-shippable equipment and piping modules

50 llarge structural
t t l mod
dulles (assembl
bled
don-s itite))

- Under construction at Taishen (China) since 2008

Courtesy of Westinghouse. Used with permission.
- 4 P&E orders in US

Advanced BWR (ABWR) and

Economic Simplified BWR (ESBWR)

b G
by
Generall El
Electric-Hitachi

t i Hit hi

28

ABWR Overview

Steam dryer
Steam nozzle
Steam separator
Feedwater
nozzle
Fuel assemblies
Pressure vessel

Vessel support
skirt

Control rod
guide tubes

Control rod drives

Recirculation pump

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

1350 MWe BWR

Typical BWR operating
conditi
ditions, pressure,
temperature, linear power,
etc.
Internal recirculation pumps
(no jet pumps) = no external
loop
Large vessel with large
water inventory + no large
piping = no core uncovery
Redundant active safety
systems
Proven technology (built and
operated for over ten years
in Japan and Taiwan) 29

ESBWR Overview

Closure Head
Steam Dryer

DPV/ IC Outlet

Main Steam Line

Flow Restrictor

Steam Separators

RPV Stabilizer

RWCU/ SDC
Outlet

Feedwater Inlet

IC Return

Chimneyy

GDCS Inlet

Chimney Partitions

Support
(sliding block)

Core Top Guide

Fuel Assemblies

GDCS Equalizing
Li Inlet
Line
l

Co
C
ore Plate
Shroud Support

Core Shroud
CRD Housing

Control Rod
Guide Tubes

Control Rod Drives (CRD)

In-core Housing

ESBWR Reactor

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

1550 MWe BWR

T i l BWR operatiting
Typical
conditions, pressure,
temperature, linear power,
etc.
etc
Natural circulation reactor =
No reactor pumps
Large vessel with large
water inventory
Core at lower elevation
within vessel
All safety-grade systems are
passive
30

BWR Primaryy System

y
Evolution

Dresden 1

KRB

Oyster Creek

Dresden 2
ABWR

SBWR

ESBWR

31

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

ABWR & ESBWR Balance of Plant is Traditional

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

32

ABWR & ESBWR Parameters

BWR/4-Mk
I(Browns Ferry 3)

BWR/6-Mk III
(Grand Gulf)

ABWR

ESBWR

3293/1098

3900/1360

3926/1350

4500/1550

Vessel height/dia. (m)

21.9/6.4

21.8/6.4

21.1/7.1

27.7/7.1

Fuel Bundles (number)

764

800

872

1132

Active Fuel Height (m)

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.0

Power density (kW/L)

50

54 2
54.2

51

54

Recirculation pumps

2(large)

2(large)

10

zero

Number of CRDs/type

185/LP

193/LP

205/FM

269/FM

Safety system pumps

18

zero

Safety diesel generator

zero

Core damage freq

freq./yr
/yr

1E 5
1E-5

1E 6
1E-6

1E 7
1E-7

1E 7
1E-7

Safety Bldg Vol (m3/MWe)

115

150

160

<100

Parameter
Power (MWt/MWe)

33
Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

ABWR Safetyy

Steam line

CSS

CSS

Feedwater line

Feedwater line

HPCF

HPCF

LPFL

LPFL

LPFL

SPC

SPC
Supression
Pool

Supression
Pool

Supression
Pool

LPFL
LPFL

Supression
Pool

LPFL
Condensate
Storage Pool

RHR

RCIC
G D
Division 1

Division 2
G D
Division 2

RHR

Division 1

RHR

Division 3

G D
Division 3

RHR

ECCS
Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

34

ESBWR Enhanced Natural Circulation

4.5
ABWR LUNGMEN

ABWR

4.0

Average Powerr per Bundle (MWt)

BWR/6
CLINTON
3.5

ESBWR
ESBWR
1132 - a

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.0

1.0

2.0

N Power Flow - 1132-4500.XLS Chart1 (5)

3.0

4.0

5.0

6.0

7.0

8.0

9.0

10.0

Average Flow per Bundle (kg/s)

Higher driving head

Chimney/taller vessel
Reduced flow restrictions
Shorter core
Increase downcomer area

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

35

ESBWR Stability
y

ESBWR is designed to operate with significant

margin to any instability regions

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

36

ESBWR Passive Safety

y

37
Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

ESBWR Passive Safety

y

Decay Heat HXs

Above Drywell

All Pipes/Valves
Inside Containment

High Elevation
Gravity Drain Pools

Raised Suppression
Pool

38

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

ESBWR Passive Systems

Isolation Condensers System (ICS)

High pressure residual heat removal

Safety Relief Valves (SRV)

Prevent reactor overpressurization discharging steam into

suppression pool

Suppression Pool

Absorbs blowdown energy during LB-LOCA.

Gravity Driven Cooling System (GDCS)

Low pressure residual heat removal following LB-LOCA.

Keep
ps the core covered.

Passive Containment Cooling System (PCCS)

Long-term heat removal from containment

No operator action needed for 72 hours
39

ESBWR Severe Accident Mitigation

Containment filled with inert gas

In-vessell rettenti
tion is complilicatted
d by
b CRDM
penetrations, so it is not done.
Quench molten core byy delu ge from the GDCS
tanks
If molten material drips through vessel, there is a
sacrificial concrete shield (core catcher) on the
containment floor
Easy to refill PCCS pool and continue to remove
the heatt from
th
f
the
th vessell ind
i definit
fi
itelly
Fission Product Control

Hold up and filtering

filtering

40

Comparison
p
of Safety
y Syystem - Passive vs. Active

Emergency
Bus Loading
Program

DG Room
Ventilation
System
Diesel Generator Room 1 of 3

Crankcase
Ventilation

G
Generator
t
Control and
Protection

Engine
Governing
Control
DG Lubrication
Oil System

Plant
Service
Water

Diesel

Starting Air

Generator

Air Intake
& Exhaust

Breaker
Closes
< 10 s

Plant
Service Water
Breaker Pump Motor

DC
Pwr

DG Fuel Oil
Storage and
Transfer System

Loads

ADS
Logic

ADS
Aux.
Aux
Water
Source

Water Source
HVAC
Reactor
Component
Cooling Water
Breaker P
Pump Motor
M t

RPV

S/P
Loads

Core
M

RCCW

HVAC

DG Fuel
Oil System

DC
Pwr

HVAC

Emergencyy Bus

DG Cooling
Water System

Initiation
Signal

Emergency Core
C li Systtem
Cooling
Breaker Pump Motor

Typical of HPCS,
LPCS, & RHR

Plant
Service
Water

M
ECCS
Logic

Initiation
Signal

Passive Plant
Conventional Active Plant

41

Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

Reduction in Systems & Buildings with Passive Systems

ABWR

ESBWR
(higher power, smaller building)
42
Courtesy of GE Hitachi Nuclear Systems. Used with permission.

Summary Features of Advanced LWRs

Reactor

US-EPR

US-APWR

AP1000

ABWR

ESBWR

Neutron spectrum

Thermal

Thermal

Thermal

Thermal

Thermal

Coolant/moderator

H2O/H2O

H2O/H2O

H2O/H2O

H2O/H2O

H2O/H2O

Fuel

LEU pins

LEU pins

LEU pins

LEU pins

LEU pins

++

++

++

Use of proven
technology
Plant simplification

++

++

M d l construction
Modular
t ti

Economy of scale

++

++

High thermal efficiency

Passive safety
g
of severe
Mitigation
accidents

+
Core
catcher

Core
catcher

In-vessel
retention

++

+
-

Core
catcher

Potential Issues for Dep

ployment
y
of

Advanced LWRs in the U.S.

No capabilities for manufacturing heavy

components left. Need to buy from overseas.
Shortage of specialized workforce experienced
in nuclear construction ((e.g.,
g , welders)).
Slow licensing process
Financial
Fi
i l riisk
k iin deregulated
l t d markets
k t

44

MIT OpenCourseWare
http://ocw.mit.edu

22.06 Engineering of Nuclear Systems

Fall 2010

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