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making. By 1985, Bernard Ebbers had taken over the chief executive
officer (CEO) position in the developing company as a last-ditch effort to
save the struggling business. Ebbers cut costs, focused on customer
service, and started a policy of stability through acquisition. Small
companies such as Com-Link 21, Telephone Management Corporation,
Inter-Comm Telephone, and several others were acquired by LDDS
during the early years. This allowed LDDS to maintain competitive prices
and rapidly increase its customer base.
It was an ideal time to be in the telecommunications industry. The U.S.
government altered the frequencies available for data transfer in
response to the burgeoning mobile phone market, and a project called
the Internet was creating international interest. What may have been a
risky leverage scenario in another market proved to be a wise strategy
for Ebbers as LDDS expanded throughout the Southwest. LDDS applied
its cost cutting and customer service controls to its acquisitions, making
them more successful and creating a widening network of semiindependent centers. By 1989, the company had annual earnings of
more than US$4.5 million, according to the International Directory of
Company Histories. Ebbers and the other owners decided to merge with
the publicly owned Advantage Company soon after, a move that allowed
LDDS to become publicly traded once the merger was complete.
By 1991, LDDS had expanded its operations into 27 different states at
the expense of long-term debt and a negative net worth. Yet under the
direction of Ebbers, acquisitions continued to grow in size. Amidst
several smaller mergers, the deal with Advanced Telecommunications
Corporation in 1992 stood out, as this added a significant number of
customers. By 1993, LDDS had merged again with both Metromedia
Communications Corporation and Resurgens Communications Group.
The resulting corporation was renamed LDDS Communications, Inc., and
Ebbers remained CEO.
Now that LDDS could compete on a national level, the company aimed
even higher. A 1994 merger with DIB Communication Groups gave the
corporation an international channel into 65 other countries and their
telecommunications
infrastructure
projects.
According
to
the International Directory of Company Histories, LDDS had officially
moved beyond mere leasing, now finding itself in charge of many
existing lines and new projects such as fiber-optic installation. By 1995,
the company was making revenues of more than US$3.7 billion and was
renamed WorldCom.
A new wave of legislation in the late 1990s made it even easier for
telecom companies to partner and merge, provided they did not violate
antitrust laws. By 1996, WorldCom offered local and long-distance
communication services in addition to Internet service. It had created
residential offerings for individual consumers and packaged services for
businesses that needed multiple services at the same time. Although
WorldCom completed several major acquisitions in 1997 and 1998, the
1998 deal with MCI Communications made the company record books as
the largest acquisition to date. WorldCom managed to buy a company
more than twice its size, with the potential to increase its annual
revenue to more than US$30 billion.
In 1999, it seemed WorldCom could do no wrong. The stock peaked at
US$64.51 in the middle of the year, and Forbes named Bernard Ebbers
one of the richest men in the nation. The company almost bought out
Sprint the same year and was stopped only by a U.S. Department of
Justice injunction in 2000 that was created to stop the giant firm from
growing too large.
Dangerous Signs
By the late 1990s and the early years of the 21st century, the market
WorldCom depended on for survival had started to falter. The collision of
Internet over exuberance and rampant acquisitions throughout the
telecom industry caused solvency problems for many businesses. In
1998, the same year of its fabled MCI acquisition, WorldCom began to
notice a slowdown in industry growth. The major banks that Ebbers was
using to finance the long-term growth spree began growing nervous. The
dot-com bust in 2000 and 2001 did nothing to ease worries.
During the bust, WorldCom made the mistake of assuming that its size
and position in the market would keep it from succumbing to the failures
and steep losses faced by many Internet businesses. However, its
industry had become intertwined with the digital market, especially from
an investment perspective. As business after business fell in ecommerce, all related services suffered as well. Money supplies dried up
where loans and equity funding had once been effortless to obtain.
Companies like WorldCom were forced to scale back their growth plans
or cut additional expenses and labor to rein in spending.
In 2001, Enron Corporation fell to both fraud and losses, claiming the
largest corporate bankruptcy in the United States. Confidence in large
corporations plummeted, investments followed suit, and WorldCom
found its position utterly reversed from only a few short years prior. CEO
Ebbers and chief financial officer (CFO) Scott Sullivan, among other
business leaders, struggled to keep WorldCom profitable.
2002: Bankruptcy and Fraud
WorldCom might have been able to survive the dot-com bust except for
two key problems. The first was debt. The years of aggressive
expansion, while allowing WorldCom to become the second-largest
telecommunications provider, took their toll. The price was a vast
amount of debt, both short and long-term, held by creditors already
skittish from the mass of failed e-businesses. By 2001, the debt load of
the telecom corporation was approaching US$41 billion, much more than
an entire year of revenue. Ebbers managed to secure corporate loans
from the directors for US$400 million to cover more immediate debts,
but this was a small solace in the face of rising costs. Bankruptcy
became an increasingly likely option for the company.
The second and more serious problem began to surface in late 2001 and
2002, due primarily to investigations by the vice president of the
WorldCom internal audit department, Cynthia Cooper. Cooper discovered
discrepancies in the accounting methods used by WorldCom. A company
probe officially confirmed the findings, and the WorldCom board
immediately fired CFO Sullivan. The senior vice president and controller
in charge of accounting quality, David Meyers, resigned at the same
time. The next day, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
took action, filing a suit against the company for fraud.
The investigation was swift, in part because the fraud was rather
obvious. The bookkeeping issues resembled undergraduate accounting
errors more than the complex fraud perpetrated by corporations such as
Enron. Line costs were at the heart of the fraud. Telecom companies
incurred line costs regularly as part of their expenses when using thirdparty networks or facilities, operations in which WorldCom had extensive
experience from its years as LDDS. But for accounting records between
1999 and 2002, WorldCom had been counting a variety of line costs as
capital expenditures.
Under Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP) in the United
States, capital expenditures are one-time costs that increase the assets
of the company and are eligible for amortization. In order to keep net
income reports more stable, companies are allowed to post such
expenses to the Property, Plant, and Equipment account. Instead of
counting the entire repair or purchase in immediate costs, the company
can then spread the cost out for years according to the depreciation of
the asset. However, the line costs WorldCom treated like depreciable
capital expenses did not belong in this account. These costs were typical
operating expenses, and the full cost was included in an expense
account, lowering net income for that accounting cycle.
Through years of delaying costs, WorldCom had managed to inflate its
net income reports artificially. This underlying fraud was worsened by
inflated revenue reports, where bogus entries from general (and
notoriously flexible) unallocated revenue accounts had given an even
more erroneous picture of WorldCom stability. Further investigation
revealed overvalued acquisitions as well. The company started by
admitting US$3.8 billion in fraud because of these actions, but as the
investigation went on a more complete picture was formed. By 2003,
estimates ranged between US$11 billion and US$12 billion in inflated
revenue reports.
WorldCom had no remaining options in the face of the investigation. In
addition to the allegations of fraud, the corporation was unable to make
its latest US$74 million interest payment on its current debts. According
to Luisa Belton???s report in CNNMoney, on July 21, 2002, the company
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It listed US$63.4 billion in assets, but
when all international branches were accounted for assets rose to
US$107 billion. This made the WorldCom bankruptcy the largest yet in
the United States, easily surpassing Enron. At the time of the bankruptcy
filing, WorldCom had more than 60,000 workers employed in 65
countries across the world.
Post-bankruptcy Blues
Chapter 11 allowed WorldCom to reorganize, but the path required full
restatements of its accounting reports for several years and some of the
worst publicity possible for any corporation. Investors were soon left with
stock worth cents on the dollar. Ebbers lost his position in the company,
and Michael Capellas of Compaq Computer Corporation was hired as
CEO. Robert Blakely became the new CFO. By late 2003, around 1,500
people both inside and outside the company were working on the
internal audit, a process which cost US$365 million.
WorldCom managed to arrange for US$2 billion in debtor-in-possession
financing from major banks such as Citigroup and J.P. Morgan. This was
an emergency move that allowed the corporation to maintain telecom
services for its customers while going through the bankruptcy. In
addition to a US$750 million commitment from past lenders, WorldCom
was able to continue paying employee wages and other foundational
expenses.
As reported by Accounting Web, in 2003, the SEC agreed to settle the
suit with WorldCom for the largest fine it had ever given, US$750 million.
Even after the bankruptcy had been concluded, US$5.7 billion in debts
remained, including all international subsidiaries. The bankruptcy was
concluded in 2004, and 2005 saw the final legal decisions in the cases of
fraud against WorldCom. As reported byInvestopedia, CEO Bernard
Ebbers received 25 years in prison, and CFO Scott Sullivan received a
reduced five-year sentence for his testimony against Ebbers. Prison
sentences were also given to controller David Myers and accounting
director Buford Yates, as well as several other accounting managers.
Charges ranged from conspiracy to commit securities fraud to filing false
statements with the Internal Revenue Service.
MCI WorldCom soon became just MCI, a company that was acquired by
Verizon Communications, Inc., in 2005 for US$7.6 billion. The
consolidation continued a streak of mergers and splits as the telecom
industry
struggled.
Telecom
manufacturers,
including
Lucent
Technologies and Nortel Networks, took years to recover because of their
inflated expectations of continued WorldCom growth. Whistleblower
Cynthia Cooper was one of the few to benefit from the fiasco. After being
named a Person of the Year in the 2002 issue of TIME magazine, Cooper
was able to start a new business as a speaker and writer on ethical
business practices.
How Giants Fall
WorldCom made two mistakes that led to its downfall. The first mistake
was fraud. Overvaluing assets or switching entries to alternative
accounts in order to produce better income statements for lenders and
investors no doubt held a powerful appeal for a struggling business in
unforgiving economic times. However, small errors, intentional or
ignored, can bring down even the largest corporations. Thorough internal
audits and periodic external audits by an experienced third party could
have prevented mistakes, especially over longer periods of time. A
complete understanding of accounting practices and transparency
requirements could have also ensured the responsibility needed with
commitments to lenders, investors, and customers alike.
WorldCom's second mistake was a risky acquisition strategy that
remained unchanged for the greater part of two decades. Expansion
through acquisition worked for Ebbers in the 1980s and helped
WorldCom reach new heights in the 1990s, but the tactic gave the
company very little defense against market changes. The enormous debt
WorldCom had built only helped crash the company more quickly in the
dot-com bust. Fraudulent behavior aside, taking time away from
acquisitions to shore up net worth and leveraging capabilities might
have helped WorldCom survive its loss of business in the first decade of
the 21st century.
Questions
1. Why did WorldCom think it was an exception to the problems faced
by other telecommunication companies? What different mindset
might have helped it survive?
2. Explain capital expenditures and Cynthia Cooper???s role in
WorldCom???s downfall. What did Cooper gain from her role?
Footnotes:
1 This essay originally appeared in Corporate Disasters: What Went
Wrong and Why. Detroit: Gale, 2012. Learning Objectives and Questions
for Discussion have been added by the staff of Business Insights: Global.
TRADUCCION 1
WorldCom: el fraude contable y adquisiciones agresivas
Gale conocimiento de la empresa: Coleccin Global Estudio de caso
Objetivos de aprendizaje
Tras el anlisis de este estudio de caso, los estudiantes deben ser capaces de hacer lo
siguiente:
Discutir la responsabilidad financiera y el valor de los auditores de terceros
Explorar la responsabilidad de la deuda y la adquisicin desenfrenada como la senda del
crecimiento
El gigante de las telecomunicaciones
En el momento en que el mundo iba digitales a mediados de la dcada de 1990,
WorldCom haba posicionado en el centro de la revolucin tecnolgica. 1 El
telecomunicaciones (telecomunicaciones) compaa descubri que tena un producto que
alimenta lo que pareca ser una demanda ilimitada de ms rpido, una mejor
comunicacin. Una demanda tan alta prometi un crecimiento fenomenal, y pareca que
WorldCom se va a convertir en uno de los negocios ms rentables en funcionamiento.
La empresa, al igual que muchas empresas que se levantaron durante la era de la
informacin, que comenz como una pequea idea en la dcada de 1980. En 1983,
Bernard Ebbers, un entrenador de baloncesto retirado que haba decidido convertirse en
un empresario, form una sociedad con varios inversores interesados. Segn la tradicin
En 2001, Enron Corporation cay al fraude y las prdidas, alegando que la mayor quiebra
corporativa en los Estados Unidos. La confianza en las grandes empresas cay en
picado, las inversiones siguieron el ejemplo, y WorldCom encontr su posicin
completamente invertida con respecto a slo unos pocos aos antes. CEO Ebbers y
director financiero (CFO) de Scott Sullivan, entre otros lderes de negocios, se esforz por
mantener WorldCom rentable.
2002: de quiebra y fraude
WorldCom podra haber sido capaz de sobrevivir a la cada de las puntocom a excepcin
de dos problemas fundamentales. La primera fue la deuda. Los aos de expansin
agresiva, al tiempo que permite WorldCom para convertirse en el segundo mayor
proveedor de telecomunicaciones, tuvieron su efecto. El precio era una gran cantidad de
la deuda, tanto a corto como a largo plazo, en manos de acreedores ya nerviosos de la
masa de e-negocios fallidos. Para el 2001, la carga de la deuda de la empresa de
telecomunicaciones se acercaba a US $ 41 millones de dlares, mucho ms que todo un
ao de ingresos. Ebbers lograron obtener prstamos corporativos de los directores por US
$ 400 millones para cubrir las deudas ms inmediatas, pero esto fue un pequeo consuelo
en la cara de los crecientes costos. La quiebra se convirti en una opcin cada vez ms
probable para la empresa.
El segundo y ms grave problema empez a surgir a finales de 2001 y 2002, debido
principalmente a las investigaciones realizadas por el vicepresidente del departamento de
auditora interna WorldCom, Cynthia Cooper. Cooper descubri discrepancias en los
mtodos contables utilizados por WorldCom. Una sonda de la compaa confirm
oficialmente los resultados, y la junta de WorldCom inmediatamente despedido CFO
Sullivan. El vicepresidente y el controlador encargado de calidad contable, David Meyers,
renunci al mismo tiempo. Al da siguiente, la Comisin de Valores de EE.UU. (SEC) tom
medidas, la presentacin de una demanda contra la empresa por fraude.
La investigacin se hizo esperar, en parte debido a que el fraude era bastante obvio. Las
cuestiones de contabilidad se parecan a errores de contabilidad de grado ms complejo
que el fraude perpetrado por corporaciones como Enron. Costos de lneas estaban en el
corazn del fraude. Las compaas de telecomunicaciones incurre en costos de lnea
regular como parte de sus gastos cuando se utilizan redes de terceros o instalaciones,
operaciones en las que WorldCom tena una amplia experiencia de sus aos como LDDS.
Sin embargo, para los documentos y registros entre 1999 y 2002, WorldCom haba
contado con una variedad de costos operativos como gastos de capital.
Bajo Prcticas de Contabilidad Generalmente Aceptados (PCGA) en los Estados Unidos,
los gastos de capital son los costos de una sola vez que aumentan los activos de la
empresa y son elegibles para la amortizacin. Con el fin de mantener a los informes de
ingresos netos ms estable, las empresas pueden escribir comentarios tales gastos a la
cuenta de la propiedad, planta y equipo. En lugar de contar toda la reparacin o la compra
de los costos inmediatos, la empresa puede distribuir el costo en los aos de acuerdo a la
depreciacin del activo. Sin embargo, la lnea cuesta WorldCom tratado como gastos de
capital amortizables no pertenecen a esta cuenta. Estos gastos fueron los gastos de
funcionamiento tpicas, y el costo total fue incluido en una cuenta de gastos, la reduccin
de las utilidades de ese ciclo contable.
A travs de aos de retraso de costes, WorldCom haba conseguido inflar sus informes de
ingresos netos artificialmente. Este fraude subyacente se ve agravada por los informes de
ingresos inflados, donde las entradas falsas de las cuentas generales (y notoriamente
flexible) de ingresos no asignados haban dado una imagen an ms errneo de la
estabilidad WorldCom. Investigaciones posteriores revelaron adquisiciones sobrevaluadas
tambin. La empresa comenz por admitir US $ 3,8 mil millones en el fraude debido a
estas acciones, pero a medida que la investigacin fue en un cuadro ms completo se
form. Para 2003, las estimaciones oscilaron entre US $ 11 millones y US $ 12 mil
millones en los informes de ingresos inflados.
WorldCom no tena opciones restantes en la cara de la investigacin. Adems de las
acusaciones de fraude, la empresa fue incapaz de hacer su ltimo pago de intereses de
EE.UU. $ 74 millones de dlares en sus deudas actuales. Segn el informe Luisa
Belton ??? s en CNNMoney, el 21 de julio de 2002, la compaa se acogi al Captulo 11
de bancarrota. Se enumeran US $ 63.4 mil millones en activos, pero cuando todas las
ramas internacionales se contabilizan como activos se elev a US $ 107 mil millones. Esto
hizo que la quiebra de WorldCom la ms grande an en los Estados Unidos, superando
fcilmente Enron. En el momento de la declaracin de quiebra, WorldCom tena ms de
60.000 trabajadores empleados en 65 pases de todo el mundo.
Los azules despus de la quiebra
Captulo 11 WorldCom permiti reorganizar, pero el camino requiere reajustes completos
de sus informes contables desde hace varios aos y algunos de los peores publicidad
posible para cualquier empresa. Los inversores pronto fueron dejados con centavos
acciones por un valor de dlar. Ebbers perdi su posicin en la empresa, y Michael
Capellas de Compaq Computer Corporation fue contratado como CEO. Robert Blakely se
convirti en el nuevo director financiero. Hacia finales de 2003, alrededor de 1.500
personas, tanto dentro como fuera de la empresa estaban trabajando en la auditora
interna, un proceso que cost US $ 365 millones.
WorldCom capaces de disponer que los US $ 2 mil millones en la financiacin de deudor
en posesin de los bancos ms importantes, como Citigroup y JP Morgan. Esta fue una
medida de emergencia que permiti a la empresa para mantener los servicios de
telecomunicaciones para sus clientes mientras que ir a travs de la quiebra. Adems de
un US $ 750 millones compromiso por parte de los prestamistas anteriores, WorldCom fue
capaz de seguir pagando los salarios de los empleados y otros gastos fundamentales.
Segn ha informado Contabilidad Web, en 2003, la SEC de acuerdo para resolver el traje
con WorldCom para la mayor multa que se haba dado nunca, US $ 750 millones. Incluso
despus de la quiebra haba sido concluido, US $ 5.7 mil millones en deudas quedaban,
incluyendo todas las filiales internacionales. La quiebra se concluy en 2004, y 2005 vio
las decisiones legales finales en los casos de fraude contra WorldCom. Segn lo
informado por Investopedia, CEO Bernard Ebbers recibi 25 aos de prisin, y el director
financiero de Scott Sullivan recibi una reduccin de la pena de cinco aos de su
testimonio contra Ebbers. Tambin se dieron sentencias de prisin a David Myers, y el
director de contabilidad Buford Yates, as como varios otros encargados de la
contabilidad. Los cargos varan de conspiracin para cometer fraude de valores para la
presentacin de declaraciones falsas con el Servicio de Impuestos Internos.
MCI WorldCom pronto se convirti en apenas MCI, una empresa que fue adquirida por
Verizon Communications, Inc., en 2005 por US $ 7,6 mil millones. La consolidacin
continu una racha de fusin y escisin como la industria de las telecomunicaciones se
esforz. fabricantes de telecomunicaciones, incluyendo Lucent Technologies y Nortel
Networks, tom aos para recuperarse debido a sus expectativas infladas de crecimiento
continuo WorldCom. Denunciantes de Cynthia Cooper fue uno de los pocos en beneficio
del fiasco. Despus de ser nombrado Persona del Ao en la edicin de 2002 de la revista
TIME, Cooper fue capaz de iniciar un nuevo negocio como orador y escritor sobre las
prcticas comerciales ticas.
Cmo Gigantes Fall
WorldCom cometi dos errores que condujeron a su cada. El primer error fue el fraude.
Sobrevaloracin de activos o cambiar las entradas a las cuentas alternativas con el fin de
producir mejores estados de resultados de los prestamistas e inversores, sin duda llev a
cabo un poderoso recurso para que una empresa luchando en tiempos econmicos
implacables. Sin embargo, los pequeos errores, intencionales o ignorados, pueden
derribar incluso las ms grandes corporaciones. auditoras internas a fondo y auditoras
externas peridicas por un tercero con experiencia podran haber evitado errores,
especialmente durante perodos de tiempo ms largos. Una comprensin completa de las
prcticas contables y los requisitos de transparencia tambin podra tener asegurada la
responsabilidad necesaria de los compromisos a los prestamistas, inversores y clientes
por igual.
segundo error de WorldCom fue una estrategia de adquisicin de riesgo que se mantuvo
sin cambios durante la mayor parte de dos dcadas. Expansin a travs de la adquisicin
trabaj para Ebbers en la dcada de 1980 y ayud a WorldCom alcanzar nuevas alturas
en la dcada de 1990, pero la tctica dio a la empresa muy poca defensa contra los
cambios del mercado. La enorme deuda de WorldCom haba construido slo ayud a
estrellarse a la compaa ms rpidamente en la cada de las punto-com. El
comportamiento fraudulento a un lado, tomando tiempo lejos de adquisiciones para
apuntalar el valor neto y la capacidad de apalancamiento podra haber ayudado a
Traduccin 2
WorldCom: el fraude contable y adquisiciones agresivas
Gale conocimiento de la empresa: Coleccin Global Estudio de caso
Objetivos de aprendizaje
Tras el anlisis de este estudio de caso, los estudiantes deben ser
capaces de hacer lo siguiente:
la
adquisicin
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