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Spouses RICARDO and G.R. No.

156171
FERMA PORTIC,Petitioners,
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
- versus - Corona,Carpio Morales, and Garcia, JJ
Respondent. April 22, 2005
DECISION

Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam in


favor of the Social Security System.
[Petitioners] defaulted in the payment of the
monthly amortizations due on the mortgage. The
Social Security System foreclosed the mortgage
and sold the subject property at public auction with
the Social Security System as the highest bidder.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
An agreement in which ownership is reserved in
the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price is known as a contract to
sell. The absence of full payment suspends the vendors
obligation to convey title. This principle holds true
between the parties, even if the sale has already been
registered. Registration does not vest, but merely serves
as evidence of, title to a particular property. Our land
registration laws do not give title holders any better
ownership than what they actually had prior to
registration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the
Rules
of
Court,
challenging
the January
29,
2002 Decision[2] and
the November
18,
2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 66393. The assailed Decision disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered
ORDERING defendant-appellant to pay the
unpaid balance of P55,000.00 plus legal
interest of 6% per annum counted from the
filing of this case. The ownership of defendantappellant over the subject property is hereby
confirmed.

On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the


redemption period, [petitioners] sold the subject
property in favor of [respondent] in consideration
of P200,025.89. Among others, the parties agreed
that [respondent] shall pay the sum of P45,025.89
as down payment and the balance of P155,000.00
shall be paid on or before May 22, 1985. The
parties further agreed that in case [respondent]
should fail to comply with the conditions, the sale
shall be considered void and [petitioners] shall
reimburse [respondent] of whatever amount
already paid.
On the same date, [petitioners] and
[respondent] executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage whereby [petitioners] sold
the subject property in favor of [respondent] in
consideration of P80,000.00, P45,000.00 thereof
shall be paid to the Social Security System.
On July 30, 1984, spouses Clodualdo
Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam, the original
owners of the subject property, sold the subject
property in favor of [respondent] forP50,000.00.
On the same date, [respondent] executed a
Deed
of
Mortgage
whereby
[respondent]
constituted a mortgage over the subject property to
secure a P150,000.00 indebtedness in favor of
[petitioners].
[Respondent] paid the indebtedness due over
the subject property to the Social Security System.

No pronouncement as to costs.[4]
In the challenged Resolution,[5] the CA denied
petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the appellate
court as follows:
Spouses
Clodualdo
Alcantara
and
Candelaria Edrosalam were the original registered
owners of a parcel of land with three-door
apartment, located at No. 9, 1st Street BBB,
Marulas, Valenzuela City. Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-71316 was issued in the names of
spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria
Edrosalam.
On October 2, 1968, spouses Clodualdo
Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam sold the
subject property in favor of [petitioners] with the
condition that the latter shall assume the mortgage
executed over the subject property by spouses

On August 6, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title


No. T-71316 in the names of spouses Clodualdo
Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam was
cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-113299 was issued in the name of
[respondent].
On May 20, 1996, [petitioners] demanded
from [respondent] the alleged unpaid balance
of P55,000.00. [Respondent] refused to pay.
On June 6, 1996, [petitioners] filed this instant
civil case against [respondent] to remove the cloud
created by the issuance of TCT No. T-113299 in
favor of [respondent]. [Petitioners] claimed that they
sold the subject property to [respondent] on the
condition that [respondent] shall pay the balance on
or before May 22, 1985; that in case of failure to
pay, the sale shall be considered void and
[petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of the
amounts already paid; that [respondent] failed to
fully pay the purchase price within the period; that
on account of this failure, the sale of the subject

property by [petitioners] to [respondent] is void; that


in spite of this failure, [respondent] required
[petitioners] to sign a lease contract over the
apartment which [petitioners] occupy; that
[respondent] should be required to reconvey back
the title to the subject property to [petitioners].

supported by the evidence.[12] Therefore, their action for


the quieting of title would not prosper, because they failed
to show the invalidity of the cloud on their title.

[Respondent] on her part claimed that her title


over the subject property is already indefeasible;
that the true agreement of the parties is that
embodied in the Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent] had
fully paid the purchase price; that [respondent] is
the true owner of the subject property; that
[petitioners] claim is already barred by laches.[6]

The Issue

After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)


of Valenzuela City rendered this judgment in favor
of petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this
Court hereby adjudicates on this case as follows:

Hence, this Petition.[13]

In its Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues


for our consideration:
(1) Whether or not the [petitioners] cause
of action is for quieting of title.
(2) Whether or not the [petitioners] cause
of action has prescribed.[14]
The main issue revolves around the characterization of
the parties agreement and the viability of petitioners
cause of action.
This Courts Ruling

1.)
The Court hereby orders the quieting of
title or removal of cloud over the [petitioners] parcel
of land and three (3) door apartment now covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City and Tax
Declaration Nos. C-018-00235 & C-031-012077
respectively, of Valenzuela City;
2.)
The
Court
hereby
orders
the
[respondent] to reconvey in favor of the [petitioners]
the parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T113299 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City
after reimbursement by the [petitioners] of the
amount actually paid by the [respondent] in the
total amount of P145,025.89;
3.)
The Court hereby DENIES damages as
claimed by both parties.[7]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals opined that the first
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) embodied the real
agreement between the parties, and that the subsequent
Deeds were executed merely to secure their respective
rights over the property.[8] The MOA stated that Cristobal
had not fully paid the purchase price. Although this
statement might have given rise to a cause of action to
annul the Deed of Sale, prescription already set in
because the case had been filed beyond the ten-year
reglementary period,[9] as observed by the CA.
Nonetheless, in conformity with the principle of unjust
enrichment, the appellate court ordered respondent to pay
petitioners the remaining balance of the purchase price. [10]
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
petitioners contended that their action was not one for the
enforcement of a written contract, but one for the quieting
of title -- an action that was imprescriptible as long as they
remained in possession of the premises.[11] The CA held,
however, that the agreement between the parties was
valid, and that respondents title to the property was amply

The Petition has merit.


Main Issue:
Nature of the Action: Quieting of Title or
Enforcement of a Written Contract
Petitioners argue that the action they filed in the
RTC was for the quieting of title. Respondents demand
that they desist from entering into new lease agreements
with the tenants of the property allegedly attests to the
fact of their possession of the subject premises. [15] Further,
they point to the existence of Civil Case No. 7446, an
action for unlawful detainer that respondent filed against
them,[16] as further proof of that fact. Being in continuous
possession of the property, they argue that their action for
the quieting of title has not prescribed.[17]
On the other hand, respondent joins the appellate
court in characterizing the action petitioners filed in the
RTC as one for the enforcement of the MOA. Being based
on a written instrument, such action has already
prescribed, respondent claims.[18] She adds that
petitioners could not have been in continuous possession
of
the
subject property because, under a duly notarized lease
agreement, they have been paying her a monthly rental
fee of P500, which was later increased to P800.
Two questions need to be answered to resolve
the present case; namely, (1) whether Cristobals title to
the property is valid; and (2) whether the Portics are in
possession of the premises, a fact that would render the
action for quieting of title imprescriptible.
Validity of Title
The CA held that the action for the quieting of title
could not prosper, because Cristobals title to the property
was amply supported by evidence.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Whenever there is a cloud on title to


real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth
and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title, an action may be brought to
remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to
prevent a cloud from being cast upon title
to real property or any interest therein.

this Court has stressed that registration does not vest, but
merely serves as evidence of, title. Our land registration
laws do not give the holders any better title than that which
they actually have prior to registration. [25]
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere
registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good
faith must concur.[26] Clearly, respondent has not yet fully
paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains
unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded
from asserting ownership against petitioners. The
appellate courts finding that she had a valid title to the
property must, therefore, be set aside.
Continuous Possession

Suits to quiet title are characterized as


proceedings quasi in rem.[19] Technically, they are
neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem,
an individual is named as defendant.[20] However, unlike
suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only
between the parties.[21]
Generally, the registered owner of a property is
the proper party to bring an action to quiet title. However,
it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of
by a person other than the registered owner because, in
the Article reproduced above, title does not necessarily
refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. [22] Thus,
lack of an actual certificate of title to a property does not
necessarily bar an action to quiet title. As will be shown
later, petitioners have not turned over and have thus
retained their title to the property.
On the other hand, the claim of respondent
cannot be sustained. The transfer of ownership of the
premises in her favor was subject to the suspensive
condition
stipulated
by
the
parties
in
paragraph 3 of the MOA, which states as follows:
3.
That
while
the
balance
of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the
FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the
ownership of the above described parcel of
land together with its improvements but the
SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right
to collect the monthly rentals due on the first
door (13-A) of the said apartment;[23]

The above-cited provision characterizes the


agreement between the parties as a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the
Portics; it will not be passed to the vendee, the Cristobals,
until the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment
is a positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply
with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event
that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor
to convey the title.[24] In short, until the full price is paid,
the vendor retains ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in
favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither
did
it
validate
the
alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again,

The issue of whether the Portics have been in


actual, continuous possession of the premises is
necessarily a question of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule
that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, when
supported by substantial evidence, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. [27] This
Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the CAs findings
sustaining those of the trial court, which held that
petitioners had been in continuous possession of the
premises. For this reason, the action to quiet title has not
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the RTC of Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 4935-V96,
dated September
23,
1999,
is
hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic vs Anastacia Cristobal


( Digested)
456 SCRA 577 Civil Law Law on Sales Contract to
Sell vs Contract of Sale
In 1968, spouses Ricardo and Ferma Portic
acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door apartment from
spouses Alcantara even though theyre aware that the
land was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in
paying SSS. The Portics then executed a contract with
Anastacia Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the said
property for P200k. Cristobals down payment was P45k
and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between
them states:
That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not
yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall
retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land
together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY
BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals
due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment;

(payment is due 22 May 1985, if Cristobal will not be able


to pay Portic will reimburse)
A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal.
Cristobal was not able to pay on the due date. A suit
ensued to lift the cloud on the title.
ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the parcel of
land?
HELD: The Portics insofar as there was no
contract of sale. What transpired between the parties was
a contract to sell. The provision of the contract
characterizes the agreement between the parties as a
contract to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is
retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed
to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the
purchase price. Such payment is a positive suspensive
condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of
obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the
effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the
title. In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains
ownership.
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in
favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither
did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot.
Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence
of, title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders
any better title than that which they actually have prior to
registration.
Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere
registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good
faith must concur. Clearly, Cristobal has not yet fully paid
the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid,
she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from
asserting ownership against the Portics. The CAs finding
that she had a valid title to the property must be set aside.

DAMAGES
Bishop of Cebu v. Mangabon (1906)
Facts:
1. Mariano Mangabons parents and brothers had been
in possession of a tract of land in the district of Ermita
until about the year 1877 (possession of at least 20
years)
2. In 1878, they vacated the land by virtue of an order
from the municipality which declared that the land was
included within the zone of materiales Fuertes (fire
zone) and the houses in which they lived upon were
of light materials
3. They vacated said land without objection

4. After the land was vacated, Parish Priests of Ermita


Church fenced the land and cleaned the same without
any objection on the part of anyone
5. In 1898, Mangabons entered upon the land in
question and built thereon a nipa house and
continued to live thereon without the consent of the
parish priest of Ermita Church or the Bishop of Cebu
6. Roman Catholic Church, represented by the Bishop of
Cebu filed an action to recover possession of said
land; amended complaint for said land to be declared
property of the Catholic Church and that it be restored
to the latter
- Property had belonged to the Catholic Church
from time immemorial
- Mangabons occupied apart thereof by the mere
tolerance of the Catholic Church
7. Mangabon:
- Claims to be the owner of the land by inheritance
- He was the legal owner when he was unlawfully
ejected by the Bishop of Cebu in 1879
- He had a right to re-enter; time for prescription
has not yet expired since he was ejected
TC: Ruled in favor of Bishop of Cebu and ordered
Mangabons to vacate the land
-

Occupation of the land by Mangabon in the year


1898 was illegal
If he thought he had a right to the land, he should
have filed an action with the court to recover
possession and not proceed to occupy the
property
If the Church acceded and voluntarily returned
possession and acknowledged that the property
belonged to him, there would be no necessity to
file an action; but in this case, Church has
objected to the occupation which necessitates a
filing of a proper action
The possession held by Mangabon in 1898
cannot be added to the former possession which
was interrupted in 1877 by the order of the
municipality
o Art. 466 CC: a person who recovers
possession according to law, which is
improperly lost, is considered as having
enjoyed it without interruption for all the
purposes which may redound to his benefit
o It cannot be ascertained that the possession
enjoyed by Mangabon was improperly lost
o It has been lost by virtue of an order from the
municipality and no proof to the contrary was
presented
o Impossible to say what was the nature of
possession prior to the year 1877whether it
was held by right or by the mere tolerance of
the Church
Acts of violence or secrecy or mere
tolerance cannot affect the right of
possession
Mangabon could not have lawfully done
what he didto re-enter upon the land
from which he had been ejected by the
city of Manila

If the order of the municipality was


illegal, and that the possession was
improperly lost, Mangabon SHOULD
HAVE REQUESTED ASSISTANCE OF
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES to recover
it PLENARY ACTION
8. Mangabon filed petition. SC resolved a relevant
question of law in deciding whether to affirm the
decision of the TC availability of accion publiciana

Issue:
Whether after the promulgation of the CC, accion
publiciana, which had for its object the recovery of
possession in a plenary action before an action for the
recovery of title could be instituted, still existed (YES)

Ratio:
-

Available actions:
o Accion interdictal recovery of physical
possession within 1 year from the time of
dispossession
o Accion publiciana better right to such
possession brought after lapse of 1 year
o Recovery of ownership action for title
If Mangabon instituted the accion interdictal within 1
year from dispossession, he would have been
restored to the possession
o 1 year period has already elapsed so such
summary action for possession could not be
maintained
But even after the lapse of 1 year, he still could have
brought an accion publiciana involved the right to
possess; based upon the fact the he, having been in
possession for 20 years, could not lose the same until
he had been given opportunity to be heard and had
been defeated in an action in court by another with a
better right

DOUBT ARISES whether accion publiciana is still


available from Art. 460 CC
o Possessor may lose possession:
(1) Abandonment
(2) Transfer to another for a good or valuable
consideration
(3) Destruction or total loss of the thing or by the
thing becoming unkmarketable
(4) By the possession of another, even against
the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year
o Questions: Which is lost, possession de facto or
also possession de jure? In the first three, both
may be lost, so it would be strange if the fourth
merely referred to possession de jure. However,
ownership cannot be lost under the fourth; owner
may recover ownership, and is only barred by
statute of limitations

Evidence that accion publiciana still exists:


o Possession constitutes a right, a right in rem,
whenever it is exercised over real property or
property rights
o Where there is a right, there is a cause of action
o It is sufficient that the right existing, there should
be an action to protect it. No necessity of any
special declaration in CC
o It is impossible to conceive that a person has a
right which need not be respected by others, and
such respect cannot be exacted unless the law
provides a remedy for its enforcement
o If a person has a right over any kind of property,
such right would not be complete unles sit could
be enforced as against the whole world
o The action is a recognition of the right; it is a
weapon for its protection
o The right does not arise from the action; but vice
versa
o Accion publiciana exists, nor for the sake of
equity, but because it must necessarily exist or
can exist as provided in Art. 445
Action brought by Catholic Church to recover the
possession which was unlawfully deprived by the
defendant can be properly maintained

Chacon v. CA (1983)
Facts:
1. Ramon Chacon granted a fishpond lease
agreement by Director of Forestry to construct and
maintain a fishpond over a mangrove swamp in Barrio
Lapasan, municipality of Cagayan, Oriental Misamis
2. Chacon developed the area into a fishpond, clearing
its shrubby growths and enclosing the same with
perimetric dikes
3. Upon his death, his heirs succeeded him in
possession, and were issued a transfer ordinary
fishpond permit
4. Heirs entered into a partnership agreement, under the
name Chacon Enterprises for the purpose of
acquiring title over the fishpond
5. Partnership applied for the purchase not only of the
15-hectare fishpond, but also the adjoining eastern
portion with an area of 4 hectares
6. Sales application alleged: area applied for had no
indication of settlement, occupation or improvement,
except the dikes and concrete gates owned by the
heirs of Ramon Chacon
7. Sales application was approved; an Order Award was
issued in favor of partnership (19 hectares, 11 ares,
14 centares); OCT issued.
8. Chacon Enterprises filed an ejectment suit against
Florentino Galasino and several other persons who
were in actual possession of an area of 43, 792 sqm.
Of the eastern portion of the land
TC: Dismissed action. Ocular inspection revealed:
defendants houses constructed in the premises are
already very old and in a dilapidated condition
defendants were staying and living in the premises for
more than one year

9. Chacon Enterprises commenced an action to recover


possession of the said eastern portion
- Defendants, under claim of ownership, have
succeeded in occupying certain portions of its
registered land without their consent; refused to
vacate
10. Defendants:
- Assert absolute ownership
- They inherited the same from Santiago Ebora
who had been in continuous, public and exclusive
possession, as owner thereof, since time
immemorial
- Upon death, the succeeded in possession as
exclusive owners; have planted coconuts thereon
- Chacon Enterprises title is null and void
11. Galasino et al. instituted case against Chacon
Enterprises for annulment of OCT and reconveyance
of eastern portion of its titled land
12. At pre-trial, parties agreed that the land in litigation
has an area of 43,792 sqm.

CFI on Galasinos action for annulment of OCT:


dismissed.

CFI on Chacon Enterprises action for recovery of


possession: ruled in favor of Chacon; ordered Galasino
et al. to vacate and surrender possession

13. Galasino et al. filed an appeal with CA.


- Basic issue: who between the parties has a better
right and title
CA: reversed decision of CFI
OCT of Chacon Enterprises null and void
insofar as it covered the portion in litigation
- Declared Galasino et al. as owners; ordered
Chacon Enterprises to reconvey the portion
14. Chacon Enterprises filed MR
- Action filed by Galasino et al. was barred by
prescription/laches
-

CA: denied motion


-

Action instituted by Galasino et al. although


denominated as one for reconveyance, is in
essence an action to quiet title; imprescriptible

15. Chacon enterprises files instant petition for review


Issues:

1. WON Galasino et al.s action is barred by prescription


(NO)
2. WON action is barred by laches (NO)
3. WON OCT issued in favor of Chacon Enterprises
should be cancelled (YES)
Ratio:
1. Although action was denominated as one for
annulment of title/ reconveyance, from the averments
in the complaint, it is actually one for quieting of title,
hence imprescriptible, Galasino et al. having actual
possession
- Chacon Enterprises: more than 12 years had
elapsed from the date its title was transcribed in
the registration book of Register of Deeds up to
the time Galasino et al. filed action for annulment
and reconveyance
o If they anchored their action o the alleged
fraud cause of action prescribed after 4
years from registration
o If it I based on implied or constructive trust,
prescribed after 10 years from registration
o In either case, BARRED
- Galasino et al: real cause of action is actually for
quieting of title; prescription does not lie

SC:
o While owner in fee continues liable to an
action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse
claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of
a court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of such claim and its effects on
his title, or to assert any superior equity in
his favor
o He may wait until his possession is disturbed
or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his rights
o Reason: his undisturbed possession gives
him a continuing right to seek the aid of a
court of equity to ascertain and determine
the nature of the adverse claim
o Galasino et al. were in actual possession at
the
time
they
filed
action
for
annulment/reconveyance
Deduced form the fact that Chacon
Enterprises filed an ejectment suit and
an action to recover possession
tantamount to an admission that they
were not in actual possession
o Galasino et al. have been in possession in
concept of owners since 1920 (coconut trees
were 20-40 years old)
2. Not barred by laches
- Requisites:
(1) Conduct on the part of defendant for which
complainant seeks remedy
(2) Delay in asserting right; complainant having
knowledge or notice of defendants conduct
and having been afforded opportunity to
institute a suit

(3) Lack of notice or knowledge that


complainant would assert his right
(4) Injury or prejudice on the part of defendant if
relief be granted to complainant
- 2nd req. missing: records do not show that
Galasino et al. had knowledge of Chacon
Enterprises title prior to the ejectment suit filed by
the latter. Former also immediately filed actions to
assert their rights
3. Yes, it should be cancelled. Its fraudulent
misrepresentations in its application gives grounds for
cancellation under Sec. 91 CA 141
- Chacon Enterprises stated in their application that
the area had no indication of settlement,
occupation or improvement
- Sec. 91: statements made in the application are
considered essential conditions and parts of any
title issued on the basis of such application; any
false statements therein shall ipso facto produce
the cancellation of the title.
o Director of Lands tasked to conduct
investigations: existence of bad faith, fraud,
etc. shall be presumed if the grantee of the
land shall refuse to give direct and specific
answers to pertinent questions in the
investigation
o On the basis of said presumption title
shall
be
cancelled
without
further
proceedings
- Sec. 90 requires that applicant state under oath
whether land is not occupied, improved, or
cultivated
DISPOSITIVE: Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED.

without notice; bulldozed the rice, corn, fruit


bearing trees, and other crops by means of force,
violence, and intimidation; it trespassed, coerced,
and threatened to harass, remove, and eject them
from their farmholdings
MTC: dismissed complaind for forcible entry

RTC: sustained dismissal

5. Villeza et al. filed petition for review with CA


CA: reversed decisions of MTC and RTC
-

Since Villeza et al. were in actual possession at


the time they were forcibly ejected, they have a
right to commence an action for forcible entry
regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession

6. GM filed MR denied.
7. Hence, instant petition.
Issues:
WON Villeza et al. are entitled to file a forcible entry case
(YES)

German Management v. CA (1989)


Facts:

Ratio:

1. Spouses
Jose,
residents
of
Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia USA, are owners of a percel of land in
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to
Homestead Patent granted to them in 1948
2. 1982 Sps. Jose executed SPA athorizing German
Management Services to develop their property into a
residential subdivision
3. German Management obtained Development Permit
- Finding that part of property was occupied by
Villeza, Gernale, and 20 others, it advised
occupants to vacate premises but they refused
- GM proceeded with the development which
included portions occupied and cultivated by
Villeza et al.
4. Villeza et al. filed action for forcible entry
- They are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan;
they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings
some 12 to 15 years from promulgation of PD 27
- GM, under a permit from Office of Provincial
Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the
Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan at its expense,
subject to the condition that it shall secure the
needed right of way from the owners of the lot to
be affected
- Instead, it forcibly removed and destroyed the
barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings

Villeza et al. as actual possessors, can commence a


forcible entry case because ownership is not an issue
-

It is merely a quieting process and never determines


the actual title to an estate
At the time GM entered property, they were already in
possession
No evidence that Sps. Jose were ever in possession
of subject property
Villeza et al.s peacable possession was manifested
by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit
bearing trees 12 to 15 years prior to GMs act of
destroying their crops
Although GM may validly claim ownership based on
title it presented, evidence does not address issue of
prior actual possession raised in forcible entry case
Party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself
Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he
has the security that entitles him to remain on the
property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having
a better right by accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria

Doctrine of self-help cannot be made the basis of


GMs act of destroying crops
o Can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the
case at bar
When possession had already been lost, owner must
resort to judicial process for the recovery
In no case may possession be acquired through force
or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real


property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon a title to real property or any interest
therein.

VDA. DE AVILES v. CA
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be
brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the
bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their lands
from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same
amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic) to Eduardo
Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio
Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or less, while the
area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square
meters more or less.

Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his


land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500
square meters and the residential portion is 680 square
meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.

Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record,


claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a
cloud to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant
admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated
June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area
was allotted to them and that the only controversy is
whether these lands were properly measured.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper


remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit
instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted
by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of
possession de facto, also within the prescribed period,
may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding
the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

BA Finance Corp vs. CA


The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish
pond which they claim is within their area. Defendant
Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern
portion of the property with an area of approximately
1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence
(thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby
molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs over said portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly


encroach to their property but the defendant said that he
merely reconstructed the same.
Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied
thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action

GR 61464, May 28 1988

FACTS:

Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the


amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory
note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative
of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special
power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who
managed the business and under whose name the said
business was registered, purportedly authorized the
husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory
note. 2months prior the procurement of the loan, Augusto
left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due and
demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same.

RULING:
No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a
boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.

The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of


attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud
consisting of the execution of Deed of Assignment

assigning the rights, titles and interests over a


construction contract executed by and between the
spouses and A. Soriano Corporation. The writ hereby
prayed for was issued by the trial court and not contented
with the order, petitioner filed a motion for the examination
of attachment debtor alleging that the properties attached
by the sheriff were not sufficient to secure the satisfaction
of any judgment which was likewise granted by the court.

ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the


obligations contracted by the husband.

Said lot was among the object of an expropriation


proceeding before the RTC. Said RTC approved the
compromise Agreement b/w the Export Processing Zone
Authority (EPZA) and Igot-Soroo et al wherein EPZA
would pay a certain amount in exchange for the subject
property.

EPZA acquired title to said land by virtue of the RTC


decision and was issued a corresponding TCT.
The Heirs of the Florentina Rapaya and Juan Cuizon filed
a complaint to nullify several documents including the
TCT issued to EPZA for they were excluded from the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate.

HELD:

A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered


owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was
established during the marriage and assets were also
acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the
property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted
by the husband. However, for the property to be liable,
the obligation contracted by the husband must have
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The
obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit
because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had
already abandoned his family and left their conjugal
home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly
authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure
such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the
requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the
welfare of the spouses.

Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the


obligation contracted by Augusto against his conjugal
properties with Lily. Furthermore, the writ of attachment
cannot be issued against the said properties and that the
petitioner is ordered to pay Lily actual damages amouting
to P660,000.00.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) V.
FERNANDEZ
ACTS:
Lot 4673 was registered in the names of Florentina
Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon among others covered by an
OCT. Sometime thereafter, Jorgea Igot-Soro o et al
executed an Extra-judicial Partition claiming to be the only
surviving heirs of the registered owners, through which
they were issued a TCT.

EPZA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of


prescription and was denied thus elevated the case to the
CA wherein the CA ruled that the heirs of Igot-Soroo
defrauded the other heirs by falsely representing that they
were the only heirs enabling them to appropriate the land
in favor of EPZA. This method of acquiring property
created a constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party
and grants them the right to vindicate regardless of the
lapse of time. Thus, the case at bar.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not private respondents claim over the
expropriated land has prescribed
2) Whether or not reconveyance lies against expropriated
property

HELD:
1) YES. As provided in the Rules of Court, persons unduly
deprived of their lawful participation in a settlement may
assert their claim only w/in the 2-year period after the
settlement and distribution of the estate. However, this
prescriptive period will not apply to those who had not
been notified of the settlement.

The Private respondents are deemed to have been


notified of the extrajudicial settlement since it was
registered and annotated on the certificate of title over the
lot.

The only exception to this rule is when the title still


remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently
caused the partition of the said property. In the case at

bar, the title has already passed to an innocent purchaser


for value, the govt through EPZA.

Their remedies of action for reconveyance resulting from


fraud, and action for reconveyance based on an implied
constructive trust has already prescribed as well the
former having prescribed 4 years from the discovery and
the latter prescribing 10 years from the alleged fraudulent
registration.

2) NO. Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose

property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in


anothers name. However, this cannot be availed once the
property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
Since the property has already passed to the govt in an
expropriation proceeding, EPZA is entitled to enjoy the
security afforded innocent 3rd persons and their title to the
property must be preserved.

However, the private respondents are not w/o remedy.


They can sue for damages their co-heirs.

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