A Review Bus Run-off-Road Crashes

Malcolm H. Ray
RoadSafe, LLC
Box 312
12 Main Street
Canton, Maine 04221
Phone: 207 514 5474, e-mail: mac@roadsafellc.com
Christine E. Carrigan
RoadSafe, LLC
Box 312
12 Main Street
Canton, Maine 04221
Phone: 207 513 6057, e-mail: christine@roadsafellc.com

Submitted
July 23, 2014
Word count
Text = 3,850
Figures&Tables: 5 @ 250 words each =1,250
Total number of words= 5,100

Paper prepared for consideration for presentation and publication at the

93th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board, January 2014

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Ray and Carrigan

A Review of Bus Run-off-Road Crashes

Malcolm H. Ray and Christine E. Carrigan
ABSTRACT
Crashes involving buses capture the attention of the media and general public because of
the dramatic and often catastrophic nature of such crashes. Sometimes national and State
roadside design policy can be driven not by good engineering but by a need to respond to the
media and general public. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates
significant crashes which often leads to investigating bus crashes because of the high number
of potential victims and the attention focused on such crashes by the media and general public.
For example, in the last forty years, fifty percent of the bridge rail crash investigations resulting
in recommendations from the NTSB to AASHTO have involved a bus or motorcoach. These
recommendations have the potential to cause widespread changes to the direction of national
highway safety policy with little consideration for the frequency of these crashes in relation to all
other vehicle crashes. It is necessary to understand the nature and frequency of these types of
crash events in relationship to all crashes to formulate effective national highway policy. This
paper capitalized on national crash data gathered by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to better understand if
buses should be given specific consideration when developing roadside design policy. The
results of this research indicate that buses are 27 percent less likely than other vehicles to become
involved in an ROR crash. Victims of bus crashes are 0.87 times less likely to become injured in
a bus crash then victims of other vehicle crashes. Bus crashes do not appear to present a
significant roadside challenge in terms of exposure or injury rates when compared to all vehicle
types. While bus crashes are dramatic and news worthy, they do not appear to be a significant
national roadside safety problem.

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INTRODUCTION

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CATASTROPHIC BUS CRASHES

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Fort Sumner, New Mexico, 1972

On December 26, 1972, a school bus transporting 34 people was traveling westbound
while a tractor-trailer truck transporting cattle was eastbound on US-60 near Fort Sumner, New
Mexico. (2) As the truck approached a narrow bridge, the driver swerved to the right after
seeing approaching headlights that appeared to be on his side of the road. The truck struck a
crash cushion at the entrance to the bridge and the right-rear wheel of the trailer mounted the
curb on the bridge. The tractor snagged the bridge railing and rotated, mounting the curb and
causing the trailer to jackknife. The bus collided with the jackknifed trailer in the westbound
lanes. Nineteen people in the bus were killed and 15 others sustained a variety of injuries. As a
result of this crash, the NTSB recommended that the FHWA expedite a program to improve,

Infrequent but catastrophic crashes involving buses capture headlines at a

disproportionate rate to the frequency that these crashes occur. The National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) investigates and determines the probable cause of significant crashes on
highways and other modes of transportation with the goal of promoting transportation safety and
preventing future similar crashes. Significant crashes are essentially those that capture intense
media attention due to the number of victims in one crash. While roadside safety professionals
attempt to minimize the number and severity of all crashes, should the intensity of media
scrutiny be the determining factor driving roadside safety policy?
As an example, since 1972, the NTSB has investigated eight bridge rail crashes which
resulted in recommendations to AASHTO. Three of these investigations involved school buses,
one involved a motor coach, two involved a passenger vehicle and two involved heavy trucks. In
other words, fifty percent of the bridge rail crashes resulting in recommendations from the NTSB
to AASHTO involved some type of bus. These alarming and often catastrophic crashes
involving buses have the potential to cause sweeping changes to the direction of national or
regional highway policy, often with little consideration for the frequency of these crashes in
relation to all other vehicle crashes.
Understanding the nature and frequency of these types of crash events in relationship to
all crashes is an important step in formulating effective national highway policy. Vehicle crash
data is collected by States using standardized police crash reports. State crash data, however,
sometimes mixes school buses with other passenger vehicles. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA), established on January 1, 2000 within the United States Department
of Transportation (US DOT) has as its primary mission to prevent commercial motor vehiclerelated fatalities and injuries. The FMCSA activities include the collection and dissemination of
data on motor carrier safety.(1) This paper uses the data gathered by the FMCSA and data which
represents all crashes to evaluate the nature, frequency and severity of bus crashes to better
understand if these vehicles should be given specific consideration when developing roadside
design policy.

Run-off-road (ROR) crashes which penetrate bridge rails or strike bridge piers are
infrequent events, however, they capture news headlines due to their dramatic and often
catastrophic outcomes. This section summarizes crashes with bridge railing and piers
investigated by the NTSB over the last forty years.

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where feasible, substandard bridge-rail systems on existing bridges to increase resistance to

pocketing or penetration by impacting vehicles of all classes and redirect those vehicles.
Research, including crash testing, should also be expedited to develop criteria for mandatory
standards for bridge-rail and guardrail designs for new bridge construction (H-74-7). (2)

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Sacramento, California, 1973

A Greyhound Bus collided with a concrete overpass support column on I-880 on
November 3, 1973. The highway was a relatively flat, straight, six-lane divided highway. The
lanes were 12 feet wide and the paved shoulders were 10 feet wide. The piers were protected by
a w-beam guardrail with wooden posts installed on a curbed median. The top of the guardrail
was 21 to 23 inches above the height of the curbing. The bus penetrated the guardrail and
impacted the piers. NTSB recommended that FHWA: Promulgate mandatory national
performance standards for traffic barrier systems. Those standards should contain criteria for
dynamic testing or analytical procedures substantiated by such test for each design to increase
the compatibility of barriers with both light and heavy vehicles. The standard should also
contain requirements regarding the placement of the barriers in the field to assure that
compatibility of the vehicle/barrier is not compromised by adjacent environment.(3)

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Martinez, California, 1976

On May 21st, 1976 a school bus was travelling on I-680 near Martinez, California with 52
people on-board when it struck a bridge railing on an off-ramp. The bus rolled over the bridge
railing of the curved bridge, landing on its roof. Twenty nine people were fatally injured in the
crash. (4) The bridge railing and the integrated curb were cited by the NTSB as one of the
contributing factors to the crash.
As a result of this crash, the NTSB made the following three recommendations that dealt
with various aspects of bridge railing design and placement:
H-77-12: Develop bridge railing designs that will meet performance standards to be
established by the FHWA for various classes of vehicles and that will be sufficient in
number to meet the various state requirements with regard to climatic and other physical
conditions that affect the operation and maintenance of a roadway system. Such bridge
barrier railing designs should be available to states that do not desire to develop their
own designs in accordance with mandatory performance standards issued by the
FHWA. (5)
H-77-13: Investigate through dynamic crash testing and analytical procedures the
effects of various geometric configurations and adjacent roadway surfaces on the
performance of traffic barrier rail systems. The investigation should also consider how
maintenance practices or the lack of maintenance affects the performance of the barrier
rail systems. (6)
H-77-14: In cooperation with the states, establish priority guidelines for improving,
through modification or retrofit, the performance of existing traffic barrier rail systems
at bridges. Consideration should be given in the priority guidelines to the potential for
multi-fatality accidents involving high occupancy vehicles such as buses. (7)

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Huntsville, Alabama, 2006

On November 20, 2006 at about 10 a.m. a school bus with 40 students onboard was
traveling westbound in the left lane of an elevated ramp portion of I-565 in Huntsville, Alabama.
(NTSB09b) A 1990 Toyota Celica was following the bus and apparently moved into the righthand lane and accelerated in order to pass the bus on the right. As the Toyota was abreast of the
bus it began to fishtail and the driver lost control, veering to the left and striking the right-front
tire of the school bus. Both vehicles swerved to the left and struck a 32-inch tall concrete bridge
railing on the left side of the ramp. The school bus climbed up onto the bridge railing and
travelled about 117 feet before completely rolling over the railing and falling about 30 feet below
onto a dirt and grass area underneath the ramp shown in Figure 1. The crash resulted in four
fatalities, 17 serious injuries, 17 minor injuries and three bus occupants were uninjured. The bus
driver was ejected in the initial crash and four passengers were either fully or partially ejected
when the bus struck the ground below. The Toyota did not penetrate the bridge railing and came
to rest against the bridge railing. The driver and passengers of the Toyota were not injured in the
crash.

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Figure 1. Final rest position of a school bus that penetrated a concrete bridge railing near
Huntsville, AL in 2006. (8)

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With respect to highway design issues, the NTSB noted that the bridge railing was a 32-inch
high Report 350 test level four (TL4) concrete safety shape installed adjacent to a four-foot left
shoulder. The bus was travelling no more than 55 mi/hr, it struck the railing at 9-10 degrees and
its gross empty weight was 17,700 lbs so the impact conditions were not extraordinary in
comparison to the standard Report 350 TL4 test conditions (i.e., 18,000-lbs single unit truck
striking the barrier at 15 degrees and 50 mi/hr). The NTSB concluded that the Toyota restricted
the bus from moving back into its lane and essentially held the front of the bus to the railing until
it eventually climbed the railing and rolled over it.

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Sherman, Texas, 2008

On August 8th, 2008 at about 12:45 a.m. a motor coach with 55 passengers and a driver
were travelling at about 68 mi/hr northbound in the right-hand lane of the four-lane US 75 near
Sherman, Texas. (9) As the motor coach approached Post Oak Creek its right steer axle failed
and the motor coach struck a seven-inch high curb at about a four-degree impact angle which it
overrode and then struck a steel bridge railing. The motor coach struck the railing at about 44
mi/hr and then slid along the railing for about 120 feet until it penetrated the bridge railing and
fell about eight feet onto the creek embankment below. Seventeen passengers were fatally
injured, the driver was seriously injured and 38 passengers received minor to serious injuries in
the crash.

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Figure 2. Site of a motorcoach bus crash in Sherman, TX, 2008. (9)

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US-75 in the area of the crash had a traffic volume of about 47,000 vehicles/day in 2006
and commercial vehicles accounted for 16 percent of the total traffic volume. The bridge railing
at the crash site, shown in Figure 2, was a 27-inch tall steel beam and post system side-mounted
on an 18-inch wide, seven-inch tall curb adjacent to a 22-inch wide shoulder. The bridge railing
was 279-ft long. The bridge railing was a Texas Type II railing which was originally designed in
1954 in accordance with the AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications in effect at the time.
Apparently, this bridge railing had been struck previously in 2001 by a tractor-trailer truck. It
had penetrated the bridge railing causing some damage to the railing anchorages in the deck.
Based on its height alone this bridge railing would be classified today as no more than a test level
three (TL3) railing but it is likely that it was never crash tested so its impact performance is
doubtful.

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As a result of the Sherman, Texas motor coach crash, NTSB issued three safety
recommendations dealing with the design and warranting of bridge railings.

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H-09-17: Establish, in conjunction with the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials, performance and selection guidelines for bridge owners to use
to develop objective warrants for high-performance Test Level Four, Five, and Six bridge
railings applicable to new construction and rehabilitation projects where railing
replacement is determined to be appropriate.

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H-09-25: Work with the Federal Highway Administration to establish performance and
selection guidelines for bridge owners to use to develop objective warrants for highperformance Test Level Four, Five, and Six bridge railings applicable to new
construction and rehabilitation projects where railing replacement is determined to be
appropriate, and include the guidelines in the Load and Resistance Factor Design
(LRFD) Bridge Design Specifications.

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H-09-26: Revise Section 13 of the Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) Bridge
Design Specifications to state that bridge owners shall develop objective warrants for the
selection and use of high-performance Test Level Four, Five, and Six bridge railings
applicable to new construction and rehabilitation projects where railing replacement is
determined to be appropriate.

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Summary

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CRASH TESTING GUIDELINES

The recommendations from the NTSB from this selection of forty years of investigations
of bus crashes into bridge rails include five general recommendations about developing selection
guidelines for all vehicles types including buses and motorcoaches. The more recent
recommendations use the specific test levels adopted in Report 350 in recommending that
criteria be established to decide when each type of test level should be used for different classes
of vehicles. There are currently no crash test procedures for buses and motorcoaches, therefore,
it is not known how buses perform in the current mix of Report 350 and the AASHTO Manual
for Assessing Safety Hardware (MASH) crash tests. This paper examines the crash data to
determine if crash statistics agree with these recommendations; if crash test criteria should be
established for buses, and if barriers should be designed for buses. These issues have been
examined to ensure that the charge of the NTSB to examine significant crashes does not
inadvertently direct safety related research from more frequent crash types to more catastrophic
but much less common bus crash types.

The current MASH and Report 350 crash testing procedures do not include buses as a test
vehicle. The test and evaluation guidelines in Report 230, used by roadside safety researchers
between 1981 and 1993, did include three types of buses in the crash test matrix: a 20,000-lbs
school bus, a 32,000-lbs small intercity bus and a 40,000-lbs large intercity bus. There were no
test levels in Report 230 so these bus tests were all supplemental tests that were used to test
hardware specifically designed for situations where heavier vehicles were considered an
important design vehicle. Supplemental tests S15 through S19 involved buses and supplemental
tests S20 and S21 involved an 80,000-lbs tractor trailer truck and an 80,000-lbs tanker-trailer
truck. Interestingly, Report 230 did not include any single-unit trucks in either the standard
minimum test matrix or the supplemental matrix.

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When Report 350 was developed, six test levels were incorporated; TL4 through TL6
were specifically added to include heavier vehicles. The bus tests from the supplemental matrix
of Report 230 were dropped and the single-unit truck test for TL4 was added. The single-unit
truck was thought to be a much more common vehicle on the roadway and presented many of the
same mass and stability challenges as the three buses used in Report 230. The current MASH
10000S single-unit truck has the same mass as the school bus in Report 230 test S15 and the
intercity buses fall in a range between the MASH single-unit truck and tractor trailer truck so the
assumption has been that buses can be accommodated by TL4 and TL5 barriers. Unfortunately,
this assumption has never been tested so it is not conclusively known if the Report 350 and
MASH tests for TL4 and TL5 barriers are effective for bus impacts.

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BUS CRASH INJURY RISK

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) was established on January
1, 2000 within the US DOT. Its primary mission is to prevent commercial motor vehiclerelated fatalities and injuries. The FMCSA activities include the collection and dissemination of
data on motor carrier safety. (1) Table 1 is a summary of 2009 police-reported crashes compiled
by the FMCSA using the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the General Estimates
System (GES) and the Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCIMS) databases.
The FARS data includes all fatal crashes regardless of vehicle types, the GES is an estimate of
all crashes regardless of severity or vehicle type and the MCIMS is a database of heavy vehicle
crashes. It shows the distribution of crash severity for trucks, buses, and all vehicles (i.e., mostly
passenger vehicles). Table 2, in contrast, provides the number of people injured in in 2009 by
vehicle type. The distinction becomes increasingly significant when a vehicle has the potential
to carry many passengers (i.e., buses). For example, Table 1 shows that there were 221 fatal
crashes involving buses in 2009, however, Table 2 shows there were 254 people killed in the
56,000 bus crashes in 2009. It would appear that the chance of being killed in a bus crash is
0.0045 (i.e., 254/56,000=0.0045). In contrast, there were 5,505,000 crashes involving all vehicle
types (i.e., primarily passenger vehicles) and 33,808 people were killed these crashes; therefore
the average person involved in any vehicle crash has about a 0.0061 chance of being killed (i.e.,
33,808/5,505,000=0.0061). The chance of being fatally injured in a bus crash is 26 percent
lower than in a crash with any type of vehicle, primarily passenger vehicles. While this
comparison does not consider the vehicle miles traveled by these vehicles, it appears that there is
a greater risk of injury resulting from crashes of all vehicles types than crashes involving only
buses. In fact, the relative risk of a bus crash injury to any vehicle type injury is 0.74 (i.e.,
0.0045/0.0061=0.74).

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Table 1 2009 Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes (1)

Crash
Severity
Fatal
Injury
PDO

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Large
Trucks
2,987
51,000
232,000

Buses
221
9,000
47,000

All
Vehicles
30,797
1,517,000
3,957,000

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Total

286,000

56,000

5,505,000

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Table 2 2009 Traffic Crash Victims (1)

Number of
Victims
Killed
Injured

Large
Truck
3,380
74,000

Buses
254
20,000

All Vehicle
33,808
2,217,000

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BUS CRASH FREQUENCY

The FMCSA data were segregated into vehicles which ran off the road and all crash
types. The same was done with FARS and GES data for the general category of all vehicle
types. Using the FHWA vehicle miles traveled information for each vehicle type, the exposure
of each vehicle type can be considered and the crash rate for each type of vehicle can be
determined. The crash rate per hundred million vehicle miles traveled (HMVMT) is shown for
all vehicle crashes and run off road crashes in Table 3. Table 3 shows the risk of being involved
in a run-off-road crash by vehicle type but does not indicate the severity of those crashes. This
table segregates the data by vehicle type and by crash type (i.e., all crashes and ROR crashes).
The relative risk of having a bus or truck crash to any vehicle crash is shown. The relative risk
of having a bus or truck ROR crash to any vehicle ROR crash is also shown.

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Table 3. 2002 to 2010 Vehicle Crash Rates by Vehicle Type.

Data
Source
(10)

(11)

Vehicle Type
All vehicles
All vehicles
Bus and truck
Bus
Truck
Bus and truck
Bus
Truck

Vehicle and Crash Type

All Crash types
Run-Off Road Crashes
All crash types

Run-Off Road crashes

Avg.
Avg.
Annual
Annual
Crashes HMVMT
5,968,444
29,602
1,094,788
29,602
145,288
2,644
11,657
102
133,633
2,542
30,696
2,644
1,006
102
29,690
2,542

Avg.
Annual
Crashes
per
HMVMT
201.76
36.98
54.95
114.28
52.57
11.61
9.86
11.68

Relative
Risk of
Heavy
Vehicle
Crash to All
vehicle
Crashes
1.00
0.18
0.27
0.57
0.26
0.31
0.27
0.32

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When considering all crash types (i.e., head-on, side swipe, angle, ROR, etc.), buses are
approximately 57 percent as likely as all vehicle types to become involved in a crash. When
limiting the analysis to ROR crashes, buses are 27 percent as likely as all vehicle types of

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becoming involved in an ROR crash. The bus ROR crash rate to all bus crash rate is
approximately 9 percent (i.e., 9.88/114.28=0.086=8.6%). This is in fact less than the all vehicle
type ROR crashes to all crash type rate (i.e., 18%). Using Table 2 and Table 3, it can also be
shown that fatal plus injury crash rate for buses is 1.6 F+I crashes/HMVMT versus 10.4 F+I
crashes/HMVMT for all vehicle types. Even with their much higher vehicle occupancy, buses
are involved in fatal plus injury crashes six times less than all vehicle types.

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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Buses are 27 percent less likely than other vehicles to become involved in an ROR crash
and are six times less likely to result in a fatal plus injury crash as the general population of
vehicles per HMVMT. Passengers of buses are 0.87 times less likely to become injured in a bus
crash than all other vehicle crashes. Bus crashes do not appear to present a significant roadside
challenge in terms or exposure or injury rates when compared to all vehicle types.
Not surprisingly, the NTSBs charge to investigate and determine the probable cause of
significant crashes slants their investigations toward more catastrophic crashes, with buses
representing 50 percent of the bridge rail investigations conducted in the last forty years. A
review of the national data on bus crashes relative to all vehicle crashes and bus ROR crashes
relative to all vehicle ROR crashes indicates that buses are involved in fewer ROR crashes than
all vehicles, even when exposure is considered.
The assumption in Report 350 and MASH has been that barriers designed for higher test
levels using single unit and tractor trailer trucks would also perform well in impact with buses
but this assumption has never been demonstrated. It would be worthwhile to perform bus crash
tests on some common TL4 and TL5 bridge railings and/or median barriers to establish definitely
whether the TL4 and TL5 barriers are effective in bus impacts. If TL4 and TL5 barriers are
shown to be effective for buses it is probably not worthwhile to incorporate buses into the
standard test matrices on a routine basis since the standard matrices using trucks would address
bus performance. Of course, if the exploratory crash tests on common TL4 and TL5 barriers
result in poor bus performance the roadside safety community might have to rethink how bus
crash safety should be incorporated into the crash testing guidelines.
The consideration of trucks is explicit in roadside design, however, buses are not directly
considered in the current crash testing design standards. Even with this explicit consideration of
trucks, trucks continue to present a larger challenge in terms of ROR crash rates. While it would
be useful to determine how typical buses perform in MASH TL4 and TL5 crash tests, when
funding is allocated for future development of roadside hardware, it appears these funds would
better serve the intended purpose of reducing ROR crash rates by focusing on all vehicle types
and truck crash types before considering buses.

This work was sponsored in part by NCHRP 22-27 and NCHRP 22-12(03). The authors
wish is thank the project panels from both projects and the program officer, Mr. Mark Bush for
their thoughtful comments and feedback throughout the research efforts.

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REFERENCES
1

About FMCSA, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, U.S. Department of

Transportation,
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/sites/fmcsa.dot.gov/files/docs/FMCSA%20Pocket%20
Guide%20to%20Large%20Truck%20and%20Bus%20Statistics%20%202014%20-%20508C.pdf , website accessed November, 2014.

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NTSB, Wilmeth Cattle Company Truck/Bridge Transportation Enterprises, Inc.,

Bus, U.S. 60-84, Fort Sumner, New Mexico, December 26, 1972, Highway
Accident Report NTSB/HAR-74/01, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, DC, 1974.

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Greyhound Bus Collision with Concrete Overpass Support Column on I-880,

San Juan Overpass, Sacramento, California, National Transportation Safety
Board, Washington, D.C., November 3, 1973.

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NTSB, Student Transportation Lines, Inc. Charter Bus Climbing of Bridge Rail
and overturn Near Martinez, California, May 21, 1976, Highway Accident
Report No. NTSB/HAR-77/02, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, D.C., 1977.

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NTSB, Student Transportation Lines, Inc. Charter Bus Climbing of Bridge Rail
and overturn Near Martinez, California, May 21, 1976, Highway Accident
Report No. NTSB/HAR-77/02, National Transportation Safety Board,
Washington, D.C., 1977.

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NTSB, Safety Recommendation No. H-77-12, National Transportation Safety

Board, Washington, D.C., 1977.

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NTSB, Safety Recommendation No. H-77-13, National Transportation Safety

Board, Washington, D.C., 1977.

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NTSB, Safety Recommendation No. H-77-14, National Transportation Safety

Board, Washington, D.C., 1977.

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NTSB, Highway Accident Brief: HWY-07-MH-007, Accident No. HWY-07MH-007, National Transportation Safety Board, Washington, D.C., 19 November
2009.

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NTSB, Highway Accident Report: Motorcoach Run-Off-the-Bridge and

Rollover, Sherman, Texas, August 9, 2009, NTSB Report No. NTSB/HAR09/02 PB2009-916202, Washington, D.C., 2009.

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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic Safety Facts, access

online, November 2012, Main access page, http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/cats/listpublications.aspx?Id=E&ShowBy=DocType, February
1, 2011.

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Commercial Motor Vehicle Facts, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration,

http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/facts-research/CMV-Facts.pdf, online
version accessed February 10, 2011.

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