Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues
are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the
political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
-elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but
embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds,
and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the
practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using
a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters,
negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting
fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co.
v. Dworken,129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law
when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in mattersconnected with the law incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's
claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts
and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of

business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have
no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid
distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be
performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] ,
p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144).
(Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers
(1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy,
counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within
the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the provisions
on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief
statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I

am quoting from the provision "who have been engaged in the

practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar
who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make
the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have
to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA
are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA,
then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation
may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards
members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is
taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set
forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although
it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal
work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would
have the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on
qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit. And,
therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and
two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants
with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the
word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that
the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM
Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.).
Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may
be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law
is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role
for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p.
593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much
of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The
members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most
developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that
in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients,
and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig
usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow
specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to
an importantly different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare
types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will
require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling,
advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of
evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of
adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which
the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are
those of corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in
corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those
members participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that
understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable to
intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "modelmaking" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and
weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the need
for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use
of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic
data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making
process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional context and the various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,

particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business administration or

management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which
are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise
from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed
by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many
smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law
firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation
have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in
board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which
require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his
work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be
more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After
all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law
firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs
go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p.
4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To
borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer
is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties,
and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining
the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion
as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins
applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion
to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For
that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role
as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles. Often
these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward
the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples
of collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world
famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of

organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within

organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective
tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate
problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates
of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now
make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving
complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize
the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used
directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such
tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern
three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a
major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial
law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and
maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when transactional or
similar facts are being considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those
activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice and
theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel
has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal
profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's
strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers,
coping internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough
to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how
the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim
is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the
very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be
able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many
would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires
next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does
not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in
the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as
an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic,
and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco
Group, served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business

conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the
farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is
adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the
law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5)
events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program.
For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the
Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in
Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31,
1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely
renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work
with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a
model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a
mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only
with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate

technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine

External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
issine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third
and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator
of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more than satisfy
the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the
officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that
the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA
744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of
a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion
vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in
the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of
confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking,
posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of
the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven
years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of
the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern
connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual
law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law
practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that
law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but
only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by
"traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the
phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most
individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually
practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a
lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the
Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt.
For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming
that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by
law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is
beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission
has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirma Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S.
Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah
(who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon
hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming
with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied:
"Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying
on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Resolution

March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed
to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of
Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since
1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No.
972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that
request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the
members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill
to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in
an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one
hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in
the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any
subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar:Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half
or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole
number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in
any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are
also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking
the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately,
the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned
whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected
by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the
following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972
total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946

(August)

206

121

18

1946

(November)

477

228

43

1947

749

340

1948

899

409

11

1949

1,218

532

164

1950

1,316

893

26

1951

2,068

879

196

1952

2,738 1,033

426

1953

2,555

284

TOTAL

968

12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to
obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the
passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which
only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually
presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be
favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, although as has been already stated, this tribunal
finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of
the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question
may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's
Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and
Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the
court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question
has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the
voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as
humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion

of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David
stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap
which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome
such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of
students who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is
claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they
suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the
times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the
practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is
entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a
serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been
published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction
since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946,
which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public
knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles,
but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar
background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the
long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established
here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From
the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law
had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day,
54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guaria (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the
contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated,
the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to
us as a favorable precedent of the law that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of
New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to

be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of
Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of
them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or
the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office.
Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who
possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously
rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed.
The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to
practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this
power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this
particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a
disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme
Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action
referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit
means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of
refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the
possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor
of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find
in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court
of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution
of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors,
the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this
examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the
latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for
that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense
with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing
whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the
age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma
competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the
present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)
xxx

xxx

xxx

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission,
that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that
question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly
seen. Please note only the following distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the
bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its
jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the
matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have
been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most
solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to
Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles,
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the
highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in
the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment

providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this
decision we quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the
English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much
uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate
qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr.
Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative
power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1,
art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve
the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and
further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and
coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty
which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of
the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10
Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state
government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from
embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot
escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an
attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small
degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach
to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at
least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the
adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament
since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted
to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be
regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with

assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of
the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity
and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no
express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of
the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments
of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at
law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the
legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express
constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications
of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the
public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its
selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course
of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel
courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an
attorney at law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely
true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a
legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New
Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys
receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the
court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565;Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43,
119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the
courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to
practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to
confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the
licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where
the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the
Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there
be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was
said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E.
487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One
is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the

court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His
cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be
hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the
common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is
almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish
and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to
the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power
of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be
admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19
How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of
its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed."
(p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal
profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath
for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows:
"They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general
practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court
the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient
evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel
moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair.
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct
causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible
to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is
not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been
so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter
of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and
Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties
relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment
may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the
exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent
powers of the court. Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent
power of the court. A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See
Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it
is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at
the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other
departments of the government. 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them
construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by
settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial
inquiry. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in
mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment a
judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the
bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments
even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the
legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument.
Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme
Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility
which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this
Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the
power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court,
but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of

attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place
of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a
determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or
supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service
of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to
admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal
profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to
the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together
for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the
legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a
good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty
of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers
which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary
to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and
exacting necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guaria (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guaria took examination and failed
by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous
examination. The Government appointed Guaria and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks
admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds
the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled
"An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the
Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the
sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as
members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time
thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of
the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the
Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General,
Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city

attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for
the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to
the satisfaction of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to
pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907,
shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required
percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to
the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former
application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts
of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning
and ability."
But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon
motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in
mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited
amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which
specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is
contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to
the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16
and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed
to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of Guaria, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of
this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such
appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant.
But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not
and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his
appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in
the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that
his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession
of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short
of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that
since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine
Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office
of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he
offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given
him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if
he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by
general rule. (In re Guaria, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from
the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is
arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to
those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned
date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class
legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas
from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899,
under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled
"An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884,
in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists
in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall
comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the
time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or
college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in
said rules". In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of
every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this
state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the
student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good
moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for

two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law
school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the
rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it
is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit
attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of
the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a
general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law
is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and
confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil
process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its
operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify
persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal
Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place
where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve
as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have
some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is
limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes First, those presenting diplomas issued by any
law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for
the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law
office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making
application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is
prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of
course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation
to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of
November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began
the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as
those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899,
and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must
be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any
natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The
proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted
by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of
being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to
prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner
here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all
alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case
of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed
upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be
considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all
open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or,
as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them that is, the right to continue their
prosecution is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from
them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental
under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of
medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of
his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and
courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call,
121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172,
76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It
is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact
in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an
individual upon whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to
admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval
forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of
Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This
Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W.
179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as
follows:
The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid
must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded

and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences,
as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference
between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the
situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it
operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5
per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5
per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has
been given, then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average
indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of
those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by
years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before
said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations
prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an
equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is
argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to
cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to
the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those
who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948,
70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent,
which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules,
by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to
undo what had been done cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the
Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as
sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court
that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is
being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by
one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in
the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing
directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of
Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules,
which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included

in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules.
This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the
existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this
country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect
is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the
text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21
(1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is
inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative
powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their
purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional
and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to
become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in
an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these
810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is
admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this
Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be,
intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good
bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to
render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law
according to existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is
contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law
students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of
1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.

RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our
beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved,
and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to
1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force
and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and
shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations
of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953
obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in
any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not.
After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin

Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.

Number of candidates

206

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

12

73'S

72'S

Number of candidates who passed

85

Number of candidates who failed

121

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

18

Percentage of success

(per cent)

41.62

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

58.74

Passing grade

(per cent)

72

November, 1946

Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose
Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.

Number of candidates

481

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

19

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent --Minutes of March 31, 1947)

Number of candidates who passed

249

Number of candidates who failed

228

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

43

Percentage of success

(per cent)

52.20

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

47.80

Passing grade
(By resolution of the Court).

(per cent)

72

October, 1947

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa,
Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Pea, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos
B. Hilado, Members.

Number of candidates

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

749

43

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 per

cent

69 per cent

40

68 per cent

Number of candidates who passed

409

Number of candidates who failed

340

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

972

Percentage of success

(per cent)

54.59

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

45.41

Passing grade

(per cent)

69

(by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1
per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.

August, 1948

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis

P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Number of candidates

899

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

64

71's

29

70's

35

Number of candidates who passed

490

Number of candidates who failed

409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

11

Percentage of success

(per cent)

62.40

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.60

Passing grade

(per cent)

70

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1949

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo,

Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.

Number of candidates

1,218

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

55

Number of candidates who passed

686

Number of candidates who failed

532

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

164

Percentage of success

(per cent)

56.28

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

43.72

Passing grade

(per cent)

74

(by resolution of the Court).

August, 1950

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B.

Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A.
Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

1,316

38

(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and

authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

Number of candidates who passed

432

Number of candidates who failed

894

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

26

Percentage of success

(per cent)

32.14

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

67.86

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1951

Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

Number of candidates who passed

Number of candidates who failed

2,068

112

1,189

879

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

196

Percentage of success

(per cent)

57.49

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

42.51

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1952

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates

2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

163

Number of candidates who passed

1,705

Number of candidates who failed

1,033

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

Percentage of success

426

(per cent)

62.27

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

37.73

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

August, 1953

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Pea, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates

2,555

Number of candidates whose grades were raised

(74's)

100

Number of candidates who passed

1,570

Number of candidates who failed

986

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972

284

Percentage of success

(per cent)

61.04

Percentage of failure

(per cent)

38.96

Passing grade

(per cent)

75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in
which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without
invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol Crim Rem. Leg Gen.

.
.
.
Av.

MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon L.

66

71

61

76 80

83

73

75

71.4

MRD- 2. Cunanan, Albino

76

72

74

75 70

70

65

72

71.45

MRD- 3. Mejia, Flaviano V.

64

64

65

68 83

74

68

80

69.85

MRD- 4. Orlina, Soledad R.

71

68

66

75 63

75

70

88

69.9

MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio Lu.

75

73

73

65 63

66

65

80

69.95

MRD- 6. Gatchalian, Salud

72

66

71

75 78

68

65

50

69.65

69

79

75

75 71

89

55

75

70.8

76

80

62

86 81

72

60

65

70.5

63

85

70

77 80

81

65

80

71.8

61

63

83

79 71

85

65

80

72.05

1948

1949

7. Abaya, Jesus A.

MRD- 8. Advincula, David D.

9. Agraviador, Alfredo L.

10. Alacar, Pascual C.

11. Amog, Pedro M.

75

66

76

78 81

74

55

85

72.2

12. Apolinario, Miguel S.

75

84

78

78 70

70

60

75

71.95

13. Aquino, Maximo G.

82

77

71

77 76

77

60

75

73.15

14. Asinas, Candido D.

75

83

69

80 81

83

55

85

72.65

15. Baldivino, Jose B.

75

65

72

82 82

69

60

80

71.95

16. Balintona, Bernardo

75

80

64

78 74

67

65

70

70

17. Banawa, Angel L.

78

70

70

75 81

83

60

60

72.3

18. Bandala, Anacleto A.

66

80

66

71 93

72

55

70

69.6

19. Bandon, Alawadin L.

74

79

69

77 91

73

60

80

73.35

20. Baquero, Benjamin

76

79

64

77 85

72

65

75

72.5

21. Blanco, Jose

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.5

22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T.

75

71

72

78 67

82

60

75

70.85

23. Canda, Benjamin S.

75

72

75

82 76

77

65

75

73.55

24. Canon, Guillermo

77

86

67

88 75

69

70

85

73.9

25. Carlos, Estela S.

75

81

81

79 72

73

65

70

73.8

26. Cerezo, Gregorio O.

69

76

76

79 71

80

55

80

70.4

27. Clarin, Manuel L.

75

82

76

81 73

69

70

75

73.95

28. Claudo, Conrado O.

76

62

78

77 73

72

60

70

71.4

29. Condevillamar, Antonio V. 68

65

74

80 85

75

60

75

71.65

72

75

69

82 83

79

65

80

73.4

31. Corona, Olvido D.

68

76

73

81 81

72

60

75

71.15

32. Dizon, Marcial C.

76

86

69

83 75

74

65

80

73.1

33. Enriquez, Agustin P.

75

77

70

81 81

77

65

80

73.75

34. Espiritu, Irineo E.

80

88

69

75 76

77

65

75

73.8

35. Fernandez, Macario J.

63

82

76

75 81

84

65

75

72.95

36. Gallardo, Amando C.

78

79

67

77 76

75

60

65

70.95

37. Garcia, Freidrich M.

76

80

66

75 72

70

60

75

69.7

38. Garcia, Julian L.

64

77

68

82 89

77

65

75

72.15

MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto R.

39. Garcia, Leon Mo.

77

86

71

80 60

82

65

75

71.85

40. Garcia, Pedro V.

76

82

73

81 74

83

60

85

73.6

41. Garcia, Santiago C.

62

91

79

75 72

75

65

80

71.8

42. Genoves, Pedro

75

83

70

78 87

76

55

80

72.7

43. Gonzales, Amado P.

75

71

71

75 86

75

60

75

72.65

44. Guia, Odon R. de

77

76

66

81 74

76

60

75

70.9

45. Fernandez, Simeon

62

68

71

80 74

90

65

75

70.85

46. Jakosalem, Filoteo

82

83

73

82 61

87

65

70

73.6

47. Jesus, Felipe D. de

75

83

67

79 78

85

60

75

72.45

48. Jocom, Jacobo M.

77

77

74

77 74

64

55

85

70.65

49. Juares, Nicolas

77

84

56

76 73

82

60

85

70

50. Kalalang, Remigio

65

75

74

80 70

70

65

85

70.3

51. Layumas, Vicente L.

67

84

65

75 89

66

60

80

70.3

52. Leyson, Amancio F.

69

83

75

76 81

75

65

75

73.15

1948

53. Libanan, Marcelino

71

83

61

77 80

81

65

85

71.75

54. Lim, Jose E.

77

77

72

76 72

64

65

70

71.15

55. Lim, Jose F.

70

75

62

83 80

71

65

80

70.4

56. Linao, Mariano M.

66

84

76

78 80

75

60

75

71.75

57. Lopez, Angelo P.

67

81

75

72 79

81

55

80

71

58. Lopez, Eliezar M.

77

75

60

75 77

85

60

75

70.7

59. Lopez, Nicanor S.

72

71

70

78 77

84

60

75

71.55

60. Manoleto, Proceso D.

72

70

65

78 81

90

60

80

71.95

61. Mancao, Alfredo P.

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

70.95

62. Manera, Mariano A.

75

78

75

75 68

79

60

65

71

63. Mercado, Arsenio N.

67

64

71

83 76

76

65

80

70.95

64. Miranda, Benjamin G.

76

81

67

82 74

77

65

80

72.55

65. Manad, Andres B.

77

75

68

82 69

72

65

75

71.15

66. Orosco, Casimiro P.

72

84

69

81 70

82

65

75

71.9

67. Padua, Manuel C.

76

76

68

80 79

79

50

75

70.1

68. Palang, Basilio S.

71

75

82

71 55

87

55

75

69.6

69. Palma, Cuadrato

62

75

69

93 80

79

55

80

69.5

70. Paganiban, Jose V.

67

83

61

81 91

74

60

75

70.6

71. Pareja, Felipe

66

71

75

81 67

74

60

70

68.75

72. Patalinjug, Eriberto

73

77

78

73 78

71

55

75

71.25

73. Paulin, Jose C.

66

69

71

77 83

82

65

75

72.1

74. Pido, Serafin C.

72

78

63

80 71

85

70

80

72.05

75. Pimentel, Luis P.

77

75

76

81 76

68

55

80

71.6

76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C.

72

78

68

89 79

81

65

85

73.55

77. Regalario, Benito B.

72

80

64

80 75

81

55

80

69.55

78. Robis, Casto P.

62

77

74

73 68

80

70

80

70.9

79. Rodil, Francisco C.

68

69

70

81 76

75

65

75

70.75

80. Rodriguez, Mariano I.

80

75

69

80 72

80

65

80

73.35

81. Romero, Crispulo P.

78

75

66

77 76

83

65

75

72.85

82. Saez, Porfirio D.

75

75

72

81 69

77

60

75

71

83. Saliguma, Crisogono D.

79

79

74

78 69

65

65

70

71.8

84. Samano, Fortunato A.

75

84

72

77 70

82

60

75

71.9

85. Santos, Faustina C.

71

68

68

76 75

85

55

75

69.5

86. Santos, Josefina R.

68

69

76

71 77

82

65

75

72.3

87. Seludo, Ananias G.

75

80

69

79 77

82

65

75

73.25

88. Semilia, Rafael I.

68

85

55

83 89

79

65

80

71.25

89. Telan, Gaudencio

77

79

70

75 70

75

60

75

70.85

90. Tesorero, Leocadio T.

75

71

63

75 82

62

65

63

69.65

91. Torre, Valentin S. de la

85

81

71

76 69

65

55

70

70.4

92. Torres, Ariston L.

78

71

72

81 61

84

55

85

70.4

93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de

70

75

71

79 65

80

65

80

70.65

94. Viado, Jose

67

70

74

75 75

90

55

80

70.7

95. Villacarlos, Delfin A.

73

87

71

82 69

70

75

85

73.85

96. Villamil, Leonor S.

73

81

76

86 86

73

55

85

73.6

97. Zabala, Amando A.

76

70

67

75 76

76

60

75

70.6

70

71

78

81 76

72

64

96

73.4

99. Espaola, Pablo S.

71

78

55

76 85

69

65

93

70.2

100. Foronda, Clarencio J.

60

78

68

79 84

88

62

93

71.9

101. Hechanova, Vicente

59

76

75

75 69

68

75

96

71.3

MRD- Pealosa, Osias R.

102.

80

78

61

76 61

77

66

85

70.2

103. Sarmiento, Floro A.

65

86

63

82 89

72

60

72

70.15

75

85

68

78 69

67

65

69

70.25

61

87

75

70 57

85

83

82

72.8

1950

MRD-98. Cruz, Filomeno de la

MRD- Torre, Catalino P.

104.

105. Ungson, Fernando S.

1951

106. Abasolo, Romulo

77

70

64

65 76

70

76

64

71.7

107. Adeva, Daniel G.

75

59

74

65 69

51

78

67

70.4

108. Aguilar, Vicente Z.

73

63

68

75 70

69

75

75

71.25

109. Amodia, Juan T.

75

76

66

75 76

60

77

76

72.35

MRD- Aosa, Pablo S.

110.

76

78

63

75 74

61

75

79

71.6

111. Antiola, Anastacio R.

68

76

75

70 71

70

81

66

73.05

112. Aquino, S. Rey A.

70

71

71

60 74

62

76

77

71.1

113. Atienza, Manuel G.

71

78

68

80 86

51

82

75

73.85

114. Avancea, Alfonso

71

71

65

75 70

72

78

80

71.8

MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N.

115.

75

73

75

70 72

65

75

76

73.25

116. Barinaga, Jeremias L.

68

69

73

70 74

50

80

79

71.2

MRD- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.

117.

76

60

67

55 74

63

77

62

70.25

MRD- Benitez, Tomas P.

67

75

75

60 73

72

75

78

72.2

118.

119. Biason, Sixto F.

73

82

67

65 66

72

77

68

71.25

MRD- Brias, Isagani A.

120.

71

69

74

70 76

52

79

72

71.95

121. Buela, Arcadio P.

72

77

61

70 71

58

79

71

69.75

122. Cabilao, Leonardo S.

73

50

75

75 75

60

71

79

71.25

123. Cabrera, Ireneo M.

75

66

70

65 72

81

70

79

72.4

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

69.65

64

73

73

80 73

57

75

59

69.65

127. Calimlim, Pedro B.

66

82

69

60 69

52

83

75

70

128. Camello, Sotero H.

70

77

63

65 75

66

84

64

71.55

129. Campos, Juan A.

71

88

70

75 64

69

71

62

70.15

130. Castillo, Antonio del

78

78

70

60 79

67

69

76

72.65

124. Cacacho, Emilio V.

125. Calilung, Soledad C.

MRD- Calimlim, Jose B.

126.

MRD- Castillo, Dominador Ad.

131.

75

61

72

75 74

71

67

66

71.1

MRD- Castro, Jesus B.

132.

72

86

72

75 65

75

76

71

72.85

133. Casuga, Bienvenido B.

75

72

72

70 69

61

75

60

70.95

134. Cabangbang, Santiago

B.

77

67

61

80 73

59

83

76

72.2

135. Cruz, Federico S.

69

74

75

75 68

65

76

70

71.65

136. Dacanay, Eufemio P.

70

73

62

75 72

69

85

71

72.05

137. Deysolong, Felisberto

66

62

72

75 70

62

83

62

70.85

MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.

138.

78

79

63

75 73

75

81

59

73.5

139. Espinosa, Domingo L.

78

63

58

70 70

67

87

63

71.6

MRD- Farol, Evencia C.

140.

80

78

66

75 81

72

62

73

72.25

141. Felix, Conrado S.

71

71

75

65 70

58

75

69

70.75

142. Fernan, Pablo L.

67

88

66

85 73

68

78

75

72.35

143. Gandioco, Salvador G.

64

58

66

65 76

70

89

75

72.1

144. Gastardo, Crispin B.

70

69

68

75 78

66

86

72

73.9

145. Genson, Angelo B.

75

57

73

65 67

54

78

56

69.55

146. Guiani, Guinald M.

68

60

75

65 74

67

75

77

71.5

147. Guina, Graciano P.

66

69

67

60 78

52

83

61

69.6

74

74

75

75 71

69

75

71

73.35

149. Ibarra, Venancio M.

60

75

74

70 74

70

80

75

71.9

150. Imperial, Monico L.

72

78

75

75 72

56

82

77

73.7

MRD- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

151.

71

70

63

85 71

60

85

53

70.85

152. Inandan, Fortunato C.

77

77

67

53 73

75

79

57

72.5

153. Jimenez, Florencio C.

75

70

70

75 72

61

75

78

72.05

154. Kintanar, Woodrow M.

70

83

72

65 76

73

75

69

72.95

155. Languido, Cesar V.

63

71

63

85 70

61

85

79

70.55

156. Lavilles, Cesar L.

61

89

75

55 73

63

75

78

70.55

157. Llenos, Francisco U.

64

70

65

60 72

65

92

75

71.75

MRD- Homeres, Praxedes P.

148.

158. Leon, Marcelo D. de

63

73

60

85 75

75

90

70

72.75

159. Llanto, Priscilla

72

68

60

65 76

67

84

68

71.35

160. Machachor, Oscar

68

59

78

70 67

57

75

75

70.15

MRD- Magsino, Encarnacion

161.

77

66

70

70 76

71

75

61

72.75

MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio M.

162.

70

61

75

65 75

50

91

51

72.3

163. Manio, Gregorio

67

67

69

80 71

67

75

75

70.65

164. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

82

60

60 69

70

68

72

62.05

MRD- Marcial, Meynardo R.

165.

66

75

74

70 75

67

81

75

73.15

166. Martin, Benjamin S.

68

72

63

75 69

63

84

62

70.1

MRD- Monterroyo, Catalina S.

167.

70

80

75

80 76

66

82

51

73.95

MRD- Montero, Leodegario C.

168.

73

67

66

80 81

65

81

75

73.75

70

72

74

75 67

70

77

69

72.05

169. Monzon, Candido T.

170. Natividad, Alberto M.

73

79

68

65 73

69

75

79

72.2

MRD- Navallo, Capistrano C.

171.

70

72

68

85 81

66

71

74

72.1

66

66

75

65 79

68

85

62

73.5

75

81

76

65 74

67

75

69

73.75

174. Olaviar, Jose O.

72

70

69

55 66

70

77

75

70.5

MRD- Perez, Cesario Z.

175.

75

76

66

80 72

63

82

69

72.95

70

66

65

70 75

64

75

70

69.95

177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 75

73

62

65 78

59

75

66

70.2

178. Recinto, Ireneo I.

73

76

68

75 74

68

80

53

72.3

MRD- Redor, Francisco K.

179.

62

77

73

75 69

64

76

69

70

MRD- Regis, Deogracias A.

180.

76

74

68

65 65

65

88

75

73.35

67

78

61

80 71

77

79

65

70.9

172. Nisce, Camilo Z.

MRD- Ocampo, Antonio F. de

173.

176. Pogado, Causin O.

181. Rigor, Estelita C.

MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, Estela

182.

70

72

62

60 88

66

67

79

70.15

183. Rosario, Prisco del

70

64

70

70 72

73

85

57

72.65

184. Rosario, Vicente D. del

75

91

65

75 68

68

79

62

72.2

185. Saavedra, Felipe

73

80

63

75 76

73

68

62

70.35

186. Salazar, Alfredo N.

66

72

73

75 67

68

77

69

70.85

187. Salem, Romulo R.

77

81

72

65 73

60

76

75

73

188. Foz, Julita A.

75

72

75

75 65

70

76

64

72.5

189. Santa Ana, Candido T.

77

69

65

75 81

75

70

75

73

190. Santos, Aquilino

72

66

69

65 68

70

81

71

71.7

191. Santos, Valeriano V.

76

72

75

75 68

62

76

79

73.1

192. Suico, Samuel

73

79

72

75 71

59

84

65

73.3

193. Suson, Teodorico

74

68

66

80 66

59

79

67

70.35

194. Tado, Florentino P.

64

76

67

65 76

72

76

53

69.7

195. Tapayan, Domingo A.

69

72

69

70 76

73

82

79

73.75

MRDTiausas, Miguel V.
196.

67

60

71

75 79

67

84

60

72.7

197. Torres, Carlos P.

68

71

71

70 70

63

82

71

71.6

198. Tria, Hipolito

69

72

75

60 69

54

78

66

70.05

199. Velasco, Avelino A.

65

72

75

75 71

67

78

76

72.1

200. Villa, Francisco C.

65

80

73

75 68

79

65

75

70.2

201. Villagonzalo, Job R.

78

67

74

65 72

51

69

71

70.25

202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro

75

74

75

55 75

66

67

75

71.45

203. Abacon, Pablo

75

72

78

81 78

72

64

55

72.7

MRP- Abad, Agapito

204.

73

76

73

85 75

63

62

75

70.95

MRP- Abella, Ludovico B.

205.

70

81

76

81 70

66

77

58

72.7

MRP- Abellera, Geronimo F.

206.

75

79

79

87 76

51

63

70

71.7

MRP- Abenojar, Agapito N.

207.

71

72

78

84 70

75

69

70

72.9

1952

208. Alandy, Doroteo R.

64

83

93

91 68

59

60

60

71.2

209. Alano, Fabian T.

70

83

61

83 72

87

72

70

71.9

71

79

80

81 73

70

72

62

73.65

211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag.

75

85

71

73 76

65

68

65

71.85

212. Acosta, Dionisio N.

75

81

78

87 56

65

77

70

72.8

MRP- Abinguna, Agapito C.

213.

66

85

80

84 75

58

76

75

73.65

214. Adove, Nehemias C.

76

86

78

77 66

78

69

62

73.55

215. Adrias, Inocencio C.

75

83

61

88 76

67

79

75

73.4

216. Aglugub, Andres R.

75

83

73

88 72

62

72

62

72.65

217. Andrada, Mariano L.

76

85

66

87 63

77

75

77

73.

MRP- Almeda, Serafin V.

218.

72

72

75

81 61

67

73

65

70.75

219. Almonte-Peralta,
Felicidad

73

71

72

91 75

67

65

53

70.7

MRP- Amodia, Juan T.

220.

75

79

68

85 62

64

75

78

71.4

MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V.

210.

MRP- Antonio, Felino A.

221.

71

76

81

83 79

52

72

70

73.3

MRP- Antonio, Jose S.

222.

75

92

90

68 65

64

68

60

73.75

223. Aonuevo, Ramos B.

71

87

78

81 64

63

74

76

72.7

224. Aquino, S. Rey A.

67

77

57

78 69

70

69

80

67.7

225. Arteche, Filomeno D.

78

83

50

89 76

77

70

70

70.8

MRP- Arribas, Isaac M.

226.

75

78

70

81 73

70

67

78

72.2

MRP- Azucena, Ceferino D.

227.

72

67

78

89 72

67

77

65

73.95

228. Atienza, Ricardo

72

87

70

79 66

55

75

75

70.85

229. Balacuit, Camilo N.

75

78

89

75 70

54

66

75

73.3

MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S.

230.

77

84

83

80 69

70

61

65

73

231. Balcita, Oscar C.

75

77

79

90 64

60

67

50

70.65

232. Barilea, Dominador Z.

71

67

82

77 64

61

65

80

70.5

MRP- Banta, Jose Y.

233.

75

80

77

81 75

63

71

75

73.95

MRP- Barrientos, Ambrosio D.

234.

76

70

67

80 67

65

70

81

70.7

235. Batucan, Jose M.

66

76

78

88 62

76

67

78

71.2

236. Bautista, Atilano C.

70

82

84

85 58

61

71

62

71.25

237. Bautista, Celso J.

71

68

63

87 80

67

80

70

72.75

238. Belderon, Jose

76

81

76

92 70

66

67

62

72.65

MRP- Belo, Victor B.

239.

76

77

64

73 75

71

76

76

72.85

MRP- Bejec, Conceso D.

240.

79

80

73

82 63

77

75

50

73.15

MRP- Beltran, Gervasio M.

241.

72

75

81

73 75

57

75

80

73.95

MRP- Benaojan, Robustiano O. 74

242.

84

77

84 75

63

68

62

72.85

MRP- Beria, Roger C.

243.

70

80

79

79 68

72

64

78

71.85

MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M.

244.

75

86

65

92 64

64

84

75

73.45

MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M.

245.

73

69

78

83 73

59

70

82

72.75

MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B.

246.

76

86

76

83 68

59

71

78

73.05

247. Buenafe, Avelina R.

78

80

75

75 70

55

72

80

72.75

248. Bueno, Anastacio F.

73

78

71

78 71

67

71

60

71.15

249. Borres, Maximino L.

67

85

62

91 72

63

76

80

70.9

MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V.

250.

72

71

76

75 74

70

71

60

72.2

MRP- Cabello, Melecio F.

251.

72

78

78

89 58

70

67

71

70.5

MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M.

252.

79

88

53

91 71

85

75

76

73.3

253. Cabreros, Paulino N.

71

79

83

84 60

62

71

50

70.85

254. Calayag, Florentino R.

69

79

66

88 69

75

68

76

70.6

76

72

80

67 62

71

66

62

70.85

70

82

81

77 78

51

75

75

73.7

76

87

69

80 58

64

78

75

71.8

MRP- Calzada, Cesar de la

255.

256. Canabal, Isabel

MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N.

257.

258. Calagi, Mateo C.

73

93

71

87 70

66

69

62

71.8

259. Canda, Benjamin S.

72

71

77

90 62

75

66

82

71.95

260. Cantoria, Eulogio

71

80

71

89 70

55

72

75

71

261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado

67

78

71

90 65

75

72

60

70.65

262. Capitulo, Alejandro P.

75

70

53

87 78

63

76

91

71.2

MRP- Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo

263.

75

93

81

76 64

75

68

56

73.15

MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V.

264.

75

86

70

87 77

52

77

82

73.9

MRP- Campanilla, Mariano B.

265.

80

75

78

77 73

71

63

76

73.65

MRP- Campos, Juan A.

266.

66

85

83

84 67

61

80

57

73.25

267. Cardoso, Angelita G.

78

71

73

76 79

56

69

60

71.8

268. Cartagena, Herminio R.

71

72

65

89 64

73

80

70

71.65

65

75

77

76 85

60

75

69

73.15

MRP- Castro, Daniel T.

269.

270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V.

70

78

72

73 77

69

64

80

71.2

271. Castro, Pedro L. de

70

68

69

87 76

75

72

70

73.35

272. Cerio, Juan A.

75

82

75

86 60

54

76

75

71.75

273. Colorado, Alfonso R.

68

75

80

74 77

66

67

80

72.6

274. Chavez, Doroteo M.

73

65

79

84 73

69

66

84

73.1

275. Chavez, Honorato A.

77

76

79

86 74

53

71

75

73.65

MRP- Cobangbang, Orlando B. 69

276.

81

74

82 76

61

78

80

73.85

277. Cortez, Armando R.

78

60

88

86 60

66

69

64

73.1

278. Crisostomo, Jesus L.

76

87

74

76 62

55

76

66

71.45

MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto R.

279.

68

87

78

86 79

50

80

60

73.7

MRP- Cruz, Raymundo

280.

75

81

79

85 72

57

68

75

72.95

MRP- Cunanan, Jose C.

281.

78

92

63

83 76

72

68

65

72.4

70

82

64

92 67

75

73

76

71.45

282. Cunanan, Salvador F.

283. Cimafranca, Agustin B.

71

76

76

80 70

71

75

71

73.35

284. Crisol, Getulio R.

70

91

78

85 68

55

71

50

70.8

MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R.

285.

76

82

69

82 66

62

80

71

72.85

MRP- Datu, Alfredo J.

286.

70

75

72

86 80

55

68

79

71.5

287. Dacuma, Luis B.

71

67

87

83 71

50

65

70

71.25

MRP- Degamo, Pedro R.

288.

73

80

82

74 80

67

67

57

73.65

70

84

82

84 77

52

73

50

72.65

75

83

86

73 54

54

75

75

72.25

73

84

64

89 71

78

75

66

72.8

MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M.

292.

71

77

71

81 69

75

80

70

73.65

MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio R.

293.

70

76

82

73 79

70

72

56

73.9

MRP- Delgado, Abner

294.

75

84

63

67 64

60

70

72

68.35

289. Delgado, Vicente N.

MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A.

290.

291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo

MRP- Domingo, Dominador T.

295.

70

69

81

82 68

63

71

75

72.2

70

78

53

88 75

77

62

76

68.05

MRP- Duque, Antonio S.

297.

75

77

78

86 76

72

64

75

73.9

298. Duque, Castulo

75

80

73

83 66

67

65

66

70.65

299. Ebbah, Percival B.

70

80

85

76 66

63

76

75

73.95

300. Edisa, Sulpicio

65

77

75

89 75

62

75

65

72

301. Edradan, Rosa C.

70

75

84

84 71

59

69

86

73.4

MRP- Enage, Jacinto N.

302.

66

70

88

93 72

67

65

75

73.2

MRP- Encarnacion, Alfonso B.

303.

75

86

73

81 63

77

69

75

72.65

304. Encarnacion, Cesar

65

78

58

68 66

64

75

78

67.1

305. Estoista, Agustin A.

78

76

74

86 58

67

70

76

71.7

66

75

80

82 80

71

67

70

73.05

296. Ducusin, Agapito B.

MRP- Fabros, Jose B.

306.

MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P.

307.

77

69

82

83 65

60

75

75

73.9

308. Fajardo, Genaro P.

70

79

77

79 79

50

73

75

72.5

309. Evangelista, Felicidad P. 75

75

72

87 63

63

77

70

72.15

310. Familara, Raymundo Z.

68

75

87

83 64

65

68

65

71.85

311. Farias, Dionisio

70

78

89

66 65

75

70

50

72.75

312. Favila, Hilario B.

71

84

74

70 75

67

73

59

72.2

MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I.

313.

71

69

70

85 69

81

72

70

72.25

MRP- Fernando, Lope F.

314.

73

77

86

79 70

76

64

50

73

MRP- Flores, Dionisio S.

315.

78

72

77

83 67

60

68

73

72.05

MRP- Fortich, Benjamin B.

316.

70

82

70

70 78

65

64

75

70.35

MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de la

317.

76

88

72

74 60

71

79

79

73.55

72

79

71

77 68

61

76

60

70.9

76

81

74

69 71

71

73

60

72.85

318. Fohmantes, Nazario S.

MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B.

319.

320. Gabuya, Jesus S.

70

83

82

83 70

63

75

65

73.75

321. Galang, Victor N.

69

83

84

76 70

57

71

60

71.95

322. Gaerlan, Manuel L.

73

87

77

90 67

61

72

75

73.15

323. Galem, Nestor R.

72

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

73.05

324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B.

75

88

75

75 63

70

70

65

71.85

70

78

84

91 80

51

65

70

72.85

326. Galindo, Eulalio D.

70

89

87

65 78

71

62

62

73.4

327. Galman, Patrocinio G.

72

72

80

85 71

56

70

53

71.15

328. Gamalinda, Carlos S.

76

79

81

86 67

63

69

55

72.55

329. Gamboa, Antonio G.

71

67

70

72 76

60

75

68

70.95

330. Gannod, Jose A.

69

80

75

81 68

62

73

68

71.25

MRP- Garcia, Matias N.

331.

67

78

74

90 79

59

76

65

72.8

MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B.

325.

MRP- Ganete, Carmelo

332.

75

87

77

82 74

57

68

81

73.3

333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R.

75

67

80

82 67

57

64

70

70.5

334. Gofredo, Claro C.

68

78

72

86 78

52

70

76

70.9

335. Gomez, Jose S.

71

76

71

81 76

63

69

62

70.85

MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.

336.

68

93

85

78 64

69

70

54

72.35

MRP- Gonzales, Rafael C.

337.

77

75

71

89 55

70

70

60

70.05

MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. de

338.

66

68

90

84 77

59

69

65

73.3

339. Grageda, Jose M. A.

70

85

72

67 70

60

73

73

70.75

340. Guzman, Juan de

75

86

69

84 64

79

75

76

73.6

MRP- Guzman, Mateo de

341.

76

79

79

73 72

69

68

80

73.9

342. Guzman, Salvador B.

71

61

74

72 61

66

78

75

70.75

343. Guzman, Salvador T. de

75

84

64

81 74

61

78

58

71.75

344. Habelito, Geronimo E.

71

76

71

87 73

60

67

55

69.65

345. Hedriana, Naterno G.

75

68

84

76 66

58

76

60

72.9

346. Hernandez, Quintin B.

67

75

72

81 72

72

66

76

70.6

347. Homeres, Agustin R.

73

84

65

86 70

77

63

76

70.7

348. Ines, Leonilo F.

65

88

71

88 77

73

61

70

70.55

349. Jamer, Alipio S.

68

75

83

89 80

61

65

50

72

MRP- Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.

350.

75

65

68

85 76

70

83

54

73.8

MRP- Jardinico, Jr., Emilio

351.

73

86

72

78 82

67

67

64

72.8

MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F.

352.

76

75

78

84 71

66

70

77

73.85

353. Jaring, Antonio S.

72

77

79

70 72

57

71

50

70.75

MRP- Javier, Aquilino M.

354.

75

84

79

78 77

61

66

66

73.05

75

75

72

88 78

58

76

43

72.4

78

61

64

73 68

76

64

80

69.7

1952

355. Jomuad, Francisco

MRP- Jose, Nestor L.

356.

357. La Q, Jose M.

75

71

75

72 70

67

81

59

73.5

358. Leon, Brigido C. de

67

75

78

91 78

51

72

80

72.55

359. Leones, Constante B.

68

81

79

84 73

60

77

60

73

360. Liboro, Horacio T.

72

69

80

87 73

62

70

61

72.4

361. Llanera, Cesar L.

77

81

80

78 64

59

75

63

73

362. Lomontod, Jose P.

75

76

69

70 73

76

74

75

73.2

363. Luna, Lucito

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

68.4

MRP- Luz, Lauro L.

364.

76

90

78

88 64

58

75

77

73.95

MRP- Macasaet, Tomas S.

365.

73

81

72

83 66

75

72

70

72.5

366. Magbiray, Godofredo V.

80

67

84

76 70

62

65

68

73.05

367. Majarais, Rodolfo P.

70

62

64

82 88

75

71

79

72.85

MRP- Makabenta, Eduardo

368.

75

90

77

83 59

71

72

78

73.3

MRP- Malapit, Justiniano S.

369.

74

83

74

89 58

60

72

76

71.1

370. Maloles, Iluminado M.

70

87

73

76 77

50

76

76

72.3

371. Maniquis, Daniel R.

75

80

73

91 69

71

65

70

72.1

372. Maraa, Arsenio

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86

67.9

373. Marasigan, Napoleon

75

71

83

75 69

62

69

70

72.75

MRP- Marco, Jaime P.

374.

75

67

74

76 64

75

75

57

71.9

MRP- Martir, Osmundo P.

375.

70

86

76

78 72

71

75

53

72.95

MRP- Masancay, Amando E.

376.

73

87

75

77 72

50

78

80

73.2

MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio T.

377.

62

87

72

79 73

76

69

77

71.3

378. Mara, Guillermo L.

70

78

78

89 75

67

66

65

72.35

MRP- Mercado, Felipe A.

379.

73

77

82

82 78

52

69

85

73.9

MRP- Miculob, Eugenio P.

380.

70

82

73

86 77

52

79

65

72.8

381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr.,

79

78

73

75 71

68

69

53

71.95

MRP- Monponbanua, Antonio

79

79

68

88 64

78

69

83

73.1

382. D.

MRP- Montero, Leodegario C.

383.

72

89

69

89 70

68

70

75

72.15

384. Morada, Servillano S.

75

76

67

71 65

66

75

76

70.9

385. Mocorro, Generoso

78

84

78

84 60

73

68

70

73

75

78

75

85 72

55

77

66

73.15

387. Motus, Rodentor P.

80

78

70

94 72

75

70

57

73.75

388. Macario, Pedro R.

70

67

74

86 78

63

72

66

72.15

MRP- Nadela, Geredion T.

389.

72

64

64

81 73

50

75

75

69.15

MRP- Nazareno, Romeo P.

390.

67

70

71

76 76

79

75

57

72.05

391. Nieto, Benedicto S.

69

79

77

77 72

62

76

76

72.9

MRP- Noguera, Raymundo

392.

71

86

81

80 73

56

72

70

73.15

MRP- Nodado, Domiciano R.

393.

70

70

69

73 57

37

64

72

63.6

67

77

78

67 75

59

71

76

71.35

MRP- Mosquera, Estanislao L.

386.

394. Nono, Pacifico G.

MRP- Nuval, Manuel R.

395.

78

72

67

90 72

68

78

67

73.65

396. Ocampo, Augusto

75

90

77

72 69

55

65

67

60.7

397. Oliveros, Amado A.

72

75

68

72 84

50

75

79

71.9

398. Opia, Jr., Pedro

76

77

74

67 73

66

68

70

71.85

MRP- Olaviar, Jose O.

399.

70

62

85

81 74

50

68

79

71.8

MRP- Olandesca, Per O.

400.

70

91

76

87 72

66

70

79

73.45

401. Orden, Apolonio J.

72

65

84

86 66

50

72

68

71.45

402. Ortiz, Melencio T.

71

75

78

81 66

67

70

78

72.1

MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S.

403.

72

64

76

86 72

61

76

75

72.95

404. Pacifico, Vicente V.

76

79

69

80 76

52

72

80

71.95

MRP- Paderna, Perfecto D.

405.

75

69

72

75 78

58

75

70

72.6

406. Padlan, Crispin M.

71

66

76

79 68

67

74

66

71.65

407. Padilla, Jose C.

70

65

67

82 78

75

78

75

73.3

408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E. 71

88

78

86 59

75

78

50

72.95

MRP- Palma, Bartolome

409.

67

81

80

82 71

75

69

75

73.25

MRP- Papa, Angel A.

410.

75

72

85

85 77

59

63

71

73.45

MRP- Parayno, Mario V.

411.

71

88

74

89 69

66

76

73

73.65

412. Paria, Santos L.

70

87

85

77 64

67

63

76

71.85

MRP- Pasion, Anastacio

413.

63

80

68

81 82

79

76

58

72.55

414. Pastrana, Rizal R.

69

76

71

76 68

63

77

83

71.65

MRP- Paulin, Jose O.

415.

70

66

80

87 75

50

65

80

70.9

MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.

416.

79

87

73

83 69

71

68

65

73.2

417. Pea, Jesus

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4

418. Perez, Toribio R.

71

64

81

92 69

58

67

70

71.25

419. Pestao, Melquiades

77

81

74

87 59

68

76

75

73.2

MRP- Pido, Serafin C.

420.

77

81

72

82 69

71

60

75

71.15

421. Pinlac, Filemon

67

76

74

86 65

79

65

72

70.55

422. Poblete, Celso B.

72

79

82

76 66

64

74

50

72.15

68

70

75

87 74

67

64

75

70.8

424. Puzon, Eduardo S.

72

80

81

69 72

53

67

70

71.05

425. Quetulio, Josefina D.

75

90

60

93 64

78

76

83

72.9

MRP- Quipanes, Melchor V.

426.

69

88

79

82 65

62

71

66

71.55

MRP- Quietson, Bayani R.

427.

73

75

76

77 70

81

71

53

72.85

428. Racho, Macario D.

68

75

81

82 78

53

66

54

70.55

429. Ramirez, Sabas P.

71

80

73

87 62

62

75

80

71.65

80

83

79

79 62

72

68

65

73.25

MRP- Piza, Luz

423.

MRP- Raffian, Jose A.

430.

MRP- Ramos, Patricio S.

431.

75

87

76

75 72

72

61

75

72.25

MRP- Ramos-Balmori, Manuela 78

432.

84

76

90 48

75

80

65

73.45

MRP- Raro, Celso

433.

75

81

76

67 75

77

55

77

71.4

MRP- Rayos, Victor S.

434.

75

86

79

91 71

67

67

70

73.9

435. Revilla, Mariano S.

75

78

81

90 70

54

69

81

73.35

436. Reyes, Abdon L.

72

64

81

78 76

73

69

53

72.85

437. Reyes, Domingo B.

72

87

78

83 72

75

62

70

72.7

438. Reyes, Francisco M.

75

85

84

68 75

71

68

50

73.9

439. Reyes, Lozano M.

80

57

78

79 78

65

64

79

73.35

75

75

82

82 76

64

68

60

73.65

441. Rigonan, Cesar V.

71

85

65

86 75

70

76

70

72.7

442. Rivera, Honorio

71

56

70

90 71

65

75

71

71.2

MRP- Reyes, Oscar R.

440.

MRP- Rivero, Buenaventura A.

443.

72

88

72

94 68

73

66

80

72.6

MRP- Robles, Enrique

444.

75

77

75

77 82

64

69

70

73.7

445. Rodriguez, Orestes

Arellano

76

75

76

63 69

77

65

78

72.25

446. Roldan, Jose V.

67

80

79

83 73

71

75

70

73.9

447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del

80

75

65

70 68

72

80

70

73.15

448. Rosario, Restituto F. del

75

75

79

90 68

65

66

63

72.1

MRP- Sabelino, Conrado S.

449.

71

81

69

75 77

71

75

70

72.95

450. San Juan, Damaso

77

86

72

89 59

76

65

72

71.6

451. Saiel, Felix L.

72

93

76

80 67

75

66

62

72.1

452. Samaniego, Jesus B.

75

80

76

72 60

67

68

70

70.6

MRP- Sandoval, Emmanuel M. 75

453.

83

70

83 77

67

77

60

73.95

MRP- Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.

454.

71

75

81

90 62

64

76

68

72.95

455. Santiago, Jr., Cristobal

75

76

84

93 63

65

59

70

71.8

456. Santillan, Juanito Ll.

76

89

83

83 63

58

65

52

71.25

MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C.

457.

75

75

78

82 73

76

66

70

73.7

MRP- Santos, Ruperto M.

458.

67

54

69

76 63

64

71

60

66.75

MRP- Santos, Aquilino C.

459.

72

71

73

79 73

79

71

85

73.8

MRP- Santos, Rufino A.

460.

75

81

79

85 74

72

66

54

73.3

461. Suanding, Bantas

75

67

67

92 79

59

76

76

73.1

76

79

76

78 72

75

68

67

73.5

463. Songco, Felicisimo G.

70

68

82

84 60

69

76

65

73.35

464. Soriano, Aniceto S.

64

79

77

80 80

53

70

65

70.7

465. Suarez, Pablo D.

73

85

70

87 76

70

64

70

71.9

MRP- Sybico, Jesus L.

466.

79

70

70

72 75

75

72

60

73.05

69

68

77

79 74

68

72

60

71.85

MRP- Sulit, Feliz M.

462.

467. Tabaque, Benjamin R.

MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita

468.

81

79

72

80 62

75

73

80

73.95

MRP- Tando, Amado T.

469.

71

82

78

83 71

61

71

60

72

470. Tasico, Severo E.

71

69

75

89 70

75

67

63

71.65

471. Tiburcio, Ismael P.

73

82

72

93 76

57

68

54

71.15

MRP- Tiongson, Federico T.

472.

70

70

76

84 77

75

75

50

73.45

MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C.

473.

75

89

63

84 85

73

73

50

73.4

474. Torrijas, Alfredo A.

77

66

67

83 68

75

71

63

71.3

MRP- Tobias, Artemio M.

475.

69

58

74

81 71

55

65

57

67.55

MRP- Trillana, Jr., Apolonio

476.

76

86

76

86 70

68

75

50

73.8

MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O.

477.

66

91

83

75 63

66

67

65

70.8

478. Trinidad, Pedro O.

66

78

78

85 78

51

64

75

70.8

MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J.

479.

80

82

77

82 67

56

68

75

72.6

480. Umali, Osmundo C.

68

75

81

80 71

69

68

60

71.7

481. Umayam, Juanito C.

77

75

87

85 56

56

66

60

71

75

72

75

74 73

76

71

70

73.55

483. Valino, Francisco M.

72

81

80

84 62

78

71

75

73.7

484. Varela, Dominador M.

67

75

81

86 72

57

81

70

73.85

485. Vega, Macairog L. de

78

62

79

87 70

70

71

65

73.8

MRP- Velasco, Emmanuel D.

486.

71

80

74

85 60

66

76

76

71.85

487. Velez, Maria E.

73

70

89

80 56

50

72

67

71.05

MRP- Venal, Artemio V.

488.

78

91

58

67 76

55

75

73

73.65

489. Venus, Conrado B.

69

81

74

85 62

66

72

77

77.05

MRP- Verzosa, Federico B.

490.

75

79

72

88 76

68

74

59

73.7

MRP- Usita, Gelacio U.

482.

MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo V.

491.

75

83

70

76 64

64

75

65

71.2

MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio C.

492.

75

85

79

88 66

77

67

70

73.95

73

69

70

88 76

66

69

50

70.75

80

85

67

77 62

75

76

73

73.15

495. Viterbo, Jose H.

80

77

65

93 70

65

65

65

70.65

496. Yaranon, Pedro

70

77

76

85 72

50

75

75

71.85

MRP- Yasay, Mariano R.

497.

75

75

72

76 63

77

70

60

71.1

MRP- Ygay, Venancio M.

498.

73

80

83

84 62

59

72

77

72.65

499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro

73

82

78

75 60

81

75

75

73.95

500. Zamora, Alberto

70

65

76

79 62

77

69

82

71.3

501. Rigonan, Felipe C.

70

79

69

89 76

62

71

64

71.2

493. Villar, Custodio R.

MRP- Villaseor, Leonidas F.

494.

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in
previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with
their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were
denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Lan
d

Merc. Int. Pol. Crim Rem Leg. Gen.

.
.
Av.

1946

68

67

76

76 73

73

49

50

66.5

1950

59

80

67

77 62

80

71

57

67.4

1951

65

76

58

55 59

63

75

72

64.9

1952

65

68

75

84 72

59

73

57

69.75

1953

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

66.7

MRD-1949

75

75

70

75 77

76

60

90

72.15

1951

64

71

58

65 68

70

75

71

66.95

71

80

62

75 75

81

55

92

69.3

1. Amao, Sulpicio M.

2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.

3. Blanco, Jose B.

4. Condeno, Mateo

1950

1951

70

60

61

65 77

64

67

81

67.85

MRD-1949

69

70

76

73 76

71

55

60

68.65

1950

60

71

55

67 67

75

56

89

68.1

MRD-1949

60

70

82

79 70

69

60

80

69.25

1950

57

65

51

69 54

85

56

84

60.3

1946

63

53

69

76 75

76

57

69

66.55

1952

70

75

69

83 59

53

74

75

68.4

1949

72

68

68

75 75

72

60

75

69.35

1952

65

79

60

72 73

51

75

86

67.9

5. Ducusin, Agapito B.

6. Garcia, Manuel N.

7. Luna, Lucito A.

8. Maraa, Arsenio s.

9. Montano, Manuel M.

1951

61

60

58

60 70

63

75

64

64.8

1952

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50

66.4

1953

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

70.65

1950

25

75

45

75 45

52

46

71

46.2

1951

70

77

65

79 66

52

70

50

66.4

1952

75

75

75

62 75

70

60

66

70.4

1950

68

78

70

75 69

70

58

69

67.75

1951

65

62

75

60 73

57

75

71

66.8

65

75

72

75 60

75

55

85

66.65

10. Pea, Jesus S.

11. Placido, Sr., Isidro

12. Rementizo, Filemon S.

1949

1951

68

57

48

60 91

66

55

75

64.05

1952

68

53

68

67 58

56

75

64

65.7

1952

67

80

51

69 69

77

73

53

66.35

1953

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

70.9

1951

67

60

70

65 68

56

75

66

67.75

1952

70

71

67

78 67

75

71

70

70.1

1948

39

69

82

75 76

72

55

50

63.5

MRD-1949

67

56

69

75 72

77

60

75

68

1951

70

59

55

60 68

57

78

67

65.8

13. Amao, Sulpicio M.

14. Rodulfa, Juan T.

15. Sanchez, Juan J.

16. Santos, Constantino

1952

62

76

54

82 72

77

66

65

66.65

1953

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

70.4

1951

60

64

55

70 68

52

70

75

62.85

1952

75

64

70

81 76

55

61

75

69.1

1953

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

MRD-1948

50

64

76

66 66

69

60

52

63.1

MRD-1949

47

66

78

64 71

86

65

85

68

1950

35

65

40

75 63

57

27

49

45

MRD-1951

68

59

72

55 69

65

75

75

69.3

1953

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

71.05

17. Santos, Salvador H.

18. Sevilla, Macario C.

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented
motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A
list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those
who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int Pol. Crim Rem. Leg Gen.

.
.
.
Av.

1. Acenas, Calixto R.

73

70

68

62 82

51

67

77

73.45

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

72.8

3. Alejandro, Exequiel

67

72

71

75 80

76

75

77

73.4

4. Andres, Gregorio M.

70

73

86

58 79

50

71

78

72.7

5. Arnaiz, Antonio E.

66

80

76

58 79

68

77

81

73.4

6. Asis, Floriano U. de

66

78

75

81 77

55

73

69

71.25

7. Bacaiso, Celestino M.

71

65

76

68 76

50

75

70

70.95

8. Bala, Florencio F.

64

82

47

70 82

58

75

82

67

9. Baldo, Olegario A.

57

74

68

68 76

52

71

76

66.7

10. Barrios, Benjamin O.

65

71

76

75 80

62

83

73

73.95

11. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

73.35

12. Burgos, Dominador C.

72

80

89

61 66

37

69

68

70.05

13. Cario, Eldo J.

79

81

60

75 74

74

76

74

73

14. Casar, Dimapuro

67

73

84

79 77

61

71

74

73.35

15. Castaeda, Gregorio

70

73

80

71 75

70

73

78

73.95

16. Estrellado, Benjamin R.

67

79

64

73 82

62

71

74

70.2

17. Fabunan, Edilberto C.

70

72

68

69 77

60

76

74

71.1

18. Feril, Domingo B.

75

71

84

65 70

60

65

70

71.6

19. Fernandez, Alejandro G.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

72.8

20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss)

76

80

86

77 64

74

66

69

73.9

21. Garcia, Rafael B.

70

86

70

75 73

63

73

75

71.65

22. Gracia, Miguel L. de

73

68

75

59 80

51

72

71

71

23. Gungon, Armando G.

68

76

76

84 77

57

77

83

73.6

24. Gutierrez, Antonio S.

68

77

66

70 72

59

71

74

69.1

25. Ilejay, Abraham I.

77

70

76

77 81

62

70

68

73.7

26. Leon, Benjamin La. De

66

66

75

70 77

55

71

82

70.35

27. Lugtu, Felipe L.

62

70

78

65 78

56

69

81

69.9

28. Lukman, Abdul-Hamid

76

64

67

69 73

59

73

75

70.45

29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G.

77

76

68

68 71

51

75

78

70.85

30. Maloles, Julius G.

77

71

60

71 79

62

68

72

69.75

31. Mandi, Santiago P.

65

76

70

61 79

68

75

72

71.1

32. Margete, Rufino C.

70

76

66

75 85

73

71

75

72.75

33. Melocoton, Nestorio B.

70

81

73

78 83

52

72

75

72.35

34. Molina, Manuel C.

75

78

70

61 75

63

66

85

70.95

35. Muoz, Mariano A.

75

80

86

67 74

57

68

76

73.75

36. Navarro, Buenaventura M.

80

75

65

75 83

55

73

79

73

37. Nodado, Domiciano R.

60

67

67

50 70

50

56

75

61.7

38. Papas, Sisenando B.

65

62

71

61 70

56

66

67

66

39. Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando

63

75

71

62 83

67

70

72

70.4

40. Padula, Benjamin C.

70

77

54

62 74

78

75

68

69.05

41. Pasno, Enrique M.

78

72

66

54 71

58

72

78

69.85

42. Pea, Jr., Narciso

70

95

81

78 67

66

67

73

72.55

43. Peralta, Rodolfo P.

70

70

52

81 68

63

59

69

63.7

44. Pigar, Leopoldo R.

76

75

78

61 72

72

71

79

73.75

45. Publico, Paciano L.

68

69

76

76 70

59

74

67

70.6

46. Radaza, Leovigildo

75

78

76

61 77

50

71

86

72.2

47. Ramos, Bernardo M.

64

62

75

93 81

52

66

80

70.1

48. Rabaino, Andres D.

68

72

75

73 78

55

69

76

70.65

49. Ravanera, Oscar N.

70

77

80

71 82

62

69

78

73.6

50. Renovilla, Jose M.

65

75

80

68 79

52

62

78

69.5

51. Sabaot, Solomon B.

69

73

80

69 82

69

69

79

73.85

52. Sumaway, Ricardo S.

66

76

69

76 74

56

72

68

69.1

53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O.

70

77

74

75 73

50

68

72

69.55

54. Vera, Federico V. de

60

61

47

77 69

50

67

77

60.9

55. Viray, Venancio Bustos

65

67

67

52 73

64

71

65

67.15

56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss)

63

70

56

75 68

54

70

77

64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int Pol. Crim Rem. Leg Gen.

.
.
.
Av.

1. Ala, Narciso

70

71

73

59 73

74

81

77

73.5

2. Alcantara, Pedro N.

67

70

75

85 87

54

71

80

72.8

3. Arellano, Antonio L.

74

66

73

60 78

63

78

72

72.9

4. Buhay, Eduardo L.

73

76

71

91 76

61

74

78

73.35

5. Calautit, Celestino R.

71

78

84

75 75

61

68

72

73.2

6. Casuncad, Sulvio P.

61

73

82

69 81

68

71

84

73.05

7. Enriquez, Pelagio y
Concepcion

84

69

76

75 82

50

58

79

72.05

8. Estonina, Severino

80

74

64

89 81

56

68

82

72.4

9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q.

65

75

87

80 81

63

61

80

72.8

70

75

77

75 78

67

72

73

73.35

10. Fernandez, Luis N.

11. Figueroa, Alfredo A.

70

75

87

78 75

50

68

68

72.3

12. Formilleza, Pedro

65

75

89

68 83

51

70

75

73.25

13. Garcia, Manuel M.

69

68

83

83 73

62

62

70

71

14. Grospe, Vicente E.

68

75

78

66 79

61

69

82

71.6

15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952)

72

79

86

78 60

61

75

70

73.05

16. Jacobo, Rafael F.

76

76

75

74 76

50

72

76

72.3

17. Macalindong, Reinerio L.

67

77

79

79 74

72

68

77

72.75

18. Mangubat, Antonio M.

70

70

78

61 80

74

62

70

71.45

19. Montano, Manuel M.

78

64

66

68 81

50

71

78

70.65

20. Plomantes, Marcos

73

67

74

58 68

70

76

71

71.6

21. Ramos, Eugenio R.

70

80

76

67 72

69

72

79

72.6

22. Reyes, Juan R.

71

73

77

76 81

59

72

74

73.2

23. Reyes, Santiago R.

65

78

83

60 76

75

70

70

72.9

24. Rivera, Eulogio J.

65

67

78

74 75

62

69

80

70.9

25. Santos, Constantino P.

73

71

70

65 78

64

65

78

70.4

26. Santos, Salvador H.

70

71

79

65 72

54

66

80

70

27. Sevilla, Macario C.

70

73

74

70 81

56

69

71

71.05

28. Villavicencio, Jose A.

78

75

70

67 69

77

64

77

73.2

29. Viray, Ruperto G.

76

73

76

73 80

58

68

83

73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490
candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in
the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74
per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those
who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the
Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession.
The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16
immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and
Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in
which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into
account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be
required to the examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. Any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled
to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any
other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with
a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the
comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices
while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that
if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort
of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a
time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one
or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last
required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in
those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which
requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The
only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years
intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the
requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a
person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar
examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately
render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago,
another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no
grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to
be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment
provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In
other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination
since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their nonadmission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general
average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.

We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not
exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to
govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have
the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and
rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more
but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question
involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might
have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion,
when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are
officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the
Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be
its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in
any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that
required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered
and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The
present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect
says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because
he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be
admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another
important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of
the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the
4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group
of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950
bar examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court
made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar
examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to
the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying
the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration
would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said

provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to
grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other
professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by
2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No.
371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO
AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations
after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding
oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing
general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar
examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that
said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another
opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to
1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily
not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court
has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the
apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it
is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination,
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be
restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below
50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is
believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last
world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the
supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the
President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would
admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He
considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who
took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted,
considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable
difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such
precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates
who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still
enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective
statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as
against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a
common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a
class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each.
(Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which
must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a
class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only
a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does
not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils
with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain
the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide
margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be
revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77
L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of
the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated
from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID

Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the
information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the
same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant
Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by
virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972
(many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration 1 submitted its Report dated November 30,
1972, with the "earnest recommendation" on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 526 2 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its
[the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine
Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to
the petition were orally expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted, 3 and all
parties were thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda. 4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act
6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such
conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes
of this Act. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall
be included in the annual appropriations for the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and
contains all necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations
of the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to them by that body in a
national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as ample material upon which the Court
may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It
will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on
pages 3 to 5 of its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of
law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the
Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do

so: the State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government
authority of a national organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the
Rule of Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their
own organized action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law,
and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal
profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent
legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of
the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of
its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to
integrate is an inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act
6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative
declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically, will "raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the
Courts have upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:
Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.
The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover,
clothed with public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but
also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part
in one of the most important functions of the State, the administration of justice, as
an officer of the court.
Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and
just that the exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer's public responsibilities.
These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but
there can be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can
operate effectively without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all
attorneys be required to contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar
through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated
Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not
already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official national
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which
every lawyer is already a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues
in reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial
support of group activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the
legal service available to the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional services, may
require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the
State. The legal profession has long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the
Court levies a tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the
purpose of a tax is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that
purpose. It would not be possible to push through an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the
integration of the Bar far outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member
that might result from his required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any
manner he wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the
Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said
member is opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become
unconstitutional for the Bar to use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for
which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free
speech" issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us
to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his
liberties were to be thus extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
war or of any other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The

right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the
requirement to pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the
Bar a new system which they hitherto have not had and through which, by proper
work, they will receive benefits they have not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their
public responsibilities in a more effective manner than they have been able to do in
the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of regulatory
power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for
new benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at
this time requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater
influence and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual
lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of
unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better and more effective discharge
by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No
less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from the unification of
the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government
authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the
inevitable result; effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and
politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved
the administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission
in the matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the
archipelago who have turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor
of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed

opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on
the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in
favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are noncommittal. 5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced
in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions
in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully
and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of
the Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance
with the attached COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 15, 1961
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without
taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
BARRERA, J.:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting
to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others, that he is a Filipino

citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken
and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid where he
studied and finished the law course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he
was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of
Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state, he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.
After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:
(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State can not be invoked by applicant. Under Article 11
thereof;
The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the validity
of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their
professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).
from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens
desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their
professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession
in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the
privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines.
(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides .
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to practice the
liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national
authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the
Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the latter. . . ..
It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired
to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2,9, and 16
thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in
the Philippine he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See
Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo, J., on leave, took no part.

Concepcion, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. L-1117

March 20, 1944

THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,

vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an
advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided
if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor.
Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but
subsequently, thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he
alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and that he never had
any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a
profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a
member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for
a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon
27, Code of Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the
period of one month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular
letters. That case, however, was more serious than this because there the solicitations were
repeatedly made and were more elaborate and insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is
of the opinion and so decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canadas free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications
and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be
allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the
lawyers oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine
bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege.4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyers
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate
of the license to practice.10
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership
dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal
profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of
Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The
practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father
validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This
is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to
the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching
has resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis
University in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the
condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the
Professional Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public
accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election
Officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing
that Ching was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5
May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed
to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to

submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the
documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen
and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine
citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be
Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that "(w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by
election upon reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2)
conditions must concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective,
namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then
explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a
reasonable time after reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of
Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953).
But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not
made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence.
However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the
relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school
records and other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino
citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang
Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a

notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to
the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the
Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether
his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority,
the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in
the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the
Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine
citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election
should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on
the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the
proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has
been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the
age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is
not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after
reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3)
years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional
provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became
of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951,
when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he
had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made
"upon reaching the age of majority." 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35)
years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over
fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of
the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be
stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him
Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio
Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien,
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban
Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and
campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. 16
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was
born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the
requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing
Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter
since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect
Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother.
In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a
Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and
privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332;
Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic,

L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano
vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the
erroneous belief that he is a non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age
constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have
elected Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re
Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who
still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came
up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these
persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien.
Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt
in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private
respondent would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in
an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his
consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree
with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age
of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond

the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter,
file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and
promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as
a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for
admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

October 15, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case is concerned with charges that, in preparing a decision for the Court, a designated
member plagiarized the works of certain authors and twisted their meanings to support the decision.
The Background Facts
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya and about 70 other elderly women, all members of the Malaya Lolas
Organization, filed with the Court in G.R. No. 162230 a special civil action of certiorari with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General.
Petitioners claimed that in destroying villages in the Philippines during World War II, the Japanese
army systematically raped them and a number of other women, seizing them and holding them in
houses or cells where soldiers repeatedly ravished and abused them.
Petitioners alleged that they have since 1998 been approaching the Executive Department,
represented by the respondent public officials, requesting assistance in filing claims against the
Japanese military officers who established the comfort women stations. But that Department
declined, saying that petitioners individual claims had already been fully satisfied under the Peace
Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Petitioners wanted the Court to render judgment, compelling the Executive Department to espouse
their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the International
Court of Justice and other international tribunals.
On April 28, 2010, the Court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners action. Justice Mariano C. del
Castillo wrote the decision for the Court. The Court essentially gave two reasons for its decision:
it cannot grant the petition because, first, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative under the Constitution and the law to determine whether to espouse petitioners
claim against Japan; and, second, the Philippines is not under any obligation in international
law to espouse their claims.
On June 9, 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Courts decision. More than
a month later on July 18, 2010, counsel for petitioners, Atty. Herminio Harry Roque, Jr.,
announced in his online blog that his clients would file a supplemental petition "detailing
plagiarism committed by the court" under the second reason it gave for dismissing the
petition and that "these stolen passages were also twisted to support the courts erroneous
conclusions that the Filipino comfort women of World War Two have no further legal
remedies." The media gave publicity to Atty. Roques announcement.
On July 19, 2010, petitioners filed the supplemental motion for reconsideration that Atty. Roque
announced. It accused Justice Del Castillo of "manifest intellectual theft and outright
plagiarism"1 when he wrote the decision for the Court and of "twisting the true intents of the

plagiarized sources to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment." 2 They charged Justice Del
Castillo of copying without acknowledgement certain passages from three foreign articles:
a. A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens by Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Yale Journal
of International Law (2009);
b. Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime by Mark Ellis, Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law (2006); and
c. Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations by Christian J. Tams, Cambridge University Press
(2005).
Petitioners claim that the integrity of the Courts deliberations in the case has been put into question
by Justice Del Castillos fraud. The Court should thus "address and disclose to the public the truth
about the manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism"3 that resulted in gross prejudice to the
petitioners.
Because of the publicity that the supplemental motion for reconsideration generated, Justice Del
Castillo circulated a letter to his colleagues, subsequently verified, stating that when he wrote the
decision for the Court he had the intent to attribute all sources used in it. He said in the pertinent
part:
It must be emphasized that there was every intention to attribute all sources, whenever due. At no
point was there ever any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own. We recall that
this ponencia was thrice included in the Agenda of the Court en banc. It was deliberated upon during
the Baguio session on April 13, 2010, April 20, 2010 and in Manila on April 27, 2010. Each time,
suggestions were made which necessitated major revisions in the draft. Sources were re-studied,
discussions modified, passages added or deleted. The resulting decision comprises 34 pages with
78 footnotes.
xxxx
As regards the claim of the petitioners that the concepts as contained in the above foreign materials
were "twisted," the same remains their opinion which we do not necessarily share. 4
On July 27, 2010, the Court En Banc referred the charges against Justice Del Castillo to its
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, chaired by the Chief Justice, for investigation and
recommendation. The Chief Justice designated retired Justice Jose C. Vitug to serve as consultant
of the Committee. He graciously accepted.
On August 2, 2010, the Committee directed petitioners to comment on Justice Del Castillos verified
letter. When this was done, it set the matter for hearing.
In the meantime, on July 19, 2010, Evan Criddle wrote on his blog that he and his co-author Evan
Fox-Descent (referred to jointly as Criddle-Descent) learned of alleged plagiarism involving their
work but Criddles concern, after reading the supplemental motion for reconsideration, was the
Courts conclusion that prohibitions against sexual slavery are not jus cogens or internationally
binding norms that treaties cannot diminish.
On July 23, 2010, Dr. Mark Ellis wrote the Court expressing concern that in mentioning his work, the
Court "may have misread the argument [he] made in the article and employed them for cross

purposes." Dr. Ellis said that he wrote the article precisely to argue for appropriate legal remedy for
victims of war crimes.
On August 8, 2010, after the referral of the matter to the Committee for investigation, the Dean of the
University of the Philippines (U.P.) College of Law publicized a Statement from his faculty, claiming
that the Vinuya decision was "an extraordinary act of injustice" and a "singularly reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land." The statement said that Justice
Del Castillo had a "deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors work," and that the Courts
decision amounted to "an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and
deceive."5
On August 18, 2010 Mr. Christian J. Tams wrote Chief Justice Renato C. Corona that, although
relevant sentences in the Courts decision were taken from his work, he was given generic reference
only in the footnote and in connection with a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than
with respect to the passages taken from his work. He thought that the form of referencing was
inappropriate. Mr. Tams was also concerned that the decision may have used his work to support an
approach to erga omnes concept (obligations owed by individual States to the community of nations)
that is not consistent with what he advocated.
On August 26, 2010, the Committee heard the parties submissions in the summary manner of
administrative investigations. Counsels from both sides were given ample time to address the
Committee and submit their evidence. The Committee queried them on these.
Counsels for Justice Del Castillo later asked to be heard with the other parties not in attendance so
they could make submissions that their client regarded as sensitive and confidential, involving the
drafting process that went into the making of the Courts decision in the Vinuya case. Petitioners
counsels vigorously objected and the Committee sustained the objection. After consulting Justice
Del Castillo, his counsels requested the Committee to hear the Justices court researcher, whose
name need not be mentioned here, explain the research work that went into the making of the
decision in the Vinuya case. The Committee granted the request.
The researcher demonstrated by Power Point presentation how the attribution of the lifted
passages to the writings of Criddle-Descent and Ellis, found in the beginning drafts of her
report to Justice Del Castillo, were unintentionally deleted. She tearfully expressed remorse
at her "grievous mistake" and grief for having "caused an enormous amount of suffering for
Justice Del Castillo and his family."6
On the other hand, addressing the Committee in reaction to the researchers explanation, counsel
for petitioners insisted that lack of intent is not a defense in plagiarism since all that is required is for
a writer to acknowledge that certain words or language in his work were taken from anothers work.
Counsel invoked the Courts ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of
Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine,7arguing that standards on plagiarism in the
academe should apply with more force to the judiciary.
After the hearing, the Committee gave the parties ten days to file their respective memoranda. They
filed their memoranda in due course. Subsequently after deliberation, the Committee submitted its
unanimous findings and recommendations to the Court.
The Issues
This case presents two issues:

1. Whether or not, in writing the opinion for the Court in the Vinuya case, Justice Del Castillo
plagiarized the published works of authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis.
2. Whether or not Justice Del Castillo twisted the works of these authors to make it appear
that such works supported the Courts position in the Vinuya decision.
The Courts Rulings
Because of the pending motion for reconsideration in the Vinuya case, the Court like its Committee
on Ethics and Ethical Standards will purposely avoid touching the merits of the Courts decision in
that case or the soundness or lack of soundness of the position it has so far taken in the same. The
Court will deal, not with the essential merit or persuasiveness of the foreign authors works, but how
the decision that Justice Del Castillo wrote for the Court appropriated parts of those works and for
what purpose the decision employed the same.
At its most basic, plagiarism means the theft of another persons language, thoughts, or ideas. To
plagiarize, as it is commonly understood according to Webster, is "to take (ideas, writings, etc.) from
(another) and pass them off as ones own."8 The passing off of the work of another as ones own is
thus an indispensable element of plagiarism.
The Passages from Tams
Petitioners point out that the Vinuya decision lifted passages from Tams book, Enforcing Erga
Omnes Obligations in International Law (2006) and used them in Footnote 69 with what the author
thought was a mere generic reference. But, although Tams himself may have believed that the
footnoting in this case was not "an appropriate form of referencing,"9 he and petitioners cannot deny
that the decision did attribute the source or sources of such passages. Justice Del Castillo did not
pass off Tams work as his own. The Justice primarily attributed the ideas embodied in the passages
to Bruno Simma, whom Tams himself credited for them. Still, Footnote 69 mentioned, apart from
Simma, Tams article as another source of those ideas.
The Court believes that whether or not the footnote is sufficiently detailed, so as to satisfy the
footnoting standards of counsel for petitioners is not an ethical matter but one concerning clarity of
writing. The statement "See Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (2005)" in
the Vinuya decision is an attribution no matter if Tams thought that it gave him somewhat less credit
than he deserved. Such attribution altogether negates the idea that Justice Del Castillo passed off
the challenged passages as his own.
That it would have been better had Justice Del Castillo used the introductory phrase "cited in" rather
than the phrase "See" would make a case of mere inadvertent slip in attribution rather than a case of
"manifest intellectual theft and outright plagiarism." If the Justices citations were imprecise, it would
just be a case of bad footnoting rather than one of theft or deceit. If it were otherwise, many would
be target of abuse for every editorial error, for every mistake in citing pagination, and for every
technical detail of form.
The Passages from Ellis
and Criddle-Descent
Petitioners also attack the Courts decision for lifting and using as footnotes, without attribution to the
author, passages from the published work of Ellis. The Court made the following statement on page
27 of its decision, marked with Footnote 65 at the end:

We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as
well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. 65 xxx
Footnote 65 appears down the bottom of the page. Since the lengthy passages in that footnote
came almost verbatim from Ellis article,10 such passages ought to have been introduced by an
acknowledgement that they are from that article. The footnote could very well have read:
65 In an article, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law (2006), Mark Ellis said: The concept of rape as an international crime is
relatively new. This is not to say that rape has never been historically prohibited, particularly in war.
But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the
Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity
explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of
Amity and Commerce between Prussia and the United States provides that in time of war all women
and children "shall not be molested in their persons." The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between
his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements Of The U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions
classified rape as a crime of "troop discipline." (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International
Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 Duke J. Comp. Intl. L. 219,
224). It specified rape as a capital crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at 236). The 1907
Hague Convention protected women by requiring the protection of their "honour." ("Family honour
and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice,
must be respected." Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct.
18, 1907. General Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, "Affirmation of the
Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal"; General
Assembly document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c)
of the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following:
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions
on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not prosecuted. (Judge
Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime and Punishment in the
International Arena,7 ILSA J. Intl. Comp. L. 667, 676.) However, International Military Tribunal for the
Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far
East Tribunal held General Iwane Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota
criminally responsible for a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons under their
authority. (The Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of The International Military Tribunal For The Far East
445-54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control Council Law No.
10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity. Law No. 10, adopted by the
four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to establish a uniform basis for prosecuting war
criminals in German courts. (Control Council for Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons
Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette
Control Council for Germany 50, 53 (1946))

The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first modernday international instrument to establish protections against rape for women. Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950) [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a
war crime, and a crime against humanity.
But, as it happened, the acknowledgment above or a similar introduction was missing from Footnote
65.
Next, petitioners also point out that the following eight sentences and their accompanying footnotes
appear in text on pages 30-32 of the Vinuya decision:
xxx In international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority.71
1avvphi1

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,72 but peremptory norms
began to attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential
1937 article, Forbidden Treaties in International Law.73 The recognition of jus cogens gained even
more force in the 1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (VCLT).74 Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained
the status of jus cogens,75 the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for
identifying peremptory norms.
After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in
1963 that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of
international law as having the character of jus cogens."76 In a commentary accompanying the draft
convention, the ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of
this rule to be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."77
Thus, while the existence of jus cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its
substance,77 beyond a tiny core of principles and rules.78
Admittedly, the Vinuya decision lifted the above, including their footnotes, from CriddleDescents article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens.11 Criddle-Descents footnotes were
carried into the Vinuya decisions own footnotes but no attributions were made to the two
authors in those footnotes.
The Explanation
Unless amply explained, the above lifting from the works of Ellis and Criddle-Descent could
be construed as plagiarism. But one of Justice Del Castillos researchers, a court-employed
attorney, explained how she accidentally deleted the attributions, originally planted in the
beginning drafts of her report to him, which report eventually became the working draft of the
decision. She said that, for most parts, she did her research electronically. For international
materials, she sourced these mainly from Westlaw, an online research service for legal and
law-related materials to which the Court subscribes.
In the old days, the common practice was that after a Justice would have assigned a case for study
and report, the researcher would source his materials mostly from available law books and published

articles on print. When he found a relevant item in a book, whether for one side of the issue or for
the other, he would place a strip of paper marker on the appropriate page, pencil mark the item, and
place the book on his desk where other relevant books would have piled up. He would later
paraphrase or copy the marked out passages from some of these books as he typed his manuscript
on a manual typewriter. This occasion would give him a clear opportunity to attribute the materials
used to their authors or sources.
With the advent of computers, however, as Justice Del Castillos researcher also explained, most
legal references, including the collection of decisions of the Court, are found in electronic diskettes
or in internet websites that offer virtual libraries of books and articles. Here, as the researcher found
items that were relevant to her assignment, she downloaded or copied them into her "main
manuscript," a smorgasbord plate of materials that she thought she might need. The researchers
technique in this case is not too far different from that employed by a carpenter. The carpenter first
gets the pieces of lumber he would need, choosing the kinds and sizes suitable to the object he has
in mind, say a table. When ready, he would measure out the portions he needs, cut them out of the
pieces of lumber he had collected, and construct his table. He would get rid of the scraps.
Here, Justice Del Castillos researcher did just that. She electronically "cut" relevant materials from
books and journals in the Westlaw website and "pasted" these to a "main manuscript" in her
computer that contained the issues for discussion in her proposed report to the Justice. She used
the Microsoft Word program.12 Later, after she decided on the general shape that her report would
take, she began pruning from that manuscript those materials that did not fit, changing the positions
in the general scheme of those that remained, and adding and deleting paragraphs, sentences, and
words as her continuing discussions with Justice Del Castillo, her chief editor, demanded.
Parenthetically, this is the standard scheme that computer-literate court researchers use everyday in
their work.
Justice Del Castillos researcher showed the Committee the early drafts of her report in the
Vinuya case and these included the passages lifted from the separate articles of CriddleDescent and of Ellis with proper attributions to these authors. But, as it happened, in the
course of editing and cleaning up her draft, the researcher accidentally deleted the
attributions.
First Finding
The Court adopts the Committees finding that the researchers explanation regarding the
accidental removal of proper attributions to the three authors is credible. Given the
operational properties of the Microsoft program in use by the Court, the accidental
decapitation of attributions to sources of research materials is not remote.
For most senior lawyers and judges who are not computer literate, a familiar example similar to the
circumstances of the present case would probably help illustrate the likelihood of such an accident
happening. If researcher X, for example, happens to be interested in "the inalienable character of
juridical personality" in connection with an assignment and if the book of the learned Civilist, Arturo
M. Tolentino, happens to have been published in a website, researcher X would probably show
interest in the following passage from that book:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.15
xxx

_____________________________
15 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Because the sentence has a footnote mark (#15) that attributes the idea to other sources, it is
evident that Tolentino did not originate it. The idea is not a product of his intellect. He merely lifted it
from Von Tuhr and Valverde, two reputable foreign authors.
When researcher X copies and pastes the above passage and its footnote into a manuscript-in-themaking in his computer, the footnote number would, given the computer program in use,
automatically change and adjust to the footnoting sequence of researcher Xs manuscript. Thus, if
the preceding footnote in the manuscript when the passage from Tolentino was pasted on it is 23,
Tolentinos footnote would automatically change from the original Footnote 15 to Footnote 24.
But then, to be of use in his materials-gathering scheme, researcher X would have to tag the
Tolentino passage with a short description of its subject for easy reference. A suitable subject
description would be: "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23" The footnote mark, 23
From Tolentino, which researcher X attaches to the subject tag, serves as reminder to him to
attribute the passage in its final form to Tolentino. After the passage has been tagged, it would now
appear like this:
The inalienable character of juridical personality.23
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.24
xxx
_____________________________
23 From Tolentino.
24 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
The tag is of course temporary and would later have to go. It serves but a marker to help researcher
X maneuver the passage into the right spot in his final manuscript.
The mistake of Justice Del Castillos researcher is that, after the Justice had decided what texts,
passages, and citations were to be retained including those from Criddle-Descent and Ellis, and
when she was already cleaning up her work and deleting all subject tags, she unintentionally deleted
the footnotes that went with such tagswith disastrous effect.
To understand this, in Tolentinos example, the equivalent would be researcher Xs removal during
cleanup of the tag, "The inalienable character of juridical personality.23," by a simple "delete"
operation, and the unintended removal as well of the accompanying footnote (#23). The erasure of
the footnote eliminates the link between the lifted passage and its source, Tolentinos book. Only the
following would remain in the manuscript:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence, they
cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.

As it happened, the Microsoft word program does not have a function that raises an alarm when
original materials are cut up or pruned. The portions that remain simply blend in with the rest of the
manuscript, adjusting the footnote number and removing any clue that what should stick together
had just been severed.
This was what happened in the attributions to Ellis and Criddle-Descent. The researcher deleted the
subject tags and, accidentally, their accompanying footnotes that served as reminder of the sources
of the lifted passages. With 119 sources cited in the decision, the loss of the 2 of them was not easily
detectable.
Petitioners point out, however, that Justice Del Castillos verified letter of July 22, 2010 is
inconsistent with his researchers claim that the omissions were mere errors in attribution. They cite
the fact that the Justice did not disclose his researchers error in that letter despite the latters
confession regarding her mistake even before the Justice sent his letter to the Chief Justice. By
denying plagiarism in his letter, Justice Del Castillo allegedly perjured himself and sought to
whitewash the case.13
But nothing in the July 22 letter supports the charge of false testimony. Justice Del Castillo merely
explained "that there was every intention to attribute all sources whenever due" and that there was
never "any malicious intent to appropriate anothers work as our own," which as it turns out is a true
statement. He recalled how the Court deliberated upon the case more than once, prompting major
revisions in the draft of the decision. In the process, "(s)ources were re-studied, discussions
modified, passages added or deleted." Nothing in the letter suggests a cover-up. Indeed, it did not
preclude a researchers inadvertent error.
And it is understandable that Justice Del Castillo did not initially disclose his researchers error. He
wrote the decision for the Court and was expected to take full responsibility for any lapse arising
from its preparation. What is more, the process of drafting a particular decision for the Court is
confidential, which explained his initial request to be heard on the matter without the attendance of
the other parties.
Notably, neither Justice Del Castillo nor his researcher had a motive or reason for omitting
attribution for the lifted passages to Criddle-Descent or to Ellis. The latter authors are highly
respected professors of international law. The law journals that published their works have
exceptional reputations. It did not make sense to intentionally omit attribution to these
authors when the decision cites an abundance of other sources. Citing these authors as the
sources of the lifted passages would enhance rather than diminish their informative value.
Both Justice Del Castillo and his researcher gain nothing from the omission. Thus, the failure
to mention the works of Criddle-Decent and Ellis was unquestionably due to inadvertence or
pure oversight.
Petitioners of course insist that intent is not material in committing plagiarism since all that a writer
has to do, to avoid the charge, is to enclose lifted portions with quotation marks and acknowledge
the sources from which these were taken.14 Petitioners point out that the Court should apply to this
case the ruling in University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals and
Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine.15 They argue that standards on plagiarism in the academe
should apply with more force to the judiciary.
But petitioners theory ignores the fact that plagiarism is essentially a form of fraud where intent to
deceive is inherent. Their theory provides no room for errors in research, an unrealistic position
considering that there is hardly any substantial written work in any field of discipline that is free of

any mistake. The theory places an automatic universal curse even on errors that, as in this case,
have reasonable and logical explanations.
Indeed, the 8th edition of Blacks Law Dictionary defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing
presentation of another person's original ideas or creative expressions as one's own." 16 Thus,
plagiarism presupposes intent and a deliberate, conscious effort to steal anothers work and pass it
off as ones own.
Besides, the Court said nothing in U.P. Board of Regents that would indicate that an intent to pass
off anothers work as ones own is not required in plagiarism. The Court merely affirmed the
academic freedom of a university to withdraw a masters degree that a student obtained based on
evidence that she misappropriated the work of others, passing them off as her own. This is not the
case here since, as already stated, Justice Del Castillo actually imputed the borrowed passages to
others.
Second Finding
The Court also adopts the Committees finding that the omission of attributions to Criddle-Descent
and Ellis did not bring about an impression that Justice Del Castillo himself created the passages
that he lifted from their published articles. That he merely got those passages from others remains
self-evident, despite the accidental deletion. The fact is that he still imputed the passages to the
sources from which Criddle-Descent and Ellis borrowed them in the first place.
This is best illustrated in the familiar example above. After the deletion of the subject tag and,
accidentally, its footnote which connects to the source, the lifted passage would appear like this:
xxx Both juridical capacity and capacity to act are not rights, but qualities of persons; hence,
they cannot be alienated or renounced.43
_____________________________
43 3 Von Tuhr 296; 1 Valverde 291.
Although the unintended deletion severed the passages link to Tolentino, the passage remains to be
attributed to Von Tuhr and Valverde, the original sources that Tolentino himself cites. The text and its
footnote reference cancel out any impression that the passage is a creation of researcher X. It is the
same with the passages from Criddle-Descent and Ellis. Because such passages remained
attributed by the footnotes to the authors original sources, the omission of attributions to CriddleDescent and Ellis gave no impression that the passages were the creations of Justice Del Castillo.
This wholly negates the idea that he was passing them off as his own thoughts.
True the subject passages in this case were reproduced in the Vinuya decision without placing them
in quotation marks. But such passages are much unlike the creative line from Robert Frost, 17 "The
woods are lovely, dark, and deep, but I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep, and
miles to go before I sleep." The passages here consisted of common definitions and terms, abridged
history of certain principles of law, and similar frequently repeated phrases that, in the world of legal
literature, already belong to the public realm.
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels,18 while the academic publishing model is based on the
originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis,
which encourages courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their
decisions. The judge is not expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The

strength of a decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and
long held legal opinions it draws from.
Third Finding
Petitioners allege that the decision twisted the passages from Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis. The
Court adopts the Committees finding that this is not so. Indeed, this allegation of twisting or
misrepresentation remains a mystery to the Court. To twist means "to distort or pervert the meaning
of."19 For example, if one lifts the lyrics of the National Anthem, uses it in his work, and declares that
Jose Palma who wrote it "did not love his country," then there is "twisting" or misrepresentation of
what the anthems lyrics said. Here, nothing in the Vinuya decision said or implied that, based on the
lifted passages, authors Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis supported the Courts conclusion that the
Philippines is not under any obligation in international law to espouse Vinuya et al.s claims.
The fact is that, first, since the attributions to Criddle-Descent and Ellis were accidentally deleted, it
is impossible for any person reading the decision to connect the same to the works of those authors
as to conclude that in writing the decision Justice Del Castillo "twisted" their intended messages.
And, second, the lifted passages provided mere background facts that established the state of
international law at various stages of its development. These are neutral data that could
support conflicting theories regarding whether or not the judiciary has the power today to
order the Executive Department to sue another country or whether the duty to prosecute
violators of international crimes has attained the status of jus cogens.
Considering how it was impossible for Justice Del Castillo to have twisted the meaning of the
passages he lifted from the works of Tams, Criddle-Descent, and Ellis, the charge of "twisting" or
misrepresentation against him is to say the least, unkind. To be more accurate, however, the charge
is reckless and obtuse.
No Misconduct
On occasions judges and justices have mistakenly cited the wrong sources, failed to use quotation
marks, inadvertently omitted necessary information from footnotes or endnotes. But these do not, in
every case, amount to misconduct. Only errors that are tainted with fraud, corruption, or malice
are subject of disciplinary action.20This is not the case here. Justice Del Castillos acts or
omissions were not shown to have been impelled by any of such disreputable motives.21 If the
rule were otherwise, no judge or justice, however competent, honest, or dedicated he may be,
can ever hope to retire from the judiciary with an unblemished record.22
No Inexcusable Negligence
Finally, petitioners assert that, even if they were to concede that the omission was the result of plain
error, Justice Del Castillo is nonetheless guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. They point out that
he has full control and supervision over his researcher and should not have surrendered the writing
of the decision to the latter.23
But this assumes that Justice Del Castillo abdicated the writing of the Vinuya decision to his
researcher, which is contrary to the evidence adduced during the hearing. As his researcher
testified, the Justice set the direction that the research and study were to take by discussing
the issues with her, setting forth his position on those issues, and reviewing and
commenting on the study that she was putting together until he was completely satisfied with
it.24 In every sense, Justice Del Castillo was in control of the writing of the report to the Court,
which report eventually became the basis for the decision, and determined its final outcome.

Assigning cases for study and research to a court attorney, the equivalent of a "law clerk" in the
United States Supreme Court, is standard practice in the high courts of all nations. This is dictated
by necessity. With about 80 to 100 cases assigned to a Justice in our Court each month, it would be
truly senseless for him to do all the studies and research, going to the library, searching the internet,
checking footnotes, and watching the punctuations. If he does all these by himself, he would have to
allocate at least one to two weeks of work for each case that has been submitted for decision. The
wheels of justice in the Supreme Court will grind to a halt under such a proposition.
What is important is that, in this case, Justice Del Castillo retained control over the writing of the
decision in theVinuya case without, however, having to look over his researchers shoulder as she
cleaned up her draft report to ensure that she hit the right computer keys. The Justices researcher
was after all competent in the field of assignment given her. She finished law from a leading law
school, graduated third in her class, served as Editor-in Chief of her schools Law Journal, and
placed fourth in the bar examinations when she took it. She earned a masters degree in
International Law and Human Rights from a prestigious university in the United States under the
Global-Hauser program, which counsel for petitioners concedes to be one of the top post graduate
programs on International Law in the world. Justice Del Castillo did not exercise bad judgment in
assigning the research work in the Vinuya case to her.
Can errors in preparing decisions be prevented? Not until computers cease to be operated by
human beings who are vulnerable to human errors. They are hypocrites who believe that the courts
should be as error-free as they themselves are.
Incidentally, in the course of the submission of petitioners exhibits, the Committee noted that
petitioners Exhibit J, the accusing statement of the Faculty of the U.P. College of Law on the
allegations of plagiarism and misinterpretation, was a mere dummy. The whole of the statement was
reproduced but the signatures portion below merely listed the names of 38 faculty members, in solid
rows, with the letters "Sgd" or "signed" printed beside the names without exception. These included
the name of retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, a U.P. professor.
Because the Committee declined to admit a mere dummy of Exhibit J, it directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy within three days of the August 26 hearing. 25 He complied. As it turned out,
the original statement was signed by only a minority of the faculty members on the list. The set of
signatories that appeared like solid teeth in the dummy turned out to be broken teeth in the original.
Since only 37 out of the 81 on the list signed the document, it does not appear to be a statement of
the Faculty but of just some of its members. And retired Justice V. V. Mendoza did not sign the
statement, contrary to what the dummy represented. The Committee wondered why the Dean
submitted a dummy of the signed document when U.P. has an abundance of copying machines.
Since the above circumstances appear to be related to separate en banc matter concerning the
supposed Faculty statement, there is a need for the Committee to turn over the signed copy of the
same to the en banc for its consideration in relation to that matter.
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the above, the Court:
1. DISMISSES for lack of merit petitioner Vinuya, et al.s charges of plagiarism, twisting of
cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano C. del Castillo;
2. DIRECTS the Public Information Office to send copies of this decision to Professors Evan
J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, Dr. Mark Ellis, and Professor Christian J. Tams at their
known addresses;

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to provide all court attorneys involved in legal research and
reporting with copies of this decision and to enjoin them to avoid editing errors committed in
the Vinuya case while using the existing computer program especially when the volume of
citations and footnoting is substantial; and
4. Finally, DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to acquire the necessary software for use by the
Court that can prevent future lapses in citations and attributions.
Further, the Court DIRECTS the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards to turn over to the en
banc the dummy as well as the signed copy of petitioners Exhibit J, entitled "Restoring Integrity," a
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law for the en bancs
consideration in relation to the separate pending matter concerning that supposed Faculty
statement.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC

February 8, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas Organization, seek
reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October 12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of
plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in
connection with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v. Romulo. 1
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or approved of the commission
of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns
plagiarism as the world in general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition. To plagiarize, says
Webster, is "to steal and pass off as ones own" the ideas or words of another. Stealing implies
malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary, the worlds leading English law dictionary quoted by the
Court in its decision, defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own." 2 The presentation of another persons
ideas as ones own must be deliberate or premeditateda taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the meaning of plagiarism
errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its application. For instance, the
Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity ordains that "plagiarism is identified not through intent
but through the act itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to ones self what is not ones work,
whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that plagiarism has occurred. Students
who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of malice are not excused." 3
But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The decision makes this
clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is based on the originality of
the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages
courts to cite historical legal data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not

expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a decision lies in the
soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and long held legal opinions it draws from. 4
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college thesis, for instance,
should contain dissertations embodying results of original research, substantiating a specific
view.5 This must be so since the writing is intended to earn for the student an academic degree,
honor, or distinction. He earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others, copies
their dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question that a cheat
deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious intent found in
dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what evidence is sufficient to prove the
commission of such dishonest conduct than in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be
easy enough for a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work of
others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence of such copied work in
his paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the students
work shows as a whole that he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of
hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize as an original piece of
work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by the government for the public good. Judges
issue decisions to resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who ache for
speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that need to be protected.
The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are originally crafted but that they are fair
and correct in the context of the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style,
is the object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts, including the
Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when reinstating the laws involved in
the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply the laws as these are written. But laws include,
under the doctrine of stare decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to
specific situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to disturb
settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same; regardless of whether the parties or property are the same." 6
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are quite often entangled in
apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions, prompting experts in the law to build up
regarding such matters a large body of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often
become part of legal writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or
solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and correct, judges and
practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift passages from such precedents and writings,
at times omitting, without malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar Association puts it succinctly.
When practicing lawyers (which include judges) write about the law, they effectively place their ideas,
their language, and their work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected.
Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without fear of committing some
wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is everything. Legal
disputes often centre round the way in which obligations have been expressed in legal documents

and how the facts of the real world fit the meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained.
This, in conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be sought in
articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the community of lawyers have
together contributed to this body of knowledge, language, and expression which is common property
and may be utilized, developed and bettered by anyone. 7
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the public domain is not
unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her
dissenting opinion, observed in her Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts
published in a legal periodical or language from a partys brief are used without giving
attribution. Thus judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve
the matter before them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings
intended to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more
importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges
adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.8
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past decisions from the time of
Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it is likely to discover that it has not on occasion
acknowledged the originators of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are
true for many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by magistrates
from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts
nationwide and with them, the municipal trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the
judiciarys more than 100 years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned
as plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They are not. Their decisions
analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. They
identify and formulate the issue or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws,
rulings, principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The decisions then draw their apt
conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings, principles, or authorities apply to the
particular cases before the Court. These efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of the judges
creativity. It is hereactually the substance of their decisionsthat their genius, originality, and
honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by the opposing sides in
a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the core of the issues that the parties
raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It
was here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign authors cited in the
charges against him. He compared the divergent views these present as they developed in history.
He then explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and
applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts and the law the
right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was original. He had but done an
honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and
elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its judges
or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.

This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the petitioners, like all lawyers
handling cases before courts and administrative tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule
they receive compensation for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they
render to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They should not
be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as they do not depart, as officers of
the court, from the objective of assisting the Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either previous decisions of the
courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judges words to lend weight to a particular point either
with or without attribution. The words of scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending on
reputation. Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In England this place is given
to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely considered authoritative. A lawyer can do little better
than to frame an argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsburys. While in many
cases the very purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the author, this is not always the
case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely
without attribution.
xxxx
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is only the arrogant fool
or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the established template and reformulate an existing
idea in the belief that in doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the
wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally considered foolhardy.9
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a case of first impression and petitioners, joined by
some faculty members of the University of the Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him
with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect for failing to attribute
lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as already stated are false, applying the
meaning of plagiarism as the world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that he lifted from their
works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the
evidence as found by its Ethics Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in
the beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly qualified and
experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted the same at the time she was
cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive
for omitting the attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she cited
in her research, had high reputations in international law.
1awphi1

Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages found in their
works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were not themselves the
originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of Justice Del Castillo accidentally
deleted the attribution to them, there remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of
the same passages to the earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in
the first place. In short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the
passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their face that the lifted
ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He did not pass them off as his
own.

With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that Justice Del Castillo had
also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his decision in another case, Ang Ladlad v.
Commission on Elections.10 Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close examination and as Justice Del
Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for reconsideration, he in fact made
attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed from his sources although they at times
suffered in formatting lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon the motion of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit motion for reconsideration-in-intervention
dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the
Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
VICENTE SOTTO

January 21, 1949

In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court.

Vicente Sotto in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This is a proceeding for contempt of our court against the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto, who was
required by their Court on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt to court for having issued a written statement in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which statement, as published in the Manila
Times and other daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53.) interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days
imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret
to say that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the majority of its
members, In the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during
these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the first measures,
which as its objects the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry from the
impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the
Philippine Judiciary.
Upon his request, the respondent was granted ten days more besides the five originally given him to
file his answer, and although his answer was filed after the expiration of the period of time given him
the said answer was admitted. This Court could have rendered a judgment for contempt after
considering his answer, because he does not deny the authenticity of the statement as it has been
published. But, in order to give the respondent ample opportunity to defend himself or justify the
publication of such libelous statement, the case was set for hearing or oral argument on January 4,

the hearing being later postponed to January 10, 1949. As the respondent did not appear at the date
set for hearing, the case was submitted for decision.
In his answer, the respondent does not deny having published the above quoted threat, and
intimidation as well as false and calumnious charges against this Supreme Court. But he therein
contends that under section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, which confers upon this Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, "this Court has
no power to impose correctional penalties upon the citizens, and that the Supreme Court can only
impose fines and imprisonment by virtue of a law, and has to be promulgated by Congress with the
approval of the Chief Executive." And he also alleges in his answer that "in the exercise of the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution, the respondent made his statement in the press
with the utmost good faith and with no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable
members of this high Tribunal, who, in his opinion, erroneously decided the Parazo case; but he has
not attacked, or intended to attack the honesty or integrity of any one.' The other arguments set forth
by the respondent in his defenses observe no consideration.
Rules 64 of the rules promulgated by this court does not punish as for contempt of court an act
which was not punishable as such under the law and the inherent powers of the court to punish for
contempt. The provisions of section 1 and 3 of said Rule 64 are a mere reproduction of section 231
and 232 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190, amended, in connection with the doctrine
laid down by this Court on the inherent power if the superior courts to punish for contempt is several
cases, among them In re Kelly, 35 Phil., 944. That the power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts of superior statue, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of
last resort in the United States, which is applicable in this jurisdiction since our Constitution and
courts of justice are patterned as expounded in American Jurisprudence is as follows:
The power of inflicting punishment upon persons guilty of contempt of court may be regarded
as an essential element of judicial authority, IT is possessed as a part of the judicial authority
granted to courts created by the Constitution of the United States or by the Constitutions of
the several states. It is a power said to be inherent in all courts general jurisdiction, whether
they are State or Federal; such power exists in courts of general jurisdiction independently of
any special express grant of statute. In many instances the right of certain courts of tribunals
to punish for contempt is expressly bestowed by statue, but such statutory authorization is
unnecessary, so far as the courts of general jurisdiction are concerned, and in general adds
nothing statutory authority may be necessary as concerns the inferior courts statutory
authority may be necessary to empower them to act. (Contempt, 12 Jur., pp. 418, 419.)
In conformity with the principle enunciated in the above quotation from American Jurisprudence, this
Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:
The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the
same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of
justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional
right to have their fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or
public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the
fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms
of law, free from outside coercion or interference. Any publication, pending a suit, reflecting
upon the upon court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with reference to
the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of court and is

punishable. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all court. The summary power to
commit and punish for contempt tending to obstructed or degrade the administration of
justice, as inherent in courts as essential to the execution of their powers and to the
maintenance of their authority is a part of the law of the land. (In reKelly, 35 Phil., 944, 945.)
Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the
decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded
it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its
decision. Had the respondent in the present case limited himself to as statement that our decision is
wrong or that our construction of the intention of the law is not correct, because it is different from
what he, as proponent of the original bill which became a law had intended, his criticism might in that
case be tolerated, for it could not in any way influence the final disposition of the Parazo case by the
court; inasmuch as it is of judicial notice that the bill presented by the respondent was amended by
both Houses of Congress, and the clause "unless the court finds that such revelation is demanded
by the interest of the State" was added or inserted; and that, as the Act was passed by Congress
and not by any particular member thereof, the intention of Congress and not that of the respondent
must be the one to be determined by this Court in applying said act.
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was
then and still is pending reconsideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only
intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the members of Justices from eleven to seven, so as
to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case
by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of
this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration of justice, for in his above-quoted
statement he says:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures,
which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy.
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many
blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that
the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision
was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine
the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme
Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino
people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these
are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be

driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other,
is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions,
which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Respondent's assertion in his answer that "he made his statement in the press with the utmost good
faith and without intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of this high
Tribunal," if true may mitigate but not exempt him from liability for contempt of court; but it is belied
by his acts and statements during the pendency of this proceeding. The respondent in his petition of
December 11, alleges that Justice Gregorio Perfecto is the principal promoter of this proceeding for
contempt, conveying thereby the idea that this Court acted in the case through the instigation of Mr.
Justice Perfecto.
It is true that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its
fullest extent, but license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused
with liberty in its true sense. As important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
exercise of the right of the citizen, is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As Judge
Holmes very appropriately said U. S vs Sullens (1929), 36 Fed. (2nd), 230, 238, 239: "The
administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally
sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights
and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which
the former receives its prerogatives and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must
be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case
where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications which
reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, this court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court
must be permitted to proceed with the disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital
to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will
act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
It is also well settled that an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts, he may be removed from office or
stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L. R. A. [N.S.], 586, 594).
In view of all the foregoing, we find the respondent Atty. Vicente Sotto guilty of contempt of this Court
by virtue of the above-quoted publication, and he is hereby sentenced to pay, within the period of
fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of P1,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
The respondent is also hereby required to appear, within the same period, and show cause to
this Court why he should not be disbarred form practicing as an attorney-at-law in any of the
courts of this Republic, for said publication and the following statements made by him during
the pendency of the case against Angel Parazo for contempt of Court.
In his statement to the press as published in the Manila Times in its issue of December 9, 1948, the
respondent said "The Supreme Court can send me to jail, but it cannot close my mouth; " and in his

other statement published on December 10, 1948, in the same paper, he stated among others: "It is
not the imprisonment that is degrading, but the cause of the imprisonment." In his Rizal day speech
at the Abellana High School in Cebu, published on January 3, 1949, in the Manila Daily Bulletin, the
respondent said that "there was more freedom of speech when American Justices sat in the Tribunal
than now when it is composed of our countrymen;" reiterated that "even if it succeeds in placing him
behind bars, the court can not close his mouth," and added: "I would consider imprisonment a
precious heritage to leave for those who would follow me because the cause is noble and lofty." And
the Manila Chronicle of January 5 published the statement of the respondent in Cebu to the effect
that this Court "acted with malice" in citing him to appear before this Court on January 4 when "the
members of this Court know that I came here on vacation." In all said statements the respondent
misrepresents to the public the cause of the charge against him for contempt of court. He says that
the cause is for criticizing the decision of this Court in said Parazo case in defense of the freedom of
the press, when in truth and in fact he is charged with intending to interfere and influence the final
disposition of said case through intimidation and false accusations against this Supreme Court. So
ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 7399

August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered
on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker towards
then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct

contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions
be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her
speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a
view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be
an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC]," which, after sending out public invitations for
nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants
that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC
should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her,
would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of
the Constitution, which provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session.No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof." Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in
every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose "is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and
that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."1
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of
their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would
be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial
upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges
speculation as to the motives.2
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature
or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee
rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by
the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. 3 The disciplinary authority of the
assembly4 and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed
in the name of parliamentary immunity.5
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable

criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could
not be the last word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady
senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted "to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court," and calling the Court a "Supreme Court of
idiots."
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.6 We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this Court and believe
that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own
hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.
1avvphi1

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed
to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional
and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other,
is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. 7Senator
Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make
on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting
tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am
humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy
the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she considered as
an "unjust act" the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice.
But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for
the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,8 have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court
and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar
with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.9
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 10 we reiterated our pronouncement in
Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer11 that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained
by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to uphold.
The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,

makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and
clamor." And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good
fidelity x x x to the courts."
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel12 that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice." Faith in the courts, a lawyer should
seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government
and to the attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an
officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." 13
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the
Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also
constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.14
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long
as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,15 a good character being
an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
"conduct" or "misconduct," the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any
misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice of their professionwould show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law
invest in them.16
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of law,
has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of
courts, and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it
in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda,
and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang17who repeatedly insulted and
threatened the Court in a most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago for
what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and
its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of
disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to reinstill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and
remind her anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is
not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples
representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before
the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall. 18 It is intended to protect members of

Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making
prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, "offensive or improper language against
another Senator or against any public institution."19 But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary
remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to
the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance.20 The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We
cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the
highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts. 21
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech.
Her implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam DefensorSantiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice