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Doctrine: Police Power
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law
on April 2, 1994. The Act, approved by President Fidel V. Ramos, seeks to provide an
adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country.
In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on
the Philippine blood banking system entitled "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the
Philippine Blood Banking System." It was found out that, among other things, that blood
sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have any of
the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely,
malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than
those donated to PNRC.
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of
commercial blood banks took effect. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of
the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Whether or not RA 7719 is a valid exercise of police power.
Yes, RA 7719 is a valid exercise of states police power.
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of
the people is a primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services
Act was enacted in the exercise of the State's police power in order to promote and
preserve public health and safety.
Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, requires the interference of the State; and,
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the objective
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public
health by ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary
blood donation. Attaining this objective requires the interference of the State given the
disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial blood banks. This action may
seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial blood
banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the
The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State's police
power. Therefore, the Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action
that is both necessary and reasonable for the common good. Police power is the State
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.


Doctrine: Police Power
The Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 grants senior citizens a 20% discount in the
purchase of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments whether it falls either
as a prescription or nonprescription medicine. Petitioner drugstore contends that they
are subject to just compensation since the discount is their money taken away from them
for public use.
Whether or not the tax deduction is a valid exercise of police power
Yes. It is similar to the power of eminent domain however this is of police power and just
compensation is not necessary. Property rights must bow to the primacy of police power
because property rights must yield to general welfare. Hence, the discount is a valid
exercise of police power since it would benefit the general welfare of the senior citizens
of the country.

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Doctrine: Classification by itself is not prohibited. It can only be assailed if it is deemed
invidious, that is, if it is not based on substantial differences. A police power measure
may be assailed upon proof that it unduly violates constitutional limitations like due
process and equal protection of the law.
Petitioner assailed the validity of administrative issuances by DPWH banning the use of
motorcycles on limited access highways, declaring certain portions of NLEX, SLEX and
Coastal Road as limited access facilities and allowing only motorcycles with engine
displacements of 400cc inside these highways. for violating RA 2000, also known as the
Limited Access Highway Act.
Whether or not the administrative issuances are valid
The Supreme Court declared void DO Nos. 74, 215 and 123 since the DPWH has no
authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Allowing only
motorcycles with at least 400 cubic centimeters engine displacement to use the toll ways
violates the equal protection clause. However, the Supreme Court declared AO 1 valid as
it does not impose unreasonable restrictions. It merely outlines several precautionary
measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These rules were designed to ensure
public safety and the uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.
The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of
the police power of the state. The police power is far-reaching in scope and is the most
essential, insistent and illimitable of all government powers. The tendency is to extend
rather than to restrict the use of police power. The sole standard in measuring its
exercise is reasonableness.

The city government of Markina, on September 30, 1994, enacted Ordinance no. 192
entitled, Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of
Marikina. The sections 3.1 and 5 of the ordinance says respectively, that the fences of
the front yard should not exceed the height of 1 meter and at least be 80% see-thru; and
in no case shall walls be built within the 5-meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial monument
line and educational and religious institutions. Such violation and non-observance of the
ordinance will render the demolition of the fences at the cost of the owner of the
On April, 200, the City government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering
them to demolish and replace the fence of their property in Marikina to make it 80% seethru, and, at the same time, move it back by 6 meters to provide parking space for
vehicles to park. The respondent then asked for an extension of time to comply with the
ordinance, but the City Government insisted in the enforcement of the subject
The respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the RTC branch 273 of
Marikina. The respondent then argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of
jurisdiction in enforcing the Ordinance and that such contravenes with their rights, and
that implementation of the ordinance in their property would be tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only
appropriate a portion of their land through eminent domain with just compensation.
The Petitioners on the other hand, countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of
Police power, by virtue of which, they could retrain property rights for the protection of
public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public convenience and general
Whether or not Ordinance no. 192 is not a valid exercise of Police Power


The Court ruled that Ordinance no. 192 must be struck down.


Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morality, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people.

St. Scholasticas Colege (SSC) and St. Scholasticas Academi-Marikina, Inc. are
educational Institutions under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Respondent
SSC owns four parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 sq./m located in Marikina
Heights. It is also the residence if the Benedictine Order, the formation house of the
novices and the retirement home of the elderly sisters, the area was enclosed by a tall
concrete perimeter fence built some 30 years ago.

The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to
enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and

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safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property.

construction site was within the no build zone demarcated in Municipal Ordinance

In White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila, for an ordinance to be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up,
no action was ever taken by the respondent mayor.

1. It must not contravene with the Constitution or any statute;

2. Must not be unfair and oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6. Must not be unreasonable.

A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan
issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Coves

To successively invoke the apparent exercise of police power, 2 tests must be made to
distinguish such, the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test.
Under the Rational Relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
(1) The interests of public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonable necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
There must be a lawful subject, and a lawful means to provide for it.
The lacking of concurrence to either of the requisites shall render the police power be
stuck down as it is an arbitrary intrusion into private rights and violation of the due
process clause.
The real intent if of the setback requirement was to make parking space free of use by
the public and not for the exclusive use of the respondents. This would be tantamount
to a taking of private property for public use without just cause and compensation. Anent
the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and un-neighborhood lines
due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of these goals. The court, thus finds section 5 of the Ordinance to be
unreasonable and oppressive. Hence the exercise of Police Power is invalid.

EO 10 was partially implemented on June 10, 2011. Thereafter, two more instances
followed wherein respondents demolished the improvements introduced by Boracay
West Cove.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA
Alleging that the order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion
Contentions of West Cove:
1) The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per
se, given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the
2) Municipality of Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order
before proceeding with the demolition.
Contention of the Mayor:
The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal
of illegally constructed buildings
The CA dismissed the petition solely on procedural ground, i.e., the special writ of
certiorari can only be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions and since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the exercise of
executive functions, and not of judicial or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.


Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines, Inc. applied for a building permit
covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan,
which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The Municipal Zoning
Administrator denied petitioners application on the ground that the proposed

Whether the judicial proceedings should first be conducted before the LGU can order
the closure and demolition of the property in question.
The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be classified as a nuisance per se
which can therefore be summarily abated. Here, it is merely the hotels particular
incident, its location and not its inherent qualities that rendered it a nuisance. Otherwise
stated, had it not been constructed in the no build zone, Boracay West Cove could have

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secured the necessary permits without issue. As such, even if the hotel is not a nuisance
per se, it is still a nuisance per accidens
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a
thing is a nuisance per se. Despite the hotels classification as a nuisance per accidens,
however, the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotels demolition. This is
because, in the exercise of police power and the general welfare clause, property rights
of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives
of the government. Moreover, the Local Government Code authorizes city and municipal
governments, acting through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. The
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing and demolition of

Basco et al argued that PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause because it legalizes
PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed,
together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
Anent the issue of local autonomy, Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 forced cities like
Manila to waive its right to impose taxes and legal fees as far as PAGCOR is concerned;
that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder
from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges
or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local
autonomy principle.
Whether or not PD 1869 is contrary to morals, public policy and public order;


Doctrine: Police Power is defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." Its
scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to
conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. It is a fundamental
attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of
In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by
Presidential Decree 1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. PAGCORs operation was a success hence in 1978, PD
1399 was passed which expanded PAGCORs power. In 1983, PAGCORs charter was
updated through PD 1869. PAGCORs charter provides that PAGCOR shall regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law.
Section 1 of PD 1869 provides:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to
centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing
franchises or permitted by law.
Atty. Humberto Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of the law creating
PAGCOR. They claim that PD 1869 because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy
and order, and is unconstitutional because a) it violates the equal protection clause and
b) it violates the local autonomy clause of the constitution.

No. Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the
prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the
exercise of its police power. The courts find that - The concept of police power is wellestablished in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or
property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the
future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits.
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin
to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very
fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has
enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the
expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to
govern its citizens". The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with selfprotection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It is "the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." It is a dynamic force that enables the state
to meet the agencies of the winds of change.

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The petition seeks to declare Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118 of the Quezon City Council
null and void. The said law, Regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation
of Private Memorial Type Cemetery or Burial Ground within the jurisdiction of Quezon
City and Providing Penalties thereof provides:
Section 9. At least 6% shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers
W/N Ordinance No. 6118 Section 9 is a valid exercise of Police Power
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit or to confiscate. Under
Sec. 13, violation of the Ordinance is punishable with a fine or imprisonment. Thus, not
a valid exercise of police power.
Police power is usually exercised in the form of regulation or restriction in the use of
property or liberty for public welfare but does not involve taking or confiscation of
property. There is only a necessity to confiscate for the purpose of destroying it top
protect peace and order and of promoting the general welfare, such as confiscation of
opium and firearms.
Further, there is no reasonable relation between setting aside of 6% of area for charity
and the promotion of health, morals, safety, or general welfare. Instead of building or
maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden.


Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls
in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent SM Prime constructs, operates, and
leases out commercial buildings and other structures.
The shopping malls operated or leased out by respondents have parking facilities for all
kinds of motor vehicles, respondents expend for the maintenance and administration of
their respective parking facilities.

In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce and on Justice and Human
Rights conducted a joint investigation to inquire into the legality of the prevalent practice
of shopping malls of charging parking fees.
The Committees find that the collection of parking fees by shopping malls is contrary to
the National Building Code and is therefore illegal.
Respondent SM Prime thereafter received information that, pursuant to Senate
Committee Report an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and similar establishments
from collecting parking fees, and to impose upon said establishments penal sanctions
under the National Building Code of the Philippines and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR).
Respondent SM Prime filed a petition declaring that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the National Building Code are unconstitutional and void.
The OSG also filed a petition against the respondents praying for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction to be issued restraining respondents from collecting parking fees
from their customers.
Whether or not the prohibition for the collection of parking fees by the respondents is a
valid exercise of the police power of State.
NO. The Court affirmed the previous decision that the respondents are not obliged to
provide free parking spaces. There is no pertaining provision in the National Building
Code that expressly provides the same.
The OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State. The Court
finds, however, that in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees from
the public for the use of the mall parking facilities, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no
longer exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers which is eminent
domain. Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for
public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
The State cannot impose the same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since
said prohibition amounts to a taking of respondents property without payment of just

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Petitioners JBL Reyes et al. are owners of a parcel of land in Tondo which are leased and
occupied as dwelling units by tenants who were paying monthly a rental of not exceeding
P300. Sometime in 1971, the Rental Freezing Law was passed prohibiting for one year
from its effectivity, an increase in monthly rentals of dwelling units that do not exceed
three hundred pesos (P300.00). The Reyess were precluded from raising the rents and
from ejecting the tenants. In 1973, respondent City Assessor of Manila re-classified and
reassessed the value of the subject properties based on the schedule of market values,
which entailed an increase in the corresponding tax rates prompting petitioners to file a
Memorandum of Disagreement averring that the reassessments made were "excessive,
unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory and unconstitutional" considering that the taxes
imposed upon them greatly exceeded the annual income derived from their properties.
They argued that the income approach should have been used in determining the land
values instead of the comparable sales approach which the City Assessor adopted.

of the organization. Individuals enrolled in its health care programs pay an annual
membership fee and are entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and curative medical
services provided by its duly licensed physicians, specialists and other professional
technical staff participating in the group practice health delivery system at a hospital or
clinic owned, operated or accredited by it. Respondent Commissioner of Internal
Revenue sent petitioner a demand letter and the corresponding assessment notices
demanding the payment of deficiency taxes. The deficiency [documentary stamp tax
(DST)] assessment was imposed on petitioners health care agreement with the
members of its health care program pursuant to the 1997 tax code. The CTA rendered a
decision partially granting the petition which orders the petitioner to pay the deficiency
VAT and respondent is ordered to desist from collecting the said DST deficiency tax.
Respondent then appealed to the CA regarding the DST assessment claiming that the
petitioners health care agreements was a contract of insurance subject to DST under
However the CA held that the health care agreement of the petitioners was in the nature
of a non-life insurance contract subject to DST.

Whether or not the tax approach used by the City Assessor of Manila reasonable.

Whether or not petitioner is engaged in the business of insurance which thus makes
them liable to DST.



No, the taxing power has the authority to make a reasonable and natural classification
for purposes of taxation but the government's act must not be prompted by a spirit of
hostility, or at the very least discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices
then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar
circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions
not being different both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
Consequently, it stands to reason that petitioners who are burdened by the government
by its Rental Freezing Laws (then R.A. No. 6359 and P.D. 20) under the principle of social
justice should not now be penalized by the same government by the imposition of
excessive taxes petitioners can ill afford and eventually result in the forfeiture of their

Health Maintenance Organizations such as the petitioner are not engaged in the
insurance business. Under RA 7878 an HMO is an entity that provides, offers or arranges
for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid
premium. The payments do not vary with the extent, frequency or type of services
provided. Section 2 (2) of PD 1460 enumerates what constitutes doing an insurance
business or transacting an insurance business which are making or proposing to make,
as insurer, any insurance contract; making or proposing to make, as surety, any contract
of suretyship as a vocation and not as merely incidental to any other legitimate business
or activity of the surety. Doing any kind of business, including a reinsurance business,
specifically recognized as constituting the doing of an insurance business within the
meaning of this Code. Petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits to its
members (with respect to its curative medical services), but these are incidental to the
principal activity of providing them medical care. The insurance-like aspect of
petitioners business is miniscule compared to its noninsurance activities. Therefore,
since it substantially provides health care services rather than insurance services, it
cannot be considered as being in the insurance business.


Petitioner is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is to establish, maintain,
conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care delivery system or a health
maintenance organization to take care of the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the
health care plan and to provide for the administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities



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On October 17, 2011 and December 16, 2013, the Quezon City Council enacted
Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 otherwise known as the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT),
and Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013; the latter ordinance imposing an annual collection
of garbage fees in conformity with R.A. 7160. Under Sec. 3 of the SHT Ordinance, a special
assessment equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php100,000
would be collected by the City, which would accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs
of the LGU of Quezon City.
Jose Ferrer, petitioner herein, is a resident of Quezon City filed the instant petition
seeking to declare unconstitutional the aforementioned city ordinances. Petitioner
asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of
garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of the LGU and that said LGU did
not raise the issue of any dire financial state and desperate financial need to fund
housing projects and garbage collection. In fact, it had a revenue collection of Php13.19B
in 2012. The imposition of the SHT and garbage fee as petitioner claims is not justifiable
as an exercise of its power to create sources of income under Sec. 5, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution; that the collection of the SHT is the same as imposing a penalty on real
property owners due to the LGU officials incompetence. Ferrer further claims that said
ordinances are increases in the property tax which are not based on the assessed value
of the property or its reassessment every three years therefore being violative of
sections 232 and 233 of the Local Government Code. Furthermore, the imposition of
garbage fee, being a basic and essential public service, should be paid out from property
tax, business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax certificate and other taxes
of the Quezon City LGU.
Respondents on the other hand insist that the questioned ordinances are proper
exercises of police power and that their enactments find basis in the social justice
principle enshrined in Sec. 9, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution. Also, Ordinance SP. 2095 is
not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the UDHA, which,
authorized LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than Php
50, 000.

is the same tax referred to in R.A. 7279 otherwise known as the UDHA. The ordinance
is consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their
respective localities in coordination with concerned agencies. The SHT charged by the
QCLGU is a tax which is within its power to impose and is therefore not confiscatory
or oppressive. Said tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or merely to raise
revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of
Police Power for the general welfare of the entire city and is greatly imbued with
public interest. LGUs are considered to have properly exercised police power if the
following requisites are met: a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class require its exercise and b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
2. No. The term fee means a charge fixed by law for the regulation or inspection of a
business or activity. The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance SP2235 is a charge fixed for the regulation of an activity. To pass judicial scrutiny, a
regulatory fee must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation
because such fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by
the regulation exceeds the cost of the regulation. Under RA 9003 or the Ecological
Solid Waste Management Act, the authority of a city or municipality to impose fees
is limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for
the disposal of these into the sanitary landfill.
Ordinance No. S-2235 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the
provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be equitable and based as far as
practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay and not unjust, excessive and confiscatory.
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable. The QC Council
failed to consider factors that could truly measure the amount of waste generated
and appropriate fee for its collection.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of
Ordinance No. SP-2095, S 2011 is SUSTAINED. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP2235, S 2013 is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.

1. Whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011 is a valid exercise
of Police Power.
2. Whether or not the enactment of Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013 is a valid exercise
of Police Power.
1. Yes. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statues and
ordinances to promote the general welfare of the people, which thus includes
taxation as one means of implementing said power. Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes
SHT equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of land in excess of Php100,000, which


Doctrine: Partnership among powers (taxation and police power)
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila, who was charged with

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the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances. The
subject is the Ordinance No. 4760, which imposes an exorbitant annual license fees (P6,
000 for first-class motels and P4, 500 for second-class motels), and other additional
requirements. The ordinance was intended to protect the public morals by discouraging
operation of establishments such as motels and the same. The petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of the ordinance on the ground that it is not a valid exercise of police
power and that the tax imposed is unreasonable.

Sesbreo then filed a complaint for damages, alleging that the VOC Teams entry to his
house and the surrounding premises was effected without his permission or a search
warrant and over the objections of his maids. Afterwards, he found that some of his
personal effects were missing, apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched
the house.



Whether or not the imposed tax in the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

Sesbreno is not entitled to recover damages. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of the metered

service contract entered into between VECO and each of its consumers, properly
authorized employees or representatives of VECO, such as the VOC team in the case at
bar, has the continuing authority to enter their consumers premises at all reasonable
hours to conduct an inspection of the meter without being liable for trespass to dwelling.

Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount,
object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. There is no
violation of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face.


Doctrine: Bill of Rights and Private Persons
VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity within Metropolitan Cebu.
Sesbreo was one of VECOs customers under the metered service contract they had
entered into. Around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 11, 1989, the Violation of
Contracts (VOC) Team of defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla and their PC
escort, Balicha, conducted a routine inspection of the house of plaintiff-appellant Raul
Sesbreo, for illegal connections, meter tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring
connections, and meter installations. After Sesbreos maid, unlocked the gate, they
inspected the electric meter and found that it had been turned upside down. Arcilla took
photographs of the upturned electric meter and replaced it with a new one. No one
called to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received the
permission of Chuchie Garcia, a visitor, to enter the house itself to examine the kind and
number of appliances and light fixtures in the household and determine its electrical
load. Afterwards, Garcia signed the Inspection Division Report and a Load Survey Sheet.

Whether or not Sesbreno is entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights.

Sesbreo contends, however, that the VOC Team did not have the right to enter the main
portion of the house and inspect the various rooms and the appliances therein because
those were not the properties of VECO, hence not covered by paragraph 9 of the
aforementioned contract. Such action is apparently violative of Section 2, Article III of
the Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right of every individual against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and Article 32 (9) of the Civil Code which holds any
public officer or employee liable for damages for the violation of the aforementioned
right. Moreover, he posits that Balicha, who was not an employee of VECO, had no
authority whatsoever to enter his house and conduct a search.
The SC found Sesbreos contention as bereft of merit. Although Balicha was not himself
an employee of VECO, his participation was to render police assistance to ensure the
personal security of Constantino and Arcilla during the inspection, rendering him a
necessary part of the team as an authorized representative. Under the circumstances,
he was authorized to enter considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended such
authority to "properly authorized employees or representatives" of VECO.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures is
intended as a restraint against the Government and its agents tasked with law
enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of State power. It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter the
main premises only after finding the meter of Sesbreo turned upside down, hanging
and its disc not rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine the unbilled
electricity consumed by his household. The circumstances justified their decision, and
their inspection of the main premises was a continuation of the authorized entry. Not
being agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.

1C | 2015 - 2016

Clearly, Sesbreo did not establish his claim for damages if the respondents were not
guilty of abuse of rights. To stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a person
should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith; otherwise, he may be liable to another
who suffers injury. It should also be noted that it was found the testimonies of Sesbreos
witnesses implausible because of inconsistencies on material points.




This is an appeal of the decision of a US District Court in Texas, which granted the
declaratory relief prayed for by the plaintiff who challenged the constitutionality of the
Texas Criminal abortion laws; but denied issuing an injunction against enforcement of
such statutes.


In 1970, Norma L. McCorvey (Jane Roe), a pregnant single woman (allegedly, a result
of rape), filed a suit against the defendant, District Attorney Henry Wade, questioning
Texas State Laws which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion except on medical
advice for the purpose of saving the mothers life. She argues that said laws are
unconstitutionally vague and that they abridge her right of personal privacy as
guaranteed and protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Later, she amended her complaint as to represent or sue on behalf of
herself and all other women similarly situated; thereby becoming a class suit.

Whether or not petitioner has state of immunity



Whether or not a womans right to privacy as protected by the constitution includes the
right to abort her child

The Republic seeks to nullify and set aside resolutions of the Sandiganbayan ordering
PCGG to pay private respondent Roberto Benedicto or his corporations the value of 277
shares of stock of NOGCCI registered in his name. Petitioner invokes state immunity from
suit claiming that the order to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary
liability on a government agency thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to
satisfy the judgment claim.

Petition granted, resolution set aside. PCGG failed to take stock of one of the exemptions
to the state immunity when the government itself is the suitor. The state itself is no less
the plaintiff in the main case, ergo immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.

Yes. The Court established that the word "person" as used in the due process clause and
in other provisions of the Constitution did not include the unborn, and therefore the
unborn lacked federal constitutional protection. It held that the right of privacy x x x is
broad enough to encompass a womans decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. We therefore conclude that the right of personal privacy includes abortion
decision, but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important
state interests in regulation.
A state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type that exempts from criminality
only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage
and without recognition of the interests involved (such as liberty interests), is violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.


1C | 2015 - 2016

Doctrine: Due Process: Liberty
Jennifer Cagandahan, born on January 13, 198, was registered as a female in her
Certificate of Live Birth. She was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasis (CAH)
which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
Thus Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate
on Dec. 11, 2003 at Branch 33 of RTC OF Siniloan Laguna. The petition shall change her
gender to male and her first name as Jeff.
Jennifer Cagandahan submitted a medical report from Dr. Michael Sionzon of UP-PGH
which states that:
Genetically, respondent is female but because her body secretes male
hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two
sex organs female and male. It is a very rare condition where the
respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female
hormones, and that she has no monthly period.
The medical certificate also testified that Cagandahans condition is permanent
and the doctor recommended the change of gender because Cagandahan has
made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change
would be advantageous to her.
The petition was granted on Jan, 12 2005 but the Office of Solicitor General filed a
petition to the Supreme Court seeking reversal of the RTC Decision.
Whether or not the petition for correction of entry of birth certificate should be granted
Yes. The court favored Cagandahans petition.
The Supreme court argued that in the absence of law governing the case of Cagandahan
the court should consider the compassionate calls for the recognition of the existence of
intersex gender.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which
should not be subject to outright denial. "It has been suggested that
there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for
those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female." The

current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person

be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification.
The SC stated in this case that the measure in determining whether or not a change of
entry in the birth certificate shall be granted, an intersex person should present evidence
medical testimony and scientific development.
The court argued that having intersex gender, Cagandahan posseses the human right of
pursuit of happiness and health. Thus she is capacitated to direct her own sexual
development and maturation.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age
of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high
levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases
of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
The court recognizes the condition of Cagandahan and by virtue of the medical testimony
and that Cagandahan by letting nature take its course have changed her physical stature
from female to male have granted her petition for change of entry on birth certificate,
that Cagandahan upon reaching the age of majority have the reason to elect what her
gender maybe.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed
out. In other words, we respect respondents condition and his mature
decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person.
We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state
and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
The court also recognizes Cagandahans right to change her first name to Jeff as the
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion. The change in first name
is in accordance to the courts decision to allow the change of entry on gender.


1C | 2015 - 2016




shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of

Doctrine: A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend
upon events foreign to the will of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the
present or future enjoyment of property. While one may not be deprived of his vested
right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in
law and jurisprudence.

[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is
forfeited in favor of the common children.

Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the
conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the
community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.

(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

The definition of net profits under Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.
On Oct. 26, 2000, Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against Brigido
B. Quiao. The RTC ruled in favor of Rita; all of their children, except Letecia who is of legal
age, was ordered to remain under the custody of Rita who was adjudged as the innocent
spouse. As to the properties, the ff. is the dispositive portion of the judgment:
Except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the
remaining properties, namely:
1)coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
2)coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
3)corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
4)coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5)parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6)parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares located in Manila de Bugabos,
Butuan City;
7)parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
8)Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City;

Neither party filed an MR nor an appeal. On Dec.12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion
for execution which the trial court granted, and a writ was issued. On July 6, 2006, the
writ was partially executed with the petitioner paying the respondents the following:
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal share;

(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision,
the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification, asking the RTC to define
the term Net Profits Earned.
Thus, the RTC explained that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder
of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each [of the]
spouse and the debts. The Order further held that after determining the remainder of
the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the
offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code. Thus, the RTC said that there
was no blatant disparity when the sheriff intended to forfeit all the remaining properties
after deducting the payments of the debts, because only separate properties of the
Brigido shall be delivered to him which he has none.
Not satisfied with the Order, the Brigido filed an MR. Consequently, the RTC issued
another Order dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision dated
October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider the Motion for
Clarification because Brigido simply wanted to clarify the meaning of net profit earned.
Furthermore, the same Order held:
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006 is hereby ordered set aside. NET
PROFIT EARNED, which is subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common children,
is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.
Thereafter, Rita filed an MR praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated
November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the trial court had changed its ruling
again and granted the respondents' MR whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was
set aside to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006.
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, Brigido filed on February 27, 2007 this instant
Petition for Review under Rule 45.

1C | 2015 - 2016


WON Brigido acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the CPG pursuant to
Art. 143 of the Old Civil Code which provides: All property of the conjugal partnership
of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
No, he did not.
The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory at the time the
Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006.
From the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTCs
Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a single issue
until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the time the petitioner
filed his motion for clarification, the trial courts decision has become final and
executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the period to appeal lapses
and no appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a
judgment that became final.
Brigido argues that the decision he is questioning is a void judgment, which never
attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any obligation. But what precisely
is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When does a judgment becomes void?
A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no power to grant
the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both. In other
words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void judgment. For sure,
the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal separation. The RTC also
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering that summons and a
copy of the complaint with its annexes were served upon the herein petitioner. Thus,
without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has jurisdiction
over the complaint and the persons of the parties.
Thus, the judgment, being final and not void, cannot anymore be disturbed, even if the
modification is meant to correct what may be considered an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law. In fact, we have ruled that for [as] long as the public respondent acted with
jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
appeal. Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October 10, 2005
was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed within the period.
Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do this. He has already lost the chance to question
the trial court's decision, which has become immutable and unalterable.

Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the common properties of
the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court forfeited them in favor of his
children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of the Family Code?
To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal or equitableto the present or
future enjoyment of property. It is clear that while one may not be deprived of his
vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is
founded in law and jurisprudence.
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was
well-aware that the respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal
properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial
court divides the community assets between the petitioner and the respondent as
circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the
community properties of the parties. Second, when the Decision dated October 10, 2005
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's ruling forfeiting what
the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article 129(7) of the Family Code.
Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
The RTC Decision dated October 10, 2005 is AFFIRMED.


Yasuyuki Ota is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina and has continuously resided in
the Philippines for more than 10 years. He filed an application to take the medical board
examinations in order to obtain and medicinal license in the Philippines. He was required
by the Philippine Regulatory Commission (PRC) to submit proof that Filipino citizens in
Japan are also allowed to practice law in their country, that there is a reciprocity
between the government of Japan and of the government of the Philippines. Respondent
was able to comply with the requirement of the PRC, and he was able to pass the board
examinations of medicine. Still, the board of medicine of PRC denied respondent of his
license, claiming that the law of Japan submitted by respondent is not conclusive proof
that Filipino citizens in Japan are allowed to practice medicine in said country.
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in finding that respondent
had established the existence of reciprocity in the practice of medicine between the
Philippines and Japan.

1C | 2015 - 2016


The Supreme Court denied the petition. Respondent was able to comply with section 9
of R.A. No. 2382 and Presidential Decree No 223 which only requires foreign citizens to
submit a law of a foreign country allowing foreigners to practice medicine in their
The petition was denied for lack of merit.


TEFASCO submitted to PPA a proposal for the construction of a specialized terminal
complex with port facilities and a provision for port services in Davao City. To ease the
acute congestion in the government ports at Sasa and Sta. Ana, PPA welcomed the
proposal and organized an inter-agency committee to study the plan. The committee
recommended approval thereof by passing the Resolution No. 7 accepting and approving
TEFASCOs project proposal. Long after TEFASCO broke ground with massive
infrastructure funded by dollar loans, the PPA Board curiously passed a resolution under
TEFASCO, to compel the latter to submit an application for construction permit.
Two years after the completion of the port facilities and the commencement of
TEFASCOs port operations, or on June 10, 1978, PPA again issued to TEFASCO another
permit which contains provision for ten percent government share out of arrastre and
stevedoring gross income and one hundred percent wharfage and berthing charges.
TEFASCO repeatedly asked PPA for extensions to pay these obligations and for reduction
in the rates but the PPAs response was final and non-negotiable. TEFASCO and PPA
executed a memorandum of agreement acknowledging TEFASCOs arrears in
government and also other conditions. Subsequently, TEFASCO sued PPA for refund of
government share it had paid and for damages as a result of alleged illegal exaction from
its clients of one hundred percent berthing and wharfage fees.
Whether or not the additional conditions imposed by PPA to TEFASCO is lawful?
No. The facts certainly bear out the conclusion that PPA passed Resolution No. 7 and the
terms and conditions thereof with a view of decongesting port traffic in government
ports and engaging TEFASCO to infuse its own funds and skills to operate another port
therein. With due consideration for the policy that laws of the land are written into every
contract, the said document stand to be the only source of obligations between the
parties. The Court said that it was arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair for PPA to add new
burdens and uncertainties into their agreement of which TEFASCO had no prior

knowledge even in the context of regulation. TEFASCO complied with its obligation which
ultimately resulted to the benefit of PPA and the latter accepted the project as
completed and authorized TEFASCO to operate the same.
Under these circumstances, PPA is estopped from reneging on its commitments and
covenants as exclusively contained in the inter-agency committee reports. But even
assuming arguendo that TEFASCO relied upon the mere privilege granted by PPA, still
the terms and conditions between them as written in the documents approving
TEFASCOs project proposal should indubitably remain the same. Under traditional form
of property ownership, recipients of privileges from the government could be said to
have no property rights because they possessed no traditionally recognized proprietary
interest therein.
For the purpose of due process analysis, a property interest includes not only the
traditional notions of real and personal property but also extends to those benefits to
which an individual may deemed to have a legitimate claim of entitlement under existing
rules and regulations. In this case, even if PPA granted TEFASCO only a license to
construct and operate a specialized complex terminal with port facilities, the fact
remains that PPA cannot unilaterally impose conditions that find no basis in the PPA
Resolution No. 7.


Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against the alleged
abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc.,
called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned
demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that the
demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an exercise of the
laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech
and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel
the demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may
result in the loss of revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that
the workers would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the
workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not

1C | 2015 - 2016


absent themselves to participate, otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the PBMEO were eventually
dismissed for a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of their Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were
found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
1. Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
2. Whether or not the company is guilty of unfair labor practice
1. No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions,"
they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with
narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." The
freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition
for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when
exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
2. Company is one guilty of unfair labor practice because the refusal on its part to permit
all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight workers from service constituted
an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and
freedom of petition for redress of grievances, the company committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Sec. 4 (a-1) in relation to Sec. 3 of RA 875 (Industrial Peace Act).
Sec. 3 of RA 8 guarantees to the employees the right to engage in concert activities
for mutual aid or protection while Sec. 4 (a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for
an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Sec. 3


Doctrine: Void-for-vagueness, Mala in Se, Reasonable doubt, Level of Scrutiny (J.

Mendoza concur)
Prosecuted for violation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659. It provides that any public officer who
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Estrada
assailed the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
He assailed the said law suffers from void for vagueness, the law failed to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms combination and series in the key phrase a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.
He contended that Plunder required to be proven beyond reasonable doubt as it is stated
under Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction, under criminal
prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds
in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is
entitled to an acquittal.
It abolishes the element of mens rea (committing intentional crime) which punishable
under RPC, proving that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is
the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites Senator Taadas remarks during
the deliberation of S.B. No.733
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being void-for-vagueness.
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires proof of beyond reasonable doubt
3. Whether or not Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum.
1. No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its
validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language
of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
petitioner is alleged to have committed.
2. No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the

1C | 2015 - 2016


accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire
ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
3. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a
prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that
the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally. It thus
alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment:
Test of Strict Scrutiny Not Applicable to Penal Statutes
Petitioner cites the dictum in Ople v. Torres that when the integrity of a fundamental
right is at stake, this Court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or
regulation stricter scrutiny and that It will not do for authorities to invoke the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. As will presently be
shown, strict scrutiny, as used in that decision, is not the same thing as the strict scrutiny
urged by petitioner. Much less did this Court rule that because of the need to give stricter
scrutiny to laws abridging fundamental freedoms, it will not give such laws the
presumption of validity.
Petitioner likewise cites the most celebrated footnote in [American] constitutional
law, i.e., footnote 4 of the opinion in United States v. Carolene Products Co., in which it
was stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously
to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Again, it should be noted that what the U.S. Supreme Court said is that there may be
narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of constitutionality for legislation
which comes within the first ten amendments to the American Federal Constitution
compared to legislation covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. The

American Court did not say that such legislation is not to be presumed constitutional,
much less that it is presumptively invalid, but only that a narrower scope will be given
for the presumption of constitutionality in respect of such statutes. There is, therefore,
no warrant for petitioners contention that the presumption of constitutionality of a
legislative act is applicable only where the Supreme Court deals with facts regarding
ordinary economic affairs, not where the interpretation of the text of the Constitution is
What footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case posits is a double standard of judicial
review: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the
political process, and deferential or rational basis standard of review for economic
legislation. As Justice (later Chief Justice) Fernando explained in Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Assn v. The City Mayor, this simply means that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects what are at the
most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Hence, strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race and facial challenges are allowed for this purpose. But criminal
statutes, like the Anti-Plunder Law, while subject to strict construction, are not subject
to strict scrutiny. The two (i.e., strict construction and strict scrutiny) are not the
same. The rule of strict construction is a rule of legal hermeneutics which deals with the
parsing of statutes to determine the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, strict
scrutiny is a standard of judicial review for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is
set opposite such terms as deferential review and intermediate review.
Thus, under deferential review, laws are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate
governmental interest, without courts seriously inquiring into the substantiality of such
interest and examining the alternative means by which the objectives could be
achieved. Under intermediate review, the substantiality of the governmental interest is
seriously looked into and the availability of less restrictive alternatives are considered.
Under strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
Considering these degrees of strictness in the review of statutes, how many criminal laws
can survive the test of strict scrutiny to which petitioner proposes to subject them? How
many can pass muster if, as petitioner would have it, such statutes are not to be
presumed constitutional? Above all, what will happen to the States ability to deal with
the problem of crimes, and, in particular, with the problem of graft and corruption in
government, if criminal laws are to be upheld only if it is shown that there is a compelling
governmental interest for making certain conduct criminal and if there is no other means
less restrictive than that contained in the law for achieving such governmental interest?

1C | 2015 - 2016




Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine Senate ratified the said
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge
of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents,
Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of
the official extradition request from the U.S Government and that he be given ample
time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested
papers but the petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RPUS Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present
the interests of the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
Whether or not to uphold a citizens basic due process rights or the governments
ironclad duties under a treaty.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another
state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under
generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as
part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.

Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of
the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the
domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted
with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is
to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the incorporation clause in the
above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain
to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the
municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees
that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to,
national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori
takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states
where the Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the


Doctrine: Relativity of Due Process
Petitioner, Cadet First Class Cudia, was a member of the Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the
Philippine Military Academy. He was supposed to graduate with honors as the class
salutatorian, receive the Philippine Navy Saber as the top Navy Cadet graduate and be
commissioned as an ensign of the Navy. Petitioner was issued a Delinquency Report (DR)
because he was late for two minutes in his ENG 412 class, other cadets were also
reported late for 5 minutes. The DRs reached the Department of Tactical Officers and
were logged and transmitted to the Company of Tactical Officers (TCO) for explanation.
Cudia incurred the penalty of 11 demerits and 13 touring hours. Several days after, Cudia
was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) per violation of the Honor Code. Lying that
is giving statements that perverts the truth in his written appeal stating that his 4th period
class ended at 3:00 that made him late for the succeeding class. Cudia submitted his

1C | 2015 - 2016


letter of explanation on the honor report. The HC constituted a team to conduct the
preliminary investigation on the violation, it recommended the case be formalized. Cudia
pleaded not guilty. The result was 8-1 guilty verdict and upon the order of the Chairman,
the HC reconvened in the chambers, after, the Presiding Officer announced a 9-0 guilty
verdict. The HC denied Cudias appeal. The Headquarters Tactics Group (HTG) conducted
a formal review and checking of findings. Special orders were issued placing Cudia on
indefinite leave of absence and pending approval of separation from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines. Cudia submitted a letter to the Office of the Commandant of Cadets
requesting his re-instatement. The matter was referred to Cadet Review and Appeals
Board (CRAB) and it upheld the decision. Cudia wrote a letter to President Aquino but
the President sustained the findings of the CRAB. CHR-CAR issued a resolution finding
probable cause for Human Rights Violations.
1. Whether or not the PMA committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cudia in
utter disregard of his right to due process and in holding that he violated the Honor
Code through lying.
2. Whether or not the court can interfere with military affairs
1. No. The determination of whether the PMA cadet has rights to due process, education,
and property should be placed in the context of the Honor Code. All the administrative
remedies were exhausted. A student of a military academy must be prepared to
subordinate his private interest for the proper functioning of the institution. The PMA
may impose disciplinary measures and punishments as it deems fit and consistent with
the peculiar needs of the institution. PMA has regulatory authority to administratively
dismiss erring cadets. PMA has a right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement
of the internal rules and regulations.
2. Yes. The court is part of the checks-and-balance machinery mandated by Article VIII of
the Constitution. The courts mandate (according to Section 1, Article 8) is expanded
that the duty of the courts is not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. No one is above the law, including the military, especially in
violations of Constitutionally guaranteed rights.
The petition is denied. The dismissal of Cudia from PMA is affirmed.


Doctrine: Due process clause requires that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case. The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
which is to be accorded finality are: 1) notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objectionsthe notice must be of such nature as
reasonably to convey the required information; 2) it must afford a reasonable time for
those interested to make their appearance. But if, with due regard for the practicalities
and peculiarities of the case, these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional
requirements are satisfied.
To promote the efficient and economical administration of funds in a trust, New York
allowed corporate trustees to pool the assets of multiple small trusts that they
administered. While each trust shared in the common fund, the trustees completely
controlled all of the assets but were required to submit periodic accountings of profits,
losses, and assets to the courts for approval. Beneficiaries had the right to object to
irregularities in the administration of the common fund after they were notified of the
accounting. They no longer could object, however, once the court approved the
Central Hanover Bank consolidated 113 small trusts into a single common fund, and it
notified all interested parties of the fund and the law that gave rise to its actions. It used
a local New York newspaper to provide notice. Mullane, who was the appointed guardian
for all parties with an interest in the trust's income, objected on the grounds that this
type of notice was insufficient to meet due process requirements. He pointed out that
out-of-state beneficiaries and other interested parties would not be likely to be informed
through publication of the impact on their rights.
Whether or not the type of notice give was sufficient to meet due process requirements
Whether such a proceeding for settlement of accounts be technically in personam, in
rem, or quasi in rem, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that
exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervision of its courts is
such as to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all

1C | 2015 - 2016


claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to
appear and be heard.
The statutory notice by publication is sufficient as to any beneficiaries whose interests
or addresses are unknown to the trustee, since there are no other means of giving them
notice which are both practicable and more effective.
Such notice by publication is not sufficient under the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis
for adjudication depriving of substantial property rights known persons whose
whereabouts are also known, since it is not impracticable to make serious efforts to
notify them at least by ordinary mail to their addresses on record with the trust company.

Doctrine: U.S. Fifth Amendment; No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service
in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just

each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could
not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be
considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying
misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the
Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.
Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made
false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they
were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a
ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken
against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the
portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned
each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could
not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be
considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying
misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the
Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim .




Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made
false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they
were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a
ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken
against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the
portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned
each false statement charge. The Board held that an employee's false statements could
not be used for purposes of impeaching the employee's credibility, nor could they be
considered in setting the appropriate punishment for the employee's underlying
misconduct. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the
Board and held that no penalty could be based on a false denial of the underlying claim.

On May 26, 1992, Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer at Department of

Agriculture, filed with the office of the DA Secretary an affidavit-complaint against Jose
J. Lucas, a photographer of the same agency, for misconduct.


Lucas appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission.

Federal employees subject to adverse actions by their respective agencies, each made
false statements to agency investigators with respect to the misconduct with which they
were charged. In each case, the agency additionally charged the false statement as a
ground for adverse action. Separately, each employee appealed the actions taken
against him or her to the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board). The Board upheld the
portion of each penalty that was based on the underlying charge. The Board overturned

CSC issued a resolution finding Lucas guilty of grave misconduct. Lucas moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.

In the said complaint, it was alleged that Lucas is touching Linatoks thigh.
On June 8, 1992, BOPI issued a summons requiring Lucas to answer the complaint, not
to file a motion to dismiss.
On June 17, 1992, Lucas sent a letter to BOPI denying the charges.
After a formal investigation, the board issued a resolution finding Lucas guilty of simple

Lucas appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA promulgated its decision setting aside the
resolution of CSC and reinstating the resolution of BOPI.

1C | 2015 - 2016


CA further ruled that a basic requirement of due process is that a person must be duly
informed of the charges against him. In the instant case, Lucas came to know of the
modification of the charge against him only when he received notice of the resolution
dismissing him from the service.
WON Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct
on a charge of simple misconduct.
Yes. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural
principles, such as right to due process in investigations and hearings. One must be duly
informed of the charges against him.


Ledesma is a Clerk III at the Records Section of the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau). She
has been with the Bureau for more than 32 years. Rank-and-file employees of the Bureau
elected her to chair their union, Buklod ng mga Kawani ng CID (Buklod), for three
consecutive terms.
On 20 March 1999, a Saturday, Tsai I Hau, also known as Steve Tsai, and his sister,
Taiwanese nationals who were studying in the country at the time, executed complaintaffidavits against Ledesma.
Steve Tsai attested that he went to the Bureau to seek Ledesmas assistance in securing
Emigrant Certificate Clearances (ECCs) for him and her sister. He gave their passports
and P3,000 to Ledesma. Steve Tsai claimed that Ledesma has helped him obtain ECCs for
the previous three years. He usually paid P1,500 for each ECC. He knew that out of the
amount Ledesma kept P200 to P300 as a service charge.
According to Steve Tsai, Ledesma instructed him to return for the ECCs, however,
Ledesma did not give him. Steve Tsai informed Ledesma that he and his sister were
leaving for a vacation. Ledesma replied that he should return the next day, but when he
did, she was still unable to produce the requested documents. Ledesma gave Steve Tsai
the ECCs but did not return their passports.
An administrative case was filed against Ledesma based on complainants affidavits.
Associate Commissioner Yap issued a Resolution that assured Ledesma of a fair
investigation and granted her an additional forty-eight hours to submit a verified
explanation to the charges. It also notified Ledesma of the formal hearing of her

administrative case. However, Ledesma failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and
neglected to submit a verified explanation.
Hence, a decision was rendered by the Bureau finding Ledesma guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Ledesma appealed to the
CSC. But CSC dismissed Ledesmas appeal.
WON the constitutional right to due process of Ledesma is violated
NO. The CSC argues that the Court of Appeals erred in finding Ledesma guilty of simple
misconduct when the charge against her was for grave misconduct. Citing Civil Service
Commission v. Lucas, a person charged with grave misconduct cannot be convicted of
simple misconduct because the two are distinct and separate offenses.
The Court held that the CSCs verdict in Lucas violated the basic requirements of due
process. The Court ruled that even in an administrative proceeding Lucas had the right
to be informed of the charges against him, as well as the right not to be convicted of an
offense for which he was not charged.
A person can be held liable for simple misconduct if any of the elements to make the
misconduct grave is not established by substantial evidence. In such a situation, there is
no violation of a persons constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him.
This is the situation in the present case.

Doctrine: Procedural Due Process
Petitioner Anonymous filed a letter-complaint against Respondent Ma. Victoria Radam,
a utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos
City in Pangasinan, for disgraceful and immoral conduct because of her pregnancy
while being a single, unmarried woman. It was then recommended that she be
suspended for 1 month or pay a fine of P5,000 for being guilty of Immoral Conduct or
Act Unbecoming a Court Employee.
She was later exonerated from the administrative liability as the penalty is only limited
to women who becomes pregnant out wedlock with a married man. In the present case,
the father of Radams child is also single and unmarried.
Whether or not the respondent was deprived of the right to due process.

1C | 2015 - 2016


Yes. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to
explain ones side, whether written or verbal. This presupposes that one has been
previously apprised of the accusation against him or her. In the case at bar, the
respondent was deprived of both with regard to her alleged unbecoming conduct in
relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her child.
Procedural requirements to avoid violation of the right of due process.
(1) The employee or the defendant must be informed by furnishing him with a copy of
the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot be dispensed
with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process.
(2) second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance
or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter,
that is to say, his defenses against the charges leveled against him and to present
evidence in support of his defense.

Doctrine: A respondent in an administrative case in not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him he is entitled only to the administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation
Former DECS Secretary Gloria filed a complaint against, herein respondent, Maria Luisa
C. Moral (Moral), then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division of the National Library for
dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
due to the pilferage of some historical documents from the vault of the Filipiniana and
Asian division, which was under her control and supervision. She was ordered dismissed
by from the government service.
Moral did not appeal the judgment but she filed a petition for production of the DECS
investigation committee report, which was, however, denied. She reiterated her request
but likewise denied. She then filed an action for mandamus and injunction before the
regular courts against Sec. Gloria praying the he be furnished a copy of the DECS
investigation committee report. Sec. Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case for
lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion, which was dismissed as well
for lack of merit. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Sec. Gloria then filed

for petition for review arguing that there is no need to file a motion for reconsideration
as the trial courts order denying the motion to dismiss is a patent nullity, and a motion
for reconsideration would practically be a useless ceremony as the trial court virtually
decided the case there is no law requiring DECS to furnish respondent with a copy of the
report of the DECS investigation committee thus the petition for mandamus has no leg
to stand on, hence should have been dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
Yes. The challenged order of the trial court falls short of the requirements prescribed in
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure. The Order merely discussed the general concept
of mandamus and the trial courts jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of
administrative agencies without stating the basis by petitioners motion to dismiss was
being denied. It is also to be noted that Courts have no supervising power over
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government. Thus,
findings of fact by an administrative board or official, following a hearing, are binding
upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official has gone
beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion or as when
there is capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to
a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.
As regarding to the remedy of Mandamus the petitioner is not entitled to the writ prayed
of for the reason that it is only applicable when a person was refused of a ministerial
duty and not of a discretionary duty. Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a
legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On
the contrary, a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into
charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation
committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.


1C | 2015 - 2016


Complainant Fe Ylaya alleged that she and her late husband are the registered owners
of 2 parcels of land covered by TCT located at Barangay Sta. Lourdes, Puerto Princesa
City. Said land was under expropriation proceedings filed by the City of Puerto Princesa
before the RTC against its former registered owner, Cirilo Arellano. RTC issued an order
for the City Government to deposit P6M as just compensation for the property.
Complainant filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Glenn Carlos
Gacott who allegedly deceived her and her late husband in signing a preparatory Deed
of Sale that the respondent converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale in favour of his
Respondent argued that the complainants greed to get the just compensation caused
her to file this baseless, unfounded [and] malicious disbarment case. He claimed that
the sale was their voluntary transaction and that he simple ratified the document. He
also claimed that Reynold and Laurentino had originally jointly purchased the properties
from Arellano on July 10, 2000; they were co-owners for some time; and that Laurentino
subsequently sold his share to Reynold under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 4, 2001.
Respondent, after submitting a comment to the complaint, the Court referred the
complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for investigation, evaluation
and recommendation.
IBP Commissioner found the respondent liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. The commissioner recommended his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of 6 months.
In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted IBP Commissioners finding, but
increased the penalty imposed to 2 years suspension and a warning.
Hence, respondent filed a Petition for Review assailing the IBPs findings.
1. Whether or not the IBP violated the respondents right to due process; and
2. Whether or not the evidence presented supports a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of the Rules on Notarial Practice.
1. NO, the IBP did not violate respondents right to due process.
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means
the total lack of opportunity to be heard or to have ones day in court. As a rule, no denial
of due process takes place where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and
to present his case; what is prohibited is the absolute lack of opportunity to be hear.

In this case, the respondents failure to cross-examine the complainant is not a sufficient
ground to support the claim that he had not been afforded due process. The respondent
was heard through his pleadings, his submission of alleged controverting evidence, and
his oral testimony during the Oct. 6, 2005 mandatory conference, which was received by
the IBP Commissioner when she arrived at her findings and recommendations, and were
the bases for the IBP Boards Resolution. Undoubtedly, [in the case] the requirement of
the laws was afforded to [the] respondent.
2. NO, the evidence presented does not support a finding that the respondent is
administratively liable for violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and Section 3(c), Rule 4 of the Rules on Notarial Practice.
The Court do not agree with the finding of the IBP. While the facts of the case may raise
some questions regarding the respondents legal practice, we nevertheless found
nothing constituting clear evidence of the respondents specific acts of fraud and deceit.
His failure to prove the existence of a co-ownership does not lead us to the conclusion
that the MOA and the Deed of Absolute Sale for creating these spurious documents. We
are further persuaded after noting that in disregarding the MOA, the IBP Commissioner
failed to specify what differences she observed in the spouses Ylayas signatures to the
MOA and what documents were used in comparison. The burden of proof is on the
complainant. It is one thing to allege deceit and misconduct, and it is another to
demonstrate by evidence the specific acts constituting the allegations. Thus, the Court
dismissed the charge for violation of the administrative liabilities charged to respondent.
However, the Court find respondent administratively liable under the following
provisions of the Code of the Professional Responsibility:

Rule 15.03 of Canon 15

-for retaining clients who had close dealings with each other. He represented only
Reynold on the same proceedings even though he already acted as legal counsel for
Reynold, Cirilo and the spouses Ylaya regarding the same matter.

Canon 16

-for malpractice, failing to exercise due diligence in caring for his clients properties that
were in his custody, which was when he allowed a party to take the original TCTs of
properties owned by another.

Rule 18.03 of Canon 18

-for neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him that is when he failed to file the Motion
for Leave to Intervene on behalf of the spouses Ylaya. What amounts to negligence or
carelessness in a lawyers discharge of his duty to his client is incapable of an exact
formulation, but the Court has consistently held that the mere failure of a lawyer to
perform the obligations due to his client is per se a violation.

1C | 2015 - 2016


Thus, the Court imposed a penalty of 1 year suspension from the practice of law, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Doctrine: In more recent rulings, the Court applied substantial evidence as the normative
quantum of proof necessary in resolving administrative complaints against judges apart
from the proof beyond reasonable doubt.
This involves an administrative complaint filed on March 2001 by complainant Margie C.
Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with
immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Complainant
alleged that sometime in 1998, respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral
relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. After
several attempts for a possible reconciliation, the scheduled hearing proceeded on
March 12, 2002. Roel Mutia testified that he saw Judge Macias and Seranillos enter a
house in Dipolog City on the afternoon of October 17, 1999. Aniceto Zozobrado testified
that he was hired by Seranillos to drive a motorcycle and ran errands for both Judge
Macias and Seranillos. The witness for respondent was Judge Macias himself. He denied
the allegations of Mutia and Zozobrado.
Whether or not administrative complaints against members of the judiciary should be
disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt
No. Members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public
service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against
them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges
have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality.
When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the
commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that the
complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we
require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish
liability. There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when
we deal with cases filed against judges.

An administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty was filed against Judge
Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch14, Cotabato City
and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao. Local Civil
registrars of Manila and Quezon City submitted a report to the Office of the Court
Administrator that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and
orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. The OCA
conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found
that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do
not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak,
Branch 15. Also, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato,
Branch 14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted
by the Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the
docket books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato. The SC ruled that Judge Indar
violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform
official duties honestly.
Notices of hearing were sent to Judge Indar and Atty. Silongan at the addresses provided
by the NBI and at their previous mailing addresses. The registered mails addressed to
Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1) "addressee out of town, move
to another place" and (2) addressee "unknown." The Notice sent to Atty. Silongan was
also returned and per LBC report, the consignee has moved to an unknown address.
Judge Jabido, who was notified of the hearing, testified that: In compliance with the
directive of the Investigating Justice to verify the authenticity of the records of the listed
decisions, judgments and orders, he issued memos to the officers of the Court, the
Branch Clerk of Court, the docket clerk, directing them to produce and secure copies of
the minutes and other documents related therein. He personally checked the records of
the RTC. The Records of the RTC are bereft of evidence to show that regular and true
proceedings were had on these cases. There is no showing that a docket fee has been
paid for each corresponding cases. There is also no showing that the parties were
notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared. There is also no record that a hearing was
conducted. No stenographic notes of the actual proceedings were also made. He could
not also determine when the said cases were submitted for decision as it was not
calendared for that purpose.
Whether or not the requirements of due process had been complied with since there
was no proof that Judge Indar personally and actually received any of the notices sent to
him in the course of the investigation.



In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against
him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing
issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one

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Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was
received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive
notices on behalf of Judge Indar. the Court held that notice and hearing are not
indispensable in administrative investigations, thus: The fact should not be lost sight of
that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding.
As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due
process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which
the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive
or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day
in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is
otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of
an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right
to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. It is settled that "technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings.
Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of
the opportunity to be heard.

1. No, the Eight Amendment has no application to public schools. In light of History, it is
not surprising to find that every Court decision considering whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual withiin the meaning of the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments has
dealt with criminal punishment. Thus, there is no reason to extend the application of
the Eight Amendment to punishments imposed by public schools. Otherwise it would
entail an intrusion to Primary educational responsibility. Furthermore, students and
parents are left with legal remedies (civil and criminal) in case school punishments are
proven harsh.
2. No, the Court explained that both physical restraint and infliction of pain are within
the historical meaning of liberty interest protected by guarantees of due process of
law. Children obviously have a strong and legitimate interest in avoiding unwarranted
punishments or being unnecessarily deprived of their liberty. However, Florida statute
has provided adequate protections, with teachers and principals alike required to
exercise prudence in applying punishments, subject to the watchful eye of the
community and the possibility of subsequent civil or criminal liability for wrongful
behavior. The Court saw no need to add pre-punishment notifications, as school
discipline has always been handled without the need for prior notification or hearings.





Petitioners who are students of the National University were barred from enrolment.
The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved
in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the
required permits.

The case centered on James Ingraham, an eighth-grade student at a public junior high
school in Florida, who in 1970 was paddled by the principal (Willie J. Wright) while being
restrained by the assistant principal (Lemmie Deliford) and the principals assistant
(Solomon Barnes). Ingraham was hit more than 20 times and required medical attention.
A complaint was filed (1971) on behalf of Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, another
student at the school who had also been paddled. The complaint claimed that the use of
corporal punishment violated both the Eighth Amendments ban on cruel and unusual
punishments and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard. A district court dismissed the complaint,
and the decision was upheld by the court of appeals.
1. Whether or not the paddling of students constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eight Amendment
2. Whether or not school officials are required to send notice to students parents prior
to imposing corporal punishment

Whether or not a schools imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process.
Yes, however, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and crossexamination is not, 'contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are
withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature
and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be
informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence

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in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Under the Education Act of 1982, students have the right to freely choose their field of
study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
EXCEPT in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. The
petitioner was denied of this right, and were being disciplined without due process, in
violation of the admonition in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that no
penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in *** (the)
Manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only after
due investigation shall have been conducted. It has already been held in Berina vs.
Philippine Maritime Institute, 117 SCRA 581, that it is illegal of a school to impose
sanctions on students without conducting due investigation.


PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by
the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity.
On March 1995, there existed a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner James
Yap and Dennis Pascual, Ericson Cano, and Michael Perez, are members of the
Domino Lux Fraternity, while the alleged assailants, private respondents Alvin
Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes, Jr. are
members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity, a rival fraternity.
Yap lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with direct assault. Similar complaints were also filed by Dennis
Pascual and Ericson Cano against Alvin Lee and private respondents Valdes and
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents
Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints
and requiring them to answer. Private respondents filed their respective answers.
During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the
students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution finding
private respondents AGUILAR, BUNGUBUNG, LEE, and REVERENTE guilty. They were

meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
However, PAPIO was acquitted.
WON private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown
hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?
No. Private respondents right to due process of law was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, there are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must
be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed
to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence
on which a fair decision can be based. To be heard does not only mean presentation
of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings and where
the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them
as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents
were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the

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Discipline Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties
before rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were
not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already
rejected in Guzman v. National University where this Court held that x x x the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.


Doctrine: Procedural Due Process
In October 2001, one of the schools officials received information that certain
fraternities were recruiting new members among Letrans high school students. The
school physician, reported that 6 students bore injuries, probable signs of blunt trauma
of more than two weeks, on the posterior portions of their thighs. The Assistant Prefect
for Discipline, conferred with the students and asked for their explanations in writing.
Four students admitted that they were neophytes of the Tau Gamma Fraternity and were
present in a hazing rite. They also identified the senior members of the fraternity present
at their hazing. Among those identified is Emerson Chester Kim Go (Kim), then a fourth
year high school student.
In the meantime, the schools security officer prepared an incident report that the Tau
Gamma Fraternity had violated its covenant with the school by recruiting 18 members
from its high school department, including Kim.
Kim, together with his parents, denied the formers membership in the said fraternity.
However, Letran found substantial basis in the allegations against the fraternity and its
alleged members; hence the school eventually decided to suspend the members from
attending classes.
The petitioners subsequently filed a complaint for damages claiming that the
respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim. Mr. and Mrs. Go also sought compensation
for the business opportunity losses they suffered while personally attending to Kims
disciplinary case. RTC ruled in favor of Kim, stating that the latter was dismissed without
due process, his membership in the fraternity was not duly proven, and Letran had no
authority to dismiss Kim from school. The Court of Appeals reversed such decision.

Whether or not Kim was unlawfully dismissed.

Kim was not dismissed unlawfully. Pursuant to DECS Order No. 20, s. 1991, all elementary
and high school students are prohibited from joining fraternities regardless of their
school of enrollment. Private schools also have the authority to promulgate and enforce
a similar prohibition pursuant to their right to establish disciplinary rules and regulations
as recognized in the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Section 78 of the
said manual provides private schools shall have the right to promulgate reasonable rules
and regulations it may deem necessary for the maintenance of good school discipline
and class attendance. It was held that Letrans rule prohibiting its high school students
from joining fraternities is a reasonable regulation and the penalty for violation of the
rule is clearly stated in Letrans enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks.
The petitioners also argue that the respondents violated due process (a) by not
conducting a formal inquiry into the charge against Kim; (b) by not giving them any
written notice of the charge; and (c) by not providing them with the opportunity to crossexamine the neophytes who had positively identified Kim as a senior member of their
However, in Guzman v. National University, it was held that due process in disciplinary
cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student
discipline cases may be summary; and cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.
To meet the minimum standards to satisfy the demands of procedural due process, (1)
the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case. These standards render the petitioners
arguments totally without merit. Also, the neophytes written statements and the
security officers incident report are admissible in school disciplinary proceedings, and
may amount to substantial evidence to support a decision in these proceedings.
The petitioners also contended that Letran defectively observed the written notice rule
because they had requested, and received, Kims written explanation at a time when the
respondents had not yet issued the written notice of the accusation against him.
Jurisprudence, however, has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in the strict judicial sense. What matters for due process
purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given.
It should also be noted that Kim had been heard through his written explanation. Thus,
he cannot claim that he was denied the right to adduce evidence in his behalf. In fact,

1C | 2015 - 2016


the petitioners were given further opportunity to produce additional evidence in the
conferences that they did not attend.

Doctrine: Due Process-Procedural Due Process
The Letter dated April 1st 1996 by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal relating to the Court the
actuations Judge Angelito C. Teh was considered by the court as an Administrative,
relative to the Election Case being handled by Atty. Macalintal.
In Election Case No. R-95-001 Judge Teh issued a resolution adverse to the client of Atty.
Macalintal, thus prompting Macalintal to question the resolution before the COMELEC.
While the case was pending at the COMELEC, Judge Teh actively participated in the
proceedings by filing his comment on the petition and, later, an urgent manifestation.

accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court, hired his own lawyer, filed his
answer to the motion and forthwith denied the same, ordering, at the same time, Atty.
Macalintal to pay P100,000.00 by way of attorney's fees and litigation expenses "for
compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the
Answer to the Motion for Inhibition." Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party
litigant and as a judge before his own court.
The SC argued that Decisions of courts need not only be just but must be perceived to
be just and completely free from suspicion or doubt both in its fairness and
integrity. Judges, being the visible representation of the law and, most importantly, of
justice, should be the embodiment of independence, competence, and integrity.
The SC also argued that a member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast
of legal and jurisprudential developments and show acquaintance with statutes,
procedural rules and authorities doctrines.
"When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a
judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and
title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was
deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order. After all,
faith in the administration of justice exists only if every party-litigant is
assured that occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles

Atty. Macalintal then filed a petition seeking to prevent Judge Teh from further acting in
the election case. Instead of inhibiting Judge Teh hired his own lawyer, and filed his
answer on his own court and ordered Atty. Macalintal to pay for the suit.
Whether or not Judge Tehs actions, reveals gross incompetence, ignorance of the law
or misconduct?
The court found Judge Tehs active participation, as a nominal or formal party, in the
election case handled by Atty. Macalintal as gross deviation from the acceptable norm
for judges, in Accordance to Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court:
", a judge whose order is challenged in an appellate court does not
have to file any answer or take active part in the proceeding unless
expressly directed by order of this Court. It is the duty of the private
respondent to appear and defend, both in his/her behalf and in behalf
of the Court or judge whose order or decision is at issue. The judge
should maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not
waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to
official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his principal
task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court. He is merely a
nominal party to the case and has no personal interest nor personality
Judge Tehs gross misconduct also manifested after Macalintal filed a motion for the
Judges inhibition in Election Case No. R-95-001, the latter, instead of acting thereon in

Thus the compendium of the evidences presented in letter proved Judge Teh guilty of
gross ignorance of the law, thus SC dismissed him from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any other branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations.


Doctrine: Due Process, Administrative Case due to mental impairment
In 1995, Floretino Floro Jr. applied to the Judicial and Bar Council, but was rejected for
the bench after failing the mandatory psychological examination conducted by
the Supreme Court. The Clinic Services of the Supreme Court found "evidence of ego
disintegration" and "developing psychotic process", and Floro voluntarily withdrew his
Floro re-applied in 1998 again with a negative evaluation. Due to his impressive academic
performance he was allowed to submit a second, more favorable psychiatric opinion

1C | 2015 - 2016


from private practitioners. On his 45th birthday Floro was appointed a regional trial court
judge in the Metro Manila region of the capital and began work in November 1998.
In March1999, Floro requested an audit be performed, which resulted in a July 13 report
to a court administrator who recommended the report be considered a complaint
against Floro and that he be given another psychiatric examination.
On July 20, 1999 Judge Floro was placed on preventive suspension during the
investigation against him. He was charged for violating a variety of rules governing
judicial conduct, including circulating a business card containing self-congratulatory
statements, and announcing his qualifications in court; declarations in criminal cases on
the side of the accused; having a private law practice while a judge; having hearings
without the presence of a prosecuting attorney; ordering mental and physical
examinations of an accused over the objections of a prosecutor on unjustified grounds.
The 13 charges against the respondent are linked to mental/psychological illness which
allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his office.
This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to
be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he
is the angel of death and that he has unseen little friends dwarfs in determining the
transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
Whether or not Judge Floro can remain as RTC Judge because of the findings of mental
impairment that renders him unfit to perform the functions of his office.
No. SC favored the decision of OCA on suspending Judge Floro, but claiming OCA nor the
SC is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is insane as, in fact, the psychologists and
psychiatrists on his case have never said so. SC on the mental impairment of Judge Floro,
he remains an honorable man and he is not guilty of gross misconduct or acts of
corruption but the findings of psychosis by the mental health professionals assigned to
his case indicate gross deficiency incompetence and independence.
Supreme Court fined Judge Floro P 40,000.00 and removed him from his position with
three years back pay, allowances, and benefits. Floro was also not barred from
application or admittance to government services which do not require the dispensation
of justice.


Zambales Chromite Mining Corp., Inc. (ZCM, Inc.) sought to be declared the rightful and
prior locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Zambales. ZCM filed their claims with
then Director of Mines Benjamin Gozon. ZCM, Inc., were asserting their claim against the
mining claims of Martinez and Pabilona. Director Gozon decided in favor of Martinez and
Pabilona and dismissed the claims of ZCM, Inc., ruling that ZCM, Inc. did not discover any
mineral nor located any mining claims in accordance with law. ZCM appealed the
decision before the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. During the
pendency of the appeal, Director Gozon was appointed Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources. Gozon in his capacity as Secretary affirmed his decision as Director of
Mines and dismissed the appeal of ZCM, Inc.
ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed the decision of Gozon.
Ruling of CFI:
The disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules
of Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining
Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an
appeal from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a
ground for disqualification. ZCM appealed the case to the CA.
Ruling of CA:
CA after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm his own decision remanded the case to the
Minister of Natural Resources.
Whether or not Gozon can review and validly affirm his earlier decision w/o disturbing
due process?
Secretary Gozon cannot review his decision as Director of Mines. A Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines is a
mockery of administrative justice.
In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be
a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is
under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real
review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case.



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Miguel Singson (Singson) was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, Ms.
Lolita Kondo, a Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted money from her
($200.00) by accusing her of having excess baggage; and that to settle the issue, she
needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the investigating
committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson from employment. Singson
then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino
ruled in favor of Singson as he found PALs side insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL
appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled to
the 2nd Division thereof.


The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay,

Rogelio Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino same arbiter which decided
Singsons case. The commissioners deliberated on the case and thereafter reversed the
decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala
deliberated on the motion. The motion was denied.
W/N Singson was denied of due process.
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that
Singson was denied due process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner
of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PALs appeal. He was reviewing his own
decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division
shall consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding
Commissioner and one member each from the workers and employers sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees equal representation and
impartiality among its members. Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3)
commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the process of review.
Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who
decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation
in this case. The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for
reconsideration of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts
from the time he filed his appeal. He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an impartial review
of three commissioners. The denial of Singsons right to an impartial review of his appeal
is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

The petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident
Auditor Alexander A. Tan. Said report implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr.,
the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller
Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente
dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB
Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper
information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against petitioner
Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. The case against
Montesa and Jecong was dismissed for lack of evidence. The resolution was approved by
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M.
Vasquez. Subsequently an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019
was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Tejano, and spouses Juana
and Vicente dela Cruz, Special Prosecutor Micael, in a memorandum recommended the
dismissal of the case which was then approved. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor,
disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal
note "assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively."
Whether or not Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion in
disapproving the memorandum of the special prosecutor recommending the dismissal
of the criminal case against the petitioners.
Yes, Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the
part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner
attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the
initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by

1C | 2015 - 2016


concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the
Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman
Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the

On August 22, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a Decision, finding Sison
and several other local officials of theProvince of Samar guilty of grave misconduct,
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him
from service.
On June 26, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman against Sison.


Doctrine: Procedural Due Process
On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by Fr. Noel Labendia
of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a letter-complaint addressed to
then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor Milagrosa T. Tan and other
local public official of the Province of Samar, including respondent Maximo D. Sison, of
highly anomalous transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of
pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13, 2004
conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit (COA), which
found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million went without
proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were expended
without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that purchases
for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained in the letter-complaint and claimed
his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his function is limited to the issuance of
a certification that an appropriation for the requisition exists, that the corresponding
amount has been obligated, and that funds are available. He did not, in any way, vouch
for the truthfulness of the certification issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he
averred that he never participated in the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes
and attendance sheet of the bidding.
Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached in the
letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected nor
directly implicated in the complaint.
On May 6, 2005, Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and
reiterated that he had not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of
public funds by the Province of Samar.

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.
It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the rules shows
the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or
disallowing the intervention, thus:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SECTION 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may
be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. A
copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion
and served on the original parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third persons, not originally parties to the
suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter, come into the case in order to protect
their right or interpose their claim. Its main purpose is to settle in one action and by a
single judgment all conflicting claims of, or the whole controversy among, the persons
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the
instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful
of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases where their
decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison detre for such a doctrine

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is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide
the issues without the judges active participation. When judges actively participate in
the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become
adversarial instead.
Rule 43, as well as Administrative Circular No. 1-95, provides that the petition for review
shall state the full names of the parties to the case without impleading the court or
agencies either as petitioners or respondents. Thus, the only parties in such an appeal
are the appellant as petitioner and appellee as respondent. The court or, in this case, the
administrative agency that rendered the judgment appealed from, is not a party in the
said appeal.
Therefore, the Office of the Ombudsman does not have the legal interest to intervene. As
the CA held correctly:
The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a
legal interest in the administrative case against the petitioner such that
it would be directly affected by the judgment that this Court had
rendered. It must be remembered that the legal interest required for
an intervention must be direct and immediate in character. Lest it be
forgotten, what was brought on appeal before this Court is the very
Decision by the Office of the Ombudsman. Plainly, the Office of the
Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an advocate, has no legal
interest at stake in the outcome of this Rule 43 Petition.


Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of
On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.
The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they
were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However,
Fortune changed the names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,'
thereby removing the said brands from the foreign brand category. Fortune also
submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original register and therefore a local
brand. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands.
RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local
brands carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR
issued Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed

55% ad valorem tax on the three brands classifying them as local brands carrying a
foreign name.
Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective.
The CIR filed a motion for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the
CA, an appeal, which was also denied.
Whether the RMC was valid
No. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing
foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law
would have its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which
at the time of its effectivity were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the
issuance of the RMC, the brands were subjected to 45% ad valorem tax. In so doing, the
BIR not simply interpreted the law but it legislated under its quasi-legislative authority.
The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should
not have been then ignored.
In order that there shall be a just enforcement of rules and regulations in conformity
with due process, Revenue Tax Issuances must comply with the following procedures:
1. This Circular shall apply only to a) Revenue Regulations; b) Revenue Audit
Memorandum Orders; and c) Revenue Memorandum Circulars and Revenue
Memorandum Orders bearing on internal revenue tax rules and regulations
2. Except when the law otherwise provides, the aforesaid internal revenue tax issuances
shall not begin to operate until after due notice thereof may be fairly presumed.
The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid
and effective administrative issuance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the Court of Tax
Appeals, is AFFIRMED.


On September 18, 2012 Judge Ferdinand Rivera Villanueva was appointed as MCTC
Presiding Judge. After a year, he applied to become an RTC judge as there were vacant
positions. The JBC Executive Officer informed him by letter that the reason his name was
not included was due to the JBCs long-standing policy of opening the chance for
promotion to second-level courts to other incumbent judges who have served in their

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current position for at least five years; since the petitioner had been only a judge for one
year, he was not included in the list. Thus, Judge Rivera filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, mandamus and declaratory relief before the Supreme Court. He asserts that
the Constitution had already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge to which the
JBC could add no more. The policy violates the equal protection and due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as its Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity
Employment. The provision of RA 8557 particularly Section 10 thereof on pre-judicature
program should be mandatory, not merely directory; and that he has all the
qualifications of an RTC judge.


Doctrine: Substantive Due Process

Whether the JBC policy of requiring five years service as first level judges before they
could be considered for promotion as second-level judges is constitutional.

Carole D. gave birth to a daughter whose father is Michael H. with which she had an illicit
affair. This happened during the period of separation of Carole D. with Gerald D. Michael
filed a filiation action in California Superior Court to establish his paternity and visitation
rights. The court denied Michaels motion for visitation. California CA affirmed, rejecting
Michaels procedural and substantive due process challenges.



The petition was dismissed. Ones inclusion in the list of candidates is subject to the
discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees for a particular judicial post. There
is no law that grants him the immediate right to a promotion to second-level courts. The
fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or
her name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an
application or accepting a recommendation, one submits to the authority of the JBC to
subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process, and to use its
discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list

Whether or not Michael is deprived of substantive due process

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees

to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the
President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the
JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public interest as it
determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987
Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies
to effectively ensure its mandate.



WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however,

DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1)
the assailed policy requiring five years of experience as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicant to the Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines
that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be implementing.

No. Michael has no constitutionally protected liberty interest in the parental relationship
he has established with Victoria, their daughter. Hence, he cannot be said to have been
deprived of substantive due process since he was not deprived of any liberty insofar as
his filiation is concern

Doctrine: The Act's definition of "mental abnormality" satisfies "substantive" due

process requirements. An individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in
avoiding physical restraint may be overridden. This Court has consistently upheld
involuntary commitment statutes that detain people who are unable to control their
behavior and thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety, provided the
confinement takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary standards. The
Act unambiguously requires a pre commitment finding of dangerousness either to one's
self or to others, and links that finding to a determination that the person suffers from a
"mental abnormality" or "personality disorder." Generally, this Court has sustained a
commitment statute if it couples proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional
factor, such as a "mental illness" or "mental abnormality," for these additional
requirements serve to limit confinement to those who suffer from a volitional
impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their control. The Act sets forth
comparable criteria with its pre commitment requirement of "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder." Contrary to Hendricks' argument, this Court has never required
States to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment statutes and

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leaves to the States the task of defining terms of a medical nature that have legal
significance. The legislature is therefore not required to use the specific term "mental
illness" and is free to adopt any similar term.
Despite several spans of incarceration, Hendricks continued to molest children over a
long period. He was convicted of taking indecent liberties with two teenage boys and
scheduled for release after serving 10 years of his sentence. Near the same time, the
state legislature sought to address the problem of repeat sex offenders by passing the
Sexually Violent Predator Act. Based on this law, the state sought his civil commitment
at the time of his scheduled release. Hendricks did not challenge his diagnosis of
pedophilia or argue that it was treatable. A jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
he was a sexually violent predator, but Hendricks succeeded in a constitutional challenge
to the Act in the Kansas Supreme Court.
Hendricks appealed the validity of his commitment as well as claiming that the state
was unconstitutionally using ex post facto and double jeopardy law, to the State
Supreme Court. The court ruled that the Act was invalid on the grounds that the
condition of "mental abnormality" did not satisfy the "substantive" due
process requirement that involuntary civil commitment must be based on the finding of
the presence of a "mental illness". It did not address the claims of ex post-facto and
double jeopardy.
WON the act is constitutional.
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the Act's procedures and the definition of a "mental
abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses to the degree
that such person is a menace to the health and safety of others." It agreed with Kansas
that the Act limits persons eligible for confinement to persons who are not able to
control their dangerousness.
Further, the court decided the Act does not violate the Constitution's double jeopardy
prohibition nor the ban on ex post-facto law because the Act does not
establish criminal proceedings and therefore involuntary confinement under it is not
punishment. Because the Act is civil, Hendricks' confinement under the Act is not a
second prosecution nor is it double jeopardy. And finally, the court said the Act is not
considered punitive if it fails to offer treatment for an untreatable condition.
The court's finding that preventative long term confinement of mentally disordered
persons has previously been justified on the grounds that some people's behavior cannot
be prevented, and it does not violate their rights to confine them to deter antisocial

behavior. However, it has also been argued that upholding the Act expands involuntary
civil commitment to people with personality disorders which could justify the
commitment of large numbers of criminals if the proof of the likelihood of re-offending
required is sufficiently inclusive, which could happen if the requirement of
dangerousness is not limited to those with a mental illness, and that if mental
abnormality (rather than mental illness) can be the basis for sex offender commitment,
there is a danger that it may expand the basis for traditional civil commitment to
personality disorders as well.

Petitioners in this case are the State of Washington and its attorney general.
Respondents Harold Glucksberg, M.D., Abigail Halperin, M.D., Thomas A. Preston, M.D.,
and Peter Shalit, M.D., are physicians who practice in Washington. These doctors
occasionally treat terminally ill, suffering patients and declare that they would assist
these patients in ending their lives if not for the Washington's assisted-suicide ban. In
January 1994, respondents, along with three gravely ill, pseudonymous plaintiffs who
have since died and compassion in dying, a nonprofit organization that counsels people
considering physician assisted suicide, sued in the united states district court, seeking a
declaration that Wash Rev Code is on its face, unconstitutional. the district court agreed
and concluded that Washingtons assisted suicide is unconstitutional because it "places
undue burden on the exercise of constitutionally protected liberty interest. This case was
reheard in the ninth circuit en band in which this court discusses what it described as
"historical" and "current societal attitudes" toward suicide and assisted suicide, and
concluded that "the constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in
controlling the time and manner of one's death. IN SHORT, a constitutionally-recognized
"right to die"
Whether or not there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's
death, or in other words is there any right to die.
The court turns to the respondent's constitutional claim. The due process clause
guarantees more than fair process, and the liberty it protects includes more than the
absence of physical restraint. The clause also provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.
Observing the due process clause, it specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. Regarding the
issue of whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time and manner of one's

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death. Similarly, the respondents assert a "liberty to choose how to die". The Washington
statute at issue in this case prohibits "aiding another person to attempt suicide," and
thus the question before the court emanates from whether the "liberty" specially
protected by the due process clause includes a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so. The history of the law's treatment of assisted
suicide in this country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all
efforts to permit it. that being the case, the decisions of the court conclude that the
asserted right to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the due process clause.

Doctrine: Substantive Due Processhold that the Due Process Clause prohibits States
from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. The statute at issue here makes sodomy a
crime only if a person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of
the same sex. Sodomy between opposite-sex partners, however, is not a crime in Texas.
That is, Texas treats the same conduct differently based solely on the participants. The
Texas statute makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law by making particular
conductand only that conductsubject to criminal sanction. And the effect of Texas
sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of prosecution or consequence of conviction.
Texas sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difcult
for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to engage in sexual
relations. Petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a
crime. Their right to liberty under the due process clause gives them full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government. It is a promise of the
Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not
John Lawrence, Tyron Garner, and Robert Eubanks were three gay men spending the
evening together at Lawrence's apartment in Houston. While Garner and Eubanks had
been involved in a romantic relationship, Lawrence and Eubands were friends. Eubanks
was angry that Garner had been flirting with Lawrence and left the apartment, ostensibly
to buy a soda. He then called the police and reported that there was a disturbance
involving weapons at the apartment. The sheriff's deputies entered the apartment on
Eubanks' directions with weapons drawn.
One of the deputies, Joseph Quinn, alleged that Lawrence and Garner were engaged in
anal sex in the bedroom, which was unlocked. However, the other three officers

reported different stories, two of them saying that they saw no intercourse at all. It is
possible that Quinn's account was driven by Lawrence's hostility toward him as well as
his biases against African-Americans and homosexuals. (Garner was African-American.)
Nevertheless, Quinn charged Lawrence and Garner with "deviate sex" under Chapter 21,
Section 21.06 of the Texas Penal Code. They pleaded no content to the charges on the
advice of their lawyers and were fined a small amount, which was raised when the judge
realized that their lawyers planned to raise a constitutional challenge to the convictions.
Appeals were permitted only in cases where a fine of at least a certain amount was
The defense attorneys argued that the Texas law violated the Constitution because it
prevented only homosexual couples from engaging in anal sex while allowing the same
conduct for heterosexual couples. Challenging the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick that criminalizing homosexuality was constitutional, they asserted the
creative argument of a right to privacy and argued that law enforcement should not have
the right to invade an individual's bedroom.
Although a three-judge appellate panel initially agreed with the defendants and struck
down the law, an en banc review reversed the panel without hearing oral arguments and
found the law constitutional. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (essentially the state
supreme court for criminal matters) declined review.
Whether or not the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the due process clause
The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain
intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.
(a) Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were free as adults to engage
in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. For this
inquiry the Court deems it necessary to reconsider its Bowers holding. The Bowers
Court's initial substantive statement-"The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy...,"
478 U. S., at 190-discloses the Court's failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at
stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married
couple were it said that marriage is just about the right to have sexual intercourse.
Although the laws involved in Bowers and here purport to do no more than prohibit a
particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching consequences,
touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private
of places, the home. They seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose

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without being punished as criminals. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows
homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.
(b) Having misapprehended the liberty claim presented to it, the Bowers Court stated
that proscriptions against sodomy have ancient roots. 478 U. S., at 192. It should be
noted, however, that there is no longstanding history in this country of laws directed at
homosexual conduct as a distinct matter. Early American sodomy laws were not directed
at homosexuals as such but instead sought to prohibit nonprocreative sexual activity
more generally, whether between men and women or men and men. Moreover, early
sodomy laws seem not to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private.
Instead, sodomy prosecutions often involved predatory acts against those who could not
or did not consent: relations between men and minor girls or boys, between adults
involving force, between adults implicating disparity in status, or between men and
animals. The longstanding criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy upon
which Bowers placed such reliance is as consistent with a general condemnation of
nonprocreative sex as it is with an established tradition of prosecuting acts because of
their homosexual character. Far from possessing "ancient roots," ibid., American laws
targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th century. Even
now, only nine States have singled out same sex relations for criminal prosecution. Thus,
the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers are more complex than the majority opinion
and the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Burger there indicated. They are not without
doubt and, at the very least, are overstated. The Bowers Court was, of course, making
the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral, but this Court's obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate its own moral code, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.
The Nation's laws and traditions in the past half century are most relevant here. They
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.
(c) Bowers' deficiencies became even more apparent in the years following its
announcement. The 25 States with laws prohibiting the conduct referenced
in Bowers are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce their laws only against homosexual
conduct. In those States, including Texas, that still proscribe sodomy (whether for samesex or heterosexual conduct), there is a pattern of non-enforcement with respect to
consenting adults acting in private. Casey, supra, at 851-which confirmed that the Due
Process Clause protects personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
educationand Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 624-which struck down class-based legislation
directed at homosexuals-cast Bowers' holding into even more doubt. The stigma the
Texas criminal statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial. Although the offense is but a
minor misdemeanor, it remains a criminal offense with all that imports for the dignity of
the persons charged, including notation of convictions on their records and on job

application forms, and registration as sex offenders under state law. Where a case's
foundations have sustained serious erosion, criticism from other sources is of greater
significance. In the United States, criticism of Bowers has been substantial and
continuing, disapproving of its reasoning in all respects, not just as to its historical
assumptions. And, to the extent Bowers relied on values shared with a wider civilization,
the case's reasoning and holding have been rejected by the European Court of Human
Rights, and that other nations have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the
protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct. There
has been no showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscribing
personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent. Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828. Bowers' holding has not induced
detrimental reliance of the sort that could counsel against overturning it once there are
compelling reasons to do so. Casey, supra, at 855856. Bowers causes uncertainty, for
the precedents before and after it contradict its central holding.
(d) Bowers' rationale does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting opinion
in Bowers JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that (1) the fact a State's governing majority has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the
intimacies of physical relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a
form of liberty protected by due process. That analysis should have controlled Bowers,
and it controls here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today,
and is hereby overruled. This case does not involve minors, persons who might be injured
or coerced, those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution.
It does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices
common to a homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process
Clause gives them the full right to engage in private conduct without government
intervention. Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest
which can justify its intrusion into the individual's personal and private life.

Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are involved in the advertising business,
particularly in billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private lands in the
Province of Rizal were removed upon complaints and by the orders of the defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection (b) of section 100
of Act No. 2339.
Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the power of the of the Collector
of Internal Revenue to remove any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that
the same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and maintain that the

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billboards in question in no sense constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the
health, morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any persons. Defendant
Collector of Internal Revenue avers that after due investigation made upon the
complaints of the British and German Consuls, the defendant decided that the billboard
complained of was and still offensive to the sight and is otherwise a nuisance.
Whether or not the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a legitimate exercise of the
police power of the Government
Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of
Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government. Where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and
care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts.
The High Court is of the opinion that unsightly advertisements or signs, signboards, or
billboards which are offensive to the sight, are not disassociated from the general
welfare of the public. This is not establishing a new principle, but carrying a wellrecognized principle to further application. Moreover, if the police power may be
exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in the country, and if
the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power.
Judgment reversed.


marriage and refusal to recognize marriages performed in other states did not violate
the couples' Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process.
1. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two
people of the same sex?
2. Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between
two people of the same sex that was legally licensed and performed in another state?
Yes, yes. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion for the 5-4 majority. The
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the
right to marry as one of the fundamental liberties it protects, and that analysis applies
to same-sex couples in the same manner as it does to opposite-sex couples. Judicial
precedent has held that the right to marry is a fundamental liberty because it is inherent
to the concept of individual autonomy, it protects the most intimate association between
two people, it safeguards children and families by according legal recognition to building
a home and raising children, and it has historically been recognized as the keystone of
social order. Because there are no differences between a same-sex union and an
opposite-sex union with respect to these principles, the exclusion of same-sex couples
from the right to marry violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also guarantees the right of
same-sex couples to marry as the denial of that right would deny same-sex couples equal
protection under the law. Marriage rights have traditionally been addressed through
both parts of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the same interrelated principles of liberty
and equality apply with equal force to these cases; therefore, the Constitution protects
the fundamental right of same-sex couples to marry. The Court also held that the First
Amendment protects the rights of religious organizations to adhere to their principles,
but it does not allow states to deny same-sex couples the right to marry on the same
terms as those for opposite-sex couples.

Groups of same-sex couples sued their relevant state agencies in Ohio, Michigan,
Kentucky, and Tennessee to challenge the constitutionality of those states' bans on
same-sex marriage or refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriages that occurred in
jurisdictions that provided for such marriages. The plaintiffs in each case argued that the
states' statutes violated the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and one group of plaintiffs also brought claims under the Civil
Rights Act. In all the cases, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and held that the states' bans on same-sex

Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo. A few
years after, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. RTC later
declared their marriage void ab initio. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Secretary General, filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG

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argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for
Fringer to be paid $2,000, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they
knowingly and willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
Whether or not a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American
citizenship in consideration of $2,000, void ab initio on the ground lack of consent
No. Their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquitting American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrated that they
willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter
into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie
that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.
The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead.
Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy
and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live. Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.



No, the Romualdez spouse contention is wrong. There is no incongruity between the
charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Information filed before the RTC.
The information filed were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the
In citing the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary as their basis for the lack of due
process, they argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the
actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information. However, their claim is wrong
because the charges contained in the complaint affidavit and charges as directed by the
COMELEC to be filed are bases on the same set of facts. They were afforded due process
because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in the Complaint


Doctrine: Void-for-vagueness, Overbreadth, and Facial Challenges
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council
composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance
Secretary Margarito Teves as members.


Whether or not RA 9372 is constitutional.

Dennis Garay filed a case alleging that Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes
Romualdez made false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 10[11] of
Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of 935 San Jose
Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113
Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City. The Romualdez
spouse committed and consummated election offenses in violation of election laws.


W/N the Romualdez spouse have been denied due process.

Yes, RA 9372 is constitutional.

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of
the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.

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Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to
free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity
of penal statutes. It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the
therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
A facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism
must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.
What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.


Doctrine: Right to Life; Religion; Health; Free Speech; Equal Protection Clause; Facial
Challenge, etc.
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012. It is a consolidation and enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks
to enhance the population control program of the government in order to promote
public welfare. However, when coercive measures are found within the law, provisions
must be removed or altered in order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by

infringing on the rights of the people. People from different sectors questioned the
Constitutionality of the said Act.
1. Whether or not Reproductive Health Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to
2. Whether or not Reproductive Health Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to
1. No. The framers of the Constitution also intended for conception to refer to the
moment of fertilization and the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In
addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only
those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus
constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child
was to prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court
cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually
prohibits abortion. By using the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the
RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those
that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb.
The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has
a bounded duty to protect it.
2. No. Petitioners claim that the right to health is violated by the RH Law because it
requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies in the National Drug Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential
medicines and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH Law). They cite
risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g. oral contraceptive pills.
SC said the RH Law does not intend to do contradict with RA 4729 (An Act to Regulate
the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Device
1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure
that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate
under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

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Under Section 9 of the RH Law requires the mandatory only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot
determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective.
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom,
freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the
right to ones freedom of expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are
The OSG assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech
regulating measure.
Supreme Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
SC said considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority
to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed
pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch
of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the
detriment of the Filipino people.

Private respondents Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of

selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners
Virgilio and Jenny Agabon as gypsum and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until
February 23, 199 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then
filed for a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims. The labor arbiter
rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondents to
pay the petitioners monetary claims. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor arbiter's
decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work, and were not
entitled to backwages and separation pay. Consequently, the CA ruled that the dismissal
of the petitioners was not illegal because they had abandoned their employment but
ordered the payments of money claims. The petitioners then seek for review to the
higher court.
Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed by the private respondents.
Privates respondents claimed that the petitioners were not dismissed but abandoned
their work. In fact, the former sent two letters to the last known addresses of the
petitioners advising them to report for work and has also managed to talk to petitioner
Virigilio by telephone sometime in June 1999 about his new assignment. However, the
petitioners we're said to be working for another company. The latter contends that they
were not given any assignment by the private respondents. The court ruled that the
employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who is admittedly
guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued employment is patently
inimical to the employer. the law protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It is also stressed that the petitioners
committed a grave offense in abandoning their work which, if the requirements of due
process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal. However, the
violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. Wherefore, the
petition is denied and the decision of the CA is affirmed with modifications.



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Doctrine: Equal protectionnot violated by legislation based on reasonable
Salus populi suprema est lexwhen the public safety or the public morals
require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the
hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance
by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer.
The private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests
of the nation.
Police powermost insistent and least limitable of all powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with selfprotection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure
intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of
the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and
add to its wealth and prosperity.

drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other
than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act,
except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police
officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal
or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this
Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of
not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding
six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer
and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime
Whether or not Act 1639 is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws,
violates due process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power

Due process:


1. that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of
the legislative department of the government

Equal protection not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And the
classification, to be reasonable:

2. that it shall be reasonable in its operation


must rest on substantial distinctions

3. that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure



must be germane to the purposes of the law


must not be limited to existing conditions only


must apply equally to all members of the same class

4. that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class.
Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, a member of non-Christian
tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in
his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639
on or about the 25th day of January, 1937. He was prosecuted for violation of Act No.
1639 (secs. 2 and 3).
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a
member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered
Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or

The Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That
it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of
their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the nonChristian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and,
eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian
brotherssalus populi suprema est lex.


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Anup Engquist, a woman of Indian descent, brought this action against the Oregon
Department of Agriculture alleging that a co-worker at the Department harassed her and
eventually engineered her termination. Although Engquist asserted numerous claims, a
jury in the federal district court only found in her favor on her equal protection,
substantive due process, and intentional interference with employment claims.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck those jury verdicts.
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had previously dealt
with such "class of one" equal protection claims eight years ago in a case, Village of
Willowbrook v. Olech, involving a village resident suing the village for unjustified zoning
decisions, it refused to apply that short, two-page opinion to Engquist's claim. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the Olech opinion may only apply when the government is in the
role of regulator and did not clarify whether it would also apply in an employment
context such as this one. In seeking Court review, Engquist noted the pervasive splits in
the circuits regarding the proper allocation of the Court's decision in Olech, while Oregon
claimed that Olech should be construed narrowly so as to avoid a deluge of petty cases
against the government. Oregon also pointed out that even if the case were to be heard,
Oregon would have qualified immunity and Engquist would necessarily lose.
Whether a public employee can state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by
alleging that she was arbitrarily treated differently from other similarly situated
employees, with no assertion that the different treatment was based on the employees
membership in any particular class. We hold that such a class-of-one theory of equal
protection has no place in the public employment context.
The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment
context. Pp. 416.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising the power to
regulate or license, as lawmaker, and acting as proprietor, to manage [its] internal
operation. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886. Thus, in the
public-employment context, the Court has recognized that government has
significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its
sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., OConnor v. Ortega, 480 U. S.
709. The relevant precedent establishes two main principles: First, government
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work, but those
rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g.,
id., at 721. Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether
the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitutional provisions basic

concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the requirements of the
government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138. Pp. 48.
(b) The Courts equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with
governmental classifications that affect some groups of citizens differently than
others. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420. Olech did recognize that a class-of-one
equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that
theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal
Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an
application of that principle to the facts in that case: The government singled Olech
out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the Court
relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a
singular way to particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and
the cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even
for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential treatment raised a
concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a
rational basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their
nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective,
individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently is an
accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This
principle applies most clearly inthe employment context, where decisions are often
subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to
articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arms-length regulation, such as in
Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment
context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a
subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. That
the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this area is not
surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government
employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886.
Recognition of a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others for
a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The
Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is
guided, as in the past, by the common-sense realization that government offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.
Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the employment
context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim
of differential treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal
constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require [t]his
displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision. Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U. S. 410. Pp. 816.


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Doctrine: Equal ProtectionGeneral Consideration
Kabataan Partylist through its representatives filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of R.A. 10367 or An Act Providing for Mandatory Biometrics Voter
Registration and COMELEC resolution nos. 9721, 9863 and 10013 concerning the
implementation of the Biometrics Law.
The petitioners contend that the law violates the constitutionally mandated right to
suffrage. As the statutory requirement of biometrics validation is similar to the previous
unconstitutional requirement of literacy and property as it curtails the right of suffrage
through deactivation of non-validated voters.

RA 10367 and the COMELEC resolutions related to it is within the Constitutionally

mandated regulation that a voter must be a person not disqualified by the law. That he
must be able to comply with the Biometrics Validation. The aforementioned law and
COMELEC resolution is in accordance with RA 8189 as it advances a compelling state
interest, which is to facilitate the conduct of orderly, honest and credible election by
eliminating the problem of flying voters and multiple registrations.
The deactivation of voters that were unable to undergo biometrics validation neutrally
applies to all voters. There is no creation of artificial class of voters the petitioners
contend nor there are favors accorded to obedient voters. Thus the regulation is beyond
the intended mantle of Equal Protection of the Law, which only works against undue
favor and individual or class, privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of in equality.

Whether or not RA 10367 and related COMELEC resolutions are constitutional




The court ruled in favour of the Biometrics law. The right to Suffrage is governed by
Section 1 Article V of the 1987 Constitution which outlines the qualifications needed to
exercise the right to suffrage. The Supreme Court interpreted the constitutionally
mandated qualifications which are: First, he must be a Filipino citizen; Second, he must
not be disqualified by law; Third, the residence requirement of at least a year living in
the country and 6 months in the locality the person is voting.


The second qualification reflects the franchised nature of the right of suffrage, that the
state exercising its inherent police powers can enact laws to regulate the right to suffrage
by imposing statutory disqualifications. This shows that the government shall have the
power to regulate the act of voters registration for the purpose of conducting honest,
peaceful and orderly election.
The right of suffrage is not a natural right created by law, it is a privilege created by the
state to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good.
Thus, although one is deemed to be a qualified elector he must still comply with the
registration procedure to in order to vote; As the right to vote is necessarily conditioned
upon certain procedural requirement suffrage he must undergo, the process of
The requirement to undergo biometrics validation is a mere aspect of the registration
procedure, of which the state has the right to regulate. The Biometrics validation is a
procedure that is consistent with the limitations imposed by the 1987 Constitution and
at the same complements the RA 8189, or the law governing the process of registration.

Mrs. Myra Bradwell, residing in the State of Illinois, made application to the judges of the
Supreme Court of that State for a license to practice law. She accompanied her petition
with the usual certificate from an inferior court of her good character, and that on due
examination she had been found to possess the requisite qualifications. The statute of
Illinois on the subject of admissions to the bar, enacts that no person shall be permitted
to practice as an attorney or counsellor-at-law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any
action, suit, or complaint, in which he is not a party concerned, in any court of record
within the State, either by using or subscribing his own name or the name of any other
person, without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from some two of
the justices of the Supreme Court.
On Mrs. Bradwell's application first coming before the court, the license was refused,
and it was stated as a sufficient reason that under the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Illinois, the applicant-'as a married woman would be bound neither by her express
contracts nor by those implied contracts which it is the policy of the law to create
between attorney and client.' After the announcement of this decision, Mrs. Bradwell,
admitting that she was a married woman filed a printed argument in which her right to
admission, notwithstanding that fact, was earnestly and ably maintained. The court
thereupon gave an opinion in writing. Extracts are here given:
Our statute provides that no person shall be permitted to practice as an
attorney or counsellor at law without having previously obtained a license
for that purpose from two of the justices of the Supreme Court. By the
second section of the act, it is provided that no person shall be entitled to

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receive a license until he shall have obtained a certificate from the court
of some county of his good moral character, and this is the only express
limitation upon the exercise of the power thus entrusted to this court. In
all other respects it is left to our discretion to establish the rules by which
admission to this office shall be determined. But this discretion is not an
arbitrary one, and must be held subject to at least two limitations. One is,
that the court should establish such terms of admission as will promote
the proper administration of justice; the second, that it should not admit
any persons or class of persons who are not intended by the legislature to
be admitted, even though their exclusion is not expressly required by the
The substance of the last limitation is simply that this important trust
reposed in us should be exercised in conformity with the designs of the
power creating it.
Whether, in the existing social relations between men and women, it
would promote the proper administration of justice, and the general wellbeing of society, to permit women to engage in the trial of cases at the
bar, is a question opening a wide field of discussion, upon which it is not
necessary for us to enter. It is sufficient to say that, in our opinion, the
other implied limitation upon our power, to which we have above
referred, must operate to prevent our admitting women to the office of
attorney at law. If we were to admit them, we should be exercising the
authority conferred upon us in a manner which, we are fully satisfied, was
never contemplated by the legislature.
It is to be remembered that at the time this statute was enacted we had,
by express provision, adopted the common law of England,
It is to be also remembered that female attorneys at law were unknown
in England, and a proposition that a woman should enter the courts of
Westminster Hall in that capacity, or as a barrister, would have created
hardly less astonishment than one that she should ascend the bench of
bishops, or be elected to a seat in the House of Commons. It is to be
further remembered, that when our act was passed, that school of reform
which claims for women participation in the making and administering of
the laws had not then arisen, or, if here and there a writer had advanced
such theories, they were regarded rather as abstract speculations than as
an actual basis for action.
That God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action, and
that it belonged to men to make, apply, and execute the laws, was
regarded as an almost axiomatic truth.

In view of these facts, we are certainly warranted in saying that when the
legislature gave to this court the power of granting licenses to practice
law, it was with not the slightest expectation that this privilege would be
extended to women.
The court having thus denied the application, Mrs. Brad-well brought the case here
Can a female citizen, duly qualified in respect of age, character, and learning, claim,
under the fourteenth amendment in the constitution, the privilege of earning a
livelihood by practicing at the bar of a judicial court?
The original Constitution said that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.
Under this provision each State could determine for itself what the privileges and
immunities of its citizens should be. A citizen emigrating from one State to another
carried with him, not the privileges and immunities he enjoyed in his native State, but
was entitled, in the State of his adoption, to such privileges and immunities as were
enjoyed by the class of citizens to which he belonged by the laws of such adopted State.
But the fourteenth amendment executes itself in every State of the Union. Whatever are
the privileges and immunities of a citizen in the State of New York, such citizen,
emigrating, carries them with him into any other State of the Union. It utters the will of
the United States in every State, and silences every State constitution, usage, or law
which conflicts with it. If to be admitted to the bar, on attaining the age and learning
required by law, be one of the privileges of a white citizen in the State of New York, it is
equally the privilege of a colored citizen in that State; and if in that State, then in any
State. If no State may 'make or enforce any law' to abridge the privileges of a citizen, it
must follow that the privileges of all citizens are the same.
It is evident that there are certain 'privileges and immunities' which belong to a citizen
of the United States as such; otherwise it would be nonsense for the fourteenth
amendment to prohibit a State from abridging them. I concede that the right to vote is
not one of those privileges. And the question recurs whether admission to the bar, the
proper qualification being possessed, is one of the privileges which a State may not deny.
From these cases the conclusion is irresistible, that the profession of the law, like the
clerical profession and that of medicine, is an avocation open to every citizen of the
United States. And while the legislature may prescribe qualifications for entering upon
this pursuit, they cannot, under the guise of fixing qualifications, exclude a class of
citizens from admission to the bar. The legislature may say at what age candidates shall
be admitted; may elevate or depress the standard of learning required. But a
qualification, to which a whole class of citizens never can attain, is not a regulation of

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admission to the bar, but is, as to such citizens, a prohibition. For instance, a State
legislature could not, in enumerating the qualifications, require the candidate to be a
white citizen. This would be the exclusion of all colored citizens, without regard to age,
character, or learning. Yet no sound mind can draw a distinction between such an act
and a custom, usage, or law of a State, which denies this privilege to all female citizens,
without regard to age, character, or learning. If the legislature may, under pretence of
fixing qualifications, declare that no female citizen shall be permitted to practice law, it
may as well declare that no colored citizen shall practice law; for the only provision in
the Constitution of the United States which secures to colored male citizens the privilege
of admission to the bar, or the pursuit of the other ordinary avocations of life, is the
provision that 'no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of a citizen.' And if this provision does protect the colored citizen, then it
protects every citizen, black or white, male or female.
Now, Mrs. Bradwell is a citizen of the United States, and of the State of Illinois, residing
therein; she has been judicially ascertained to be of full age, and to possess the requisite
character and learning.
Still admission to the bar was denied her, not upon the ground that she was not a citizen;
not for want of age or qualifications; not because the profession of the law is not one of
those avocations which are open to every American citizen as matter of right, upon
complying with the reasonable regulations prescribed by the legislature; but first upon
the ground that inconvenience would result from permitting her to enjoy her legal rights
in this, to wit, that her clients might have difficulty in enforcing the contracts they might
make with her, as their attorney, because of her being a married woman; and, finally, on
the ground of her sex, merely.
But whatever the statute of Illinois meant, I maintain that the fourteenth amendment
opens to every citizen of the United States, male or female, black or white, married or
single, the honorable professions as well as the servile employments of life; and that no
citizen can be excluded from any one of them. Intelligence, integrity, and honor are the
only qualifications that can be prescribed as conditions precedent to an entry upon any
honorable pursuit or profitable avocation, and all the privileges and immunities which I
vindicate to a colored citizen, I vindicate to our mothers, our sisters, and our daughters.
The inequalities of sex will undoubtedly have their influence, and be considered by every
client desiring to employ counsel.
There may be cases in which a client's rights can only be rescued by an exercise of the
rough qualities possessed by men. There are many causes in which the silver voice of
woman would accomplish more than the severity and sternness of man could achieve.
Of a bar composed of men and women of equal integrity and learning, women might be
more or less frequently retained, as the taste or judgment of clients might dictate. But
the broad shield of the Constitution is over them all, and protects each in that measure
of success which his or her individual merits may secure.


Doctrine: Equal ProtectionBases for Classification
In July, 1978, a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Sonoma County, Cal.,
alleging that petitioner, then a 17 1/2-year-old male, had had unlawful sexual
intercourse with a female under the age of 18, in violation of 261.5. The evidence
adduced at a preliminary hearing showed that, at approximately midnight on June 3,
1978, petitioner and two friends approached Sharon, a 16 1/2-year-old female, and her
sister as they waited at a bus stop. Petitioner and Sharon, who had already been drinking,
moved away from the others and began to kiss. After being struck in the face for
rebuffing petitioner's initial advances, Sharon submitted to sexual intercourse with
petitioner. Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and
federal constitutional grounds, asserting that 261.5 unlawfully discriminated on the
basis of gender. The trial court and the California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's
request for relief, and petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court of California.
Whether or not California's "statutory rape" law, 261.5 of the California Penal Code
Ann. (West Supp. 1981), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
No. The justification offered by the state is that the statute is intended to prevent
illegitimate teenage pregnancies.
The state does have a strong interest in preventing such pregnancies; there are
significant social, medial, and economic consequences, and many of these are likely to
fall on the state.
Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the
consequences of pregnancy.
Thus, the legislature was within its authority when it elected to punish only the
participant who suffers few of the consequences of his conduct.
The risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females; no
similar natural sanctions deter males.
A criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly equalize the
deterrents on the sexes.
A gender neutral statute might not be as effective.

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A female is surely less likely to report violations of the statute if she would be subject to
criminal prosecution as well.

Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a
victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner. The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified
TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should
not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an exercise in futility. Petitioner filed
before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product
of an invalid law. The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued
by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
A. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
B. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
A. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial
distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of

the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the
class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom
the Senate extends its protection.
B. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which
is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be
enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way,
the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before such
acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, among which is protection of women and children from violence and
threats to their personal safety and security.


Doctrine: A statute based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional
guaranty of equal protection of the law. The law may treat one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial difference to distinguish on class
from another.
On July 10, 1983, Nicolas Montesclaros (72 years old) married Milagros Orbiso (43 years
old). Two years later, Nicolas filed with GSIS an application for retirement benefits, which
he qualified for on February 18, 1985, under PD 1146. Nicolas died on April 22, 1992.
Subsequently, Milagros filed with GSIS a claim for survivorship pension under PD 1146.
GSIS denied the claim because under Sec. 18 of PD 1146, the surviving spouse has no
right to survivorship pension if the surviving spouse contracted the marriage with the
pensioner within three years before the pensioner qualified for pension. Milagros filed a
special civil action for declaratory relief questioning validity of Sec. 18, PD 1146
disqualifying her from receiving survivorship pension.
Whether or not Sec. 18 of PD 1146 violates the equal protection clause

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Yes. The proviso is unduly oppressive. There is confiscation of benefits due the surviving
spouse without giving the surviving spouse an opportunity to be heard. The object of the
prohibition is vague. There is no reasonable connection between means employed and
the purpose intended. The law itself does not provide any reason for purpose of such a
prohibition. If the reason is to prevent deathbed marriages, the classification does not
rest on substantial distinctions.


Petitioner Tuan Anh Nguyen was born out of wedlock in Vietnam to a Vietnamese citizen
and petitioner Joseph Boulais, a United States citizen. Nguyen became a lawful
permanent United States resident at age six and was raised by Boulais. At age 22, Nguyen
pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to two counts of sexual assault on a child.
Subsequently, respondent Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation
proceedings against him based on his serious criminal offenses. The Immigration Judge
ordered him deportable. Boulais obtained an order of parentage from a state court while
Nguyens appeal was pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, but the Board
dismissed the appeal, rejecting Nguyens citizenship claim because he had not complied
with 8 U.S.C. Section 1409(a)s requirements for one born out of wedlock and abroad to
a citizen father and a noncitizen mother. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioners
claim that 1409 violates equal protection by providing different citizenship rules for
children born abroad and out of wedlock depending on whether the citizen parent is the
mother or the father.
Whether or not Section 1409 violates the equal protection guarantee embedded in the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Section 1409 is consistent with the equal protection guarantee.
(a) A child born abroad and out of wedlock acquires at birth the nationality status of a
citizen mother who meets a specified residency requirement. However, when the father
is the citizen parent, inter alia, one of three affirmative steps must be taken before the
child turns 18: legitimization, a declaration of paternity under oath by the father, or a
court order of paternity. The failure to satisfy this section renders Nguyen ineligible for
(b) A gender-based classification withstands equal protection scrutiny if it serves
important governmental objectives and the discriminatory means employed are

substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The Congress' decision to

impose different requirements on unmarried fathers or mothers is based on the
significant difference between their respective relationships to the potential citizen at
the time of birth and is justified by two important governmental interests:
The first such interest is the importance of assuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists. Because fathers and mothers are not similarly situated with regard
to proof of biological parenthood, the imposition of different rules for each is not
troublesome from a constitutional perspective. Section 1409(a)(4)s provision of three
options is designed to ensure acceptable documentation of paternity. The Constitution
does not require that Congress elect one particular mechanism from among many
possible methods of establishing paternity, and Section 1409(a)(4) represents a
reasonable legislative conclusion that the satisfaction of one of several alternatives will
suffice to establish the required father-child blood link.
The second governmental interest furthered by Section 1409(a)(4) is the determination
to ensure that the child and citizen parent have the opportunity to develop a relationship
that consists of real, everyday ties providing a connection between child and citizen
parent and, in turn, the United States. Section 1409 takes the unremarkable step of
ensuring that the opportunity inherent in the event of birth as to the mother-child
relationship exists between father and child before citizenship is conferred upon the
latter. That interests importance is too profound to be satisfied by a DNA test because
it does not, by itself, ensure father-child contact during the childs minority. Congress is
well within its authority in refusing, absent proof of an opportunity for a relationship to
develop, to commit this country to embracing a child as a citizen. Moreover, Section 1409
does not embody a gender-based stereotype because there is nothing irrational in
recognizing that at the moment of birth, the mothers knowledge of the child and the
fact of parenthood have been established in a way not guaranteed to the unwed father.
The means Congress chose substantially relate to its interest in facilitating a parent-child
relationship. Congress enacted an easily administered scheme to promote the different
but still substantial interest of ensuring an opportunity for that relationship to develop.
Section 1409(a)(4) should not be invalidated because Congress elected to advance an
interest that is less demanding to satisfy than some alternative. The Congress means are
in substantial furtherance of an important governmental objective, and the fit between
the means and that end is exceedingly persuasive.
(c) Section 1409(a)(4) imposes a minimal obligation. Only the least onerous of its three
options must be satisfied; and it can be satisfied on the day of birth, or the next day, or
for the next 18 years. Moreover, it is not the sole means of attaining citizenship for the
child, who can seek citizenship in his or her own right, rather than via reliance on parental
(d) Because the statute satisfies the equal protection scrutiny applied to gender-based
qualifications, the Court need not consider whether it can confer citizenship on terms

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other than those specified by Congress or assess the implications of statements in earlier
cases regarding the wide deference afforded to Congress in exercising its immigration
and naturalization power.

Ezra Vincent died intestate, survived by only collateral relations and an illegitimate
daughter, whose guardian (appellant) sued to have her declared Vincent's sole heir. The
trial court ruled that under Louisiana law the collateral relations took the decedent's
property to the exclusion of the daughter, who had been acknowledged by her father
but not legitimated. The Louisiana Court of Appeal affirmed. The State Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Appellant contends that Louisiana's intestate succession laws that bar
an illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children in the father's estate
constitute an invidious discrimination violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Constitution.
Whether or not the Louisiana Law is violative of the Equal Protection Clause
No. These rules for intestate succession may or may not reflect the intent of particular
parents. Many will think that it is unfortunate that the rules are so rigid. Others will think
differently. But the choices reflected by the intestate succession statute are choices,
which are within the power of the State to make. The Federal Constitution does not give
this Court the power to overturn the State's choice under the guise of constitutional
interpretation because the Justices of this Court believe that they can provide better
rules. In other words, the Louisiana statutory intestate succession scheme is within the
State's power to establish rules for the protection and strengthening of family life and
for the disposition of property, and in view of various statutory alternatives, none of
which was chosen by Vincent, did not (unlike the situation in Levy) constitute an
insurmountable barrier to illegitimate children. In short, we conclude that in the
circumstances presented in this case, there is nothing in the vague generalities of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses [401 U.S. 532, 540] which empowers this
Court to nullify the deliberate choices of the elected representatives of the people of


Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley, appellant, intermittently for 18 years, during which
time they had three children. Under Illinois law the children of unwed fathers became
wards of the State upon death of the mother. When Joan died a dependency proceeding
was instituted by the State and appellants children were declared wards of the State
and placed with court-appointed guardians. Appellant appealed upon the fact that he
had never been shown to be an unfit parent and that since married fathers and unwed
mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been
deprived of the equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether or not the Illinois statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution by distinguishing against and burdening unwed fathers?
As a matter of due process of law, appellant was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a
parent before his children were taken from him. By denying him a hearing when all other
parents whose custody of their children is challenged are permitted one, the State
denied appellant the equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under Illinois law, children of all parents can be taken from them in a neglect proceeding,
but only after notice, hearing, and proof of unfitness. In contrast, an unwed father is
uniquely subject to the more simplistic dependency proceeding.
The private interest of a man and the children he has sired and raised warrants deference
and protection. In comparison, previous case law has not refused to recognize those
family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.
The State claims that the interest furthered by the statue is to protect the moral,
emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor and the best interests of the
community. In support of this interest, the State asserts that most unmarried fathers are
unsuitable and neglectful parents. However, the State registers no gain toward its goals
when it separates children from the custody of fit parents. The States insistence on
presuming rather than proving appellants unfitness solely on the basis of convenience
is unconstitutional.

The petitioners seek admission into colleges or schools of medicine. However, the
petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT). Republic Act 2382 as amended by R.A. 4224 and 5946, known
as the Medical Act of 1959 created, among others, the Board of Medical Education (BME)
whose functions include "to determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a

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recognized college of medicine" (Sec. 5 (a). Section 7 of the same Act requires from
applicants to present a certificate of eligibility for entrance to medical school from the
BME. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports, established a uniform admission test called National Medical Admission Test as
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility.
Petitioners then filed with the RTC a petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition
with a prayer Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin
the Sec. of educ, BME from enforcing Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no.
2 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as condition for securing (cea).
Whether or not Sec. 5(a) and (f) of R.A. 4224 and MECS Order no. 2 violate the
constitution as they prescribe an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement
The legislative and administrative provisions impugned in this case constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety
of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully
approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches
has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the
power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is
also well recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those
who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have
long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the
establishment of minimum medical educational requirements-i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school-for admission to the medical
profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority
of the state. What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation
of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who
exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical
practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current state of
our social and economic development, are widely known.

The Court believes that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the
NMAT as a means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improving the quality of medical education
in the country."


Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12
months, as Chief Officer.
However, on the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer (lower salary than Chief Officer)
upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by
the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence,
Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines,
serving only two months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and
twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was
declared illegal and awarding him monetary benefits.
On appeal, the NLRC modified (lowered the awards) the LA decision based on the
provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x in case of termination of overseas employment
without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with
interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on
non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

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1. No. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in
his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive
is not tenable.

In New York, as in most States, it is a crime to aid another to commit or attempt suicide,
but patients may refuse even lifesaving medical treatment. Although it would be
consistent with the standards of their medical practices to prescribe lethal medication
for mentally competent, terminally ill patients who are suffering great pain and desire a
doctor's help in taking their own lives, they are deterred from doing so by New York's
assisted-suicide ban.

The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges
on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of
the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and
well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
2. Yes. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Under the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042, Overseas Filipino
Workers (OFWs) are classified into two categories. The first category includes OFWs with
fixed-period employment contracts of less than one year. In case of illegal dismissal, they
are entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion of their contract. The second
category consists of OFWs with fixed-period employment contracts of one year or more.
In case of illegal dismissal, they are entitled to monetary award equivalent to only three
These different ways of computing the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based
on their employment periods discriminate one (1) category whose contracts have an
unexpired portion of one year or more and subject them to the peculiar disadvantage of
having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for three (3) months or for the
unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, simply because the other categorys
unexpired contracts fall short of one year.
In addition, those OFWs belonging to the first category are likewise put on a
disadvantaged position compared to local workers with fixed-period employment who
are entitled to the award of salaries for the remainder of their fixed-term employment,
in case of illegal dismissal.
Considering these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the 5th paragraph of
Section 10, Republic Act (R.A) No. 8042 contains a discriminatory classification, since in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local
workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause unfairly singles out one
classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage, thus violating the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.


Respondent New York physicians and three gravely ill patients who have since died, sued
the State's Attorney General, claiming that the ban violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause.
WON there is violation of the Equal Protection Clause when a state criminalizes assisted
NO. The Equal Protection Clause embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases
alike but may treat unlike cases accordingly.
The distinction between letting a patient die and making that patient die is important,
and has been widely recognized and endorsed in the medical profession, the state
courts, and the overwhelming majority of state legislatures, which, like New York's, have
permitted the former while prohibiting the latter.
Logic and contemporary practice support New York's judgment that the two acts are
different, and New York may therefore, consistent with the Constitution, treat them
New York's reasons for recognizing and acting on the distinction between refusing
treatment and assisting a suicide; protecting vulnerable people from indifference,
prejudice, and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a
possible slide toward euthanasia are valid and important public interests that easily
satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational
relation to some legitimate end.


Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to reclusion perpetua for
the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping
(along with Agapito, Palmares and Padua). The decision for the first two petitioners was
rendered on March 8, 1954 and the third on Dec. 5, 1955. The last petitioner Bagolbagol

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was penalized with reclusion perpetua on Jan. 12, 1954. Each of the petitioners have
been imprisoned for more than 13 years by virtue of their convictions.
They now invoke the doctrine laid down in People v. Hernandez which negated such
complex crime, a ruling which was not handed down until after their convictions have
become final. In People v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that the information against the
accused for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted
under Art. 134 of the RPC, there being no such complex offense. This ruling was not
handed down until after their convictions have become final. Since Hernandez served
more than the maximum penalty that could have been served against him, he is entitled
to freedom, and thus, his continued detention is illegal.
Whether or not Art. 22 of the RPC which gives a penal judgment a retroactive effect is
applicable in this case (WON judicial decisions favorable to the accused/convicted for the
same crime can be applied retroactively)
Yes. Judicial decisions favorable to the accused must be applied retroactively. Petitioners
relied on Art. 22 of the RPC, which states the penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the accused who is not a habitual criminal. The Civil Code also
provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of
our legal system. Petitioners even raised their constitutional right to equal protection,
given that Hernandez et al., has been convicted for the same offense as they have,
though their sentences were lighter. Habeas corpus is the only means of benefiting the
accused by the retroactive character of a favorable decision.

Doctrine: The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is
intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing
the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike,
under like circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court filed by petitioner Judy Anne L. Santos (Santos) seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the Resolution, dated 19 June 2006, of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) en banc
in C.T.A. EB. CRIM. No. 001 which denied petitioners Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review. Petitioner intended to file the Petition for Review with the CTA

en banc to appeal the Resolutions dated 23 February 2006 and 11 May 2006 of the CTA
First Division in C.T.A. Crim. Case No. 0-012 denying, respectively, her Motion to Quash
the Information filed against her for violation of Section 255, in relation to Sections 254
and 248(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended; and her Motion
for Reconsideration.
On 19 May 2005, then Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Commissioner Guillermo L.
Parayno, Jr. wrote to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul M. Gonzales a letter
regarding the possible filing of criminal charges against petitioner. BIR Commissioner
Parayno began his letter with the following statement:
I have the honor to refer to you for preliminary investigation and filing of an information
in court if evidence so warrants, the herein attached Joint Affidavit of RODERICK C. ABAD,
Supervisor TEODORA V. PURINO, of the National Investigation Division, BIR National
Office Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City, recommending the criminal prosecution
of MS. JUDY ANNE LUMAGUI SANTOS for substantial underdeclaration of income, which
constitutes as prima facie evidence of false or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of
the NIRC and punishable under Sections 254 and 255 of the Tax Code.
In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized the findings of the investigating
BIR officers that petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 2002 filed
with the BIR, declared an income of P8,033,332.70 derived from her talent fees solely
from ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR offices and those given by
petitioners accountant and third parties, however, confirmed that petitioner received
in 2002 income in the amount of at least P14,796,234.70, not only from ABS-CBN, but
also from other sources, such as movies and product endorsements; the estimated tax
liability arising from petitioners under declaration amounted to P1,718,925.52,
including incremental penalties; the non-declaration by petitioner of an amount
equivalent to at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return was considered a
substantial under declaration of income, which constituted prima facie evidence of false
or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended; and petitioners
failure to account as part of her income the professional fees she received from sources
other than ABS-CBN and her under declaration of the income she received from ABSCBN amounted to manifest violations of Sections 254 and 255, as well as Section 248(B)
of the NIRC, as amended.
As regards petitioners second ground in her intended Petition for Review with the CTA
en banc, she asserts that she has been denied due process and equal protection of the
laws when similar charges for violation of the NIRC, as amended, against Regina
Encarnacion A. Velasquez (Velasquez) were dismissed by the DOJ in its Resolution dated
10 August 2005 in I.S. No. 2005-330 for the reason that Velasquezs tax liability was not
yet fully determined when the charges were filed.

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Whether or not petitioner was denied of equal protection of law
Petitioner cannot claim denial of due process when she was given the opportunity to file
her affidavits and other pleadings and submit evidence before the DOJ during the
preliminary investigation of her case and before the Information was filed against her.
Due process is merely an opportunity to be heard. In addition, preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ is merely inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the merits.
Its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether the
respondent therein is probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties evidence. Hence, if the investigating prosecutor is
already satisfied that he can reasonably determine the existence of probable cause
based on the parties evidence thus presented, he may terminate the proceedings and
resolve the case.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence
of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
Petitioner was not able to duly establish to the satisfaction of this Court that she and
Velasquez were indeed similarly situated, i.e., that they committed identical acts for
which they were charged with the violation of the same provisions of the NIRC; and that
they presented similar arguments and evidence in their defense - yet, they were treated



Doctrine: The "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section
44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements.

The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
COMELEC reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the Voters
Registration Act. The act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city
or municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal
protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition.
Petitioners contend that RA 8189 Section 44 is unconstitutional as it violates the equal
protection clause enshrined in the constitution; that it violates constitutional guarantee
on security of civil servants; that it undermines the constitutional independence of
COMELEC and COMELECs constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic
constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on 3 separate readings
WON section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional.
No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the equal protection
clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them
from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment. Large-scale
anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the complicity of
election officers, who are the highest representatives of COMELEC in a city or


Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of
RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP,
members of Congress, the COMELEC, former Presidents, and the National Census and
Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking
privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of
National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering
Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special
Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the
Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled

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Whether or not Sec. 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional
Hereby declared unconstitutional.
The EPC is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination
offends the requirements of justice and fair play. According to a long line of
decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The equal protection clause does
not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking
privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category
to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines
and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should
not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such
privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why
the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee.
In the SCs view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was
the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver
of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother
flow of communication between the government and the people. If the problem of the
respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to
us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do
not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which
may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is
not solved by violating the Constitution.


RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993,
effectively replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP)
Employees Association Inc. filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office
of the President to restrain BSP from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i),
Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to establishment of a Human resource management
system and a compensation structure as part of the authority of the Monetary Board.
Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below shall be in accordance with the
rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that the classifications is not
reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said proviso has been
prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the other hand
contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided that
it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary
board. The Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the
provision, that the classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation
and it adheres to the policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence
within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the government.
Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
Yes, the proviso is unconstitutional as it operates on the salary grade or the officer
employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher
salary grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by
the Salary Standardization Act. In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the
basis of the salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit specifically
withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of
rank-and-file employees because the former are not covered by the salary
standardization act as provided by the proviso. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP
rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for
career advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay.
Considering that majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose
status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is
they - and not the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living,
and improve the quality of life for all. Any act of Congress that runs counter to this
constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass

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IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the
last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

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