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EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
Right to be reimbursed

RP vs Ballocanag
Civil Law; Property; Builder in Good Faith; Words and Phrases; A builder or planter in good faith is one who builds or
plants on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof, unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds or plants on it.The courts in the reversion case overlooked the issue of whether Reyes, vis--vis his
improvements, is a builder or planter in good faith. In the instant case, the issue assumes full significance, because
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code grant the builder or planter in good faith full reimbursement of useful
improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made. A builder or planter in good faith is one who
builds or plants on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof, unaware of any flaw in his title to the land at the
time he builds or plants on it.
Same; Same; Same; To order Reyes to simply surrender all of the fruit-bearing trees in favor of the State would
inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.We are disposed
to agree with the CA that Reyes was a planter in good faith. Reyes was of the belief that he was the owner of the
subject land; in fact, a TCT over the property was issued in his name. He tilled the land, planted fruit trees thereon, and
invested money from 1970. He received notice of the Republics claim only when the reversion case was filed on May
13, 1987. The trees are now full-grown and fruit-bearing. To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing
trees in favor of the Statebecause the decision in the reversion case declaring that the land is part of inalienable
forest land and belongs to the State is already final and immutablewould inequitably result in unjust enrichment of
the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good faith.
Same; Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
and good conscience.Nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari potest. This basic doctrine on unjust enrichment
simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense. There is
unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or
property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Options that Reyes may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code have been
restricted by the terms of Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement [AFFLA]; The only equitable alternative would be to
order the Republic to pay Reyes the value of the improvements he introduced on the property.The options that Reyes
may exercise under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code have been restricted. It is no longer feasible to permit him
to remove the trees he planted. The only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes the value
of the improvements he introduced on the property. This is only fair because, after all, by the terms of the AFFLA, upon
the expiration of the lease or upon its cancellation if there be any violation or breach of its terms, all permanent
improvements on the land shall pass to the ownership of the Republic without any obligation on its part to indemnify
the lessee.
NUISANCE

Castro vs Monsod
Civil Law; Property; The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works, or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper.Article 437 of the Civil Code
provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon
any works, or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper. However, such right of the owner is not
absolute and is subject to the following limitations: (1) servitudes or easements, (2) special laws, (3) ordinances, (4) reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation, and (5) rights of third persons.
Same; Same; Easements; An easement is established either by law or by will of the owners.An easement or servitude is an
encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner. There are two
kinds of easements according to source. An easement is established either by law or by will of the owners. The courts cannot
impose or constitute any servitude where none existed. They can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by law or by the
will of the owners. There are therefore no judicial easements.
Same; Same; Same; An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the
limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.An owner, by virtue
of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any
adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an absolute
property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor, and if either, in excavating on his own premises,

he so disturbs the lateral support of his neighbors land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to
fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.
Perez vs Madrona
Civil Law; Property; Nuisance; Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.If petitioner indeed found respondents fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to demolish
the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove
respondents supposed violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not
be abated summarily without judicial intervention. Our ruling in Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc., 452
SCRA 174 (2005), on the need for judicial intervention when the nuisance is not a nuisance per se, is well worth mentioning.
Same; Same; Same; By its nature, a fence is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community; Not being a nuisance per
se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted.Respondents
fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily
to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the
sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement
without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
Hidalgo Enterprises vs Balandan
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES; MAINTAINER LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO CHILD.One
who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and
who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises.
ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO SWIMMING POOL OR WATER TANK.The attractive nuisance doctrine
generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial
feature other than the mere water and its location.
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Quisumbing, Sycip, Quisumbing & Salazar for petitioner.
Antonio M. Moncado for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from a decision of the Court of Appeals requiring Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. to pay Guillermo
Balandan and his wife, damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son Mario.
It appears that the petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo,
Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. While the
factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. The
edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. Through the wide gate entrance, which was
continually open, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said
factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. At about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiffs' son, Mario
Balandan, a boy barely 3, years old, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age, entered the factory premises
through the gate, to take a bath in one of said tanks; and while thus bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be
fished out later, already a cadaver, having died of 'asphyxia secondary to drowning.'"
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive
nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons entering its premises. It
applied the doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin, recognized in this jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila Electric, 16
Phil., 8.
The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or
appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a
trespasser in the premises. (See 65 C. J. S., p. 455.)
The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those
of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this'

attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children (65 C. J. S., p. 458).


Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract little children in play? In other
words is the body of water an attractive nuisance? The great majority of American decisions say no.
"The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence
of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location."
"There are numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has been held not to be applicable to ponds or
reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals, dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools, * * *." (65 C. J. S., p. 476
et seg. citing decisions of California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, lowa, Louisiana, Miss., Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Nebraska, Wisconsin.)
ln fairness to the Court of Appeals it should be stated that the above volume of Corpus Juris Secundum was published in
1950, whereas its decision was promulgated on September 30, 1949.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly
explained by the Indiana Appellate Court as follows:
"Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of
drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the
owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding
any new danger, * * * (he) is not liable because of having created an 'attractive nuisance.' Anderson vs. Reith-Riley Const. Co.,
N. E., 2nd, 184, 185; 184, 185; 112 Ind. App., 170.
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the question whether the petitioner had taken
reasonable precautions becomes immaterial. And the other issue submitted by petitionerthat the parents of the boy were guilty
of contributory negligence precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving their son under the
care of no responsible individualneeds no further discussion.
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. No costs.
AC Enterprises Inc. Vs Frabelle Properties Corp
Same; Same; Nuisance; Noise; An action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the blowers
of an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money.We agree with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the
CA, that as gleaned from the material averments of the complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent
in its complaint before the RTC, the petition is one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically the noise
generated by the blowers of the airconditioning system of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea for a writ of
preliminary and permanent injunction, plus damages. Such action of respondent is incapable of pecuniary estimation because
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money. Although respondent prayed for judgment for
temperate or moderate damages and exemplary damages, such claims are merely incidental to or as a consequence of, the
principal relief sought by respondent. An action incapable of pecuniary estimation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC as provided in Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691. In Tatel v. Municipality of Virac,
207 SCRA 157 (1992), the Court ruled that a simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance, now the RTC.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term nuisance is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways
which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A
private nuisance is one which violates only private rights and produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is
public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property or by causing a common
injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common to the general public.Article 694 of the New Civil Code defines a
nuisance as follows: Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. The term nuisance is so comprehensive that it has been applied to
almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or
his comfort. According to Article 695 of the Civil Code, a nuisance may be either public or private: Art. 695. Nuisance is either
public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the
extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in
the foregoing definition. A private nuisance has been defined as one which violates only private rights and produces damages to
but one or a few persons. A nuisance is public when it interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on
public property or by causing a common injury. It is an unreasonable interference with the right common to the general public.

Same; Same; Same; A private nuisance action is the remedy for an invasion of a property right, while the action for the
abatement of a public nuisance should be commenced by the city or municipality. Under Article 705 of the New Civil Code, a
party aggrieved by a private nuisance has two alternative remedies: (1) a civil action; or (2) abatement, without judicial
proceedings. A person injured by a private nuisance may abate it as provided in Article 706: Art. 706. Any person injured by a
private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without
committing a breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed. A private nuisance action is the remedy for an invasion of a
property right. On the other hand, the action for the abatement of a public nuisance should be commenced by the city or
municipality. A private person may institute an action for the abatement of a public nuisance in cases wherein he suffered a
special injury of a direct and substantial character other than that which the general public shares. The district health officer
shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
Same; Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units (LGUs); The local sanggunian is empowered to enact
ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance but cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance
per se and order its condemnationit does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such
thing is not a nuisance per se, a thing which must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.We agree with
petitioners contention that, under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of
nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and
order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature,
situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact, a
nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Devolution; Words and Phrases; Devolution refers to the act by which the national government
confers powers and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities; What
were devolved by the Department of Enrivonment and Natural Resources (DENR) to the Local Government Units (LGUs)
under DENR Administrative Order No. 30 dated 30 June 1992, in relation to R.A. No. 7160, were the regulatory
functions/duties of the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were absorbed and integrated by the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).Section 17 of R.A. No. 7160 provides that local government units shall discharge
the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to the law; and such other powers,
functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services
and facilities in the Code. Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers powers and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. What were devolved by the DENR to the
LGUs under DENR Administrative Order No. 30 dated June 30, 1992, in relation to R.A. No. 7160, were the regulatory
functions/duties of the National Pollution Control Commission (NPCC) which were absorbed and integrated by the EMB, as
provided in Title No. XIV, Chapter 2, Section 17 of the 1987 Administrative Code. However, the DENR exercises
administrative supervision and control over the LGUs. Enumerated in Chapter IV, Article 1, Sections 74 to 79 of the Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the NPCC implementing P.D. 984 are the regulations relative to noise control, specifically, the
noise quality standards.
Same; Same; Same; Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air-conditioning units of a building is nuisance is to
be resolved only by the courts in due course of proceedingsnoise is not a nuisance per se; Noise becomes actionable only
when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of
the listener; Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the noise
an actionable nuisancein the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of many necessary
occupations.Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air-conditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is
to be resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings. The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the
consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even though it
arises from the operation of a lawful business, only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the
vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics
will not render the noise an actionable nuisance. In the conditions of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct of
many necessary occupations. Its presence is a nuisance in the popular sense in which that word is used, but in the absence of
statute, noise becomes actionable only when it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of
the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. What those limits are cannot be fixed by any definite measure of quantity or
quality; they depend upon the circumstances of the particular case. They may be affected, but are not controlled, by zoning
ordinances. The delimitation of designated areas to use for manufacturing, industry or general business is not a license to emit

every noise profitably attending the conduct of any one of them.


Same; Same; Same; Test to Determine Noise as Nuisance.The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so
injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit
imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which
involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of
property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volumeit
is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities,
rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.Commercial and industrial activities which are lawful in
themselves may become nuisances if they are so offensive to the senses that they render the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. The fact that the cause of the complaint must be substantial has often led to expressions in the opinions that to
be a nuisance the noise must be deafening or loud or excessive and unreasonable. The determining factor when noise alone is
the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical
discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. If the
noise does that it can well be said to be substantial and unreasonable in degree; and reasonableness is a question of fact
dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a
nuisance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Persons who live or work in thickly populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual
annoyances and of those trades and businesses which are properly located and carried on in the neighborhood where they live or
work. The courts have made it clear that in every case the question is one of reasonableness. What is a reasonable use of ones
property and whether a particular use is an unreasonable invasion of anothers use and enjoyment of his property so as to
constitute a nuisance cannot be determined by exact rules, but must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each case,
such as locality and the character of the surroundings, the nature, utility and social value of the use, the extent and nature of the
harm involved, the nature, utility and social value of the use or enjoyment invaded, and the like. Persons who live or work in
thickly populated business districts must necessarily endure the usual annoyances and of those trades and businesses which are
properly located and carried on in the neighborhood where they live or work. But these annoyances and discomforts must not be
more than those ordinarily to be expected in the community or district, and which are incident to the lawful conduct of such
trades and businesses. If they exceed what might be reasonably expected and cause unnecessary harm, then the court will grant
relief.
Same; Same; Same; Causes of Action; Elements; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases; A cause of action is the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another; The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is whether,
admitting the veracity of what appears on the face and within the four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to the relief
prayed for.A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on
the part of such defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is
whether, admitting the veracity of what appears on the face and within the four corners of the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to
the relief prayed for. Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged therein? Indeed, the inquiry
is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on
which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be presented by defendants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken into account
without modification although with reasonable inferences therefrom, and all the pleadings filed may be considered, including
annexes, motions and the other evidence on record.The general rule is that the facts asserted in the complaint must be taken
into account without modification although with reasonable inferences therefrom. However, all the pleadings filed may be
considered, including annexes, motions and the other evidence on record, to wit: However, in so doing, the trial court does not
rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a
finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such
pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these
supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions
of fact.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Words and Phrases; A person injured by a nuisance may bring an action in his own name and
in behalf of others similarly affected to abate the same; Interest within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules
of Court means material interest, an interest in essence to be affected by the judgment as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest, and by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. Section 2, Rule 3, of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure provides that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. SEC. 2.
Parties in interest.A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. (2a) Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in essence to be affected by the judgment as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. A real party in interest-plaintiff is one who has a legal right while a real party
defendant is one who has a correlative legal obligation whose act or omission violate the legal right of the former. A person
injured by a nuisance may bring an action in his own name and in behalf of others similarly affected to abate the same. One who
has an interest in the property affected such as the owner thereof or fix interest therein are proper parties as plaintiffs.
Possession alone of real estate is sufficient to sustain an action to recover damages from the maintenance of a nuisance by the
adjoining property in such manner as to injure the enjoyment of the former.
Same; Same; Same; Liability for nuisance may be imposed upon one who sets in motion the force which entirely caused the
tortuous act, one who sets in motion a force or a chain of events resulting in the nuisance; It is sufficient to maintain an action
for abatement of a nuisance if his building is rendered valueless for the purpose it was devoted.Liability for nuisance may be
imposed upon one who sets in motion the force which entirely caused the tortuous act; upon one who sets in motion a force or a
chain of events resulting in the nuisance. In an action for damages resulting from a nuisance, responsibility arises not only from
the creator of the nuisance but from its continued maintenance as well. One is entitled to damages on account of the conduct by
another of his business which unreasonably and substantially interferes with the quiet enjoyment of his premises by himself or
of his tenants. It is sufficient to maintain an action for abatement of a nuisance if his building is rendered valueless for the
purpose it was devoted.
Same; Same; Same; A negligent or intentional act may constitute a nuisance.A negligent act may constitute a nuisance. An
intentional act may also constitute a nuisance. A nuisance may be formed from a continuous, known invasion, where, after
complaint, and notice of damage, the defendant continues to offend and refuses to correct or discontinue the nuisance. In such a
case, the nuisance is deemed intentional. An unreasonable use, perpetrated and unconnected even after complaint and notice of
damage is deemed intentional.
Telmo vs Bustamante
Civil Law; Nuisance; A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts
summarily removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which would have
necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose an inconvenience to the public by
blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.
City of Manila vs Laguio
Constitutional Law; Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to substantive
require-ments.The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be
valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Same; Same; Local Governments; Police Power; Local government units exercise police power through their respective
legislative bodies, in this case, the sangguniang panlungsod or the city coun-cil.Local government units exercise police power
through their respective legislative bodies; in this case, the sangguniang panlung-sod or the city council. The Code empowers
the legislative bodies to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the

province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of
the exercise of such delegated power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of
the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Procedural Due Process and Substantive Due Process Distinguished.Procedural due
process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life,
liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the
government must provide when it takes a particular action. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the
government has an adequate reason for taking away a persons life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for the governments action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law; Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. The police power granted to local
government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a
qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due process requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall
be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rightsa violation of the due process clause.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.The
Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The
Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3
instructs its own-ers/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said businesses into
allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can nd must be recognized as a taking
of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the
prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to
any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.
The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property,
and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the
structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning,
be destroyed without compensation.Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be

made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended
for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles
of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause.The Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The
cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying
out its provisions. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due
process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. This is a
sweeping exercise of police power that is a result of a lack of imagination on the part of the City Council and which amounts to
an interference into personal and private rights which the Court will not countenance. In this regard, we take a resolute stand to
uphold the constitutional guarantee of the right to liberty and property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied
the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The equal protection of
the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends
to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requirements in order that Classification of the Subjects of Legislation may be Valid.
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only
on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable
requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: 1) It must be based on substantial
distinctions; 2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; 3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; 4) It must
apply equally to all members of the class.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which
are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited
powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is
particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or
otherwise come under the rule of strict construction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within
the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.Not only does the
Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the
statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment
and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair
shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be
valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in
conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself
or is established by proper evidence.Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may
be the rule, it has already been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the
ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it
contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

Lucena Grand Central Terminal vs JAC Liner


Municipal Corporations; Local Government Units; Police Power; As with the State, the local government may be considered as
having properly exercised its police power only if there is a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.Respecting
the issue of whether police power was properly exercised when the subject ordinances were enacted: As with the State, the local
government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Same; Same; Same; Traffic Congestion; That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid.
That traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern, cannot be gainsaid. In Calalang v. Williams which involved a
statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national
roads, this Court held: In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to
public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general
welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. (Emphasis supplied) The
questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, they involve
public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for the proper exercise of police power is thus present.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited.
Respondents suggestion to have this Court look behind the explicit objective of the ordinances which, to it, was actually to
benefit the private interest of petitioner by coercing all bus operators to patronize its terminal does not lie. Lim v. Pacquing
instructs: . . . [T]his Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later
given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited.
(Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, in the first place, absolute lack of evidence
to support ADCs allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this
Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable. (Italics
supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The ordinances assailed herein are characterized by overbreadththey go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem; A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a
more careful formulation of solutions to societal problems.With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the
city to a single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including
those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, the franchise for
which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down
their existing terminals and use the facilities of petitioner. x x x As in De la Cruz and Lupangco, the ordinances assailed herein
are characterized by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally, since
the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees, rentals and charges, such
measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What should have been done was to determine exactly
where the problem lies and then to stop it right there. The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between
authority and liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to
rights. (Italics supplied) A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to
societal problems.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nuisances; Bus Terminals; Bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of
traffic; In the subject ordinances, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities
which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.From the
memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of
traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence,
the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per
se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all
terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this
Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload
passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be
instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances,

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however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to
provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon
public roads, they are not obstaclesthe buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are.As
for petitioners argument that the challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
[r]egulate traffic on all streets and bridges; prohibit encroachments or obstacles thereon and, when necessary in the interest of
public welfare, authorize the removal of encroachments and illegal constructions in public places: Absent any showing, nay
allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load
and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and
obstacles does not extend to terminals.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The operation of bus terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot
be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort of the community; Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however,
it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings.Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner
argues. For their operation is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property,
health, or comfort of the community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect effects upon
the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be
abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings, as was done in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably
necessary.As for petitioners claim that the challenged ordinances have actually been proven effective in easing traffic
congestion: Whether an ordinance is effective is an issue different from whether it is reasonably necessary. It is its
reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a law were measured by its
effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen to be effective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The weight of popular opinion must be balanced with that of an individuals rights.The Court is
not unaware of the resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the establishment of a common terminal, and
similar expressions of support from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by petitioner. The weight of
popular opinion, however, must be balanced with that of an individuals rights. There is no question that not even the strongest
moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a
majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
Gancayco vs City Government of QC
Civil Law; Nuisance; A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily
be abated under the undefined law of necessity.Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2)
annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free
passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5) hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be
per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily
be abated under the undefined law of necessity.
Same; Same; Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance.Neither does the MMDA have the
power to declare a thing a nuisance. Only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. In AC
Enterprises v. Frabelle Properties Corp., 506 SCRA 625 (2006), we held: We agree with petitioners contention that, under
Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is
empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however,
that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have
the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it
authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not
such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law . If a thing be in fact, a nuisance due to
the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Emphasis
supplied.)
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

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Donation
C-J Yulo and Sons vs Ramos Catholic Bishop of San Pablo
Civil Law; Property; Donations; Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous.Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may
be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or
simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity. This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a
remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for past services, which services do
not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, the value of which is inferior
than that of the donation given. Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to
be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the
thing donated. Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike
the other forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts.
Same; Same; Same; Revocation; Considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation
was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach
of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.As in Silim, the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into
by the donee were for the sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In fact, such lease was
authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is
needed. Hence, considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the donation was made but
precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed,
which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.
Lagazo vs CA
Civil Law; Donations; Simple or pure and onerous donations distinguished.A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is
pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services
equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be
governed by the rules on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
Same; Same; Court rules that the donation was simple, not onerous.We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even
conceding that petitioners full payment of the purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not
however imposed by the donor as a condition for the donation.
Same; Same; Acceptance of the donation by the donee is indispensable, its absence makes the donation null and void.In the
words of the esteemed Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. The donation,
following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. Furthermore, [i]f the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof
in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments. Acceptance of the donation by the donee is, therefore,
indispensable; its absence makes the donation null and void.
Marquez vs CA
Civil Law; Contracts; Trusts; Obligations; Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They
arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property
which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.As such, when Rafael Marquez, Sr., for one reason or another,
misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children were still alive, and
managed to secure a transfer of certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust under Article 1456 was established.
Constructive trusts are created in equity in order to prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who,
by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, did the action for reconveyance filed by the petitioners
prescribe, as held by the Court of Appeals?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten

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years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.In this regard, it is settled that an action for reconveyance based
on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. For the
purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982.
Thus, considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is evident
that prescription had not yet barred the action.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Implied or constructive trusts are obligations created by law and the prescriptive period to
enforce the same prescribes in ten years.To bolster the foregoing position, the Court of Appeals reliance on Gerona v. de
Guzman, is misplaced. In Amerol v. Bagumbaran, we ruled that the doctrine laid down in the earlier Gerona case was based on
the old Code of Civil Procedure which provided that an action based on fraud prescribes within four years from the date of
discovery. However, with the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the provisions on prescriptive periods
are now governed by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or constructive trusts are obligations created by law, then the
prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten years.
Same; Damages; In a plea for moral damages and attorneys fees, petitioners must satisfactorily show that they have suffered
mental anguish as provided in Article 2219 and Article 2290 of the Civil Code.While we rule in favor of petitioners, we
cannot grant their plea for moral damages and attorneys fees since they have not satisfactorily shown that they have suffered
mental anguish as provided in Article 2219 and Article 2290 of the Civil Code.
Heirs of Maramag vs Maramag
Civil Law; Insurance Law; Article 2011 of the Civil Code expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by
special laws; i.e., the Insurance Code; The only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still
alive or the beneficiary if the insured is already deceased upon the maturation of the policy; Exception is where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity.
It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in light of Article 2011 of
the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code.
Section 53 of the Insurance Code statesSECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper
interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. Pursuant thereto, it
is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if
the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of the policy. The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance
contract was intended to benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity.
In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.
Same; Same; Same; No legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured.
The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering
that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loretos insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal
proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the
insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or
by the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the
designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated any beneficiary,
or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall
redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.
Florencio vs de Leon
Civil Law; Donation; Donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership; Essential Elements of Donation.Under the New
Civil Code, donation is one of the modes of acquiring ownership. Among the attributes of ownership is the right to possess the
property. The essential elements of donation are as follows: (a) the essential reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (b) the
increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (c) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. When applied to a
donation of an immovable property, the law further requires that the donation be made in a public document and that the
acceptance thereof be made in the same deed or in a separate public instrument; in cases where the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, it is mandated that the donor be notified thereof in an authentic form, to be noted in both instruments.
Same; Same; Once the donation is accepted, it is generally considered irrevocable and the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property, except on account of officiousness, failure by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or
ingratitude.As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the

13

donor to the donee, and is perfected from the moment the donor is made aware of the acceptance by the donee, provided that the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable, and the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property, except on account of officiousness, failure
by the donee to comply with the charge imposed in the donation, or ingratitude. The acceptance, to be valid, must be made
during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee. It must be made in the same deed or in a separate public document, and the
donees acceptance must come to the knowledge of the donor.
Same; Same; In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document;
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assesors Office is not necessary for it to be considered
valid and official.In order that the donation of an immovable property may be valid, it must be made in a public document.
Registration of the deed in the Office of the Register of Deeds or in the Assessors Office is not necessary for it to be considered
valid and official. Registration does not vest title; it is merely evidence of such title over a particular parcel of land. The
necessity of registration comes into play only when the rights of third persons are affected. Furthermore, the heirs are bound by
the deed of contracts executed by their predecessors-in-interest.
Santos vs Alana
Civil Law; Contracts; Donations; Under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficious if it exceeds this limitation
no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than what he may give or receive by will.Under Article 752 of the
Civil Code, the donation is inofficious if it exceeds this limitationno person may give or receive, by way of donation, more
than he may give or receive by will. In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the
death of the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be
brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year
prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the
extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory heirs.
Central Phil University vs CA
Donations; Onerous Donations; Words and Phrases; An onerous donation is one executed for a valuable consideration which is
considered the equivalent of the donation itself.We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the conditions set
forth in the deed of donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that his donation was
onerous, one executed for a valuable consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation itself, e.g., when a
donation imposes a burden equivalent to the value of the donation. A gift of land to the City of Manila requiring the latter to
erect schools, construct a childrens playground and open streets on the land was considered an onerous donation. Similarly,
where Don Ramon Lopez donated the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an obligation upon the latter to establish a
medical college thereon, the donation must be for an onerous consideration.
Same; Same; Obligations; Conditional Obligations; When a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would
build upon the land a school, the condition imposed is not a condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss
of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person
donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If there is no fulfillment or compliance with the resolutory condition, the donation may now be
revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.It is not correct to
say that the schoolhouse had to be constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before the donee could become the
owner of the land, otherwise, it would be invading the property rights of the donor. The donation had to be valid before the
fulfillment of the condition. If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the condition, such as what obtains in the instant
case, the donation may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have acquired under it shall be deemed lost and
extinguished.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statute of Limitations; Prescription; Where the time within which the condition should be fulfilled
depends upon the exclusive will of the donee, its absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the

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deed of donation are sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action for annulment of donation.The
claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action of private respondents is unavailing. The condition imposed by the
donor, i.e., the building of a medical school upon the land donated, depended upon the exclusive will of the donee as to when
this condition shall be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it bound itself to comply with the condition thereof.
Since the time within which the condition should be fulfilled depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has been held
that its absolute acceptance and the acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of donation were sufficient to
prevent the statute of limitations from barring the action of private respondents upon the original contract which was the deed of
donation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; A cause of action arises when that which should have been done is not done,
or that which should not have been done is done, and in cases where there is no special provision for such computation, recourse
must be had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action could have been
instituted.Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for the revocation of the donation and recovery of the
property donated cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A cause of action arises when that which should have
been done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done. In cases where there is no special provision for such
computation, recourse must be had to the rule that the period must be counted from the day on which the corresponding action
could have been instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the
computation of the period. In this case, the starting point begins with the expiration of a reasonable period and opportunity for
petitioner to fulfill what has been charged upon it by the donor.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances
it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration thereof.Thus, when the obligation does not fix a
period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197
of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation
itself cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when more
than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed the donee to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition in the donation.This general rule however cannot be applied considering the different set of circumstances existing
in the instant case. More than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been allowed petitioner to avail of the
opportunity to comply with the condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its favor forever valid. But,
unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence, there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the obligation when such procedure
would be a mere technicality and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and expensive
multiplication of suits.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rescission; When obligor cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the
obligee may seek rescission, and in the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the period of the compliance, there
is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one of
the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall decree the
same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period. In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the
period of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court to decree the rescission claimed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in
favor of the least transmission of rights and interests.Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically a
gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least
transmission of rights and interests.
DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion:
Donations; Obligations; Conditions as used in donations and as used in the law of obligations, compared.There is no
conditional obligation to speak of in this case. It seems that the conditions imposed by the donor and as the word is used in
the law of donations is confused with conditions as used in the law of obligations. In his annotation of Article 764 of the Civil
Code on Donations, Arturo M. Tolentino, citing the well-known civilists such as Castan, Perez Gonzalez and Alguer, and Colin
& Capitant, states clearly the context within which the term conditions is used in the law of donations, to wit: The word
conditions in this article does not refer to uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment of a juridical relation
depends, but is used in the vulgar sense of obligations or charges imposed by the donor on the donee . It is used, not in its
technical or strict legal sense, but in its broadest sense.

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Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Modal Donation, Explained.Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks
of conditions of a donation, what are referred to are actually the obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon
the donee and which would characterize the donation as onerous. In the present case, the donation is, quite obviously, onerous,
but it is more properly called a modal donation. A modal donation is one in which the donor imposes a prestation upon the
donee. The establishment of the medical college as the condition of the donation in the present case is one such prestation.
Same; Same; Statute of Limitations; Prescription; The mere fact that there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of the
donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to
revoke the donation becomes imprescriptible.Although it is admitted that the fulfillment of the conditions/obligations of the
present donation may be dependent on the will of the donee as to when it will comply therewith, this did not arise out of a
condition which the donee itself imposed. It is believed that the donee was not meant to and does not have absolute control over
the time within which it will perform its obligations. It must still do so within a reasonable time. What that reasonable time is,
under the circumstances, for the courts to determine. Thus, the mere fact that there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of
the donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to
revoke the donation becomes imprescriptible.
Eduarte vs CA
Donations; Revocation of Donation; All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.As
noted in the aforecited opinion all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation. Petitioners
attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the Revised Penal Code is therefore unwarranted
considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered as crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact
that they are classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Testimony; Handwriting Experts; The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends
not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.In gauging the relative weight to be given to the opinion of
handwriting experts, we adhere to the following standards: We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert
depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing
out distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the
formation of letters in some other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as the involuntary
and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself permanent.
Land Titles; Ownership; Possession; The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat the title of a holder of a
registered torrens title to real property.We agree with petitioners. The rule is well-settled that mere possession cannot defeat
the title of a holder of a registered torrens title to real property. Moreover, reliance on the doctrine that a forged deed can legally
be the root of a valid title is squarely in point in this case: Although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and
conveys no title, however there are instances when such a fraudulent document may become the root of a valid title. One such
instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true owner to the forger, and while it
remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon
what appeared in the certificate.
Same; Sales; The fact that the vendors title was fraudulently secured cannot prejudice the rights of the purchasers absent any
showing that they had knowledge or participation in such irregularity.When herein petitioners purchased the subject property
from Helen Doria, the same was already covered by TCT No. T-23205 under the latters name. And although Helen Dorias title
was fraudulently secured, such fact cannot prejudice the rights of herein petitioners absent any showing that they had any
knowledge or participation in such irregularity. Thus, they cannot be obliged to look beyond the certificate of title which
appeared to be valid on its face and sans any annotation or notice of private respondents adverse claim. Contrary therefore to
the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property
without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the
purchase or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.
Same; Same; The established rule is that the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected
notwithstanding the fraud employed by the seller in securing his title.Respondent Court therefore committed a reversible
error when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court annulling and setting aside the deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1988

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between petitioners and Helen Doria, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27434 issued under petitioners name, the
established rule being that the rights of an innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the
fraud employed by the seller in securing his title.
Same; Same; Assurance Fund; Remedies of the owner of a parcel of land who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of
his property.In this regard, it has been held that the proper recourse of the true owner of the property who was prejudiced and
fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action for damages against those who caused or employed the fraud, and if
the latter are insolvent, an action against the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund.