Alano v.

MagudLogmao

Laurel v.
Abrogar

Midway
Maritime
vs Castro

Arnelito Lugmao fell while passing through an overpass in Farmers

market. He was sent to EAMC who recorded his name as Angelito
Lugmoso. Later on he was transferred to the Natl Kidney Institite (NKI).
There he was pronounced braindead by Dr. Alano, and issued a memo to
his subordinates that his organs may be subject to donation ONLY if the
requirements under PD 856 are shown to have been complied with. After
reporting to the NBI and several broadcasts on GMA and ABS-CBS, they
proceeded with the removal of the organs. Zenaida, the mother of
Arnelito, sued Alano, NKI and Funerario Oro based on quasi-delict,
alleging that the concealed the identity of Arnelito so they can get his
organs. RTC awarded moral and exemplary damages, later on reduced by
the CA.
The proximate cause of the injury suffered i.e. emotional pain by Zenaida
could not be attributed to the negligence of the Alano because he
observed reasonable diligence in requiring his subordinates to proceed
with the donation only upon compliance with PD 856. There was no
expert witness that they should have waited longer.
SEC. 96 PROVIDES: (d) If the deceased has no next of kin and his remains
are in the custody of an accredited hospital, the Director of the hospital
may donate an organ or any part of the body of the deceased in
accordance with the requirement prescribed in this Section.
PLDT filed a case under Art. 308 of the RPC against Baynet for
conducting international simple resale (ISR) based on theft over the ff: 1)
intangible telephone services that are being offered by PLDT and
other telecommunication companies, 2) the use of those facilities
over a period of time; and 3) the revenues derived in connection with
the rendition of such services and the use of such facilities. CA affirmed
the arguments of PLDT which cited jurisprudence which compared
telephone services with electricity and gas suppliers.
SC 1ST DIVISION: Neither time nor services may be taken and occupied or
appropriated. A service is generally not considered property and a theft
of service would not, therefore, constitute theft since there can be no
caption or asportation. Neither is the unauthorized use of the equipment
and facilities of PLDT by the petitioner theft under the aforequoted
provision of the RPC
P: MM & Adoracion (owners of land but LESSEE of the building)
R: Castros (owners of the building)
Father of Castro mortgaged Bancom foreclosed - Union Bank was the
highest bidder Adoracions father bought the land
Over the years, several cases were lodged by P & R against each other.
RTC ruled in the ejectment case the award in favor of Adoracion of the
land along with the improvements
Payment of rentals by petitioner confirms the existence of its agreement
to lease the residential building.
CONCLUSIVE TITLE IN LEASE OF PROPERTY: Given the existence of the
lease, the petitioners claim denying the respondents ownership of the
residential house must be rejected.
Once a contact of lease is shown to exist between the parties, the
lessee cannot by any proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive
presumption that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of
possession to the subject premises than the lessee."

General
Mariano
Alvarez
Cooperativ
e v. NHA

Dream
village vs
BCDA

Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court prohibits a tenant from
denying the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of
the relation of landlord and tenant between them.
In Santos v. National Statistics Office, the Court expounded on the
rule on estoppel against a tenant and further clarified that what a
tenant is estopped from denying is the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation.
o If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired
subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply.
GEMASCO filed a case against NHA based on the deed of transfer of the
management of the water system issued in favor of GWAD. Later on, LA
held GEMASCO liable for illegal dismissal, ordering the execution of three
watertanks.
The water tanks are devoted to public use; hence, properties of public
dominion
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to
levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of
public dominion is void for being contrary to public policy.
Timeline
RP acquired Fort Bonifacio from the US
Marcos and Aquino issued orders classifying the properties as
alienable. Aquino later on limited the classification to lots 1 & 2
1992- RA 7227 creating the BCDA to oversee and accelerate the
conversions of military reservations to productive civilian use,
including Fort Bonifacio
Case: Dream village filed a case before COSLAP based on the unlawful
assertion of BCDA of title of the subject properties. COSLAP ruled in favor
of Dream Village stating that they acquired ownership based on
prescription and in order to prevent social unrest. CA ruled that COSLAP
has no jurisdiction. COSLAP justified its jurisdiction in a previous case
involving private parties.
Dream Village sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the
area declared in Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and
disposable.
THE BCDA LAW MAKES THE EXPRESS RESERVATION THAT THEY ARE TO BE
SOLD IN ORDER TO RAISE FUNDS FOR THE CONVERSION OF THE FORMER
AMERICAN BASES IN CLARK AND SUBIC. THE COURT NOTED THAT THE
PURPOSE OF THE LAW CAN BE TIED TO EITHER "PUBLIC SERVICE" OR "THE
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL WEALTH" UNDER ARTICLE 420(2) OF THE CIVIL
CODE.

While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial in

character may be the object of prescription, those "intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth" are
considered property of public dominion and therefore not susceptible
to acquisition by prescription.
o For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already
classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth."
o Before acquisitive prescription can commence, the property
sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable

and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State

that it is no longer intended for public service or the development
of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State,
the land remains to be property of public dominion.
Ownership of a land registered under a Torrens title cannot be lost by
prescription or adverse possession.

Co-ownership
Meralco
Dionisio Deloy donated the subject land to CEDA. CEDA entered into a
vs Heirs
deed of sale with MERALCO which covers its electricity distribution
of Deloy
system.
In 1985, Meralco requested the extension of the lease of agreement. The
heirse became pre-occupied with subject land after it became part of the
a civil case for reconstitution of title.
In 2001, the civil case concluded, after which, the heirs offered to sell the
property to Meralco who declined. This prompted the heirs to order
Meralco to vacate the property and filed a case for unlawful detainer.
MTCC: ruled that it had no jurisdiction because an interpretation of the
deed of donation would make it one not capable of pecuniary
estimation. Nevertheless, it opined that MERALCO was entitled to the
possession of the subject land.
It was of the view that it would only be when the deed of donation
would be revoked or the deed of sale nullified that MERALCOs
possession of the subject land would become unlawful.
RTC: affirmed the MTCC ruling.
RTC can reverse the MTCC ruling because the later is only provisional.
CA: An ejectment case, based on the allegation of possession by
tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful detainer.
FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION: MERALCO contends that the heirs
complaint failed to state a case for unlawful detainer because the
allegations involve a prior determination on the issue of ownership
before the issue of possession can be validly resolved.
Sec. 33 Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691 -> Sec. 16, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court allows the first level courts, in ejectment cases, to
provisionally determine the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
resolving the issue of physical possession.
EXTRANEOUS EVIDENCE VS DEED OF SALE: By seeking Dionisios permission
to occupy the subject land, MERALCO expressly acknowledged his
paramount right of possession.
Admission against interest
Deed of Sale did not cover the land
Mangaser Mangaser discovered that respondent stealthy intruded and occupied a
vs Ugay
portion of his property by constructing a residential house -> Lupong
Tagapamayapa failed to reach a settlement. Mangaser submitted Tax

EDC v.
SamsonBico

Cabrera
vs Ysaac

declaration and Torrens title.

MTC: ruled in favor of respondent. Managser failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that the lot occupied by respondent was (1) within his
lot titled and that he had (2) prior physical possession.
RTC: RTC reversed the MTC decision because possession of the land did
not only mean actual or physical possession but also included the
subject of the thing to the action of one's will or by the proper
acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
CA: reversed again. Tax declarations are not conclusive. Possession must
be actual and not legal.
SC: Possession can be acquired by juridical acts.
REASON: for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession.
Whether the issue of ownership is material and relevant in resolving the
issue of possession: Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides
that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of
possession if the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of
ownership. But this provision is only an exception and is allowed only in
this limited instance - to determine the issue of possession and
only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership.
This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership should be
provisionally determined in this case.
First, the juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner
arise would be the registration of the free patent and the issuance of
OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the Torrens title suggests
ownership over the land.
Second, respondent also asserts ownership over the land based on his
prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
possession in the concept of an owner of the property in dispute.
Because there are conflicting claims of ownership, then it is proper to
provisionally determine the issue of ownership to settle the issue of
possession de facto.
TORRENS TITLE: A person who has a Torrens title over the property is
entitled to the possession
TAX DECLARATIONS: are not conclusive proof of possession of a parcel of
land, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not
in his actual or constructive possession.
SALE OF ALIQUOT PORTION IS VALID EVEN WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF COOWNERS:
Held that the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided
property held in common was VALID. It applied the principle: "Quando res
non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no
force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have)
Hence in this case, it allowed the sale of an undivided interest in coowned property since the rule is that a co-owner has full ownership of his
pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and substitute another person in its enjoyment.
SALE OF A DETERMINATE PORTION REQUIRES THE CONSENT OF THE COOWNERS: If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot
sell a definite portion of the land without consent from his or her co-

owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest of the co-owned
property. Hence, prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of
common property requires the consent of all co- owners.
Here, there was no evidence that the other co-owners consented to such.
Thus, HENRY could not sell. At best, the agreement is a contract to sell,
not a contract of sale. A contract to sell is a promise to sell an object,
subject to suspensive conditions. Without the fulfillment of these
suspensive conditions, the sale does not operate to determine the
obligation of the seller to deliver the object.
The absence of a contract of sale means that there is no source of
obligations for respondent, as seller, or petitioner, as buyer. Rescission is
impossible because there is no contract to rescind. The rule in Article
1592 that requires a judicial or notarial act to formalize rescission of a
contract of sale of an immovable property does not apply.
Even more, jurisprudence has held that Article 1592 "does not apply to a
contract to sell or promise to sell, where title remains with the vendor
until fulfillment to a positive suspensive condition, such as full payment
of the price. Thus, the contrac to sell could be validly cancelled through
non-payment.