[Staredecisis]isamaximamong...

lawyers,thatwhateverhasbeen
donebeforemaylegallybedoneagain:andthereforetheytakespecial
caretorecordallthedecisionsformerlymadeagainstcommonjustice
andthegeneralreasonofmankind.
JonathanSwift,GulliversTravels.

HowstaredecisisSubvertstheLaw
JonRoland
2000June10

One of the most important doctrines in Western law is that ofstare

decisis,aLatintermofartwhichmeans"tostandbydecidedcases;to
uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudications".[1]In modern
jurisprudence,however,ithascometotakeonalifeofitsown,withall
precedents being presumed to be wellfounded, unbiased legal
decisions,ratherthanpoliticaldecisions,andpresumedtohaveboththe
authorityoftheconstitutionalenactmentsonwhichtheyarebased,plus
thatoftheprecedentsonwhichtheyarebased,sothatlaterprecedents
arepresumedtobemoreauthoritativethanearlierones.
Thedoctrinealsotendstogivegreatweighttotheopinioninthecase,
even to the point of treating the opinion as though it was law, even
thoughonlytheorderandfindingshavetheactualforceoflaw,andonly
in that case,andanexplanationofhowthedecisionwasreached is
onlydictum,orcommentary.Thismeansthatapoorlywordedopinion
can define a set of legal positions that exceed the bounds of the
underlyingconstitutionalenactments,andbecomethebasisforfuture
precedents,asthoughtheywereconstitutionalenactmentsthemselves.
Theproblemisexacerbatedbythefailureofjudgestoclearlydelineate
theboundariesbetweenedictanddictum.
The doctrine tends to disfavor legal argument that precedents were
wrongly decided, especially if they are precedents established at a

higher level in the appeals hierarchy, and to demand the litigants

"distinguish" their cases from adverse precedents, arguing that those
precedentsdonotapplytothepresentcasebecauseofelementsthat
make it different from the cases on which the precedents were
established.Thiscanbeverydifficulttodoifthereareagreatmany
recentcasesonthesameissueswhichcovermostofthepossibilities.
The situation can be made more difficult by the rules of most courts
whichlimitthelengthofbriefsthelitigantsmayfile.Inworkingbackward
throughalonglineofwrongfulprecedents,alitigantcanreachthelength
limitbeforetheargumentcanmakeitbacktothefoundationswherethe
chain of precedents began to drift away from its authority in the
constitutionalenactments.
ThesituationcanbeillustratedbytheVenndiagraminFigure1,inwhich
the first set A represents the set of legal positions consistent with
theConstitution, and the points outside the circle represent
unconstitutional positions. It is noted that the boundary of the set is
fuzzy,representingtheambiguityofinterpretationattheboundary.The
centralpointB'representsacourtdecisionwhoseopiniondefinesaset
oflegalpositionsconsistentwithit,shownbytheellipticalsetwiththe
letterBatthetop,butaportionofthatsetextendsbeyondtheboundsof
A.TheopinioninthenextdecisionC'alsofallswithinAanddefinesyet
anotherregionCofconsistentpositions,butwhichextendsbeyondboth
AandB.DecisionD'fallswithinC,butnotAorB,andfurtherdefinesa
consistency set that extends beyond A, B, and C. The Decision E'
doesn'tliewithinanyoftheregionsdefinedbythepreviousprecedents,
but its region of consistency overlaps D and barely C, the kind of
situationthatmightresultfromalegalargumentthatreachestogeta
politicaldecisionnotbasedonprecedent.Finally,thelastdecisionF'is
basedonEdefinesconsistencysetFbutliesentirelyoutsideA,B,C,
andD.

Theproblemforjurisprudence,especiallyconstitutionaljurisprudence,is
howtogetbackwithinAwhenone'sopponent'spositionissupportedby
FandonecannotdistinguishprecedentstakingtheargumentbacktoA
withinthebriefpagelimits.Itmaybealmostimpossibleunlessoruntil
one can get the case to the Supreme Court, which can ignore and
reverseitsownprecedents,butwhichcantakeonlyabout75casesa
year,andisreluctanttoissuesweepingopinionsthatcancoveralarge
numberofcasesthatmightotherwisedeservetobegrantedcertiorari,
butwhichwillnevermakeitbecausethelitigantsarediscouragedfrom
makingfundamentalargumentsthatmightworkwiththeSupremeCourt
butwhichwouldbedisfavoredbylowercourts.
tisdifficulttoestimatehowmanyunconstitutionallegislativeprovisions
are adoptedeachyearbyCongress,butaplausiblenumberismore
than20,000,oraboutasmanyasthenumberofbillsintroducedeach
year.Thereissimplynowaythatthefederalcourtscanhandleallthe
cases that might arise under that many provisions. They are almost
forced to rely on the presumption of constitutionality of statutes, but
membersofCongressareincreasinglyreluctanttorestrainthemselves
fromadoptinglegislationtheyknowtobeunconstitutional,butwhichis
supported by some of their constituents,and passing theduty to the
federalcourtsofstrikinglegislationthatshouldneverhavebeenpassed
inthefirstplace.
The waystare decisisis supposed to be used is indicated by the
definition of it in Bouvier'sLaw Dictionaryof 1856, which is closer to
originalpracticeandintent:
tare decisis. To abide or adhere to decided cases.
2. It is a general maxim that when a point has been settled by
decision,itformsaprecedentwhichisnotafterwardstobedeparted
from.Thedoctrineofstaredecisisisnotalwaystobereliedupon,forthe

courts find it necessary to overrule cases which have been hastily

decided,orcontrarytoprinciple.Manyhundredsofsuchoverruledcases
may be found in the American and English books of reports. Mr.
Greenleafhasmadeacollectionofsuchcases,towhichthereaderis
referred.Vide1Kent,Com.477;Livingst.Syst.ofPen.Law,104,5.[2]
Thisindicatesthatthewaystaredecisisissupposedtobeusedisto
define the boundaries of the constitutional enactments, as shown in
Figure2,wherethedecisionsB'...L'lieonthefuzzyboundariesofthe
region of legitimacy A and sharpen those boundaries. This is
accomplished by opinions that do not define a set of consistent
propositions that extend beyond A. That is, every judge is careful to
anticipateallthewaysthewordsofhisopinionmightbemisconstruedto
support decisions beyond what is authorized by the constitutional
enactments,andinparticular,theConstitution.
Therewouldappeartobeonlytwowaysoutofourpresentpredicament:
EitherthepeoplemuststartelectingdifferentmembersofCongress,and
demandthattheystrictlycomplywiththeConstitution,orelsethecourts,
especiallytheSupremeCourt,needtostartissuingsweepingopinions
which overturn past precedents and strike down entire blocks of
legislation.
However, the drift away from constitutional legitimacy represented by
Figure1isnotjusttheresultofincompetenceorconfusion.Thereisa
factionwhichhastendedtodominatethefederalgovernment,especially
duringmostofthe20thcentury,whichhasdeliberatelysoughttoextend
precedentsbeyondtheboundsoforiginalconstitutionalunderstanding.It
hasdonethisbycarefullyselectingcasesagainstweakorinadequately
representeddefendants,appealingonlythosecasestheyaresurethey
willwin,andframingtheargumentssothatthejudgesoftendon'thavea
choice that is constitutional, but must choose between two

unconstitutional positions. Ordinarily this is supposed to be guarded

againstbyconstitutionallyprotectivepartiesfilingamicuscuriaebriefsto
argueastrictconstructionistposition,butsuchbriefsarenotalwaysfiled
inimportantcases,orareoftenignoredbythecourt.
The Supreme Court, beginning with the decision inUnited States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and continuing in 2000 with several
decisions likeUnited States v. Morrison, Docket 995 andJones v.
United States, Docket 995739, which roll back the federal criminal
legislationbasedontheCommerceClause,isneverthelessstillunwilling
toissuesweepingopinions,butpreferstorelyonnarrowlyconstructed
opinionsthathavetheeffectofintroducingconfusionandconflictintothe
systemofprecedents,perhapsinthehopesthatlowercourtswillseize
onthemtocreatestillmoreconflicts,whichtheSupremeCourtwillthen
only have to decide among, without drawing as much controversy to
themselvesastheywouldiftheyissuedsweepingopinions.
Bytreatingcourtopinionsasthoughtheyaregenerallaw,andnotjust
law for a particular case, we become accomplices in delegating
legislativepowerstojudicialofficials,whichisforbiddenbyArt.ISec.1
oftheU.S.Constitutionandsimilarclausesofstateconstitutions,which
delegate legislative powers exclusively to the legislative branch, and
allowfornodelegationoflegislativepowertootherbranches.
There is a fundamental logical problem withstare decisisas it is
currently practiced, which is that it is a logically separate system of
propositions that is independent of, and potentially inconsistent with,
constitutional enactments. One who takes an oath to uphold the
writtenconstitutionisboundtoignoreprecedentsinconflictwithit,and
torestdecisionsstrictlyonpropositionsthatarelogicallyderivedfrom
constitutional enactments, considering precedents only where they
sharpenambiguitiesinthelanguageofthewrittenenactments.Totreat
[3][4]

precedents as superior to constitutional enactments is to introduce

contradictionsintothelaw,andinanysystemoflogicalpropositions,
acceptanceofasinglecontradictionacceptsallcontradictions,rendering
every proposition logically undecidable.Contrary to the view ofsome
judges,thelawmustbelogical,oritisnotlaw.
Therearetwovariantsonthedoctrineofstaredecisis.Theproblemwe
havediscussedhereiswiththestrongform,whichtreatsprecedents
asbinding.However,thereisaweakerform,whichtreatsprecedentsas
merelypersuasive.Inthissecondvariant,adissentingopinioncouldbe
morepersuasivethantheprevailingopinion,ifthepersoncitingitagreed
withit.Inthisvariant,precedentbecomesmerelyaconvenientwayto
savetimeandwordsbycitingthereasoninginanothercase,saying"My
reasoningissimilartothat",andnothingmore.Historically,whatcameto
betreatedasbindingstartedaspersuasive.Returningtotreatmentof
precedents as merely persuasive would solve the problem discussed
here,buthistoryshowsusthatjudgesarepronetodriftbacktotreating
them as binding unless some corrective mechanism is instituted to
preventit.Findingsuchacheckwouldthenbeanessentialcomponent
ofanylastingreform.
Staredecisisisthewayjudgesseekthesafetyoftheherd.Weneedto
demandtheyexhibitmorecourage,andreturntofundamentalprinciples,
resorting tostare decisisonly when the positions lie on the fuzzy
boundaryoftheregionoflegitimacy.