1

Case No. 15
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119220. September 20, 1996.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NILO
SOLAYAO, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Violeta M. Parea for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; P.D. No. 1866; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITION;
ELEMENTS THEREOF. This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati ruled that in crimes
involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements
thereof, viz: (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned
or possessed it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.
2. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS SEARCH BEFORE
MAKING AN ARREST JUSTIFIED BY SUSPICIOUS CONDUCT OF ACCUSED; CASE AT
BENCH. Accused appellant argued that the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in
evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search. He maintained that the search
made on his person violated his constitutional right to be secure in his person and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not only was the search made without a warrant
but it did not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. . . . Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
however, accused-appellant's arguments are hardly tenable. He and his companions' drunken
actuations aroused the suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group. After SPO3 Nio told accused-appellant
not to run away, the former identified himself as a government agent. The peace officers did not
know that he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of
firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays
surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had aroused
their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which
accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm. As with Posadas, where this Court ruled that the
search and seizure brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened
to a "stop and frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an
arrest could be made. . . ., the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure
may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk"
accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade
firearm as evidence.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON STRENGTH OF ITS OWN

EVIDENCE; LACK OF LICENSE TO POSSESS FIREARM NOT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
IN CASE AT BENCH. As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove
the second element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm,
this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the prosecution
failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to possess the
subject firearm. . . . This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police from
the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or permit to
possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully authorized to
carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution from its duty to
establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and convincing evidence,
like a certification from the government agency concerned." Putting it differently, "when a
negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case depends upon the establishment of a
negative, and the means of proving the fact are equally within the control of each party, then the
burden of proof is upon the party averring the negative." In this case, a certification from the
Firearms and Explosives Unit of the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a
licensee of a firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
4. ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL ADMISSION BY ACCUSED NOT SUFFICIENT TO PROVE LACK
OF A LICENSE; CASE AT BENCH. In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove
by testimonial evidence that accused-appellant admitted before Police Officer Nio at the time
that he was accosted that he did not have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm
when he was asked if he had one. In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's
admission to prove the second element. . . . By its very nature, an "admission is the mere
acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred tending to
incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt." In other words, it is a
"statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of
other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to authorize
conviction." From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is
insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged. Moreover,
said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of
the Revised Rules of Court . . . . Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accusedappellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the
prosecution but does not stand as proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license.
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran,
Branch 16, with the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition 1 defined and
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1866.
The lone prosecution witness, SPO3 Jose Nio, narrated that at about 9:00
o'clock in the evening of July 9, 1992, with CAFGU members Teofilo Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio
Cenining, he went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to conduct an

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intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran. 2
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to
Barangay Onion where they met the group of accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering
five. The former became suspicious when they observed that the latter were drunk and that
accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Accusedappellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled. 3
Police Officer Nio told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself
as "PC," after which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and
found wrapped in it a 49-inch long homemade firearm locally known as "latong." When he
asked accused-appellant who issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was
connected with the military or any intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and
turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran who subsequently investigated
him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm. 4
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun
but averred that this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes
Cenining, when it was still wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware
that there was a shotgun concealed inside the coconut leaves since they were using the
coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him
after the others had been used up. 5 Accused-appellant's claim was corroborated by one
Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes Cenining which turned out
to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves. 6
On August 25, 1994, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal
possession of firearm under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and imposed upon
him the penalty of imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporalmaximum to reclusion
perpetua. The trial court, having found no mitigating but one aggravating circumstance of
nighttime, sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua with
the accessory penalties provided by law. 7 It found that accused-appellant did not contest
the fact that SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or
license to possess the same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's submission that
he was in possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching Barangay
Onion, he followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie
Regir and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions. 8
Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following
errors:
"I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.
II. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime in the imposition of the maximum penalty against the
accused-appellant." 9
This Court, in the case of People v. Lualhati 10 ruled that in crimes involving illegal possession
of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the existence
of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same.

In assigning the first error, accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in
admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless
search. He maintained that the search made on his person violated his constitutional right
to be secure in his person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Not
only was the search made without a warrant but it did not fall under any of the
circumstances enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides, inter alia:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Hence, the search being unlawful, the homemade firearm confiscated from him is inadmissible
in evidence for being "the fruit of the poisonous tree." 11 As such, the prosecution's case must
necessarily fail and the accused-appellant acquitted.
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the line of reasoning in People v. Cuizon,
et al. 12 where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law
requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may
likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede
the search of a person and his belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law."
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, however, accused-appellant's
arguments are hardly tenable. He and his companions' drunken actuations aroused the
suspicion of SPO3 Nio's group, as well as the fact that he himself was attired in a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit 13 and that upon espying the peace officers, his
companions fled. It should be noted that the peace officers were precisely on an
intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons were roaming around the
barangays of Caibiran. 14
The circumstances in this case are similar to those obtaining in Posadas v. Court
of Appeals 15 where this Court held that "at the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did not know that
he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearm
and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They
did not know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest
without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case
brought about by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and
frisk" situation. There was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could
be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Nio told accused-appellant not to run away, the
former identified himself as a government agent. 16 The peace officers did not know that
he had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming in the barangays
surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group that had
aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in coconut
leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

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As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and
seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop
and frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured
a search warrant first.
Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted
the homemade firearm as evidence.
As to the question of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the
second element, that is, the absence of a license or permit to possess the subject firearm,
this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General which pointed out that the
prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant lacked the necessary permit or license to
possess the subject firearm. 17
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such
burden upon the prosecution. The absence of such license and legal authority constitutes
an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm, and every ingredient
or essential element of an offense must be shown by the prosecution by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 18
In People v. Tiozon, 19 this Court said:
"It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8
SCRA 758 could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon
a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the
issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but we are of the
considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of proof as
to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact
alleged by the prosecution must be proven if 'it is an essential ingredient
of the offense charged,' the burden of proof was with the prosecution in
this case to prove that the firearm used by appellant in committing the
offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The
information filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower
court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no 'license or
permit to possess' the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems
clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative
fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases.
In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was charged with 'having
criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the
qualifications required to be a voter. It was there held that the negative
fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the
crime charged and should be proved by the prosecution. In another case
(People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with
illegal practice of medicine because he had diagnosed, treated and
prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he
received monetary compensation, without having previously obtained the

proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as

provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code, this Court held that if
the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting
without the qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the
offense charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same,
although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the
prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima
facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both
appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even aprima
facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of
a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this view as follows:
'The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the
better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve the
party making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is
so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to
have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not
have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person
prosecuted for doing an act or carrying on a business, such as,
the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution
aver the want of a license if it had acquired no knowledge of
that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or nonexistence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by
the defendant, it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party
alleging the want of the license to prove the allegation.
Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which
lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the
accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the
prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him.' (6 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8)."
Finally, the precedents cited above have been crystallized as the present governing case law on
this question. As this Court summed up the doctrine in People v. Macagaling: 20
"We cannot see how the rule can be otherwise since it is the inescapable
duty of the prosecution to prove all the ingredients of the offense as
alleged against the accused in an information, which allegations must
perforce include any negative element provided by the law to integrate
that offense. We have reiterated quite recently the fundamental mandate
that since the prosecution must allege all the elements of the offense
charged, then it must prove by the requisite quantum of evidence all the
elements it has thus alleged."
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only able to prove by testimonial evidence that accusedappellant admitted before Police Officer Nio at the time that he was accosted that he did not
have any authority or license to carry the subject firearm when he was asked if he had
one. 21 In other words, the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's admission to prove the
second element.

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Is this admission sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element
of illegal possession of firearm which is that accused-appellant does not have the
corresponding license? Corollary to the above question is whether an admission by the
accused-appellant can take the place of any evidentiary means establishing beyond
reasonable doubt the fact averred in the negative in the pleading and which forms an
essential ingredient of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the negative. By its very nature, an
"admission is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may
be inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his
guilt." 22 In other words, it is a "statement by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to issues
pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which
is, of itself, insufficient to authorize conviction." 23 From the above principles, this Court can
infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the commission of the crime charged.
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in nature. As such, it does not fall
under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial
or other proceedings in the same case does not require proof."
Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of firearm. It does not even establish
a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as proof of
the fact of absence or lack of a license.
This Court agrees with the argument of the Solicitor General that "while the
prosecution was able to establish the fact that the subject firearm was seized by the police
from the possession of appellant, without the latter being able to present any license or
permit to possess the same, such fact alone is not conclusive proof that he was not lawfully
authorized to carry such firearm. In other words, such fact does not relieve the prosecution
from its duty to establish the lack of a license or permit to carry the firearm by clear and
convincing evidence, like a certification from the government agency concerned." 24
Putting it differently, "when a negative is averred in a pleading, or a plaintiff's case
depends upon the establishment of a negative, and the means of proving the fact are
equally within the control of each party, then the burden of proof is upon the party averring
the negative." 25
In this case, a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit of the
Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a firearm of any
kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the second assigned
error.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are other legal grounds for his
continued detention, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Mendoza, J ., is on leave.
||| (People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996)

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Case No. 16
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NASARIO
MOLINA y MANAMAT @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y
MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ateneo Legal Aid Office for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS
In the morning of August 8, 1995, the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, dispatched the
team of SP04 Dionisio Cloribel, SP02 Paguidopon and SPO1 Pamplona to proceed to the house
of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, after the latter received an information from his informer that an
alleged marijuana pusher will be passing at that place anytime that morning. At around 9:30, a
"trisikad" carrying Nasario Molina and Gregorio Mula passed by. SPO1 Paguidopon then pointed
at Nasario and Gregorio as the pushers. The team then immediately boarded the vehicle,
overtook the "trisikad" and then requested it to stop. Mula then handed the black bag, which he
was holding to Molina. After introducing himself as police officer, Pamplona requested Molina to
open the bag. Molina replied " Boss, if possible we will settle this." Pamplona however insisted
on opening the bag, which revealed the marijuana leaves inside.
For unlawful possession of 946.9 grams of dried marijuana, accused-Nasario Molina and
Gregorio Mula were found by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City guilty of violation of Section
8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425), as amended by Republic
Act No. 7659, and sentenced them to death. The court a quo anchored its judgment of
conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent
search conducted by the peace officers, were valid because accused-appellants were caught
in flagrant delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.
Hence, this automatic review.
In acquitting accused-appellants of the crime charged, the Supreme Court held that the
accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a
bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such
response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused
appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not
constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrant delicto arrest. Moreover, it could not be said
that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no

consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Thus, the Court held that the
arrest of accused-appellants did not fall under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by
the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE: EXCLUSIONARY RULE; RATIONALE FOR THE RULE. The
fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of
a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule
enshrined under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures Thus: Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding Without this rule,
the right to privacy would be a form, of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's high
regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. The constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2)
search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST; A LAWFUL ARREST
MUST PRECEDE THE SEARCH; PERMISSIBLE WARRANTLESS ARREST. The first
exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this instance,
the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant
of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a
peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place

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where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT WHERE IMPLIED ACQUIESCENCE TO THE
SEARCH WAS GIVEN UNDER COERCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. Moreover, it could not be
said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches and seizure.
Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGALITY OF THE SEARCH RENDERS ARTICLES SEIZED INADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE. Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall
under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted
as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in
favor of accused-appellant.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST.
In People v. Chua Ho San, the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent
case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, probable cause means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RELIABLE INFORMATION ALONE NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, it was held that "the accusedappellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of
the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel.
It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became
suspect
and
so
subject
to
apprehension."

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO BE VALID. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

9. 1D, ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, accusedappellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on
board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or
have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded "Boss, if
possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response
which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were
committing a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon
(who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting the society
from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert those values upon
which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend. 1
For automatic review is the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in
Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias"Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of dried marijuana
which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
accusation against them. 6 Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S.
Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the Philippine National
Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. 7 The first time he came to see the said
marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then
with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver,
accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had

7
no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accusedappellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. 8
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that
the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time that
morning. 9Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for assistance at the
PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4
Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and
SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait
for the alleged pusher to pass by. 10
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned in the house of
SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance,
SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team
boarded their vehicle and overtook the "trisikad." 11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house,
thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted. 12
The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who
was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the
bag. 13 Molina replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this." 14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants
Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers. 15
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence
for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 16 The demurrer was denied by the trial court. 17 A motion for reconsideration
was filed by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, 18 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any
evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own
evidence through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of
both accused of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant
to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA
and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY
OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be
effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to
Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.
The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate
the entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme
Court, Manila, for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme
Court and its appropriate action as the case may be.
SO ORDERED. 19

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of
Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-appellants
contend: EICScD
I.
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING
BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE
GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF
ANY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT
DEATH. 20
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for
the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out in a
reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the
existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. 21
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III,
Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 22 Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and undeserving of
mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too, without this rule, the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit
this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 23

8
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; 24 and (6) stop
and frisk situations (Terry search). 25
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and
seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search. In this
instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the
process cannot be reversed. 26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a
valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the
person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners). 27

informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension."
Likewise, in People v. Mengote, 32 the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side
. . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt
acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause.
According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these
acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least
being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People v. Encinada,33 the
Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding
two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 34 the trial court concluded that petitioner was
attempting to commit a crime as he was "'standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon
Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer
(sic) to them."' 35 In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the
part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed. 36
It went on to state that

In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding that the
warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted by the peace
officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of
prohibited drugs. 28 This brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search
and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San, 29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent
case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or
constitutive of probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria, 30 probable cause means an
actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause,
coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin, 31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not,
at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or
that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9
and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could

have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes
were "moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous
since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions
were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion
or trouble . . .
Third, there was at all no g-round, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for
as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between
Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. 37
Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. 38
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters not that accusedappellant Molina responded "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1
Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the
arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an equivocal statement
which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest.

9
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be
the subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. cCDAHE
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance of accusedappellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned Mula's name and
address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the side of the road.
These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accusedappellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1
Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.

against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of
accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive, all efforts for the
achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest of
criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal
Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong"
and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy", are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-appellants even
before the arrest, to wit
"Q: When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another
person and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the
black bag to another person?
A: Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula
and Molina, when they pass by through the street near the
residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one
that is Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina" 39
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1 Pamplona
could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1 Paguipodon because
Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of accusedappellants' name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguipodon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more so the
arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants' identity, and
were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada
even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal gambling activities, thus, lending at least a
semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court
declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding
that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant
disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a
felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances." 40
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against unreasonable
searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 41
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Molina y Manamat, G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001)

10
in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Verily, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. In view thereof,
the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside for lack of jurisdiction and on ground
of reasonable doubt.

SYLLABUS
Case No. 17
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123595. December 12, 1997.]
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin and Martinez Law Offices for petitioner.

SYNOPSIS
In an information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, petitioner was charged
with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for keeping, possessing and/or
acquiring a hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and permit from the
proper authorities. On arraignment, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of
not guilty. After trial on the merits, the court a quo found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal
possession of explosives under the said law and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less
than seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum and not more
than thirty years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal indicating
that he was appealing to the Supreme Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to
the Court of Appeals. In its decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Unable to accept conviction, petitioner filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent court
erred in affirming the findings of the trial court that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid
and legal.
The Supreme Court finds the petition impressed with merit. For purposes of determining
appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is
taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal
therefrom should have been to the Court and not the Court of Appeals. Hence, the challenged
decision immediately fall in jurisdictional grounds. Additionally, the Court is convinced that the
prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty. First, serious doubts
surrounds the story of police office Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's
possession. Notably, Yu did not identify in court the grenade he allegedly seized. Second, if
indeed petitioner had a grenade with him and that two days earlier he was with the group about
to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, it was then unnatural and against common
experience that petitioner simply stood in Plaza Miranda in proximity to the police officers. Lastly,
even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial
investigation police officer Serapio, such admission is inadmissible in evidence for it was taken

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT; FOR

PURPOSES OF DETERMINING APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
CRIMINAL CASES, THE MAXIMUM OF THE PENALTY IMPOSABLE BY LAW IS TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT AND NOT THE MINIMUM. For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in
criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since
the maximum of the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to
Supreme Court, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948,
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
The term life imprisonment as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of
Article VIII of the Constitution.
2. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; PETITIONER'S ADMISSION OF POSSESSION OF
THE GRENADE DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION, WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. Even assuming that petitioner admitted
possession of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such
admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on
petitioner the day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have
requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if
petitioner consented to the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel,
the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of
counsel.
3. ID.; ID.; WARRANTLESS ARREST; LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE PART OF
THE ARRESTING OFFICER OR AN OVERT PHYSICAL ACT ON THE PART OF THE
ACCUSED, INDICATING THAT THE CRIME HAD JUST BEEN COMMITTED, OR WAS GOING
TO BE COMMITTED, MAKES THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE ACCUSED NOT ONE
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST; CASE AT BAR. In a search incidental to a lawful
arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within which
the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property
found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may
be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit
arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just

11
been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Having thus shown the
invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could
not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; "STOP AND FRISK" AS A "LIMITED PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF OUTER
CLOTHING FOR WEAPONS"; JUSTIFICATION FOR AND ALLOWABLE SCOPE THEREOF.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold
today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment . . . Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, 2 as follows: LLjur
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep,
possess and/or acquire a hand grenade, without first securing the
necessary license and/or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment 3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of
not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A2," 4 while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed with a search
warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner. 5
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its witnesses:
Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino C. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando
Ramilo, who examined the grenade.

Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30
p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men,
with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with
"[t]their eyes . . . moving very fast." 6
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for
about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside
petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then
brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander. 8
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a
group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda.
Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda,
Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when
Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable
to catch any of the latter. Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on
the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not
creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions
approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from
petitioner. 9
Josefino C. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and a certain
Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio conducted
the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to remain silent and to be assisted
by competent and independent counsel. Despite Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan
manifested their willingness to answer questions even without the assistance of a lawyer.
Serapio then took petitioner's uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer
available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared
the affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the
grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive Ordinance
Disposal Unit for examination. 11
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it was
inadmissible in evidence. 12
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties included, among
other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received
a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO Diosdado Diotoy for
examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing
his name, the date and time he received the specimen. During the preliminary examination of
the grenade, he "found that [the] major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse
assembly [were] all present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and capable of

12
exploding." On even date, he issued a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he
forwarded to Diotoy on 11 August 1991. 13
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990
and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August
1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen
arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other
men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought
to and detained at Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The
officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang
tama mo sa akin." This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and
said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me."
Petitioner denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However,
several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once
again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was
presented. 14
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a "stop and
frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information." 15 Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that
a crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require
probable cause would have been "premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his
companions were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as
petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and
"reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different directions
as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a
limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to
allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence." 18
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the
purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to
establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court
thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3
of P.D. No. 1866, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum,
and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA,
as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was appealing to
this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals which
docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file briefs. 21

In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH
UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE
SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE FROM HIM
"WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF
AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any of the
conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People
vs.Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized, inadmissible in
evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court and
prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, noting, first,
that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that the grenade was
"planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial court that the grenade
was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court
focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade seized from petitioner.
Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground
that there was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense,"
thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a
live grenade and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with
unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza Miranda at a time when political
tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of terroristic activities, [can] claim
that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention
that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb site
especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of
an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply
too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the testimony of
the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza
Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the latter's arrest, or on 27
August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted suspiciously, the "accumulation" of
which was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an offense was about to be
committed. Moreover, the Court of Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross
negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence,
if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several
innocent persons while maiming numerous others, before arriving at what
would then be an assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed

13
probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in
saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be the kind
of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of
everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal
technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which
petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that
someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a
prohibited article. Here the police officers were responding to a [sic]
public clamor to put a check on the series of terroristic bombings in the
Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a bomb threat
aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they
conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious
movements in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had]
no personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here, PO3 Yu
[had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in Plaza
Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST
OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RULING IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the validity of the
warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he
was "attempting to commit a crime," as the evidence for the prosecution merely disclosed that
he was "standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving
very fast" and "looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner
points out the factual similarities between his case and that of People v. Mengote to
demonstrate that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged decision.
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the penalty
imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND
ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more
than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.

The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall unlawfully
possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of the penalty,
and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty isreclusion
perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant
to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. 30 The term "life
imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of
Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of
the Constitution.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's decision to this
Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter proceeded
to resolve the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us, with the petition for
review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the Office of the Solicitor
General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental
Briefs.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the prosecution failed
to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found in and
seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he
allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after putting an "X" mark
at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the
other hand, the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer Ramilo referred to
what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after
petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no
evidence whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from
petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo was the
grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the
grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the grenade he examined was
that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and
preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was with a
group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased,
but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow officers were in uniform
and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then unnatural and against common
experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu
observed petitioner for thirty minutes and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to
discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his custodial
investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was

14
taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, which provide
as follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel.

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. No
lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no
PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to the investigation and
waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing,
neither was it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and search of
petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below.
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order
to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests,
searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, 32 subject to
certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped . . .
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
"hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2)
search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; 33 (5) a
search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and frisk." 35

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with
"the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as] an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence
necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of
the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 36 In this instance, the
law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. 38
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the
search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an
overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was
being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry; thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual
conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience
that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment . . . 39
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop
and frisk," 40 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and
frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure

15
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group which
attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a
genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the
credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be
chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares
otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were
"immediately collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it
was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared
on cross-examination: cdrep
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not
create any commotion?
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir. 42
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware that
a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in [sic] his
person. 43
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights solemnly
guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on
ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby
ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from detention, unless his further detention
is justified for any other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco and Martinez, JJ ., concur.
||| (Malacat y Mandar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997)

16
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and
death. aDcHIS
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must
necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable
penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the
legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in
Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is
there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary,
this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case
was also in excess of the of quantity provided in Section 20.

Case No. 18
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
MONTILLA y GATDULA, accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
RUBEN

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Sison Salomon Gonong Miranda & Associates for accused-appellant.

SYNOPSIS
Appellant was apprehended by members of the Cavite PNP transporting 28 marijuana bricks
contained in a traveling bag and a carton box weighing 28 kilograms. The PNP officers alleged
that they acted on a tip-off by an informant that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio City
with an undetermined amount of marijuana.
Appellant during the trial disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He admitted coming all
the way from Baguio and proceeded to Dasmarias, Cavite, but denied carrying any luggage
with him. The trial culminated in a verdict of guilty beyond reasonable doubt in a decision of the
trial court which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant.
All errors assigned by the appellant, i.e. insufficiency of evidence, unlawful warrantless search
and seizure, and failure of prosecution to establish that the 28 marijuana bricks confiscated from
him were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court, did not
impress the Court.
The reversible error or the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now
provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section
4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT

GENERALLY NOT DISTURBED ON APPEAL. In the present appellate review, appellant
disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited
drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns
no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the
lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be
attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving
in nature.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WHERE AN OFFENSE MAY BE COMMITTED IN DIFFERENT
MODES, AN INDICTMENT WOULD SUFFICE IF THE OFFENSE IS COMMITTED IN ANY
MODES SPECIFIED THEREIN. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be
committed in any of the different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the
offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is
so as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the
ground of multifariousness.
3. ID.; ID.; CORROBORATED EVIDENCE; COULD BE DISPENSED WITH BY THE
PROSECUTION. For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court,
which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally
taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution,
more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose
performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption.
4. ID.; ID.; INFORMANTS ARE GENERALLY NOT PRESENTED IN COURT. Informants are
generally not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their
invaluable services to the police.

17
5. ID.; ID.; PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES FOR THE PEOPLE PREROGATIVE OF THE
PROSECUTION. Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its
witnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course.
6. ID.; ID.; APPELLANT CAN RESORT TO COERCIVE PROCESS TO COMPEL EYEWITNESS
TO APPEAR. Appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to
compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below, but which remedy was not availed of
by him.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES CONSTRUED. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays
down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength
of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit
of a poisonous tree.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT
ALLOWED. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid
proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; (2) searches of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6)
"stop and frisk" measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; SEARCH
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST, LEGAL; CASE AT BAR. On the defense argument that
the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from him, still
the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result
thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, REQUIRED. A legitimate warrantless arrest, as
above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly
search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense. On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). These instances have
been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. DTIaHE
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE, CONSTRUED. The conventional view is that
probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and
conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
12. ID.; EVIDENCE; EVIDENTIARY MEASURE FOR PROPRIETY OF FILING CRIMINAL
CHARGES AND FOR EFFECTION OF A WARRANTLESS ARREST, LIBERALIZED.
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the

propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been
reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima
facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or quantum, and was even used with dubiety as
equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the
term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for
belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of, or an apparent state of
facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and
prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime. Felicitously, those
problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue under
discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof
that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in
other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists." It should, therefore, be in that sense,
wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.

13. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH VALID WHERE
ACCUSED WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. In the case at bar, as soon as
appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once indicated to the officers
that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted
that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and
carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their
man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal
effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and
requested him to open and show them the contents of the traveling bag, which appellant
voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag yielded the
prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his
luggage to their headquarters for questioning. Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the
search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable
cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a wellgrounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search
yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is
ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his
belongings without the requisite warrant were both justified.
14. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARILY SUBMITS TO A
SEARCH, HE IS PRECLUDED FROM LATER COMPLAINING THEREOF. Furthermore, that
appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the officers
approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the
contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers
asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded presumably or in all likelihood
resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individual
voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon his person or
premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

18
15. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; MAY BE WAIVED EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY. After all, the
right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly or
impliedly. Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless
search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that
person's regard for the supremacy of the law, the case of herein appellant is evidently different
for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag
without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clear
waiver of his right.
16. ID.; ID.; RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION; NON-OBSERVANCE WILL NOT STRIKE DOWN PROCEEDINGS IN THE
LOWER COURT WHERE APPELLANT DID NOT CONFESS DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AND WHERE HIS GUILT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED BY OTHER
EVIDENCE. Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities,
claiming that he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could possibly have
violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438 which defines certain rights of persons arrested,
detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and
investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof. Assuming the
existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not necessarily
be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial
investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary
confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in
evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other
evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers
together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered and admitted in
evidence in the court below.
17. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT, AS AMENDED; UNLAWFUL
TRANSPORTATION OF MARIJUANA; PENALTY. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in
Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian
hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs
carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. As found by the trial court, there were neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the
second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.

amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias,
Cavite in an information which alleges: cdasia
That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran,
Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
administer, transport, and deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried
marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of
the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the
public interest. 1
The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from
appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. 2 Trial was held on scheduled dates
thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8,
1995 and which imposed the extreme penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to
pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 3
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00
A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by
SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine
National Police Command based in Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was
caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which
marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of
appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before,
or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize,
would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an
undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting
officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day,
hour, and place. 4
Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during
the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias,
Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there
was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective job at a garment factory in said
locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was
accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.

DECISION

He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was
never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he
had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in
the garment factory where she reportedly worked as a supervisor, 5 although, as the trial court
observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged employment.

Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 27, 1994 for
violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as

In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally
caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and
exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings
of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower court on the positive testimonies

REGALADO, J p:

19
of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's
fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.

illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence,
appellant's asseverations must fail.

1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of
insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the
police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."

The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have
been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was
essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the
witnesses arrayed by the State against him. These assertions are, however, much too strained.
Far from compromising the primacy of appellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of
the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.

Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly
corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right
to confront the witnesses against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who
would have contradicted the hearsay and conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how
appellant was collared by them.
The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as
amended, is as follows:
SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Prohibited Drugs. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a
fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.
Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in
any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.
Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the
various modes of commission 6 being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and
transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law.
The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitive scope to other acts besides those
mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in
any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts
specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving
away, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.

As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts
alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported
marijuana. The governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the
different modes provided by law is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to
have been committed in one, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in
the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a
description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness. 7 In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing
that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the

For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the
declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not
hearsay as both testified upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such, the
testimony of the informer could be dispensed with by the prosecution, 8 more so where what he
would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties
regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in
court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police. 9 Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not
for the defense to dictate that course. 10 Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the
coercive process of subpoena to compel that eyewitness to appear before the court
below, 11 but which remedy was not availed of by him.
2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful
warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as
2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised
by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law
enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant. Their misfeasance should
therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant
on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision. 12 Evidence secured on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language
of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs
searches; 13 (2) searches of moving vehicles, 14 (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; 15 (4)
consented searches; 16 (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest; 17 and (6) "stop and frisk"
measures 18 have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions.
In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the
law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier
coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the
policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for, under these
circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the
obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.
While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the
warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the

20
drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such
delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of
transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were concealed and whether the
same were arriving together with, or were being brought by someone separately from, the
courier.

as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived
the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for
belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of, 23 or an apparent
state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent
and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed the crime. 24

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant,
assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time
they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented
by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening
time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered,
especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a
dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding
the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to
reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when
and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would do
so.

Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the
issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule
112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
as suffices to "engender a well founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and
the respondent's probable guilt thereof. 25 It has the same meaning as the related phraseology
used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the
respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists." 26 It should, therefore, be in that
sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally
authorized.

On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both
SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past
operations. Moreover, experience shows that although information gathered and passed on by
these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal, and not as neatly and completely
packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes
successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of
understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic
appreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them
from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers. prcd

In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at
once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting
shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden
inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers
thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking
pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced
themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the
traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1
Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they
brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarters for questioning.

3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the
evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation
of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest
under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 19 On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest which
could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests set out in Section
5(a). 20 These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante
delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the
determination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as
having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and
prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commission of an offense, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 21
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the
propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been
reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima
facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or quantum, 22 and was even used with dubiety

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box
should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But,
precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are
necessarily hidden in containers and concealed from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably
assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant was by their side and had so
informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been
irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt
a "wait and see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.
Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to
the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could
properly create in the minds of the officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant
was in the act of violating the law. The search yielded affirmance both of that probable cause
and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a crime by illegally transporting
prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caughtin
flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant
were both justified.
Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To
repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they
asked him about the contents of his luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal
effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably

21
or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities.
When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted
upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.
After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either
expressly or impliedly. 27 Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a
warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of
that person's regard for the supremacy of the law, 28 the case of herein appellant is evidently
different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the
bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a
clear waiver of his right. 29
4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and
adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the
same marijuana examined by the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting
officers did not identify in court the marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did
not have to do so. It should be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and
formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag and the
carton box in which the same were contained. The articles were properly marked as confiscated
evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the
chemist for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs
taken from appellant. The trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence, satisfied that
the articles were indubitably no other than those taken from appellant.
Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting
who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag
of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and
the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thus confirming the veracity of the report of the
informer. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than that appellant had transported the
illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the
subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being Indian
hemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond
doubt. LLjur
Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was
not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
Indeed, appellant has a point. The police authorities here could possibly have violated the
provision of Republic Act No. 7438 30 which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained,
or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and
investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.
Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will
not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during
his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or
involuntary confession or admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been
inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly
established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the
arresting officers together with the documentary and object evidence which were formally offered
and admitted in evidence in the court below.

5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant.
As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now
provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is, in the case of Indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section
4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the
present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be
observed in the application of said penalties.
As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances
attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must
necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable
penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the court a quo, it was never intended by the
legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in
Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is
there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary,
this Court has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code, 31 the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that
case was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.
It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the
violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4
whereby, regardless of Section 20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited
drug involved in any offense in said section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 32 While the minority or the death of the victim
will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic aggravating
circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of
death if the offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the
rules on the graduation of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there
was neither a minor victim nor a consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article
63 of the Code govern.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in
Criminal Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben
Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the
judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Martinez,
JJ ., concur.
Vitug, J., concurs in the result; but reserves his vote on the discussion of the warrantless search
upon appellant as being incidental to a lawful arrest.
||| (People v. Montilla y Gatdula, G.R. No. 123872, January 30, 1998)

22
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus
stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned
to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the
country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body
number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902. 1
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. 2
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station,
set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.

Case No. 19
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 91107. June 19, 1991.]
THE PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, * defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.
DECISION
PADILLA, J p:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred
to as the accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The
factual background of the case is as follows:

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the
NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their
inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner
riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was
found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that
accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC
Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

23
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish, a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the
issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by
the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by
him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He
further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because
there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked
accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his
neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The
officer in turn handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer
came back, he charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the
bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not
give credence to accused's defense. LibLex
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by
his failure to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at
the Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation
when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as
well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as
amended. 3 The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE,
finding
the
guilt
of
the
accused
Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds
him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for proper
disposition under Section 20, Article IV ofRepublic Act 425, as amended.
SO ORDERED." 4
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without
a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 However, where the search
is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest

without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances. 6
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. 7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search
was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime. LLphil
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. 8 The
required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case. 9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as
valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and
attempted to flee. 12
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in
his possession. Said information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very
same morning that accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

24
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case, 13 the
police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San
Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of dangerous drugs,
based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police
authorities. It was held that when faced with on-the spot information, the police officers had to
act quickly and there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the
bus (where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was
initially made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused,
during the course of the inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The
failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to
arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a
regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily
present his identification papers when required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was
trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose aprobable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on the personal effects of the
accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his
pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy
bears with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his
identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive the
NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness
in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
||| (People v. Malmstedt, G.R. No. 91107, June 19, 1991)

25
argued that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or
had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the
presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was
incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure. We disagree. At the time the peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he
had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now
know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAN BE VALIDLY EFFECTED WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY AN ARREST;
CASE AT BAR. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be
effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and
search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity
of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa. As between a warrantless
search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the
case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that
when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty
of the police officers to inspect the same. It is too much indeed to require the police officers to
search the bag in the possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search
warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.

Case No. 20

DECISION
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 89139. August 2, 1990.]

ROMEO POSADAS y ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURT
OF
APPEALS
and
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Rudy G. Agravante for petitioner.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT; SEC. 5, RULE 113 THEREOF. From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that
an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others,
when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; NOT
INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST IN THE CASE AT BAR. The Solicitor General, in
justifying the warrantless search and seizure of the buri bag then carried by the petitioner,

GANCAYCO, J p:
The validity of a warrantless search on the person of petitioner is put into issue in this case.
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra
Umpar, both members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom
assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a surveillance along Magallanes
Street, Davao City. While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciously.
They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his
resistance.
They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith &
Wesson revolver with Serial No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber
gun, 2 a smoke (tear gas) grenade 3 a and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They
brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. In the course of the same, the
petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or authority to possess firearms and
ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. He was then taken to the Davao
Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt.
Didoy, the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and

26
ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial
on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at the
time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5)
months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the
costs.
The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the
government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over
said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City." 5
Not satisfied therewith the petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in
due course a decision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming in toto the appealed
decision with costs against the petitioner. 6
Hence, the herein petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest
or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner
are inadmissible in evidence against him. LexLib
The Solicitor General, in justifying the warrantless search of the buri bag then carried by the
petitioner, argues that under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court a person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of
an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7. (6a, 17a)"

From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by
a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
The Solicitor General argues that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was
actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of
the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. We disagree.
At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner
as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was
hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said
circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. llcd
However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a
search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been
upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa, 7 as follows:
"Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been
stopped and searched without a search warrant by the military manning
the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the
incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether
there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and
seizure. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are
reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks
into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably
in other areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the
NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers
and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow
units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of
which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating

27
economic conditions which all sum up to what one can rightly consider,
at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse

by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. (Emphasis
supplied)."
Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints
and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more
reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of a probable
cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee
with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the
bag and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such an exercise
may prove to be useless, futile and much too late.
In People vs. CFI of Rizal, 8 this Court held as follows:
". . . In the ordinary cases where warrant is indispensably necessary, the
mechanics prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court must be followed and satisfied. But We need not argue that there
are exceptions. Thus in the extraordinary events where warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence
of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was
made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles
procured."
The Court reproduces with approval the following disquisition of the Solicitor General: cdphil
"The assailed search and seizure may still be justified as akin to a "stop
and frisk" situation whose object is either to determine the identity of a
suspicious individual or to maintain thestatus quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information. This is illustrated in the
case of Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In this case, two men
repeatedly walked past a store window and returned to a spot where they
apparently conferred with a third man. This aroused the suspicion of a

police officer. To the experienced officer, the behavior of the men

indicated that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery. When
the police officer approached the men and asked them for their names,
they mumbled a reply. Whereupon, the officer grabbed one of them, spun
him around and frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did
the same to the other two and found another weapon. In the prosecution
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon, the defense of illegal
search and seizure was put up. The United States Supreme Court held
that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach a person for the purpose of investigating
possible criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to
make an arrest." In such a situation, it is reasonable for an officer rather
than simply to shrug his shoulder and allow a crime to occur, to stop a
suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain
the status quo while obtaining more information. . . .
Clearly, the search in the case at bar can be sustained under the
exceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been violated." 9
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
||| (Posadas y Zamora v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89139, August 02, 1990)

28
are to be expected but must be disregarded if they do not affect the basic credibility of the
evidence as a whole. (People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990)
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY WAS PERFORMED APPLICABLE TO
CASE AT BAR. There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was motivated by
any reason other than the desire of the police officers to accomplish their mission. Courts
generally give full faith and credit to police officers when the facts and circumstances
surrounding then acts sustain the presumption that they have performed their duties in a regular
manner.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONY MUST CONFORM TO HUMAN
EXPERIENCE; CASE AT BAR. While the appellants maintain that they did not know what
was in the cargo. Their main concern was in going back to Baguio City and they saw no need to
question their two passengers on why flowers were being kept in closed cans and sacks, the
appellants' version is not believable. It is inconceivable that the appellants would not even bother
to ask the names of the strangers who approached them in a restaurant at night wanting to hire
their jeepney, considering that they were familiar with the identity of the passenger, Luisa
Mendoza, who hired them to transport her goods to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet. It is likewise
incredible that the appellants did not show the slightest curiousity as to why flowers were being
kept in closed tin cans and sealed sacks and cellophane. On the other hand, the appellants had
clear knowledge that Luisa Mendoza was transporting cartons containing dried fish and canned
goods on the trip out of Baguio. It is contrary to human experience that the appellants would
inquire about the name of the passenger and the cargo she was loading on their jeep and not
doing the same about another who would transport goods on a midnight trip. Well-settled is the
rule that evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but it must be credible itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness
than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
Case No. 21
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85177. August 20, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MOISES MASPIL, JR. y
WAYWAY and SALCEDO BAGKING y ALTAKI, defendants-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Peter C. Fianza for defendants-appellants.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; MINOR INCONSISTENCIES
DO NOT AFFECT CREDIBILITY. It has been ruled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses not on material points is not fatal. Moreover, minor inconsistencies

4. ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBILITY; SLIGHT DISCREPANCY IN THE WEIGHT IN KILOS OF

MARIJUANA, NOT MATERIAL IN CASE AT BAR. While there is a discrepancy of 3.76
between the number of kilos stated in the information (111.9 kilos) and in the report of the
forensic chemist (115.66 kilos), the marijuana examined by the forensic chemist, which was
contained in three big round tin cans, two jute sacks (there was really only one jute sack colored
light green which was confiscated but since one of the plastic sacks [green] appeared to be
tattered, some of its contents were transferred to a white jute sack), (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 5)
and two plastic bags colored yellow and green (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 3), was positively
identified to be the same as those confiscated from the appellants. Lt. Valeroso testified that
Exhibits "B" (yellow plastic bag), "C" light green jute sack, "D" (green plastic bag), "E" (one big
can), "F" (second can), "G" (third can) were, indeed, the same articles which he saw at the back
of the jeepney of the appellants. (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 5) One of the appellants,
Moises Maspil, even admitted that the articles identified by Lt. Valeroso in his testimony were
indeed, the same articles confiscated from their jeepney at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet. (T.S.N.,
February 24, 1988, pp. 34-35) Moreover, the words "more or less" following the weight in kilos of
the marijuana in the questioned information declare that the number of kilos stated therein is just
an approximation. It can therefore be a little lighter or heavier. The slight discrepancy is not
material.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT AT CHECKPOINTS; VALIDITY THEREOF;
CASE AT BAR. Upon inspection at a checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan,
Atok, Benguet, the jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his companion was found loaded with

29
suspected dried marijuana leaves. The appellants were arrested as a consequence and the
suspected marijuana leaves were confiscated. The search was conducted within reasonable
limits. There was information that a sizeable volume of marijuana will be transported to take
advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein there will be a lot of people going to and from
Baguio City (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 6). In fact, during the three day (October 30, 1986
to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint, there were also other drug related arrests
made aside from that of the two appellants. As held in the case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R.
No. 83988, September 29, 1989, checkpoints during these abnormal times, when conducted
within reasonable limits are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community. But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search would still be valid. This case
involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring a search warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since they were
transporting the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben, G.R. No.
63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was actually being committed.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SUFFICIENT TIME FOR POLICE OFFICERS TO OBTAIN A
WARRANT IN CASE AT BAR. The appellants, however, cite the case of People v.
Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In said case, the PC officers received information that the
accused-appellant, on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City, was carrying marijuana. When the
accused-appellant was descending the gangplank, the PC officers detained him and inspected
the bag that he was carrying and found marijuana. The Court ruled that since the marijuana was
seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence. There are certain facts of the said case which are
not present in the case before us. In the Aminnudin case, the records showed that there was
sufficient time and adequate information for the PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The
officers knew the name of the accused, that the accused was on board M/V Wilcon 9, bound to
Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival of the said vessel. On the other hand, in this case there
was no information as to the exact description of the vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A
jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger ship on the high seas. The ruling in
the Aminnudin case, is not applicable to the case at bar.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This petition is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 5, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declare the accuse MOISES
MASPIL, JR. y WAYWAY and SALCEDO BAGKING y ALTAKI guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal transportation of
marijuana as charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer
LIFE IMPRISONMENT; to pay a fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay their proportionate shares
in the costs.
The confiscated marijuana (Exhibits "B", "B-1" to "B-23"; "C", "C-1" to "C16", "D", "D-1" to "D-20"; "E", "E-1", to "E-14"; "F", "F-1"; "G", "G-1") are
hereby declared forfeited in favor of the Government and upon the finality

of this decision, the Branch Clerk of Court is directed to turn over the
same to the Dangerous Drugs Board (NBI), through the Chief, PC Crime
Laboratory, Regional Unit No. 1 Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, for
disposition in accordance with law." (Rollo, pp. 25-26)
In Criminal Case No. 4263-R, the information filed against the two accused alleged:
"That on or about the 1st day of November, 1986, at Sayangan,
Municipality of Atok, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, and without any
authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
transport and carry in transit from Sinto, Bauko, Mt. Province to Atok,
Benguet One Hundred Eleven Kilos and Nine Grams (111.9 kilos), more
or less, of dried marijuana leaves which are sources of dangerous and
prohibited drugs and from which dangerous and prohibited drugs nay be
derived and manufactured, in violation of the said law." (Rollo, p. 11)
The narration of facts by the trial court is as follows:
"According to Jerry Veleroso, Sgt. Amador Ablang and Sgt. Florentino
Baillo, all members of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics
Command stationed in Baguio City, (See also Exhibit "I") on October 30,
1986, they established a checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at
Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along the Halsema Highway, to check
on vehicles proceeding to Baguio City because their Commanding
Officer, Maj. Basilio Cablayan, had been earlier tipped off by some
confidential informers that the herein accused Maspil and Bagking would
be transporting a large volume of marijuana to Baguio City. The informers
went along with the operatives to Sayangan.
"At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, the operatives
intercepted a Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his
companion. Upon inspection, the jeep was found loaded with two (2)
plastic sacks (Exhibits "B" and "D"), one (1) jute sack (Exhibit "C") and
three (3) big round tin cans (Exhibits "E", "F" and "G") which, when
opened contained several bundles of suspected dried marijuana leaves
(Exhibits "B-1", to "B-23"; "C-1" to "C-16"; "D-1" to "D-20"; "E-1" to "E-14";
"F-1" and "G-1").
"Maspil and Bagking were arrested and the suspected marijuana leaves
were confiscated.
"The confiscated items were later on referred to the PC Crime Laboratory,
Regional Unit I, for examination (Exhibit "A"). Forensic Chemist Carlos V.
Figuerroa performed the requested examination and determined that the
specimen, with an aggregate weight of 115.66 kilos, were positive to the
standard tests for marijuana.
"The accused admitted that the marijuana dried leaves were indeed
confiscated from the jeep being then driven by Maspil with Bagking as his

30
helper. However, they claimed that the prohibited drugs belonged to two
of their passengers who loaded them in the jeep as paying cargo for
Baguio City without the accused knowing that they were marijuana.
"The accused declared that on October 31, 1986, at the burned area
along Lakandula Street, Baguio City, a certain Mrs. Luisa Mendoza hired
the jeep of Maspil to transport her stock of dried fish and canned goods
contained in cartons to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet, because her own
vehicle broke down. They left Baguio City at about 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon (11:30 in the morning, according to Bagking) with Mrs.
Mendoza, her helper and salesgirls on board the jeep with Maspil as
driver and Bagking as his own helper. They arrived at Abatan at about
6:00 o'clock in the evening.
"After unloading their cargo, Maspil and Bagking repaired to a restaurant
for their dinner before undertaking the trip back to Baguio City. While thus
eating, they were approached by two persons, one of whom they would
learn later on to be a certain Danny Buteng. Buteng inquired if they were
going to Baguio City and upon being given an affirmative answer, he said
that he would ride with them and that he has some cargo. Asked what the
cargo was, Buteng replied that they were flowers in closed tin cans and
sealed sacks for the commemoration of All Souls Day in Baguio City. After
Buteng had agreed to Maspil's condition that he would pay for the space
to be occupied by his cargo, Buteng himself and his companion loaded
the cargo and fixed them inside Maspil's jeep.
"Maspil and Bagking left Abatan at about 7:00 o'clock that same evening
of October 31. Aside from Buteng and companion they had four other
passengers. These four other passengers alighted at Natubleng,
Buguias, Benguet.
"Upon reaching Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, Maspil stopped at the
Marosan Restaurant where they intended to take coffee. Their remaining
passengers Buteng and companion alighted and went to the
restaurant. However, a soldier waved at Maspil to drive to where he was,
which Maspil did. The soldier secured Maspil's permission to inspect their
cargo after which he grabbed Maspil on the latter's left shoulder and
asked who owned the cargo. Maspil told the soldier that the cargo
belonged to their passengers who went to the restaurant. The soldier
called for his companions and they went to look for Maspil's passengers
in the restaurant. Later on, they returned and placed Maspil and Bagking
under arrest since their cargo turned out to be marijuana.
"Lawrence Balonglong, alias Banawe, a radio reporter of DZWX Bombo
Radio who was invited by Lt. Valeroso to witness the operation, affirmed
the unsuccessful pursuit of the alleged two companions of Maspil and
Bagking. He recalled that he was awakened from his sleep at the town
hall in Sayangan after the arrest of Maspil and Bagking. When he went to
the scene, the NARCOM operatives boarded the jeep of Maspil to chase
the two companions of Maspil and Bagking. Balonglong climbed on top of

the jeep with his camera to join the chase. They proceeded towards the
direction of Bontoc but failed to catch anyone. Hence, they returned.
"Thereupon, Maspil and Bagking were taken to the town hall where they
were allegedly maltreated to admit ownership of the confiscated
marijuana. At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of November 1, the
soldiers took them away from Sayangan to be transferred to their station
at Baguio City. On their way, particularly at Km. 32 or 34, they met Mike
Maspil, an elder brother of Moises Maspil, and the soldiers called for him
and then Lt. Valeroso and his men mauled him on the road.
"Mike testified that between 3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
November 1, he was informed by a neighbor that his brother Moises was
detained at the Atok Municipal Jail. So he called for Jose Pos-el and
James Longages, his driver and helper, respectively, to go along with him
to see Moises. They rode in his jeep. On the way, they met the group of
Lt. Valeroso. For no apparent reason, Lt. Valeroso boxed and kicked him
several times. Thereafter, Lt. Valeroso placed him under arrest together
with his driver and helper. They were all brought to a shoe store on Gen.
Luna Road, Baguio City, together with Moises and Bagking. There, Lt.
Valeroso got his wallet containing P210.00 and Seiko wrist watch but the
receipt (Exhibit "3") was issued by a certain Miss Pingil, a companion of
Valeroso. He was released after nine days. He then went to Lt. Valeroso
to claim his wallet, money and watch but he was told that they were with
Miss Pingil. However, when he went to Miss Pingil, the latter said that the
items were with Lt. Valeroso. He sought the assistance of then Tourism
Deputy Minister Honorato Aquino who assigned a lawyer to assist him.
The lawyer advised him to file a case against Lt. Valeroso but because of
the intervening congressional elections, the matter has never been
pursued." (Rollo, p. 21-24)
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors in their appeal, to wit:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED MARIJUANA AS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION IS
DIFFERENT FROM THAT PRESENTED FOR LABORATORY
EXAMINATION.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WERE
ONLY TWO OCCUPANTS, THE APPELLANTS, IN THE VEHICLE
WHERE THE ALLEGED MARIJUANA WAS CONFISCATED.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED
KNEW THAT THE CARGO THEY WERE TRANSPORTING WAS
MARIJUANA.

31
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ALLEGED CONFISCATED MARIJUANA.
V
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SHIFTING FROM THE
PROSECUTION THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE COMMISSION OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED TO THE APPELLANTS TO PROVE THEIR
INNOCENCE." (Rollo, p. 40)

Q Where were you when these two persons were apprehended?

A I was in the Municipal Hall asleep, sir.
Q How did you know then that these people were apprehended?
A It is like this, sir, on the night of October 31, I was then asleep
and at around 11:00, I guess, p.m., they awakened me
so I went and I saw these two guys being apprehended
by the Narcom operative.
Court:

The main defense of the appellants is their claim that the prohibited drugs belonged to their two
passengers who loaded them in the jeep as paying cargo without the appellants knowing that
the cargo was marijuana.

Q You saw them being apprehended?

In the second and third assignment of errors, the appellants claim that the trial court erred in not
appreciating their version of the facts.

Q Already apprehended?

The appellants state that the trial court's reliance on Sgt. Baillo's testimony that they were the
only ones in the jeep cannot be given credence as Sgt. Baillo's testimony is full of
inconsistencies.
The appellants cite Sgt. Baillo's inconsistencies as to the time of the arrest whether morning or
afternoon, the time the checkpoint was removed and the persons who were with him at the time
of arrest.
It has been ruled that inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not on
material points is not fatal. Moreover, minor inconsistencies are to be expected but must be
disregarded if they do not affect the basic credibility of the evidence as a whole. (People v.
Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990)

A No, sir . . . I saw them there.

A Already apprehended.
Atty. Fianza:
Q And when you saw these persons, what did you do, if any?
A What I recall is that when I went to the road, where these two
guys were apprehended, the operatives boarded the
same jeep and I even climbed the jeep . . . on top of
the jeep holding my camera and tape recorder and we .
. . I don't know . . . they chased, according to the
operatives, they chased two companions of the two
arrested guys." (T.S.N., May 11, 1988, p. 4)

The defense even state that there were a lot of policemen (T.S.N., December 1, 1987, p. 22) and
it was but natural that there would be confusion on who was there at the time of the arrest.

In their brief, the appellants even admit that "he (Balonglong) did not see the passengers"
and it was just his impression that there were other people present. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7)

The trial court gave credence to the positive and categorical statement of Sgt. Baillo that there
were only two occupants, and these were the appellants inside the jeepney at the time (T.S.N.,
June 30, 1987, p. 18). We see no cogent reason to reverse this finding of fact.

The appellants maintain that they did not know what was in the cargo. Their main concern was
in going back to Baguio City and they saw no need to question their two passengers on why
flowers were being kept in closed cans and sacks. They were apprehended after midnight. They
traversed a lonely and reputedly dangerous portion of the mountain highway.

There is nothing in the records to suggest that the arrest was motivated by any reason other
than the desire of the police officers to accomplish their mission. Courts generally give full faith
and credit to police officers when the facts and circumstances surrounding then acts sustain the
presumption that they have performed their duties in a regular manner. (Rule 131, Section 5 (m),
Rules of Court; People v. Marcos, supra; People v. Yap and Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 87088-89, May
9, 1990).
The appellants put forward the testimony of Lawrence Balonglong which corroborates and
affirms their stand that there were, indeed, passengers in the jeepney.
However, a close perusal of said testimony reveals no such corroboration. The pertinent portions
of Balonglong's testimony is as follows:
"xxx xxx xxx

The appellants' version is not believable. It is inconceivable that the appellants would not even
bother to ask the names of the strangers who approached them in a restaurant at night wanting
to hire their jeepney, considering that they were familiar with the identity of the passenger, Luisa
Mendoza, who hired them to transport her goods to Abatan, Buguias, Benguet.
It is likewise incredible that the appellants did not show the slightest curiousity as to why flowers
were being kept in closed tin cans and sealed sacks and cellophane. On the other hand, the
appellants had clear knowledge that Luisa Mendoza was transporting cartons containing dried
fish and canned goods on the trip out of Baguio. It is contrary to human experience that the
appellants would inquire about the name of the passenger and the cargo she was loading on
their jeep and not doing the same about another who would transport goods on a midnight trip.

32
Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but it must be credible itself. No better test has yet been found to measure the
value of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
(People v. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292, 297 [1987]; People v. Aldana, G.R. No. 81817, July 27,
1989; People v. Pascua, G.R. No. 82303, December 21, 1989).
The appellants further allege that if, indeed they knew about the contents of their cargo, they
would have adopted means to prevent detection or to evade arrest.
At the time the appellants were being motioned by the policemen to come nearer the checkpoint,
there was no way that the appellants could have evaded the arrest without putting their lives in
jeopardy. They decided to just brazen it out with police and insist on their version of the story.
As for the other assigned errors, the appellants in the first assigned error, contend that since
there is a discrepancy of 3.76 between the number of kilos stated in the information (111.9 kilos)
and in the report (115.66 kilos) of the forensic chemist, it is very likely that the marijuana
presented as evidence was not the one confiscated from the appellants or even if they were the
same, it could have already been tampered with. The appellants conclude that the marijuana
then, cannot be admitted as evidence.
The marijuana examined by the forensic chemist, which was contained in three big round tin
cans, two jute sacks (there was really only one jute sack colored light green which was
confiscated but since one of the plastic sacks [green] appeared to be tattered, some of its
contents were transferred to a white jute sack), (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 5) and two plastic
bags colored yellow and green (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 3), was positively identified to be the
same as those confiscated from the appellants. This is very clear from the testimony of Lt.
Valeroso who stated:
"xxx xxx xxx
Q When you went down, where were these two suspects, as you
said?
A They were sitted (sic) at the front seat.
Q Front seat of what?
A The jeep, sir.
Q And did you ask or see what was inside the jeep?
A Yes.

the same articles which he saw at the back of the jeepney of the appellants. (T.S.N.,
September 16, 1987, p. 5)
One of the appellants, Moises Maspil, even admitted that the articles identified by Lt. Valeroso in
his testimony were indeed, the same articles confiscated from their jeepney at Sayangan, Atok,
Benguet. (T.S.N., February 24, 1988, pp. 34-35)
Moreover, the words "more or less" following the weight in kilos of the marijuana in the
questioned information declare that the number of kilos stated therein is just an approximation. It
can therefore be a little lighter or heavier. The slight discrepancy is not material.
Another ground stated by the appellants for the inadmissibility in evidence of the confiscated
marijuana is that the marijuana allegedly seized from them was a product of an unlawful search
without a warrant.
In the case of Valmonte v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988, September 29, 1989, the Court held that:
"xxx xxx xxx
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse
by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is
susceptible of abuse. But at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable limits are part of the
price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community."
The search was conducted within reasonable limits. There was information that a sizeable
volume of marijuana will be transported to take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein
there will be a lot of people going to and from Baguio City (T.S.N., September 16, 1987, p. 6). In
fact, during the three day (October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint,
there were also other drug related arrests made aside from that of the two appellants.
But even without the Valmonte ruling, the search would still be valid. This case involves a search
incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search
warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides:
"SEC. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
and Rule 113, Section 5 (1) which state:

Q And what were those?

"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

A It was all suspected marijuana dried leaves contained in three

big cans, one sack colored green, two sacks colored
yellow and green." (Italics supplied, T.S.N., September
16, 1987, p. 4)

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

Lt. Valeroso further testified that Exhibits "B" (yellow plastic bag), "C" light green jute sack,
"D" (green plastic bag), "E" (one big can), "F" (second can), "G" (third can) were, indeed,

This case falls squarely within the exceptions. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto
since they were transporting the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben,
G.R. No. 63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was actually being committed.

33
The appellants, however, cite the case of People v. Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In said
case, the PC officers received information that the accused-appellant, on board a vessel bound
for Iloilo City, was carrying marijuana. When the accused-appellant was descending the
gangplank, the PC officers detained him and inspected the bag that he was carrying and found
marijuana. The Court ruled that since the marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in
evidence.
There are certain facts of the said case which are not present in the case before us. In
the Aminnudin case, the records showed that there was sufficient time and adequate information
for the PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The officers knew the name of the accused, that
the accused was on board M/V Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival of the
said vessel.
On the other hand, in this case there was no information as to the exact description of the
vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger ship on
the high seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case, is not applicable to the case at bar.
As for the fifth and last assigned error we agree with the Solicitor General that:
"Examination of the testimonies of appellants show that they admit the
fact that the confiscated marijuana was taken from their jeep while they
were transporting it from Abatan, Buguias, Benguet to Baguio City. This
being so, the burden of the prosecution to prove illegal transportation of
prohibited drugs punished under Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended, has
been satisfactorily discharged. The rule in civil as well as in criminal
cases is that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The
prosecution avers the guilt of the accused who is presumed to be
innocent until the contrary is proved. Therefore, the prosecution must
prove such guilt by establishing the existence of all elements of the crime
charged. But facts judicially known, presumed, admitted or confessed
need not be proved. (Rule 129, Sec. 4, Rules on Evidence) (Appellee's
Brief, p. 26-27)
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellants having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Case No. 22
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-63630. April 6, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y
BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXCEPTIONS TO THE
REQUIRING SEARCH WARRANT; CASE AT BAR. One of the exceptions to the general rule
requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: "Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest.
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113,
Sec. 5(a) provides: ". . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Accused was caught in flagrante, since he
was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely within the
exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals
that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN,
pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There
was not enough time to secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling
in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of
drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods,
robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which
these persons are associated.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; TRIAL COURT'S FINDING; ENTITLED TO
GREAT RESPECT AND ACCORDED THE HIGHEST CONSIDERATION. As to doubtfulness
of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest
consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the
province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor
and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony
(People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find
no reason to disturb the following findings.
3. ID.; ID.; REGULARITY OF OFFICIAL ACTS RELATIVE TO ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENT
TAKEN DURING IN-CUSTODY INTERROGATION, MUST BE PROVED DURING TRIAL.
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically
denied in court, that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied
upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it
does not appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero,
104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove
that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v.
Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that: "In effect, the Court not only
abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to admissibility of
statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the full
adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally
protected rights."

34
4. ID.; ID.; DANGEROUS DRUG ACT (R.A. 6425); PROPER AUTHENTICATION OF
MARIJUANA LEAVES SEIZED; SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. Accusedappellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was
never authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes
on the fact that the marijuana package brought by Patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime
Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused. We rule,
however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package together
with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise
testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request
bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were
sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the forensic chemist was
satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused. Even assuming arguendo that the
marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated, still, we cannot
discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive
results for marijuana.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-PRESENTATION OF INFORMER NOT FATAL TO PROSECUTION'S
CASE. Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was
insufficient and doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt. In attacking the
sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before
the lower court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue.
This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony
would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case. (People v.
Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989;
People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTUAL POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA LEAVES; PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more
or less, and from this finding extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be
pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to be approximately one
kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana
weighed only 600 grams. Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer
upon the accused an intent to transport the marijuana leaves. Nor can it be said that the intent to
transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe
penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in
this case. What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the
marijuana leaves but his actual possession.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region
at San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay a fine of
P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:

"That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San
Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL TANGLIBEN
y BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana leaves
with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same
to Olongapo City, without authority of law to do so." (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based
is narrated by the trial court as follows:
"It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the
late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo
L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay
Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the
Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San
Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance mission was aimed not only
against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but
also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs
based on informations supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in
the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling
bag (Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him;
that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and Punzalan to
open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on
when the patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag were
marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and weighing
one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and the
reason why he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel
Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City
to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and
that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his
Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).

It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following

morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio Quevedo asked his copoliceman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and
who has had special training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little
portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion
examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that
Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana
leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the
remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the
PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March
3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same were also
found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1)." (At pp. 910, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:

35
"The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his
wife begot a child on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly employed in
the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that he
is engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds,
including chicks, and used to conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that
he goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and whenever
he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and
dispose the same in Manila; that he never left his residence at Antipolo,
Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to Subic to
collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy Crations; that he was able to meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the
evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because he
had a drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00
o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo City but he failed and was able to
take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening; that it was a Victory Liner
Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy, he did not notice that the bus
was only bound for San Fernando Pampanga; that upon alighting at the
Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he crossed the
street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a
man whom he came to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and
asked him if he has any residence certificate; that when he took out his
wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took all the money inside the
wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him that he'll be
taken to the municipal building for verification as he may be an NPA
member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman, identified by
him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he
arrived; that Pat. Quevedo took him upstairs and told him to take out
everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may
get the same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat.
Quevedo took the same, telling him that it shall be returned to him but
that it was never returned to him; that he was thereafter placed under
detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with
possession of marijuana and if he would like to be bailed out, somebody
is willing to help him; and, that when he was visited by his wife, he told
his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he
told his wife not to complain anymore as it would be useless." (Rollo, pp.
10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in
his appeal:
"THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE." (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique
Chan died. Thereafter, this court appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra, and
pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of Court, required the new

counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her brief, raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN
UNLAWFUL SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA LEAVES AS THE
LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT
WAS NEVER AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT." (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an
unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
". . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This
case therefore falls squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a
lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same
issue, held that:
"Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel
did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in
flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore,
there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana."

36
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402
[1988]. In that case the PC officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accusedappellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this
tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the gangplank,
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The
Court held that the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally.
The records show, however, that there were certain facts, not existing in the case before us,
which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein: prLL
"The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two
days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and
search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His
name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a 'search warrant was not necessary.' "
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to
the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot
information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search
warrants during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms,
jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized
from him was never authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He
capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana package brought by Patrolman Roberto Quevedo to
the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing the name of the accused.
We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package
together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad
likewise testified that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letterrequest bore the name of the accused, then the requirements of proper authentication of
evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the forensic
chemist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly
authenticated, still, we cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto
Quevedo which yielded positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and
doubtful and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been
presented before the lower court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an

already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several cases that non-presentation of the
informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; People v. Viola, G.R.
No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia,
147 SCRA 538).

As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue
of credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the
highest consideration by the appellate court. Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within
the province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and observe the
demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of
their testimony (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167
SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the following findings: LLjur
"The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and
Romeo Punzalan are positive and sufficiently clear to show the
commission by the accused of the offense herein charged. These
prosecution witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a
very serious offense against the accused. The knowledge on what these
witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official
performance of their duties and their (sic) being no showing that they are
prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned patrolmen that what they found in
the possession of the accused were marijuana leaves were corroborated
by the examination findings conducted by Pat. Roberto Quevedo (Exhibit
H) and by Forensic Chemist Marlene Salangad of the PCCL, with station
at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo,
p. 11)
"Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect
that Pat. Punzalan got all the money from his wallet when he was
accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet,
otherwise he will be 'salvaged', why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the
accused to the Municipal Building for interrogation and/or verification?
Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is
unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony of the accused that Pat.
Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso bill and never returned the same to
him. If the two policemen really got any money from the accused and that
the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two
policemen still produce in Court as evidence that expensive-looking
traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which contained
the marijuana leaves in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by
the prosecution in this case were all based on personal knowledge
acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their
official duties and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they
are bias (sic) or that they have any prejudice against the herein accused.

37
Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of the
uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former
should prevail." (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed
himself through compulsory court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since
not one other witness was presented nor was any justification for the non-appearance given, the
inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot prevail vis-a-vis the
positive testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the
lower court, is an added circumstance tending to establish his guilt. LibLex
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
"The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused
weighs one (1) kilo, more or less. The intent to transport the same is clear
from the testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among other
things, that when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him
that he (accused) is bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City.
Moreover, considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves found in the
possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San
Fernando, Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can
be said that the intent to transport the marijuana leaves has been clearly
established." (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically
denied in court, that he is transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied
upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial confession cannot be admitted because it
does not appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation, was apprised of
his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero,
104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove
that before Duero made his alleged oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived
those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in People v.
Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
"In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of
regularity of official acts relative to admissibility of statements taken
during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the
full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction It is now
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during a trial that prior to
questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected
rights."
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding
extracted a clear intent to transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that
although the information stated the weight to be approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist
who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only 600 grams. Such
amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to
transport the marijuana leaves.

Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused
was arrested at San Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a
crime with an extremely severe penalty must be based on evidence which is clearer and more
convincing than the inferences in this case. LexLib
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana
leaves but his actual possession.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8
of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but
MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
||| (People v. Tangliben y Bernardino, G.R. No. L-63630, April 06, 1990)

38
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio, for defendant-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEIZURE BASED ON AN
INFORMER'S TIP, AT A TIME WHEN ACCUSED WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME, ILLEGAL;
EVIDENCE OBTAINED, INADMISSIBLE. Where it is not disputed that the PC officers had no
warrant when they arrestedAminnudin while he was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and seized the bag he was carrying, and that their only justification was the tip they
had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them
that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana, the search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and warrantless arrest did not come under
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal
and the evidence obtained was inadmissible.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO URGENCY COULD BE INVOKED IN PRESENT CASE TO DISPENSE
WITH OBTENTION OF ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANT. The present case presented no
such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at
least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and
search Aminnudinwho was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify
the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The
Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR WAS NOT COMMITTING A CRIME WHEN HE
WAS ARRESTED. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his
arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no
outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to
him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Case No. 23

AQUINO, J., Dissenting:

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74869. July 6, 1988.]

PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General, for plaintiff-appellee.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES

AND SEIZURES; ARREST AT TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME IS LAWFUL; SEARCH
LIKEWISE LAWFUL. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was carrying
marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking
from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a
prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his
arrest could be lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6-a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the
search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful
(Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court).

39

DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless
arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving
him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of
P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon
9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him
to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from
him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana
leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later,
the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with
him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a
sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a "thorough investigation." 5 The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was
eventually convicted. 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the
informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was
found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests
on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed
against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he
parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what
marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed
to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling
from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other
expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt
but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers
nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 1 6 He also said he sold one of the

watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to
his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also
rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries
sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge
who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh
their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush
of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the
impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact
amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accusedappellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit
to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never
been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for
his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that
he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not
even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b)
of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a
lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution,
that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying.
Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer
who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the
arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may
prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as
follow:
"Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the
coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

"A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
"Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?

40
"A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984
we have already reports of the particular operation which was
being participated by Idel Aminnudin.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25,
1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

"A Before June 23, 1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was
coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received
the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on
his activities, we have reports that he has already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
"A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling
operation.
"COURT:
"Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before
June 25, 1984, did you also receive any report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin?
"A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of
Idel Aminnudin.
"Q What were those activities?
"A Purely marijuana trafficking.
"Q From whom did you get that information?

"Q You

mean that before June 23, 1984

that Aminnudin was coming?

you

did

not know

"COURT:
"Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Are you sure of that?
"A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
"Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984,
you had already gathered information to the effect that
Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
"A Only on the 23rd of June.

"A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of

information, maybe for security reason and we cannot identify
the person.

"Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of
the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

"Q But you received it from your regular informer?

"A No, more.

"A Yes, sir.

"Q Why not?

"ATTY. LLARIZA:

"A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive
result.

"Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that
Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
"A Marijuana, sir.
"Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?
"A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
"Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25, 1984 two days
before?

"Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do
not need a search warrant anymore?
"A Search warrant is not necessary." 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of
the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of
laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of

41
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the
warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the
warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable
cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to
comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant
was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive
finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce
upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed
to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of
Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The

constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense
is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the
fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an
incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did
not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search
was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and
commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the
protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The
Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminal should escape than that the government
should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the
accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must
therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea JJ. concur.
||| (People v. Aminnudin y Ahni, G.R. No. 74869, July 06, 1988)

42
Case No. 24
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 79965. May 25, 1994.]
PEOPLE OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PABLO
RODRIGUEZ y COTARIAN, accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; NOT PROVED IN
CASE AT BAR. In his brief, the Solicitor General agreed with appellant's posture that the
prosecution failed to establish the act of unlawfully selling, distributing and delivering marijuana
as alleged in the Information (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 7; Rollo, p. 96). But he claimed that
the prosecution's evidence indubitably established that appellant, having been caught in
flagrante delicto in possession of marijuana committed the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana under Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee,
p. 9; Rollo, p. 96). We agree with the Solicitor General's assertion that the prosecution failed to
establish that appellant sold, distributed and delivered marijuana.
2. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT EVIDENCE WITHHELD IS FOR SINISTER MOTIVE. We
have held that ". . ., when a party has it in his possession or power to produce the best evidence
of which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is that the
evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his evil or
fraudulent purpose (Ching Sui Yong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 187 [1990]).
3. ID.; ID.; HEARSAY; SWORN STATEMENT OF AFFIANT WHO DID NOT TESTIFY. The
sworn statement executed by Abrera, (Exh. D) pointing to appellant as the person who gave him
a tinfoil of marijuana is inadmissible in evidence and has no probative value. The failure of the
prosecution to present Abrera in court although he was named as one of the prosecution
witnesses deprived the accused the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. ". . . [C]rossexamination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to
the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show that the
presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm (People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45
[1991]).
4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH; OBJECTS SEIZED UNDER AN UNLAWFUL
ARREST, INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales
searched appellant without a warrant. It is contended however that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of appellant itself was also made without a warrant of
arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be justified only if there was a crime committed in the
presence of the arresting officers. The marijuana supposedly confiscated from appellant is
therefore inadmissible in evidence for having been taken in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN MAY A PERSON BE SUBJECTED THERETO. The cardinal rule is that
no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging

43
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest (People v. De la Cruz,
184 SCRA 416 [1990]).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL SEARCH ON OBJECTS SEIZED. "If a person is
searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without
warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious
enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest
which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as BEING 'the fruit of the poisonous
tree'" (Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990]; People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988];
U.S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853 [1917]; U.S. v. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514 [1912]). In that event, any
evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any purpose in
any proceeding" (Nolasco v. Pao, 147 SCRA 509 [1987]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986]).
DECISION
QUIASON, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Tabaco, Albay, in
Criminal Case No. T-1374, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425 as amended by B.P. No.
179). LLpr
I
The Information charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about the 21st day of June, 1984, at 3:30 o'clock (sic) in the
afternoon, more or less, at the ground floor of the Tabaco Bus Terminal,
Municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law or any government agency, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with deliberate intent to violate the law
had in his possession and control dried Marijuana leaves and seeds, sell,
deliver and distribute sticks of Marijuana" (Rollo, p. 13).
On May 7, 1985, appellant assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the information.
On July 8, 1986, the trial court rendered its decision, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of delivering, distributing and selling marijuana. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby issued, sentencing the accused,
Pablo Rodriguez y Cotarian, to the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 and with costs" (Rollo, p. 32).
Hence, this appeal.
II
The facts, as found by the trial court and presented by the Solicitor General, are as follows:

"On July 21, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock (sic) in the afternoon, the Tabaco
Police Station received a report from an unidentified telephone caller that
somebody was selling marijuana inside the Wonder Dog Circus.
Forthwith, Pats. Rogelio Gonzales and Benito Bongalos proceeded to the
Wonder Dog Circus near the public market of Tabaco, to verify the report.
Arriving at the place, they spotted appellant Pablo Rodriguez and
Gregorio Abrera acting suspiciously. Abrera was putting marijuana inside
his pocket (tsn., June 11, 1985, pp. 3-4).
Accordingly, Pats. Gonzales and Bongalos approached appellant and
Abrera and, after introducing themselves as police officers, placed the
two under arrest. Pat. Gonzales found a small pocket containing
marijuana (Exhibit "B") inside the right side pocket of appellant's pants
(tsn., June 11, 1985, pp. 4-5). Upon the other hand, Abrera voluntarily
handed over a plastic tea bag containing marijuana (Exhibit "C") to Pat.
Gonzales (tsn., October 15, 1985, pp. 6, 8). llcd
Appellant and Abrera were then brought to the police station where they,
as well as the items confiscated from them, were turned over to Cpl.
Santos Colarina, Chief Investigator of the Tabaco Police Station (tsn.,
June 11, 1985, p. 5).
When investigated, Abrera voluntarily admitted having possessed the
marijuana confiscated from him but pointed at appellant as the one who
gave him the marijuana and blamed appellant for it (Exhibit "D"). Even as
appellant heard Abrera making said statements, appellant kept silent and
failed to react (tsn., October 15, 1988, p. 41).
Lt. Lorlie Arroyo, Forensic Chemist of the PC Crime Laboratory, Camp
Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, conducted an examination on the items
seized from the appellant and Abrera and found them to be positive of
marijuana (tsn., May 7, 1985, pp. 11, 28).
Consequently, appellant was charged with violating Section 4, Article II, of
R. A. No. 6425, as amended. Abrera, upon the other hand, was not
similarly charged presumably because he was a user. Any way, it was
allegedly the Station Commander of the Tabaco Police Station who opted
not to press charges against Abrera (tsn., October 15, 1985, pp. 19-20)"
(Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 3-5; Rollo, p. 96).
On the other hand, appellant gave the following version of the incident:
". . . . On June 21, 1984 at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he and a
certain Rogelio "Lilio" Cardano were at the "Wonder Dog Circus" at the
bus terminal of Tabaco, Albay, as they were selling an amplifier.
Suddenly, they were searched by Patrolman Gonzales and Bongalos,
without any warrant, due to alleged information, that they were selling
marijuana (TSN, May 12, 1986, p. 4). But the policemen did not find any
marijuana. Instead, they found in his bag three (3) fifty-peso bills
(P150.00), the price of the amplifier, which was already in the possession
of the buyer, the owner of the circus (TSN, id., p. 5). Pat. Gonzales took

44
the amount and returned it to the operator of the circus (TSN, id., p. 7).
Subsequently, the accused and Abrera were brought to the Police
Station, where the accused was locked-up and mauled inside the prison
cell (TSN., id., p. 5). While in prison, the accused was approached by
Pat. Gonzales who told him that he also had marijuana for sale at
P200.00 which he showed him (TSN, id., p. 6). However, the accused
refused the offer (TSN, id., p. 7). The amplifier was brought to the police
station and returned to the accused by investigator Colarina (TSN, id., pp.
7-8). The accused was detained for one-and-a-half months, while Abrera
was not (TSN, id., p. 6)" (Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10). prLL
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of the offense charged. He assigns
the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON THE CONJECTURAL AND CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON THE MARIJUANA SEIZED BY THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
WITHOUT WARRANT.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON HIS SILENCE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
SWORN STATEMENT OF GREGORIO ABRERA, WHO DID NOT TAKE
THE WITNESS STAND, DESPITE HAVING BEEN LISTED AS ONE OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN
REGULARLY PERFORMED.
III
In his brief, the Solicitor General agreed with appellant's posture that the prosecution failed to
establish the act of unlawfully selling, distributing and delivering marijuana as alleged in the
Information (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 7; Rollo p. 96). But he claimed that the prosecution's
evidence indubitably established that appellant, having been caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of marijuana committed the crime of illegal possession of marijuana under Section 8,
Article II of R. A. No. 6425, as amended (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 9; Rollo, p. 96).

We agree with the Solicitor General's assertion that the prosecution failed to establish that
appellant sold, distributed and delivered marijuana.
The records show that the two prosecution witnesses did not actually see appellant transact any
business dealing with marijuana. On cross examination, Pat. Gonzales testified as follows:
ATTY. GONZAGA:

"Q: You mentioned of an investigation. There was actually no selling or

transacting of marijuana. Is that right?
A: I did not see them actually transacting. However we saw them acting
suspiciously.
Q: But you did not see Pablo Rodriguez giving any marijuana to Abrera?
A: I did not. But when we were getting near them (accused), they started
to leave. (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 10; emphasis supplied).
Pat. Gonzales, upon further questioning by the trial court, said that:
COURT:
"Q: But you did not see actually (sic) Rodriguez giving the marijuana to
Abrera?
A: No, Your Honor, I did not" (TSN, June 11,1985, p. 10, emphasis
supplied).
Pat. Bongalos also could not say whether appellant was selling, distributing or delivering
marijuana to Abrera when he was placed under arrest.
The person, who is in the best position to testify whether appellant sold marijuana or not, was
Abrera, as he was the person whom appellant allegedly dealt with. We are placed at a quandary
as to why Abrera was not prosecuted together with appellant nor was he made to testify for the
prosecution when he was named as one of its witnesses. As testified to by the prosecution
witnesses, Abrera was not similarly charged with appellant because Abrera, when investigated,
pointed to appellant as the person who gave him the marijuana. The reliance made by the police
investigator on Abrera's word is simply puzzling.
We have held that ". . ., when a party has it in his possession or power to produce the best
evidence of which the case in its nature is susceptible and withholds it, the fair presumption is
that the evidence is withheld for some sinister motive and that its production would thwart his
evil or fraudulent purpose (Ching Sui Yong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 187
[1990]).
The sworn statement executed by Abrera, (Exh. D) pointing to appellant as the person who gave
him a tinfoil of marijuana is inadmissible in evidence and has no probative value. The failure of
the prosecution to present Abrera in court although he was named as one of the prosecution
witnesses deprived the accused the opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. ". . . [C]rossexamination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to
the constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show that the
presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm" (People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45
[1991]).
Having held that appellant is not guilty of the offense charged under Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, we shall now dwell on the question whether appellant is guilty of
possession of marijuana under Section 8, Article I of the same Act. cdrep
After a careful review of the records and transcript of stenographic notes, we find that appellant
should likewise be acquitted of the offense of possession of marijuana.

45
Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales searched appellant without a warrant. It is contended however that
the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of appellant itself was also
made without a warrant of arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be justified only if there was a
crime committed in the presence of the arresting officers.
The arresting officers went to the "Wonder Dog Circus" to verify a telephone call that a person
with a knapsack had marijuana in his possession. Pat. Gonzales admitted that they arrested
appellant because he acted suspiciously.
Part of his testimony is reproduced as follows:
ATTY. GONZAGA:
(CROSS EXAMINATION)
"Q: You said that at the premises of the Wonder Dogs circus, you saw
the accused acting suspiciously. Is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But you were actually there?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you introduced yourselves as members of the INP?
A: Yes, sir.

A: Because from (sic) the information received thru a telephone call that
a person with a knapsack was in possession of marijuana"
(TSN, October 15, 1985, p. 11; Emphasis supplied).
There is no evidence to show that appellant was committing any crime at the time of his arrest.
The testimony of Pat. Gonzales on the arrest of appellant is reproduced as follows:
FISCAL VILLAMIN:
(DIRECT EXAMINATION)
"Q: How did you effect the apprehension?
A: While we were approaching the accused we saw them putting
something inside a bag.
Q: What did you do then?
A: We apprehended them.
Q: Whom did you apprehend?
A: Pablo Rodriguez and Abrera.
Q: What procedure did you observe in arresting Rodriguez?

Q: After which, you frisked Pablo Rodriguez?

A: Furnished with the necessary information, we arrested the accused

while he was transacting marijuana.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: While making the arrest, what did you do?

Q: And in fact, you found inside his pocket this Exhibit "B". Is that right?

A: I asked the accused what he was placing inside his pocket, and I
found out that it was marijuana" (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 4;
Underscoring supplied).

A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did the investigation per instruction from your police headquarters.
Is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So you acted merely from the information thru the telephone and the
suspicious acting of the accused.
A: Yes, sir.
Pat. Bongalos also admitted that he did not personally know whether appellant was in
possession of the prohibited drug. He testified as follows:
FISCAL VILLAMIN: (Continuing)
"Q: For what was he investigated of?
A: For the possession of marijuana.
Q: Why do you know that he was in possession of marijuana?

To the question of the defense counsel as to whether he saw appellant selling marijuana, Pat.
Gonzales answered:
"I did not see them actually transacting. However, we saw them acting
suspiciously" (TSN, June 11, 1985; p. 10). cdll
To the same question of the trial court, Pat. Gonzales answered:
"No, Your Honor, I did not" (TSN, June 11, 1985, p. 10).
The cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house,
body or personal belonging except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful
arrest (People v. De la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416 [1990]).
"If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances other than those justifying an
arrest without warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some
felonious enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only
the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof as being 'the fruit of the
poisonous tree'" (Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990]; People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA

46
402 [1988]; U. S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853 [1917]; U. S. v. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514 [1912]. In that
event, any evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is inadmissible "for any
purpose in any proceeding" (Nolasco v. Pao, 147 SCRA 509 [1987]; People v. Burgos, 144
SCRA 1 [1986]). llcd
The marijuana supposedly confiscated from appellant is therefore inadmissible in evidence for
having been taken in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant is REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the offense charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. llcd
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 25
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 87059. June 22, 1992.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGELIO
MENGOTE Y TEJAS, accused-appellant.

Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Cruz and Kapunan, JJ., are on leave.
||| (People v. Rodriguez y Cotarian, G.R. No. 79965, May 25, 1994)

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Violeta C. Drilon counsel de oficio for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE; EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF; EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. It is
submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could
it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the
testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court. There is no question that evidence obtained as a result
of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the
absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will the wrong be repressed."
2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; WHEN
LAWFUL; REQUISITES; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. The Solicitor General, while
conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the
arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court. We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and
cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution. Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously
inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We
therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or
Par. (b) of this section. Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the
presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been established in the case at
bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to
side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was

47
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least
being attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the
time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting
officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had
was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.

Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto
Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the
robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the
robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him,
including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm
or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted" on
him at the time of his arrest. 3

DECISION

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B and C and
admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal
evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. 4

CRUZ, J p:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the
strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest.
In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because
it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government
disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because
its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without
warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District
received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at
the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen
Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one
of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves
as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the
other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who
turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver
with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a
fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote
and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence
Division. LLpr
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T.
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the proper authorities.

It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor having been previously obtained.
Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote
was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that
the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also
have been disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III,
Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the
justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be
repressed."
The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at
bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him
were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or private
person may without a warrant, arrest a person: Cdpr

48
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we can agree with the
prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness
of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting
officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in
question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that
had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by
Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long
as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and
induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant
had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been
suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not
exactly forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It
might have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place
where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was
arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger
jeep with his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of
day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze
of the noonday sun.

On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his
eyes were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in
the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been
shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they
were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there
were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North
Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he
elaborate on the impending crime. LLpr
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt, 5 the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the
accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer
and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the
accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the
arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, he
surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made
the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable
cause had been sufficiently established.
The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers'
suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed,
or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin, 7 where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of
the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed
nor was he actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the
arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause
that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a
warrant.
Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in
fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither
were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after
Danganan had appeared at the police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his
house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession or the
firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been
searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he
licensed to possess it.
Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone
the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the
robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:

49
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must
have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be
committed in is presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential
precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been
committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:
If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of
such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have
personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case
of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just
because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or if a
peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may
have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be
done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse,
personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we
here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from
him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must
therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is
not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accusedappellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so
just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as
a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her representation even more
commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they
allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the
requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they
had invalidly seized. LLpr

This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of
the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because,
ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ ., concur.
||| (People v. Mengote y Tejas, G.R. No. 87059, June 22, 1992)
Case No. 26
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120431. April 1, 1998.]
RODOLFO ESPANO, accused-petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

SYNOPSIS
This is a petition for review of the decision of the court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR No. 13976
dated January 16, 1995 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II Section 8
of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. The records of the case reveal that herein petitioner was caught in possession of and
under his custody twelve plastic cellophane bags weighing 5.5 grams containing crushed
flowering tops, marijuana which is a prohibited drug. In his appeal before the Supreme Court,
petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him because (1) the
pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (2) the superiority of his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (3) he was denied the
constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (4) his conviction was based
on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified. CIScaA
The Supreme Court finds that there was no compelling reason to reverse the decisions of the
trial and appellate courts. In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses were more credible than those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show
that Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons other than his
duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as
possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his official duty must prevail. Furthermore, the defense of alibi set up by

50
petitioner deserved scant consideration. He simply contended that he was in his house sleeping
at the time of the incident. Lastly, the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible
in evidence because he was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted by
police officers. However, as for the other ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's
residence, the same are inadmissible in evidence considering that the said bags were seized at
petitioner's house after his arrest, hence, do not fall under the exceptions provided under Article
III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. In view thereof, the instant petition is denied and the
challenged decision is affirmed with modification as to the penalty.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF TRIAL
COURTS ON THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT;
CASE AT BAR. It is a well-settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of
witness deserve a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during
the trial, the trial judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his
findings will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear and showing that he had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which could have altered the conviction of the appellants. In this case, the findings of the trial
court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible that those of the defense must stand.
Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying against him, was motivated by reasons
other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any intent to falsely impute to him such a serious
crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of his official duty must prevail.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIM OF FRAME-UP, LIKE ALIBI, IS A DEFENSE THAT HAS BEEN
INVARIABLY VIEWED BY THE COURT WITH DISFAVOR; CASE AT BAR. The defense set
up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply contended that he was in his
house sleeping at the time of the incident. This court has consistently held that alibi is the
weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was
not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible
for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of 'frame-up,' like alibi, is a defense that has been
invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted but difficult to
prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." No clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST; THE MARIJUANA SEIZED FROM
PETITIONER'S HOUSE AFTER HIS ARREST IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE; CASE AT
BAR. The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and
seizures under Article III, Section 2 which provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." An exception to the
said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest of dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It may extend beyond the person

of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this
case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's house after his arrest at
Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions. . . . The articles seized from
petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search made incidental to a lawful
arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which yielded ten cellophane bags
of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not armed with a search warrant at
the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of petitioner. HTScEI
4. CRIMINAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 AS AMENDED BY Republic Act 7659; IF THE
QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA INVOLVED IS LESS THAN 750 GRAMS, THE IMPOSABLE
PENALTY RANGES FROM PRISION CORRECTIONAL TO RECLUSION TEMPORAL; CASE
AT BAR. This Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L)(I) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as
amended. Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve
years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. With the passage
of Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall
now depend on the quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659,
Section 20, and as interpreted in People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555 [1994]) and People v. Lara,
(236 SCRA 291 [1994]) if the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the
imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional to reclusion temporal. Taking into
consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory provision is favorable
to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the penalty imposed
under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied.
5. ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months of arresto mayor. cSDHEC
DECISION
ROMERO, J p:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 13976
dated January 16, 1995, 1 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 1, convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for violation of Article II, Section 8
of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act. aisadc
Petitioner was charged under the following information:
"That on or about July 14, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines the said
accused, not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited
drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his
possession and under his custody and control twelve (12) plastic
cellophane (bags) containing crushed flowering tops, marijuana weighing
5.5 grams which is prohibited drug.

51
Contrary to law." 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan, shows that
on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30 a.m., he and other police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo
Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics
Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the
area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person. After the alleged buyer left, they
approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded
two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana . When asked if he had more marijuana, he replied
that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they found ten
more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was brought to the police headquarters where
he was charged with possession of prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991, petitioner posted
bail 3 and the trial court issued his order of release on July 29, 1991. 4

Annabelle Alip, forensic chemist of the WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Section, testified
that the articles sent to her by Pat. Wilfredo Aquino regarding the apprehension of a certain
Rodolfo Espano for examination tested positive for marijuana, with total weight of 5.5 grams.
By way of defense, petitioner that on said evening, he was sleeping in house and was awakened
only when the policemen handcuffed him. He alleged that the policemen were looking for his
brother-in-law Lauro, and when they could not find the latter, he was brought to the police station
for investigation and later indicted for possession of prohibited drugs. His wife Myrna
corroborated his story.
The trial court rejected petitioner's defense as a "mere afterthought" and found the version of the
prosecution "more credible and trustworthy."
Thus, on August 14, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, convicting petitioner of the crime
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE there being proof beyond reasonable doubt, the court
finds the accused Rodolfo Espano y Valeria guilty of the crime of violation
of Section 8, Article II, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, and pursuant to law
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years and to pay a fine of P6,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of default plus costs.
The marijuana is declared fortified in favor of government and shall be
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board without delay.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, however, affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the basis of the
following: (a) the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible; (b) the superiority of his
constitutional right to be presumed innocent over the doctrine of presumption of regularity; (c) he

was denied the constitutional right of confrontation and to compulsory process; and (d) his
conviction was based on evidence which was irrelevant and not properly identified.
After a careful examination of the records of the case, this Court finds no compelling reason
sufficient to reverse the decisions of the trial and appellate courts.
First, it is a well settled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve
a high degree of respect. Having observed the deportment of witnesses during the trial, the trial
judge is in a better position to determine the issue of credibility and, thus, his findings will not be
disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear showing that he had overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could
have altered the conviction of the appellants. 6
In this case, the findings of the trial court that the prosecution witnesses were more credible than
those of the defense must stand. Petitioner failed to show that Pat. Pagilagan, in testifying
against him, was motivated by reasons other than his duty to curb drug abuse and had any
intent to falsely impute to him such a serious crime as possession of prohibited drugs. In the
absence of such ill motive, the presumption of regularity of his official duty must prevail.
In People v. Velasco, 7 this Court reiterated the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty which provides:
". . . Appellant failed to establish that Pat. Godoy and the other members
of the buy-bust team are policemen engaged in mulcting or other
unscrupulous activities who where motivated either by the desire to extort
money or exact personal vengeance, or by sheer whim and caprice,
when they entrapped her. And in the absence of proof of any intent on the
part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime
against appellant, as in this case, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, . . ., must prevail over the self-serving and
uncorroborated claim of appellant that she had been framed." 8
Furthermore, the defense set up by petitioner does not deserve any consideration. He simply
contended that he was in his house sleeping at the time of the incident. This Court has
consistently held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; and for it to prosper, the accused has
the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime of its commission and that it was
physically impossible for him to be there. Moreover, the "claim of a 'frame-up', like alibi, is a
defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can just as easily be
concocted but difficult to prove, and is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." 9 No clear and convincing
evidence was presented by petitioner to prove his defense of alibi.
Second, petitioner contends that the prosecution's failure to present the alleged informant in
court cast a reasonable doubt which warrants his acquittal. This is again without merit, since
failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment especially when he
is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation had indeed been
conducted. In this case, Pat. Pagilagan, one of the policemen who apprehended petitioner,
testified on the actual incident of July 14, 1991, and identified him as the one they caught in
possession of prohibited drugs. Thus,

52
"We find that the prosecution had satisfactorily proved its case against
appellants. There is no compelling reason for us to overturn the finding of
the trial court that the testimony of Sgt. Gamboa, the lone witness for the
prosecution, was straightforward, spontaneous and convincing. The
testimony of a sole witness, if credible and positive and satisfies the court
beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict." 10
Thus on the basis of Pat. Pagilagan's testimony, the prosecution was able to prove that
petitioner indeed committed the crime charged; consequently, the finding of conviction was
proper.
Lastly, the issue on the admissibility of the marijuana seized should likewise be ruled upon. Rule
113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides:
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
a. when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
xxx xxx xxx."
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result
of a buy-bust operation conducted by police officers on the basis of information received
regarding the illegal trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The
police officer saw petitioner handing over something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left,
they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was, therefore,
lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were admissible in evidence, being the
fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same
inadmissible in evidence.
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures
under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purposes shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized."
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. In this case, the ten cellophane bags of marijuana seized at petitioner's
house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the said exceptions.
In the case of People v. Lua, 12 this Court held:

"As regards the brick of marijuana found inside the appellant's house, the
trial court correctly ignored it apparently in view of its inadmissibility.
While initially the arrest as well as the body search was lawful, the
warrantless search made inside the appellant's house became unlawful
since the police operatives were not armed with a search warrant. Such
search cannot fall under "search made incidental to a lawful arrest," the
same being limited to body search and to that point within reach or
control of the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the
means of committing violence or of escaping. In the case at bar, appellant
was admittedly outside his house when he was arrested. Hence, it can
hardly be said that the inner portion of his house was within his reach or
control."
The articles seized from petitioner during his arrest were valid under the doctrine of search
made incidental to a lawful arrest. The warrantless search made in his house, however, which
yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana became unlawful since the police officers were not
armed with a search warrant at the time. Moreover, it was beyond the reach and control of
petitioner.
In sum, this Court finds petitioner Rodolfo Espano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Article II, Section 8, in relation to Section 2 (e-L) (I) of REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, as amended.
Under the said provision, the penalty imposed is six years and one day to twelve years and a
fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousands pesos. With the passage of Republic Act No.
7659, with took effect on December 31, 1993, the imposable penalty shall now depend on the
quantity of drugs recovered. Under the provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, and as
interpreted in People v. Simon 13 and People v. Lara, 14 if the quantity of marijuana involved is
less than 750 grams, the imposable penalty ranges from prision correccional toreclusion
temporal. Taking into consideration that petitioner is not a habitual delinquent, the amendatory
provision is favorable to him and the quantity of marijuana involved is less than 750 grams, the
penalty imposed under Republic Act No. 7659 should be applied. There being no mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the
medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower
in degree, which is one (1) month and one (1) day six (6) months of arresto mayor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner Rodolfo Espano is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) months
and ONE (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum of TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months and ONE
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Kapunan and Purisima, JJ ., concur.
||| (Espano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120431, April 01, 1998)

53

Case No. 27
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97143. October 2, 1995.]
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO
FIGUEROA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. cdlex

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY; ARTICLES SEIZED INCIDENTAL TO A
LAWFUL ARREST; ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds
of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While we might concede difficulty in readily
accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search was conducted with
consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should be pointed out, in any
case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of a lawful arrest. A
significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the search and seizure is
effected as an incident to a lawful arrest and so, in People vs. Musa, (217 SCRA 597) this Court
elaborated; thus "The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest,
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surrounding under
his immediate control. Objects in the 'plain view' of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."
2. ID.; ID.; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; CREDIBILITY THEREOF; NOT AFFECTED BY
INCONSISTENCIES ON MINOR DETAILS; CASE AT BAR. Appellant faults the trial court for

54
giving credence to the testimony given by witnesses for the prosecution despite what he claims
to be inconsistencies in their declarations. Appellant particularly calls attention to the assertion of
prosecution witness Sgt. Atas, to the effect that appellant was with a companion inside a room
when arrested and that the seized firearm was found under the cushion of the bed, against the
statement of Capt. Rosario, another prosecution witness, that appellant was alone when
arrested and that the gun was found under appellant's bed. We do not consider these
discrepancies to be so major as to warrant a complete rejection of their questioned testimony. It
is not unnatural for witnesses of the same incident to somehow perceive differently and to
thereby vary in their respective accounts of the event. The contradiction of witnesses on minor
details is nothing unusual and should be expected. We see no cogent reason for not according
due respect to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses.
3. ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED;
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. It is claimed that appellant was just "framed-up." The
conduct of the appellant following his arrest would belie this allegation. Appellant himself
admitted that he failed to complain about this matter when he was apprehended. Neither did he
report the so called "planting of the gun" to the police authorities nor did he bring it up before the
Metropolitan Trial Judge when he appeared for preliminary investigation. In fact, it would seem
that the only time appellant mentioned the alleged "frame-up" was when he testified at the trial of
this case. No plausible reason was given by appellant that would have prompted police
authorities to falsely impute a serious crime against him. Absent a strong showing to the
contrary, we must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. cdlex
DECISION
VITUG, J p:
Arturo Figueroa was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition
in an information that read:
"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ARTURO
FlGUEROA of the crime of Illegal Possession of the Firearm and
Ammunition, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 10th day of November 1989 at San Francisco
Subdivision, Brgy. San Juan, Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and control one (1) pistol cal. 45 with
defaced serial number with one magazine and seven (7) live
ammunitions for the said firearm without first having obtained the
necessary permit or license from competent authority to possess the
same." 1
When arraigned, the accused entered a plea of "Not Guilty"; thereupon, trial
ensued.
It would appear that on 10 November 1989, at around seven o'clock in the
morning, Captain Lodivino Rosario, the Executive Officer of the 215th PC Company, and
his men arrived at the residence of accused Arturo Figueroa at Barangay San Juan, San

Francisco Subdivision, General Trias, Cavite, to serve a warrant for his arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, in Criminal Case No. 411 and Criminal Case No.
412 (for the crime of Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and for Violation of Section 16, Art.
III, Republic Act 6425). While serving the warrant of arrest, the officers noticed, strewn
around, aluminum foil packages of different sizes in the sala. Suspecting thus the presence
of "shabu" in the premises, the arresting officers requested appellant, as well as his brother
and sister, to acquiesce to a search of the house. The search yielded a .45 caliber pistol, a
magazine, seven live ammunitions, and a match box containing an aluminum foil package
with "shabu." Confronted, Figueroa denied ownership of the items. An inventory was
conducted by the PC team, attested to by Barangay Captain Bigornia, of the seized items.
The accused, besides assailing the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution, questioned the admissibility in evidence of the firearm and rounds of
ammunition which, he claims, were discovered and taken during warrantless search.
On 30 October 1990, the trial court rendered a decision finding the accused
Arturo Figueroa guilty.
From the judgment, the decretal portion of which reads
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the costs.
"The firearm and ammunitions are confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government.
"Capt. Lodivino Rosario, Executive Officer, 215th PC Coy, is hereby
ordered to return to Arturo Figueroa the motorcycle with Motor Engine
No. KIE 073574 taken from the house of the Figueroas on November 10.
1989." 2
this appeal is interposed by Arturo Figueroa (a) reiterating his argument against the
admissibility against him of evidence seized following a warrantless search and (b)
challenging anew the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
The appeal cannot be sustained. cdll
The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds of ammunition were not unlawfully obtained. While
we might concede difficulty in readily accepting the statement of the prosecution that the search
was conducted with consent freely given by appellant and members of his household, it should
be pointed out, in any case, that the search and seizure was done admittedly on the occasion of
a lawful arrest. 3
A significant exception from the necessity for a search warrant is when the
search and seizure is effected as an incident to a lawful arrest 4 and so, in People vs.
Musa, 5 this Court elaborated; thus
"The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful
arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the
premises or surrounding under his immediate control. Objects in the 'plain
view' of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence."

55
Appellant faults the trial court for giving credence to the testimony given by
witnesses for the prosecution despite what he claims to be inconsistencies in their
declarations. Appellant particularly calls attention to the assertion of prosecution witness
Sgt. Atas, to the effect that appellant was with a companion inside a room when arrested
and that the seized firearm was found under the cushion of the bed, against the statement
of Capt. Rosario, another prosecution witness, that appellant was alone when arrested and
that the gun was found under appellant's bed. We do not consider these discrepancies to
be so major as to warrant a complete rejection of their questioned testimony. It is not
unnatural for witnesses of the same incident to somehow perceive differently and to
thereby vary in their respective accounts of the event. 6 The contradiction of witnesses on
minor details is nothing unusual and should be expected. 7 We see no cogent reason for
not according due respect to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses.
Finally, it is claimed that appellant was just "framed-up." The conduct of the
appellant following his arrest would belie this allegation. Appellant himself admitted that he
failed to complain about this matter when he was apprehended. Neither did he report the
so-called "planting of the gun" to the police authorities nor did he bring it up before the
Metropolitan Trial Judge when he appeared for preliminary investigation. In fact, it would
seem that the only time appellant mentioned the alleged "frame-up" was when he testified
at the trial of this case. No plausible reason was given by appellant that would have
prompted police authorities to falsely impute a serious crime against him. Absent a strong
showing to the contrary, we must accept the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty. 8
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED. LexLibris
Feliciano and Romero, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., is on leave.
||| (People v. Figueroa, G.R. No. 97143, October 02, 1995)

Case No. 28
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 80508. January 30, 1990.]
EDDIE GUAZON, JOSEFINA CABRERA, YOLANDA DACUNES, VIOLETA
SEVILLA, QUERUBIN BILLONES, ESTELITA BILLONES, GORGONIA
MACARAEG, LAUREANA JOAQUIN, CRESTITA LICUP, SOLIDAD ABURDO,
ROSALINA VILLARDA, CONRADA HOBALANE, ERLINDA RESTORAN,
VERIDIAN FLORA, ROSELA CONDE, SOSIMA COSTO, JOSEFINA ALDIANO,
ROSALINA DOMINGO, ARESTIO YANGA, MILAGROS GONZALES,
ESTRELITA ESTARES, BONIFACIA ANTIVO, PATRIA VALLES, ERLINDA
LEE, MELANIO GAROFIL, ERIBERTO MATEO, FRANCISCO HORTILLANO,
ANATALIA PESIMO, LOSENDO GARBO, VIRGINIA LORESTO, LYDIA ELA,
RAFAEL VILLABRILLE, MA. RECHILDA SABALZA, EDITHA MAAMO,
ELENIETA BANOSA, ALEXANDER LABADO, ANDREW GO, WYNEFREDO
REYES,
ROSARIO
SESPENE,
ROSA
MARTIN
and
JAIME
BONGAT, petitioners, vs. MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALFREDO LIM, and COL. JESUS GARCIA, respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SATURATION DRIVE; CONSIDERED UNLAWFUL IN CASE AT
BAR. The facts that on twelve occasions between March and November, 1987 the military
conducted the saturation drives in question is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor General
admits that they, the saturation drives, had been done, except that they had been done "with due
regard to human rights." "Not only that," so he states: . . . they were intelligently and carefully
planned months ahead of the actual operation. They were executed in coordination with

56
barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit themselves voluntarily for
character and personal verification. Local and foreign correspondents, who had joined these
operations, witnessed, and reported the events that transpired relative thereto. (After Operation
Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13; November 24, 1987,
Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged victims who numbered
thousands had not themselves complained. The question, then, is purely one of law: Are the
saturation drives in question lawful and legitimate? It is also a question that is nothing novel: No,
because the arrests were not accompanied by a judicial warrant. Therefore, the fact that they
had been carefully planned, executed in coordination with Tondo's barangay officials, and
undertaken with due courtesy and politeness (which I doubt), will not validate them. The lack of a
warrant makes them, per se, illegal. I find allusions to the last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that
case, our men in uniform had all the right to act amidst crimes being committed in flagrante. The
instant case is quite different. There are no offenses being committed, but rather, police officers
fishing for evidence of offenses that may have been committed. As I said, in that event, a court
warrant is indispensable.
2. ID.; ID.; "SHOW OF FORCE" IN THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL WARRANT; CONSIDERED A
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHT. According to the majority, "the remedy is not to stop all
police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong in police
making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas . . . " But the petitioners have not come to
court to "stop all police actions" but rather, the saturation drives, which are, undoubtedly, beyond
police power. That "[a] show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are
protected and not violated" is a contradiction in terms. A "show of force" (by way of saturation
drives) is a violation of human rights because it is not covered by a judicial warrant. In all candor,
I can not swallow what I find is a complete exaggeration of the issues: . . . A show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A blanket
prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on one
confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals are
easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their offices
because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally prohibited. As a
general rule, a peace officer can not act unless he is possessed of the proper arrest or search
warrant. The exception is when a criminal offense is unfolding before him, in which case, action
is justified and necessary. The majority would have the exception to be simply, the general rule.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT. That "the
problem is not initially for the Supreme Court" is to me, an abdication of judicial duty. As I
indicated, the controversy is purely one of law the facts being undisputed. Law, needless to
say, is the problem of the Supreme Court, not the Executive. Worse, it is passing the buck. The
petitioners, precisely, have a grievance to raise, arising from abuses they pinpoint to the lower
offices of the Executive (which presumably has its imprimatur). To make it an executive problem,
so I hold, is to make the Executive judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a neutral arbiter. I
am also taken aback by references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge
of the events . . . keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing problems of the Executive, the military,
and the police to the Supreme Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils." First,
the facts are not "second-hand", they are undisputed: There had been saturation drives.
Second, the petitioners have trooped to the highest court with a legitimate grievance against the
Executive (and military).
DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police
officers represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or
"Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila.
The forty one (41) petitioners state that they are all of legal age, bonafide residents of Metro
Manila and taxpayers and leaders in their respective communities. They maintain that they have
a common or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, protection of their human
rights and the reign of peace and order in their communities. They claim to represent "the
citizens of Metro Manila who have similar interests and are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all before this Court."
The public respondents, represented by the Solicitor General, oppose the petition
contending inter alia that petitioners lack standing to file the instant petition for they are not the
proper parties to institute the action. prcd
According to the petitioners, the following "saturation drives" were conducted in Metro Manila:
1. March 5, 1987 at about 9:30 PM in Tindalo, Kagitingan, and
Magdalena Streets, Tondo, Manila.
2. June 19, 1987 at about 10:00 PM in Mata Street, Panday Pira
Extension and San Sebastian Street, Tondo, Manila.
3. July 20, 1987 at about 8:00 AM in Bangkusay Street, Tondo, Manila.
4. August 11 to 13, 1987 between 11:00 PM and 2:00 AM in six blocks
along Aroma Beach up to Happy Land, Magsaysay Village,
Tondo, Manila.
5. August 19, 1987 at 9:00 PM in Herbosa Extension, Quirino Street, and
Pacheco Street, Tondo, Manila.
6. August 28, 1987 at 10:30 PM, in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas,
Metro Manila.
7. August 30, 1987 at 9:30 PM at Paraiso Extension, Magsaysay Village,
Tondo, Manila.
8. October 12, 1987 at 12:00 midnight in Apelo Cruz Compound, Quezon
City.
9. October 17, 1987 at 11:00 PM in Quirino Street, Tondo, Manila.
10. October 23, 1987 at 2:30 A.M. in Sun Valley Drive, Manila
International Airport, Pasay City.
11. November 1, 1987 at 4:00 A.M. in Cordillera Street, Sta. Mesa,
Manila.

57
12. November 3, 1987 at 5:00 A.M. in Lower Maricaban, Pasay City,
Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in critical areas
pinpointed by the military and police as places where the subversives are hiding. The arrests
range from seven (7) persons during the July 20 saturation drive in Bangkusay, Tondo to one
thousand five hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on November 3 during the drive at Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a common pattern
of human rights abuses. In all these drives, it is alleged that the following were committed:
"1. Having no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or
early morning hours, police and military units without any search warrant
or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one residence and
sometimes whole barangay or areas of barangay in Metro Manila. Most
of them are in civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification
cards.
"2. These raiders rudely rouse residents form their sleep by banging on
the walls and windows of their homes, shouting, kicking their doors open
(destroying some in the process), and then ordering the residents within
to come out of their respective residences.
"3. The residents at the point of high-powered guns are herded like cows,
the men are ordered to strip down to their briefs and examined for tattoo
marks and other imagined marks.
"4. While the examination of the bodies of the men are being conducted
by the raiders, some of the members of the raiding team force their way
into each and every house within the cordoned off area and then proceed
to conduct search of the said houses without civilian witnesses from the
neighborhood.
"5. In many instances, many residents have complained that the raiders
ransack their homes, tossing about the residents' belongings without total
regard for their value. In several instances, walls are destroyed, ceilings
are damaged in the raiders' illegal effort to 'fish' for incriminating
evidence.
"6. Some victims of these illegal operations have complained with
increasing frequency that their money and valuables have disappeared
after the said operations.
"7. All men and some women who respond to these illegal and
unwelcome intrusions are arrested on the spot and hauled off to waiting
vehicles that take them to detention centers where they are any warrants
of arrest duly issued by a judge, nor under the conditions that will
authorize warrantless arrest. Some hooded men are used to fingerpoint
suspected subversives.

"8. In some instances, arrested persons are released after the expiration
of the period wherein they can be legally detained without any charge at
all. In other instances, some arrested persons are released without
charge after a few days of arbitrary detention.
"9. The raiders almost always brandish their weapons and point them at
the residents during these illegal operations.
"10. Many have also reported incidents of 'on-the-spot beatings',
maulings and maltreatment.
"11. Those who are detained for further 'verification' by the raiders are
subjected to mental and physical torture to extract confessions and
tactical information." (Rollo, pp. 2-4)
The public respondents stress two points in their Comment which was also adopted as their
Memorandum after the petition was given due course.
First, the respondents have legal authority to conduct saturation drives. And second, they allege
that the accusations of the petitioners about a deliberate disregard for human rights aretotal lies.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation drives is concerned, the respondents cite Article VII,
Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
"The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied by the respondents.)
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article which provides:
"The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. . . . ."
There can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the nature
described by the petitioners would be illegal and blantantly violative of the express guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. If the military and the police must conduct concerted campaigns to flush out
and catch criminal elements, such drives must be consistent with the constitutional and statutory
rights of all the people affected by such actions. llcd
There is, of course, nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive,
invoked by the Solicitor General, to order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness, and alarming communist activities. The Constitution grants to Government the
power to seek and cripple subversive movements which would bring down constituted authority
and substitute a regime where individual liberties are suppressed as a matter of policy in the
name of security of the State. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the
Bill of Rights. The Government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres of influence it is
trying hard to suppress. Our democratic institutions may still be fragile but they are not in the
least bit strengthened through violations of the constitutional protections which are their
distinguishing features.

58
In Roan v. Gonzales (145 SCRA 687; 690-691 [1986], the Court stated:
"One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is the right
to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That right has ancient
roots, dating back through the mists of history to the mighty English kings
in their fortresses of power. Even then, the lowly subject had his own
castle where he was monarch of all he surveyed. This was his humble
cottage from which he could bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of
the Crown.
"That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few libertarian
regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to dwindle against the
onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are among the fortunate few, able
again to enjoy this right after the ordeal of the past despotism. We must
cherish and protect it all the more now because it is like a prodigal son
returning.
"That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of article IV of
the 1973 Constitution:
"SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
xxx xxx xxx
Only last year, the Court again issued this reminder in 20th Century Fox Film Corporation
v. Court of Appeals (164 SCR 650, 660-661 [1988]):
"This constitutional right protects a citizen against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person, papers
and effects. We have explained in the case of People vs. Burgos (144
SCRA 1) citing Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why the right is so
important:
"'It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it
could be also looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected
area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. (Cf.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [1966]) What is sought to be guarded
is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In
that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the
choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he
wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is

outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon

to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of
his life. (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and
Boyd v. United States, 116 630 [1886]). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966]),
could fitly characterize constitutional right as the embodiment of a
'spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person
and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy
must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (ibid, p. 74.)"
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US 165; 96 L. Ed.
183 [1952]) emphasizes clearly that police actions should not be characterized by methods that
offend a sense of justice. The court ruled:
"Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the
present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by
which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too
energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth
and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
contents this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain
evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are
methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation."
It is significant that it is not the police action per se which is impermissible and which should be
prohibited. Rather, it is the procedure used or in the words of the court, methods which "offend
even hardened sensibilities." In Breithaupt v. Abram (352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the
same court validated the use of evidence, in this case blood samples involuntarily taken from the
petitioner, where there was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking. The Court stated:
"Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing 'brutal' or
'offensive' in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case,
under the protective eye of a physician. To be sure, the driver here was
unconscious when the blood was taken, but the absence of conscious
consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking a violation
of a constitutional right; and certainly the rest was administered here
would not be considered offensive by even the most delicate.
Furthermore, due process is not measured by the yardstick of personal
reaction or the sphygmogram of the most sensitive person, but by that
whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has been woven
by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct. . . . ."
The individual's right to immunity from such invasion of his body was considered as "far
outweighed by the value of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by the police
action. LexLib

59
It is clear, therefore, that the nature of the affirmative relief hinges closely on the determination of
the exact facts surrounding a particular case.
The violations of human rights alleged by the petitioners are serious. If an orderly procedure
ascertains their truth, not only a writ of prohibition but criminal prosecutions would immediately
issue as a matter of course. A persistent pattern of wholesale and gross abuse of civil liberties,
as alleged in the petition, has no place in civilized society.
On the other hand, according to the respondents, the statements made by the petitioners are
a complete lie.
The Solicitor General argues:
"This is a complete lie.
Just the contrary, they had been conducted with due regard to human
rights. Not only that, they were intelligently and carefully planned months
ahead of the actual operation. They were executed in coordination with
barangay officials who pleaded with their constituents to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification. Local and
foreign correspondents, who had joined these operations, witnessed and
recorded the events that transpired relative thereto. (After Operation
Reports: November 5, 1987, Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why in all the drives so far
conducted, the alleged victims who numbered thousands had not
themselves complained.

"In her speech during turn-over rites on January 26, 1987 at Camp
Aguinaldo, President Aquino branded all accusations of deliberate
disregard for human rights as 'total lies.' Here are excerpts from her
strongest speech yet in support of the military:
"'All accusations of a deliberate disregard for human
rights have been shown up to be total lies.
"' . . . To our soldiers, let me say go out and fight,
fight with every assurance that I will stand by you through thick
and thin to share the blame, defend your actions, mourn the
losses and enjoy with you the final victory that I am certain will
be ours.
"'You and I will see this through together.
"'I've sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution.
"'We have wasted enough time answering their
barkings for it is still a long way to lasting peace. . . . . The
dangers and hardships to our men in the field are great enough
as it is without having them distracted by this worthless carping
at their backs.

"'Our counter-insurgency policy remains the same:

economic development to pull out the roots and military
operations to slash the growth of the insurgency.
"'The answer to terror is force now.
"'Only feats of arms can buy us the time needed to
make our economic and social initiatives bear fruit. . . . . Now
that the extreme Right has been defeated, I expect greater
vigor in the prosecution of the war against the communist
insurgency, even as we continue to watch our backs against
attacks from the Right. (Philippine Star, January 27, 1988, p. 1,
Annex 15; emphasis ours.)'
"Viewed in the light of President Aquino's observation on the matter, it can
be said that petitioners misrepresent as human nights violations the
military and police zealous vigilance over the people's right to live in
peace and safety." (Rollo, pp. 36-38)
Herein lies the problem of the Court. We can only guess the truth. Everything before us consists
of allegations. According to the petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the
saturation drives covered by the petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34,
Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila
International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons treated in the illegal and
inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial
court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have
been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the several
thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of
those affected has apparently complained.
A particularly intriguing aspect of the Solicitor General's comments is the statement that local
and foreign correspondents actually joined the saturation drives and witnessed and recorded the
events. In other words, the activities sought to be completely proscribed were in full view of
media. The sight of hooded men allegedly being used to fingerpoint suspected subversives
would have been good television copy. If true, this was probably effected away from the
ubiquitous eye of the TV cameras or, as the Solicitor General contends, the allegation is a
"complete lie." LLjur
The latest attempt to stage a coup d'etat where several thousand members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines sought to overthrow the present Government introduces another aspect of the
problem and illustrates quite clearly why those directly affected by human rights violations
should be the ones to institute court actions and why evidence of what actually transpired should
first be developed before petitions are filed with this Court.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the
combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise
quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the
Bill of Rights. This is exactly what happened in the White Plains Subdivision and the commercial
center of Makati during the first week of December, 1989.

60
The aerial target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal
elements particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials
by elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.
It is clear from the pleadings of both petitioners and respondents, however, that there was no
rebellion or criminal activity similar to that of the attempted coup d' etats. There appears to have
been no impediment to securing search warrants or warrants of arrest before any houses were
searched or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is no strong showing that the
objectives sought to be attained by the "areal zoning' could not be achieved even as the rights of
squatter and low income families are fully protected.
Where a violation of human rights specifically guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, it is the
duty of the court to stop the transgression and state where even the awesome power of the state
may not encroach upon the rights of the individual.
It is the duty of the court to take remedial action even in cases such as the present petition
where the petitioners do not complain that they were victims of the police actions, where no
names of any of the thousands of alleged victims are given, and where the prayer is a general
one to stop all police "saturation drives," as long as the Court is convinced that the event actually
happened.
The Court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. This is so
inspite of the alleged pleas of barangay officials for the thousands of residents "to submit
themselves voluntarily for character and personal verification." We cannot imagine police actions
of the magnitude described in the petitions and admitted by the respondents, being undertaken
without some undisciplined soldiers and policemen committing certain abuses. However, the
remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. We see
nothing wrong in police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas. Police cannot
respond to riots or violent demonstrations if they do not move in sufficient numbers. A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and not violated. A
blanket prohibition such as that sought by the petitioners would limit all police actions to one on
one confrontations where search warrants and warrants of arrests against specific individuals
are easily procured. Anarchy may reign if the military and the police decide to sit down in their
offices because all concerted drives where a show of force is present are totally
prohibited. LibLex
The remedy is not an original action for prohibition brought through a taxpayers' suit. Where not
one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged, the problem is not initially for the
Supreme Court. It is basically one for the executive departments and for trial courts. Well
meaning citizens with only second hand knowledge of the events cannot keep on
indiscriminately tossing problems of the executive, the military, and the police to the Supreme

Court as if we are the repository of all remedies for all evils. The rules of constitutional litigation
have been evolved for an orderly procedure in the vindication of rights. They should be followed.
If our policy makers sustain the contention of the military and the police that occasional
saturation drives are essential to maintain the stability of government and to insure peace and
order, clear policy guidelines on the behavior of soldiers and policemen must not only be
evolved, they should also be enforced. A method of pinpointing human rights abuses and
identifying violators is necessary.
The problem is appropriate for the Commission on Human Rights. A high level conference
should bring together the heads of the Department of Justice, Department of National Defense
and the operating heads of affected agencies and institutions to devise procedures for the
prevention of abuses.
Under the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman whom we
can order prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts ascertained through an orderly procedure,
no permanent relief can be given at this time. Further investigation of the petitioners' charges
and a hard look by administration officials at the policy implications of the prayed for blanket
prohibition are also warranted:
In the meantime and in the face of a prima facie showing that some abuses were probably
committed and could be committed during future police actions, we have to temporarily restrain
the alleged banging on walls, the kicking in of doors, the herding of half-naked men to assembly
areas for examination of tattoo marks, the violation of residences even if these are humble
shanties of squatters, and the other alleged acts which are shocking to the conscience.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of Manila,
Malabon, and Pasay City where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their
allegations and where specific erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted.
Copies of this decision are likewise forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights, the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National Defense, and the Commanding General PC-INP
for the drawing up and enforcement of clear guidelines to govern police actions intended to
abate riots and civil disturbances, flush out criminal elements, and subdue terrorist activities.
In the meantime, the acts violative of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed
during the police actions are ENJOINED until such time as permanent rules to govern such
actions are promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.