Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, versus - GLORIA GOO

ABBAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 183896 Present: VELASCO, JR., 1., Chairperson,
PERALTA, ABAD, MENDOZA, and LEONEN,JJ. Promulgated: January 30, 2013 f!. \ t~
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------e--=~~r-- DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: This is
a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed
the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 109, Pasay City, and theCA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision. The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria GooAbbas (Gloria) with the
RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03- 0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment
of his marriage to Gloria. In the Marriage Contrace of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License
No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was 1 Penned by Associate Justice Celia
C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Myrna
Dimaranan Vidal. 2 Penned by Judge Tingaraan U. Guiling. 'Rollo, p. 13. I Decision G.R. No. 183896 2
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in
1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the
Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at
his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law
arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one
of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the
ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona,
Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found.5
The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows: 11 July 2003 TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19,
1993. No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993. This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for
whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7 On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had
filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8 4 Id. at 47. 5 Id. 6 Id. at 12. 7 Id. at 10. 8 Id. at 48. Decision G.R. No. 183896 3 Petitioner also
presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.
Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9 Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for
marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification
dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the
same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11 For her part, Gloria testified on her own
behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay
captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January
9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with
the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the
day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After
the solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with that office.17 Atty.
Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by

the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the
marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on
January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was
obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as
sponsor, and 9 Id. at 49, January 19, 1993 in some parts of the records. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 49-50. 12 Id.
at 50. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 Id. at 51. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. at 52. Decision G.R. No. 183896 4
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other
witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21 Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at
her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing
the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to
their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back
to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of
the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25
She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26 As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both
parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on
January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez. The
respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing
their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a
marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage
license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28 Gloria further
testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29 Gloria also testified that she filed
a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
existence of 21 Id. 22 Id. at 53. 23 Id. at 54. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. at 55. 28 Id. 29 Id. at 56. Decision
G.R. No. 183896 5 the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A03408, with the RTC of Manila.30 Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August
9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
Chinese.31 The Ruling of the RTC In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and
Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been
issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of
the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and
that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent
declaring as follows: 1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled; 2. Terminating the community of property relations
between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation
by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties. 3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the
Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective
civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria GooAbbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. SO ORDERED.34 30 Id. at 57. 31 Id. 32 Id. at 58. 33 Article 9. A
Marriage License shall be issued by the Local Civil Registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance
with Chapter 2 of this Title. 34 Rollo, pp. 58-59. Decision G.R. No. 183896 6 Gloria filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the
questioned decision to the Court of Appeals. The Ruling of the CA In her appeal to the CA, Gloria
submitted the following assignment of errors: I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF
A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE. II THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING

EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE
CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO
WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE. III THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL
BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35 The
CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by
law.37 It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The
CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed
only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy.38 The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision reads as follows: 35 Id. at 122. 36 Id. at 128. 37 Id. at 129. 38 Id. at 130.
Decision G.R. No. 183896 7 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03- 0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs. SO
ORDERED.39 Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41 Hence, this petition. Grounds in Support of
Petition I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING
REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO
THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42 The Ruling of this Court The petition is meritorious. As the marriage of Gloria
and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are
Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1)
Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. 39 Id. at 131. 40
Id. at 135-146. 41 Id. at 173-174. 42 Id. at 31. Decision G.R. No. 183896 8 Art. 4. The absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in
Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the
party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those solemnized without
a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter. There is no issue with the essential
requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a
valid marriage license. We find the RTC to be correct in this instance. Respondent Gloria failed to
present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as
the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license
was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had
allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was
issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written
statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry. In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: The above Rule
authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public 43 G.R. No. 103047,

September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257. Decision G.R. No. 183896 9 officers charged with the duty, inter
alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such
other relevant data.44 The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license
for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License
No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria
and Syed do not appear in the document. In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The CA
deduced that from the absence of the words despite diligent search in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had
been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value. To justify that deduction,
the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular case,
the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage
license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical
declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply. Under Sec. 3(m),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty.46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact,
proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond
to those of Gloria and Syed 44 Id. at 262. 45 Supra note 43. 46 Alcantara v. Alcantara, G.R. No.
167746. August 28, 2007, 531 SCRA 446, 456. Decision G.R. No. 183896 10 does not overturn the
presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office. It is telling that
Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why
the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the
validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the
existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from.
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to
how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as
well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. It is also noted that the solemnizing officer
testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local
Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from
that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed. In the case of Cario v.
Cario, 47 following the case of Republic, 48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance
of said license. The case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria
has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the
respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of
the alleged marriage license. To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion
that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA: 47 403 Phil. 861, 869 (2001). 48 Supra
note 43. 49 Supra note 47, at 870. Decision G.R. No. 183896 11 Moreover, the record is replete with
evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and

there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to
marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee.
The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in
the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before
the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit 5-C which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract. x x x
x The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea
Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he
filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family
Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an
Information for Bigamy (Exhibit 1) dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a
second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process
allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50 All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2). Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27
to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 50 Rollo, pp. 129-130. 51 Art. 27. In case either or both of
the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of
a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. Art. 28. If the
residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to
appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of
a marriage license. Art. 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing
officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally
authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the
residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the
officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and
the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. Art. 30. The original of the affidavit required in the
last preceding article, together with a legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the
person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed
within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. Art. 31. A marriage in articulo
mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an
airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at
ports of call. Art. 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have
authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military
operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. Decision 12 G.R. No. 183896 Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio. As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage
to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be
that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a
valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The
law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed is void ab initio. WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petitiOn is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03- 0382-CFM annulling the
marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO
ORDERED. J. VELASCO, JR. Art. 33. Marriage among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural
communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage licenses, provided they arc
solemnized in accordance with thcir customs, rites or practices. Art. 34. No license shall be necessary
for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. Thc contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting
parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

TRATEGIC
ALLIANCE
CORPORATION,
Petitioner,

DEVELOPMENT

G.R. No. 187872

Present:

- versus -

STAR
INFRASTRUCTURE
CORPORATION ET AL.,
Respondents.

DEVELOPMENT

CORONA, C. J.,
Chairperson,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA* and
PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:
November 17, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

The classification of causes of action as intra-corporate disputes is at the heart of this petition for
review on certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the 22
December 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No.
96945[1] as well as the 30 April 2009 resolution which denied the motion for reconsideration of the
same decision.[2]

The Facts

Petitioner Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) is a domestic corporation primarily

engaged in the business of a development company in all the elements and details thereof, with
principal

place

individuals

[4]

of

business

at

Poblacion

and three other corporations,

[5]

Sur,

Bayambang,

Pangasinan. [3] Along

with

five

STRADEC incorporated respondent Star Infrastructure

Development Corporation (SIDC) on 28 October 1997, for the purpose of engaging in the general
construction business. As such incorporator, STRADEC fully paid and owned 2,449,998 shares or 49%
of the 5,000,000 shares of stock into which SIDCs authorized capital stock of P5,000,000.00 were
divided.[6] Pursuant to an amendment of its Articles of Incorporation on 5 June 1998, SIDC transferred

its principal place of business from Pasig City to Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan [7] and, later, to
Lipa, Batangas.[8]

On 8 October 2004, respondents Aderito Z. Yujuico and Bonifacio C. Sumbilla, in their

respective capacities as then President and Treasurer of STRADEC, executed a Promissory Note for and
in consideration of a loan in the sum of P10,000,000.00 ostensibly extended in favor of said
corporation by respondent Robert L. Wong, one of the incorporators of SIDC. [9] As security for the
payment of the principal as well as the stipulated interests thereon, a pledge constituted over
STRADECs entire shareholdings in SIDC was executed by respondent Yujuico on 1 April 2005. [10] In view
of STRADECs repeated default on its obligations, [11] however, the shares thus pledged were sold by way
of the 26 April 2005 notarial sale conducted in Makati City by respondent Raymond M. Caraos. Having
tendered the sole bid of P11,800,000.00,[12] respondent Wong was issued the corresponding certificates
of stocks by respondent Bede S. Tabalingcos, SIDCs Corporate Secretary for the years 2004 and 2005,
after the transfer was recorded in the corporations stock and transfer book. [13]

On 17 July 2006, Cezar T. Quiambao, in his capacity as President and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of STRADEC, commenced the instant suit with the filing of the petition which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 7956 before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City, sitting as a
Special Commercial Court (SCC).[14] In its 31 July 2006 amended petition, STRADEC alleged, among
other matters, that respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla were not authorized to enter into any loan
agreement with respondent Wong, much less pledge its SIDC shareholdings as security therefor; that it
did not receive the proceeds of the supposed loan and immediately apprised SIDC of the irregularity of
the transaction upon discovering the same; that it was only able to ascertain the details of the
transaction and transfer of the subject shares from a narration thereof in a Certification dated 3
September 2005 issued by respondent Tabalingcos; and, that respondent Wong subsequently sold the
shares to respondent Cypress Tree Capital Investment, Inc. (CTCII), a corporation he formed with
members of his own family on 5 July 2005.[15]

STRADEC further averred that it already caused the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation of the unlawful transfer of its shares; that it was altogether eased out during
the 30 July 2005 SIDC annual stockholders meeting where respondent Wong was acknowledged as the

holder of the subject shares and the further transfer of the corporations principal place of business to
Lipa, Batangas was approved; and, that despite being left out in the notice sent by respondent Cynthia
Laureta, SIDCs new Corporate Secretary, it fielded a proxy to the 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders
special meeting where the increase of the corporations authorized capital stock toP850,000,000.00
was discussed together with the decrease of the number of its directors from nine to five. In addition to
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin, among other matters,
CTCIIs exercise of proprietary rights over the subject shares, SIDCs implementation of the resolutions
passed during the 20 July 2006 stockholders meeting and any action thereon by respondent Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), STRADEC prayed for the grant of the following reliefs: (a) the
nullification of the loan and pledge respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla contracted with respondent
Wong; (b) the avoidance of the notarial sale conducted by respondent Caraos; (c) the cancellation of
the transfer of its shares in SIDCs books; (d) the invalidation of the 30 July 2005 and 20 July 2006 SIDC
stockholders meetings; and, (e) the grant of its claims for attorneys fees and the costs. [16]

On 30 August 2006, the RTC issued a resolution denying STRADECs application for writ of
preliminary injunction on the ground that the grant thereof would effectively dispose of the main action
without trial; and, that the right to the relief sought was, as yet, uncertain in view of the pendency of
cases before the courts of Pasig and Urdaneta City involving, among other issues, the ownership of
STRADECs shares and the legitimacy of its two opposing sets of directors. [17] Anent STRADECs
amended petition as aforesaid, the RTC issued the following order on the same date:

The Amended Petition dated July 31, 2006 presents four (4) main causes of
action.
The Court holds that as for the first and second causes of action, to wit: First
declaration of nullity of the supposed loan extended by respondent Wong to STRADEC
and the Deed of Pledge covering STRADECs entire shareholding in SIDC; Second
declaration of nullity of the 26 April 2005 auction sale of STRADECs entire
shareholdings in SIDC in Makati City, this Court is the wrong venue; The Rules of Court
provides that all other actions (other than real) may be commenced and tried where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides; or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff. By the foregoing,
STRADEC should file the case, under the first cause of action, either in Bayambang,
Pangasinan, its principal place of business as stated in the Articles of Incorporation or
in any of the residences of Yujuico, Sumbilla or Wong. The same holds true with respect
to the second cause of action. The matter is between STRADEC and its alleged erring
officers over the alleged irregular auction sale of STRADECs shareholdings in SIDC,
hence, venue should be at the residences of the parties, as plaintiff may elect, as
discussed above.
Although this Court is not the correct venue, the Court will not dismiss the case
but however will not act thereon.

As for the third and fourth causes of action which are the cancellation of
registration of fraudulent transfers involving STRADECs shareholding in SIDC and the
declaration of invalidity of the 30 July 2005 annual stockholders meeting and 20 July
2006 special stockholders meeting of SIDC, the Court resolves to hold in abeyance any
action thereon until after the Supreme Court shall have rendered a ruling as to who
between the conflicting two (2) sets of Board of Directors of STRADEC should be
recognized as legitimate, because it is only then that this Court could make a
determination on the issue raised by the respondents on the authority of Mr. Quiambao
to represent STRADEC in this suit.
SO ORDERED.[18]

Dissatisfied with the foregoing order, STRADEC, through its counsel of record, interposed an
oral motion for reconsideration on the ground that the solidary liability the individual respondents and
SIDC incurred for the tortious transfer of the subject shares justified the laying of venue at the latters
principal place of business in Batangas; that the pledge executed by respondent Yujuico violated the
18 October 2004 temporary restraining order issued by Branch 48 of the RTC of Urdaneta City in Civil
Case No. U-14 (SCC-2874), the intra-corporate dispute earlier filed to determine STRADECs legitimate
Directors and Officers; and, that pursuant to the 25 November 2004 order issued in the same case, a
writ of preliminary injunction had been issued enjoining respondent Yujuico and his cohorts from acting
as STRADECs Officers and committing acts inimical to its interests. [19] The motion was, however, denied
for lack of merit in the second 30 August 2006 order issued by the RTC upon the finding that the theory
of solidary liability foisted by STRADEC had no basis in its pleadings and that the injunctive writ issued
in Civil Case No. U-14 (SCC-2874) was not determinative of the issue of ownership of its shares. [20]

Aggrieved, STRADEC filed the petition for certiorari docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No.
96945, on the ground that the RTC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in finding that venue was improperly laid, in holding in abeyance further proceedings in the
case and in denying its application for a writ of preliminary injunction. [21] In receipt of respondents
separate comments[22] to the petition and the memoranda subsequently filed by the parties, [23] the
Ninth Division of the CA rendered the herein assailed 22 December 2008 decision, [24] discounting the
grave abuse of discretion STRADEC imputed against the RTC upon the following findings and
conclusions, to wit:

1. STRADECs first and second causes of action for nullification of the pledge
constituted over its shares and the subsequent notarial sale thereof are purely
civil in nature and were, therefore, erroneously joined with its third and fourth

causes of action for invalidation of the registration of the transfer in SIDCs

books as well as its annual and special stockholders meetings;
2. Aside from correctly applying the rule on venue in personal actions for STRADECs
first and second causes of action, the RTC cannot be faulted for not ordering
the dismissal of the same since misjoinder of causes of action does not involve
a question of jurisdiction and the discretionary authority to order separation of
the misjoined causes of action necessarily includes the authority to stay
proceedings with respect thereto;
3. Further proceedings with respect to the third and fourth causes of action were also
correctly held in abeyance by the RTC in view of the pendency of cases in other
courts involving, among other issues, the ownership of STRADECs shares, its
legitimate Directors and Corporate Officers and the authority of Cezar T.
Quiambao to act for and its behalf; and
4. The pendency of said cases discounts the existence of a clear and unmistakable
right on the part of STRADEC as would justify the grant of its application to an
injunctive writ which would, at any rate, effectively dispose of the main case
without trial.[25]

STRADECs motion for reconsideration [26] of the foregoing decision was denied in the 30 April
2009 resolution issued in the case, [27] hence, this petition.

The Issues

STRADEC urges the reversal and setting aside of the assailed CA decision and resolution on the
following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOT ONLY DECIDED QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE

IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT, BUT HAS ALSO SO FAR SANCTIONED THE LOWER
COURTS DEPARTURE FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS AS TO CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS
POWER OF SUPERVISION, IN THAT
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT CHARACTERIZING THE
FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 7956 AS
INTRA-CORPORATE AND PLACE ITS VENUE AND JURISDICTION
IN RTC BATANGAS CITY.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ASCRIBING GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO RTC BATANGAS CITYS REFUSAL TO APPLY
THE RULES OF COURT AFTER RULING THAT IT WAS NOT THE PROPER
VENUE FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION IN CIVIL CASE
NO. 7956.

C. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ASCRIBING GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO RTC BATANGAS CITYS RULING TO HOLD IN
ABEYANCE FURTHER PROCEEDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THE THIRD AND
FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 7956 BY REASON OF
AN UNRELATED PENDING ACTION.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ASCRIBING GRAVE
ABUSE TO RTC BATANGAS CITYS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS APPLICATION
FOR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE A SHOWING OF A
CLEAR AND POSITIVE RIGHT AND A CONTINUING VIOLATION BY THE
RESPONDENTS THEREOF.[28]

The Courts Ruling

We find merit in the petition.

An intra-corporate dispute is understood as a suit arising from intra-corporate relations [29] or

between or among stockholders or between any or all of them and the corporation. [30] Applying what
has come to be known as the relationship test, it has been held that the types of actions embraced by
the foregoing definition include the following suits: (a) between the corporation, partnership or
association and the public; (b) between the corporation, partnership or association and its
stockholders, partners, members, or officers; (c) between the corporation, partnership or association
and the State insofar as its franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; and, (d) among the
stockholders, partners or associates themselves. [31] As the definition is broad enough to cover all kinds
of controversies between stockholders and corporations, the traditional interpretation was to the effect
that the relationship test brooked no distinction, qualification or any exemption whatsoever. [32]

However, the unqualified application of the relationship test has been modified on the ground that the
same effectively divests regular courts of jurisdiction over cases for the sole reason that the suit is
between the corporation and/or its corporators. It was held that the better policy in determining which
body has jurisdiction over a case would be to consider not only the status or relationship of the parties
but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. [33] Under the nature of the
controversy test, the dispute must not only be rooted in the existence of an intra-corporate
relationship, but must also refer to the enforcement of the parties' correlative rights and obligations
under the Corporation Code as well as the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the

corporation.[34] The combined application of the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test
has, consequently, become the norm in determining whether a case is an intra-corporate controversy
or is purely civil in character.

In the case at bench, STRADECs first and second causes of action seek the nullification of the loan and
pledge over its SIDC shareholding contracted by respondents Yujuico, Sumbilla and Wong as well the
avoidance of the notarial sale of said shares conducted by respondent Caraos. STRADECs 31 July 2006
amended petition significantly set forth the following allegations common to its main causes of action,
to wit:
xxx

4. Sometime in June 2005, STRADECs President and Chairman of the Board of

Directors, Cezar T. Quiambao, received information that STRADEC had been divested of
its shareholdings in SIDC.
Apparently, all of STRADECs 49% shareholdings in SIDC were transferred and placed in
the name of respondent Wong, another incorporator of SIDC, upon the instance of
respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla, former officers of STRADEC.
5. However, respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla, despite being former officers of
STRADEC, never possessed authority to transact any business in behalf of STRADEC
involving any of its corporate assets and investments, including STRADECs
shareholdings in SIDC.
6. Upon learning of this highly irregular development, STRADEC immediately called the
attention of SIDCs Board of Directors and officers and requested official confirmation of
the recording of any such sale in the books of SIDC cautioning that STRADEC had not
authorized the sale or transfer of its shares in SIDC.
xxxx
7. To date, however, STRADEC has not received any response from SIDCs Board of
Directors and officers.
8. Instead, STRADEC was able to secure from a secondary source a copy of
the Certification dated 23 September 2005 issued by respondent Tabalingcos, SIDCs
Corporate Secretary, narrating how all of STRADECs shareholdings in SIDC, among
others, were acquired by respondent Wong by reason of respondents Yujuico and
Sumbillas unauthorized acts.
The same Certification states that the shareholdings were in turn transferred by
respondent Wong to respondent CTCII, which as STRADEC would later learn was a
newly-formed corporation of respondent Wongs family;
xxxx

11. STRADEC was able to get hold of a document entitled Deed of Pledge dated
08 October 2004 purportedly signed by respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla in behalf of
STRADEC as pledgor, and by respondent Wong as pledgee.
xxxx
12. The Deed of Pledge made it appear, among others, that for and in partial
consideration of a loan from respondent Wong in the principal amount of only TEN
MILLION PESOS (P10,000,000.00), STRADEC pledged its 2,449,998 shares of stocks in
SIDC worth TWO HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR MILLION, NINE HUNDRED NINETY-NINE
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P244,999,800.00).
13. STRADEC, however, had never authorized respondents Yuhuico and
Sumbilla to enter into any loan agreement with respondent Wong, much less pledge its
shareholdings in SIDC.
14. Neither has STRADEC at any time received any amount of loan personally
from Mr. Wong.
xxxx
15. Moreover, a subsequent examination of the Notarial Records of respondent
Caraos for the year 2004 with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
the Regional TrialCourt of Makati City revealed that the Deed of Pledge is not one of the
documents notarized by Atty. Caraos during the period of September 2003 to
December 2004.
16. STRADEC was also able to get hold of a Certificate of Sale issued by
respondent Caraos on 26 April 2005 stating that an auction sale was held on 26 April
2005 wherein all of STRADECs 2,449,998 shares of stock in SIDC, among others, were
sold to respondent Wong to satisfy STRADECs alleged outstanding obligation in the
amount of ELEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P11,800,000.00);
From the Certificate of Sale, it appears that respondent Caraos proceeded with
the auction sale without any notice to STRADEC as the supposed pledgor, and despite
the fact that that respondent Wong, the supposed pledgee, was the only bidder.
xxxx
17. Incidentally, respondent CARAOS and SIDCs Corporate Secretary, Atty.
Tabalingcos, are partners of the same law firm;
18. STRADEC has good reasons to believe that while it immediately informed
the officers of SIDC of the irregularities attending the divestment of its shareholdings in
said respondent corporation, its Corporate Secretary, respondent Tabalingcos,
apparently went on to register the transfers in the corporations stock and transfer
book, as evidenced by SIDCs General Information Sheet for 2005, wherein it was
annotated that the shares of STRADEC or Strategic Alliance Development Corp. has
been acquired by Mr. Wong in view of the Notarial Sale conducted on April 26, 2005.
xxxx
19. Worse, it would appear now that respondent Wong had likewise unlawfully
transferred STRADECs 49% shareholdings in SIDC to his newly formed Corporation,
respondent CTCII.
x x x x[35]

Applying the relationship test, we find that STRADECs first and second causes of action qualify as intracorporate disputes since said corporation and respondent Wong are incorporators and/or stockholders
of SIDC. Having acquired STRADECs shares thru the impugned notarial sale conducted by respondent
Caraos, respondent Wong appears to have further transferred said shares in favor of CTCII, a
corporation he allegedly formed with members of his own family. By reason of said transfer, CTCII
became a stockholder of SIDC and was, in fact, alleged to have been recognized as such by the latter
and its corporate officers. To our mind, these relationships were erroneously disregarded by the RTC
when it ruled that venue was improperly laid for STRADECs first and second causes of action which,
applying Section 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[36] should have been filed either at the
place where it maintained its principal place of business or where respondents Yujuico, Sumbilla and
Wong resided.

Considering that they fundamentally relate to STRADECs status as a stockholder and the
alleged fraudulent divestment of its stockholding in SIDC, the same causes of action also qualify as
intra-corporate disputes under the nature of the controversy test. As part of the fraud which attended
the transfer of its shares, STRADEC distinctly averred, among other matters, that respondents Yujuico
and Sumbilla had no authority to contract a loan with respondent Wong; that the pledge executed by
respondent Yujuico was simulated since it did not receive the proceeds of the loan for which its shares
in SIDC were set up as security; that irregularities attended the notarial sale conducted by respondent
Caraos who sold said shares to respondent Wong; that the latter unlawfully transferred the same
shares in favor of CTCII; and, that SIDC and its officers recognized and validated said transfers despite
being alerted about their defects. Ultimately, the foregoing circumstances were alleged to have
combined to rid STRADEC of its shares in SIDC and its right as a stockholder to participate in the latters
corporate affairs.

In addition to being conferred by law, [37] it bears emphasizing that the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal over the case is determined by the allegations in the complaint [38] and the character of the
relief sought,[39] irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims asserted therein.[40]Moreover, pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act No. 8799, [41] otherwise
known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the SEC over all cases enumerated under
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as
SCCs[42] pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC promulgated on 21 November 2000. Thus, Section 1(a), Rule

1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies (Interim Rules) provides
as follows:

SECTION 1. (a) Cases covered. These Rules shall govern the procedure to be
observed in civil cases involving the following:
(1) Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors,
business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or misrepresentation
which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders,
partners, or members of any corporation, partnership, or association;
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association
relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates; and between,
any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are
stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers,
or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
(4) Derivative suits; and
(5) Inspection of corporate books. (Italics supplied)

In upholding the RTCs pronouncement that venue was improperly laid, the CA ruled that
STRADECs first and second causes of action were not intra-corporate disputes because the issues
pertaining thereto were civil in nature. In support of the foregoing conclusion, the CA cited Speed
Distributing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals [43] where this Court essentially ruled out the existence of
an intra-corporate dispute from an action instituted by the wife for the nullification of the transfer of a
property between corporations of which her deceased husband was a stockholder. The CA also relied
on this Courts pronouncement in Nautica Canning Corporation vs. Yumul [44] to the effect, among others,
that an action to determine the validity of the transfer of shares from one stockholder to another is
civil in nature and is, therefore, cognizable by regular courts and not the SEC. [45] In addition to the fact
that the first case involved a civil action instituted against corporations by one who was not a
stockholder thereof, however, STRADEC correctly points out that, unlike the second case, the limited
jurisdiction of the SEC is not in issue in the case at bench.

Even prescinding from the different factual and legal milieus of said cases, the CA also failed to
take into consideration the fact that, unlike the SEC which is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, [46] SCCs
like the RTC are still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed
before them. In G.D. Express Worldwide N.V. vs. Court of Appeals,[47] this Court ruled as follows:

It should be noted that the SCCs are still considered courts of general
jurisdiction. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799 directs merely the Supreme Court's
designation of RTC branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over intra-corporate
disputes. Nothing in the language of the law suggests the diminution of jurisdiction of
those RTCs to be designated as SCCs. The assignment of intra-corporate disputes to
SCCs is only for the purpose of streamlining the workload of the RTCs so that certain
branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject matter.
The designation of certain RTC branches to handle specific cases is nothing
new. For instance, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, the Supreme Court has assigned certain RTC branches to hear
and decide cases under Sections 56 and 57 of R.A. No. 6657.
The RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate dispute can be likened
to an RTC exercising its probate jurisdiction or sitting as a special agrarian court. The
designation of the SCCs as such has not in any way limited their jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.

Viewed in the foregoing light and the intra-corporate nature of STRADECs first and second causes of
action, the CA clearly erred in upholding the RTCs finding that venue therefor was improperly
laid. Given that the question of venue is decidedly not jurisdictional and may, in fact, be waived, [48] said
error was further compounded when the RTC handed down its first 30 August 2006 order even before
respondents were able to file pleadings squarely raising objections to the venue for said causes of
action.[49]Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules,[50] at any rate, it cannot be gainsaid that
STRADEC correctly commenced its petition before the RTC exercising jurisdiction over SIDCs principal
place of business which was alleged to have been transferred from Bayambang, Pangasinan to Lipa,
Batangas.[51] It matters little that STRADEC, as pointed out by respondents, also questions the validity
of the 30 July 2005 SIDC stockholders annual meeting where the aforesaid change in the address of its
principal place of business was allegedly approved. Said matter should be properly threshed out in the
proceedings before the RTC alongside such issues as the validity of the transfers of STRADECs shares
to respondents Wong and CTCII, the propriety of the recording of said transfers in SIDCs books,
STRADECs status as a stockholder of SIDC, the legality of the 20 July 2006 SIDC stockholders special
meeting or, for that matter, Cezar T. Quiambaos authority to represent STRADEC in the case at bench.

The rule is settled that rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical
sense,[52] for they have been adopted to help secure not override substantial justice. [53] Considering
that litigation is not a game of technicalities [54] courts have been exhorted, time and again, to afford
every litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case free from the
constraints of technicalities. Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the

attainment of justice, it is well recognized that courts are empowered to suspend its rules, when the
rigid application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice. [55] No less than
Section 3, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules provides that the provisions thereof are to be liberally construed
in order to promote their objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and inexpensive determination
of every action or proceeding.

The CA also erred in upholding the RTCs suspension of proceedings for STRADECs third and
fourth causes of action assailing the registration of the transfers of its shares as well as the 30 July
2005 annual meeting and 20 July 2006 special meeting of SIDCs stockholders, in view of the pendency
of actions in other courts involving ownership of the shares into which STRADECs own capital stock has
been divided and its legitimate directors and officers. On the principle that a corporation is a legal
entity with a personality separate and distinct from its individual stockholders or members and from
that of its officers who manage and run its affairs, [56] we find that said other actions have little or no
bearing to the issues set forth in STRADECs amended petition which, at bottom, involve the transfer of
its own shareholding in SIDC and its status and rights as such stockholder. The record also shows that
the impugned loan transaction was contracted by respondents Yujuico and Sumbilla on 8 October 2004
or before the 10 December 2004 election of STRADECs Board of Directors conducted pursuant to the
25 November 2004 order issued in Civil Case No. U-14 (SCC-2874). Thus, even the restoration of status
quo ante in said case pursuant to this Courts 29 January 2007 decision in G.R. No. 168639,
entitled Alderito Yujuico, et al. vs. Cezar T. Quiambao, et al. [57] is no hindrance to the determination of
the issues of want of authority and consideration for the transfer of STRADECs shares.

Considering that the determination of the factual and legal issues presented in the case can
proceed independent of those being litigated in the other cases filed against each other by the
members of STRADEC's Board of Directors, we find that the CA finally erred in denying STRADEC's
application of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain (a) CTCII from further exercising proprietary
rights over the subject shares; (b) SIDC and its officers from recognizing the transfer or further
transfers of the same; (c) the implementation of the resolutions passed during the 20 July 2006 SIDC
stockholders special meeting; and (d) the SEC from acting on any report submitted in respect
thereto. A provisional remedy which has, for its object, the preservation of the status quo,
[58]

preliminary injunction may be resorted to by a party in order to preserve and protect certain rights

and interests during the pendency of an action. [59] By both law and jurisprudence, said provisional writ

may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites, to wit: (1) that the invasion
of the right is material and substantial; (2) that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and, (3) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. [60]

As the owner, STRADEC is undoubtedly possessed of clear and unmistakable rights over the
subject SIDC shares which respondent Yujuico pledged in favor of respondent Wong. Unless collectively
restrained, the aforesaid acts will completely divest STRADEC of its shares and unfairly deprive it of
participation in SIDC's corporate affairs pending the determination of the validity of the impugned
transfers. Given that the parties have already submitted their arguments for and against the writ of
preliminary injunction sought, STRADEC is, however, required to put up an injunction bond pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules.[61] Conditioned to answer for damages respondents may sustain
as a consequence of the issuance of the writ, [62] the amount of the bond is fixed at P10,000,000.00
which is equivalent to the supposed loan for which STRADEC's shares were pledged by respondent
Yujuico.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision and
resolution

are,

accordingly, REVERSED and SET

entered ORDERING the

resumption

of

proceedings

ASIDE. In
in

Civil

lieu

Case

No.

thereof,
7956

another
without

is

further

delay. Subject to the posting of the requisite bond in the sum ofP10,000,000.00, STRADEC's application
for a writ of preliminary injunction is likewise GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780

October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September
29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25,
2008Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee
Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage
with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as
husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or
complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in
jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a
motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007,
the Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a determination for failure of
both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision, 5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty
Albios and Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any
right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to
the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life,
such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion
for want of merit. It explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely
give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only
as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand
the nature and consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It
further explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never
intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for
personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of
$2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE
CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT. 8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer
to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and
willingly entered into that marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to
the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The
parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the
purpose of Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage
was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply 10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on
certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole
purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of
lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the
purposes of immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of
marriage fraud for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been
referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into
solely for the legitimization of a child.12Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for
immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the
time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 15 established the principal
test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a
sham if the bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.
"This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986
(IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into
for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading
immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited
purpose of immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose
marriages in the United States made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the
country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six
months. The Court, through Judge Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into
permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every
contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary,
they do not contract if they do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no
exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage
without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a marriage only for the
sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married
at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily
understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others. 18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, 19 which declared as
valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a
valid marriage could not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee, 21 further recognized that a fraudulent or
sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as
problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first
necessary. 22 At present, United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited
purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld
such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be

recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC
went on to explain that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means
for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature
and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be
similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a
marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under
Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code
provides that the absence of any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of
a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. 24 Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that
the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or
unfavorable consequences of their act. 25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was
also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was
freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through
marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary
to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a
joke, with no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding
that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation. 27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no
intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence
of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the
respondent to acquire American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to
further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to
create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or
voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of

foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are
present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid. 28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. 29 The right to marital
privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live
together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. 30 Thus,
marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, 31 are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest
purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be
considered a sham or fraudulent for the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues
to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud,
namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the
wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4)
concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit
shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the
sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent
party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot
declare such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they
have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot
be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a
judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]

SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted
by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy
between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was
on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with
whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10,
1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no
children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who
spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government
agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00
from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).[4]
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of
money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at
least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
death benefits which she (petitioner) received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pagibig. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to
declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she met
petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of
sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab
initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no
marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO
(sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot
issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this
archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may
serve.[6]

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the
amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S.
Cario, plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial
court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE
INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE.[8]
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. [9] However, for purposes
other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case.[10] In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous
marriage void.[11]
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of
the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully
entitled to the subject death benefits of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage,[12] and
the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, [13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not
fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove
the non-issuance of a marriage license.Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has
been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is
valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before
the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided
the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner
and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded
to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before
a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased
and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent
Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage
of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime. [16] Considering that the two marriages are
void ab initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership
of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on
Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and
woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, [17] ... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions ...
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to
him or her exclusively.Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household,
or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. [18]
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid
(between petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM,
Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee
presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in
the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and
the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the
same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal
heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family
Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like
the absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages

and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in
equal shares.For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
xxxxxxxxx
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by
any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally
between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto.
[19]
Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first
marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the
deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, [20] where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding
that:
... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal
partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her
status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon
his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husbands share in the property here in
dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he
only just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her
share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. [21]
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires
a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case,
the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family
Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important
condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married
wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first
marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage, otherwise the second marriage
would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are
not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for purposes
other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage
claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party
has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from
which his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the

issues before it, will rule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of
the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog,[23] the
Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue
that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code connoted that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to
pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 175581

- versus JOSE A. DAYOT,

Respondent.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 179474

Present:

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
March 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa TecsonDayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7
November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and
Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City
Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. [2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and
Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, [3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with
Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not
execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five
years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the
same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live
as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by
her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man
bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the
papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned
about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who
immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas
house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their
marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality
of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on
account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August
1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. [7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented
by both parties, this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to
make him or her sign a blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that
something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for
[Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the
said package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the
fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he
will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months to discover
that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact
that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the
duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one
year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and
false. [Jose], again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be
contacted in case of emergency. This Court does not believe that the only reason why
her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there then.This
is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded
wife, he would have written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified
that she signed her name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified that the
signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother
that he voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on

November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she
believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes.The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured
through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article
87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by
[Felisa] through fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed an annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a
Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was
solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 [14] of the Civil
Code did not exist in the marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment
of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court
of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in
giving his consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already
prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by
fraud, force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years
after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4) years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by Jose in
February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for
annulment of marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the
complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]

Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was
void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
76[16] of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of
marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five

years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa
had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity
of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained therein. In
this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer
over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to
their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a
member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article
56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage must
belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only in
Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His
central opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose
cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital
cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it
rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and
another one entered declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C.
Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City. [19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v.
Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license on the basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age
of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5) years
and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is
counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal
union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of
cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous

5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be
sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their
spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the
requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply
with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a preconceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public
that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a
marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab
initio because of the absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court
rendered a Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals
Amended Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for
Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1
August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the
Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. [23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its
Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR
LACK OF MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She
differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa
adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an
administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the
declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered
ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. [26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit
executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the
Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the
marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was
not required to investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully
obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition,
the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under
Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their witnesses, and must be
considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as
husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating
Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false
affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986,
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of
the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)

Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license,
character. (Emphasis ours.)

except

in

marriage

of

exceptional

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides,
save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article
75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the
marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is
that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government
official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. [32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III,
comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortis or at the point
of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, [33] (3) ratification
of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages. [34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other

qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.

The reason for the law, [35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending
a marriage license may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a
marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age
of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years;
and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other. [37] One of the central issues in the
Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have
in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab
initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the
indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly [38] but reasonably construed. [39] They extend only so far
as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court
will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in Article 76 to apply,
it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and
that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to
read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to
those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The
minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed
with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state
the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that

the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took
steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the
time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and
Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their
marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her
neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. [44] The
appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum fiveyear requisite is factual in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth
or falsehood of the alleged facts. [46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this
Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory findings. However,
the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial
court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based
on substantial evidence.[48]

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to
exempt them from the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties
affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did
Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds
no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with

reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to
which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually
entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant
consolidated Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that every intendment of law or fact leans
towards the validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite
marriage license or compliance with the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary
parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. [53] To permit a false
affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this
Court is to protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that
violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage
license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the
falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie,
then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at
all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity,
Jose should be denied relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his

wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application
where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability. [55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from
assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa
had lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on
31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. [56] Jose and Felisas
marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by
exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years - and continuity that
is unbroken.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa
Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costS.
O ORDERED.