Week 10

III.

IN CASE OF DENIAL OF PROTEST OR INACTION, APPEAL TO CTA

A. Scope of Jurisdiction of CTA/What is Appealable to CTA
Sec. 4, 2nd par., NIRC Sec. 228, NIRC

Section 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. - The power to interpret the
provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner,
subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.
The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals.
CHAPTER III - PROTESTING AN ASSESSMENT, REFUND, ETC.
Section 228. Protesting of Assessment. - When the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative finds that
proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings: provided, however, That a
preassessment notice shall not be required in the following cases:
(a) When the finding for any deficiency tax is the result of mathematical error in the computation of the tax as
appearing on the face of the return; or
(b) When a discrepancy has been determined between the tax withheld and the amount actually remitted by the
withholding agent; or
(c) When a taxpayer who opted to claim a refund or tax credit of excess creditable withholding tax for a taxable period
was determined to have carried over and automatically applied the same amount claimed against the estimated tax
liabilities for the taxable quarter or quarters of the succeeding taxable year; or
(d) When the excise tax due on exciseable articles has not been paid; or
(e) When the article locally purchased or imported by an exempt person, such as, but not limited to, vehicles, capital
equipment, machineries and spare parts, has been sold, traded or transferred to non-exempt persons.
The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the facts on which the assessment is made; otherwise, the
assessment shall be void.
Within a period to be prescribed by implementing rules and regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to
said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner or his duly authorized representative shall issue an
assessment based on his findings.
Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing rules
and regulations.
Within sixty (60) days from filing of the protest, all relevant supporting documents shall have been submitted;
otherwise, the assessment shall become final.
If the protest is denied in whole or in part, or is not acted upon within one hundred eighty (180) days from submission
of documents, the taxpayer adversely affected by the decision or inaction may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the said decision, or from the lapse of one hundred eighty (180)-day period;
otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable.

Sec. 7, Rep. Act No. 1125, as amended by Rep. Act No. 9282
Section 7. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by
appeal, as herein provided.
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money
charges; seizure, detention or release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation
thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of
Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property or other matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.

CIR v. Villa, 22 SCRA 4 (1968)

"What may be the subject of a judicial review is the decision of the Commissioner on the protest against assessment,
not the assessment itself."
FACTS: The spouses Villa filed joint income tax returns for the years 1951 to 1956. The BIR issued assessments for
deficiency of income tax for the said years. Without contesting the said assessments with the CIR, they filed a petition
for review with the CTA. The CTA took cognizance of the of the appeal and rendered favorable judgment to the
spouses. The CIR appealed to the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the CTA.
ISSUE: Is an appeal to the CTA proper in this case? Is the CTA vested with jurisdiction?
HELD: No. The rule is that where a taxpayer questions an assessment and asks the Collector to reconsider or cancel
the same because he (the taxpayer) believes he is not liable therefor, the assessment becomes a "disputed
assessment" that the Collector must decide, and the taxpayer can appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals only upon
receipt of the decision of the Collector on the disputed assessment. Since in the instant case the taxpayer appealed
the assessment of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue without previously contesting the same, the appeal was
premature and the Court of Tax Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain said appeal. For, as stated, the jurisdiction of
the Tax Court is to review by appeal decisions of Internal Revenue on disputed assessments. The Tax Court is a court
of special jurisdiction. As such, it can take cognizance only of such matters as are clearly within its jurisdiction.

B. Application of 180-day Rule

Sec. 3(a)(2), Rule 4 and Sec. 3(a), Rule 8, Revised Rules of the CTA (S.C.
A.M. No. 05-11-07-CTA, Nov. 22, 2005)
SEC. 3. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions. The Court in Divisions shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following:
(2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue
Code or other applicable law provides a specific period for action: Provided, that in case of disputed assessments,
the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the one hundred eighty day-period under Section 228 of
the National Internal revenue Code shall be deemed a denial for purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal his case
to the Court and does not necessarily constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the
tax case; Provided, further, that should the taxpayer opt to await the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue on the disputed assessments beyond the one hundred eighty day-period abovementioned, the taxpayer
may appeal such final decision to the Court under Section 3(a), Rule 8 of these Rules; and Provided, still further, that
in the case of claims for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review
with the Court prior to the expiration of the two-year period under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code;

Lascona Land Co., Inc. v. CIR, CTA Case No. 5777, Jan. 4, 2000
FACTS The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued an assessment against Lascona Land Co., Inc.
(Lascona) informing the latter of its alleged deficiency income tax for the year 1993 in the amount of P753,266.56.
Consequently, on April 20, 1998, Lascona filed a letter protest, but was denied by Norberto R. Odulio, Officer-inCharge (OIC), Regional Director, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Revenue Region No. 8, Makati City. On April 12, 1999,
Lascona appealed the decision before the CTA. Lascona alleged that the Regional Director erred in ruling that the
failure to appeal to the CTA within thirty (30) days from the lapse of the 180-day period rendered the assessment final
and executory. The CIR, however, maintained that Lasconas failure to timely file an appeal with the CTA after the
lapse of the 180-day reglementary period provided under Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
resulted to the finality of the assessment.
ISSUE Whether the subject assessment has become final, executory and demandable due to the failure of petitioner
to file an appeal before the CTA within thirty (30) days from the lapse of the One Hundred Eighty (180)-day period
pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC.
HELD NO.
[T]he Court has held that in case the Commissioner failed to act on the disputed assessment within the 180-day
period from date of submission of documents, a taxpayer can either: (1) file a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals within 30 days after the expiration of the 180-day period; or (2) await the final decision of the Commissioner
on the disputed assessments and appeal such final decision to the Court of Tax Appeals within 30 days after receipt
of a copy of such decision. These options are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of the other.
Therefore, as in Section 228, when the law provided for the remedy to appeal the inaction of the CIR, it did not intend
to limit it to a single remedy of filing of an appeal after the lapse of the 180-day prescribed period. Precisely, when a
taxpayer protested an assessment, he naturally expects the CIR to decide either positively or negatively. A taxpayer
cannot be prejudiced if he chooses to wait for the final decision of the CIR on the protested assessment. More so,
because the law and jurisprudence have always contemplated a scenario where the CIR will decide on the protested
assessment.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. v. CIR, G.R. No. 168498, April 24, 2007
Facts: RCBC received a Formal Letter of Demand dated May 25, 2001 from the respondent CIR for its tax liabilities
particularly for Gross Onshore Tax in the amount of P53,998,428.29 and Documentary Stamp Tax for its Special
Savings Placements in the amount of P46,717,952.76, for the taxable year 1997.Petitioner filed a protest
letter/request for reconsideration/reinvestigation pursuant to Section 228 of the NIRC. As the protest was not acted
upon by the respondent, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CTA for the cancellation of the assessments.
Respondent filed a motion to resolve first the issue of CTAs jurisdiction, which was granted by the CTA in a
Resolution dated September 10, 2003.8 The petition for review was dismissed because it was filed beyond the 30day period following the lapse of 180 days from petitioners submission of documents in support of its protest, as
provided under Section 228 of the NIRC and Section 11 of R.A. No. 1125, otherwise known as the Law Creating the
Court of Tax Appeals. Petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal to the CTA En Banc from the
dismissal of its petition for review. Consequently, the September 10, 2003 Resolution became final and executory on
October 1, 2003 and Entry of Judgment was made on December 1, 2003.9
Thereafter, respondent sent a Demand Letter to petitioner for the payment of the deficiency tax assessments. On
February 20, 2004, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment on the ground of excusable negligence of its
counsels secretary who allegedly misfiled and lost the September 10, 2003 Resolution. The CTA Second Division set
the case for hearing on April 2, 2004 during which petitioners counsel was present. Respondent filed an Opposition
while petitioner submitted its Manifestation and Counter-Motion. On May 3, 2004, the CTA Second Division rendered
a Resolution denying petitioners Petition for Relief from Judgment. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
denied in a Resolution dated November 5, 2004,16 hence it filed a petition for review with the CTA En Banc, docketed
as C.T.A. EB No. 50, which affirmed the assailed Resolutions of the CTA Second Division in a Decision dated June 7,
2005.

Ruling: As provided in Sec. 228, the failure of the taxpayer to appeal from an assessment on time rendered the
assessment final, executory and demandable. RCBC is precluded from disputing the correctness of the assessment.
While the right to appeal a decision of the Commissioner of CTA is merely a statutory remedy, nevertheless the
requirement that it must be brought within 30 days is jurisdictional. If a statutory remedy provides as a condition
precedent that the action to enforce it must be commenced within a prescribed time, such requirement is jurisdictional
and failure to comply therewith may be raised in a MTD.
Shorter digest:
On July 5, 2001, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued a final assessment notice (FAN) to the Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) demanding a total tax liability of about P100 million. On July 20, 2001
(within the 30 day period from issuance of FAN to file a protest), RCBC filed a protest. The CIR never acted on the
protest. On April 30, 2002, RCBC filed an appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
ISSUE: Whether or not RCBC filed a timely appeal.
HELD : No. Under the law, after the lapse of 180 days within which the CIR is supposed to rule on the protest yet
the CIR did not, the taxpayer has 30 days from said lapse to file an appeal with the CTA. In the case at bar, the
protest was filed on July 20, 2001. From that date, RCBC had until September 18, 2001 (60 days) to submit
supporting documents. There was no showing that RCBC submitted any such documents. But assuming it submitted
said documents on September 18, 2001, the 180 day period for the CIR to decide shall commence on that date
hence the 180 day period has lapsed on March 17, 2002. Thereafter, RCBC has 30 days to appeal the inaction of the
CIR (30 days from the lapse of the 180 day period) or until April 16, 2002. RCBC filed its appeal on April 30, 2002
which was already beyond the 30 day period. In such case, the decision of the CIR indirectly denying the protest by
reason of inaction is already final and executory and is no longer appealable.

C. What Constitutes Denial of Protest/Decision on Disputed Assessment

1. General Rule
2. Issuance of Revised Assessment Upon Reinvestigation
Avon Products Mfg., Inc. v. CIR, CTA Case No. 5908, Jan. 20, 2005
BRIEF 1: The CTA denied the petition for refund filed by Avon based on the argument that it erroneously paid
excise tax of P53 million for the products because those should not be considered toilet waters.
Avons definition of toilet waters comes from the old Revenue Regulation 8-84 which defined toilet waters as scented
alcoholic or nonalcoholic preparations primarily used as body fragrance containing essential oils, i.e., more than 3
percent by weight.
Avon argued that since its products do not contain essential oils of 3 percent or more by weight, then its products
should not be subject to excise tax imposed on toilet waters under Section 150. But the CTA said that the petitioners
definition of toilet waters has already been repealed, and that the BIR has already come up with a new definition of
the product.
Under Revenue Memorandum Circular 17-2002, the term toilet waters was defined as a scented alcohol-based liquid
used as perfume, after shave lotion, or deodorant, and thus, such products and all other colognes are classified as
toilet waters subject to excise tax.
The CTA said that the new definition of the term toilet waters was issued in the valid exercise by the BIR
commissioner of the power to interpret the provisions of the Tax Code, subject to the power of the secretary of
finance to review such interpretations.
Since Section 150 of the Tax Code is silent as to the definition of the term toilet waters, the clarification made by
respondent is given great weight. Therefore, the definition of toilet waters as a scented alcohol-based liquid used as
perfume, aftershave-lotion, or deodorant, and the classification of the same, covering all other colognes, as provided
in the RMC 17-2002, will apply, the decision said.

BRIEF 2: The CIRs failure to appreciate the supporting documents presented by the taxpayer is not tantamount to
denial of due process.
The Commissioner of Internal Revenues non-appreciation of taxpayers arguments and supporting documents
submitted before the Court of Tax Appeals which led to the subsequent issuance of identical Preliminary Assessment
Notice (PAN), Final Assessment Notice (FAN) and Collection Letter cannot in any way be construed as deprivation of
the taxpayers right to due process absent any proof of any irregularity in the performance of CIRs official duties.
Thus, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the CIRs official duties shall therefore stand.
In Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. CIR, the Supreme Court held that a Revenue Memorandum Circular is merely an
administrative interpretation of the law which cannot be given effect if it is contrary to the Revenue Regulations.

3. Final Notice Before Seizure

CIR v. Isabela Cultural Corp., 361 SCRA 71 (2001)
Facts: Isabela Cultural Corporation (ICC), a domestic corporation received an assessment notice for deficiency
income tax and expanded withholding tax from BIR. It arose from the disallowance of ICCs claimed expense for
professional and security services paid by ICC; as well as the alleged understatement of interest income on the three
promissory notes due from Realty Investment Inc. The deficiency expanded withholding tax was allegedly due to the
failure of ICC to withhold 1% e-withholding tax on its claimed deduction for security services.
ICC sought a reconsideration of the assessments. Having received a final notice of assessment, it brought the case
to CTA, which held that it is unappealable, since the final notice is not a decision. CTAs ruling was reversed by CA,
which was sustained by SC, and case was remanded to CTA. CTA rendered a decision in favor of ICC. It ruled that
the deductions for professional and security services were properly claimed, it said that even if services were
rendered in 1984 or 1985, the amount is not yet determined at that time. Hence it is a proper deduction in 1986. It
likewise found that it is the BIR which overstate the interest income, when it applied compounding absent any
stipulation.
Petitioner appealed to CA, which affirmed CTA, hence the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the expenses for professional and security services are deductible.
Held: No. One of the requisites for the deductibility of ordinary and necessary expenses is that it must have been
paid or incurred during the taxable year. This requisite is dependent on the method of accounting of the taxpayer. In
the case at bar, ICC is using the accrual method of accounting. Hence, under this method, an expense is recognized
when it is incurred. Under a Revenue Audit Memorandum, when the method of accounting is accrual, expenses not
being claimed as deductions by a taxpayer in the current year when they are incurred cannot be claimed in the
succeeding year.
The accrual of income and expense is permitted when the all-events test has been met. This test requires: 1) fixing of
a right to income or liability to pay; and 2) the availability of the reasonable accurate determination of such income or
liability. The test does not demand that the amount of income or liability be known absolutely, only that a taxpayer has
at its disposal the information necessary to compute the amount with reasonable accuracy.
From the nature of the claimed deductions and the span of time during which the firm was retained, ICC can be
expected to have reasonably known the retainer fees charged by the firm. They cannot give as an excuse the
delayed billing, since it could have inquired into the amount of their obligation and reasonably determine the amount.

4. Final Demand Letter

CIR v. Ayala Securities Corp., 70 SCRA 204 (1976)

Facts: An assessment made on 21 February 1961 by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against the Ayala
Securities Corporation (and received by the latter on 22 March 1961) in the sum of P758,687.04 on its surplus of
P2,758,442.37 for its fiscal year ending 30 September 1955. Raised before the Court of Tax Appeals, the tax court
reversed the assessment of the 25% surtax and interest in the amount of P758,687.04, and thereby cancelled and
declared of no force and effect the assessment of the Commissioner for 1955.
On 8 April 1976, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and ruled that the assessment
fell under the 5-year prescriptive period provided in section 331 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and
that the assessment had, therefore, been made after the expiration of the said 5-year prescriptive period and was of
no binding force and effect. The Commissioner moved for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court set aside its decision of 8 April 1976, and rendered in lieu thereof another judgment ordering the
corporation to pay the assessment in the sum of P758,687.04 as 25% surtax on its unreasonably accumulated
surplus, plus the 5% surcharge and 1% monthly interest thereon, pursuant to section 51 (e) of the NIRC, as amended
by RA 2343; with costs.
BRIEF:

Ayala Securities Corp filed its ITR w/ the CIR for the fiscal year w/c ended on Sept 30, 1955.
Attached to its ITR was the audited financial statements showing a surplus of P2M+.
Income tax due on the return was duly paid w/in the period prescribed by law.
CIR then advised Ayala for the assessment of P758k unpaid tax on its accumulated surplus.
Ayala protested ate assessment and sought reconsideration given that the accumulation was 1) for a bona
fide business purpose and not to avoid imposition of tax, and 2) assessment was issued beyond 5 yrs.
CTA and SC both held that the assessment was made beyond the 5-year period and thus had no binding
force and effect.
I: W/n the assessment was done beyond the prescriptive period
R: YES.
In this case, the applicable provision is NOT Sec 332a but Sec 331.
Sec 332 should apply when there is fraud / falsity on the return with intent to evade payment of tax.
There is no evidence presented by the CIR in this case as to any fraud/falsity on the return w/ intent to avoid
payment.
Fraud is a question of fact, circumstances must be proven and alleged.
In this case, the assessment issued on Feb 21, 1961, received by Ayala on March 22, 1961, was made
BEYOND the 5 year period prescribed under Sec331 (Ayala could file its income tax on or before Jan 1956
thus, assessment must be made NOT later than Jan 1961). Thus, it was no longer binding on Ayala Securities.

Surigao Electric Co. Inc. v. CTA, 57 SCRA 523 (1974)

Surigao vs CTA 57 SCRA 523

Facts: Petitioner Surigao Electric Co., grantee of a legislative electric franchise, contested a warrant of distraint and
levy to enforce the collection from "Mainit Electric" of a deficiency franchise tax plus surcharge. Thereafter the
Commissioner, by letter dated April 2, 1961, advised the petitioner to take up the matter with the General Auditing
Office, enclosing a copy of the 4th Indorsement of the Auditor General dated November 23, 1960. This indorsement
indicated that the petitioner's liability for deficiency franchise tax for the period from September 1947 to June 1959
was P21,156.06, excluding surcharge. Subsequently, in a letter to the Auditor General dated August 2, 1962, the
petitioner asked for reconsideration of the assessment, admitting liability only for the 2% franchise tax in accordance
with its legislative franchise and not at the higher rate of 5% imposed by Sec. 259 of the NIRC, which latter rate the
Auditor General used as basis in computing the petitioner's deficiency franchise tax. An exchange of correspondence
between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Commissioner and the Auditor General, on the other, ensued, all on
the matter of the petitioner's liability for deficiency franchise tax. The controversy culminated in a revised assessment
dated April 29, 1963 in the amount of P11,533.53, representing the petitioner's deficiency franchise-tax and
surcharges thereon for the period from April 1, 1956 to June 30, 1959. The petitioner then requested a recomputation

of the revised assessment in a letter to the Commissioner dated June 6, 1963. The Commissioner, however, in a
letter dated June 28, 1963 denied the request for recomputation.
Petitioner appealed to the CTA which was subsequently dismised on the ground that the appeal was filed beyond the
thirty-day period of appeal provided by Sec. 11 of Republic Act 1125.
Issue:
WON the petitioner's appeal to the CTA was time-barred.
Ruling:
YES. To sustain the petitioner's contention that the Commissioner's letter of June 28, 1963 denying its request for
further amendment of the revised assessment constitutes the ruling appealable to the tax court and that the thirty-day
period should, therefore, be counted from July 16, 1963, the day it received the June 28, 1963 letter, would, in effect,
leave solely to the petitioner's will the determination of the commencement of the statutory thirty-day period, and
place the petitioner and for that matter, any taxpayer in a position, to delay at will and on convenience the
finality of a tax assessment. This absurd interpretation espoused by the petitioner would result in grave detriment to
the interests of the Government, considering that taxes constitute its life-blood and their prompt and certain
availability is an imperative need.

5. Filing of Collection Suit

CIR v. Union Shipping Corp., 185 SCRA 547 (1990)
FACTS: In a letter dated December 27, 1974 petitioner assessed against Yee Fong Hong, Ltd. and/or herein private
respondent Union Shipping Corporation for deficiency income taxes due for the years 1971 and 1972. Private
respondent protested the assessment.
Petitioner, without ruling on the protest, issued a Warrant of Distraint and Levy. In a letter, private respondent
reiterated its request for reinvestigation. Petitioner, again, without acting on the request for reinvestigation and
reconsideration of the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, filed a collection suit against private respondent.
In 1979, private respondent filed with respondent court a Petition for Review. The CTA ruled in favor of private
respondent. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a warrant of distraint and levy is proof of the finality of an assessment and is
tantamount to an outright denial of a motion for reconsideration of an assessment.
HELD: The Supreme Court had already laid down the dictum that the Commissioner should always indicate to the
taxpayer in clear and unequivocal language what constitutes his final determination of the disputed assessment.
There appears to be no dispute that petitioner did not rule on private respondent's motion for reconsideration but
contrary to the above ruling of this Court, left private respondent in the dark as to which action of the Commissioner is
the decision appealable to the Court of Tax Appeals. Had he categorically stated that he denies private respondent's
motion for reconsideration and that his action constitutes his final determination on the disputed assessment, private
respondent without needless difficulty would have been able to determine when his right to appeal accrues and the
resulting confusion would have been avoided.

6. Referral to Solicitor General for Collection

Republic v. Lim Tian Teng Sons & Co., supra
(THIS CASE IS IN WEEK 8 or 9 whatever)

7. Issuance of Warrant of Distraint and Levy

Central Cement Corporation v. CIR, CTA Case No. 4312, Sept. 1,

1993

CIR v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)

Advertising Associates, Inc. v. CA, 133 SCRA 765 (1984)
D. Period to Appeal/Effect of Failure to Appeal
Sec. 228, last par., NIRC
Sec. 11, Rep. Act. No. 1125, as amended by Rep. Act. No. 9282
St. Stephens Association v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 104 Phil. 314
(1958)
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cebu v. Collector, 4 SCRA 279 (1962)
Pantranco v. Blaquera, 107 Phil. 975 (1960)
Basa v. Republic, 138 SCRA 34 (1985)
Mambulao Lumber Co. v. CIR, 132 SCRA 1 (1984)
E. Mode of Appeal and Effect of Appeal
1. Appeal to a Division of the CTA
Sec. 11, Rep. Act. No. 1125, as amended by Rep. Act. No. 9282
2. Appeal to CTA En Banc
Sec. 18, Rep. Act. No. 1125, as amended by Rep. Act. No. 9282
IV. APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
Sec. 19, Rep. Act. No. 1125, as amended by Rep. Act. No. 9282
Section 19. Review by certiorari. - Any ruling, order or decision of the Court of Tax Appeals may likewise be
reviewed by the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari in proper cases. Proceedings in the Supreme Court upon a
writ of certiorari or a petition for review, as the case may be, shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court or such rules as the Supreme Court may prescribe.