Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18463

October 4, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the
Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered
that certain documents which constituted the records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine
Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the
Senate informed that body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover
the guilty party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the
newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the scandalous robbery of
records which were kept and preserved in the iron safe of the Senate, yet up to this time
there is not the slightest indication that the author or authors of the crime will ever be
discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente itself, and the
persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not have to display great skill in
order to succeed in their undertaking, unless they should encounter the insuperable obstacle
of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances that have
surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of the place in which
it was committed.

How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their conscience and with
serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of the Senate
have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who secured their election
through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution authorizing its
committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which should be taken with reference
to the article published inLa Nacion. On September 15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution
authorizing the President of the Senate to indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and
corresponding action, all the papers referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor,
Mr. Gregorio Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of
Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in which it was
alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. The defendant
Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and again in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had rested, the
defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the
Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable
George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of Spain for the
protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King against free
speech and action by Spanish subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was
doubtless considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative than to
insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other articles of that Code,
was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the dominion of Spain because the
King's subject in the Philippines might defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or
other representatives of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other
persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said provision,
with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into "innocuous desuetude," but
the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has, by a majority decision, held that said article
256 is the law of the land to-day. . . .
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding upon this court
until otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal offense, and
little importance is attached to them, because they are generally the result of political
controversy and are usually regarded as more or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this
character upon a legislative body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such
publications are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the
provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come to us from the
Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes punishment for persons who use
insulting language about Ministers of the Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain

doubtless left the need of such protection to his ministers and others in authority in the
Philippines as well as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority decision, has
held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made an insulting remark about the
President of the United States was punishable under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it
applicable in that case, it would appear to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256
must be enforced, without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other
legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty as charged in the
information and under article 256 of their Penal Code sentences him to suffer two months
and one day of arresto mayor and the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the
costs of both instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an extensive brief, and
eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his learned counsel, all reduce themselves to
the pertinent and decisive question which was announced in the beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow the rule
announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case,
the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or
words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with
the writer of the instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was
deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the Spanish Penal
Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the
opinion that the Court of First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of
his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment
appealed from and ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new
trial. Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case
has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the Helbig case, in view
of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case
and the case before us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there
was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new
point which, under the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto
case, urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not restrained, as
was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much prefer to resolve the question
before us unhindered by references to the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result can be had. A
majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect
of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or
insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of
article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused
should be acquitted for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a
violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256 was

abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and
is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we will discuss the
two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code.
The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the Philippine Commission shortly after
organization of this legislative body. Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation,
expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical
exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the honesty,
virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of one who is alive, and
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws
and parts of laws now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby
repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict therewith, and that
the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of
Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been particularly
affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1.
Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on
the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of the Libel
Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and insults, and it was found that
those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of
writing an publicity entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p.
842,ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code, as for instance
article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in writing, which may
have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine
Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel,
as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable
when defaming a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be
recognized as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law,
art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the author of a libel
charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the
range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal
Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any
person who, by . . .writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person
in authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-known rule of
statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the old subject-matter of
antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give
expression in it to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary
implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident

that Act No. 277 had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by
writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have affected
article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the Philippine son article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code. Appellant's main proposition in the lower court and again
energetically pressed in the appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is
not now in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty
over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic principles of government. This
view was indirectly favored by the trial judge, and, as before stated, is the opinion of three
members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title I of Book II
punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or independence of the state,
crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes the
crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortesand its members and against the council of
ministers, crimes against the form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion
and worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes of
rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and contempts,
insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against
their agents and other public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in
Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or
deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with
an article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now being weighed in
the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or
the offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is,
the defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for there
could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America), or other person in authority in
the Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to do with such
subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of
ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of
whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of
a municipal law or political law, and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States
and the characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations
of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the laws regulating
the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter
[1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542;
Roa vs. Collector of Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme
Court stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances and

regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions and Constitution of the new government
are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of political jurisdiction and legislative power and the
latter is involved in the former to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to
that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It cannot be admitted that the
King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives;
and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them.
Every nation acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and
laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it."
(Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the Military
Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the municipal laws of the
conquered territory affecting private rights of person and property and providing for the punishment
of crime were nominally continued in force in so far as they were compatible with the new order of
things. But President McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first
effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political
relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that day to this, the
ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under consideration were still effective. To
paraphrase the language of the United States Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910],
217 U. S., 349), there was not and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a
careful consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they
accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had been 'made
the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been squarely raised, the
appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain portions of the Spanish codes repugnant
t democratic institutions and American constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18;
U.S.vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533;
Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under American sovereignty
was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the
Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to
prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he government which they are
establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views,
but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their
prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable
requisites of just and effective government. At the same time the Commission should bear in
mind, and the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are
certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental
system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual
freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by
us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be
essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these
principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands
for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs

or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened
thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and
rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our Supreme Court,
in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed
the government on the model with which American are familiar, and which has proven best adapted
for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their customs, habits, and
prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley, demand obeisance to authority, and royal
protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the Government of
Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the King. With the change of
sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines. It was
in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for convenience certain of the existing
institutions and laws were continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes,
on the individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person
in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only with bated breath. "In the
eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal
rights with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of respectability and intelligence
as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to
freely enter and abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the
life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man may lawfully
do what he will, so long as it is notmalum in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the
qually sacred rights of others." (State vs.Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United States are
derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which words which would not be
actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or
of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special damage. The Crown of
England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the
Emperors Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since,
become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is not known. In
the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the
Government, the Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so much
popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is
recognized, and in practice a person holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any
person may let fly his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his character free plunder
for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p.
245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American
character and system of government. The gulf which separates this article from the spirit which
inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a monarchy from
a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This article was crowded out by implication as

soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all
proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the nature
of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the
public, have been obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands.
1awph!l.net

From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes contempts against
executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment
for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American principles.
Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it
is an agent and servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and
obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction. The American
system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience where such respect and
obedience is due, but never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official
position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for
contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris.
Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion, although for different
reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with
costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the acquittal of the accused,
for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of article 256
of the Penal Code; for although that article is in force with respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by
deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof, outside of
his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult
committed against an authority by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.
ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has not been shown either
under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except as it refers to "Ministers
of the Crown," whom we do not have in our Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing
or printing, committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by reason thereof,
which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.
Johnson, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge
Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."

The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice
Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to
whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint for
partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased Francisco Reyes, the
common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola alleged among other
things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was not a daughter of the deceased
Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola,
she being the only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa
Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his
second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by the deceased were all the
conjugal properties of the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties
were acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there was any
partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first be partitioned into two
parts, and one part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the share of the
latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the
deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his children by his two
marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge Asuncion in Civil
Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon
a preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds, and hereby renders
judgment (1) Declaring the plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes as the only
children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes
Diaz to Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales to
have been an illegitimate child of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring
Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and 1/4 of Lot
1145 as belonging to the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Francisco Reyes Diaz and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304
and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the spouses Francisco
Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez in common partnership; (5) Declaring
that 1/2 of Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the deceased
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring the defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, being the only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa
Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of each of Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506; and the remaining onehalf (1/2) of each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as
belonging to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene
Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 2304
and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining

one-half (1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2) of onefourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the estate of Francisco
Reyes Diaz; (8) Directing the division or partition of the estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to give or grant to Irene
Ondez, as surviving widow of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary
share of. one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of Francisco Reyes
Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art. 892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the
remaining portion of the estate to be divided among the plaintiffs
Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes, Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the total share of plaintiff
Sinforosa R. Bales in the hereditary estate shall not exceed the
equivalent of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each of the
other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983, New Civil Code), each of
the latter to receive equal shares from the hereditary estate, (Ramirez
vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs. Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.]
p. 33); (9) Directing the parties, within thirty days after this judgment
shall have become final to submit to this court, for approval a project
of partition of the hereditary estate in the proportion above indicated,
and in such manner as the parties may, by agreement, deemed
convenient and equitable to them taking into consideration the
location, kind, quality, nature and value of the properties involved;
(10) Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and defendant
Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the costs of this suit, in the proportion
of one-third (1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by the
second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other claims of the parties [pp
27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on October
16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which is marked
Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of partition was not signed by the
parties themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant,
Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for
convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this
Court for approval the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled
case, to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project
of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong
exclusively to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters
along the eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to
Bernardita R. Macariola;

3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa

Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters
along the western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to
Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes
and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking
the portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded
to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that
the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to
Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Project of Partition
indicated above which is made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have
signed this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both
counsels of the respective parties to this Court that the Project of
Partition, as above- quoted, had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant approving the above
Project of Partition, and that both lawyers had represented to the
Court that they are given full authority to sign by themselves the
Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the above-quoted
Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby approves the
same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such papers,
documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were
adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of
Partition and the delivery of the respective properties adjudicated to
each one in view of said Project of Partition, and to perform such
other acts as are legal and necessary to effectuate the said Project of
Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October, 1963.

(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge

EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11, 1963, only for
the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of the Province of Leyte to
issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in
conformity with the project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or rather
one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which according to the
decision was the exclusive property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was
adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela,
and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project of partition
was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided
into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in Judge Asuncion's
court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq.
meters was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued
transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of Tacloban
(Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E
with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S.
Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation
purposes (Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their
respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders of the
corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as
the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of
Incorporation of "The Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we
shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint dated August 6,
1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge Asuncion violated Article 1491,
paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was
one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated
Article 14, paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by associating himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he
was a judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an
impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador
Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in

fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar;
and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics by respondent
Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply was filed on
October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this
case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and
recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27,
1971 recommending that respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the
first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent should
be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On the third
and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), complainant
herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that
some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon
was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was
filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on
August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was
no longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the
portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already
sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the
cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez,
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial,
Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A.
Tolete were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her counsel.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, who was
directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now
Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of the Project of
Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the
partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay defendant Judge Elias
B. Asuncion,

(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P400,000.00]

for moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS [P200,000.001
for exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS [P50,000.00] for nominal
damages; and
(d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's
Fees.
B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT MARIQUITA
VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND FOR THE HEIRS OF THE
DECEASED GERARDO VILLASIN
(1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs
of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of
Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.
C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SINFOROSA R.
BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010

(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer,
Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT BONIFACIO RAMO
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the Court of Appeals
upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R. Macariola, under her
first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of
the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those
properties involved in Civil Case No. 3010. 'That Article provides:

Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is
the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property" (The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519
[1979], Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E,
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because
none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in question
was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965,
respondent's order dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11,
1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31,
1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or
more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes,
Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold
on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife
who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to
the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and
his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and
of the subsequent two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before
the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of
partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and the
subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from
Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in

Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963.
Therefore, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no longer alter,
change or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of
Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or
orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one
year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the
project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph
5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio
Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal
the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval
of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice
thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question whether or not the
acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the subsequent transfer of
the whole lot to "TRADERS" of which respondent was the President and his wife the
Secretary, was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the project of
partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the transactions
between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E, and he insists that
there is no evidence whatsoever to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase
of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in the record showing
that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot
1184-E from the Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable
citizen, credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he bought Lot
1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from the Reyeses without any
intervention of, or previous understanding with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in approving the
project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of
the Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required the signature of the
parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the project of partition submitted to
him for approval; however, whatever error was committed by respondent in that
respect was done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by
Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola, That he was

authorized by his client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24,
January 20, 1969). While it is true that such written authority if there was any, was
not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate
the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only one that was presented as
respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to
believe that she knew the contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she
gave her conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban
Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh.
9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U)
approving the project of partition was duly entered and registered on November 26,
1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by Bernardita Reyes
Macariola onOctober 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector Decena the one-fourth share
of the late Francisco Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated
that she was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having been
adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father Francisco Reyes Diaz as
per decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A).
The deed of sale was duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted that in the project
of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was approved by respondent on October
23, 1963, followed by an amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather
1/4 thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot 1154 which
complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963, several days after the
preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her onefourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010 and not because
of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from the
decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the
estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was the share
of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see
Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot
1154 only by means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola
sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was wen
aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and
B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during the
cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot
1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that
she could not have been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative
to the project of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according to her the
properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the least valuable.

Complainant, however, did not present any direct and positive evidence to prove the
alleged gross inequalities in the choice and distribution of the real properties when
she could have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location, kind, the
assessed and market value of said properties. Without such evidence there is
nothing in the record to show that there were inequalities in the distribution of the
properties of complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New
Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was,
however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the
performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as
aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of
respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in
litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were
ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the judiciary
has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of
justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give
cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case
of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was
no longer in litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and not from the
parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and
transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible
suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in civil case
3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers
practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations
and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said
corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy,
nor can they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial
intervention in commercial or industrial companies within the limits of the districts,
provinces, or towns in which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public
prosecution in active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors,
municipal judges, and municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance
are temporarily discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx

5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in
a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public
officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that
political law embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the
law on public officers and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more
of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public officers and
employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de
Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took
effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States
to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have
been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another,
either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their
nature and pertain to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease
upon the transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of
the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of
the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14).
However, such political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued in force if the
conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the
war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S.
220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of
Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that
the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change.
Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new
relations are created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country,

transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which
may be denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that
which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals,
remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the
State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States
and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has
no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First
Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H, Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides
that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt
practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because there is no
showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or
transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar, the
business of the corporation in which respondent participated has obviously no relation or connection
with his judicial office. The business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes
or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case
involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on
public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any contract or business in which it
is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is
necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and,
hence, the official who intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office
cannot commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by Justice
Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any undue advantage
in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the
corporation benefited in one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed
that there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which

the corporation was either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita
R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein sought to
recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No.
4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge
Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having
disposed of his interest therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no provision in
both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an existing law expressly
prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the Judiciary Act of
1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said
law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after
office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging in commerce is,
as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to
America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against the purchase by
judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose jurisdiction they perform their duties,
cannot apply to respondent Judge because the sale of the lot in question to him took place after the
finality of his decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of
partition; hence, the property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant to the Civil
Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service from engaging in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of department, the same, however,
may not fall within the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution or law on any
public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service, that
is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the Department Head may not
constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil
Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the
Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private
business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the Judiciary, is covered by
Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7,
Article X, 1973 Constitution.

Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested in the
President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only on two grounds,
namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court,
which alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister)
of Justice to conduct the corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the
grounds and prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme Court can
discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner may, for ...
violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the
interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him in
rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding
six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action
against civil service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or employees subject to
the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service; for, certainly, the Commissioner is not
the head of the Judicial Department to which they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section
89) and the Civil Service Law itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the
Supreme Court (Sec. 20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is
the only other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution). Besides, a
violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for disciplinary action against
judges because to recognize the same as applicable to them, would be adding another ground for
the discipline of judges and, as aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two
grounds for their removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner of Civil Service
who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after
submission to it, all administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the
competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their
removal, separation, and suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and
efficiency of such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question that a judge
belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government as a Presidential appointee
and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting
Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees
who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of
Civil Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619
[1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, is not violative of
the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to
the Civil Service Act of 1959, the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon
25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:

A judge should abstain from making personal investments in enterprises which are
apt to be involved in litigation in his court; and, after his accession to the bench, he
should not retain such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient
to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable that he should,
so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all relations which would normally tend to
arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his
impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had withdrawn on
January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their respective shares to third parties,
and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12,
1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of respondent on
January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by respondent and his wife of their
shares in the corporation only 22 days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that
respondent realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon
25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate
withdrawal from the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that respondent was guilty
of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable
defiance of the law and utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of
the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of
action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that respondent
associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan who openly and
publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in
truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys
and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was an "impostor" and
claims that all the time he believed that the latter was a bona fide member of the bar.
I see no reason for disbelieving this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by
complainant that Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorneyat-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the words "Attorneyat Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and it was but natural for respondent
and any person for that matter to have accepted that statement on its face value.
"Now with respect to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of
fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting his wife to be a
godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M & M-1), that fact even if true did not
render respondent guilty of violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his
friendly relations with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official
actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is no tangible
convincing proof that herein respondent gave any undue privileges in his court to
Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the latter benefitted in his practice of law from his

personal relations with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on
the Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador Tan.
Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to refrain as much as
possible from maintaining close friendly relations with practising attorneys and
litigants in his court so as to avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or
friendship constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30, Canons
of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social relations, that in itself would not
constitute a ground for disciplinary action unless it be clearly shown that his social
relations be clouded his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his
friends (pp. 403-405, rec.).
In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, did
not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which was in litigation in his court and in
engaging in business by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, he should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business
activities, because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized with
propriety but must always be above suspicion.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Guerrero, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, JJ.,
concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos and Esolin JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

MANUEL B. IMBONG, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME FERRER, as Chairman of the Comelec, LINO M. PATAJO and CESAR MILAFLOR, as
members thereof, respondents.
G.R. No. L-32443 September 11, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE
VALIDITY OF R.A. No. 6132, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
ACT OF 1970. RAUL M. t,petitioner,
vs.
COMELEC, respondent.
Manuel B. Imbong in his own behalf.
Raul M. Gonzales in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Acting Assistant Solicitor General Ricardo L.
Pronove, Jr., and Solicitors Raul I. Goco, Bernardo P. Pardo, Rosalio A. de Leon, Vicente A. Torres
and Guillermo C. Nakar for respondents.

Lorenzo Taada, Arturo Tolentino, Jovito Salonga and Emmanuel Pelaez as amici curiae.

MAKASIAR, J.:
These two separate but related petitions for declaratory relief were filed pursuant to Sec. 19 of R.A.
No. 6132 by petitioners Manuel B. Imbong and Raul M. Gonzales, both members of the Bar,
taxpayers and interested in running as candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
Both impugn the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming during the oral argument that it
prejudices their rights as such candidates. After the Solicitor General had filed answers in behalf the
respondents, hearings were held at which the petitioners and the amici curiae, namely Senator
Lorenzo Taada, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Senator Jovito Salonga, and Senator Emmanuel Pelaez
argued orally.
It will be recalled that on March 16, 1967, Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to
Art. XV of the Constitution, passed Resolution No. 2 which among others called for a Constitutional
Convention to propose constitutional amendments to be composed of two delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those of Congressmen, to be
elected on the second Tuesday of November, 1970 in accordance with the Revised Election Code.
After the adoption of said Res. No. 2 in 1967 but before the November elections of that year,
Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 4914 implementing the aforesaid
Resolution No. 2 and practically restating in toto the provisions of said Resolution No. 2.
On June 17, 1969, Congress, also acting as a Constituent Assembly, passed Resolution No. 4
amending the aforesaid Resolution No. 2 of March 16, 1967 by providing that the convention "shall
be composed of 320 delegates apportioned among the existing representative districts according to
the number of their respective inhabitants: Provided, that a representative district shall be entitled to
at least two delegates, who shall have the same qualifications as those required of members of the
House of Representatives," 1 "and that any other details relating to the specific apportionment of
delegates, election of delegates to, and the holding of, the Constitutional Convention shall be embodied in
an implementing legislation: Provided, that it shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this
Resolution." 2
On August 24, 1970, Congress, acting as a legislative body, enacted Republic Act No. 6132,
implementing Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4, and expressly repealing R.A. No.
4914. 3
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales assails the validity of the entire law as well as the particular provisions
embodied in Sections 2, 4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a). Petitioner Manuel B. Imbong impugns the
constitutionality of only par. I of Sec. 8(a) of said R.A. No. 6132 practically on the same grounds
advanced by petitioner Gonzales.
I
The validity of Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 6132, which considers, all public officers and employees, whether
elective or appointive, including members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as officers
and employees of corporations or enterprises of the government, as resigned from the date of the

filing of their certificates of candidacy, was recently sustained by this Court, on the grounds, inter
alia, that the same is merely an application of and in consonance with the prohibition in Sec. 2 of Art.
XII of the Constitution and that it does not constitute a denial of due process or of the equal
protection of the law. Likewise, the constitutionality of paragraph 2 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 was
upheld. 4
II
Without first considering the validity of its specific provisions, we sustain the constitutionality of the
enactment of R.A. No. 6132 by Congress acting as a legislative body in the exercise of its broad lawmaking authority, and not as a Constituent Assembly, because
1. Congress, when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution, has full and plenary authority to propose Constitutional amendments or
to call a convention for the purpose, by a three-fourths vote of each House in joint
session assembled but voting separately. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 calling for a
constitutional convention were passed by the required three-fourths vote.
2. The grant to Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority to call
a constitutional convention includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary
implication, all other powers essential to the effective exercise of the principal power
granted, such as the power to fix the qualifications, number, apportionment, and
compensation of the delegates as well as appropriation of funds to meet the
expenses for the election of delegates and for the operation of the Constitutional
Convention itself, as well as all other implementing details indispensable to a fruitful
convention. Resolutions Nos. 2 and 4 already embody the above-mentioned details,
except the appropriation of funds.
3. While the authority to call a constitutional convention is vested by the present
Constitution solely and exclusively in Congress acting as a Constituent Assembly, the
power to enact the implementing details, which are now contained in Resolutions
Nos. 2 and 4 as well as in R.A. No. 6132, does not exclusively pertain to Congress
acting as a Constituent Assembly. Such implementing details are matters within the
competence of Congress in the exercise of its comprehensive legislative power,
which power encompasses all matters not expressly or by necessary implication
withdrawn or removed by the Constitution from the ambit of legislative action. And as
lone as such statutory details do not clash with any specific provision of the
constitution, they are valid.
4. Consequently, when Congress, acting as a Constituent Assembly, omits to provide
for such implementing details after calling a constitutional convention, Congress,
acting as a legislative body, can enact the necessary implementing legislation to fill in
the gaps, which authority is expressly recognized in Sec. 8 of Res No. 2 as amended
by Res. No. 4.
5. The fact that a bill providing for such implementing details may be vetoed by the
President is no argument against conceding such power in Congress as a legislative
body nor present any difficulty; for it is not irremediable as Congress can override the

Presidential veto or Congress can reconvene as a Constituent Assembly and adopt a

resolution prescribing the required implementing details.
III
Petitioner Raul M. Gonzales asserts that Sec. 2 on the apportionment of delegates is not in
accordance with proportional representation and therefore violates the Constitution and the intent of
the law itself, without pinpointing any specific provision of the Constitution with which it collides.
Unlike in the apportionment of representative districts, the Constitution does not expressly or
impliedly require such apportionment of delegates to the convention on the basis of population in
each congressional district. Congress, sitting as a Constituent Assembly, may constitutionally
allocate one delegate for, each congressional district or for each province, for reasons of economy
and to avoid having an unwieldy convention. If the framers of the present Constitution wanted the
apportionment of delegates to the convention to be based on the number of inhabitants in each
representative district, they would have done so in so many words as they did in relation to the
apportionment of the representative districts. 5
The apportionment provided for in Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 cannot possibly conflict with its own intent
expressed therein; for it merely obeyed and implemented the intent of Congress acting as a
Constituent Assembly expressed in Sec. 1 of Res. No. 4, which provides that the 320 delegates
should be apportioned among the existing representative districts according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, but fixing a minimum of at least two delegates for a representative district.
The presumption is that the factual predicate, the latest available official population census, for such
apportionment was presented to Congress, which, accordingly employed a formula for the
necessary computation to effect the desired proportional representation.
The records of the proceedings on Senate Bill No. 77 sponsored by Senator Pelaez which is now
R.A. No. 6132, submitted to this Tribunal by the amici curiae, show that it based its apportionment of
the delegates on the 1970 official preliminary population census taken by the Bureau of Census and
Statistics from May 6 to June 30, 1976; and that Congress adopted the formula to effect a
reasonable apportionment of delegates. The Director of the Bureau of Census and Statistics himself,
in a letter to Senator Pelaez dated July 30, 1970, stated that "on the basis of the preliminary count of
the population, we have computed the distribution of delegates to the Constitutional Convention
based on Senate Bill 77 (p. 2 lines 5 to 32 and p. 3 line 12) which is a fair and an equitable method
of distributing the delegates pursuant to the provisions of the joint Resolution of both Houses No. 2,
as amended. Upon your request at the session of the Senate-House Conference Committee
meeting last night, we are submitting herewith the results of the computation on the basis of the
above-stated method."
Even if such latest census were a preliminary census, the same could still be a valid basis for such
apportionment.6 The fact that the lone and small congressional district of Batanes, may be overrepresented, because it is allotted two delegates by R.A. No. 6132 despite the fact that it has a population
very much less than several other congressional districts, each of which is also allotted only two
delegates, and therefore under-represented, vis-a-vis Batanes alone, does not vitiate the apportionment
as not effecting proportional representation. Absolute proportional apportionment is not required and is
not possible when based on the number of inhabitants, for the population census cannot be accurate nor
complete, dependent as it is on the diligence of the census takers, aggravated by the constant movement
of population, as well as daily death and birth. It is enough that the basis employed is reasonable and the

resulting apportionment is substantially proportional. Resolution No. 4 fixed a minimum of two delegates
for a congressional district.

While there may be other formulas for a reasonable apportionment considering the evidence
submitted to Congress by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, we are not prepared to rule that the
computation formula adopted by, Congress for proportional representation as, directed in Res. No. 4
is unreasonable and that the apportionment provided in R.A. No. 6132 does not constitute a
substantially proportional representation.
In the Macias case, relied on by petitioner Gonzales, the apportionment law, which was nullified as
unconstitutional, granted more representatives to a province with less population than the provinces
with more inhabitants. Such is not the case here, where under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 6132 Batanes is
allotted only two delegates, which number is equal to the number of delegates accorded other
provinces with more population. The present petitions therefore do not present facts which fit the
mould of the doctrine in the case of Macias et al. vs. Comelec, supra.
The impossibility of absolute proportional representation is recognized by the Constitution itself when
it directs that the apportionment of congressional districts among the various provinces shall be "as
nearly as may be according to their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one
member" (Sec. 5, Art. VI, Phil. Const., emphasis supplied). The employment of the phrase "as nearly
as may be according to their respective inhabitants" emphasizes the fact that the human mind can
only approximate a reasonable apportionment but cannot effect an absolutely proportional
representation with mathematical precision or exactitude.
IV
Sec. 5 of R.A. 6132 is attacked on the ground that it is an undue deprivation of liberty without due
process of law and denies the equal protection of the laws. Said Sec. 5 disqualifies any elected
delegate from running "for any public office in any election" or from assuming "any appointive office
or position in any branch of the government government until after the final adjournment of the
Constitutional Convention."
That the citizen does not have any inherent nor natural right to a public office, is axiomatic under our
constitutional system. The State through its Constitution or legislative body, can create an office and
define the qualifications and disqualifications therefor as well as impose inhibitions on a public
officer. Consequently, only those with qualifications and who do not fall under any constitutional or
statutory inhibition can be validly elected or appointed to a public office. The obvious reason for the
questioned inhibition, is to immunize the delegates from the perverting influence of self-interest,
party interest or vested interest and to insure that he dedicates all his time to performing solely in the
interest of the nation his high and well nigh sacred function of formulating the supreme law of the
land, which may endure for generations and which cannot easily be changed like an ordinary statute.
With the disqualification embodied in Sec. 5, the delegate will not utilize his position as a bargaining
leverage for concessions in the form of an elective or appointive office as long as the convention has
not finally adjourned. The appointing authority may, by his appointing power, entice votes for his own
proposals. Not love for self, but love for country must always motivate his actuations as delegate;
otherwise the several provisions of the new Constitution may only satisfy individual or special
interests, subversive of the welfare of the general citizenry. It should be stressed that the
disqualification is not permanent but only temporary only to continue until the final adjournment of
the convention which may not extend beyond one year. The convention that framed the present

Constitution finished its task in approximately seven months from July 30, 1934 to February 8,
1935.
As admitted by petitioner Gonzales, this inhibition finds analogy in the constitutional provision
prohibiting a member of Congress, during the time for which he was elected, from being appointed to
any civil office which may have been created or the emolument whereof shall have been increased
while he was a member of the Congress. (Sec. 16, Art. VI, Phil. Constitution.)
As observed by the Solicitor General in his Answer, the overriding objective of the challenged
disqualification, temporary in nature, is to compel the elected delegates to serve in full their term as
such and to devote all their time to the convention, pursuant to their representation and commitment
to the people; otherwise, his seat in the convention will be vacant and his constituents will be
deprived of a voice in the convention. The inhibition is likewise "designed to prevent popular political
figures from controlling elections or positions. Also it is a brake on the appointing power, to curtail the
latter's desire to 'raid' the convention of "talents" or attempt to control the convention." (p. 10, Answer
in L-32443.)
Thus the challenged disqualification prescribed in Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 6132 is a valid limitation on the
right to public office pursuant to state police power as it is reasonable and not arbitrary.
The discrimination under Sec. 5 against delegates to the Constitutional Convention is likewise
constitutional; for it is based on a substantial distinction which makes for real differences, is germane
to the purposes of the law, and applies to all members of the same class. 7 The function of a delegate
is more far-reaching and its effect more enduring than that of any ordinary legislator or any other public
officer. A delegate shapes the fundamental law of the land which delineates the essential nature of the
government, its basic organization and powers, defines the liberties of the people, and controls all other
laws. Unlike ordinary statutes, constitutional amendments cannot be changed in one or two years. No
other public officer possesses such a power, not even the members of Congress unless they themselves,
propose constitutional amendments when acting as a Constituent Assembly pursuant to Art. XV of the
Constitution. The classification, therefore, is neither whimsical nor repugnant to the sense of justice of the
community.
As heretofore intimated, the inhibition is relevant to the object of the law, which is to insure that the
proposed amendments are meaningful to the masses of our people and not designed for the
enhancement of selfishness, greed, corruption, or injustice.
Lastly, the disqualification applies to all the delegates to the convention who will be elected on the
second Tuesday of November, 1970.
V
Paragraph 1, Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is impugned by both petitioners as violative of the
constitutional guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, freedom of expressions,
freedom of assembly and freedom of association.
This Court ruled last year that the guarantees of due process, equal protection of the laws, peaceful
assembly, free expression, and the right of association are neither absolute nor illimitable rights; they
are always subject to the pervasive and dormant police power of the State and may be lawfully
abridged to serve appropriate and important public interests. 8

In said Gonzalez vs. Comelec case the Court applied the clear and present danger test to determine
whether a statute which trenches upon the aforesaid Constitutional guarantees, is a legitimate
exercise of police power. 9
Paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a), R.A. No. 6132 prohibits:
1. any candidate for delegate to the convention
(a) from representing, or
(b) allowing himself to be represented as being a candidate of any
political party or any other organization; and
2. any political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional
or other organizations or organized group of whatever nature from
(a) intervening in the nomination of any such candidate or in the filing
of his certificate, or
(b) from giving aid or support directly or indirectly, material or
otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election.
The ban against all political parties or organized groups of whatever nature contained in par. 1 of
Sec. 8(a), is confined to party or organization support or assistance, whether material, moral,
emotional or otherwise. The very Sec. 8(a) in its provisos permits the candidate to utilize in his
campaign the help of the members of his family within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, and a campaign staff composed of not more than one for every ten precincts in his district. It
allows the full exercise of his freedom of expression and his right to peaceful assembly, because he
cannot be denied any permit to hold a public meeting on the pretext that the provision of said section
may or will be violated. The right of a member of any political party or association to support him or
oppose his opponent is preserved as long as such member acts individually. The very party or
organization to which he may belong or which may be in sympathy with his cause or program of
reforms, is guaranteed the right to disseminate information about, or to arouse public interest in, or
to advocate for constitutional reforms, programs, policies or constitutional proposals for
amendments.
It is therefore patent that the restriction contained in Sec. 8(a) is so narrow that the basic
constitutional rights themselves remain substantially intact and inviolate. And it is therefore a valid
infringement of the aforesaid constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners.
In the aforesaid case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, this Court unanimously sustained the validity
of the limitation on the period for nomination of candidates in Sec. 50-A of R.A. No. 4880, thus:
The prohibition of too early nomination of candidates presents a question that is not
too formidable in character. According to the act: "It shall be unlawful for any political
party, political committee, or political group to nominate candidates for any elective
public office voted for at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately

preceding an election, and for any other elective public office earlier than ninety days
immediately preceding an election.
The right of association is affected. Political parties have less freedom as to the time
during which they may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, however, as
to render meaningless such a basic right. Their scope of legitimate activities, save
this one, is not unduly narrowed. Neither is there infringement of their freedom to
assemble. They can do so, but not for such a purpose. We sustain its validity. We do
so unanimously. 10
In said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court likewise held that the period for the conduct of an
election campaign or partisan political activity may be limited without offending the aforementioned
constitutional guarantees as the same is designed also to prevent a "clear and present danger of a
substantive evil, the debasement of the electoral process." 11
Even if the partisan activity consists of (a) forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or
other group of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against a party or candidate; (b) holding political conventions, caucuses,
conferences, meetings, rallies, parades or other similar assemblies for the purpose of soliciting votes
and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against any candidate or party; and (c)
giving, soliciting, or receiving contributions for election campaign either directly or indirectly, (Sec.
50-B, pars. (a), (b), and (c), R.A. 4880), the abridgment was still affirmed as constitutional by six
members of this Court, which could not "ignore ... the legislative declaration that its enactment was
in response to a serious substantive evil affecting the electoral process, not merely in danger of
happening, but actually in existence, and likely to continue unless curbed or remedied. To assert
otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the reality of the situation." 12;
Likewise, because four members dissented, this Court in said case of Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra,
failed to muster the required eight votes to declare as unconstitutional the limitation on the period for
(a) making speeches, announcements or commentaries or holding interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office; (b) publishing or distributing campaign literature or
materials; and (e) directly or indirectly soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or
propaganda for or against any candidate or party specified in Sec. 50-B, pars. (c), (d) & (e) of R.A.
4880. 13
The debasement of the electoral process as a substantive evil exists today and is one of the major
compelling interests that moved Congress into prescribing the total ban contained in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, to justify such ban. In the said Gonzales vs. Comelec case, this Court gave
"due recognition to the legislative concern to cleanse, and if possible, render spotless, the electoral
process," 14 impressed as it was by the explanation made by the author of R.A. No. 4880, Sen. Lorenzo
Taada, who appeared as amicus curiae, "that such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be
part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but
to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in
this country. He did invite our attention likewise to the well-settled doctrine that in the choice of remedies
for an admitted malady requiring governmental action, on the legislature primarily rests the responsibility.
Nor should the cure prescribed by it, unless clearly repugnant to fundamental rights, be ignored or
disregarded." 15

But aside from the clear and imminent danger of the debasement of the electoral process, as
conceded by Senator Pelaez, the basic motivation, according to Senate Majority Floor Leader
Senator Arturo Tolentino, the sponsor of the Puyat-Tolentino amendment embodied in par. 1 of Sec.
8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, is to assure the candidates equal protection of the laws by according them
equality of chances. 16 The primary purpose of the prohibition then is also to avert the clear and present
danger of another substantive evil, the denial of the equal protection of the laws. The candidates must
depend on their individual merits and not on the support of political parties or organizations. Senator
Tolentino and Senator Salonga emphasized that under this provision, the poor candidate has an even
chance as against the rich candidate. We are not prepared to disagree with them, because such a
conclusion, predicated as it is on empirical logic, finds support in our recent political history and
experience. Both Senators stressed that the independent candidate who wins in the election against a
candidate of the major political parties, is a rare phenomenon in this country and the victory of an
independent candidate mainly rests on his ability to match the resources, financial and otherwise, of the
political parties or organizations supporting his opponent. This position is further strengthened by the
principle that the guarantee of social justice under Sec. V, Art. II of the Constitution, includes the
guarantee of equal opportunity, equality of political rights, and equality before the law enunciated by Mr.
Justice Tuazon in the case Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration. 17
While it may be true that a party's support of a candidate is not wrong per se it is equally true that
Congress in the exercise of its broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as mala prohibita
when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such act is the party or organization support
proscribed in Sec. 8(a),which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated.
Senator Tolentino emphasized that "equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support." 18
The questioned par. 1 of Sec. 8 (a) likewise can easily pass the balancing-of-interest test.

19

In the apt words of the Solicitor General:

It is to be noted that right now the nation is on the threshold of rewriting its
Constitution in a hopeful endeavor to find a solution to the grave economic, social
and political problems besetting the country. Instead of directly proposing the
amendments Congress has chosen to call a Constitutional Convention which shall
have the task of fashioning a document that shall embody the aspirations and ideals
of the people. Because what is to be amended is the fundamental law of the land, it
is indispensable that the Constitutional Convention be composed of delegates truly
representative of the people's will. Public welfare demands that the delegates should
speak for the entire nation, and their voices be not those of a particular segment of
the citizenry, or of a particular class or group of people, be they religious, political,
civic or professional in character. Senator Pelaez, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Codes and Constitutional Amendments, eloquently stated that "the
function of a constitution is not to represent anyone in interest or set of interests, not
to favor one group at the expense or disadvantage of the candidates but to
encompass all the interests that exist within our society and to blend them into one
harmonious and balanced whole. For the constitutional system means, not the
predominance of interests, but the harmonious balancing thereof."

So that the purpose for calling the Constitutional Convention will not be deflated or
frustrated, it is necessary that the delegatee thereto be independent, beholden to no
one but to God, country and conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The evil therefore, which the law seeks to prevent lies in the election of delegates
who, because they have been chosen with the aid and resources of organizations,
cannot be expected to be sufficiently representative of the people. Such delegates
could very well be the spokesmen of narrow political, religious or economic interest
and not of the great majority of the people. 20
We likewise concur with the Solicitor General that the equal protection of the laws is not unduly
subverted in par. I of Sec. 8(a); because it does not create any hostile discrimination against any
party or group nor does it confer undue favor or privilege on an individual as heretofore stated. The
discrimination applies to all organizations, whether political parties or social, civic, religious, or
professional associations. The ban is germane to the objectives of the law, which are to avert the
debasement of the electoral process, and to attain real equality of chances among individual
candidates and thereby make real the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The political parties and the other organized groups have built-in advantages because of their
machinery and other facilities, which, the individual candidate who is without any organization
support, does not have. The fact that the other civic of religious organizations cannot have a
campaign machinery as efficient as that of a political party, does not vary the situation; because it
still has that much built-in advantage as against the individual candidate without similar support.
Moreover, these civic religious and professional organization may band together to support common
candidates, who advocates the reforms that these organizations champion and believe are
imperative. This is admitted by petitioner Gonzales thru the letter of Senator Ganzon dated August
17, 1970 attached to his petition as Annex "D", wherein the Senator stated that his own "Timawa"
group had agreed with the Liberal Party in Iloilo to support petitioner Gonzales and two others as
their candidates for the convention, which organized support is nullified by the questioned ban,
Senator Ganzon stressed that "without the group moving and working in joint collective effort" they
cannot "exercise effective control and supervision over our
leaders the Women's League, the area commanders, etc."; but with their joining with the LP's they
"could have presented a solid front with very bright chances of capturing all seats."
The civic associations other than political parties cannot with reason insist that they should be
exempted from the ban; because then by such exemption they would be free to utilize the facilities of
the campaign machineries which they are denying to the political parties. Whenever all organization
engages in a political activity, as in this campaign for election of delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, to that extent it partakes of the nature of a political organization. This, despite the fact
that the Constitution and by laws of such civic, religious, or professional associations usually prohibit
the association from engaging in partisan political activity or supporting any candidate for an elective
office. Hence, they must likewise respect the ban.
The freedom of association also implies the liberty not to associate or join with others or join any
existing organization. A person may run independently on his own merits without need of catering to
a political party or any other association for support. And he, as much as the candidate whose
candidacy does not evoke sympathy from any political party or organized group, must be afforded

equal chances. As emphasized by Senators Tolentino and Salonga, this ban is to assure equal
chances to a candidate with talent and imbued with patriotism as well as nobility of purpose, so that
the country can utilize their services if elected.
Impressed as We are by the eloquent and masterly exposition of Senator Taada for the invalidation
of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132, demonstrating once again his deep concern for the
preservation of our civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights, We are not persuaded to entertain
the belief that the challenged ban transcends the limits of constitutional invasion of such cherished
immunities.
WHEREFORE, the prayers in both petitions are hereby denied and R.A. No. 6132 including Secs. 2,
4, 5, and 8(a), paragraph 1, thereof, cannot be declared unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Castro, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28196

November 9, 1967

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DIRECTOR OF PRINTING and AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28224

November 9, 1967

PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
No. 28196:
Ramon A. Gonzales for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Juan T. David as amicus curiae
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
No. 28224:
Salvador Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
G. R. No. L-28196 is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
Petitioner therein prays for judgment:
1) Restraining: (a) the Commission on Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913, or from
performing any act that will result in the holding of the plebiscite for the ratification of the
constitutional amendments proposed in Joint Resolutions Nos. 1 and 3 of the two Houses of
Congress of the Philippines, approved on March 16, 1967; (b) the Director of Printing from printing
ballots, pursuant to said Act and Resolutions; and (c) the Auditor General from passing in audit any
disbursement from the appropriation of funds made in said Republic Act No. 4913; and
2) declaring said Act unconstitutional and void.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives
passed the following resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution
of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives

from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be

apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their
respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention
to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the
general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as
to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the
aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967,
became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the
aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general
elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
The petition in L-28196 was filed on October 21, 1967. At the hearing thereof, on October 28, 1967,
the Solicitor General appeared on behalf of respondents. Moreover, Atty. Juan T. David and counsel
for the Philippine Constitution Association hereinafter referred to as the PHILCONSA were
allowed to argue as amici curiae. Said counsel for the PHILCONSA, Dr. Salvador Araneta, likewise
prayed that the decision in this case be deferred until after a substantially identical case brought by
said organization before the Commission on Elections,1 which was expected to decide it any time,
and whose decision would, in all probability, be appealed to this Court had been submitted thereto
for final determination, for a joint decision on the identical issues raised in both cases. In fact, on
October 31, 1967, the PHILCONSA filed with this Court the petition in G. R. No. L-28224, for review
bycertiorari of the resolution of the Commission on Elections2 dismissing the petition therein. The two
(2) cases were deemed submitted for decision on November 8, 1967, upon the filing of the answer of
respondent, the memorandum of the petitioner and the reply memorandum of respondent in L28224.
Ramon A. Gonzales, the petitioner in L-28196, is admittedly a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a
voter. He claims to have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens,
taxpayers, and voters similarly situated. Although respondents and the Solicitor General have filed
an answer denying the truth of this allegation, upon the ground that they have no knowledge or
information to form a belief as to the truth thereof, such denial would appear to be a perfunctory one.
In fact, at the hearing of case L-28196, the Solicitor General expressed himself in favor of a judicial
determination of the merits of the issued raised in said case.
The PHILCONSA, petitioner in L-28224, is admittedly a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisan organization the objective
of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend its Constitution against erosions
or onslaughts from whatever source. Despite his aforementioned statement in L-28196, in his
answer in L-28224 the Solicitor General maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of L-28224, upon the ground that the same is "merely political" as held in Mabanag
vs. Lopez Vito.3 Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, who appeared before the Commission on Elections and
filed an opposition to the PHILCONSA petition therein, was allowed to appear before this Court and
objected to said petition upon the ground: a) that the Court has no jurisdiction either to grant the
relief sought in the petition, or to pass upon the legality of the composition of the House of

Representatives; b) that the petition, if granted, would, in effect, render in operational the legislative
department; and c) that "the failure of Congress to enact a valid reapportionment law . . . does not
have the legal effect of rendering illegal the House of Representatives elected thereafter, nor of
rendering its acts null and void."
JURISDICTION
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission,4 this Court speaking through one of the leading
members of the Constitutional Convention and a respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose
P. Laurel declared that "the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof." It is true that in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,5 this Court
characterizing the issue submitted thereto as a political one, declined to pass upon the question
whether or not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to the
Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification satisfied the three-fourths
vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this precedent has been weakened, however,
by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate,6 Avelino vs. Cuenco,7 Taada vs.
Cuenco,8 and Macias vs. Commission on Elections.9 In the first, we held that the officers and
employees of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the
Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to determine the
number of Senators necessary for a quorum in the Senate; in the third, we nullified the election, by
Senators belonging to the party having the largest number of votes in said chamber, purporting to
act on behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes therein, of two (2) Senators
belonging to the first party, as members, for the second party, of the, Senate Electoral Tribunal; and
in the fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representative districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the apportionment
had not been made as may be possible according to the number of inhabitants of each province.
Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4) cases, that the issues therein raised were
political questions the determination of which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.10 It is part of the inherent powers of the
people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours 11 to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.12Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, notas members
of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function,13 for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution they
are the very source of all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily, that they do not
have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise,
they could brush aside and set the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a
government of laws, not of men, and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed
by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, 14 the power to declare a
treaty unconstitutional,15 despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent assembly
violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review,
and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito,16 the latter should be deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous
on this point.
THE MERITS
Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution, as amended, reads:
The Congress in joint session assembled by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to
this Constitution or call a convention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as
part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which
the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
Pursuant to this provision, amendments to the Constitution may be proposed, either by Congress, or
by a convention called by Congress for that purpose. In either case, the vote of "three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately" is necessary.
And, "such amendments shall be valid as part of" the "Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their
ratification."
In the cases at bar, it is conceded that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been approved by a vote of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately. This, notwithstanding, it is urged that said resolutions are null and void because:
1. The Members of Congress, which approved the proposed amendments, as well as the resolution
calling a convention to propose amendments, are, at best, de facto Congressmen;
2. Congress may adopt either one of two alternatives propose amendments or call a convention
therefore but may not avail of both that is to say, propose amendment and call a convention at
the same time;
3. The election, in which proposals for amendment to the Constitution shall be submitted for
ratification, must be aspecial election, not a general election, in which officers of the national and
local governments such as the elections scheduled to be held on November 14, 1967 will be
chosen; and
4. The spirit of the Constitution demands that the election, in which proposals for amendment shall
be submitted to the people for ratification, must be held under such conditions which, allegedly,
do not exist as to give the people a reasonable opportunity to have a fair grasp of the nature and
implications of said amendments.
Legality of Congress and Legal Status of the Congressmen
The first objection is based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, which provides:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty
Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be
according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least
one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the
return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been
made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed
by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the
present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous and compact territory.
It is urged that the last enumeration or census took place in 1960; that, no apportionment having
been made within three (3) years thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines and/or the election of its
Members became illegal; that Congress and its Members, likewise, became a de facto Congress
and/or de facto congressmen, respectively; and that, consequently, the disputed Resolutions,
proposing amendments to the Constitution, as well as Republic Act No. 4913, are null and void.
It is not true, however, that Congress has not made an apportionment within three years after the
enumeration or census made in 1960. It did actually pass a bill, which became Republic Act No.
3040,17 purporting to make said apportionment. This Act was, however, declared unconstitutional,
upon the ground that the apportionment therein undertaken had not been made according to the
number of inhabitants of the different provinces of the Philippines.18
Moreover, we are unable to agree with the theory that, in view of the failure of Congress to make a
valid apportionment within the period stated in the Constitution, Congress became an
"unconstitutional Congress" and that, in consequence thereof, the Members of its House of
Representatives are de facto officers. The major premise of this process of reasoning is that the
constitutional provision on "apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration,
and not otherwise," is mandatory. The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said
apportionment does not justify, however, the conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation
rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its Members have become de facto officers.
It is conceded that, since the adoption of the Constitution in 1935, Congress has not made a valid
apportionment as required in said fundamental law. The effect of this omission has been envisioned
in the Constitution, pursuant to which:
. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall
have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall
be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. . . . .
The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the
apportionment, a Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it
implies necessarily that Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing
at the time of the expiration of said period.
It is argued that the above-quoted provision refers only to the elections held in 1935. This theory
assumes that an apportionment had to be made necessarily before the first elections to be held after
the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or in 1938.19 The assumption, is, however,
unwarranted, for there had been no enumeration in 1935, and nobody could foretell when it would be

made. Those who drafted and adopted the Constitution in 1935 could be certain, therefore, that the
three-year period, after the earliest possible enumeration, would expire after the elections in 1938.
What is more, considering that several provisions of the Constitution, particularly those on the
legislative department, were amended in 1940, by establishing a bicameral Congress, those who
drafted and adopted said amendment, incorporating therein the provision of the original Constitution
regarding the apportionment of the districts for representatives, must have known that the three-year
period therefor would expire after the elections scheduled to be held and actually held in 1941.
Thus, the events contemporaneous with the framing and ratification of the original Constitution in
1935 and of the amendment thereof in 1940 strongly indicate that the provision concerning said
apportionment and the effect of the failure to make it were expected to be applied to conditions
obtaining after the elections in 1935 and 1938, and even after subsequent elections.
Then again, since the report of the Director of the Census on the last enumeration was submitted to
the President on November 30, 1960, it follows that the three-year period to make the apportionment
did not expire until 1963, or after the Presidential elections in 1961. There can be no question,
therefore, that the Senate and the House of Representatives organized or constituted on December
30, 1961, were de jure bodies, and that the Members thereof were de jure officers. Pursuant to the
theory of petitioners herein, upon expiration of said period of three years, or late in 1963, Congress
became illegal and its Members, or at least, those of the House of Representatives, became illegal
holder of their respective offices, and were de facto officers.
Petitioners do not allege that the expiration of said three-year period without a reapportionment, had
the effect of abrogating or repealing the legal provision creating Congress, or, at least, the House of
Representatives, and are not aware of any rule or principle of law that would warrant such
conclusion. Neither do they allege that the term of office of the members of said House automatically
expired or that they ipso facto forfeited their seats in Congress, upon the lapse of said period for
reapportionment. In fact, neither our political law, nor our law on public officers, in particular, supports
the view that failure to discharge a mandatory duty, whatever it may be, would automatically result in
the forfeiture of an office, in the absence of a statute to this effect.
Similarly, it would seem obvious that the provision of our Election Law relative to the election of
Members of Congress in 1965 were not repealed in consequence of the failure of said body to make
an apportionment within three (3) years after the census of 1960. Inasmuch as the general elections
in 1965 were presumably held in conformity with said Election Law, and the legal provisions creating
Congress with a House of Representatives composed of members elected by qualified voters of
representative districts as they existed at the time of said elections remained in force, we can not
see how said Members of the House of Representatives can be regarded as de facto officers owing
to the failure of their predecessors in office to make a reapportionment within the period
aforementioned.
Upon the other hand, the Constitution authorizes the impeachment of the President, the VicePresident, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General for, inter alia, culpable
violation of the Constitution,20 the enforcement of which is, not only their mandatory duty, but also,
their main function. This provision indicates that, despite the violation of such mandatory duty, the
title to their respective offices remains unimpaired, until dismissal or ouster pursuant to a judgment
of conviction rendered in accordance with Article IX of the Constitution. In short, the loss of office or
the extinction of title thereto is not automatic.

Even if we assumed, however, that the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it
would not follow that the contested resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact,
the main reasons for the existence of the de facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts
of persons holding, under color of title, an office created by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid
insofar as the public as distinguished from the officer in question is concerned. 21 Indeed,
otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the Government would be entitled to
demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold,before dealing with them,
or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the
limits of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments. 22 One can imagine
this great inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de
facto doctrine.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally.23 It may not be
contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be
questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer.24 And the reasons are obvious: (1) it
would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within
the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned.
It is argued that the foregoing rules do not apply to the cases at bar because the acts therein
involved have not been completed and petitioners herein are not third parties. This pretense is
untenable. It is inconsistent withTayko vs. Capistrano.25 In that case, one of the parties to a suit being
heard before Judge Capistrano objected to his continuing to hear the case, for the reason that,
meanwhile, he had reached the age of retirement. This Court held that the objection could not be
entertained, because the Judge was at least, a de facto Judge, whose title can not be assailed
collaterally. It should be noted that Tayko was not a third party insofar as the Judge was concerned.
Tayko was one of the parties in the aforementioned suit. Moreover, Judge Capistrano had not, as
yet, finished hearing the case, much less rendered decision therein. No rights had vested in favor of
the parties, in consequence of the acts of said Judge. Yet, Tayko's objection was overruled.
Needless to say, insofar as Congress is concerned, its acts, as regards the Resolutions herein
contested and Republic Act No. 4913, are complete. Congress has nothing else to do in connection
therewith.
The Court is, also, unanimous in holding that the objection under consideration is untenable.
Available Alternatives to Congress
Atty. Juan T. David, as amicus curiae, maintains that Congress may either propose amendments to
the Constitution or call a convention for that purpose, but it can not do both, at the same time. This
theory is based upon the fact that the two (2) alternatives are connected in the Constitution by the
disjunctive "or." Such basis is, however, a weak one, in the absence of other circumstances and
none has brought to our attention supporting the conclusion drawn by the amicus curiae. In fact,
the term "or" has, oftentimes, been held to mean "and," or vice-versa, when the spirit or context of
the law warrants it.26
It is, also, noteworthy that R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 propose amendments to the constitutional
provision on Congress, to be submitted to the people for ratification on November 14, 1967, whereas
R. B. H. No. 2 calls for a convention in 1971, to consider proposals for amendment to the
Constitution, in general. In other words, the subject-matter of R. B. H. No. 2 is different from that of R
B. H. Nos. 1 and 3. Moreover, the amendments proposed under R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3, will be

submitted for ratification several years before those that may be proposed by the constitutional
convention called in R. B. H. No. 2. Again, although the three (3) resolutions were passed on the
same date, they were taken up and put to a vote separately, or one after the other. In other words,
they were notpassed at the same time.
In any event, we do not find, either in the Constitution, or in the history thereof anything that would
negate the authority of different Congresses to approve the contested Resolutions, or of the same
Congress to pass the same in, different sessions or different days of the same congressional
session. And, neither has any plausible reason been advanced to justify the denial of authority to
adopt said resolutions on the same day.
Counsel ask: Since Congress has decided to call a constitutional convention to propose
amendments, why not let the whole thing be submitted to said convention, instead of, likewise,
proposing some specific amendments, to be submitted for ratification before said convention is held?
The force of this argument must be conceded. but the same impugns the wisdom of the action taken
by Congress, not its authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof to permit Members of
Congress to run for election as delegates to the constitutional convention and participate in the
proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or not this should be done is
a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.
On this question there is no disagreement among the members of the Court.
May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General Election?
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members
of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose
amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an
election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
There is in this provision nothing to indicate that the "election" therein referred to is a "special," not a
general, election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been
submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it
best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
It would be better, from the viewpoint of a thorough discussion of the proposed amendments, that
the same be submitted to the people's approval independently of the election of public officials. And
there is no denying the fact that an adequate appraisal of the merits and demerits proposed
amendments is likely to be overshadowed by the great attention usually commanded by the choice
of personalities involved in general elections, particularly when provincial and municipal officials are
to be chosen. But, then, these considerations are addressed to the wisdom of holding a plebiscite
simultaneously with the election of public officer. They do not deny the authority of Congress to
choose either alternative, as implied in the term "election" used, without qualification, in the
abovequoted provision of the Constitution. Such authority becomes even more patent when we
consider: (1) that the term "election," normally refers to the choice or selection of candidates to

public office by popular vote; and (2) that the word used in Article V of the Constitution, concerning
the grant of suffrage to women is, not "election," but "plebiscite."
Petitioners maintain that the term "election," as used in Section 1 of Art. XV of the Constitution,
should be construed as meaning a special election. Some members of the Court even feel that said
term ("election") refers to a "plebiscite," without any "election," general or special, of public officers.
They opine that constitutional amendments are, in general, if not always, of such important, if not
transcendental and vital nature as to demand that the attention of the people be focused exclusively
on the subject-matter thereof, so that their votes thereon may reflect no more than their intelligent,
impartial and considered view on the merits of the proposed amendments, unimpaired, or, at least,
undiluted by extraneous, if not insidious factors, let alone the partisan political considerations that
are likely to affect the selection of elective officials.
This, certainly, is a situation to be hoped for. It is a goal the attainment of which should be promoted.
The ideal conditions are, however, one thing. The question whether the Constitution forbids the
submission of proposals for amendment to the people except under such conditions, is another
thing. Much as the writer and those who concur in this opinion admire the contrary view, they find
themselves unable to subscribe thereto without, in effect, reading into the Constitution what they
believe is not written thereon and can not fairly be deduced from the letter thereof, since the spirit of
the law should not be a matter of sheer speculation.
The majority view although the votes in favor thereof are insufficient to declare Republic Act No.
4913 unconstitutional as ably set forth in the opinion penned by Mr. Justice Sanchez, is, however,
otherwise.
Would the Submission now of the Contested Amendments to the People Violate the Spirit of the
Constitution?
It should be noted that the contested Resolutions were approved on March 16, 1967, so that, by
November 14, 1967, our citizenry shall have had practically eight (8) months to be informed on the
amendments in question. Then again, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4913 provides:
(1) that "the amendments shall be published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, at
least twenty days prior to the election;"
(2) that "a printed copy of the proposed amendments shall be posted in a conspicuous place in every
municipality, city and provincial office building and in every polling place not later than October 14,
1967," and that said copy "shall remain posted therein until after the election;"
(3) that "at least five copies of said amendment shall be kept in each polling place, to be made
available for examination by the qualified electors during election day;"
(4) that "when practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be determined by the
Commission on Elections, shall be kept in each polling place;"
(5) that "the Commission on Elections shall make available copies of said amendments in English,
Spanish and, whenever practicable, in the principal native languages, for free distributing:" and

(6) that the contested Resolutions "shall be printed in full" on the back of the ballots which shall be
used on November 14, 1967.
We are not prepared to say that the foregoing measures are palpably inadequate to comply with the
constitutional requirement that proposals for amendment be "submitted to the people for their
ratification," and that said measures are manifestly insufficient, from a constitutional viewpoint, to
inform the people of the amendment sought to be made.
These were substantially the same means availed of to inform the people of the subject submitted to
them for ratification, from the original Constitution down to the Parity Amendment. Thus, referring to
the original Constitution, Section 1 of Act No. 4200, provides:
Said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto, shall be published in the Official
Gazette, in English and in Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to
said election, and a printed copy of said Constitution, with the Ordinance appended thereto,
shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial government office
building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen
hundred and thirty-five, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination
of the election. At least ten copies of the Constitution with the Ordinance appended thereto,
in English and in Spanish, shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by
the qualified electors during election day. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal local
dialects as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior shall also be kept in each
polling place.
The provision concerning woman's suffrage is Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 34, reading:
Said Article V of the Constitution shall be published in the Official Gazette, in English and in
Spanish, for three consecutive issues at least fifteen days prior to said election, and the said
Article V shall be posted in a conspicuous place in each municipal and provincial office
building and in each polling place not later than the twenty-second day of April, nineteen and
thirty-seven, and shall remain posted therein continually until after the termination of the
plebiscite. At least ten copies of said Article V of the Constitution, in English and in Spanish,
shall be kept at each polling place available for examination by the qualified electors during
the plebiscite. Whenever practicable, copies in the principal native languages, as may be
determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept in each polling place.
Similarly, Section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 517, referring to the 1940 amendments, is of the
following tenor:
The said amendments shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues
of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall
be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office
building and in every polling place not later than May eighteen, nineteen hundred and forty,
and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least ten copies of said
amendments shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by the
qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Secretary of the Interior, shall also be kept therein.
As regards the Parity Amendment, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 73 is to the effect that:

The said amendment shall be published in English and Spanish in three consecutive issues
of the Official Gazette at least twenty days prior to the election. A printed copy thereof shall
be posted in a conspicuous place in every municipal, city, and provincial government office
building and in every polling place not later than February eleven, nineteen hundred and
forty-seven, and shall remain posted therein until after the election. At least, ten copies of the
said amendment shall be kept in each polling place to be made available for examination by
the qualified electors during election day. When practicable, copies in the principal native
languages, as may be determined by the Commission on Elections, shall also be kept in
each polling place.
The main difference between the present situation and that obtaining in connection with the former
proposals does not arise from the law enacted therefor. The difference springs from the
circumstance that the major political parties had taken sides on previous amendments to the
Constitution except, perhaps, the woman's suffrage and, consequently, debated thereon at
some length before the plebiscite took place. Upon the other hand, said political parties have not
seemingly made an issue on the amendments now being contested and have, accordingly, refrained
from discussing the same in the current political campaign. Such debates or polemics as may have
taken place on a rather limited scale on the latest proposals for amendment, have been due
principally to the initiative of a few civic organizations and some militant members of our citizenry
who have voiced their opinion thereon. A legislation cannot, however, be nullified by reason of the
failure of certain sectors of the community to discuss it sufficiently. Its constitutionality or
unconstitutionality depends upon no other factors than those existing at the time of the enactment
thereof, unaffected by the acts or omissions of law enforcing agencies, particularly those that take
place subsequently to the passage or approval of the law.
Referring particularly to the contested proposals for amendment, the sufficiency or insufficiency, from
a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the people on November 14, 1967,
depends in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as this phase of the
case, constitute the minority upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such as to
fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is
under R. B. H. No. 1 the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of
Representatives, from 120 to 180, and under R. B. H. No. 3 the authority given to the members
of Congress to run for delegates to the Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to
discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. We who
constitute the minority believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such requirement and that said
Act is, accordingly, constitutional.
A considerable portion of the people may not know how over 160 of the proposed maximum of
representative districts are actually apportioned by R. B. H. No. 1 among the provinces in the
Philippines. It is not improbable, however, that they are not interested in the details of the
apportionment, or that a careful reading thereof may tend in their simple minds, to impair a clear
vision thereof. Upon the other hand, those who are more sophisticated, may enlighten themselves
sufficiently by reading the copies of the proposed amendments posted in public places, the copies
kept in the polling places and the text of contested resolutions, as printed in full on the back of the
ballots they will use.
It is, likewise, conceivable that as many people, if not more, may fail to realize or envisage the effect
of R. B. H. No. 3 upon the work of the Constitutional Convention or upon the future of our Republic.
But, then, nobody can foretell such effect with certainty. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article

XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits
Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the
functions of delegates to the Convention.
We are impressed by the factors considered by our distinguished and esteemed brethren, who opine
otherwise, but, we feel that such factors affect the wisdom of Republic Act No. 4913 and that of R. B.
H. Nos. 1 and 3, not theauthority of Congress to approve the same.
The system of checks and balances underlying the judicial power to strike down acts of the
Executive or of Congress transcending the confines set forth in the fundamental laws is not in
derogation of the principle of separation of powers, pursuant to which each department is supreme
within its own sphere. The determination of the conditions under which the proposed amendments
shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within the legislative sphere. We
do not believe it has been satisfactorily shown that Congress has exceeded the limits thereof in
enacting Republic Act No. 4913. Presumably, it could have done something better to enlighten the
people on the subject-matter thereof. But, then, no law is perfect. No product of human endeavor is
beyond improvement. Otherwise, no legislation would be constitutional and valid. Six (6) Members of
this Court believe, however, said Act and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 violate the spirit of the Constitution.
Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H.
Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are
hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Makalintal and Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs fully with the above opinion, adding a few words on the question of
jurisdiction.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, THE AUDITOR, and THE
DISBURSING OFFICER OF THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, respondents, RAUL S.
MANGLAPUS, JESUS G. BARRERA, PABLO S. TRILLANA III, VICTOR DE LA SERNA,

MARCELO B. FERNAN, JOSE Y. FERIA, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, VICTOR F. ORTEGA,

and JUAN V. BORRA, Intervenors.
Arturo M. Tolentino in his own behalf.
Ramon A. Gonzales for respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention.
Emmanuel Pelaez, Jorge M. Juco and Tomas L. Echivarre for respondent Disbursing Officer of the
1971 Constitutional Convention.
Intervenors in their own behalf.

BARREDO, J.:
Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional
amendment "reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines
to eighteen years "shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution
No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by
declaring said resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding
of such plebiscite and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC)
performed and to be done by it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and
void, for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines.
As a preliminary step, since the petition named as respondent only the COMELEC, the Count
required that copies thereof be served on the Solicitor General and the Constitutional Convention,
through its President, for such action as they may deem proper to take. In due time, respondent
COMELEC filed its answer joining issues with petitioner. To further put things in proper order, and
considering that the fiscal officers of the Convention are indispensable parties in a proceeding of this
nature, since the acts sought to be enjoined involve the expenditure of funds appropriated by law for
the Convention, the Court also ordered that the Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of
the Convention be made respondents. After the petition was so amended, the first appeared thru
Senator Emmanuel Pelaez and the last two thru Delegate Ramon Gonzales. All said respondents,
thru counsel, resist petitioner's action.
For reasons of orderliness and to avoid unnecessary duplication of arguments and even possible
confusion, and considering that with the principal parties being duly represented by able counsel,
their interests would be adequately protected already, the Court had to limit the number of
intervenors from the ranks of the delegates to the Convention who, more or less, have legal interest
in the success of the respondents, and so, only Delegates Raul S. Manglapus, Jesus G. Barrera,
Pablo S. Trillana III, Victor de la Serna, Marcelo B. Fernan, Jose Y. Feria, Leonardo Siguion Reyna,
Victor Ortega and Juan B. Borra, all distinguished lawyers in their own right, have been allowed to
intervene jointly. The Court feels that with such an array of brilliant and dedicated counsel, all
interests involved should be duly and amply represented and protected. At any rate, notwithstanding
that their corresponding motions for leave to intervene or to appear as amicus curiae 1 have been
denied, the pleadings filed by the other delegates and some private parties, the latter in

representation of their minor children allegedly to be affected by the result of this case with the
records and the Court acknowledges that they have not been without value as materials in the
extensive study that has been undertaken in this case.
The background facts are beyond dispute. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being
by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the Philippines approved in its capacity as a
constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to propose amendments to
the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of Congress held on March 16,
1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention were all elected under
and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The
pertinent portions of Resolution No 2 read as follows:
SECTION 1. There is hereby called a convention to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines, to be composed of two elective Delegates from each
representative district who shall have the same qualifications as those required of
Members of the House of Representatives.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 7. The amendments proposed by the Convention shall be valid and
considered part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in
an election at which they are submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to
Article XV of the Constitution.
Resolution No. 4 merely modified the number of delegates to represent the different cities and
provinces fixed originally in Resolution No 2.
After the election of the delegates held on November 10, 1970, the Convention held its inaugural
session on June 1, 1971. Its preliminary labors of election of officers, organization of committees and
other preparatory works over, as its first formal proposal to amend the Constitution, its session which
began on September 27, 1971, or more accurately, at about 3:30 in the morning of September 28,
1971, the Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 reading thus: .
CC ORGANIC RESOLUTION NO. 1
A RESOLUTION AMENDING SECTION ONE OF ARTICLE V OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO
18
BE IT RESOLVED as it is hereby resolved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention:
Section 1. Section One of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines is amended
to as follows:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by (male) citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are (twenty-one)
EIGHTEEN years or over and are able to read and write, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the

municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months

preceding the election.
Section 2. This amendment shall be valid as part of the Constitution of the
Philippines when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to coincide
with the local elections in November 1971.
Section 3. This partial amendment, which refers only to the age qualification for the
exercise of suffrage shall be without prejudice to other amendments that will be
proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the
amended Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution.
Section 4. The Convention hereby authorizes the use of the sum of P75,000.00 from
its savings or from its unexpended funds for the expense of the advanced plebiscite;
provided, however that should there be no savings or unexpended sums, the
Delegates waive P250.00 each or the equivalent of 2-1/2 days per diem.
By a letter dated September 28, 1971, President Diosdado Macapagal, called upon respondent
Comelec "to help the Convention implement (the above) resolution." The said letter reads:
September 28, 1971
The Commission on Elections Manila
Thru the Chairman
Gentlemen:
Last night the Constitutional Convention passed Resolution No. 1 quoted as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(see above)
Pursuant to the provision of Section 14, Republic Act No. 6132 otherwise known as
the Constitutional Convention Act of 1971, may we call upon you to help the
Convention implement this resolution:
Sincerely,
(Sgd.) DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
DIOSDADO P.
MACAPAGAL
President
On September 30, 1971, COMELEC "RESOLVED to inform the Constitutional Convention that it will
hold the plebiscite on condition that:

(a) The Constitutional Convention will undertake the printing of separate official
ballots, election returns and tally sheets for the use of said plebiscite at its expense;
(b) The Constitutional Convention will adopt its own security measures for the
printing and shipment of said ballots and election forms; and
(c) Said official ballots and election forms will be delivered to the Commission in time
so that they could be distributed at the same time that the Commission will distribute
its official and sample ballots to be used in the elections on November 8, 1971.
What happened afterwards may best be stated by quoting from intervenors' Governors' statement of
the genesis of the above proposal:
The President of the Convention also issued an order forming an Ad Hoc Committee
to implement the Resolution.
This Committee issued implementing guidelines which were approved by the
President who then transmitted them to the Commission on Elections.
The Committee on Plebiscite and Ratification filed a report on the progress of the
implementation of the plebiscite in the afternoon of October 7,1971, enclosing copies
of the order, resolution and letters of transmittal above referred to (Copy of the report
is hereto attached as Annex 8-Memorandum).
RECESS RESOLUTION
In its plenary session in the evening of October 7, 1971, the Convention approved a
resolution authored by Delegate Antonio Olmedo of Davao Oriental, calling for a
recess of the Convention from November 1, 1971 to November 9, 1971 to permit the
delegates to campaign for the ratification of Organic Resolution No. 1. (Copies of the
resolution and the transcript of debate thereon are hereto attached as Annexes 9 and
9-A Memorandum, respectively).
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING IMPLEMENTATION
On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed Resolution No. 24 submitted by
Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the Convention to
implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee
ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation.
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect
as laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the elections of eight
senators and all city, provincial and municipal officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of
Comelec's acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by
said resolutions are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is,
by the Constitution, a power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be
exercised by the Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed

amendment in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and
all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand,
respondents and intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details
of the plebiscite for the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose
is within the authority of the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to
propose amendments and that this power includes that of submitting such amendments either
individually or jointly at such time and manner as the Convention may direct in discretion. The
Court's delicate task now is to decide which of these two poses is really in accord with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
As a preliminary and prejudicial matter, the intervenors raise the question of jurisdiction. They
contend that the issue before Us is a political question and that the Convention being legislative
body of the highest order is sovereign, and as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the
control of the Congress and the courts. In this connection, it is to be noted that none of the
respondent has joined intervenors in this posture. In fact, respondents Chief Accountant and Auditor
of the convention expressly concede the jurisdiction of this Court in their answer acknowledging that
the issue herein is a justifiable one.
Strangely, intervenors cite in support of this contention portions of the decision of this Court in the
case of Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774, wherein the members of the Court, despite their being
divided in their opinions as to the other matters therein involved, were precisely unanimous in
upholding its jurisdiction. Obviously, distinguished counsel have either failed to grasp the full impact
of the portions of Our decision they have quoted or would misapply them by taking them out of
context.
There should be no more doubt as to the position of this Court regarding its jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
constitutionality of the acts of the Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, and, for that matter,
those of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, which concededly is at par with the former. A simple reading of Our ruling in that very
case of Gonzales relied upon by intervenors should dispel any lingering misgivings as regards that
point. Succinctly but comprehensively, Chief Justice Concepcion held for the Court thus: .
As early as Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil. 139, 157), this Court
speaking through one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention and a
respected professor of Constitutional Law, Dr. Jose P. Laurel declared that "the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof."
It is true that in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito (supra), this Court characterizing the issue
submitted thereto as a political one declined to pass upon the question whether or
not a given number of votes cast in Congress in favor of a proposed amendment to
the Constitution which was being submitted to the people for ratification
satisfied the three-fourths vote requirement of the fundamental law. The force of this
precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes v. Chief Accountant of the
Senate (81 Phil. 818), Avelino v. Cuenco, (L-2851, March 4 & 14, 1949), Taada v.
Cuenco, (L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957) and Macias v. Commission on Elections, (L18684, Sept. 14, 1961). In the first we held that the officers and employees of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal are under its supervision and control, not of that of the

Senate President, as claimed by the latter; in the second, this Court proceeded to
determine the number of Senators necessary for quorum in the Senate; in the third,
we nullified the election, by Senators belonging to the party having the largest
number of votes in said chamber, purporting to act, on behalf of the party having the
second largest number of votes therein of two (2) Senators belonging to the first
party, as members, for the second party, of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and in the
fourth, we declared unconstitutional an act of Congress purporting to apportion the
representatives districts for the House of Representatives, upon the ground that the
apportionment had not been made as may be possible according to the number of
inhabitants of each province. Thus we rejected the theory, advanced in these four (4)
cases that the issues therein raised were political questions the determination of
which is beyond judicial review.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is
not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress (Section 1, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines). It is part of the inherent powers of the people as
the repository sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours (Section 1, Art. 11,
Constitution of the Philippines) to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law. Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. (Section 1, Art. XV, Constitution of
the Philippines) Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and
members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of aconstituent assembly. When acting as such, the members
of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, (Of amending the Constitution) for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution they are the very source of all powers of
government including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution,
the members of Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows,
necessarily, that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within
or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same
at naught, contrary to the basic tenet that ours is a government of laws, not of men,
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that the
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, (And, inferentially, to lower
courts.) the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional. (Sec. 2(1), Art. VIII of the
Constitution), despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress acting as a constituent
assembly violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable not political, and,
hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent that this view may be inconsistent
with the stand taken in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, (supra) the latter should be deemed
modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point.
No one can rightly claim that within the domain of its legitimate authority, the Convention is not
supreme. Nowhere in his petition and in his oral argument and memoranda does petitioner point
otherwise. Actually, what respondents and intervenors are seemingly reluctant to admit is that the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, as any other convention of the same nature, owes its existence
and derives all its authority and power from the existing Constitution of the Philippines. This

Convention has not been called by the people directly as in the case of a revolutionary convention
which drafts the first Constitution of an entirely new government born of either a war of liberation
from a mother country or of a revolution against an existing government or of a bloodless seizure of
power a la coup d'etat. As to such kind of conventions, it is absolutely true that the convention is
completely without restrain and omnipotent all wise, and it is as to such conventions that the remarks
of Delegate Manuel Roxas of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 quoted by Senator Pelaez refer.
No amount of rationalization can belie the fact that the current convention came into being only
because it was called by a resolution of a joint session of Congress acting as a constituent assembly
by authority of Section 1, Article XV of the present Constitution which provides:
ARTICLE XV AMENDMENTS
SECTION 1. The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a convention for the
purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved
by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted
to the people for their ratification.
True it is that once convened, this Convention became endowed with extra ordinary powers
generally beyond the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such
powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it may
propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the same are duly ratified by the
people, it necessarily follows that the acts of convention, its officers and members are not immune
from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force and effect in its entirety
and in everyone of its parts the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and operates even
within the walls of that assembly. While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the
performance of its task to propose amendments to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of
restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it is equally beyond cavil that neither the
Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country the equal protection of the laws
or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of Rights of the existing
Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution providing for the
taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of any tax,
impost or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between
private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers
in the Constitution.
It being manifest that there are powers which the Convention may not and cannot validly assert,
much less exercise, in the light of the existing Constitution, the simple question arises, should an act
of the Convention be assailed by a citizen as being among those not granted to or inherent in it,
according to the existing Constitution, who can decide whether such a contention is correct or not? It
is of the very essence of the rule of law that somehow somewhere the Power and duty to resolve
such a grave constitutional question must be lodged on some authority, or we would have to confess
that the integrated system of government established by our founding fathers contains a wide
vacuum no intelligent man could ignore, which is naturally unworthy of their learning, experience and
craftsmanship in constitution-making.

We need not go far in search for the answer to the query We have posed. The very decision of Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales, so much invoked by intervenors, reiterates and reinforces the
irrefutable logic and wealth of principle in the opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Laurel
in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 134, reading:
... (I)n the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the
several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement,
the great landmark of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and
perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people, acting through
their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to
operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of check and balances
and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument.
The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are
real as they should be in any living Constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this
moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development
there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by
clear implication from section 2 of Article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers or government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to strike

conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its functions is in this manner the

judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our
Constitution, it ought not the less to be remembered that, in the language of James
Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional liberty ... the
people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians ... their eyes must
be ever ready to mark, their voices to pronounce ... aggression on the authority of
their Constitution." In the last and ultimate analysis then, must the success of our
government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the National Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3,
1935, confirmed the election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other
hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on December 9, 1935,
fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns
and qualifications of members of the National Assembly; notwithstanding the
previous confirmations made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended
by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off
the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, submitted after
December 3, 1935 then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9,
1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the
respondents, the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its
proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly, then the resolution of
December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave
constitutional nature between the National Assembly on the one hand and the
Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the republican
government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our
own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral
Commission as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely, to determine all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while
acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restriction. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of
the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the

fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government are
necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.
Discarding the English type and other European types of constitutional government,
the framers of our Constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some
countries which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been
inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to
interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would
be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition, courts are bound to assume what
is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921 expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81,
Chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In
countries whose constitution are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this
power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa. Whereas, in
Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to Constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslavak, Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX,
Constitution of the Republic of 1931) especial constitutional courts are established to
pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the nature of the present
controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if
the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created
in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so
must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason, and
authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present
case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter
of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly." .
As the Chief Justice has made it clear in Gonzales, like Justice Laurel did in Angara, these
postulates just quoted do not apply only to conflicts of authority between the three existing regular
departments of the government but to all such conflicts between and among these departments, or,
between any of them, on the one hand, and any other constitutionally created independent body, like
the electoral tribunals in Congress, the Comelec and the Constituent assemblies constituted by the
House of Congress, on the other. We see no reason of logic or principle whatsoever, and none has
been convincingly shown to Us by any of the respondents and intervenors, why the same ruling
should not apply to the present Convention, even if it is an assembly of delegate elected directly by
the people, since at best, as already demonstrated, it has been convened by authority of and under
the terms of the present Constitution..
Accordingly, We are left with no alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the present
case. It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Convention or
that the Convention is subject to the control of the Court, but simply because both the Convention
and the Court are subject to the Constitution and the rule of law, and "upon principle, reason and
authority," per Justice Laurel, supra, it is within the power as it is the solemn duty of the Court, under

the existing Constitution to resolve the issues in which petitioner, respondents and intervenors have
joined in this case.
II
The issue of jurisdiction thus resolved, We come to the crux of the petition. Is it within the powers of
the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order, on its own fiat, the holding of a plebiscite for the
ratification of the proposed amendment reducing to eighteen years the age for the exercise of
suffrage under Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution proposed in the Convention's Organic
Resolution No. 1 in the manner and form provided for in said resolution and the subsequent
implementing acts and resolution of the Convention?
At the threshold, the environmental circumstances of this case demand the most accurate and
unequivocal statement of the real issue which the Court is called upon to resolve. Petitioner has very
clearly stated that he is not against the constitutional extension of the right of suffrage to the
eighteen-year-olds, as a matter of fact, he has advocated or sponsored in Congress such a
proposal, and that, in truth, the herein petition is not intended by him to prevent that the proposed
amendment here involved be submitted to the people for ratification, his only purpose in filing the
petition being to comply with his sworn duty to prevent, Whenever he can, any violation of the
Constitution of the Philippines even if it is committed in the course of or in connection with the most
laudable undertaking. Indeed, as the Court sees it, the specific question raised in this case is limited
solely and only to the point of whether or not it is within the power of the Convention to call for a
plebiscite for the ratification by the people of the constitutional amendment proposed in the
abovequoted Organic Resolution No. 1, in the manner and form provided in said resolution as well
as in the subject question implementing actions and resolution of the Convention and its officers, at
this juncture of its proceedings, when as it is a matter of common knowledge and judicial notice, it is
not set to adjourn sine die, and is, in fact, still in the preliminary stages of considering other reforms
or amendments affecting other parts of the existing Constitution; and, indeed, Organic Resolution
No. 1 itself expressly provides, that the amendment therein proposed "shall be without prejudice to
other amendments that will be proposed in the future by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other
portions of the amended section or on other portions of the entire Constitution." In other words,
nothing that the Court may say or do, in this case should be understood as reflecting, in any degree
or means the individual or collective stand of the members of the Court on the fundamental issue of
whether or not the eighteen-year-olds should be allowed to vote, simply because that issue is not
before Us now. There should be no doubt in the mind of anyone that, once the Court finds it
constitutionally permissible, it will not hesitate to do its part so that the said proposed amendment
may be presented to the people for their approval or rejection.
Withal, the Court rests securely in the conviction that the fire and enthusiasm of the youth have not
blinded them to the absolute necessity, under the fundamental principles of democracy to which the
Filipino people is committed, of adhering always to the rule of law. Surely, their idealism, sincerity
and purity of purpose cannot permit any other line of conduct or approach in respect of the problem
before Us. The Constitutional Convention of 1971 itself was born, in a great measure, because of
the pressure brought to bear upon the Congress of the Philippines by various elements of the
people, the youth in particular, in their incessant search for a peaceful and orderly means of bringing
about meaningful changes in the structure and bases of the existing social and governmental
institutions, including the provisions of the fundamental law related to the well-being and economic
security of the underprivileged classes of our people as well as those concerning the preservation
and protection of our natural resources and the national patrimony, as an alternative to violent and

chaotic ways of achieving such lofty ideals. In brief, leaving aside the excesses of enthusiasm which
at times have justifiably or unjustifiably marred the demonstrations in the streets, plazas and
campuses, the youth of the Philippines, in general, like the rest of the people, do not want confusion
and disorder, anarchy and violence; what they really want are law and order, peace and orderliness,
even in the pursuit of what they strongly and urgently feel must be done to change the present order
of things in this Republic of ours. It would be tragic and contrary to the plain compulsion of these
perspectives, if the Court were to allow itself in deciding this case to be carried astray by
considerations other than the imperatives of the rule of law and of the applicable provisions of the
Constitution. Needless to say, in a larger measure than when it binds other departments of the
government or any other official or entity, the Constitution imposes upon the Court the sacred duty to
give meaning and vigor to the Constitution, by interpreting and construing its provisions in
appropriate cases with the proper parties, and by striking down any act violative thereof. Here, as in
all other cases, We are resolved to discharge that duty.
During these twice when most anyone feels very strongly the urgent need for constitutional reforms,
to the point of being convinced that meaningful change is the only alternative to a violent revolution,
this Court would be the last to put any obstruction or impediment to the work of the Constitutional
Convention. If there are respectable sectors opining that it has not been called to supplant the
existing Constitution in its entirety, since its enabling provision, Article XV, from which the Convention
itself draws life expressly speaks only of amendments which shall form part of it, which opinion is not
without persuasive force both in principle and in logic, the seemingly prevailing view is that only the
collective judgment of its members as to what is warranted by the present condition of things, as
they see it, can limit the extent of the constitutional innovations the Convention may propose, hence
the complete substitution of the existing constitution is not beyond the ambit of the Convention's
authority. Desirable as it may be to resolve, this grave divergence of views, the Court does not
consider this case to be properly the one in which it should discharge its constitutional duty in such
premises. The issues raised by petitioner, even those among them in which respondents and
intervenors have joined in an apparent wish to have them squarely passed upon by the Court do not
necessarily impose upon Us the imperative obligation to express Our views thereon. The Court
considers it to be of the utmost importance that the Convention should be untrammelled and
unrestrained in the performance of its constitutionally as signed mission in the manner and form it
may conceive best, and so the Court may step in to clear up doubts as to the boundaries set down
by the Constitution only when and to the specific extent only that it would be necessary to do so to
avoid a constitutional crisis or a clearly demonstrable violation of the existing Charter. Withal, it is a
very familiar principle of constitutional law that constitutional questions are to be resolved by the
Supreme Court only when there is no alternative but to do it, and this rule is founded precisely on the
principle of respect that the Court must accord to the acts of the other coordinate departments of the
government, and certainly, the Constitutional Convention stands almost in a unique footing in that
regard.
In our discussion of the issue of jurisdiction, We have already made it clear that the Convention
came into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section I of Article XV of the
Constitution, already quoted earlier in this opinion. We reiterate also that as to matters not related to
its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the
Constitution, the Convention and its officers and members are all subject to all the provisions of the
existing Constitution. Now We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the
Constitution, it is subject to the provisions of Section I of Article XV. This must be so, because it is
plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same
should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.

Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional
democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the
succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,
future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the people within the country and those
subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution
worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate
deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no
less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared
with as much care and deliberation. From the very nature of things, the drafters of an original
constitution, as already observed earlier, operate without any limitations, restraints or inhibitions
save those that they may impose upon themselves. This is not necessarily true of subsequent
conventions called to amend the original constitution. Generally, the framers of the latter see to it
that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or changed, not only for reasons
purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions are supposed to be designed so
as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs
and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions
motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original
constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made so by the
people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And when such limitations or
conditions are so incorporated in the original constitution, it does not lie in the delegates of any
subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such conditions because they
are as powerful and omnipotent as their original counterparts.
Nothing of what is here said is to be understood as curtailing in any degree the number and nature
and the scope and extent of the amendments the Convention may deem proper to propose. Nor
does the Court propose to pass on the issue extensively and brilliantly discussed by the parties as to
whether or not the power or duty to call a plebiscite for the ratification of the amendments to be
proposed by the Convention is exclusively legislative and as such may be exercised only by the
Congress or whether the said power can be exercised concurrently by the Convention with the
Congress. In the view the Court takes of present case, it does not perceive absolute necessity to
resolve that question, grave and important as it may be. Truth to tell, the lack of unanimity or even of
a consensus among the members of the Court in respect to this issue creates the need for more
study and deliberation, and as time is of the essence in this case, for obvious reasons, November 8,
1971, the date set by the Convention for the plebiscite it is calling, being nigh, We will refrain from
making any pronouncement or expressing Our views on this question until a more appropriate case
comes to Us. After all, the basis of this decision is as important and decisive as any can be.
The ultimate question, therefore boils down to this: Is there any limitation or condition in Section 1 of
Article XV of the Constitution which is violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite
on the sole amendment contained in Organic Resolution No. 1? The Court holds that there is, and it
is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must
be submitted to the people in a single "election" or plebiscite. It being indisputable that the
amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only the first amendment the
Convention propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same
for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null
and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. lt says distinctly that
either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may
propose amendments to this Constitution," thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments
that Congress or the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that
"such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the
votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification,"
thus leaving no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any
amendment or amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention,
and the provision unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this
provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking
as constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the
whole of it if only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is
to be viable as the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately
formidable and reliable as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties,
ideology, social ideals, and national and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the
other. lt is inconceivable how a constitution worthy of any country or people can have any part which
is out of tune with its other parts..
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once
the original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder,
for when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assumed its harmony as
an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can
examine it before casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole
document the merits and demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so
also, when an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like
fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing
constitution and or any of its parts and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that
under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided
the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of
the constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of
suffrage, there are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment, although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would
favor the reduction of the voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the
circumstances, and he does not see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication
whether they will ever be or not, because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind
of judgment can he render on the proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do
not have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all.
Who can say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of
voters for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in
other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes,
if not radical ones, in almost every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined
in the present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the

effect of the reduction of the voting age upon the different institutions which the Convention may
establish and of which presently he is not given any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to
the Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis
for an intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other
parts of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present
state of things, where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not
thousands, of proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single
proposal or a few of them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the
present Constitution does not contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election"
wherein the people are in the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We
reject the rationalization that the present Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple
reason that intervenors themselves are stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is
to enable the eighteen year olds to take part in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to
be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language
of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper
submission".
III
The Court has no desire at all to hamper and hamstring the noble work of the Constitutional
Convention. Much less does the Court want to pass judgment on the merits of the proposal to allow
these eighteen years old to vote. But like the Convention, the Court has its own duties to the people
under the Constitution which is to decide in appropriate cases with appropriate parties Whether or
not the mandates of the fundamental law are being complied with. In the best light God has given
Us, we are of the conviction that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has finished, and
separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been called to formulate, the Convention's
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate
the condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or plebiscite for the
ratification of all the amendments the Convention may propose. We are not denying any right of the
people to vote on the proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV of
the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately from but together with all the
other amendments to be proposed by this present Convention.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention,
insofar as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution
of the respondent Comelec complying therewith (RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null
and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer, Chief Accountant and Auditor of the
Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action in compliance with the said
organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court declares this
decision immediately executory. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Teehankee, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. No. L-56404 April 2, 1981

RAMON A. GONZALES, MANUEL B. IMBONG, JO AUREA MARCOS-IMBONG, RAY ALLAN T.
DRILON, NELSON B. MALANA and GIL M. TABIOS, petitioners,

vs.
THE NATIONAL TREASURER and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions1 proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged
constitutional infirmity. Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the
Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present
Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that
the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana 2 ruling to the contrary notwithstanding. To
put it at its mildest, such an approach has the arresting charm of novelty but nothing else. It is in fact
self defeating, for if such were indeed the case, petitioners have come to the wrong forum. We sit as a
Court duty-bound to uphold and apply that Constitution. To contend otherwise as was done here would
be, quite clearly, an exercise in futility. Nor are the arguments of petitioners cast in the traditional form of
constitutional litigation any more persuasive. For reasons to be set forth, we dismiss the petitions.
The suits for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 3 and March 12, 1981. 4 On March 10 and
13 respectively, respondents were required to answer each within ten days from notice. 5 There was a
comment on the part of the respondents. Thereafter, both cases were set for hearing and were duly
argued on March 26 by petitioners and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for respondents. With the
submission of pertinent data in amplification of the oral argument, the cases were deemed submitted for
decision.
It is the ruling of the Court, as set forth at the outset, that the petitions must be dismissed.
1. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the
dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, 6 dismissing petitions for prohibition and
mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six 7 to four. 8 It
then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect." 9 Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of
January 17, 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the
Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not
only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a
matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as
that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black 10 and Murphy, 11 the Supreme
Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of
coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what
was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this
character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court
has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, 12 promulgated
barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten
cases may be cited. 13
2. We come to the crucial issue, the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose
amendments and how it may be exercised. More specifically as to the latter, the extent of the

changes that may be introduced, the number of votes necessary for the validity of a proposal, and
the standard required for a proper submission. As was stated earlier, petitioners were unable to
demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by unconstitutionality.
(1) The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The applicable
provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it reads thus:
"The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its Members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly
and the regular National Assembly and the Members thereof."14 One of such powers is precisely that of
proposing amendments. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National
Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the
majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. 15 When, therefore,
theInterim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos,
met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond
doubt. It could and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed. It may
be observed parenthetically that as far as petitioner Occena is Concerned, the question of the authority of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose amendments is not new. In Occena v. Commission on
Elections, 16 filed by the same petitioner, decided on January 28, 1980, such a question was involved
although not directly passed upon. To quote from the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Antonio in
that case: "Considering that the proposed amendment of Section 7 of Article X of the Constitution
extending the retirement of members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts from sixty-five
(65) to seventy (70) years is but a restoration of the age of retirement provided in the 1935 Constitution
and has been intensively and extensively discussed at the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as
through the mass media, it cannot, therefore, be said that our people are unaware of the advantages and
disadvantages of the proposed amendment." 17
(2) Petitioners would urge upon us the proposition that the amendments proposed are so extensive
in character that they go far beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang
Pambansa as Successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise
and not to amend. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar, speaking for the Court,
in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections 18 to dispose of this contention. Thus: "3. And whether the
Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the
present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the
democratic system, is of no moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification.
Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution.
4. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument
against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire
Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed
would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 19 There is here the
adoption of the principle so well-known in American decisions as well as legal texts that a constituent
body can propose anything but conclude nothing. 20 We are not disposed to deviate from such a principle
not only sound in theory but also advantageous in practice.
(3) That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the
standard for proper submission. Again, petitioners have not made out a case that calls for a
judgment in their favor. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above
questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition
to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a

requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a requirement either when,

as in this case, the Interim Batasang Pambansa exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Moreover, even on the assumption that the requirement of three- fourth votes applies,
such extraordinary majority was obtained. It is not disputed that Resolution No. 1 proposing an
amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own
a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No.
2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a
vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention. Where then is the alleged infirmity?
As to the requisite standard for a proper submission, the question may be viewed not only from the
standpoint of the period that must elapse before the holding of the plebiscite but also from the
standpoint of such amendments having been called to the attention of the people so that it could not
plausibly be maintained that they were properly informed as to the proposed changes. As to the
period, the Constitution indicates the way the matter should be resolved. There is no ambiguity to
the applicable provision: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by
the InterimBatasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day
period provided by the Constitution. Thus any argument to the contrary is unavailing. As for the people
being adequately informed, it cannot be denied that this time, as in the cited 1980 Occena opinion of
Justice Antonio, where the amendment restored to seventy the retirement age of members of the
judiciary, the proposed amendments have "been intensively and extensively discussed at
the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as well as through the mass media, [ so that ] it cannot, therefore, be
said that our people are unaware of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendment
[ s ]." 22
WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL

ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA,
in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country,
except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the
proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
"innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons
hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the
dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the
members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that,
as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the
country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by
individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued
by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise

necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.

The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition
is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating
Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago
filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This

deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed
this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in
the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA
would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and
the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and
legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
They argue therein that:

15

on the petition.

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT
LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
"COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION"
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED
FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE
THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO
NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS
A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT
THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX
E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION"
OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT
ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD
BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts
off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend

the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On
the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:

(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a
subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the
validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to,
the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the
Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to
reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a
plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees
that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative,
includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No.
6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No.
6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.

(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b)
noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by
private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the
counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for
the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul
Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set
the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all
other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance,
"to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle
the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove
the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be
availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their
elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a)
the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the
procedure for a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not
constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the
filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also submits
that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an
initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and
the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing
law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed
only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by
the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of
five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and
the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the
said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues,
which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far
filed:

1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed
in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the
Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or
refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record
of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in
due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I

THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF

THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition
for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing
the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
(People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of
the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of
the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of
Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days
their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together
with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on
to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of
signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That
section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or

(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___
Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted
a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully
call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.

32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory
questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least
10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long
as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on
this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee
hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment
through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from
the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first
amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this
initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected
that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up
with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details
on how this is to be carried out is it possible that, in effect, what

will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the

legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that
possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even
the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an
initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in
the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the
proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the
drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would
have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal
mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of
constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that
would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions
are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or
the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be
placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can

incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately

cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals
to AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that
this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in
Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing

this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include
the process of revision; whereas theprocess of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute
the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed
amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by
the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as
follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE

PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS,

OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it
possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out
the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not
prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of
the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:

MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.

MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not
cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when
he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal,
what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of
amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended,
reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading
on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was
allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view
thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the
second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the
rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right]
is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House
of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which
dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X
(Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50and by the
House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through
the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1
of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum
and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in
part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of
the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(Emphasis supplied).

The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading
of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved,
but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted
is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to
be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which
we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.

(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative
bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined
by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings
of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to
enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in
the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the
power of initiative as a consequence thereof;

(d) The formulation of the proposition;

(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered
voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative
on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the
approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting
in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself
is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress
to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters
of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The
Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits
that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain
assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then
is theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to

prescribe the form of the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters'
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its
time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term
limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should
not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it
orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that
R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735
should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for
the intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation. 1 Stated otherwise,
intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment. 2
Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the
history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate
Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and
Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body."
Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks: 6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional
basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced
by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.

2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle
remained applicable, the 1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between
the Legislature and the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that the
Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the people and all
sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress;
however, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the people, through the system
of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers since reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32
of the same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on
referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the
people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed
on Congress to implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system of initiative and
referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local Government
Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang
Barangay, all of which are variations of the power of initiative and referendum. He
added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise provided
in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the
subject which he will later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as
part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the
instant Bill among which are the constitutions of states in the United States which
recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to
project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states, he said, are
Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative
and referendum apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures,
which are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added that the
procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the requirements of a
certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in American laws. Although an
infant in Philippine political structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said,

is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after
American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the
Constitutional Commissioners saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an
instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself to be indifferent to
the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an opportune
time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws
which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as
advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for
the consideration of the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the
Constitution once every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on
measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of
plebiscite by presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of registered voters at which
every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of the registered
voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall
determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the
referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required
number of votes, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot
ignore the people's call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech
together with the footnotes be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz: 7
xxx xxx xxx

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO

Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular
democracy ever since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A
substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of democracy is
there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the increasingly elitist
approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means
whereby the people can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI;
Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be made part of his
sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited
Constitutional provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten
the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming an enlightened public
opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill will also
give street parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic
forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so
that it can be initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of
House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their personal and
political consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed
out in a Bicameral Conference Committee. 8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989, 9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the
consolidated version should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated
by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because
this is new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more
cautious approach and limiting it only to the local government units
because even with that stage where . . . at least this has been quite
popular, ano? It has been attempted on a national basis. Alright.
There has not been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon.
And, second, we consider also that it is only fair that the local
legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the legislation bill
proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect system of initiative. If after
all, the local legislative assembly or body is willing to adopt it in full
or in toto, there ought to be any reason for initiative, ano for initiative.
And, number 3, we feel that there should be some limitation on the
frequency with which it should be applied. Number 4, na the people,
thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that is beyond the scope of
authority of the local legislative body, otherwise, my God, magaassume sila ng power that is broader and greater than the grant of
legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5, because of

that, then a proposition which has been the result of a successful

initiative can only carry the force and effect of an ordinance and
therefore that should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare
it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond
powers of local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence
namin, so we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa
inyo naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that,
alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute.
Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito,
and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is
the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa
amin eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang
number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan.
Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation of both
bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill
No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman
Roco upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The record of the House Representative
states: 11
xxx xxx xxx

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines

Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers to
the system providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally,
Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically
provided for local initiative and referendum and the House
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum on
the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the
Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few
questions?

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please

proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the
two bills was that in the Senate version there was a provision for local
initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local
initiative and referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided
purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two
provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and
referendum both in the constitutional amendment and national
legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance
with the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this
Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system
which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional
amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and
referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial
difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I
said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial and municipal
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated
bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the
legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We
have also held that where a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be
adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text
of said law to reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section
5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also
states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to
defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the

policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not
require our legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose
Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to
refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished
Vicente Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But
the use of inapt or inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can
be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal
meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium.
Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and
sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are
entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or
spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly
disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the
law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac,
then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the
COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation
of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) to fix standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which
is the essence of every law, and, without the aforementioned standard, there would
be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by
the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation
of our republican system.

Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells
out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is
hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards
to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's
initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing
of the petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the
amendment takes effect 23 and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure,
these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out
the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is
to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In
enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law
implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show
that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the
rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is
possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out
the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not
prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In
response to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the
legislature over the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize another body to check the proper form.
It could also authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In
other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or
impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair
the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it
to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their
promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare
the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United
States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders
of the military commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a
prerequisite to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute
are not to be read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a single program
and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by
Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations
themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive Order the necessity
of protecting military resources in the designated areas against espionage and
sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20
look at the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink.
The policy and standards can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the
standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as
adequate more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31"public
welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and equity," 34 "adequate and efficient
instruction," 35"public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater national interest", 38 "protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal
and coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to
effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas.
The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at
bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas
did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by

the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition,
the case at bar was filed by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against
the Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an
organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the
Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to
lift the temporary restraining order against the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all
motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their
solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in
section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the
people and their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our
sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment
of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution
strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the
Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making process of our people.
The Constitution says their right cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a
question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an
exercise of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from
the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that
freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably,
freedom of speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this
reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To
be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the
predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that
the only constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV

In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987
Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article
of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to
check excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days
ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City
involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the
tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque
abstraction to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom in
full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back
the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people who are
pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into a
sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy
nobody can claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:

The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to
commit, itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this time
would only be to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus
S. Delfin in his capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking
through a people initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded
and given its due course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method,
is explicit. Section 2, Article XVII, thereof provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional imperatives,
the petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The
petition would require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the
necessary publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct
"Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in
establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made
permanent under the ponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so
understood as having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The
grant of such a right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.

The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed themselves.
The postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has
taught us that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the
consent of those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning
if it comes with the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves the
Court, I most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not
Republic Act No. 6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on
right of the people to directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by
the Court at this point would at best be only a non-binding, albeit possibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued
by the Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for
constitutional amendments.

FRANCISCO, J., dissenting and concurring:

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and
well-written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. 1 Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has given more
significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose,
enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to propose
amendments to the constitution as well. 2 To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my
mind, amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is based
principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on their
allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. [And] [t]his indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments, because constitutional amendments take effect upon
ratification not after publication. 3
which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under Section 9
of Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph
(b) thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every
part of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. 4 Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be
interpreted in isolation. The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a
whole. 5

In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to
propose amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election
called for the purpose". 6The same section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an
"initiative on the constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
constitution" 7 Paragraph (e) again of Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an
initiative on the constitution is approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for
an initiative on the Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of the registered voters as signatories, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the
implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative.
"A legal provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless
surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or
having no effect whatsoever thereon". 8 That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the
deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505, it was noted:
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the
consolidated House Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr.
Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically
provided for local initiative and referendum and the House of
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum an
the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the
Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few
questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please
proceed.

MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the
two bills was that in the Senate version there was a provision for local
initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local
initiative and referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided
purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two
provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and
referendum both in the constitutional amendment and national
legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance
with the provision of the Constitution to enact the enabling law, so
that we shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it
five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional
amendments to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years." (Id.
[Journal and Record of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8
June 1989, p. 960; quoted in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292293 [1994]; emphasis supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the
Constitution. When consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and as
approved and enacted into law, the proposal included initiative on both the
Constitution and ordinary laws. 9
Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other
construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and
spirit behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any
action (such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996
[Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private
respondents' petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would
appear that proof of procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time the
petition for initiative is filed, is a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:

A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after
five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five
(5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with
the required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence,
therefore, of an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections, any determination
of whether private respondents' proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an
"inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. I,
however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents'
petition for initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported
by proof of strict compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
"initiatory" Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through
initiative," there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required
number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least
3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government resources may
be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any
petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other
rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be
amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by
all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail,
nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the
majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to

implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it
bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him
of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby
preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the
Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed,
there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended by
the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an
initiative on the Constitution. 1 I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative,
sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views,
which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en
banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 2 that "provisions for
initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the
exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec, 3 that any "effort to
trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735
wisely empowered 4 the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B.
Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort
to give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local
legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled

I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from
exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private
respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should
be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I
firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative.
The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech
and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking
freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may
disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not
really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we
hate." 5
Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three
are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and
plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights
of our people to be used as their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction,
oppression and misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency,
accountability and faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and
abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully
nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity,
but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining
order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen
Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it
orders the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that
R.A. No. 5735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the
Pedrosas has no leg to stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate
amendments to the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735
should start with the search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for
the intent of the legislature is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation. 1 Stated otherwise,
intent is the essence of the law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment. 2

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative
to propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the
history of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 3 and Senate Bill No. 17. 4 Senate
Bill No. 17 was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception
Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and
Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body."
Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505 5 expressly included people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship remarks: 6
xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional
basis of the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced
by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle
remained applicable, the 1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured
presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between
the Legislature and the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the
exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that the
Philippines is a republican state where sovereignty resides in the people and all
sovereignty emanates from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress;
however, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the people, through the system
of initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have
plenary powers since reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32
of the same Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on
referendum and initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the
people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
initiative, upon petition of at least 12 percent of the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed
on Congress to implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system of initiative and
referendum under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local Government
Code which vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative
processes, decide the holding of plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang
Barangay, all of which are variations of the power of initiative and referendum. He

added that the holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum are likewise provided
in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the
subject which he will later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as
part of his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the
instant Bill among which are the constitutions of states in the United States which
recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to
project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states, he said, are
Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
practically all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative
and referendum apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures,
which are likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added that the
procedure provided by the Bill from the filing of the petition, the requirements of a
certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to
electors are substantially similar to the provisions in American laws. Although an
infant in Philippine political structure, the system of initiative and referendum, he said,
is a tried and tested system in other jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after
American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the
Constitutional Commissioners saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an
instrument which can be used should the legislature show itself to be indifferent to
the needs of the people. This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an opportune
time to pass the Bill even as he noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws
which are necessary to safeguard individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as
advocated in House Bill No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for
the consideration of the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the
Constitution once every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on
measures that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of
plebiscite by presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of registered voters at which
every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of the registered

voters thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall
determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the
referendum within 45 to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required
number of votes, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot
ignore the people's call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech
together with the footnotes be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz: 7
xxx xxx xxx

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO

Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular
democracy ever since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A
substantial segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of democracy is
there, but not the reality or substance of it because of the increasingly elitist
approach of their representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means
whereby the people can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI;
Section 3, Article X; and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be made part of his
sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited
Constitutional provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten
the politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming an enlightened public
opinion, and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill will also
give street parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic
forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so
that it can be initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of
House Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their personal and
political consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed
out in a Bicameral Conference Committee. 8 In the meeting of the Committee on June 6,
1989, 9 the members agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the

consolidated version should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated
by House Bill No. 21505. The transcript of the meeting states:

xxx xxx xxx

CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because
this is new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more
cautious approach and limiting it only to the local government units
because even with that stage where . . . at least this has been quite
popular, ano? It has been attempted on a national basis. Alright.
There has not been a single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon.
And, second, we consider also that it is only fair that the local
legislative body should be given a chance to adopt the legislation bill
proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing indirect system of initiative. If after
all, the local legislative assembly or body is willing to adopt it in full
or in toto, there ought to be any reason for initiative, ano for initiative.
And, number 3, we feel that there should be some limitation on the
frequency with which it should be applied. Number 4, na the people,
thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that is beyond the scope of
authority of the local legislative body, otherwise, my God, magaassume sila ng power that is broader and greater than the grant of
legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5, because of
that, then a proposition which has been the result of a successful
initiative can only carry the force and effect of an ordinance and
therefore that should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to declare
it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is beyond
powers of local government units to enact. Iyon ang main essence
namin, so we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang sa
inyo naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that,
alright, although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute.
Alright, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito,
and magiging basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and
magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is
the House bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa
amin eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang
number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pagusapan.
Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng national at saka
constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na consolidation of both
bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill
No. so and so. 10
When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman
Roco upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The record of the House Representative
states: 11
xxx xxx xxx

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines

Sur is recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the
disagreeing provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers to
the system providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally,
Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so
both versions are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically
provided for local initiative and referendum and the House
Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum on
the Constitution and on national legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the
Minority Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few
questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please
proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the
two bills was that in the Senate version there was a provision for local
initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local
initiative and referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided
purely for national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two
provisions were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and
referendum both in the constitutional amendment and national
legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance
with the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this
Congress to enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system

which can be done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of
the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional
amendments in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and
referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial
difference between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I
said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial and municipal
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated
bill on Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the
legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may
not be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We
have also held that where a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that
interpretation which will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be
adopted. 12
The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to
implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text
of said law to reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon

compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section
5(b) states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also
states that "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to
defeat its intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to
the Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the
policy thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be
expected for laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not
require our legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose
Garcia Villa or in lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to
refuse to effectuate the intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished
Vicente Francisco 13 reminds us: "Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But
the use of inapt or inaccurate language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can
be ascertained. The same is equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical
expressions, that is, such expressions and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the
legislature intended that they bear, although such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal
meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium.
Again, the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and
sections of a statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are
entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses. 14
All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or
spirit of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly
disregards the rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the
law is its body but its spirit is its soul. 15
II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, 16 promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac,
then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the
COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation

of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General, 17 this Court, thru
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be
complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and (b) to fix standard the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which
is the essence of every law, and, without the aforementioned standard, there would
be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted
within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also and this is worse to
unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by
the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation
of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement
of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects
above referred to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells
out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is
hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards
to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from
overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary to start a people's
initiative, 18 directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, 19 what the COMELEC should do upon filing
of the petition for initiative, 20 how a proposition is approved, 21 when a plebiscite may be held, 22 when the
amendment takes effect 23 and what matters may not be the subject of any initiative. 24 By any measure,
these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out
the boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the
circumstances under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is
to prevent a total transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate." 25 In
enacting R.A. No. 6735, it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law
implementing people's initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show
that it merely provided the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The debates 26 in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the
rules of procedure to enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:

MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is

possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out
the initiative. . . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not
prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers, 27 Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In
response to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the
legislature over the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize another body to check the proper form.
It could also authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In
other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or
impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair
the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it
to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their
promulgation. As aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly
pinpoint the standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare
the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity." 28 He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United
States, 29 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders
of the military commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a
prerequisite to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute
are not to be read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a single program
and must be judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by

Congress of the Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations

themselves followed a standard authorized by the Executive Order the necessity
of protecting military resources in the designated areas against espionage and
sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20
look at the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink.
The policy and standards can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the
standards provided for in R.A. No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as
adequate more general standards such as "simplicity and dignity," 30 "public interest," 31"public
welfare," 32 "interest of law and order," 33 "justice and equity," 34 "adequate and efficient
instruction," 35"public safety," 36 "public policy", 37 "greater national interest", 38 "protect the local
consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates", 39 and "promote simplicity,
economy and efficiency in government." 40 A due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal
and coordinate branch of government, should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to
effectuate laws unless they are clearly unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas.
The inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at
bar started when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to
Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas
did not join the petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by
the COMELEC. The petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition,
the case at bar was filed by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus
Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the
People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against
the Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an
organization was not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the
Pedrosas ". . . to desist from conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the
Constitution." On December 19, 1996, we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to
lift the temporary restraining order against the Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all
motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their
solicitation of signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the
Constitution which provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in
section 1, Article II of the Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides
in the people and all government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the
people and their voice is part of the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our
sovereignty but no power can trivialize them for sovereignty is indivisible.

But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and
their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment
of adequate consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution
strengthening the sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the
Constitution, the Pedrosas are participating in the political decision-making process of our people.
The Constitution says their right cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a
question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an
exercise of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from
the Malolos Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that
freedom of speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably,
freedom of speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this
reason, the Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to
amend the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To
be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the
predicate of progress and we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that
the only constant in life is change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987
Constitution. On October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article
of faith in our Constitution. 41 On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to
check excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected. 42 On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and
doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise." 43 Just a few days
ago, or on March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision, 44 we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City
involving the mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the
tribunal of the people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque
abstraction to a robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom in
full. The Court cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back
the flowering of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people who are
pro-change but not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into a
sterile talkaton. Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy
nobody can claim any infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA,
in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this
demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country,
except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main sponsor 2 of the
proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
"innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing
amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of
three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention. 4 For this and the other reasons
hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;

3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist

Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the
dates designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the
members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise
of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that,
as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all over the
country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures affixed by
individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it is
necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued
by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise
necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, 8 and Section 8 of Article X 9 of the Constitution. Attached to the petition
is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7
OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of
hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty.
Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been
passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating
Constitution Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago
filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely,
initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to
provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was left to some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed
this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994:
"There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as implementing [the
provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been
obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in
print media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional
amendments because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after
publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the
conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and
local laws, is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for
the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is
authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned
funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in
the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA
would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and
the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and

legislator's suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
They argue therein that:

15

on the petition.

1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL

TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT
LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
"COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE
THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT
DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE
ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR
PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE
SUPERVISING SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE
DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS
P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO
SUPERVISE CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION"
UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS.COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S
SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED
FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE
THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO
NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES
AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF
THESE LAWS."

6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS

A PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT
THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX
E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION"
OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT
ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF
THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE
ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD
BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY
JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts
off with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend
the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On
the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which
governs the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a
subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the
validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to,
the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the
Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to
reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a
plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.

In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
Its Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees
that power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative,
includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No.
6735 because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No.
6735 does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No.
6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this
Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b)
noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by
private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the
counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for
the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul
Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set
the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 Arevision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.

(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all
other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance,
"to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle
the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for
participation in policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove
the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be
availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their
elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a)
the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfin's petition.

(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the
procedure for a people's initiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution.
That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not
constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient
standard for a valid delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the
filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also submits
that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an
initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and
the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.

The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article
XVII of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing
law on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed
only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by
the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention
of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of
five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring
LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and
the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the
said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues,
which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far
filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and
Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and
Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed
in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a
revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature
gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and
volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the
publication of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution.

5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the
Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or
refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record
of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in
due time, their separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF
THE DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition
for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing
the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested.
(People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of
the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of
the questioned Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and
political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.

30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition. 26 The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of
Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days
their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically
gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together
with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on
to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding
the defendant to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of
signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality
because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT
SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses
congressional action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever
reason, does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That
section reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___
Section ___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted
a new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully
call attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a
complete Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed
provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of
the Members, may I quote Section 2:

The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.

32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory
questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least
10 percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to
the legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long
as the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on
this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee
hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The
Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment
through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from
the date of the ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first
amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this
initiative power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected
that within that five-year period, the National Assembly can come up
with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details
on how this is to be carried out is it possible that, in effect, what
will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the
legislature rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that
possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even
the legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an
initiative.
xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in

the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the
proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the
drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would
have a lot of difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as
written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of
legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal
mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal
mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of
circumspection in the drafting and in the amendments of the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of
constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that
would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions
are drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or
the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the
Constitution by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be
placed in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can
incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately
cover all the conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals
to AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that
this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the
traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in

Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative

should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision. 34
xxx xxx xxx

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing

this process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on
Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph
(c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of
amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include
the process of revision; whereas theprocess of initiation to amend,
which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute
the entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed
amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by
the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as
follows: "SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION
MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE
THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS,
OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.

THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it
possible for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out
the initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not
prevent the legislature from asking another body to set the
proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of
the proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to
legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the
procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's
proposed amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not

cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when

he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and
"revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal,
what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of
amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed
by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the
Legislative because it would require another voting by the
Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an
amendment, when the Commission shall take up the Article on the
Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended,
reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT
LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS
THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN
ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS
RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading
on 9 July 1986.41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was

allowed to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view

thereof, the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing "percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the
second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation
of the exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second
paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the
rules implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right]
is to be carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House
of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which
dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X
(Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50and by the
House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.

First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is
silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the
Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power
to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through
the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1
of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum
and appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in
part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to
the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of
the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and

c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended
or repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative
on amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution.
This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of
values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading
of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum)
leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved,
but on its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted
is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to
be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which
we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative
on amendments to the Constitution. 53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in
an election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
certification and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative
bodies of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined
by law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings
of sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be
petitions for both national and localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the
proper courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this
Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to
enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in
the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and

(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.

55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:

(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the
power of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered
voters for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative
on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3;
(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution
may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the
number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the
approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting
in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the
COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above.
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself
is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.

Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress
to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin
Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters
of which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The
Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits
that he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain
assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then
is theinitiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The
only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to
prescribe the form of the petition; 63(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its
election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election
registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters'
identification cards used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent
Commission must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings
under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not
assign to the petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND,
meaning, undocketed. That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not
have been dignified by the Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the
order directing Delfin and the oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it,
the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its
time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term
limits of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should
not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of
the right of the people under that system.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered

a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing
rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153

October 25, 2006

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III,
BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA
represented by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by
its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas,
MIGRANTE represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA
represented by its Secretary General Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor
de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo

Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR.
DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter Change, DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROSBARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS
C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR.
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE

CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R.
OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299

October 25, 2006

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1 and individuals, commenced gathering signatures
for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under
Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act
("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at

least three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of
Article VI (Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 5 and by
adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino
Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following
proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative. 7
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8 declaring RA
6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. 9
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and
mandamus to set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC
to give due course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a
binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to
that case, and their petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign
people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's
verification of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent
injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the
petitioners, urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General
proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to
implement the system of initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the
Lambino Group's petition. The supporting intervenors10 uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing
intervenors11 hold the contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The
opposing intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the
validity of the signature gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with
the minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section
2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;12 (4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not

mere amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the
Lambino Group's compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative
petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After
receiving the parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present
petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse
of discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Direct Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a
people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready
to be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them
before they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to
them and they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional
amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it
around for signature.13 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two
essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a
petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or
attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an
assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of
the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time
constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed14 the concept of people's initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States 15 which
allow initiative petitions,the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text
of the proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people
must sign on an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.16
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various
courts. Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts,
affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the
signature has not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more
importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant
potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition

to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could easily
mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting,
portions of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems
particularly acute when, in this case, the person giving the description is the drafter of
the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite
signatures to qualify for the ballot.17 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,18 the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are
described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide
sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to
sign the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional
provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is
proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this
knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
(Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of
that which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the
initiative void.19
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the
full text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's
initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the
framers intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments
before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed,
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested
parties who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments
to the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the
arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather
the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the
constitutional requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that
the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments
was the signature sheet attached21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by
intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:

Province:

City/Municipality:

No. of
Verified

Legislative District: Barangay:

Signatures:

PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY
IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR
THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which
shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing
thereof.

Precinct
Number

Name
Last Name, First
Name, M.I.

Address

Birthdate
MM/DD/YY

Signature

Verification

10

_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)

_________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

__________________
Witness
(Print Name and Sign)

There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed
changes in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the
proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments before this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the BicameralPresidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to
August 2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the
Lambino Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When
asked if his group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed
his answer and stated that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
petition, not the draft of the 25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August
2006 amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started
gathering signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August
2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as
follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity
as a registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines, as shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as
representative of the mass of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines" 22 has posted the
full text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to
adopt a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's
Consultative Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint
Declaration for Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority
coalition of the House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her
Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final
report sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which
militates against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress
to amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to
pursue the constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without
prejudice to other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE
MEMBER-LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006
at the Century Park Hotel, Manila.23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August
2006 petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution
No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution."
The proposals of the Consultative Commission24 arevastly different from the proposed changes of
the Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the
COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the
existing Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions
have profound impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing
Constitution, provisions that the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino
Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution,
including the introduction of new Transitory Provisions.

The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the
filing of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC.
However, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused
the circulation of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing
with the COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the
Lambino Group's claim that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the
Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments
alleged in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of
Section 5 of the Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect
their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended
petition was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signaturegathering. Instead, the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this
Court that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The
signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated
with, the signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer
who did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S.
S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters
who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in
the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed
with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that
the signature sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply,
the Lambino Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention
the amended petition. This contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments
that what they circulated was the draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not
read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground
that he did not understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a
proposed changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino

Group quotes requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same
authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated
with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino
Group's proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The
Lambino Group's citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to
August 2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they
filed later with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their
belated claim that they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or
amended petition. Nevertheless, even assumingthe Lambino Group circulated the amended
petition during the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating
only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000
copies of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty.
Lambino added that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but
he could not state with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty.
Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself
caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the
proposed changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one
copy each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and
company attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets
could have circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures.
Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the
maximum number of people who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not
exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3
million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million
signatories saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed
changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the
signature sheet of such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral
arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a
mere reading of the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of
the proposed changes in the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative
clause of the Constitution.

For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the
full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of
the proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are
almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own
term of office; 27
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have
inferred or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the
people during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be
held during the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of
all local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously
with the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular
Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows
the interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously
with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office.
This allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current
three-year term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members
of the Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his
group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group
deceived the 6.3 million signatories, and even the entire nation.

This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the
6.3 million signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group
because the signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is
a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes
would require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the
local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature
sheets. The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions,
provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court
and the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the
Lambino Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts
the people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing
them to sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find
unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not
only the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,29 the Supreme Court of Florida
declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if
our judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of
the proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it
is voting on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment
being voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very
broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and
violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis
supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,30 the Supreme
Court of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the singlesubject rule was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the
deliberate intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a
greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative
process. The drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process.
They often emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more

complex or less appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petitionsigners and eventual voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the
election. More importantly, there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an
initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to
be undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the
signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament
to amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed
changes, or before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the
interim Parliament has the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the
proposed Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to
immediately amend or revise again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again
so soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or
revisions the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for
such further amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature
and effect of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the
people" because the people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament
until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the
interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010.
However, there is no counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives
even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the
present Senators. Thus, all the present members of the House will remain members of the interim
Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises
all the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the
House of Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people
who signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used
to discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would
be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to
members of the existing House of Representatives.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text
of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the
people. That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law,
the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a
general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not
personally know the people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the
people before they sign the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to
comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision
through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and
not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode
is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode,
applies only to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the
following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report
No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now

covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members,
may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal
was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that
this system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the
operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1,
instead of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process
of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a
revision which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense
that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the
coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision;
whereas, the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words
"amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be
covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.31 (Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and

wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they
are empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus,
in McFadden v. Jordan,32 the Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x
applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments
to the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x
It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through
ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that
purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative
measure (hereinafter termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure
became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then
the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed
upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:33
It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be
amended or revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other
change only through the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes
that there is a difference between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an
examination of the measure here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is
generally understood and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be
based in large part on the revision of the constitution drafted by the 'Commission for
Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to
the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's majority
vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the
plaintiffs is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted
to the people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article
XVII, Section 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the
manner provided in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There
can be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A
popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the

manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a
constitution in a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost
invariably treated as extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is
universally conceded that the people are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a
constitution and to change their own work at will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly
manner and according to the settled principles of constitutional law. And where the people, in
adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method by which the people may alter or amend
it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed restrictions, is
unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a
people's initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should
be dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution.
One of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this
manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of
the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for
which it was framed.35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a
change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision
generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just
like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of
our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its

Branches."38 A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that
"jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances." 39
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles
- Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in
the entire Constitution.40Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great coequal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the
separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone
of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the
abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the
face alone of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes
will radically alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become
obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and
plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which
have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should
be altered. Thus, for instance a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on
other important provisions of the Constitution.41 (Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,42 an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative
"was defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other
provisions of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside
the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has
been in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except
one, since the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary
change. The concept of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of
government. It would not only radically change the whole pattern of government in this

state and tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the
physical facilities necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the
people at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit
further amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which
would result, or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to
adopt them, simple chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result
would obtain from an amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a
Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to
detail. These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many
sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and
up-to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could
be amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.43 (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that
would be affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's
present initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on
the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's
present initiative seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative
in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one
of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts
and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same
substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the
changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide
for both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional
delegates, while the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks
of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience
of the people, that on one hand the common people in general are not expected to work fulltime on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation,
profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention
delegates are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision"

and "amendment" pertain only to the process or procedure of coming up with the
corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the
original; boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
same proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would
constitute a revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed
changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional
convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals
drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are
clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration.
More so, if such theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government
established in the Constitution. Such a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any
theory advocating that a proposed change involving a radical structural change in government does
not constitute a revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,46 the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution
proposed by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a
procedure by which the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it
does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the
distinction between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and
subject matter of the proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal
overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching
changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing
fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined
group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion
the most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it
violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of
the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a
revision of the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions
of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed
amendments, the court said:

"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as
a means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use
as a means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of
the constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea
that an individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x
xxx
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and
at the other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties
arise in determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably
located at the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a
radical overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of
government, requiring far-reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting
any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a
revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years 47 is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100 percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. 48 Also, a change
requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
amendment and not a revision.49
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the
Constitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches.
These three examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end
where the revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change
in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For
example, the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1,
Article II50 of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the
fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be
examined case-by-case, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions
allow people's initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded
proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions.

In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior
law, the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the
Lambino Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of
construction by stating that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall
be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to
freeze the two irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a
future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily
conceded during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage."
In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision
automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is
not between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed
changes. The inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
"Parliamentary system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a
"unicameral parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are
among the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly
refer to the traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French,
Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have
all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who signed the signature sheets realize that they were
adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution
but only for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a UnicameralParliamentary system requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution.
Revision of the Constitution through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the

Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiagowill not change the
outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements of the Constitution to implement the
initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before
the Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the
well-settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be
resolved on some other grounds.51
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on
initiatives to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative
must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA
6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for
an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and
Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming
to act "together with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition
and amended petition. Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even
comply with the basic requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the
form of government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735
prohibits submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the
Lambino Group's initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino
Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this
Court's ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)
v. COMELEC.52 For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be
attributed to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA
therein, it appearing that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court
in G.R. No. 127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.

5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of
all the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising
it in blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters,
to be tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a
cavalier change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new
dominant political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this
country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast53
approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That
approval included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group,
can change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign
capacity, prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional
change, which means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution.
This is one act the Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution,
this Court is sworn to perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which
embodies the real sovereign will of the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override
the specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise,
the Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures
through false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that
their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to
change the Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or
"sovereign will" in the present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend
and protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively
gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976

VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power
of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in
the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling
for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such
replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of
his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree,
Presidential Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the
provisions of presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in
"barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16,
1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No.
991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below. 2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033,
stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced
thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to
the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments
to the Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of
a plebiscite within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:

1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members
of the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by
law, shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the
different regions of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by
their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the
Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the
sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and
the, manner of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the
same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National
Assembly and the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not
exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of
the members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the
Speaker shall have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime
Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa
is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his
powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers
vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime
Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have
been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a
threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National
Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees,
orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions,
powers, and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections
may be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people
regarding any important matter whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in
full force and effect.

9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they
have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October
1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son,
commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on
Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without
force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the
Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on
Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October
16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on
Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the
issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the
transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the
referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L44684, was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention,
asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the
transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article
XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL
M. GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to
restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming ReferendumPlebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the
incumbent President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the
submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the
plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and
allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines
the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.

1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito
V. Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos.
991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees
are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its
enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may
be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million
Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the
lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to
litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits,
this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem
it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed
Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification,
raises a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised
by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution
resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National
Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly (Sec.
1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to
constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of
the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The
implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed
as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section
2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be
heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also
of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power,
so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where
the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is
definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of
the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional
authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the
amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a
downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would
merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the
interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed
was valid or not. 10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that
the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure
adopted for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear
Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act,
provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present
Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the
proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial
but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which

includes the competence to determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been
observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to
and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference
of the Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of nonpolitical impression. In the Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on
the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the
Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification
Cases 12involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General
was dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion,
expressing the majority view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory
of the respondents therein that the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be
held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or
not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and
We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical unanimity. We overruled the
respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the
constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon
vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly
modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito." 13 The return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor
General, was decisively refused by the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons
adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in support on the political
question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by
this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our
decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis
which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of
all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its
Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an
election.

SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with
Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2)
by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National
Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in
an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of
transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National
Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested
with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the
interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the
country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention,
revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions,
they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion
as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor,
Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by
Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim
National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 1015, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against
the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens
Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim
National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question of
whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of
the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed
automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that
referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment
to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when
engaged in the amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by
the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the
National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in

character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic

character and that of a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of
law. 17Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The
prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation.
The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government
today are more or less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as
imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually independent
branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any
one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the
separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In
normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By
this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government
when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary
union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the
separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their
fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and
presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive
is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result,
cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power of the
state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system
of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own
right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special
exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional
restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at.
That sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory
Provisions, thus: 23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have
been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President
and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National
Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or

done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the incumbent
President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim
National Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a
vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking
powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter,
this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time.
The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to
efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the
steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by
the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession,
inflation, and economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just
confines the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national
forces, yet the facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in
meeting the same, indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter
fully addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment,
the President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference.
Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the
interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions).
Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim
National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the
President to assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that
body's legislative functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging
the legislative functions of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge
the function of that Assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct,
although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has
converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme
Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by
its very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without

constitutional infractions. For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake
the amending process would leave the governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding the objective of a crisis government "to
end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times, that Presidential initiative to reduce
into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all, constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The
Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays,
about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities,
72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment
of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting
of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the

The Batasang Bayan (legislative

council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet
members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive
committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people
in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the Constitution, including
the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the
exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 . 28

proposed amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the
Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed
amendments) to the people in the National Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.

V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the
Philippines, a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of
individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It
means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence, the people
may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of
express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because, as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment,
as all life is all experiment." 34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require
that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is
based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their
sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed,
proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the
sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the
powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed amendments and the
question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves
implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be
followed reside somehow in a particular body.

VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to
be continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was
prompted by the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true
pulse may be felt to guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the
succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may
participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new
Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above
which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to
answer the referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite.
There is nothing objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and
submitting to them for ratification of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes
(15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every
barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another
containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters
fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years
and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be
separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes. 38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely
consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues
submitted to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the
totality of the executive power of the President. 39It is participated in by all citizens from the age of
fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts . 40 A "plebiscite," on
the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election
Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the
freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation
of Justice Fernando, 41 is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled
voice. To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression
of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing
freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he would not
countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes"
or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus, the dissenters
soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed
amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled

matter. 43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate
in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues. 44

VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free
debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are
the issues of the day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That
notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous
plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls:
"Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled
plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as
ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of
the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940
Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of the President and
Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of publication in three
consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity Amendment,
an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the
plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)." 45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme
court held that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body or
in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because
proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor,
the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there
is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication
being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is
but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In the
words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and
the felt needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it
ought to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by
proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?

2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as
set up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
therefor a sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando,
Claudio Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and
Ruperto G. Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices
Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and
Munoz Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and
dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that
there is concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts
as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the
proposed amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar
expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices
Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond
the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA
774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's
lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above
stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and time to assure intelligent
consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling cases of Gonzales,
supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion,
Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma
voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J, in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36142 March 31, 1973

JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36164 March 31, 1973
VIDAL TAN, J. ANTONIO ARANETA, ALEJANDRO ROCES, MANUEL CRUDO, ANTONIO U.
MIRANDA, EMILIO DE PERALTA AND LORENZO M. TAADA, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE , THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF LAND REFORM, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE CHAIRMAN OF
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON REORGANIZATION, THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL
SERVICE, respondents.

G.R. No. L-36165 March 31, 1973.

GERARDO ROXAS, AMBROSIO PADILLA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, SALVADOR H. LAUREL,
RAMON V. MITRA, JR. and EVA ESTRADA-KALAW, petitioners,
vs.
ALEJANDRO MELCHOR, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his
capacity as Secretary of National Defense; General ROMEO ESPINO, in his capacity as Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines; TANCIO E. CASTAEDA, in his capacity as
Secretary General Services; Senator GIL J. PUYAT, in his capacity as President of the Senate;
and Senator JOSE ROY, his capacity, as President Pro Tempore of the of the
Senate, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36236 March 31, 1973
EDDIE B. MONTECLARO, [personally and in his capacity as President of the National Press
Club of the Philippines], petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, THE AUDITOR
GENERAL, THE BUDGET COMMISSIONER & THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-36283 March 31, 1973
NAPOLEON V. DILAG, ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., LEONARDO ASODISEN, JR., and RAUL
M. GONZALEZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, THE HONORABLE BUDGET COMMISSIONER, THE HONORABLE AUDITOR
GENERAL, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner Josue Javellana.
Lorenzo M. Taada and Associates for petitioners Vidal Tan, et al.
Taada, Salonga, Ordoez, Rodrigo, Sanidad, Roxas. Gonzales and Arroyo for petitioners Gerardo
Roxas, et al.
Joker P. Arroyo and Rogelio B. Padilla for petitioner Eddie Monteclaro.
Raul M. Gonzales and Associates for petitioners Napoleon V. Dilag, et al.
Arturo M. Tolentino for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza and Solicitor
Reynato S. Puno for other respondents.
RESOLUTION

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

The above-entitled five (5) cases are a sequel of cases G.R. Nos. L-35925,
L-35929, L-35940, L-35941, L-35942, L-35948, L-35953, L-35961, L-35965 and
L-35979, decided on January 22, 1973, to which We will hereafter refer collectively as the plebiscite
cases.
Background of the Plebiscite Cases.
The factual setting thereof is set forth in the decision therein rendered, from which We quote:
On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was
amended by Resolution No. 4 of said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said
Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132,
approved on August 24, 1970, pursuant to the provisions of which the election of
delegates to said Convention was held on November 10, 1970, and the 1971
Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971. While the
Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued
Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial Law. On
November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines. The next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the
Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for
ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as
setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed Constitution on
January 15, 1973.
Soon after, or on December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed, with this Court, Case G.R.
No. L-35925, against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines
and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from
implementing Presidential Decree No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the
Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and
effect as law because the calling ... of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the
conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be
answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for the purpose, are, by
the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress ...," and "there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973,
there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient
time to inform the people of the contents thereof."
Substantially identical actions were filed, on December 8, 1972, by Pablo C. Sanidad
against the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L- 35929) on December 11,
1972, by Gerardo Roxas, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the Director of
Printing, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R. L-35940), by
Eddie B. Monteclaro against the Commission on Elections and the Treasurer of the
Philippines (Case G.R. No. L-35941), and by Sedfrey Ordoez, et al. against the
National Treasurer and the Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35942); on
December 12, 1972, by Vidal Tan, et al., against the Commission on Elections, the
Treasurer of the Philippines, the Auditor General and the Director of Printing (Case
G.R. No. L-35948) and by Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino against the
Commission on Elections (Case G.R. No. L-35953); on December 14, 1972, by
Jacinto Jimenez against the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, the
Treasurer of the Philippines and the Director of the Bureau of Printing (Case G.R.

No. L-35961), and by Raul M. Gonzales against the Commission on Elections, the
Budget Commissioner, the National Treasurer and the Auditor General (Case G.R.
No. L-35965); and on December 16, 1972, by Ernesto C. Hidalgo against the
Commission on Elections, the Secretary of Education, the National Treasurer and the
Auditor General (Case G.R. No. L-35979).
In all these cases, except the last (G.R. No. L-35979), the respondents were required
to file their answers "not later than 12:00 (o'clock) noon of Saturday, December 16,
1972." Said cases were, also, set for hearing and partly heard on Monday, December
18, 1972, at 9:30 a.m. The hearing was continued on December 19, 1972. By
agreement of the parties, the aforementioned last case G.R. No. L-35979 was,
also, heard, jointly with the others, on December 19, 1972. At the conclusion of the
hearing, on that date, the parties in all of the aforementioned cases were given a
short period of time within which "to submit their notes on the points they desire to
stress." Said notes were filed on different dates, between December 21, 1972, and
January 4, 1973.
Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open
debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced
the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when
General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held
on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20,
moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972,
temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and
open debate on the proposed Constitution."
In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned
plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said
plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress
was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on
January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was
that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in
view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after
consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on
Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases.
"In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No.
L-35948 filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as
possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973." It was alleged in said
motion, inter alia:
"6. That the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree
No. 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain
public questions [Bulletin Today, January 1, 1973];
"7. That thereafter it was later announced that "the Assemblies will be asked if they
favor or oppose

[1] The New Society;

[2] Reforms instituted under Martial Law;
[3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and
when (the tentative new dates given following the postponement of
the plebiscite from the original date of January 15 are February 19
and March 5);
[4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in
accordance with the existing Constitution despite Martial Law."
[Bulletin Today, January 3, 1973.]
"8. That it was later reported that the following are to be the forms of the questions to
be asked to the Citizens Assemblies:
[1] Do you approve of the New Society?
[2] Do you approve of the reform measures under martial law?
[3] Do you think that Congress should meet again in regular session?
[4] How soon would you like the plebiscite on the new Constitution to
be held? [Bulletin Today, January 5, 1973].
"9. That the voting by the so-called Citizens Assemblies was announced to take
place during the period from January 10 to January 15, 1973;
"10. That on January 10, 1973, it was reported that on more question would be
added to the four (4) question previously announced, and that the forms of the
question would be as follows:
[1] Do you like the New Society?
[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?
[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
[5] Do you like the way President Marcos running the affairs of the
government? [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; emphasis an
additional question.]
"11. That on January 11, 1973, it was reported that six (6) more questions would be
submitted to the so-called Citizens Assemblies:
[1] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular
government to decide issues of national interests?

[2] Do you approve of the new Constitution?

[3] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution?
[4] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in
accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution?
[5] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next
elections to be called?
[6] Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11,
1973; emphasis supplied]
"12. That according to reports, the returns with respect to the six (6) additional
questions quoted above will be on a form similar or identical to Annex "A" hereof;
"13. That attached to page 1 of Annex "A" is another page, which we marked as
Annex "A-1", and which reads:
COMMENTS ON
QUESTION No. 1
In order to broaden the base of citizens' participation
in government.
QUESTION No. 2
But we do not want the Ad Interim Assembly to be convoked. Or if it is
to be convened at all, it should not be done so until after at least
seven (7) years from the approval of the New Constitution by the
Citizens Assemblies.
QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should already be considered
the plebiscite on the New Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the
new Constitution should be deemed ratified.
QUESTION No. 4
We are sick and tired of too frequent elections. We are fed up with
politics, of so many debates and so much expenses.
QUESTION No. 5

Probably a period of at least seven (7) years moratorium on elections

will be enough for stability to be established in the country, for
reforms to take root and normalcy to return.
QUESTION No. 6
We want President Marcos to continue with Martial Law. We want him
to exercise his powers with more authority. We want him to be strong
and firm so that he can accomplish all his reform programs and
establish normalcy in the country. If all other measures fail, we want
President Marcos to declare a revolutionary government along the
lines of the new Constitution without the ad interim Assembly."
"Attention is respectfully invited to the comments on "Question No. 3," which reads:

QUESTION No. 3
The vote of the Citizens Assemblies should be considered the
plebiscite on the New Constitution.
If the Citizens Assemblies approve of the New Constitution, then the
new Constitution should be deemed ratified.
This, we are afraid, and therefore allege, is pregnant with ominous possibilities.
14. That, in the meantime, speaking on television and over the radio, on January 7,
1973, the President announced that the limited freedom of debate on the proposed
Constitution was being withdrawn and that the proclamation of martial law and the
orders and decrees issued thereunder would thenceforth strictly be enforced [Daily
Express, January 8, 1973];
15. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore state, that the question added
in the last list of questions to be asked to the Citizens Assemblies, namely:
Do you approve of the
New Constitution?
in relation to the question following it:
Do you still want a plebiscite to be
called to ratify the new Constitution?"

would be an attempt to by-pass and short-circuit this Honorable Court before which
the question of the validity of the plebiscite on the proposed Constitution is now
pending;
"16. That petitioners have reason to fear, and therefore allege, that if an affirmative
answer to the two questions just referred to will be reported then this Honorable

Court and the entire nation will be confronted with a fait accompli which has been
attained in a highly unconstitutional and undemocratic manner;
"17. That the fait accompli would consist in the supposed expression of the people
approving the proposed Constitution;
"18. That, if such event would happen, then the case before this Honorable Court
could, to all intents and purposes, become moot because, petitioners fear, and they
therefore allege, that on the basis of such supposed expression of the will of the
people through the Citizens Assemblies, it would be announced that the proposed
Constitution, with all its defects, both congenital and otherwise, has been ratified;
"19. That, in such a situation the Philippines will be facing a real crisis and there is
likelihood of confusion if not chaos, because then, the people and their officials will
not know which Constitution is in force.
"20. That the crisis mentioned above can only be avoided if this Honorable Court will
immediately decide and announce its decision on the present petition;
"21. That with the withdrawal by the President of the limited freedom of discussion on
the proposed Constitution which was given to the people pursuant to Sec. 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 73, the opposition of respondents to petitioners' prayer at
the plebiscite be prohibited has now collapsed and that a free plebiscite can no
longer be held."
At about the same time, a similar prayer was made in a "manifestation" filed by the
petitioners in L-35949, "Gerardo Roxas, et al. v. Commission on Elections, et al.,"
and L-35942, "Sedfrey A. Ordoez, et al. v. The National Treasurer, et al."
The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution
requiring the respondents in said three (3) cases to comment on said "urgent motion"
and "manifestation," "not later than Tuesday noon, January 16, 1973." Prior thereto,
or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L35948 riled a "supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of
additional respondents," praying
"... that a restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining
respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department of
Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the
Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado
Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its
Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their deputies, subordinates and
substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned
such task, from collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to
the President or other officials concerned, the so-called Citizens'
Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were
supposed to have met during the period comprised between January
10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph
1 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion."
In support of this prayer, it was alleged

"3. That petitioners are now before this Honorable Court in order to ask further that
this Honorable Court issue a restraining order enjoining herein respondents,
particularly respondent Commission on Elections as well as the Department of Local
Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roo; the Department of Agrarian
Reforms and its head, Secretary Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification
Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; and their deputies,
subordinates and/or substitutes, from collecting, certifying, announcing and reporting
to the President the supposed Citizens' Assemblies referendum results allegedly
obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period between January
10 and January 15, 1973, particularly on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of
this Supplemental Urgent Motion;
"4. That the proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies are illegal, null and
void particularly insofar as such proceedings are being made the basis of a
supposed consensus for the ratification of the proposed Constitution because:
[a] The elections contemplated in the Constitution, Article XV, at
which the proposed constitutional amendments are to be submitted
for ratification, are elections at which only qualified and duly
registered voters are permitted to vote, whereas, the so called
Citizens' Assemblies were participated in by persons 15 years of age
and older, regardless of qualifications or lack thereof, as prescribed in
the Election Code;
[b] Elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional
amendments contemplated in Article XV of the Constitution have
provisions for the secrecy of choice and of vote, which is one of the
safeguards of freedom of action, but votes in the Citizens' Assemblies
were open and were cast by raising hands;
[c] The Election Code makes ample provisions for free, orderly and
honest elections, and such provisions are a minimum requirement for
elections or plebiscites for the ratification of constitutional
amendments, but there were no similar provisions to guide and
regulate proceedings of the so called Citizens' Assemblies;
[d] It is seriously to be doubted that, for lack of material time, more
than a handful of the so called Citizens' Assemblies have been
actually formed, because the mechanics of their organization were
still being discussed a day or so before the day they were supposed
to begin functioning:
"Provincial governors and city and municipal mayors
had been meeting with barrio captains and community
leaders since last Monday [January 8, 1973) to thresh
out the mechanics in the formation of the Citizens
Assemblies and the topics for discussion." [Bulletin
Today, January 10, 1973]
"It should be recalled that the Citizens' Assemblies were ordered formed only at the
beginning of the year [Daily Express, January 1, 1973], and considering the lack of
experience of the local organizers of said assemblies, as well as the absence of

sufficient guidelines for organization, it is too much to believe that such assemblies
could be organized at such a short notice.
"5. That for lack of material time, the appropriate amended petition to include the
additional officials and government agencies mentioned in paragraph 3 of this
Supplemental Urgent Motion could not be completed because, as noted in the
Urgent Motion of January 12, 1973, the submission of the proposed Constitution to
the Citizens' Assemblies was not made known to the public until January 11, 1973.
But be that as it may, the said additional officials and agencies may be properly
included in the petition at bar because:
[a] The herein petitioners have prayed in their petition for the
annulment not only of Presidential Decree No. 73, but also of "any
similar decree, proclamation, order or instruction.
so that Presidential Decree No. 86, insofar at least as it attempts to submit the
proposed Constitution to a plebiscite by the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, is
properly in issue in this case, and those who enforce, implement, or carry out the
said Presidential Decree No. 86. and the instructions incidental thereto clearly fall
within the scope of this petition;
[b] In their petition, petitioners sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining not only the respondents named in
the petition but also their "agents" from implementing not only
Presidential Decree No. 73, but also "any other similar decree, order,
instruction, or proclamation in relation to the holding of a plebiscite on
January 15, 1973 for the purpose of submitting to the Filipino people
for their ratification or rejection the 1972 Draft or proposed
Constitution approved by the Constitutional Convention on November
30, 1972"; and finally,
[c] Petitioners prayed for such other relief which may be just and
equitable. [p. 39, Petition].
"Therefore, viewing the case from all angles, the officials and government agencies
mentioned in paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion, can lawfully be
reached by the processes of this Honorable Court by reason of this petition,
considering, furthermore, that the Commission on Elections has under our laws the
power, among others, of:
(a) Direct and immediate supervision and control over national,
provincial, city, municipal and municipal district officials required by
law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections on matters
pertaining to the enforcement of the provisions of this Code ..."
[Election Code of 1971, Sec. 3].
"6. That unless the petition at bar is decided immediately and the Commission on
Elections, together with the officials and government agencies mentioned in
paragraph 3 of this Supplemental Urgent Motion are restrained or enjoined from
collecting, certifying, reporting or announcing to the President the results of the
alleged voting of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies, irreparable damage will be

caused to the Republic of the Philippines, the Filipino people, the cause of freedom
an democracy, and the petitioners herein because:
[a] After the result of the supposed voting on the questions mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof shall have been announced, a conflict will arise
between those who maintain that the 1935 Constitution is still in
force, on the one hand, and those who will maintain that it has been
superseded by the proposed Constitution, on the other, thereby
creating confusion, if not chaos;
[b] Even the jurisdiction of this Court will be subject to serious attack
because the advocates of the theory that the proposed Constitution
has been ratified by reason of the announcement of the results of the
proceedings of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies will argue that,
General Order No. 3, which shall also be deemed ratified pursuant to
the Transitory Provisions of the proposed Constitution, has placed
Presidential Decree Nos. 73 and 86 beyond the reach and jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court."
On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the
respondents in said case G.R. No. L-35948 to file "file an answer to the said motion
not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973," and setting the motion for hearing
"on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m." While the case was being heard, on the date last
mentioned, at noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion
and said that, upon instructions of the President, he (the Secretary of Justice) was
delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been
signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and
announced to the Court, the parties in G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing
in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that the
President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed
said Proclamation No. 1102, earlier that morning. Thereupon, the writer read
Proclamation No. 1102 which is of the following tenor:
"BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
"PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
"ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
"WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one
Constitutional Convention is subject to ratification by the Filipino people;
"WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in
districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated
December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district
or ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines
and who are registered in the list of Citizen Assembly members kept by the barrio,
district or ward secretary;

"WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the
base of citizen participation in the democratic process and to afford ample
opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues;
"WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the following questions were posed before
the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do
you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixtyone (14,976,561) members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the
adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three
thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the
question as to whether or not the people would still like a plebiscite to be called to
ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight
hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and
that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote
in a plebiscite;
"WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per
cent of the members of the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new
Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that the
new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim
that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971)
Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the
votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the
Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
"IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-three.
(Sgd.)
FERDI
NAND
E.
MARC
OS
"Presid
ent of
the
Philippi
nes
"By the President:

"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
"Executive Secretary"
Such is the background of the cases submitted determination. After admitting some
of the allegations made in the petition in L-35948 and denying the other allegations
thereof, respondents therein alleged in their answer thereto, by way affirmative
defenses: 1) that the "questions raised" in said petition "are political in character"; 2)
that "the Constitutional Convention acted freely and had plenary authority to propose
not only amendments but a Constitution which would supersede the present
Constitution"; 3) that "the President's call for a plebiscite and the appropriation of
funds for this purpose are valid"; 4) that "there is not an improper submission" and
"there can be a plebiscite under Martial Law"; and 5) that the "argument that the
Proposed Constitution is vague and incomplete, makes an unconstitutional
delegation of power, includes a referendum on the proclamation of Martial Law and
purports to exercise judicial power" is "not relevant and ... without merit." Identical
defenses were set up in the other cases under consideration.
Immediately after the hearing held on January 17, 1973, or since the afternoon of
that date, the Members of the Court have been deliberating on the aforementioned
cases and, after extensive discussions on the merits thereof, have deemed it best
that each Member write his own views thereon and that thereafter the Chief Justice
should state the result or the votes thus cast on the points in issue. Hence, the
individual views of my brethren in the Court are set forth in the opinions attached
hereto, except that, instead of writing their separate opinions, some Members have
preferred to merely concur in the opinion of one of our colleagues.
Then the writer of said decision expressed his own opinion on the issues involved therein, after
which he recapitulated the views of the Members of the Court, as follows:
1. There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the legality of
Presidential Decree No. 73.
2. On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Esguerra and myself, or six (6) Members of the Court, are of the opinion
that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar
and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree.
3. On the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed
Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L35948, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue
has become moot and academic. Justices Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
myself have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention.
4. Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional
Convention had authority to continue in the performance of its functions despite the
proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold
the same view.
5. On the question whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper
submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom
essential therefor is concerned, Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a
repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935

Constitution and the existence of Martial Law, and would, therefore, grant the
petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra
are of the opinion that issue involves questions of fact which cannot be
predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual
possibility of adequate freedom, for the purposes contemplated.
6. On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed:
a. Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
Esguerra and myself are of the opinion that the question of validity of
said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court,
which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question.
b. Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of
Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be
determined by the Court, and that the "purported ratification of the
Proposed Constitution ... based on the referendum among Citizens'
Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the
requirements of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution," but that such
unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related
relevant circumstances, ... the new Constitution is legally
recognizable and should be recognized as legitimately in force."
c. Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed
Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with Article XV of the
1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect
whatsoever.
d. Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent to act" on the
issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the
people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and
manageable standards," since the issue "poses a question of fact.
7. On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted in the affirmative,
for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee,
and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case No. L-35948 as to which they
voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to
file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the legality of Presidential
Proclamation No. 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the
petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the aforementioned purpose, but he
believes, in effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits
everyone of the cases under consideration.
Accordingly, the Court acting in conformity with the position taken by six (6) of its members, 1 with
three (3) members dissenting, 2 with respect to G.R. No. L-35948, only and another member 3 dissenting,
as regards all of the cases dismissed the same, without special pronouncement as to costs.
The Present Cases
Prior thereto, or on January 20, 1973, Josue Javellana filed Case G.R. No. L-36142 against the
Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance, to restrain said

respondents "and their subordinates or agents from implementing any of the provisions of the
propose Constitution not found in the present Constitution" referring to that of 1935. The petition
therein, filed by Josue Javellana, as a "Filipino citizen, and a qualified and registered voter" and as
"a class suit, for himself, and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated," was amended on
or about January 24, 1973. After reciting in substance the facts set forth in the decision in the
plebiscite cases, Javellana alleged that the President had announced "the immediate
implementation of the New Constitution, thru his Cabinet, respondents including," and that the latter
"are acting without, or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed Constitution" upon
the ground: "that the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, is
without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies"; that the same "are without power to approve the
proposed Constitution ..."; "that the President is without power to proclaim the ratification by the
Filipino people of the proposed Constitution"; and "that the election held to ratify the proposed
Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Similar actions were filed, on January 23, 1973, by Vidal Tan, J. Antonio Araneta, Alejandro Roces,
Manuel Crudo, Antonio U. Miranda, Emilio de Peralta and Lorenzo M. Taada, against the Executive
Secretary, the Secretaries of Finance, Justice, Land Reform, and National Defense, the Auditor
General, the Budget Commissioner, the Chairman of the Presidential Commission on
Reorganization, the Treasurer of the Philippines, the Commission on Elections and the
Commissioner of Civil Service 4 on February 3, 1973, by Eddie Monteclaro, personally and as President
of the National Press Club of the Philippines, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Public
Information, the Auditor General, the Budget Commissioner and the National Treasurer 5 and on February
12, 1973, by Napoleon V. Dilag, Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., Leonardo Asodisen, Jr. and Raul M.
Gonzales, 6 against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Budget
Commissioner and the Auditor General.
Likewise, on January 23, 1973, Gerardo Roxas, Ambrosio Padilla, Jovito R. Salonga, Salvador H.
Laurel, 7 Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. and Eva Estrada-Kalaw, the first as "duly elected Senator and Minority Floor
Leader of the Senate," and others as "duly elected members" thereof, filed Case G.R. No. L-36165,
against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, the Secretary of General Services, the President and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate. In their petition as amended on January 26, 1973 petitioners Gerardo Roxas, et al.
allege, inter alia, that the term of office of three of the aforementioned petitioners 8 would expire on
December 31, 1975, and that of the others 9 on December 31, 1977; that pursuant to our 1935
Constitution, "which is still in force Congress of the Philippines "must convene for its 8th Session on
Monday, January 22, 1973, at 10:00 A.M., which is regular customary hour of its opening session"; that
"on said day, from 10:00 A.M. up to the afternoon," said petitioner "along with their other colleagues, were
unlawfully prevented from using the Senate Session Hall, the same having been closed by the authorities
in physical possession and control the Legislative Building"; that "(a)t about 5:00 to 6:00 P.M. the said day,
the premises of the entire Legislative Building were ordered cleared by the same authorities, and no one
was allowed to enter and have access to said premises"; that "(r)espondent Senate President Gil J. Puyat
and, in his absence, respondent President Pro Tempore Jose Roy we asked by petitioning Senators to
perform their duties under the law and the Rules of the Senate, but unlawfully refrained and continue to
refrain from doing so"; that the petitioners ready and willing to perform their duties as duly elected
members of the Senate of the Philippines," but respondent Secretary of National Defense, Executive
Secretary and Chief of Staff, "through their agents and representatives, are preventing petitioners from
performing their duties as duly elected Senators of the Philippines"; that "the Senate premise in the
Congress of the Philippines Building ... are occupied by and are under the physical control of the
elements military organizations under the direction of said respondents"; that, as per "official reports, the
Department of General Services ... is now the civilian agency in custody of the premises of the Legislative
Building"; that respondents "have unlawfully excluded and prevented, and continue to so exclude and
prevent" the petitioners "from the performance of their sworn duties, invoking the alleged approval of the
1972 (1973) Constitution of the Philippines by action of the so-called Citizens' Assemblies on January 10,
1973 to January 15, 1973, as stated in and by virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 signed and issued by the

President of the Philippines"; that "the alleged creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as instrumentalities for
the ratification of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" is inherently illegal and palpably
unconstitutional; that respondents Senate President and Senate President Pro Tempore "have unlawfully
refrained and continue to refrain from and/or unlawfully neglected and continue to neglect the
performance of their duties and functions as such officers under the law and the Rules of the Senate"
quoted in the petition; that because of events supervening the institution of the plebiscite cases, to which
reference has been made in the preceding pages, the Supreme Court dismissed said cases on January
22, 1973, by a majority vote, upon the ground that the petitions therein had become moot and academic;
that the alleged ratification of the 1972 (1973) Constitution "is illegal, unconstitutional and void and ... can
not have superseded and revoked the 1935 Constitution," for the reasons specified in the petition as
amended; that, by acting as they did, the respondents and their "agents, representatives and
subordinates ...have excluded the petitioners from an office to which" they "are lawfully entitled"; that
"respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy have unlawfully refrained from convening the Senate for its 8th
session, assuming general jurisdiction over the Session Hall and the premises of the Senate and ...
continue such inaction up to this time and ... a writ of mandamus is warranted in order to compel them to
comply with the duties and functions specifically enjoined by law"; and that "against the above mentioned
unlawful acts of the respondents, the petitioners have no appeal nor other speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law except by invoking the equitable remedies of mandamus and prohibition with
the provisional remedy of preliminary mandatory injunction."

Premised upon the foregoing allegations, said petitioners prayed that, "pending hearing on the
merits, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued ordering respondents Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and the ... Secretary of General Service, as well as all their agents, representatives and
subordinates to vacate the premises of the Senate of the Philippines and to deliver physical
possession of the same to the President of the Senate or his authorized representative"; and that
hearing, judgment be rendered declaring null and Proclamation No. 1102 ... and any order, decree,
proclamation having the same import and objective, issuing writs of prohibition and mandamus, as
prayed for against above-mentioned respondents, and making the writ injunction permanent; and
that a writ of mandamusbe issued against the respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy directing them
to comply with their duties and functions as President and President Pro Tempore, respectively, of
the Senate of Philippines, as provided by law and the Rules of the Senate."
Required to comment on the above-mentioned petitions and/or amended petitions, respondents
filed, with the leave Court first had and obtained, a consolidated comment on said petitions and/or
amended petitions, alleging that the same ought to have been dismissed outright; controverting
petitioners' allegations concerning the alleged lack impairment of the freedom of the 1971
Constitution Convention to approve the proposed Constitution, its alleged lack of authority to
incorporate certain contested provisions thereof, the alleged lack of authority of the President to
create and establish Citizens' Assemblies "for the purpose submitting to them the matter of
ratification of the new Constitution," the alleged "improper or inadequate submiss of the proposed
constitution," the "procedure for ratification adopted ... through the Citizens Assemblies"; a
maintaining that: 1) "(t)he Court is without jurisdiction to act on these petitions"; 2) the questions
raised therein are "political in character and therefore nonjusticiable"; 3) "there substantial
compliance with Article XV of the 1 Constitution"; 4) "(t)he Constitution was properly submitted the
people in a free, orderly and honest election; 5) "Proclamation No. 1102, certifying the results of the
election, is conclusive upon the courts"; and 6) "(t)he amending process outlined in Article XV of the
1935 Constitution is not exclusive of other modes of amendment."
Respondents Puyat and Roy, in said Case G.R. No. L-36165, filed their separate comment therein,
alleging that "(t)he subject matter" of said case "is a highly political question which, under the
circumstances, this ...Court would not be in a position to act upon judicially," and that, in view of the
opinions expressed by three members of this Court in its decision in the plebiscite cases, in effect

upholding the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, "further proceedings in this case may only be an
academic exercise in futility."
On February 5, 1973, the Court issued a resolution requiring respondents in L-36236 to comment on
the petition therein not later than Saturday, February 10, 1973, and setting the case for hearing on
February 12, 1973, at 9:30 a.m. By resolution dated February 7, 1973, this Court resolved to
consider the comments of the respondents in cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, and L-36165, as
motions to dismiss the petitions therein, and to set said cases for hearing on the same date and time
as L-36236. On that date, the parties in G.R. No. L-36283 10 agreed that the same be, likewise, heard,
as it was, in fact, heard jointly with the aforementioned cases G.R. Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165 and
L-36236. The hearing, which began on February 12, 1973, shortly after 9:30 a.m., was continued not only
that afternoon, but, also, on February 13, 14, 15 and 16, morning and afternoon, after which the parties
were granted up to February 24, 1973, noon, within which to submit their notes of oral arguments and
additional arguments, as well as the documents required of them or whose presentation was reserved by
them. The same resolution granted the parties until March 1, 1973, to reply to the notes filed by their
respective opponents. Counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 and L-36165 filed their
aforementioned notes on February 24, 1973, on which date the Solicitor General sought an extension of
time up to March 3, 1973, within which to file his notes, which was granted, with the understanding that
said notes shall include his reply to the notes already filed by the petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-36164 a L36165. Counsel for the petitioners, likewise, moved and were granted an extension of time, to expire on
March 10, 1973, within which to file, as they did, their notes in reply to those submitted by the Solicitor
General on March 3, 1973. On March 21, 1973, petitioners in L-36165 filed a "Manifestation a
Supplemental Rejoinder," whereas the Office of the Solicitor General submitted in all these cases a
"Rejoinder Petitioners' Replies."
After deliberating on these cases, the members of the Court agreed that each would write his own
opinion and serve a copy thereof on his colleagues, and this they did. Subsequently, the Court
discussed said opinions and votes were cast thereon. Such individual opinions are appended hereto.
Accordingly, the writer will first express his person opinion on the issues before the Court. After the
exposition his aforesaid opinion, the writer will make, concurrently with his colleagues in the Court, a
resume of summary of the votes cast by them in these cases.
Writer's Personal Opinion
I.
Alleged academic futility of further proceedings in G.R. L-36165.
This defense or theory, set up by counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy in G.R. No. L36165, and, also, by the Solicitor General, is predicated upon the fact that, in Our decision in the
plebiscite cases, Mr. Justice Barredo had expressed the view that the 1935 Constitution had "pro
tanto passed into history" and "been legitimately supplanted by the Constitution now in force by
virtue of Proclamation No. 1102 ..."; that Mr. Justice Antonio did not feel "that this Court competent to
act" in said cases "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards" and
because "the access to relevant information is insufficient to assure the correct determination of the
issue," apart from the circumstance that "the new constitution has been promulgated and great
interests have already arisen under it" and that the political organ of the Government has recognized
its provisions; whereas, Mr. Justice Esguerra had postulated that "(w)ithout any competent
evidence ... about the circumstances attending the holding" of the "referendum or plebiscite" thru the
Citizens' Assemblies, he "cannot say that it was not lawfully held" and that, accordingly,
he assumed "that what the proclamation (No. 1102) says on its face is true and until overcome by
satisfactory evidence" he could not "subscribe to the claim that such plebiscite was not held

accordingly"; and that he accepted "as a fait accompli that the Constitution adopted (by the 1971
Constitutional Convention) on November 30, 1972, has been duly ratified.
Counsel for respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy goes on to say that, under these circumstances,
"it seems remote or improbable that the necessary eight (8) votes under the 1935 Constitution, and
much less the ten (10) votes required by the 1972 (1973) Constitution, can be obtained for the relief
sought in the Amended Petition" in G.R. No.
L-36165.
I am unable to share this view. To begin with, Mr. Justice Barredo announced publicly, in open court,
during the hearing of these cases, that he was and is willing to be convinced that his aforementioned
opinion in the plebiscite cases should be reconsidered and changed. In effect, he thus declared that
he had an open mind in connection with the cases at bar, and that in deciding the same he would not
necessarily adhere to said opinion if the petitioners herein succeeded in convincing him that their
view should be sustained.
Secondly, counsel for the aforesaid respondents had apparently assumed that, under the 1935
Constitution, eight (8) votes are necessary to declare invalid the contested Proclamation No. 1102. I
do not believe that this assumption is borne out by any provision of said Constitution. Section 10 of
Article VIII thereof reads:
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty or law shall be heard and decided
by the Supreme Court in banc, and no treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional
without the concurrence of two thirds of all the members of the Court.
Pursuant to this section, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Supreme Court is
required only to declare "treaty or law" unconstitutional. Construing said provision, in a resolution
dated September 16, 1949, then Chief Justice Moran, voicing the unanimous view of the Members
of this Court, postulated:
... There is nothing either in the Constitution or in the Judiciary Act requiring the vote
of eight Justices to nullify a rule or regulation or an executive order issued by the
President. It is very significant that in the previous drafts of section 10, Article VIII of
the Constitution, "executive order" and "regulation"were included among those that
required for their nullification the vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Court.
But "executive order" and "regulation" were later deleted from the final draft (Aruego,
The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 495, 496), and thus a mere
majority of six members of this Court is enough to nullify them. 11
The distinction is not without reasonable foundation. The two thirds vote (eight [8] votes)
requirement, indeed, was made to apply only to treaty and law, because, in these cases, the
participation of the two other departments of the government the Executive and the Legislative
is present, which circumstance is absent in the case of rules, regulations and executive orders.
Indeed, a law (statute) passed by Congress is subject to the approval or veto of the President,
whose disapproval cannot be overridden except by the vote of two-thirds (2/3) of all members of
each House of Congress. 12 A treaty is entered into by the President with the concurrence of the
Senate,13 which is not required in the case of rules, regulations or executive orders which are exclusive
acts of the President. Hence, to nullify the same, a lesser number of votes is necessary in the Supreme
Court than that required to invalidate a law or treaty.
Although the foregoing refers to rules, regulations and executive orders issued by the President, the
dictum applies with equal force to executive proclamation, like said Proclamation No. 1102,

inasmuch as the authority to issue the same is governed by section 63 of the Revised Administrative
Code, which provides:
Administrative acts and commands of the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines touching the organization or mode of operation of the Government or
rearranging or readjusting any of the districts, divisions, parts or ports of the
(Philippine Islands) Philippines and all acts and commands governing the general
performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general concern
shall be made effective in executive orders.
Executive orders fixing the dates when specific laws, resolutions, or orders are to
have or cease to (have) effect and any information concerning matters of public
moment determined by law, resolution, or executive orders, may be promulgated in
an executive proclamation, with all the force of an executive order. 14
In fact, while executive order embody administrative acts or commands of the President, executive
proclamations are mainly informative and declaratory in character, and so does counsel for
respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy maintain in G.R. No.
L-36165. 15 As consequence, an executive proclamation has no more than "the force of an executive
order," so that, for the Supreme Court to declare such proclamation unconstitutional, under the 1935
Constitution, the same number of votes needed to invalidate an executive order, rule or regulation
namely, six (6) votes would suffice.
As regards the applicability of the provisions of the proposed new Constitution, approved by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, in the determination of the question whether or not it is now in force,
it is obvious that such question depends upon whether or not the said new Constitution has been
ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution, upon the authority of which
said Constitutional Convention was called and approved the proposed Constitution. It is well settled
that the matter of ratification of an amendment to the Constitution should be settled by applying the
provisions of the Constitution in force at the time of the alleged ratification, or the old Constitution. 16
II
Does the issue on the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 partake of the nature of a political, and,
hence, non-justiciable question?
The Solicitor General maintains in his comment the affirmative view and this is his main defense. In
support thereof, he alleges that "petitioners would have this Court declare as invalid the New
Constitution of the Republic" from which he claims "this Court now derives its authority"; that
"nearly 15 million of our body politic from the age of 15 years have mandated this Constitution to be
the New Constitution and the prospect of unsettling acts done in reliance on it caution against
interposition of the power of judicial review"; that "in the case of the New Constitution, the
government has been recognized in accordance with the New Constitution"; that "the country's
foreign relations are now being conducted in accordance with the new charter"; that "foreign
governments have taken note of it"; that the "plebiscite cases" are "not precedents for holding
questions regarding proposal and ratification justiciable"; and that "to abstain from judgment on the
ultimate issue of constitutionality is not to abdicate duty."
At the outset, it is obvious to me that We are not being asked to "declare" the new Constitution
invalid. What petitioners dispute is the theory that it has been validly ratified by the people, especially
that they have done so in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. The petitioners
maintain that the conclusion reached by the Chief Executive in the dispositive portion of

Proclamation No. 1102 is not borne out by the whereases preceding the same, as the predicates
from which said conclusion was drawn; that the plebiscite or "election" required in said Article XV
has not been held; that the Chief Executive has no authority, under the 1935 Constitution, to
dispense with said election or plebiscite; that the proceedings before the Citizens' Assemblies did not
constitute and may not be considered as such plebiscite; that the facts of record abundantly show
that the aforementioned Assemblies could not have been held throughout the Philippines from
January 10 to January 15, 1973; and that, in any event, the proceedings in said Assemblies are null
and void as an alleged ratification of the new Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, not only because of the circumstances under which said Assemblies had been created
and held, but, also, because persons disqualified to vote under Article V of the Constitution were
allowed to participate therein, because the provisions of our Election Code were not observed in said
Assemblies, because the same were not held under the supervision of the Commission on Elections,
in violation of section 2 of Article X of the 1935 Constitution, and because the existence of Martial
Law and General Order No. 20, withdrawing or suspending the limited freedom to discuss the merits
and demerits of said proposed Constitution, impaired the people's freedom in voting thereon,
particularly a viva voce, as it was done in many instances, as well as their ability to have a
reasonable knowledge of the contents of the document on which they were allegedly called upon to
express their views.
Referring now more specifically to the issue on whether the new Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the
1935 Constitution is a political question or not, I do not hesitate to state that the answer must be in
the negative. Indeed, such is the position taken by this Court, 17 in an endless line of decisions, too
long to leave any room for possible doubt that said issue is inherently and essentially justiciable.
Such, also, has been the consistent position of the courts of the United States of America, whose
decisions have a persuasive effect in this jurisdiction, our constitutional system in the 1935
Constitution being patterned after that of the United States. Besides, no plausible reason has, to my
mind, been advanced to warrant a departure from said position, consistently with the form of
government established under said Constitution..
Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, 18 We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that
the question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for
the ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that
the issue was a justiciable one. With identical unanimity, We overruled the respondents' contention in the
1971 habeas corpus cases, 19 questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the
factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on
August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelona v. Baker 20 and Montenegro
v. Castaeda, 21insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and
refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, 22 the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 23 Hence,
respondents herein urge Us to reconsider the action thus taken by the Court and to revert to and follow
the views expressed in Barcelon v. Baker and Mabanag v. Lopez Vito. 24
The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially the same as those given in
support of the political-question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite cases, which
were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence, Our decision in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of
the nature and effect of a stare decisis, which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration in the
plebiscite cases.
The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable,
not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called

political questions is the principle of separation of powers characteristic of the Presidential system
of government the functions of which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three
(3) categories, namely: 1) those involving the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative
department; 2) those concerned mainly with the enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions
applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the executive department; and 3) those
dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of justice.
Within its own sphere but only within such sphere each department is supreme and
independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority, not only to encroach upon the powers or
field of action assigned to any of the other departments, but, also, to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other
departments provided that such acts, measures or decisions are withinthe area allocated thereto
by the Constitution. 25
This principle of separation of powers under the presidential system goes hand in hand with the
system of checks and balances, under which each department is vested by the Fundamental Law
with some powers to forestall, restrain or arrest a possible or actual misuse or abuse of powers by
the other departments. Hence, the appointing power of the Executive, his pardoning power, his veto
power, his authority to call the Legislature or Congress to special sessions and even to prescribe or
limit the object or objects of legislation that may be taken up in such sessions, etc. Conversely,
Congress or an agency or arm thereof such as the commission on Appointments may approve
or disapprove some appointments made by the President. It, also, has the power of appropriation, to
"define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," as well as that of
impeachment. Upon the other hand, under the judicial power vested by the Constitution, the
"Supreme Court and ... such inferior courts as may be established by law," may settle or decide with
finality, not only justiciable controversies between private individuals or entities, but, also, disputes or
conflicts between a private individual or entity, on the one hand, and an officer or branch of the
government, on the other, or between two (2) officers or branches of service, when the latter officer
or branch is charged with acting without jurisdiction or in excess thereof or in violation of law. And so,
when a power vested in said officer or branch of the government is absolute orunqualified, the acts
in the exercise of such power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-justiciable or
beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of justice would be arrogating upon themselves a power
conferred by the Constitution upon another branch of the service to the exclusion of the others.
Hence, in Taada v. Cuenco, 26 this Court quoted with approval from In re McConaughy, 27 the following:
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions
involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as
the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the
actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but
it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney
General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx xxx
"... What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not
judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department
or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, N.W. 724, 15 L.R.A. 561; In re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32
Pac. 470, 948, 19 L.R.A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16 C.C.A. 516, 30 L.R.A.
90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle 151 Ill. 41, 37 N.E. 683, 25 L.R.A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220.
Thus theLegislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass law or submit

a proposed constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial

control over such matters, not merely because they involve political questions, but
because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the
Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated him, free from judicial
control, so long as he observes the laws act within the limits of the power conferred.
His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a
politics nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular
matter under his control.But every officer under constitutional government must act
accordingly to law and subject its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or
disregard thereof must subject him to that restraining and controlling power of the
people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it must be remembered that
the people act through courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature.
One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the
department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations
which the law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle,
unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to "the end that the
government may be one of laws and not of men" words which Webster said
were the greatest contained in any written constitutional document." (Emphasis
supplied.)
and, in an attempt to describe the nature of a political question in terms, it was hoped,
understandable to the laymen, We added that "... the term "political question" connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy" in matters concerning the
government of a State, as a body politic. "In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum
(supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations
respected, is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations particularly
those prescribed or imposed by the Constitution would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial
inquiry into such issue and the settlement thereof are the mainfunctions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and
balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of the land,
to support and defend the Constitution to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson, 28 it was
held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another branch of the
government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the court went farther
and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended as it is in our 1935 Constitution
"then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that constitution, will declare the
amendment invalid." 29 In fact, this very Court speaking through Justice Laurel, an outstanding authority
on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly respected and foremost leaders of the
Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution declared, as early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, thejudicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments" of the government. 30

The Solicitor General has invoked Luther v. Borden 31 in support of his stand that the issue under
consideration is non-justiciable in nature. Neither the factual background of that case nor the action taken
therein by the Federal Supreme Court has any similarity with or bearing on the cases under
consideration.
Luther v. Borden was an action for trespass filed by Luther with the Circuit Court of the United States
against Borden and others for having forcibly entered into Luther's house, in Rhode Island,
sometime in 1842. The defendants who were in the military service of said former colony of England,
alleged in their defense that they had acted in obedience to the commands of a superior officer,
because Luther and others were engaged in a conspiracy to overthrow the government by force and
the state had been placed by competent authority under Martial Law. Such authority was the charter
government of Rhode Island at the time of the Declaration of Independence, for unlike other
states which adopted a new Constitution upon secession from England Rhode Island retained its
form of government under a British Charter, making only such alterations, by acts of the Legislature,
as were necessary to adapt it to its subsequent condition as an independent state. It was under this
form of government when Rhode Island joined other American states in the Declaration of
Independence and, by subsequently ratifying the Constitution of the United States, became a
member of the Union. In 1843, it adopted a new Constitution.
Prior thereto, however, many citizens had become dissatisfied with the charter government.
Memorials addressed by them to the Legislature having failed to bring about the desired effect,
meetings were held and associations formed by those who belonged to this segment of the
population which eventually resulted in a convention called for the drafting of a new Constitution
to be submitted to the people for their adoption or rejection. The convention was not authorized by
any law of the existing government. The delegates to such convention framed a new Constitution
which was submitted to the people. Upon the return of the votes cast by them, the convention
declared that said Constitution had been adopted and ratified by a majority of the people and
became the paramount law and Constitution of Rhode Island.
The charter government, which was supported by a large number of citizens of the state, contested,
however, the validity of said proceedings. This notwithstanding, one Thomas W. Dorr, who had been
elected governor under the new Constitution of the rebels, prepared to assert authority by force of
arms, and many citizens assembled to support him. Thereupon, the charter government passed an
Act declaring the state under Martial Law and adopted measures to repel the threatened attack and
subdue the rebels. This was the state of affairs when the defendants, who were in the military
service of the charter government and were to arrest Luther, for engaging in the support of the rebel
government which was never able to exercise any authority in the state broke into his house.
Meanwhile, the charter government had taken measures to call its own convention to revise the
existing form of government. Eventually, a new constitution was drafted by a convention held under
the authority of the charter government, and thereafter was adopted and ratified by the people.
"(T)he times and places at which the votes were to be given, the persons who were to receive and
return them, and the qualifications of the voters having all been previously authorized and provided
for by law passed by the charter government," the latter formally surrendered all of its powers to the
new government, established under its authority, in May 1843, which had been in
operation uninterruptedly since then.
About a year before, or in May 1842, Dorr, at the head of a military force, had made an unsuccessful
attempt to take possession of the state arsenal in Providence, but he was repulsed, and, after an
"assemblage of some hundreds of armed men under his command at Chepatchet in the June
following, which dispersed upon approach of the troops of the old government, no further effort was
made to establish" his government. "... until the Constitution of 1843" adopted under the auspices

of the charter government "went into operation, the charter government continued to assert its
authority and exercise its powers and to enforce obedience throughout the state ... ."
Having offered to introduce evidence to prove that the constitution of the rebels had been ratified by
the majority of the people, which the Circuit Court rejected, apart from rendering judgment for the
defendants, the plaintiff took the case for review to the Federal Supreme Court which affirmed the
action of the Circuit Court, stating:
It is worthy of remark, however, when we are referring to the authority of State
decisions, that the trial of Thomas W. Dorr took place after the constitution of 1843
went into operation. The judges who decided that case held their authority under that
constitution and it is admitted on all hands that it was adopted by the people of the
State, and is the lawful and established government. It is the decision, therefore, of a
State court, whose judicial authority to decide upon the constitution and laws of
Rhode Island is not questioned by either party to this controversy, although the
government under which it acted was framed and adopted under the sanction and
laws of the charter government.
The point, then, raised here has been already decided by the courts of Rhode Island.
The question relates, altogether, to the constitution and laws of that State, and the
well settled rule in this court is, that the courts of the United States adopt and follow
the decisions of the State courts in questions which concern merely the constitution
and laws of the State.
Upon what ground could the Circuit Court of the United States which tried this case
have departed from this rule, and disregarded and overruled the decisions of the
courts of Rhode Island?Undoubtedly the courts of the United States have certain
powers under the Constitution and laws of the United States which do not belong to
the State courts. But the power of determining that a State government has been
lawfully established, which the courts of the State disown and repudiate, is not one of
them. Upon such a question the courts of the United States are bound to follow the
decisions of the State tribunals, and must therefore regard the charter government as
the lawful and established government during the time of this contest. 32
It is thus apparent that the context within which the case of Luther v. Borden was decided is basically
and fundamentally different from that of the cases at bar. To begin with, the case did not involve a
federal question, but one purely municipal in nature. Hence, the Federal Supreme Court was "bound
to follow the decisions of the State tribunals" of Rhode Island upholding the constitution adopted
under the authority of the charter government. Whatever else was said in that case constitutes,
therefore, an obiter dictum. Besides, no decision analogous to that rendered by the State Court of
Rhode Island exists in the cases at bar. Secondly, the states of the Union have a measure of internal
sovereignty upon which the Federal Government may not encroach, whereas ours is a unitary form
of government, under which our local governments derive their authority from the national
government. Again, unlike our 1935 Constitution, the charter or organic law of Rhode Island
contained noprovision on the manner, procedure or conditions for its amendment.
Then, too, the case of Luther v. Borden hinged more on the question of recognition of government,
than on recognition of constitution, and there is a fundamental difference between these two (2)
types of recognition, the first being generally conceded to be a political question, whereas the nature
of the latter depends upon a number of factors, one of them being whether the new Constitution has
been adopted in the manner prescribed in the Constitution in force at the time of the purported
ratification of the former, which is essentially a justiciablequestion. There was, in Luther v. Borden, a

conflict between two (2) rival governments, antagonistic to each other, which is absent in the present
cases. Here, the Government established under the 1935 Constitution is the very same government
whose Executive Department has urged the adoption of the new or revised Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention and now alleges that it has been ratified by the people.
In short, the views expressed by the Federal Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden, decided in 1849,
on mattersother than those referring to its power to review decisions of a state court concerning the
constitution and government of that state, not the Federal Constitution or Government, are
manifestly neither, controlling, nor even persuasive in the present cases, having as
the Federal Supreme Court admitted no authority whatsoever to pass upon such matters or to
review decisions of said state court thereon. In fact, referring to that case, the Supreme Court of
Minnessota had the following to say:
Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, is always cited by those who assert that
the courts have no power to determine questions of a political character. It is
interesting historically, but it has not the slightest application to the case at bar. When
carefully analyzed, it appears that it merely determines that the federal courts will
accept as final and controlling a decision of the highest court of a state upon a
question of the construction of the Constitution of the state. ... . 33
Baker v. Carr, 34 cited by respondents, involved an action to annul a Tennessee statute apportioning the
seats in the General Assembly among the counties of the State, upon the theory that the legislation
violated the equal protection clause. A district court dismissed the case upon the ground, among others,
that the issue was a political one, but, after a painstaking review of the jurisprudence on the matter, the
Federal Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision and held that said issue was justiciable and nonpolitical, inasmuch as:"... (d)eciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the
Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever
authority has been committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a
responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution ... ."
Similarly, in Powell v. McCormack, 35 the same Court, speaking through then Chief Justice Warren,
reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals of New York affirming that of a Federal District Court,
dismissing Powell's action for a declaratory judgment declaring thereunder that he whose qualifications
were uncontested had been unlawfully excluded from the 90th Congress of the U.S. Said dismissal
was predicated upon the ground, inter alia, that the issue was political, but the Federal Supreme Court
held that it was clearly a justiciable one.
The Supreme Court of Minnessota undertook a careful review of American jurisprudence on the
matter. Owing to the lucidity of its appraisal thereof, We append the same to this opinion as Annex A
thereof.
After an, exhaustive analysis of the cases on this subject, the Court concluded:
The authorities are thus practically uniform in holding that whether a constitutional
amendment has been properly adopted according to the requirements of an existing
Constitution is a judicial question. There can be little doubt that the consensus of
judicial opinion is to the effect that it is the absolute duty of the judiciary to determine
whether the Constitution has been amended in the manner required by the
Constitution, unless a special tribunal has been created to determine the question;
and even then many of the courts hold that the tribunal cannot be permitted to
illegally amend the organic law. ... . 36

In the light of the foregoing, and considering that Art. XV of our 1935 Constitution prescribes the
method or procedure for its amendment, it is clear to my mind that the question whether or not the
revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance
with said Art. XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it is not only subject to
judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's boundenduty to decide such question.
The Supreme Court of the United States has meaningfully postulated that "the courts cannot reject
as 'no law suit' " because it allegedly involves a political question "a bona fide controversy as
to whether some action denominated "political" exceeds constitutional authority." 37
III
Has the proposed new or revised Constitution been ratified conformably to said Art. XV of the 1935
Constitution?
Petitioners in L-36142 maintain the negative view, upon ground: 1) that the President "is without
authority to create the Citizens' Assemblies" through which, respondents maintain, the proposed new
Constitution has been ratified; that said Assemblies "are without power to approve the proposed
Constitution"; 3) that the President "is without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people
of the proposed Constitution"; and 4) that "the election held (in the Citizens' Assemblies) to ratify the
proposed Constitution was not a free election, hence null and void."
Apart from substantially reiterating these grounds support of said negative view, the petitioners in L36164 contend: 1) that the President "has no power to call a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection"
of the proposed new Constitution or "to appropriate funds for the holding of the said plebiscite"; 2)
that the proposed new or revised Constitution "is vague and incomplete," as well as "contains
provisions which are beyond the powers of the 1971 Convention to enact," thereby rendering it "unfit
for ... submission the people;" 3) that "(t)he period of time between November 1972 when the 1972
draft was approved and January 11-15, 1973," when the Citizens' Assemblies supposedly ratified
said draft, "was too short, worse still, there was practically no time for the Citizens' Assemblies to
discuss the merits of the Constitution which the majority of them have not read a which they never
knew would be submitted to them ratification until they were asked the question "do you approve
of the New Constitution?" during the said days of the voting"; and that "(t)here was altogether no
freedom discussion and no opportunity to concentrate on the matter submitted to them when the
1972 draft was supposedly submitted to the Citizens' Assemblies for ratification."
Petitioner in L-36236 added, as arguments in support of the negative view, that : 1) "(w)ith a
government-controlled press, there can never be a fair and proper submission of the proposed
Constitution to the people"; and 2) Proclamation No. 1102 is null and void "(i)nasmuch as the
ratification process" prescribed "in the 1935 Constitution was not followed."
Besides adopting substantially some of the grounds relied upon by the petitioners in the abovementioned cases, the petitioners in L-36283 argue that "(t)he creation of the Citizens' Assemblies as
the vehicle for the ratification of the Constitution was a deception upon the people since the
President announced the postponement of the January 15, 1973 plebiscite to either February 19 or
March 5, 1973." 38
The reasons adduced by the petitioners in L-36165 in favor of the negative view have already been
set forth earlier in this opinion. Hence, it is unnecessary to reproduce them here. So it is, with
respect to the positions taken in L-36165 by counsel for therein respondents Gil J. Puyat and Jose
Roy although more will be said later about them and by the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
other respondents in that case and the respondents in the other cases.

1. What is the procedure prescribed by the 1935 Constitution for its amendment?
Under section 1 of Art. XV of said Constitution, three (3) steps are essential, namely:
1. That the amendments to the Constitution be proposed either by Congress or by a convention
called for that purpose, "by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives voting separately," but "in joint session assembled";
2. That such amendments be "submitted to the people for their ratification" at an "election"; and
3. That such amendments be "approved by a majority of the votes cast" in said election.
Compliance with the first requirement is virtually conceded, although the petitioners in L-36164
question the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to incorporate certain provisions into the
draft of the new or revised Constitution. The main issue in these five (5) cases hinges, therefore, on
whether or not the last two (2) requirements have been complied with.
2. Has the contested draft of the new or revised Constitution been submitted to the people for their
ratification conformably to Art. XV of the Constitution?
In this connection, other provisions of the 1935 Constitution concerning "elections" must, also, be
taken into account, namely, section I of Art. V and Art. X of said Constitution. The former reads:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by male citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able
to read and write, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in
the municipality wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election. The National Assembly shall extend the right of suffrage to women, if in a
plebiscite which shall be held for that purpose within two years after the adoption of
this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand women possessing the
necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question.
Sections 1 and 2 of Art. X of the Constitution ordain in part:
Section 1. There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and two other Members to be appointed by the President with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, who shall hold office for a term of nine years
and may not be reappointed. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and
shall exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
decide, save those involving the right to vote, alladministrative questions, affecting
elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by
the Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring fee, orderly, and
honest elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court.

xxx xxx xxx 39

a. Who may vote in a plebiscite under Art. V of the Constitution?
Petitioners maintain that section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution is a limitation upon the exercise of the
right of suffrage. They claim that no other persons than "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are twenty-one years of age or over and are able to read and write, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for one year and in the municipality wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the election," may exercise the right of suffrage in the
Philippines. Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that said provision
merely guarantees the right of suffrage to persons possessing the aforementioned qualifications and
none of the disqualifications, prescribed by law, and that said right may be vested by competent
authorities in persons lacking some or all of the aforementioned qualifications, and possessing some
of the aforesaid disqualifications. In support of this view, he invokes the permissive nature of the
language "(s)uffrage may be exercised" used in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution, and the
provisions of the Revised Barrio Charter, Republic Act No. 3590, particularly sections 4 and 6
thereof, providing that citizens of the Philippines "eighteen years of age or over," who are registered
in the list of barrio assembly members, shall be members thereof and may participate as such in the
plebiscites prescribed in said Act.
I cannot accept the Solicitor General's theory. Art. V of the Constitution declares who may exercise
the right of suffrage, so that those lacking the qualifications therein prescribed may not exercise such
right. This view is borne out by the records of the Constitutional Convention that drafted the 1935
Constitution. Indeed, section 1 of Art. V of the 1935 Constitution was largely based on the report of
the committee on suffrage of the Convention that drafted said Constitution which report was, in turn,
"strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in the Philippines ... ." 40 " Said committee had
recommended: 1) "That the right of suffrage should exercised only by male citizens of the Philippines." 2)
"That should be limited to those who could read and write." 3) "That the duty to vote should be
made obligatory." It appears that the first recommendation was discussed extensively in the Convention,
and that, by way of compromise, it was eventually agreed to include, in section 1 of Art. V of the
Constitution, the second sentence thereof imposing upon the National Assembly established by the
original Constitution instead of the bicameral Congress subsequently created by amendment said
Constitution the duty to "extend the right of suffrage women, if in a plebiscite to, be held for that
purpose within two years after the adoption of this Constitution, not less than three hundred thousand
women possessing the necessary qualifications shall vote affirmatively on the question." 41
The third recommendation on "compulsory" voting was, also debated upon rather extensively, after
which it was rejected by the Convention. 42 This accounts, in my opinion, for the permissive language
used in the first sentence of said Art. V. Despite some debates on the age qualification amendment
having been proposed to reduce the same to 18 or 20, which were rejected, and the residence
qualification, as well as the disqualifications to the exercise of the right of suffrage the second
recommendation limiting the right of suffrage to those who could "read and write" was in the language
of Dr. Jose M. Aruego, one of the Delegates to said Convention "readily approved in the Convention
without any dissenting vote," although there was some debate on whether the Fundamental Law should
specify the language or dialect that the voter could read and write, which was decided in the negative. 43
What is relevant to the issue before Us is the fact that the constitutional provision under
consideration was meant to be and is a grant or conferment of a right to persons possessing the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications therein mentioned, which in turn, constitute
a limitation of or restriction to said right, and cannot, accordingly, be dispensed with, except by
constitutional amendment. Obviously, every such constitutional grant or conferment of a right is
necessarily a negation of the authority of Congress or of any other branch of the Government to
deny said right to the subject of the grant and, in this sense only, may the same partake of the

nature of a guarantee. But, this does not imply not even remotely, that the Fundamental Law allows
Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications
mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
At this juncture, it is noteworthy that the committee on suffrage responsible for the adoption of
section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution was "strongly influenced by the election laws then in force in
the Philippines." Our first Election Law was Act 1582, passed on January 9, 1907, which was partly
amended by Acts 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768, and incorporated into the Administrative Code of
1916 Act 2657 as chapter 20 thereof, and then in the Administrative Code of 1917 Act 2711
as chapter 18 thereof, which, in turn, was amended by Act 3387, approved on December 3, 1927.
Sections 431 and 432 of said Code of 1917, prescribing, respectively, the qualifications for and
disqualifications from voting, are quoted below. 44 In all of these legislative acts, the provisions
concerning the qualifications of voters partook of the nature of a grant or recognition of the right of
suffrage, and, hence, of adenial thereof to those who lacked the requisite qualification and possessed any
of the statutory disqualifications. In short, the history of section 1, Art. V of the Constitution, shows beyond
doubt than the same conferred not guaranteed the authority to persons having the qualifications
prescribed therein and none of disqualifications to be specified in ordinary laws and, necessary
implication, denied such right to those lacking any said qualifications, or having any of the aforementioned
disqualifications.
This view is further bolstered by the fact that the 1971 Constitutional Convention sought the
submission to a plebiscite of a "partial amendment" to said section 1 of Art. V of the 1935
Constitution, by reducing the voting age from twenty-one (21) years to eighteen (18) years, which,
however, did not materialize on account of the decision of this Court in Tolentino v. Commission on
Elections, 45 granting the writs, of prohibition and injunction therein applied for, upon the ground that,
under the Constitution, all of the amendments adopted by the Convention should be submitted in "an
election" or a single election, not separately or in several or distinct elections, and that the proposed
amendment sought to be submitted to a plebiscite was not even a complete amendment, but a "partial
amendment" of said section 1, which could be amended further, after its ratification, had the same taken
place, so that the aforementioned partial amendment was, for legal purposes, no more than
a provisional or temporary amendment. Said partial amendment was predicated upon the generally
accepted contemporary construction that, under the 1935 Constitution, persons below twenty-one (21)
years of age could not exercise the right of suffrage, without a previous amendment of the Constitution.
Upon the other hand, the question, whether 18-year-old members of barrio assemblies may vote in
barrio assembly plebiscites is, to say the least, a debatable one. Indeed, there seems to be a conflict
between the last paragraph of said section 6 of Rep. Act No. 3590, 46 pursuant to which the "majority
vote of all the barrio assemblymembers" (which include all barrio residents 18 years of age or over, duly
registered in the list of barrio assembly members) is necessary for the approval, in an assembly
plebiscite, of "any budgetary, supplemental appropriations or special tax ordinances," whereas, according
to the paragraph preceding the penultimate one of said section, 47 "(a)ll duly registered barrio assembly
members qualified to vote" who, pursuant to section 10 of the same Act, must be citizens "of the
Philippines, twenty-one years of age or over, able to read and write," and residents the barrio "during the
six months immediately preceding election, duly registered in the list of voters" and " otherwise
disqualified ..." just like the provisions of present and past election codes of the Philippines and Art. V
of the 1935 Constitution "may vote in the plebiscite."
I believe, however, that the apparent conflict should resolved in favor of the 21-year-old members of
the assembly, not only because this interpretation is in accord with Art. V the Constitution, but, also,
because provisions of a Constitution particularly of a written and rigid one, like ours generally
accorded a mandatory status unless the intention to the contrary is manifest, which is not so as
regards said Art. V for otherwise they would not have been considered sufficiently important to be
included in the Fundamental Law of the land. 48Besides, it would be illogical, if not absurd, believe that
Republic Act No. 3590 requires, for the most important measures for which it demands in addition to

favorable action of the barrio council the approval of barrio assembly through aplebiscite, lesser
qualifications than those prescribed in dealing with ordinary measures for which such plebiscite need not
be held.

It is similarly inconceivable that those who drafted the 1935 Constitution intended section 1 of Art. V
thereof to apply only to elections of public officers, not to plebiscites for the ratification of
amendments to the Fundamental Law or revision thereof, or of an entirely new Constitution, and
permit the legislature to require lesser qualifications for such ratification, notwithstanding the fact that
the object thereof much more important if not fundamental, such as the basic changes introduced
in the draft of the revised Constitution adopted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, which a
intended to be in force permanently, or, at least, for many decades, and to affect the way of life of the
nation and, accordingly, demands greater experience and maturity on the part of the electorate
than that required for the election of public officers, 49 whose average term ranges from 2 to 6 years.
It is admitted that persons 15 years of age or over, but below 21 years, regardless of whether or not
they possessed the other qualifications laid down in both the Constitution and the present Election
Code, 50 and of whether or not they are disqualified under the provisions of said Constitution and
Code, 51 or those of Republic Act No. 3590, 52 have participated and voted in the Citizens' Assemblies that
have allegedly ratified the new or revised Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
In fact, according to the latest official data, the total number of registered voters 21 years of age or
over in the entire Philippines, available in January 1973, was less than 12 million. Yet, Proclamation
No. 1102 states that 14,976,56 "members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the
adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against ... 743,869 who voted for its rejection," whereas,
on the question whether or not the people still wanted a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new
Constitution, "... 14,298,814 answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of
the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite." In other words,
it is conceded that the number of people who allegedly voted at the Citizens' Assemblies for
exceeded the number of registered voters under the Election Code in force in January 1973.
It is thus clear that the proceedings held in such Citizens' Assemblies and We have more to say
on this point in subsequent pages were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the
qualifications prescribed in section 1 of Art. V of the Constitution were allowed to vote in said
Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of
age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in the
Citizens' Assemblies must be considered null and void. 53
It has been held that "(t)he power to reject an entire poll ... should be exercised ... in a case where it
is impossibleto ascertain with reasonable certainty the true vote," as where "it is impossible to
separate the legal votes from the illegal or spurious ... ." 54
In Usman v. Commission on Elections, et al., 55 We held:
Several circumstances, defying exact description and dependent mainly on the
factual milieu of the particular controversy, have the effect of destroying the integrity
and authenticity of disputed election returns and of avoiding their prima facie value
and character. If satisfactorily proven, although in a summary proceeding, such
circumstances as alleged by the affected or interested parties, stamp the election
returns with the indelible mark of falsity and irregularity, and, consequently, of
unreliability, and justify their exclusion from the canvass.

Then, too, the 1935 Constitution requires "a majority of the votes cast" for a proposed amendment to
the Fundamental Law to be "valid" as part thereof, and the term "votes cast" has a well-settled
meaning.
The term "votes cast" ... was held in Smith v. Renville County Commissioners, 65
N.W. 956, 64 Minn. 16, to have been used as an equivalent of "ballots cast." 56
The word "cast" is defined as "to deposit formally or officially." 57
It seems to us that a vote is cast when a ballot is deposited indicating a "choice." ... The
word "cast" means "deposit (a ballot) formally or officially ... .

... In simple words, we would define a "vote cast" as the exercise on a ballot of the
choice of the voter on the measure proposed. 58
In short, said Art. XV envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots not orally
or by raising by the persons taking part in plebiscites. This is but natural and logical, for, since the
early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its major
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when
necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns. And the 1935 Constitution has been consistently
interpreted in all plebiscites for the ratification rejection of proposed amendments thereto, from 1935
to 1967. Hence, the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies was and is null and void ab initio.
b. How should the plebiscite be held? (COMELEC supervision indispensable; essential requisites)
Just as essential as compliance with said Art. V of the 19 Constitution is that of Art. X thereof,
particularly its sections 1 and 2. Indeed, section 1 provides that "(t)here shall be
an independent Commission on Elections ... ." The point to be stressed here is the term
"independent." Indeed, why was the term used?
In the absence of said constitutional provision as to the independence of the Commission, would it
have been depends upon either Congress or the Judiciary? The answer must be the negative,
because the functions of the Commission "enforcement and administration" of election laws
are neither legislative nor judicial in nature, and, hence, beyond the field allocated to either Congress
or courts of justice. Said functions are by their nature essentially executive, for which reason, the
Commission would be under the "control" of the President, pursuant to section 10, paragraph (1) of
Art. VII of the Constitution, if Art. X thereof did not explicitly declare that it (the Commission) is an
"independent" body. In other words, in amending the original 1935 Constitution, by inserting therein
said Art. X, on the Commission on Elections, the purpose was to make said
Commission independent principally of the Chief Executive.
And the reason therefor is, also, obvious. Prior to the creation of the Commission on Elections as a
constitutional organ, election laws in the Philippines were enforced by the then Department of the
Interior, through its Executive Bureau, one of the offices under the supervision and control of said
Department. The same like other departments of the Executive Branch of the Government
was, in turn, under the control of the Chief Executive, before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution,
and had been until the abolition of said Department, sometime ago under the control of the
President of the Philippines, since the effectivity of said Fundamental Law. Under the provisions
thereof, the Executive could so use his power of control over the Department of the Interior and its
Executive Bureau as to place the minority party at such a great, if not decisive, disadvantage, as to
deprive it, in effect, of the opportunity to defeat the political party in power, and, hence, to enable the

same to perpetuate itself therein. To forestall this possibility, the original 1935 Constitution was
amended by the establishment of the Commission on Elections as a constitutional body independent
primarily of the President of the Philippines.
The independence of the Commission was sought to be strengthened by the long term of office of its
members nine (9) years, except those first appointed 59 the longest under the Constitution,
second only to that of the Auditor General 60; by providing that they may not be removed from office
except by impeachment, placing them, in this respect, on the same plane as the President, the VicePresident, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Auditor General; that they may not be reappointed;
that their salaries, "shall be neither increased nor diminished during their term of office"; that the decisions
the Commission "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" only 61; that "(n)o pardon, parole, or
suspension sentence for the violation of any election law may be granted without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission" 62; and, that its chairman and members "shall not, during the
continuance in office, engage in the practice of any profession or intervene, directly or indirectly, in the
management or control of any private enterprise which in anyway may affected by the functions of their
office; nor shall they, directly or indirectly, be financially interested in any contract with the Government or
any subdivision or instrumentality thereof." 63 Thus, the framers of the amendment to the original
Constitution of 1935 endeavored to do everything possible protect and insure the independence of each
member of the Commission.
With respect to the functions thereof as a body, section 2 of said Art. X ordains that "(t)he
Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration all laws
relative to the conduct of elections," apart from such other "functions which may be conferred upon it
by law." It further provides that the Commission "shall decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all administrative question affecting elections, including the determination of the number and
location of polling places, and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials."
And, to forests possible conflicts or frictions between the Commission, on one hand, and the other
offices or agencies of the executive department, on the other, said section 2 postulates that "(a)ll law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the
Commission, shall act as its deputies for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections."
Not satisfied with this, it declares, in effect, that "(t)he decisions, orders, and ruling of the
Commission" shall not be subject to review, except by the Supreme Court.
In accordance with the letter and spirit of said Art. X of the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 6388,
otherwise known as the Election Code of 1971, implements the constitutional powers of the
Commission on Elections and grants additional powers thereto, some of which are enumerated in
sections 5 and 6 of said Act, quoted below. 64Moreover, said Act contains, inter alia, detailed provisions
regulating contributions and other (corrupt) practices; the establishment of election precincts; the
designation and arrangement of polling places, including voting booths, to protect the secrecy of the
ballot; formation of lists of voters, the identification and registration of voters, the proceedings therefor, as
well as for the inclusion in, or exclusion or cancellation from said list and the publication thereof; the
establishment of municipal, provincial and files of registered voters; the composition and appointment of
board of election inspectors; the particulars of the official ballots to be used and the precautions to be
taken to insure authenticity thereof; the procedure for the casting of votes; the counting of votes by boards
of inspectors; the rules for the appreciation of ballots and the preparation and disposition of election
returns; the constitution and operation of municipal, provincials and national boards of canvassers; the
presentation of the political parties and/or their candidates in each election precinct; the proclamation of
the results, including, in the case of election of public officers, election contests; and the jurisdiction of
courts of justice in cases of violation of the provisions of said Election Code and the penalties for such
violations.
Few laws may be found with such meticulous and elaborate set of provisions aimed at "insuring free,
orderly, and honest election," as envisaged in section 2 of Art. X of the Constitution. Yet, none of the
foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions was followed by the so-called Barangays or

Citizens' Assemblies. And no reasons have been given, or even sought to be given therefor. In many,
if not most, instances, the election were held a viva voce, thus depriving the electorate of the right to
vote secretly one of the most, fundamental and critical features of our election laws from time
immemorial particularly at a time when the same was of utmostimportance, owing to
the existence of Martial Law.
In Glen v. Gnau, 65 involving the casting of many votes, openly, without complying with the requirements
of the law pertinent thereto, it was held that the "election officers" involved "cannot be too strongly
condemned" therefor and that if they "could legally dispense with such requirement ... they could with
equal propriety dispense with all of them, including the one that the vote shall be by secret ballot, or even
by ballot
at all ... ."
Moreover, upon the formal presentation to the Executive of the proposed Constitution drafted by the
1971 Constitutional Convention, or on December 1, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 73 (on the validity
of which which was contested in the plebiscite cases, as well as in the 1972 habeas
corpus cases 66 We need not, in the case of bar, express any opinion) was issued, calling a plebiscite,
to be held on January 15, 1973, at which the proposed Constitution would be submitted to the people for
ratification or rejection; directing the publication of said proposed Constitution; and declaring, inter alia,
that "(t)he provision of the Election Code of 1971, insofar as they are not inconsistent" with said decree
excepting those "regarding right and obligations of political parties and candidates" "shall apply to the
conduct of the plebiscite." Indeed, section 2 of said Election Code of 1971 provides that "(a)ll elections of
public officers except barrio officials and plebiscites shall be conducted in the manner provided by this
Code." General Order No. 20, dated January 7, 1973, postponing until further notice, "the plebiscite
scheduled to be held on January 15, 1973," said nothing about the procedure to be followed in plebiscite
to take place at such notice, and no other order or decree has been brought to Our attention, expressly or
impliedly repealing the provisions of Presidential Decree 73, insofar as said procedure is concerned.
Upon the other hand, said General Order No. 20 expressly suspended "the provisions of Section 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 73 insofar as they allow free public discussion of proposed Constitution ...
temporarily suspending effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for the purposes of free open dabate on
the proposed Constitution ... ." This specific mention of the portions of the decrees or orders or
instructions suspended by General Order No. 20 necessarily implies that all other portions of said
decrees, orders or instructions and, hence, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 73 outlining
the procedure to be followed in the plebiscite for ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution
remained in force, assuming that said Decree is valid.
It is claimed that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 86-A the text of which is quoted below 67
the Executive declared, inter alia, that the collective views expressed in the Citizens' Assemblies "shall
be considered in the formulation of national policies or programs and, wherever practicable, shall be
translated into concrete and specific decision"; that such Citizens' Assemblies "shall consider vital national
issues ... like the holding of the plebiscite on the new Constitution ... and others in the future, which shall
serve as guide or basis for action or decision by the national government"; and that the Citizens'
Assemblies "shall conduct between January 10 and 15, 1973, a referendum on important national issues,
including those specified in paragraph 2 hereof, and submit the results thereof to the Department of Local
Governments and Community Development immediately thereafter, ... ." As in Presidential Decree No.
86, this Decree No. 86-A does not and cannot exclude the exercise of the constitutional supervisory
power of the Commission on Elections or its participation in the proceedings in said Assemblies, if the
same had been intended to constitute the "election" or Plebiscite required Art. V of the 1935 Constitution.
The provision of Decree No. 86-A directing the immediate submission of the result thereof to the
Department of Local Governments Community Development is not necessarily inconsistent with, and
must be subordinate to the constitutional power of the Commission on Elections to exercise its "exclusive
authority over the enforcement and administration of all laws to the conduct of elections," if the

proceedings in the Assemblies would partake of the nature of an "election" or plebiscite for the ratification
or rejection of the proposed Constitution.

We are told that Presidential Decree No. 86 was further amended by Presidential Decree No. 86-B,
dated 1973, ordering "that important national issues shall from time to time; be referred to the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) for resolution in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 86-A
dated January 5, 1973 and that the initial referendum include the matter of ratification of the
Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention" and that "(t)he Secretary of the Department of
Local Governments and Community Development shall insure the implementation of this order." As
in the case of Presidential Decrees Nos. 86 and 86-A, the foregoing directives do not necessarily
exclude exercise of the powers vested by the 1935 Constitution in the Commission on Elections,
even if the Executive had the authority to repeal Art. X of our Fundamental Law which he does not
possess. Copy of Presidential Decree No. 86-B is appended hereto as Annex B hereof.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of
the Commission on Elections, and without complying with the provisions of the Election Code of
1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. What is more, they were held under the
supervision of the very officers and agencies of the Executive Department sought to be
excluded therefrom by Art. X of the 1935 Constitution. Worse still, said officers and agencies of the
1935 Constitution would be favored thereby, owing to the practical indefinite extension of their
respective terms of office in consequence of section 9 of the Transitory Provisions, found in Art. XVII
of the proposed Constitution, without any elections therefor. And the procedure therein mostly
followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns files by
the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Art. of the Constitution
which can hardly be sanctioned. And, since the provisions of this article form part of
the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly,
and honest" expression of the people's will, the aforementioned violation thereof renders null and
void the contested proceedings or alleged plebiscite in the Citizens' Assemblies, insofar as the same
are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. "... (a)ll the authorities agree that the legal definition of an election, as well as that which
is usually and ordinarily understood by the term, is a choosing or as election by those having a right
to participate (in the selection) of those who shall fill the offices, or of the adoption or rejection of any
public measure affecting the territory involved. 15 Cyc. 279; Lewis v. Boynton, 25 Colo. 486, 55 Pac.
732; Saunders v. Haynes, 13 Cal. 145; Seaman v. Baughman, 82 Iowa 216, 47 N.W. 1091, 11 L.R.A.
354; State v. Hirsh, 125 Ind. 207, 24 N.E. 1062, 9 L.R.A. 170; Bouvier's Law Dictionary. 68
IV
Has the proposed Constitution aforementioned
been approved by a majority of the people in
Citizens' Assemblies allegedly held
throughout the Philippines?
Respondents maintain the affirmative, relying upon Proclamation No. 1102, the validity of which is
precisely being contested by petitioners herein. Respondents claim that said proclamation is
"conclusive" upon this Court, or is, at least, entitled to full faith and credence, as an enrolled bill; that
the proposed Constitution has been, in fact, ratified, approved or adopted by the "overwhelming"
majority of the people; that Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution has thus been "substancially" complied
with; and that the Court refrain from passing upon the validity of Proclamation No. 1102, not only
because such question is political in nature, but, also, because should the Court invalidate the
proclamation, the former would, in effect, veto the action of the people in whom sovereignty resides
and from its power are derived.

The major flaw in this process of rationalization is that it assumes, as a fact, the very premise on
which it is predicated, and which, moreover, is contested by the petitioners. As the Supreme Court of
Minnessota has aptly put it
... every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and
subject to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must
subject him to the restraining and controlling of the people, acting through the
agency of the judiciary; for it must be remembered that the people act through courts,
as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as
representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with
the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. ... .
Accordingly, the issue boils downs to whether or not the Executive acted within the limits of his
authority when he certified in Proclamation No. 1102 "that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen
hundred and seventy-one (1971) Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming
majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
throughout the Philippines and has thereby come into effect."
In this connection, it is not claimed that the Chief Executive had personal knowledge of the data he
certified in said proclamation. Moreover, Art. X of the 1935 Constitution was precisely inserted to
place beyond the Executive the power to supervise or even exercise any authority whatsoever over
"all laws relative to the conduct of elections," and, hence, whether the elections are for the choice or
selection of public officers or for the ratification or rejection of any proposed amendment, or revision
of the Fundamental Law, since the proceedings for the latter are, also, referred to in said Art. XV as
"elections".
The Solicitor General stated, in his argument before this Court, that he had been informed that there
was in each municipality a municipal association of presidents of the citizens' assemblies for each
barrio of the municipality; that the president of each such municipal association formed part of a
provincial or city association of presidents of such municipal associations; that the president of each
one of these provincial or city associations in turn formed part of a National Association or
Federation of Presidents of such Provincial or City Associations; and that one Francisco Cruz from
Pasig, Rizal, as President of said National Association or Federation, reported to the President of the
Philippines, in the morning of January 17, 1973, the total result of the voting in the citizens'
assemblies all over the country from January 10 to January 15, 1973. The Solicitor General further
intimated that the said municipal associations had reported the results of the citizens' assemblies in
their respective municipalities to the corresponding Provincial Association, which, in turn, transmitted
the results of the voting in the to the Department of Local Governments and Community
Development, which tabulated the results of the voting in the citizens' assemblies throughout the
Philippines and then turned them over to Mr. Franciso Cruz, as President or acting President of the
National Association or Federation, whereupon Mr. Cruz, acting in a ceremonial capacity, reported
said results (tabulated by the Department of Governments and Community Development) to the
Chief Executive, who, accordingly, issued Proclamation No. 1102.
The record shows, however, that Mr. Cruz was not even a member of any barrio council since 1972,
so that he could possibly have been a member on January 17, 1973, of a municipal association
of presidents of barrio or ward citizens' assemblies, much less of a Provincial, City or National
Association or Federation of Presidents of any such provincial or city associations.
Secondly, at the conclusion of the hearing of these cases February 16, 1973, and in the resolution of
this Court of same date, the Solicitor General was asked to submit, together with his notes on his

oral argument, a true copy of aforementioned report of Mr. Cruz to the President and of
"(p)roclamation, decree, instruction, order, regulation or circular, if any, creating or directing or
authorizing creation, establishment or organization" of said municipal, provincial and national
associations, but neither a copy of alleged report to the President, nor a copy of any "(p)roclamation,
decree, instruction, order, regulation or circular," has been submitted to this Court. In the absence of
said report, "(p)roclamation, decree, instruction," etc., Proclamation No. 1102 is devoid of
any factual and legalfoundation. Hence, the conclusion set forth in the dispositive portion of said
Proclamation No. 1102, to the effect that the proposed new or revised Constitution had been ratified
by majority of the votes cast by the people, can not possibly have any legal effect or value.
The theory that said proclamation is "conclusive upon Court is clearly untenable. If it were, acts of
the Executive and those of Congress could not possibly be annulled or invalidated by courts of
justice. Yet, such is not the case. In fact, even a resolution of Congress declaring that a given person
has been elected President or Vice-President of the Philippines as provided in the Constitution, 69 is
not conclusive upon the courts. It is no more than prima facieevidence of what is attested to by said
resolution. 70 If assailed directly in appropriate proceedings, such as an election protest, if and when
authorized by law, as it is in the Philippines, the Court may receive evidence and declare, in accordance
therewith, who was duly elected to the office involved. 71 If prior to the creation of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, no such protest could be filed, it was not because the resolution of Congress declaring who had
been elected President or Vice-President was conclusive upon courts of justice, but because there
was no law permitting the filing of such protest and declaring what court or body would hear and decide
the same. So, too, a declaration to the effect that a given amendment to the Constitution or revised or
new Constitution has been ratified by a majority of the votes cast therefor, may be duly assailed in court
and be the object of judicial inquiry, in direct proceedings therefor such as the cases at bar and the
issue raised therein may and should be decided in accordance with the evidence presented.
The case of In re McConaughy 72 is squarely in point. "As the Constitution stood from the organization of
the state" of Minnessota "all taxes were required to be raised under the system known as the
'general property tax.' Dissatisfaction with the results of this method and the development of more
scientific and satisfactory methods of raising revenue induced the Legislature to submit to the people an
amendment to the Constitution which provided merely that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects. This proposed amendment was submitted at the general election held in November, 1906, and
in due time it was certified by the state canvassing board and proclaimed by the Governor as having been
legally adopted. Acting upon the assumption that the amendment had become a part of the Constitution,
the Legislature enacted statutes providing for a State Tax Commission and a mortgage registry tax, and
the latter statute, upon the same theory, was held constitutional" by said Court. "The district court found
that the amendment had no in fact been adopted, and on this appeal" the Supreme Court was "required
to determine the correctness of that conclusion."
Referring to the effect of the certification of the State Board of Canvassers created by the Legislature
and of theproclamation made by the Governor based thereon, the Court held: "It will be noted that
this board does no more than tabulate the reports received from the various county board and add
up and certify the results. State v. Mason, 45 Wash. 234, 88 Pac. 126, 9 L.R.A. (U.S.) 1221. It
is settled law that the decisions of election officers, and canvassing boards are not conclusive and
that the final decision must rest with the courts, unless the law declares that the decisions of the
board shall be final" and there is no such law in the cases at bar. "... The correctness of the
conclusion of the state board rests upon the correctness of the returns made by the county boards
and it is inconceivable that it was intended that this statement of result should be final and
conclusive regardless of the actual facts. The proclamation of the Governor adds nothing in the way
of conclusiveness to the legal effect of the action of the canvassing board. Its purpose is to formally
notify the people of the state of the result of the voting as found by the canvassing board. James on
Const. Conv. (4th Ed.) sec. 523."

In Bott v. Wartz, 73 the Court reviewed the statement of results of the election made by the canvassing
board, in order that the true results could be judicially determined. And so did the court in Rice v.
Palmer. 74
Inasmuch as Art. X of the 1935 Constitution places under the "exclusive" charge of the Commission
on Elections, "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections," independently of the Executive, and there is not even a certification by the Commission in
support of the alleged results of the citizens' assemblies relied upon in Proclamation No.
1102 apart from the fact that on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation
of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments had certified to the
President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines it follows
necessarily that, from a constitutional and legal viewpoint, Proclamation No. 1102 is not even prima
facie evidence of the alleged ratification of the proposed Constitution.
Referring particularly to the cases before Us, it will be noted that, as pointed out in the discussion of
the preceding topic, the new or revised Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
was not ratified in accordance with the provisions of the 1935 Constitution. In fact, it has not even
been, ratified in accordance with said proposed Constitution, the minimum age requirement therein
for the exercise of the right of suffrage beingeighteen (18) years, apart from the fact that Art. VI of the
proposed Constitution requires "secret" voting, which was not observed in many, if not most,
Citizens' Assemblies. Besides, both the 1935 Constitution and the proposed Constitution require a
"majority of the votes cast" in an election or plebiscite called for the ratification of an amendment or
revision of the first Constitution or the effectivity of the proposed Constitution, and the phrase "votes
cast" has been construed to mean "votes made in writing not orally, as it was in many Citizens'
Assemblies.75
Even counsel for Gil J. Puyat and Jose Roy, as respondents in L-36165, asserts openly that Art. XV
of the Constitution has not been complied with, and since the alleged substantial compliance with
the requirements thereof partakes of the nature of a defense set up by the other respondents in
these cases, the burden of proving such defense which, if true, should be within their peculiar
knowledge is clearly on such respondents. Accordingly, if despite the extensive notes and
documents submitted by the parties herein, the members of the Court do not know or are not
prepared to say whether or not the majority of the people or of those who took part in the Citizens'
Assemblies have assented to the proposed Constitution, the logical step would be to give due
course to these cases, require the respondents to file their answers, and the plaintiffs their reply,
and, thereafter, to receive the pertinent evidence and then proceed to the determination of the issues
raised thereby. Otherwise, we would be placing upon the petitioners the burden of disproving a
defense set up by the respondents, who have not so far established the truth of such defense.
Even more important, and decisive, than the foregoing is the circumstance that there is ample
reason to believe that many, if not most, of the people did not know that the Citizens' Assemblies
were, at the time they were held, plebiscites for the ratification or rejection of the proposed
Constitution. Hence, in Our decision in the plebiscite cases, We said, inter alia:
Meanwhile, or on December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081, for the purpose of free and open
debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced
the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when
General Order No. 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held
on January 15, 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order No. 20,
moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of December 17, 1972,

temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and
open debate on the proposed Constitution.
In view of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned
plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the
aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said
plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then again, Congress
was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on
January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential Decree No. 73 was
that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and
appropriate funds therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in
view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President reportedly after
consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on
Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these
cases.
And, apparently, the parties in said cases entertained the same belief, for, on December 23, 1972
four (4) days after the last hearing of said cases 76 the President announced the postponement of the
plebiscite scheduled by Presidential Decree No. 73 to be held on January 15, 1973, after consultation
with the Commission on Elections and the leaders of Congress, owing to doubts on the sufficiency of the
time available to translate the proposed Constitution into some local dialects and to comply with some
pre-electoral requirements, as well as to afford the people a reasonable opportunity to be posted on the
contents and implications of said transcendental document. On January 7, 1973, General Order No. 20
was issued formally, postponing said plebiscite "until further notice." How can said postponement be
reconciled with the theory that the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies scheduled to be held from
January 10 to January 15, 1973, were "plebiscites," in effect, accelerated, according to the theory of the
Solicitor General, for the ratification of the proposed Constitution? If said Assemblies were meant to be
the plebiscites or elections envisaged in Art. XV of the Constitution, what, then, was the
"plebiscite" postponed by General Order No. 20? Under these circumstances, it was only reasonable for
the people who attended such assemblies to believe that the same were not an "election" or plebiscite for
the ratification or adoption of said proposed Constitution.
And, this belief is further bolstered up by the questions propounded in the Citizens' Assemblies,
namely:
[1] Do you like the New Society?
[2] Do you like the reforms under martial law?
[3] Do you like Congress again to hold sessions?
[4] Do you like the plebiscite to be held later?
[5] Do you like the way President Marcos is running the affairs of the
government? [Bulletin Today, January 10, 1973; emphasis an additional question.]
[6] Do you approve of the citizens assemblies as the base of popular government to
decide issues of national interests?
[7] Do you approve of the new Constitution?
[8] Do you want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?

[9] Do you want the elections to be held in November, 1973 in accordance with the
provisions of the 1935 Constitution?
[10] If the elections would not be held, when do you want the next elections to be
called?
[11] Do you want martial law to continue? [Bulletin Today, January 11, 1973]
To begin with, questions nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 11 are not proper in a plebiscite for the
ratification of a proposed Constitution or of a proposed amendment thereto. Secondly, neither is the
language of question No. 7 "Do you approve the new Constitution?" One approves "of" the act of
another which does not need such approval for the effectivity of said act, which the first person,
however, finds to be good, wise satisfactory. The approval of the majority of the votes cast in
plebiscite is, however, essential for an amendment to the Constitution to be valid as part thereof.
Thirdly, if the proceedings in the Citizens' Assemblies constituted a plebiscite question No. 8 would
have been unnecessary and improper, regardless of whether question No. 7 were answered
affirmatively or negatively. If the majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the affirmative, the
proposed Constitution would have become effective and no other plebiscite could be held thereafter
in connection therewith, even if the majority of the answers to question No. 8 were, also, in the
affirmative. If the majority of the answers to question No. 7 were in the negative, neither may another
plebiscite be held, even if the majority of the answers to question No. 8 were in the affirmative. In
either case, not more than one plebiscite could be held for the ratification or rejection of the
proposed Constitution. In short, the insertion of said two (2) questions apart from the other
questions adverted to above indicates strongly that the proceedings therein did not partake of the
nature of a plebiscite or election for the ratification or rejection of the proposed Constitution.
Indeed, I can not, in good conscience, declare that the proposed Constitution has been approved or
adopted by the people in the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines, when it is, to my mind, a
matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such citizens' assemblies in many parts of
Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines. In a letter of Governor Efren B.
Pascual of Bataan, dated January 15, 1973, to the Chief Executive, the former reported:
... This report includes a resumee (sic) of the activities we undertook in effecting
the referendum on the eleven questions you wanted our people consulted on and the
Summary of Results thereof for each municipality and for the whole province.
xxx xxx xxx
... Our initial plans and preparations, however, dealt only on the original five
questions. Consequently, when we received an instruction on January 10 to
change the questions, we urgently suspended all scheduled Citizens Assembly
meetings on that day and called all Mayors, Chiefs of Offices and other government
officials to another conference to discuss with them the new set of guidelines and
materials to be used.
On January 11, ... another instruction from the top was received to include the
original five questions among those to be discussed and asked in the Citizens'
Assembly meetings. With this latest order,we again had to make modifications in our
instructions to all those managing and supervising the holding of the Citizens'
Assembly meetings throughout the province. ... Aside from the coordinators we had
from the Office of the Governor, the splendid cooperation and support extended by
almost all government officials and employees in the province, particularly of the

Department of Education, PC and PACD personnel, provided us with enough hands

to trouble shoot and implement sudden changes in the instructions anytime and
anywhere needed. ...
... As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their
preference and readiness to accept this new method of government to
people consultation in shaping up government policies.
Thus, as late as January 10, 1973, the Bataan officials had to suspend "all scheduled Citizens'
Assembly meetings ..." and call all available officials "... to discuss with them the new set of
guidelines and materials to be used ... ." Then, "on January 11 ... another instruction from the top
was received to include the original five questions among those be discussed and asked in the
Citizens' Assembly meetings. With this latest order, we again had to make modifications in our
instructions to all those managing and supervising holding of the Citizens' Assembly meetings
throughout province. ... As to our people, in general, their enthusiastic participation showed their
preference and readiness to accept the new method of government to people consultation in
shaping upgovernment policies."
This communication manifestly shows: 1) that, as late a January 11, 1973, the Bataan officials had
still to discuss not put into operation means and ways to carry out the changing instructions
from the top on how to organize the citizens' assemblies, what to do therein and even what
questions or topics to propound or touch in said assemblies; 2) that the assemblies would involve no
more than consultations or dialogues between people and government not decisions be made by
the people; and 3) that said consultations were aimed only at "shaping up government policies" and,
hence could not, and did not, partake of the nature of a plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of a
proposed amendment of a new or revised Constitution for the latter does not entail the formulation of
a policy of the Government, but the making of decision by the people on the new way of life, as a
nation, they wish to have, once the proposed Constitution shall have been ratified.
If this was the situation in Bataan one of the provinces nearest to Manila as late as January 11,
1973, one can easily imagine the predicament of the local officials and people in the remote barrios
in northern and southern Luzon, in the Bicol region, in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao. In fact,
several members of the Court, including those of their immediate families and their household,
although duly registered voters in the area of Greater Manila, were not even notified that citizens'
assemblies would be held in the places where their respective residences were located. In the
Prohibition and Amendment case, 77 attention was called to the "duty cast upon the court of taking
judicial cognizance of anything affecting the existence and validity of any law or portion of the
Constitution ... ." In line with its own pronouncement in another case, the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States stressed, in Baker v. Carr, 78 that "a court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious
mistake, when the validity of the law depends upon the truth of what is declared."
In the light of the foregoing, I cannot see how the question under consideration can be answered or
resolved otherwise than in the negative.
V
Have the people acquiesced in the proposed Constitution?
It is urged that the present Government of the Philippines is now and has been run, since January
17, 1971, under the Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention; that the political
department of the Government has recognized said revised Constitution; that our foreign relations
are being conducted under such new or revised Constitution; that the Legislative Department has

recognized the same; and that the people, in general, have, by their acts or omissions, indicated
their conformity thereto.
As regards the so-called political organs of the Government, gather that respondents refer mainly to
the offices under the Executive Department. In a sense, the latter performs some functions which,
from a constitutional viewpoint, are politics in nature, such as in recognizing a new state or
government, in accepting diplomatic representatives accredited to our Government, and even in
devising administrative means and ways to better carry into effect. Acts of Congress which define the
goals or objectives thereof, but are either imprecise or silent on the particular measures to be
resorted to in order to achieve the said goals or delegate the power to do so, expressly or impliedly,
to the Executive. This, notwithstanding, the political organ of a government that purports to be
republican is essentially the Congress or Legislative Department. Whatever may be the functions
allocated to the Executive Department specially under a written, rigid Constitution with a
republican system of Government like ours the role of that Department is inherently, basically and
fundamentally executive in nature to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed," in the
language of our 1935 Constitution. 79
Consequently, I am not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive
Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1102, connote a recognition thereof o an acquiescence
thereto. Whether they recognized the proposed Constitution or acquiesce thereto or not is something
that cannot legally, much less necessarily or even normally, be deduced from their acts in
accordance therewith, because the are bound to obey and act in conformity with the orders of the
President, under whose "control" they are, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution. They have
absolutely no other choice, specially in view of Proclamation No. 1081 placing the Philippines under
Martial Law. Besides, by virtue of the very decrees, orders and instructions issued by the President
thereafter, he had assumed all powers of Government although some question his authority to do
so and, consequently, there is hardly anything he has done since the issuance of Proclamation
No. 1102, on January 17, 1973 declaring that the Constitution proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention has been ratified by the overwhelming majority of the people that he
could not do under the authority he claimed to have under Martial Law, since September 21, 1972,
except the power of supervision over inferior courts and its personnel, which said proposed
Constitution would place under the Supreme Court, and which the President has not ostensibly
exercised, except as to some minor routine matters, which the Department of Justice has continued
to handle, this Court having preferred to maintain the status quo in connection therewith pending
final determination of these cases, in which the effectivity of the aforementioned Constitution is
disputed.
Then, again, a given department of the Government cannot generally be said to have
"recognized" its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts
of another. Accordingly, when a subordinate officer or office of the Government complies with the
commands of a superior officer or office, under whose supervision and control he or it is, the former
merely obeys the latter. Strictly speaking, and from a legal and constitutional viewpoint, there is no
act of recognition involved therein. Indeed, the lower officer or office, if he or it acted otherwise,
would just be guilty of insubordination.
Thus, for instance, the case of Taylor v. Commonwealth 80 cited by respondents herein in support of
the theory of the people's acquiescence involved a constitution ordained in 1902 and "proclaimed by a
convention duly called by a direct vote of the people of the state to revise and amend the Constitution of
1869. The result of the work of that Convention has been recognized, accepted and acted upon as
the only valid Constitution of the State" by
1. The "Governor of the State in swearing fidelity to it and proclaiming it, as directed thereby";

2. The "Legislature in its formal official act adopting a joint resolution, July 15, 1902, recognizing the
Constitution ordained by the Convention ...";
3. The "individual oaths of its members to support it, and by its having been engaged for nearly a
year, in legislating under it and putting its provisions into
operation ...";
4. The "judiciary in taking the oath prescribed thereby to support it and by enforcing its provisions ...";
and
5. The "people in their primary capacity by peacefully accepting it and acquiescing in it, by
registering as voters under it to the extent of thousands throughout the State, and by voting, under
its provisions, at a general election for their representatives in the Congress of the United States."
Note that the New Constitution of Virginia, drafted by a convention whose members were elected
directly by the people, was not submitted to the people for ratification or rejection thereof. But, it was
recognized, not by the convention itself, but by other sectors of the Government, namely, the
Governor; the Legislature not merely by individual acts of its members, but by formal joint
resolution of its two (2) chambers; by the judiciary; and by the people, in the various ways specified
above. What is more, there was no martial law. In the present cases, noneof the foregoing acts of
acquiescence was present. Worse still, there is martial law, the strict enforcement of which was
announced shortly before the alleged citizens' assemblies. To top it all, in the Taylor case, the
effectivity of the contested amendment was not contested judicially until about one (1) year after the
amendment had been put into operation in all branches of the Government, and complied with by
the people who participated in the elections held pursuant to the provisions of the new Constitution.
In the cases under consideration, the legality of Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be
held on January 15, 1973, was impugned as early as December 7, 1972, or five (5)
weeks before the scheduled plebiscite, whereas the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 declaring on
January 17, 1973, that the proposed Constitution had been ratified despite General Order No. 20,
issued on January 7, 1972, formally and officially suspending the plebiscite until further notice
was impugned as early as January 20, 1973, when L-36142 was filed, or three (3) days after the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1102.
It is further alleged that a majority of the members of our House of Representatives and Senate have
acquiesced in the new or revised Constitution, by filing written statements opting to serve in the Ad
Interim Assembly established in the Transitory Provisions of said Constitution. Individual acts of
recognition by members of our legislature, as well as of other collegiate bodies under the
government, are invalid as acts of said legislature or bodies, unless its members have performed
said acts in session duly assembled, or unless the law provides otherwise, and there is no such law
in the Philippines. This is a well-established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public
Officers, and no plausible reason has been adduced to warrant departure therefrom. 81
Indeed, if the members of Congress were generally agreeable to the proposed Constitution, why did
it become necessary to padlock its premises to prevent its meeting in session on January 22, 1973,
and thereafter as provided in the 1935 Constitution? It is true that, theoretically, the members of
Congress, if bent on discharging their functions under said Constitution, could have met in any other
place, the building in which they perform their duties being immaterial to the legality of their official
acts. The force of this argument is, however, offset or dissipated by the fact that, on or about
December 27, 1972, immediately after a conference between the Executive, on the one hand, and
members of Congress, on the other, some of whom expressed the wish to meet in session on
January 22, 1973, as provided in the 1935 Constitution, a Daily Express columnist (Primitivo Mijares)
attributed to Presidential Assistant Guillermo de Vega a statement to the effect that "'certain

members of the Senate appear to be missing the point in issue' when they reportedly insisted on
taking up first the question of convening Congress." The Daily Express of that date, 82 likewise,
headlined, on its front page, a "Senatorial PlotAgainst 'Martial Law Government' Disclosed". Then, in its
issue of December 29, 1972, the same paper imputed to the Executive an appeal "to diverse groups
involved in a conspiracy to undermine" his powers" under martial law to desist from provoking a
constitutional crisis ... which may result in the exercise by me of authority I have not exercised."
No matter how good the intention behind these statement may have been, the idea implied therein
was too clear an ominous for any member of Congress who thought of organizing, holding or taking
part in a session of Congress, not to get the impression that he could hardly do so without inviting or
risking the application of Martial Law to him. Under these conditions, I do not feel justified in holding
that the failure of the members of Congress to meet since January 22, 1973, was due to their
recognition, acquiescence in or conformity with the provisions of the aforementioned Constitution, or
its alleged ratification.
For the same reasons, especially because of Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire Philippines
under Martial Law, neither am I prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards
Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, decrees and/or
instructions some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects issued subsequently
thereto amounts, constitutes or attests to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation
No. 1102. In the words of the Chief Executive, "martial law connotespower of the gun,
meant coercion by the military, and compulsion and intimidation." 83 The failure to use the gun against
those who comply with the orders of the party wielding the weapon does not detract from the intimidation
that Martial Law necessarily connotes. It may reflect the good, reasonable and wholesome attitude of the
person who has the gun, either pointed at others, without pulling the trigger, or merely kept in its holster,
but not without warning that he may or would use it if he deemed it necessary. Still, the intimidation is
there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of
conformity or acquiescence. This is specially so when we consider that the masses are, by and
large, unfamiliar with the parliamentary system, the new form of government introduced in the proposed
Constitution, with the particularity that it is not even identical to that existing in England and other parts of
the world, and that even experienced lawyers and social scientists find it difficult to grasp the full
implications of some provisions incorporated therein.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is well to remember that the
same refers to a document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and attested to by the
Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary of the House of Representatives, concerning legislative
measures approved by the two Houses of Congress. The argument of the Solicitor General is,
roughly, this: If the enrolled bill is entitled to full faith and credence and, to this extent, it is conclusive
upon the President and the judicial branch of the Government, why should Proclamation No. 1102
merit less consideration than in enrolled bill?
Before answering this question, I would like to ask the following: If, instead of being certified by the
aforementioned officers of Congress, the so-called enrolled bill were certified by, say, the President
of the Association of Sugar Planters and/or Millers of the Philippines, and the measure in question
were a proposed legislation concerning Sugar Plantations and Mills sponsored by said Association,
which even prepared the draft of said legislation, as well as lobbied actually for its approval, for
which reason the officers of the Association, particularly, its aforementioned president whose
honesty and integrity are unquestionable were present at the deliberations in Congress when the
same approved the proposed legislation, would the enrolled bill rule apply thereto? Surely, the
answer would have to be in the negative. Why? Simply, because said Association President has
absolutely no official authority to perform in connection therewith, and, hence, his certification is
legally, as good as non-existent.

Similarly, a certification, if any, of the Secretary of the Department of Local Governments and
Community Development about the tabulated results of the voting in the Citizens Assemblies
allegedly held all over the Philippines and the records do not show that any such certification, to
the President of the Philippines or to the President Federation or National Association of presidents
of Provincial Associations of presidents of municipal association presidents of barrio or ward
assemblies of citizens would not, legally and constitutionally, be worth the paper on which it is
written. Why? Because said Department Secretary is not the officer designated by law to
superintend plebiscites or elections held for the ratification or rejection of a proposed amendment or
revision of the Constitution and, hence, to tabulate the results thereof. Worse still, it is the
department which, according to Article X of the Constitution, should not and must not be all
participate in said plebiscite if plebiscite there was.
After citing approvingly its ruling in United States v. Sandoval, 84 the Highest Court of the United States
that courts "will not stand impotent before an obvious instance of a manifestly unauthorized exercise of
power." 85
I cannot honestly say, therefore, that the people impliedly or expressly indicated their conformity to
the proposed Constitution.
VI
Are the Parties entitled to any relief?
Before attempting to answer this question, a few words be said about the procedure followed in
these five (5) cases. In this connection, it should be noted that the Court has not decided whether or
not to give due course to the petitions herein or to require the respondents to answer thereto.
Instead, it has required the respondents to comment on the respective petitions with three (3)
members of the voting to dismiss them outright and then considers comments thus submitted by
the respondents as motions to dismiss, as well as set the same for hearing. This was due to the
transcendental nature of the main issue raised, the necessity of deciding the same with utmost
dispatch, and the main defense set up by respondents herein, namely, the alleged political nature of
said issue, placing the same, according to respondents, beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry and
determination. If this defense was sustained, the cases could readily be dismissed; but, owing to the
importance of the questions involved, a reasoned resolution was demanded by public interest. At the
same time, respondents had cautioned against a judicial inquiry into the merits of the issues posed
on account of the magnitude of the evil consequences, it was claimed, which would result from a
decision thereon, if adverse to the Government.
As a matter of fact, some of those issues had been raised in the plebiscite cases, which were
dismissed as moot and academic, owing to the issuance of Proclamation No. 1102 subsequently to
the filing of said cases, although before the rendition of judgment therein. Still one of the members of
the Court (Justice Zaldivar) was of the opinion that the aforementioned issues should be settled in
said cases, and he, accordingly, filed an opinion passing upon the merits thereof. On the other hand,
three (3) members of the Court Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra filed separate opinions
favorable to the respondents in the plebiscite cases, Justice Barredo holding "that the 1935
Constitution has pro tanto passed into history and has been legitimately supplanted by the
Constitution in force by virtue of Proclamation 1102." 86 When the petitions at bar were filed, the same
three (3) members of the Court, consequently, voted for the dismissal of said petitions. The majority of the
members of the Court did not share, however, either view, believing that the main question that arose
before the rendition of said judgment had not been sufficiently discussed and argued as the nature and
importance thereof demanded.

The parties in the cases at bar were accordingly given every possible opportunity to do so and to
elucidate on and discuss said question. Thus, apart from hearing the parties in oral argument for five
(5) consecutive days morning and afternoon, or a total of exactly 26 hours and 31 minutes the
respective counsel filed extensive notes on their or arguments, as well as on such additional
arguments as they wished to submit, and reply notes or memoranda, in addition to rejoinders
thereto, aside from a sizeable number of document in support of their respective contentions, or as
required by the Court. The arguments, oral and written, submitted have been so extensive and
exhaustive, and the documents filed in support thereof so numerous and bulky, that, for all intents
and purposes, the situation is as if disregarding forms the petitions had been given due course
and the cases had been submitted for decision.
Accordingly, the majority of the members of the Court believe that they should express their views on
the aforementioned issues as if the same were being decided on the merits, and they have done so
in their individual opinion attached hereto. Hence, the resume of the votes cast and the tenor of the
resolution, in the last pages hereof, despite the fact that technically the Court has not, as yet,
formally given due course to the petitions herein.
And, now, here are my views on the reliefs sought by the parties.
In L-36165, it is clear that we should not issue the writ of mandamus prayed for against Gil J. Puyat
and Jose Roy, President and President Pro Tempore respectively of the Senate, it being settled in
our jurisdiction, based upon the theory of separation of powers, that the judiciary will not issue such
writ to the head of a co-equal department, like the aforementioned officers of the Senate.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, as well as in cases L36142, L-36164, L-36236 and L-36283, my vote is that the petitions therein should be given due
course, there being more thanprima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been
ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has
been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in
force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the Fundamental Law of the Land, without
prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its
ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the
provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
Perhaps others would feel that my position in these cases overlooks what they might consider to be
the demands of "judicial statesmanship," whatever may be the meaning of such phrase. I am aware
of this possibility, if not probability; but "judicial statesmanship," though consistent with Rule of
Law, cannot prevail over the latter. Among consistent ends or consistent values, there always is a
hierarchy, a rule of priority.
We must realize that the New Society has many achievements which would have been very difficult,
if not impossible, to accomplish under the old dispensation. But, in and for the judiciary,
statesmanship should not prevail over the Rule of Law. Indeed, the primacy of the law or of the Rule
of Law and faithful adherence thereto are basic, fundamental and essential parts of statesmanship
itself.
Resume of the Votes Cast and the Court's Resolution
As earlier stated, after the submittal by the members of the Court of their individual opinions and/or
concurrences as appended hereto, the writer will now make, with the concurrence of his colleagues,
a resume or summary of the votes cast by each of them.

It should be stated that by virtue of the various approaches and views expressed during the
deliberations, it was agreed to synthesize the basic issues at bar in broad general terms in five
questions for purposes of taking the votes. It was further agreed of course that each member of the
Court would expound in his individual opinion and/or concurrence his own approach to the stated
issues and deal with them and state (or not) his opinion thereon singly or jointly and with such
priority, qualifications and modifications as he may deem proper, as well as discuss thereon other
related issues which he may consider vital and relevant to the cases at bar.
The five questions thus agreed upon as reflecting the basic issues herein involved are the following:
1. Is the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 a justiciable, or political and therefore nonjusticiable, question?
2. Has the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention been ratified validly (with
substantial, if not strict, compliance) conformably to the applicable constitutional and statutory
provisions?
3. Has the aforementioned proposed Constitution acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by
the people?
4. Are petitioners entitled to relief? and
5. Is the aforementioned proposed Constitution in force?
The results of the voting, premised on the individual views expressed by the members of the Court in
their respect opinions and/or concurrences, are as follows:
1. On the first issue involving the political-question doctrine Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court, hold that the issue of the validity
of Proclamation No. 1102 presents a justiciable and non-political question. Justices Makalintal and
Castro did not vote squarely on this question, but, only inferentially, in their discussion of the second
question. Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed there has been
approval by the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually
been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep hands-off out of respect to the
people's will, but, in negative, the Court may determine from both factual and legal angles whether or
not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution been complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, or
three (3) members of the Court hold that the issue is political and "beyond the ambit of judicial
inquiry."
2. On the second question of validity of the ratification, Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee and myself, or six (6) members of the Court also hold that the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified in accordance with Article
XV, section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, which provides only one way for ratification, i.e., "in an
election or plebiscite held in accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly
registered voters. 87
Justice Barredo qualified his vote, stating that "(A)s to whether or not the 1973 Constitution has been
validly ratified pursuant to Article XV, I still maintain that in the light of traditional concepts regarding
the meaning and intent of said Article, the referendum in the Citizens' Assemblies, specially in the
manner the votes therein were cast, reported and canvassed, falls short of the requirements thereof.
In view, however, of the fact that I have no means of refusing to recognize as a judge that factually

there was voting and that the majority of the votes were for considering as approved the 1973
Constitution without the necessity of the usual form of plebiscite followed in past ratifications, I am
constrained to hold that, in the political sense, if not in the orthodox legal sense, the people may be
deemed to have cast their favorable votes in the belief that in doing so they did the part required of
them by Article XV, hence, it may be said that in its political aspect, which is what counts most, after
all, said Article has been substantially complied with, and, in effect, the 1973 Constitution has been
constitutionally ratified."
Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, or three (3) members of the Court hold that under their
view there has been in effect substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements for valid
ratification.
3. On the third question of acquiescence by the Filipino people in the aforementioned proposed
Constitution, no majority vote has been reached by the Court.
Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that "the
people have already accepted the 1973 Constitution."
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself hold that there can be no free
expression, and there has even been no expression, by the people qualified to vote all over the
Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under Martial Law.
Justice Fernando states that "(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions
to the effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted
acquiesced in by the people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage
prepared to state that such doctrine calls for application in view of the shortness of time that has
elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the people in the absence of the
freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law." 88
Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the
question. Justices Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that
"Under a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle
restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people
have accepted the Constitution." 89
4. On the fourth question of relief, six (6) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra voted to DISMISS the petition. Justice Makalintal and
Castro so voted on the strength of their view that "(T)he effectivity of the said Constitution, in the final
analysis, is the basic and ultimate question posed by these cases to resolve which considerations
other than judicial, an therefore beyond the competence of this Court, 90 are relevant and
unavoidable." 91
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee and myself voted to
deny respondents' motion to dismiss and to give due course to the petitions.
5. On the fifth question of whether the new Constitution of 1973 is in force:
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the people's acceptance thereof;
Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third

question that they could not state with judicial certainty whether the people have
accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and
Two (2) members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that the
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force;
with the result that there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
ACCORDINGLY, by virtue of the majority of six (6) votes of Justices Makalintal, Castro, Barredo,
Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra with the four (4) dissenting votes of the Chief Justice and Justices
Zaldivar, Fernando and Teehankee, all the aforementioned cases are hereby dismissed. This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered
in force and effect.
It is so ordered.
Makalintal, Castro, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
ANNEX A
PERTINENT PORTIONS
OF THE
MINNESSOTA SUPREME COURT
DECISION
ON THE CASE
IN RE McCONAUGHY
"(a) An examination of the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the
authority to determine the validity of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional
amendments. It has beenjudicially determined whether a proposed amendment received the
constitutional majority of votes (Dayton v. St. Paul, 22 Minn. 400; Rice v. Palmer, 78 Ark. 432, 96
S.W. 396; Bott v. Wurtz, 63 N.J. Law, 289, 43 Atl. 744, 881, 45 L.R.A. 251; State v. Foraker, 46 Ohio
St. 677, 23 N.E. 49l; 6 L.R.A. 422; Tecumseh National Bank V. Saunders, 51 Neb. 801, 71 N.W. 779;
Green v. State Board, 5 Idaho, 130, 47 Pac. 259, 95 Am. St. Rep. 169; In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59
N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. 722; Knight v. Shelton [C.C.] 134 Fed. 423); whether a proposed amendment is
a single amendment, within the constitutional requirement that every amendment must be separately
submitted (State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 South. 927; Gabbert v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 171 Mo.
84, 70 S.W. 891; State v. Timme, 54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785; In re Denny, 156 Ind. 104, 59 N.E. 359,
51 L.R.A. 722; Lobaugh v. Cook, 127 Iowa, 181, 102 N.W. 1121; People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, 74
Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34; State v. Board, 34 Mont. 426, 87 Pac. 450; State v. Winnett [Neb.]
110 N.W. 1113, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 149); whether the failure to enter the resolution of submission upon
the legislative journals invalidates the amendment (Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543,14 N.W. 738,15
N.W. 609; Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3; West v. State, 50 Fla. 154, 39 South.
412; Durfee v. Harper, 22 Mont. 354, 56 Pac. 56; State v. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391, 12 Pac. 835, 3 Am. St.
Rep. 895); whether the description of the amendment and the form of the ballot are
sufficient (Russell v. Croy, 164 M 69, 63 S.W. 849; State v. Winnett [ Neb.] 110 N.W. 1113, L.R.A.

[N.S.] 149; Murphy Chair Co. v. Attorney General [Mich.] 112 N.W. 127); whether the method of
submission sufficient (Lovett v. Ferguson,, 10 S.D. 44, 71 N.W. 765; Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 63
S.W. 849); whether the publication of the amendment or of a notice relative to it is sufficient (Com. v.
Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505, 50 L.R.A. 568; Russell v. Croy, 164 Mo. 69, 63 S.W. 849); whether
the submission may be well by resolution as by a legislative act approved by the executive (Com. v.
Griest, 196 Pa. 396, 46 Atl. 505, 50 L.R. 568; Warfield vi Vandiver, 101 Md. 78, 60 Atl. 538; Edward
Lesueur, 132 Mo. 410, 33 S.W. 1130, 31 L.R.A. 815; Hays v. Hays, 5 Idaho, 154, 47 Pac. 732; State
v. Dahl, 6 N.D. 81, 6 N.W. 418, 34 L.R.A. 97); at what election the amendment be submitted (People
v. Curry, 130 Cal. 82, 62 Pac. 516).
In Rich v. Board of Canvassers, 100 Mich. 458, 59 N.W. 183, the court said: "It is contended that the
determination of the question whether an amendment to the Constitution has been carried involves
the exercise of political, and not judicial, power. If this be so, it follows that the promulgation of any
purported amendment by the executive or any executive department is final, and that the action
cannot be questioned by the judiciary; but, with reference to the conditions precedent to submitting a
proposed amendment to a vote of the people, it has been repeatedly held, by courts of the highest
respectability, that it is within the power of the judiciary to inquire into the question, even in a
collateral proceeding. ... It is to be noted that under section 1 of article 20 of the Constitution of the
state no amendment can become a part of the Constitution until ratified by a vote of the people. One
prerequisite is equally as essential as the other. The amendment must first receive the requisite
majority in the Legislature, and afterwards be adopted by the requisite vote. ... It is the fact of a
majority vote which makes the amendment a part of the Constitution."
"In considering the cases it is necessary to note whether in the particular case the court was called
upon to determine between rival governments, or whether the Legislature, or some board or official,
had legally performed the duty imposed by the Constitution or statutes. In re State v. McBride, 4 Mo.
303, 29 Am. Dec. 636, it was held that the General Assembly, under the power granted by the
Constitution, could change the Constitutiononly in the manner prescribed by it, and that it was the
duty of the court to determine whether all prerequisites had been complied with. In Collier v.
Frierson, 24 Ala. 100, it was held that a Constitution can be changes only by the people in
convention or in a mode described by the Constitution itself, and that if the latter mode is
adoptedevery requisite of the Constitution must be observed. 'It has been said," says the court, "that
certain acts are to be done, certain requisitions are to be observed, before a change can be effected;
but to what purpose are these acts required, or these requisitions enjoined, if the Legislature or any
other department of the government candispense with them. To do so would be to violate the
instrument which they are sworn to support; and every principle of public law and sound
constitutional policy requires the court to pronounce against every amendment which is shown not to
have been made in accordance with the rules prescribed by the fundamental law.'
"In State v. Swift, 69 Ind. 505, it was said that: 'The people of a state may form
an original Constitution, or abrogate an old one and form a new one, at any time, without any
political restriction, except the Constitution of the United States, but if they undertake to add an
amendment, by the authority of legislation to a Constitution already in existence, they can do it only
by the method pointed out by the Constitution to which the amendment is added. The power to
amend a Constitution by legislative action does not confer the power to break it, any more than it
confers the power to legislate on any other subject contrary to its prohibitions.' So, in State v. Timme,
54 Wis. 318, 11 N.W. 785, it was held that no amendments can be made to the Constitution of the
state without a compliance with the provisions thereof, both in the passage of such amendment by
the Legislature and the manner of submitting it to the people. The courts have not all agreed as to
the strictness of compliance which should be required.

"In the Prohibition and Amendment Case, 24 Kan. 700, the court determined judicially whether an
amendment to the Constitution had been legally adopted. After approving the statement quoted
from Collier v. Frierson, supra, that 'we entertain no doubt that, to change the Constitution in an other
mode than by a convention, every requisite which is demanded by the instrument itself must be
observed, and the omission of any one is fatal to the amendment,' the court held that, 'as substance
of right is grander and more potent than methods of form,' there had been substantial compliance
with the constitutional requirement that a proposed amendment to the Constitution must be entered
at length on the legislative journal. It appears that the joint resolution making submission simply
provided that a proposition should be submitted to the electors at the general election of 1880. It did
not declare that the machinery of the general election law should control, or that any particular
officers or board would receive, count, or canvass the votes cast. But the existing election
machinery was adequate, and the votes were received, counted, and canvassed, and the result
declared as fully as though it had been in terms so ordered. These methods had been followed in
the adoption of previous amendments, and was held that, conceding the irregularity of the
proceedings the Legislature and the doubtful scope of the provisions for the election, yet in view of
the very uncertainty of such provision the past legislative history of similar propositions, theuniversal
prior acquiescence in the same forms of procedure and the popular and unchallenged acceptance of
the legal pendency before the people of the question of the amendment for decision, and in view
of the duty cast upon the court taking judicial knowledge of anything affecting the existence and
validity of any law or portion of the Constitution, it must be adjudged that the proposed amendment
became part of the Constitution. The effect was to hold that a provision of the Constitution requiring
the proposed amendment to be entered in full on the journals was directory, and not mandatory.
This liberal view was approved in State v. Winnett (Neb.) 110 N. 1113, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 149, and
People v. Sours, 31 Colo. 369, Pac. 167, 102 Am. St. Rep. 34. But it has not been universally
accepted.
"In Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479, 11 Pac. 3, the court, in commenting upon the Kansas
case said: 'The reasoning by which the learned court reached the conclusion it did is not based
on any sound legal principles, but contrary to them. Neither the argument nor the conclusion can
command our assent or approval. The argument is illogical, and based on premises which
are without any sound foundation, and rests merely on assumption.' See, also, the well-considered
case of Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Or. 118, 74 Pac. 710, 75 Pac. 222.All these cases concede the
jurisdiction of the court to determine whether, in submitting a proposed amendment to the people,
the Legislature legally observed the constitutional provisions as to the manner of procedure.
InLivermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424, 25 L.R.A. 312, the court, at the instance of a citizen
and a taxpayer, restrained the Secretary of State from taking steps to submit to the people a
proposed amendment to the Constitution agreed to by the Legislature on the ground that the
Legislature had not acted in conformity with the Constitution and that the proposed amendment was
of such a character that it could not properly become a part of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
of Colorado, in People v. Sours, supra, refused to exercise this authority.
"The entire question received elaborate consideration in Koehler v. Hill, 60 Iowa, 543, 14 N.W. 738,
15 N.W. 609. The amendment, which concededly had been adopted by the people, had not, before
its submission, been entered in full upon the legislative journals, as required by the Constitution, and
it was held that this was amaterial variance in both form and substance from the constitutional
requirements, and that the amendment didnot, therefore, become a part of the Constitution. As to the
claim that the question was political, and not judicial, it was said that, while it is not competent for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Constitution and the form of government under which they
themselves exist, and from which they derive their powers, yet, where the existing Constitution
prescribes a method for its own amendment, an amendment thereto, to be valid, must be adopted in
strict conformity to that method; and it is the duty of the courts in a proper case, when an
amendment does not relate to their own power or functions, to inquire whether, in the adoption of the
amendment, the provisions of the existing Constitution have been observed, and, if not, to declare

the amendment invalid and of no force. This case was followed in State v. Brookhart, 113 Iowa, 250,
84 N.W. 1064.
"In University v. McIver, 72 N.C. 76, the question whether a proposed amendment to the Constitution
had been legally adopted was treated as a judicial question. By the Constitution a proposed
amendment was required to be approved by Legislatures before its submission to the people. In this
instance a bill was passed which contained 17 amendments. The next Legislature rejected 9 and
adopted 8 of the amendments, and submitted them to the people. The majority of the people voted
for their adoption; but it was contended that the Constitution contemplated and required that the
same bill and the same amendments, without change, should approved by both Legislatures, and
that it did not follow because the second Legislature adopted separately 8 out of 17amendments
adopted by the first Legislature, it would have adopted the 17, or any of them, if they had been voted
upon the second in the form adopted by the first body. The substance of the contention was that
there had not been a concurrence of the two Legislatures on the same amendments, according to
the letter and spirit of the Constitution. The court held that the power of the Legislature in submitting
amendments could not be distinguished from the powers of convention, and that, as the people had
spoken and ratified the amendments, they became a part of the Constitution.
"In Westinghausen v. People, 44 Mich. 265, 6 N.W. 641, it was held that prior to 1876 a proposed
amendment to Constitution could not be submitted to the people at any other than a general
election; but, as the amendment under consideration had been submitted after the Constitution been
changed, it had been legally submitted and adopted.
"In State v. Powell, 77 Miss. 543, 27 South. 927, the question whether an amendment to the
Constitution had been legally submitted and adopted by the people was held to be judicial,
and not political, in its nature. The amendment under consideration changed the Constitution by
providing for an elective, instead of an appointive, judiciary. It was contented that the amendments
had been improperly submitted and adopted by a majority of the qualified voters voting at election,
as required by the Constitution. The law did direct how the result of the election should be
determined. The Legislature by joint resolution recited that the election had been duly held
throughout the state, and, as it appeared from the returns made to the Secretary of State, that
21,169 votes were cast in favor of, and 8,643 votes against, the amendment, it resolved 'that said
amendment be, and hereby is, insertedinto the Constitution of the state of Mississippi as a part of
the Constitution.' In fact, the amendment was notsubmitted in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution, and it did not receive a majority of all the qualified voters voting at the election. It was
argued that the rules prescribed by the Constitution "are all for the guidance of the Legislature, and
from the very nature of the thing the Legislature must be the exclusive judge of all questions to be
measured or determined by these rules. Whether the question be political, and certainly a legislative
one, or judicial, to be determined by the courts, this section of rules, not only of procedure, but of
final judgment as well, confides to the separate magistracy of the legislative department full power to
hear, consider, and adjudge that question. The Legislature puts the question to the qualified electors.
The qualified electors answer back to the Legislature. "If it shall appear" to the Legislature that its
question has been answered in the affirmative, the amendment is inserted and made a part of the
Constitution. The Governor and the courts have no authority to speak at any stage of the
proceedings between the sovereign and the Legislature, and when the matter is thus concluded it is
closed, and the judiciary is as powerless to interfere as the executive.' But it was held that the
question whether the proposition submitted to the voters constituted one, or more than one,
amendment, whether the submission was according to the requirements of the Constitution, and
whether the proposition was in fact adopted, were all judicial, and not political, questions. 'We do
not,' said Chief Justice Whitfield, 'seek a jurisdiction not imposed upon us by the Constitution. We
could not, if we would, escape the exercise of that jurisdiction which the Constitution has imposed
upon us. In the particular instance in which we are now acting, our duty to know what the
Constitution of the state is, and in accordance with our oaths to support and maintain it in its integrity,

imposed on us a most difficult and embarrassing duty, one which we have not sought, but one
which, like all others, must be discharged."
"In Bott v. Wurtz, 63 N.J. Law, 289, 43 Atl. 744, 881, 45 L.R.A. 251, it was held that it was the duty of
the judicial department of the government to determine whether the legislative department or its
officers had observed the constitutional injunctions in attempting to amend the Constitution, and to
annul their acts if they had not done so. The case is an interesting and well-considered one. The
Constitution provided the manner in which proposed amendments should be submitted to the
people, but did not provide a method for canvassing the votes. The Legislature having agreed to
certain proposed amendments, passed an act for submitting the same to the people. This statute
provided for the transmission to the Secretary of State of certificate showing the result of the voting
throughout the state, and made it the duty of the Governor at the designated time summon four or
more Senators, who, with the Governor, should constitute a board of state canvassers to canvass
and estimate the votes for and against each amendment. This board was to determine and declare
which of the proposed amendments had been adopted and to deliver a statement of the results to
the Secretary of State, and "any proposed amendment, which by said certificate and determination
of the board of canvassers shall appear to have received in its favor the majority of all the votes cast
in the state for and against said proposed amendment, shall from the time of filing such certificate be
and become an amendment to and a part of the Constitution of the state; and it shall be the duty of
the Governor of the state forthwith, after such a determination, to issue a proclamation declaring
which of the said proposed amendments have been adopted by the people." This board was
required to file a statement of the result of the election, and the Governor to issue his proclamation
declaring that the amendment had been adopted and become a part of the Constitution. At the
instance of a taxpayer the Supreme Court allowed a writ of certiorari to remove into the court for
review the statement of the results of the election made by the canvassing board, in order that it
might be judicially determined whether on the facts shown in that statement the board had legally
determined that the proposed amendment had been adopted. The Supreme Court decided that the
concurrence of the board of state canvassers and the executive department of the government in
their respective official functions placed the subject-matter beyond the cognizance of the judicial
department of the state. The Court of Appeals, after a full review of the authorities, reversed this
decision, and held that the questions were of a judicial nature, and properly determinable by the
court on their merits. Mr. Justice Dixon, after stating the facts, said: 'It thus becomes manifest that
there was present in the Supreme Court, and is now pending in this court, every element tending to
maintain jurisdiction over the subject-matter, unless it be true, as insisted, that the judicial
department of the government has not the right to consider whether the legislative department and
its agencies have observed constitutional injunctions in attempting to amend the Constitution, and to
annul their acts in case that they have not done so. That such a proposition is not true seems to be
indicated by the whole history of jurisprudence in this country.' The court, after considering the case
on the merits, held that the proper conclusion had been drawn therefrom, and that the amendment in
question was legally submitted and adopted.
"The recent case of Rice v. Palmer, 78 Ark. 432, 96 S.W. 396, presented the identical question which
we have under consideration. In reference to the contention that the Constitution intended to
delegate to the Speaker of the House of Representatives the power to determine whether an
amendment had been adopted, and that the question was political, and not judicial, the court
observed: "The argument has often been made in similar cases to the courts, and it is found in many
dissenting opinions; but, with probably a few exceptions, it is not found in anyprevailing opinion."
"In State v. Tooker, 15 Mont. 8, 37 Pac. 840, 25 L.R.A. 560, it was held that the constitutional
requirement of publication of a proposed constitutional provision for three months prior to the
election at which it is to be submitted to the people is mandatory and that noncompliance therewith
renders the adoption of an amendment of no effect."

ANNEX B
MALACAANG
MANILA
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 86-B
Defining Further the Role of Barangays (Citizens Assemblies)
WHEREAS, since their creation pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86 dated December 31, 1972,
the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) have petitioned the Office of the President to submit to them for
resolution important national issues;
WHEREAS, one of the questions persistently mention refers to the ratification of the Constitution
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention;
WHEREAS, on the basis of the said petitions, it is evident that the people believe that the
submission of the proposed Constitution to the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays should taken as a
plebiscite in itself in view of the fact that freedom of debate has always been limited to the leadership
in political, economic and social fields, and that it is now necessary to bring this down to the level of
the people themselves through the Barangays or Citizens Assemblies;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order that important national issues shall from
time to time be referred to the Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) for resolution in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 86-A dated January 5, 1973 an that the initial referendum shall include the
matter of ratification of the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.
The Secretary of the Department of Local Government and Community Development shall insure
the implementation of this Order.
Done in the City of Manila, this 7th day of January in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.
(SGD.) FERDINAND
E. MARCOS
By the President:
(SGD.) ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
Executive Secretary

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs.

AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
-----------------------(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made by the SC.)
Minute Resolutions
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73748, May 22, 1986]
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT
CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET AL.
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22, 1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R.

No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No.
73990, Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the government of
President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her government is illegal because it was not established
pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the petitions for the reasons to
be stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748
and 73972 withdrew the petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extrajudicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have no personality to sue and
their petitions state no cause of action. For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the
people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de factogovernment but is in fact
and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the
fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court

* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.-----------------------------------------DIGEST
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
country;

It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.