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People v.

273 SCRA 385
Topic : Requirement as to decisions
In a two-page decision, the trial court, after giving a summary of the testimonies of the complainant
and accused-appellant herein, convicted the latter of four counts of consummated rape and one
attempted rape. The court laconically ruled: The issue is simple. Is the private complainant credible
in her story of how she was raped? The answer of this Court is an undoubtful and a definite yes.
Hence, the accused appealed the case. He contends that the decision of the trial court does not
state and facts and law upon which it is based as provided in Article VIII, Section 14, of the 1987
Whether or not the two-page decision of the said trial court conforms with the constitutional
requirement as provided in Article VIII, Section 14
No. It does not. The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must
set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many
functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the
decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the findings of facts
or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an
assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal

Hernandez v. CA (1993)
228 SCRA 429
Topic : Requirement as to decisions
Petitioner was charged in nine informations with estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22. At his
arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges. After a joint trial, petitioner was convicted
of the nine charges in a joint decision. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the conviction of
petitioner was affirmed. Hence, the petition at bar. The petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals did not make a complete finding of facts as to the last the other errors he raised, thus, it
violates article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution. Further, he argues this because the decision of
the Court of Appeals merely adopted the statement of facts of the Solicitor General.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals must make its separate finding of facts for the errors raised by
the party/parties
The Court of Appeals did not deem it necessary to make a separate finding of facts for said
assigned errors, because they were just the necessary consequences of the previous, assigned
errors. The constitutional mandate only requires that the decision should state the facts on which it
is based. There is no proscription made in the briefs or memoranda of the parties, instead of
rewriting the same in its own words.

Yao v. CA
G.R. No. 132428, October 24, 2000
George Yaos legal dilemma commenced when the Philippine Electrical Manufacturing Company
(PEMCO) noticed the proliferation locally of General Electrical (GE) lamp starters. As the only local
subsidiary of GE-USA, Remandaman was able to purchase from TCC fifty (50) pieces of
fluorescent lamp starters with the GE logo and design. Assessing that these products were
counterfeit. PEMCO applied for the issuance of a search warrant. This was issued by the MeTC,
Branch 49, Caloocan City. Eight boxes, each containing 15, 630 starters, were thereafter seized
from the the TCC warehouse in Caloocan City. The indictment charged Yao and Roxas of having
mutually and in conspiracy sold fluorescent lamp starters which have the GE logo, design and
containers, making them appear as genuine GE fluorescent lamp starters; and inducing the public
to believe them as such. Both accused pleaded not guilty. The MeTC acquitted Roxas but
convicted Yao. In acquitting Roxas, the trial court declared that the prosecution failed to prove that
he was still one of the Board of Directors at the time the goods were seized. Yao filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the MeTC denied. He then appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City (RTC). Judge Adoracion Angeles rendered a one-page Decision which affirmed in toto the
MeTC decision. Yao filed a motion for reconsideration and assailed the decision as violative of

Section 2, Rule 20 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration as devoid
of merit and reiterated that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed on appeal unless for strong and cogent reasons. Yao appealed to the
Court of Appeals by filing a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals granted Yao an extension of
twenty (20) days to file the appelant's brief. However, the Court of Appeals promulgated a
Resolution declaring that the decision of RTC has long become final and executory and ordering
the records of the case remanded to said court for the proper execution of judgment. Yao filed an
Urgent Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgment contending that the resolution did not specifically
dismiss the appeal but the Court of Appeals denied the Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Entry of
Judgment for lack of merit.

Whether or not Yao was denied due process.
Yes he was. The decision of the RTC affirming the conviction of Yao transgressed Section 14,
Article VIII of the Constitution, which states: SECTION 14. No decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
The Court finds that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short
of the constitutional injunmction. The RTc decision achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not
even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. The Court cannot consider or
affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures
of validity. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTC decision without saying more. A decision or
resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the issues for resolution,
otherwise, the appeal would be pointless.

Dizon v. Judge Lopez

A.M. 96-1338, September 5, 1997
April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, convicting complainant of falsification of private document.
The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision
sentencing him to imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on him. The judgment
consisted of reading the dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to imprisonment, without
serving a copy of the decision on him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a few
days for their copy of the decision, but although petitioner and his father by turns went to the court
to obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. Complainant alleges that the failure of
respondent judge to furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and eight months after
the promulgation of its dispositive portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII,
Sec.14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from rendering decisions without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and Sec.15 of the same Art.
VIII, which provides that in all cases lower courts must render their decisions within three months
from the date of their submission. Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the judgment
was promulgated with the reading of the dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared,
although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it, she withheld its dispositive portion until
the day of its promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the dispositive portion had been
read to complainant, respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II, presently OIC of
Branch 109) for typing and incorporation into the text of the decision. The court found complainant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code. Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of the
decision was unintentional. The Deputy Court Administration believes that Judge Lopez should be
given admonition for her negligence, but recommends that the other charges against her for
violation of the Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be dismissed for lack of merit.
Whether or not the respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution.
YES. The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, 15(1) of the Constitution which provides:
All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the

Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other lower
courts.It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the decision to the accused is not
sufficient. It is the judgment that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on which such
judgment is based. However, the Court finds the other charges against respondent to be without
merit. First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial by reason of
respondent's failure to furnish him with a copy of the decision until after one year and eight months
is without basis. Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete decision did
not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for reconsideration. Nonetheless, certain factors
mitigate respondent judge's culpability. Except for this incident, respondent's record of public
service as legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as State Prosecutor, and
later Senior State Prosecutor, of the Department of Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial
Judge for more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance or wrongdoing. In
view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with WARNING that repetition of the
same acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.

Asiavest Limited v. CA

The plaintiff Asiavest Limited filed a complaint against the defendant Antonio Heras praying that
said defendant be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amounts awarded by the Hong Kong Court
Judgment. The action filed in Hong Kong against Heras was in personam, since it was based on
his personal guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. The trial court concluded that the
Hong Kong court judgment should be recognized and given effect in this jurisdiction for failure of
HERAS to overcome the legal presumption in favor of the foreign judgment. Asiavest moved for the
reconsideration of the decision. It sought an award of judicial costs and an increase in attorney's
fees with interest until full payment of the said obligations. On the other hand, Heras no longer
opposed the motion and instead appealed the decision to CA. The Court of Appeals (CA) agreed
with Heras that notice sent outside the state to a non-resident is unavailing to give jurisdiction in an
action against him personally for money recovery. Summons should have been personally served
on Heras in Hong Kong.
Whether or not the judgment of the Hong Kong Court has been repelled by evidence of want of
jurisdiction due to improper notice to the party
YES. Asiavest cannot now claim that Heras was a resident of Hong Kong at the time since the
stipulated fact that Heras "is a resident of New Manila, Quezon City, Philippines" refers to his

residence at the time jurisdiction over his person was being sought by the Hong Kong court.
Accordingly, since Heras was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, ne in
personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. he extraterritorial
service in the Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court
jurisdiction over his person. It follows that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and
effect here in the Philippines for having been rendered without jurisdiction. On the same note,
Heras was also an absentee, hence, he should have been served with summons in the same
manner as a non-resident not found in Hong Kong. Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
providing for extraterritorial service will not apply because the suit against him was in personam.
Neither can we apply Section 18, which allows extraterritorial service on a resident defendant who
is temporarily absent from the country, because even if Heras be considered as a resident of Hong
Kong, the undisputed fact remains that he left Hong Kong not only temporarily but for good.

Tichangco v Enriquez
433 SCRA 324
Topic : Petition for review with motion for reconsideration
The decision of the Land Registration Authority (lRA) ruled that there were no legal grounds to
intiate proceeding to nullify Original Certificate of Title and the subsequent titles derived therefrom.
Hence, the petitioners appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA ruled in
favor of the respondent. Then, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners. But it was
immediately denied. Hence, this present recourse entitled by petitioners as a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Unfortunately, it was dismissed by the Supreme Courts Third Division, because
certiorari was not a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal A year after, the Court upon

reconsideration deemed the Petition as one filed under Rule 45 because it was submitted within
the 15-day period required by it.
Whether or not certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper recourse
No. Their remedy should be based on Rule 45, because they are appealing a final disposition of
the Court of Appeals. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in
character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It involves a correction of errors of
jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is not a
substitute for an appeal, when the latter remedy is available. Indubitably, the CA had jurisdiction
over petitioners appeal from the Resolution of the LRA and rendered the assailed Decision in the
proper exercise of that jurisdiction.

Martinez vs CA

Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz entered into an oral
contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for
the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the sum of
P15,000.00. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la Paz,
mother of private respondents, although the latter had already sold it to private respondent
Manuela de la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated. He was assured by them that the lot
belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would give a downpayment of
P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz and that the balance would be payable by installment.
After giving the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a house on the lot
and began paying the real estate taxes on said property. In the meantime, in a Deed of. Absolute
Sale with Right to Repurchase, private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right to
repurchase the same within one year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan
Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was the lot previously sold to
petitioner. Petitioner discovered that the lot he was occupying with his family had been sold to the
spouses Veneracion after receiving a letter from private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion claiming
ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the property and remove their
improvements thereon. Petitioner, in turn, demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of
sale from private respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was the owner
of the property as he had previously purchased the same from private respondents De la Paz.
Whether or not private respondents Veneracion are buyers in good faith of the lot in dispute as to
make them the absolute owners thereof in accordance with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code on double
sale of immovable property.
No. The deed of sale executed by private respondents Godofredo and Manuela De la Paz in favor
of private respondents spouses Reynaldo and Susan Veneracion is null and void. In this case, the
Court of Appeals based its ruling that private respondents Veneracion are the owners of the
disputed lot on their reliance on private respondent Godofredo De la Paz's assurance that he would
take care of the matter concerning petitioner's occupancy of the disputed lot as constituting good
faith. This case, however, involves double sale and, on this matter, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code
provides that where immovable property is the subject of a double sale, ownership shall be
transferred (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it to the Registry of
Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in
default thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title. The requirement of the law, where title
to the property is recorded in the Register of Deeds, is two-fold: acquisition in good faith and
recording in good faith.

KMU Labor Center v Garcia

G.R. No. 11538, December 23, 1994
Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then
LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus operators to charge
passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the LTFRB official rate for a period
of one (1) year.This range was later increased by LTFRB thru a Memorandum Circular No. 92-009
providing, among others, that "The existing authorized fare range system of plus or minus 15 per
cent for provincial buses and jeepneys shall be widened to 20% and -25% limit in 1994 with the
authorized fare to be replaced by an indicative or reference rate as the basis for the expanded fare
range. Sometime in March, 1994, private respondent PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation
policy of the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators to collect plus 20% and minus 25% of the
prescribed fare without first having filed a petition for the purpose and without the benefit of a public
hearing, announced a fare increase of twenty (20%) percent of the existing fares. On March 16,
1994, petitioner KMU filed a petition before the LTFRB opposing the upward adjustment of bus
fares, which the LTFRB dismissed for lack of merit.
Whether or not the authority given by respondent LTFRB to provincial bus operators to set a fare
range of plus or minus fifteen (15%) percent, later increased to plus twenty (20%) and minus
twenty-five (-25%) percent, over and above the existing authorized fare without having to file a
petition for the purpose, is unconstitutional, invalid and illegal.
Yes. Under section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public
Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the
existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under Executive Order No. 202
dated June 19, 1987. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory
bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a
transport operator, or other public service.