MWSS v. CA [G.R. No. L-54526. August 25, 1986.

] Second Division, Feria (J): 4 concur,

1 took no part
Facts: The City of Dagupan filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System (MWSS), for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan
Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses RA 1383 which
vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems
throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the
expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to
P255,000.00.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the city on the basis of a stipulation
of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in bad faith and hence not
entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it. NAWASA appealed to the then Court of
Appeals and argued in its lone assignment of error that the city should have been held
liable for the amortization of the balance of the loan secured by NAWASA for the
improvement of the Dagupan Waterworks System. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
MWSS, successor-ininterest of the NAWASA, appealed (petition for review on
certiorari) to the Supreme Court raising the sole issue of whether or not it has the right to
remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the Dagupan Waterworks
System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad faith.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court, with costs against
MWSS.
1. Practice; Common error in joining the court as party respondent in an appeal under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court It is a common error of joining the court (be it a Regional
Trial Court, the Intermediate Appellate Court, or the Sandiganbayan) as a party
respondent in an appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The only parties in an appeal by certiorari are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee
as respondent. (Cf. Elks Club vs. Rovira, 80 Phil. 272) The court which rendered the
judgment appealed from is not a party in said appeal. It is in the special civil action of
certiorari under Section 5 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the court or judge is
required to be joined as party defendant or respondent. The joinder of the Intermediate
Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan as party respondent in an appeal by certiorari is
necessary in cases where the petitioner-appellant claims that said court acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. An example of this is a case
where the petitioner-appellant claims that the Intermediate Appellate Court or the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in making its findings of fact, thus
justifying the review by this court of said findings of fact. (See the exceptions to the rule
of conclusiveness of the findings of fact of the Intermediate Appellate Court or the
Sandiganbayan in the case of Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 66497-98, July 10,
1986.) In such a case, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is at the same time a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the joinder of the
Intermediate Appellate Court or the Sandiganbayan becomes necessary. (Cf. Lianga
Lumber Company vs. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., March 31, 1977, 76 SCRA 197).

2. Removability of useful improvement should have in the counterclaim; Pleadings could

not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence The procedural objection of the City
is technically correct, as that assuming that MWSS (NAWASA) has the right to remove
the useful improvements, such improvements were not actually identified, and hence a
rehearing would be required which is improper at the current stage of the proceedings;
and finally, that such improvements, even if they could be identified, could not be
separated without causing substantial injury or damage to the Dagupan Waterworks
System; NAWASA should have alleged its additional counterclaim in the alternative - for
the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful improvements
or for the removal of all the useful improvements it had introduced. In the present case,
no evidence whatsoever had been introduced by MWSS on the issue of removability of
the improvements and the case was decided on a stipulation of facts. Consequently, the
pleadings could not be deemed amended to conform to the evidence.
3. Possessor in bad faith does not have the right to remove useful improvements Article
449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that he who builds, plants or sows in
bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity. As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had
made without right to indemnity (Santos vs. Mojica, Jan. 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 703).
4. Only possessor in good faith has right to be refunded for useful expenses with right of
retention until reimbursed; or removal of useful improvements without damage to the
principal thing Under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under
Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if
the can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the
possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses.
5. Possessor in bad faith has right to remove improvements for pure luxury or mere
pleasure, provided such suffers no injury thereby The right given a possessor in bad faith
is to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere
pleasure, provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not
prefer to retain them by paying the value they have at the time he enters into possession
(Article 549, Id.).
6. Mindanao Academy v. Yap In Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap (13 SCRA 190), it was
held that if the defendant constructed a new building, as he alleges, he cannot recover its
value because the construction was done after the filing of the action for annulment, thus
rendering him a builder in bad faith who is denied by law any right of reimbursement.
What this Court allowed appellant Yap to remove were the equipment, books, furniture
and fixtures brought in by him, because they were outside of the scope of the judgment
and may be retained by him.
7. Carbonell v. CA cannot invoke to modify the provisions of the Code; Case is not a
precedent The decision in the case of Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals (69 SCRA 99)
cannot be invoked to modify the clear provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines that
a possessor in bad faith is not entitled to reimbursement of useful expenses or to removal
of useful improvements. In said case, the lower courts found that respondents Infantes
were possessors in good faith. On appeal, the First Division of this Court reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals and declared petitioner Carbonell to have the superior
right to the land in question. On the question of whether or not respondents Infantes were

possessors in good faith, four Members ruled that they were not, but as a matter of equity
allowed them to remove the useful improvements they had introduced on the land. Justice
Teehankee (now Chief Justice) concurred on the same premise as the dissenting opinion
of Justice Muoz Palma that both the conflicting buyers of the real property in question,
namely petitioner Carbonell as the first buyer and respondents Infantes as the second
buyer, may be deemed purchasers in good faith at the respective dates of their purchase.
Justice Muoz Palma dissented on the ground that since both purchasers were
undoubtedly in good faith, respondents Infantes prior registration of the sale in good
faith entitled them to the ownership of the land. Inasmuch as only four Members
concurred in ruling that respondents Infantes were possessors in bad faith and two
Members ruled that they were possessors in good faith, said decision does not establish a
precedent.

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner, vs. THE SPOUSES

LEONOR and GERARDOSANTOS, doing business under the name and style of
"SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURTOF APPEALS,
respondents.184 SCRA 614 / G.R. No. 80298, April 26, 1990 1st DivisionFACTS:
A person identifying himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order by telephone with th
epetitioner company for 406 books, payable on delivery. Herein petitioner prepared and
delivered the sametogether with an invoice. In turn Cruz issued a personal check covering
the purchase price of P8,995.65.Cruz then sold 120 of the books to private respondent
Leonor Santos who, after verifying the seller'sownership from the invoice he showed
her, paid him P1,700.00.Petitioner made an inquiry with the De la Salle College where
Cruz had claimed to be a dean.Petitioner was informed that there was no such person in
its employ. It was found out that Cruz had nomore account or deposit with the Philippine
Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check.With the aid of policemen
Cruz was trapped. His real name is Tomas de la Pea. It was found out that 120of the
books he had ordered from EDCA were sold to the private respondents. Petioner and the
police went
to Santos store and seized the subject
books.The private respondents sued for recovery of the books after demand for their
return was rejectedby EDCA. The Municipal Trial Court ruled in favour of private
respondents, which was sustained by theRegional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the same. Hence, this petition. The petitioner arguesthat it was, because the
impostor acquired no title to the books that he could have validly transferred to theprivate
respondents. Its reason is that as the payment check bounced for lack of funds, there was
a failureof consideration that nullified the contract of sale between it and Cruz.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued bydela
Pena in payment therefor which was dishonored.
HELD:
The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between theparties on the
subject matter and the consideration. According to the Civil Code: ART. 1475. The
contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of mindsupon the thing
which is the object of the contract and upon the price.From that moment, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the lawgoverning the form
of contracts. ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon theactual or constructive delivery thereof. ART. 1478. The parties may
stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to thepurchaser until he has fully
paid the price.

It is clear that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment
of thepurchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that
such ownership shallpass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
delivery of the thing sold even if thepurchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment
only creates a right to demand payment or to rescindthe contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation abovenoted,
delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn
transfer it toanother. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the
books which hecould then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had
not yet paid for them to EDCAwas a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair
the title acquired by the private respondents to thebooks. Article 559 provides that "the
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalentto a title," thus
dispensing with further proof. Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the
booksbelonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The private respondent did
not have to go beyondthat invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered for sale
by Cruz belonged to him; yet she
did. Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of
the books, thesebeing movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more
proof before deciding to buy them.
Petition is denied.

DE GARCIA V. COURT OF APPEALS/ GUEVARA- Buying Lost or Stolen Goods

(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of any movable may recover
the same from the possessor except when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it
and it has been obtained by the latter in good faith at a public sale wherein the former
needs to reimburse the latter of the price paid.
:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.

FACTS:
Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold mounting, 2.05 diamondsolitaire, and 4 brills. Sometime in February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house.
Luckily, on October 1953 (barely a year after), she found it at a restaurant, La Bulakena,
on the finger of the restaurant owner, Consuelo De Garcia.
Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained to her how she had lost it.
When the ring was handed to her by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time
around, she brought her husband and Rebullida, the person whom she bought the ring
from, to verify the identity of the ring. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high
power lens and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it was the very ring that he
had sold to the Guevaras. After that, Guevara sent a written request for the ring, but De
Garcia did not deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of seizure, De Garica
likewise refused to deliver the ring.
According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare who got it from another
Miss who in turn got it from the owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however,
was nowhere to be found. She boarded three months at the first buyers house but left a

week after her landlady bought the ring. The first buyer did not even know Aling
Petrings last name nor her forwarding address.
De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value. She says her possession is
equivalent to title.
[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at the time it was purchased
and at the time it was found, but this was because De Guevara substituted the diamondsolitaire with a heavier stone.]
The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA reversed in favor of the owner,
Guevara. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: Who has a better right?

RULING: Guevara (owner)

Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article establishes two exceptions to
the general rule of irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity. THE ONLY
EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.
There is no merit in the contention that De Garcias possession is in good faith,
equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat the owners claim. Possession in good faith does not
really amount to title for the reason that there is a period for acquisitive prescription for
movable through uninterrupted possession of 4 years.
The title of the possessor in good faith is not that of ownership, but is merely a
presumptive title sufficient to serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. This, one who
has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same.
Besides, De Garcias title, if any, was weak. Her source, Aling Petring, was dubious.
She did not make a comment when Rebullida examined the ring nor did she answer
Guevaras letter asserting ownership of it. Her testimony was weak!
Other facts
1. Subject matter = 1 diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with 1 2.05 cts.
diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills 0.10 cts. total weight.
2. Mr. Rebullidas experience in the jewelry business = 30 years
3. Mrs. Garcia = owner of La Bulakea restaurant
4. Weight of the diamonds:
5. substituted diamond = 2.57 cts.
6. lost diamond (guevaras) = 2.05 cts
7. Ruling of the CA = return the ring or pay P1,000 and costs, P1,000 (attys fees) &
P1,000 as exemplary damages

DIZON V. SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering
possession. Where the owner delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission

but the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is not stopped form pursuing
an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita
Sison entered into a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita
received the ring and issued a receipt. After some time, Lourdes made demands for the
return of the ring but the latter refused to comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return,
Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of the pledge and she found out
that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison, the
niece of Claritas husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador
Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for
the return of the ring pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.
The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring
during the pendency of the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by
the CA on appeal. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NO
It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the
CC which states that the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the
possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the
current possessor. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence
would require him to inquire whether or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by
pledge is entitled to do so. The principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there
was no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity
for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be the last to complain if the right of
the true owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other issues raised:

Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.
> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is
sought to be bound.
> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.
Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

> Interpretation of the unlawfully deprived in Art. 559 of the CC. It is understood to
include all cases where there has been no valid transmission of ownership. If our
legislature intended interpretation to be that of the French Code, it certainly would have
adopted and used a narrower term than the broad language of Art. 559 (formerly 464) and
the accepted meaning in accordance with our jurisprudence.

DONATION
De luna versus abrigo
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The
donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms
and conditions. In case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically
revert to the donor. When the Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna
revived the said donation by executing a Revival of Donation Intervivos with the
following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and
Kindergarten School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years
from the date of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a
Deed of Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the
remaining area was retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint
with the RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were
violated. The Foundation defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially
complied with the conditions and that the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time
to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4
years). The heirs did not file an MR and went straight to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of
revocation of the donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written
contract)

RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are

governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of
prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation, it was held that the general
rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the New Civil Code as provided
in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion
which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a
donation must be brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the
conditions of the donation. However, said article does not apply to onerous donations in
view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous donations are
governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on
donation applies in the case at bar.

PAJARILLO VS IACFacts:Perfecta baleen died in 1945 leaving a 28-hectare lot. Perfecta

was survived bysister juana and brother felipe.May 1946 juana and felipe executed an
Extrajudicial Sale of the Estate of Perfecta, which states that Felipe and Juana agreed to
carryout the requests of perfecta that in consideration of her love and affection it be
donated to Salud whois the daughter of Juana.June 1946 Salud executed the following
public instrument which states:
that I salud the only done do hereby r
eceive and accept this donation and further express my gratitude for the kindness and
liberality of the donors, felipe and juana.1951, acceding to the request of her mother
juana, salud transferred possessionof the lot to her mother who was them living w
ith Claudio saluds brother and his
family. During the period they were occupying the land, Claudio paid realty taxes.May
25, 1956 Juana executed a deed of absolute sale conveying the land toClaudio for 12,000.
Claudio had the land registered in his name and was issuetct.1963, juana died.1965 salud
filed a complaint for reconveyance on the ground that deed of sale infavor of Claudio was
fictitious and its registration was null and void.Claudio argues that the fact that
acceptance was made in separate instrumentwas not noted in both instruments as required
by the civil code.ISSUE: WON THE DONATION IS VALIDHELD:YES.It is true that
there is nothing in either of the two instruments showing thatauthentic notice of the
acceptance was made by salud to felipe. And while the
first instrument contains the statement that the done does hereby accept this
donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of
the donor the only signatories thereof were Felipe and Juana.. That was
in factthe reason for separate instrument f acceptance signed by Salud a month
later. A strict interpretation of art 633 of the old civil code, can lead to no other conclusio
n that on the annulment of the donation for being defective in for. Thiswould be in
keeping with the unmistakable language of art. 633. A literal adherence to
the requirement of the law might result not in justice to theparties but conversely a
distortion of their intentions it is also a policy of the courtto avoid such an
interpretation.The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of
thedonation is duly communicated to the donor. Here it is not even, suggested thatJuana
was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later andrequested that the
donated land be not registered during her lifetime by salud.The donation cannot be
declared ineffective just because there is no notation inthe EJS of donees acceptance that
would be placing too much stress on mereform over the substance. It would also be

disregard the clear reality of theacceptance of the donation as manifested in these

separate instrument and aslater acknowledge and as latter acknowledged by juana

Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. CA/RIETA

G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991
FACTS:
RIETA FILED NULLIFICATION OF DEED OF DONATION, RECISSION OF
CONTRACT AND RECONVEYANCE OF REAL PROPERTY WITH DAMAGES
against Ignao and ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF IMUS, CAVITE/MANILA.
1.
Executed deed of donation covering a parcel of land
i. CONDITION: Donee shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of
one hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation, otherwise would
render ipso facto null and void; deed and property would revert back to donors.
1.

2.
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Bishop of Imus executed a deed of absolute sale to Ignao for P114,000

IGNAO: MOTION TO DISMISS
No legal capacity to sue
No cause of action
Prescribed (added by Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus)
Not a real party in interest (Bishop of Manila)
Was ruled that the complaint for cause of action has already prescribed.

3.
1.

APPEALED TO CA:
WON the action for rescission of contracts (deed of donation and deed of
sale) has prescribed
2.
WON the dismissal of the action for rescission of contracts (deed of
donation and deed of sale) on the ground of prescription carries with it the dismissal of
the main action for reconveyance.
CA held that action not prescribed.
ISSUE:
Has the cause of action already prescribed? NO.
ARTICLE 764: "(t)his action shall prescribe after 4 years from the non-compliance with
the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against
the donee's heirs.
Is there a cause of action? UNJUSTIFIED CAUSE OF ACTION
HELD:
Judgment SET ASIDE and another judgment DISMISSED.
1. DEED HAS AUTOMATIC REVERSION EXPRESSED, JUDICIAL DECLARATION
NOT NECESSARY HENCE.
a. Judicial action for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides
that it may be revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and conditions.
b. Judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special provision granting the
power of cancellation.
2. UNDUE RESTRICTION ON RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP, CONTRARY TO PUBLIC
POLICY.
a. DONATION: effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee.
Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property

donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the
same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
b. Condition imposed must not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
EDUARTE versus CA
All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation of
donation.

FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of
donation inter vivos of of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed
another deed of donation inter vivos ceding the other of the property to Helen Doria.
Helen Doria donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the Calauan Christian Reformed
Church. Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some 700 meters for
his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC
on the ground that the deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his
liberality claiming ingratitude (commission of offense against the person, honor or
property of donor [par. 1])

ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude
against Calapine (considering that falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES
In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that all crimes which offend the donor show
ingratitude and are causes of revocation. Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses
according to their classification under the RPC by deleting the first sentence. However,
this is unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats and coercion are considered
crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes
against personal liberty and security under the RPC.
Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the Court
to be revocable. The Court applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands
were registered lands and it has already passed from the forger (Doria) to innocent
purchasers for value (Eduarte, et al.).

NOCEDA vs CA Case Digest

NOCEDA vs CA
[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]
FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the
daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially
settled a parcel of land located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was

said to have an area of 66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directos share was 11,426 square
meters, defendant Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square
meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to
defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister, Carolina.
However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff
Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria
Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-fifth each. In said
extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032 over Lot 1121
in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have an area
of only 29,845 square meters.
Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him
by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the
extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three
huts. But in 1985, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff
Directo, occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without
her consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but
the latter refused.
Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession
and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before
the lower court.
Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the donation.
ISSUE: W/N petitioner Nocedas acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude
sufficient to grant the revocation of the donation?
HELD: YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion
donated to him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole
area of Lot C which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of
occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latters
knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of
the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor.[31] The
law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in
the action for revocation.
Republic of the Philippines v. Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat (2001)
Posted on October 4, 2013 by Intentional Lacunae
Silim and Mangubat donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools,
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur, on the condition that said land shall be
used exclusively and forever foreducational purposes. However, as the said parcel of land
was too small for the construction of the planned Bagong Lipunan School Building, the
Province of Zamboanga, through its division superintendent, executed a deed of
exchange in favor of a new and suitable location. Consequently, whatever was built on
the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new fitting location.

The issue arose when the donators found out that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma took the
land for himself and constructed his house thereon. Silim and Mangubat sought to have
the donation declared null and void on the ground that the condition of the donation was
violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school,
which it was conditioned on, was never built thereon.
RULING: YES. The Court upheld the validity of the donation. Firstly, it ruled that
there was a valid acceptance in accordance with Arts. 745 and 749 of the Civil Code: it
was made personally or through an agent, and it was made in a public document. Anent
the second contention concerning the non-fulfillment of the consideration, the Court ruled
that contrary to Silim and Mangubats argument, the parcel of land was usedprecisely for
school purposes. The exchange of the donated lot for a bigger lot was done in pursuance
with the condition that they (Silim and Mangubat) imposed. Remember: the lot was
exchanged with a bigger lot to give way for the construction of Bagong Lipunan
Elementary School and for no other reason.
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot
for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the
donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by
the limited area of the donated lot.