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People of the Philippines vs.

Jesus Retubado
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellants younger brother who was mentally ill.
Someone inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his
father were having dinner, it exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter
was brought to the attention of the barangay captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that
Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however, was bent on confronting Emmanuel
Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab driver) was
confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter
pushed the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife,
Norberta Caon was in the balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel,
Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Emmanuel Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus
told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his
son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her hand on her husbands
shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot Emmanuel
on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was
brought to the Tuburan District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police but
failed to surrender the firearm he used to kill the victim.
Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with
due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he insisted
that Emmanuel wake up his son, Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun.
Jesus grabbed Emmanuels hand, they struggled for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees.
Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuels forehead, and the gun suddenly went off. Jesus then
rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table. When he went back to the
dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it into the sea.
Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally
liable for the victims death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No! Homicide only
Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical
theory of criminal law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril
(un mal), actual or imminent (actual o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights
(bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity of ones body, and property (la vida, la integridad
corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. It is indispensable that the state
of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of
the RPC. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing
evidence. By admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of
his own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution. Whether the accused
acted under a state of necessity is a question
of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the
provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the
victim at close range on the forehead. The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Norberta Caons testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim in a
state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.
There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery,
two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the
confluence of the abovementioned conditions.
The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

CABANLIG VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
Prosections version:

A robbery occurred in Nueva Ecija but 4 days later, 3 suspects were caught. All items were recovered
except for a vase and a small radio. Valino, one of those apprehended, knew where the location of the
stolen items were so 5 policemen decided to escort Valino to the place where the stolen items were
hidden. They rode a jeep. While on their way, Valiano was able to grab one of the polices M16 armalite.
Cabanlig, who was behind Valino inside the jeep, saw what happened and decided to fire one shot at
Valino, and after 3 seconds, fired another 4 consecutive shots. Valino did not fire a shot. The next day,
somebody heard the police talking to a fellow policeman, saying that they salvaged Valino.
Defenses version:
It was not a salvage. It was an act of self-defense and performance of duty Sandiganbayan: Cabanlig
liable for homicide since he failed to show that the shooting was the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty (but the 4 others were acquitted since there was no evidence of conspiracy)
Issue: W/N Cabanlig is liable for Valinos death.
Held: NO. Acquitted.
- Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle
of self-preservation from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty.
The difference between the two justifying circumstances is clear, as the requisites of selfdefense and
fulfillment of duty are different.
- While self-defense and performance of duty are two distinct justifying circumstances, self-defense or
defense of a stranger may still be relevant even if the proper justifying circumstance in a given case is
fulfillment of duty. For example, a policeman's use of what appears to be excessive force could be
justified if there was imminent danger to the policeman's life or to that of a stranger. If the policeman used
force to protect his life or that of a stranger, then the defense of fulfillment of duty would be complete, the
second requisite being present.
- Undoubtedly, the policemen were in the legitimate performance of their duty when Cabanlig shot Valino.
Thus, fulfillment of duty is the justifying circumstance that is applicable to this case. To determine if this
defense is complete, we have to examine if Cabanlig used necessary force to prevent Valino from
escaping and in protecting himself and his co-accused policemen from imminent danger.
- In this case, Valino was committing an offense in the presence of the policemen when Valino grabbed
the M16 Armalite from Mercado and jumped from the jeep to escape. The policemen would have been
justified in shooting Valino if the use of force was absolutely necessary to prevent his escape. But Valino
was not only an escaping detainee. Valino had also stolen the M16 Armalite of a policeman. The
policemen had the duty not only to recapture Valino but also to recover the loose firearm. By grabbing
Mercado's M16 Armalite, which is a formidable firearm, Valino had placed the lives of the policemen in
grave danger.
- Had Cabanlig failed to shoot Valino immediately, the policemen would have been sitting ducks. All of the
policemen were still inside the jeep when Valino suddenly grabbed the M16 Armalite.
- By suddenly grabbing the M16 Armalite from his unsuspecting police guard, Valino certainly did not
intend merely to escape and run away as far and fast as possible from the policemen. Valino did not have
to grab the M16 Armalite if his sole intention was only to flee from the policemen. If he had no intention to
engage the policemen in a firefight, Valino could simply have jumped from the jeep without grabbing the
M16 Armalite.
- The Sandiganbayan had very good reasons in steadfastly adhering to the policy that a law enforcer
must first issue a warning before he could use force against an offender. However, the duty to issue a
warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers.
The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the
law enforcers. In exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law
enforcer is already imminent, and there is no other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law
enforcer's failure to issue a warning is excusable.

Luis A. Tabuena, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan


(268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997)
FACTS:
Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the presidents office and in cash what the
MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was reiterated in a Presidential
memorandum. In obedience to Pres. Marcos instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and
Adolfo Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused
the release of P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe Roa-

Gimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she received from
Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCC never received the money. The case involves two (2) separate
petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta. They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision
convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds in the amount of P55M.Further, petitioners claimed that
they were charged with intentional malversation, as alleged in the amended information, but it would
appear that they were convicted for malversation with negligence. Hence, their conviction of a crime
different from that chargedviolated their constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Sandigan bayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the amended information;
and
2. Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.
HELD:
(1)No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in
the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the
mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved.(2)Yes. Tabuena acted in strict compliance
with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order emanated from the Office of the President and bears the
signature of the President himself, the highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it
was regularly issued. And on its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment
of an obligation illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act
swiftly without question. However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the
accused's basic constitutional right to due process. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took
part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court
were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation. Tabuena
and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for the court
to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal
throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such
errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments
of error or not. The " cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly
denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due process requires no less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to
be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The parties are entitled
to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process. HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta
are acquitted of the crime of malversation.

People vs. Madarang


332 SCRA 99, [G.R. No. 132319] (May 12, 2000)
FACTS:
After having a quarrel, accused stabbed his wife causing her death. He was then charged with Parricide.
He claimed that he was in the state of insanity during that incident for he cannot recollect what happened.
He further claimed that according to the doctor in NCMH, wherein he was admitted, there was a high
possibility that he was already suffering from insanity prior to his commission of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused, invoking insanity, can claim exemption from liability for the crime he
committed.
RULING:
No. He is not exempt. In the Philippines, the courts have established a more stringent criterion for insanity
to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Mere abnormality
of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The issue of insanity is a question of fact. The state or
condition of a mans mind can only be measured and judged by his behavior. Establishing ones insanity

requires testimony of an expert witness, such as a psychiatrist. The proof must relate to the time
preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.
In the case at bar, the appellant was diagnosed to be suffering from schizophrenia when he was
committed to the NCMH months after he killed his wife. Medical books describe schizophrenia as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. The arguments advanced by the appellant to prove his
insanity are speculative and non-sequitur. For one, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the
stabbing incident amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. None of the witnesses
declared that he exhibited any of the symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or
simultaneous with the stabbing incident. Also schizophrenics have lucid intervals during which they are
capable of distinguishing right from wrong.

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO


FACTS:
Alberto Antonio and Arnulfo Tuadles decided to play pusoy-dos. When it came to tally their scores and
collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. The prosecution alleged that in the course of an
argument, without warning or cause, Alberto pulled his gun behind his back and shot Arnulfo at close
range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. On the other hand, the
defense pointed out that Arnulfo suddenly grabbed Albertos gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life,
Alberto reached for Arnulfos hand and they grappled for the possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a
single shot roared. Arnulfo fell face down to the floor.
The RTC found Alberto guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that treachery attended the commission of the crime of
murder???
RULING: Yes.The RTC did not explain the basis for the qualification of treachery except for a terse
citation that there was a sudden attack and that Arnulfo had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious
and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows that the
incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime.
It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the
offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further
required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent where
the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.

PEOPLE VS. ANTONIO


FACTS:
Alberto Antonio and Arnulfo Tuadles decided to play pusoy-dos. When it came to tally their scores and
collect the winnings from the loser, an argument arose. The prosecution alleged that in the course of an
argument, without warning or cause, Alberto pulled his gun behind his back and shot Arnulfo at close
range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious deed. On the other hand, the
defense pointed out that Arnulfo suddenly grabbed Albertos gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life,
Alberto reached for Arnulfos hand and they grappled for the possession of the gun. As they wrestled, a
single shot roared. Arnulfo fell face down to the floor.
The RTC found Alberto guilty of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in holding that treachery attended the commission of the crime of
murder???
RULING: Yes.The RTC did not explain the basis for the qualification of treachery except for a terse
citation that there was a sudden attack and that Arnulfo had no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate. It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There must be a conscious
and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. All the evidence shows that the
incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur of the moment crime.
It is not enough that the means, methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the
offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the offended party. It is further
required, for treachery to be appreciable, that such means, method or form was deliberated upon or
consciously adopted by the offender. Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent where
the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment.

ORTEGA V. PEOPLE
Facts: Joemar Ortega raped AAA (name withheld), the daughter of FFF who was a close friend of
Joemars mom.
He was around 13 years old then and AAA was around 6 years old. During trial, the RTC and CA were not
impressed with the defense of denial and adjudged guilty of rape.
The important issue arose during the pendency of the case in the SC. In 2006 (while the case
was still pending), RA 9344 (The Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act) was passed. One of its provisions
found in sec. 64 of the act provides that ...cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the time of
the commission of the crime shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer. Thus, Ortega contends that he should not be
made to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua as he was 13 years old when the crime was committed.
The OSG argued that Ortega is no longer covered by the provisions of Section 64 of RA 9344
since as early as 1999, Ortega was convicted by the RTC and the conviction was affirmed by the CA in
2001. RA 9344 was passed into law in 2006, and with Ortega now approximately 25 years old, he no
longer qualifies as a child as defined by RA 9344. Moreover, the OSG claimed that the retroactive effect
of Section 64 of RA 9344 is applicable only if the child-accused is still below 18 years old as explained
under Sections 67 and 68 thereof.
Issue: Should RA 9344 apply retroactively to Ortegas case?
Held: Yes. A retroactive application of RA 9344 should be given to Ortega pursuant to the well-entrenched
principle in criminal law - favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
the accused are given retroactive effect.
Furthermore, the deliberations of the Senate with regard to RA 9344 show an intent for it to apply
retroactively. As stated by Senator Santiago even after final conviction if, in fact, the offender is able to
prove that at the time of the commission of the offense he is a minor under this law, he should be given
the benefit of the law. Senator Pimentel concurred with this statement.
Ortega was only 13 years old at the time of the commission of the alleged rape. This was duly
proven by
the certificate of live birth, by his testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, his age was
never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. As such, Ortega, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. No. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability. However, this does not mean that he is exempted from civil liability.

People v. Arpon
G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Arpon was charged with one count of statutory rape and seven counts of rape. The
RTC and CA convicted accused-appellants of all counts of rape charged.

Records show that the first count of rape against private complainant AAA was committed by accusedappellant in the house of the former when she was still eight years old (1995). In July 1999, she was
again raped by accused-appellant for five times on different nights. She avers that accused-appellant was
then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house of AAAs neighbor. He came to AAAs
house, took off her panty and went on top of her. When asked again how the accused-appellant raped her
for five nights in July of the said year, AAA narrated that accused-appellant pulled down her panty, went
on top of her and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every time she urinated,
thereafter, she felt pain.

AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice in August 1999 at nighttime. He
kissed her and then he took off his shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and
in her chest because he was heavy. She related that the accused-appellant was her uncle as he was the
brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not tell anybody about the rapes because the accusedappellant threatened to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he proceeded to also
rape her younger sister, DDD

Accused-appellant interpose alibi and denial as his defense. He further assails the credibility of AAA for
having inconsistencies in her testimony.

ISSUE: Is the accused-appellant guilty of all counts of rape charged against him?

HELD: NO, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three instances when the accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge of her.
The first incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was only eight years
old. Article 266-A (1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements of which are:
(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented. Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, the date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is
carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the
elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal. As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited
with veracity the substance of AAAs testimony and the Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the finding
of the RTC.
Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court
disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. AAAs
testimony merely described a single incident of rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four
instances of rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July 1999. The same is also
true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly committed in August 1999.
Accused-appellants defense of alibi cannot stand. Hence, accused-appellant is proven to have
committed three counts of rape against AAA. He is, however, exempted from criminal liability for the first
count of rape (statutory) on account of him being a minor when he committed the crime. As such, he is
only guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape with his relationship as an uncle to the
victim as a qualifying circumstance.

Llave vs People
FACTS:
Neil Llave, a 12 year old boy, was charged with raping Debbielyn, a 7 year old girl, in
Pasay City. After school, Debbielyn proceeded home, changed her clothes and went to her
mothers store to bring home unsold quail eggs. On her way, she passed by a vacant house
adjacent to Teofistos house (their neighbor). She was suddenly pulled by petitioner to a pile of
hollow blocks; forced her to lay down on the cement. Petitioner removed his and the victims
clothes. He lay on top of the victim, started kissing her and inserted his penis inside the victims
vagina. The
victim resisted to no avail.
Thereafter Teofisto heard the victims cries and went out to see what has happened. At
that point, Llave took off.
The parents of the victim, upon knowing the incident, found petitioner in the latters
grandparents house. Llave was arrested by the tanod.
The victim was brought to the Child Protection Unit of the PGH where Dr. Castillo found
that no injury was found on the hymen and perineum, there was a scanty yellowish discharge
between the labia minora. There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1 oclock
position near the anus which can only be caused by a blunt object such as erect penis or finger.
The findings, according to the Dr., were consistent with the claim that victim was sexually
abused.
The RTC and the CA both convicted petitioner of the crime of rape. Both courts found
that petitioner, by his conducts during the incident, acted with discernment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner acted with discernment
HELD:

Yes he did! Article 12, par3 of the RPC exempts from criminal liability persons who are
over 9 years and under 15 UNLESS he acted with discernment. The ratio for the exemption is
the absence of intelligence which is an essential part of a felony whether by dolo or culpa.
Intelligence is the power to determine the morality of human acts and to distinguish licit from
illicit acts. Discernment is the metal capacity to understand the difference of right and wrong.
In this case, presence of discernment was deduced from the calculated acts of petitioner
i.e. dragging the victim in the vacant house so as not to be discovered and quickly taking off
when Teofisto discovered the crime.
In fact, upon prodding of petitioners dad, he hid at his grandmothers house to evade arrest.
MINOR ISSUE:
Whether or not there petitioner, as he contends, was deprived of preliminary investigation
No. No need for preliminary investigation. According to the rules on criminal procedure,
when there is a valid warrantless arrest, preliminary investigation may not be conducted
provided there was an inquest. In this case there was a valid warrantless arrest and inquest

PEOPLE v DEL ROSARIO

G.R. No. 127755 | April 14, 1999 | J. Bellosillo

FACTS:

Based on eyewitness Paul Alonzo:


o May 13, 1996, bet. 6 to 6:30 PM, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of Nitas Drugstore,
General Luna St., Cabanatuan City (bec. 3 women flagged him)
o He saw 2 men and a woman struggling for possession of a bag. After taking the bag, the Snatcher
1 (armed with a gun) started chasing another man who was trying to help the woman. Snatcher 2
kicked the woman, sending her to the ground. When S1 came back, he shot the woman (who was
still on the floor) on the head.
o The bag was then taken to the tricycle of Joselito Del Rosario, which was parked 1 meters in
front of Alonzo. Someone inside received the bag. S1 then sat behind the driver, S2 went inside the
sidecar, and they sped off.
o Alonzo managed to recognize the driver and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He
then went to the police HQ to report the incident.
Del Rosarios version:
o At around 5:30 PM, he was hired (for P120) by a certain Boy Santos to drive him (Boy) to a cockpit.
However, after being directed to the market place and fetching Jun Marquez and Dodong Bisaya,
he was asked to proceed and stop at the corner of Burgos and Gen. Luna St. on the pretext of
Bisaya buying a cigarette.
o Bisaya then accosted Virginia Bernas (victim) and grappled with her for the bag. Marquez alighted
and helped Bisaya.
o He tried to leave, but Santos, who was then inside the sidecar, prevented him from leaving and
even threatened to shoot him. After Bisaya took the bag, Marquez (before boarding) shot Bernas
on the head while she was lying prone on the ground. Bisaya then boarded the sidecar and
Marquez rode behind him. He was the directed to drive towards Dicarma. He overheard them
saying they would throw the bag at some street where there were cogon grasses.
o After arriving at Dicarma, he was warned not to tell the police otherwise, his family would be
harmed. He then went home, and because of the threat, did not report the matter to the owner of
the trike nor to the brgy. capt. and police.
Him, long with Ernesto Jun Marquez, Virgilio Boy Santos and John Doe (Dodong) was then charged with
the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robber Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old
businesswoman, of 200k in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof, shot and killed her. He was the
only one tried. Marquez was killed in a police encounter and the two remained at large.
He was found guilty as co-principal in the crime, sentencing him to death and payment for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:

He contends that the RTC did not acknowledge the presence of threat and irresistible force employed upon
him by his co-accused;
o WON he can claim exemption from criminal liability under Art. 12, par. 5 of the RPC
(Exempting circumstance: acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force): YES.
o SC said he was unarmed and unable to protect himself when he was prevented at gunpoint from
leaving the crime scene during the commission of the crime. He was also only forced to help them
escape.
o A person who acted under this circumstance acted without freedom. Actus me invito factus non
est meus actus (An act done by me against my will is not my act)
o The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending as to induce
well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm. It leaves no opportunity for escape or
self-defense in equal combat. It is so formidable that the person is reduced to a mere instrument
who not only acts without will but also against his will.

The RTC was wrong in saying his fear was merely speculative, fanciful and remote since a gun
pointed at him could not be constitute irresistible force because it did not pass the test required by
the law and jurisprudence.

It is natural that a person threatened with weapons will normally, usually and probably do
what an armed man asks them to do, nothing more, nothing less.

A person in his situation would be more concerned with his personal welfare and security
rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that day.

Upon cross-examination, he said that Santos gun was pointed at him and he (Santos)
threatened to kill even his family.
He is then exempt from criminal liability since by reason of fear of bodily harm he was compelled
against his will to transport his co-accused away from the crime scene.

WHEREFORE, he is ACQUITTED! RTC decision reversed.


Other issues:
o

RTC did not consider his defense that he was not part of the conspiracy; WON he was part of the conspiracy:
Like, of course not. Duh. Conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy. It is when two or more persons aim their
acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence odd sentiment. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without
the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy.
Apparently, police officers did not recite his Miranda rights during custodial investigation. Since he was not told
of his right to remain silent, his verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest
were inadmissible against him.
Apparently, the same police officers only invited him for interview. After he had given all information, led them
to the place where the bag was and to the whereabouts of the other accused, and had given his statement, they
detained him in the police station. He was detained/arrested without a warrant.

People vs. Lising, 285 SCRA 595 [G.R. No. 106210], (Jan. 30, 1998)

FACTS:
Manalili, thru Garcia, contracted Lising to affect the arrest of Robert Herrera the suspect
in killing his brother. Unfortunately, Lising and his companions arrested and killed wrong persons.
The trial court found the defendants guilty of the crime of double murder qualified with treachery
and aggravated by premeditation. Garcia prays that his liability be mitigated on grounds of lack of
intent or motive, acts made under the compulsion of an irresistible force and in the impulse of
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Garcia acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force and in the
impulse of uncontrollable fear.

RULING:
No, Garcia did not act under the compulsion of an irresistible force and in the impulse of
uncontrollable fear. The court ruled that to be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced
him to a mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will. The compulsion
must be of some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in equal
combat or for escape.
Garcia's participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched, up to the
killing of the victims is undisputed. He was very well aware of Manalili's plans. He was
instrumental in introducing Lising to Manalili. Likewise, Lising's intention to silence both Cochise
and Beebom at the end upon realizing an alleged mistake was known to him. He did not do
anything to deter the commission or to report the crimes immediately thereafter. In fact, he stated
that he and Lising saw each other after the incident but never mentioned anything about it, which
only goes to show their intention of concealing the crime.

Ty vs People
439 SCRA 220G.R. No. 149275

September 27, 2004

Facts: This case originated from the filing of 7 Informations for violation of B.P.
22against the petitioner Vicky C. Ty who drew and issued to Manila Doctors Hospital
seven (7)post-dated checks amounting to P30,000.00 each which was subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of
such dishonor, she failed to pay the Hospital within five (5) banking days after
receiving said notice. The trial court as affirmed by the CA with modification
convicted Ms. Ty guilty of seven (7)counts of violation of B.P 22 . In her appeal, she
invoked the defense that sheissued the checks "under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury."
Issue: Whether or not the defense of uncontrollable fear is acceptable to warrant
an exemption from criminal liability?
Held: No. For Uncontrollable fear to be appreciated as exempting circumstance, the
following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2)the fear
must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least
equal to that committed. It must appear that the threat that caused the
uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would
have succumbed to it. In this case, the fear harbored by Ms. Ty was not real and
imminent. She claimed that she was compelled toissue the checks, a condition the
hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged, for fear
that her mother's health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment
of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear;
it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. Hence, the decision was
affirmed.

People vs. Bandian, 63 Phil 530 (1936)


FACTS: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to
respond to the call of nature. Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly showing signs of not being able to
support herself. Rushing to her aid, he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on
Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn babe near a path adjoining the thicket
where the appellant had gone a few moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno
declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The
trial court gave credit to this opinion.
Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide
Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The
evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her childs death in one way or another, or in
abandoning it in the thicket, did so willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former lover, which was not unknown to her
second lover, Kirol, took place three years before the incident; her married life with Kirolshe considers
him her husband as he considers him his wifebegan a year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew
of the pregnancy and that it was his and that theyve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the child. The
appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.
Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did not occur to her or she was unable,
due to her debility or dizziness, which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the
seventh exempting circumstance, to take hernchild from the thicket where she had given it birth, so as not
to leave it abandoned and exposed to the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because
of imprudence or any other reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility,
she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on her part.
The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such circumstances (Art.
12(4), RPC). Thus, having the fourth and seventh exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted
of the crime that she had been accused of.