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E. Summary Procedures (Art.

249-252)
(See RA 8369 Family Courts Act of 1997)
F. Rights of Parents
Cases: Silva vs. CA and Gonzales 275 SCRA 604
London vs. BCC October 10, 2002
XIII. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CHILDREN
Arts. 356-364, 375-376, CC
Art. 129(a), 211, par. 2, 213, 226, FC
Arts. 3 and 4, P.D. 603
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 88202. December 14, 1998]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA
VICENCIO, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
April 28, 1989, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52,
dated, August 31, 1987. The appealed decision granted private respondent Cynthia Vicencios
petition for change of surname, from Vicencio to Yu.
As found by the trial court, hereunder are the facts and circumstances of the case:
Petitioners evidence is to the effect that she was born on 19 January 1971 at the Capito
l
Medical Center, Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega
Leabres (Exh. C, also marked Annex A of Petition); that on 10 January 1972, after a marital
spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan; that since
then Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to his family and it was Ernesto Yu who
had come to the aid of Fe Esperanza Labres (sic) and her children; that on 29 June 1976, F
e
Esperanza Leabres filed a petition in the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
for dissolution of their conjugal partnership, Civil Case No. E-02009, which was granted in a
decision rendered by the Hon. Regina C. Ordoez Benitez on 11 July 1977 (Exhs. D, D-1 to D3); that sometime in 1983, petitioners mother filed another petition for change of name, Sp.
Proc. No. 83-16346, that is to drop the surname of her husband therefrom, and after hearing a
decision was rendered on 5 July 1983 by the Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV of this Court
approving the petition (Exh. E); that in 1984, petitioners mother again filed another petition with
this Court, Sp. Proc. No. 84-22605, for the declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and
which petition was granted on 26 April 1984 in a decision rendered by the Hon. Corona IbaySomera (Exh. F & F-1); that on 15 April 1986, petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu were joined
in matrimony in a ceremony solemnized by Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila (Exh. G).

It was also established that evern (sic) since her childhood, petitioner had not known much less
remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her known father had been and still is Ernesto
Yu; that despite of which she had been using the family name Vicencio in her school and other
related activities therein; that in view of such situation, confusion arose as to her parentage and
she had been subjected to inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family name, both by her
classmates and their neighbors, causing her extreme embarrassment; that on two (2) occassions
when she ran as a beauty contestant in a Lions Club affair and in a Manila Red Cross pageant,
her name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu; that her step-father had been priorly consulted about this
petition and had given his consent thereto; that in fact Ernesto Yu testified for petitioner and
confirmed his consent to the petition as he had always treated petitioner as his own daughter ever
since.[3]
At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court, the OSG manifested that it
was opposing the petition. It participated in the proceedings by cross-examining the private
respondent Cynthia Vicencio, (petitioner a quo) and her witnesses.
Disregarding the OSGs contention, the trial court ruled that there is no valid cause for denying
the petition. Further, the trial court stated that it could not compel private respondents stepfather to adopt her, as adoption is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption should not be a
cause for disallowing private respondent to legally change her name.[4] Hence, it granted the
change of surname of private respondent from Vicencio to Yu.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court, which held that it is for the
best interest of petitioner that her surname be changed. The appellate court took into account the
testimonies of private respondent and her witnesses that allowing the change of surname would
give her an opportunity to improve her personality and welfare.[5] It likewise noted that the
discrepancy between her original surname, taken from her biological father; and the surname of
her step-father, who has been socially recognized as her father, caused her embarrassment and
inferiority complex.[6]
The main issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court
s
decision allowing the change of private respondents surname to that of her step-fathers
surname.
In Republic vs. Hernandez[7], we have recognized inter alia, the following as sufficient grounds
to warrant a change of name: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult
to write or pronounce; (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known
since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is
based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose, or that the
change of name would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the justifiable grounds aforecited. She
says that confusion has arisen as to her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has

acted as her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since she is known in
society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that she has been subjected to inquirie
s
regarding her use of a different surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment.
However, it is not denied that private respondent has used Vicencio as her surname in her school
records and related documents. But she had used the surname of her step-father, Yu, when she
participated in public functions, such as entering beauty contests, namely, with the Lions Club
and the Manila Red Cross, and when she celebrated her debut at the Manila Hotel.[8]
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and reasonable cause to warrant
private respondents change of surname. Such change might even cause confusion and give rise
to legal complications due to the fact that private respondents step-father has two (2) children
with her mother. In the event of her step-fathers death, it is possible that private respondent
may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter. In his memorandum, the Solicitor
General, opines that Ernesto Yu has no intention of making Cynthia as an heir because despite
the suggestion made before the petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the
change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by adoption, he has not opted for
such a remedy.[9]
We find merit in the Solicitor Generals contention.
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause
for which the change is sought.[10] The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court
does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general rule on the use
of
surnames[11], specifically the law which requires that legitimate children shall principally use
the surname of their father[12].
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe Leabres and Pablo
Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her
father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of
a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.[13]
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondents parentage because of her
surname. But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow
private respondent to bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally adopted by him.
While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the surname of their respective stepfathers even without the benefit of adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the
present case. In Calderon vs. Republic,[14] and Llaneta vs. Agrava,[15] this Court allowed the
concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father, but unlike the situation in the present
case where private respondent is a legitimate child, in those cases the children were not o
f
legitimate parentage. In Moore vs. Republic,[16] where the circumstances appears to be similar
to the present case before us, the Court upheld the Republics position:
We find tenable this observation of governments counsel.

Indeed, if a child born out of a

lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the
first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his
real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in th
e
community.
While the purpose which may have animated petitioner is plausible and may run along the
feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the Moore
family, our hand is deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present overlook or brush
aside.[17]
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic,[18] the Court ruled that:
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mothers second husband, who is not their
father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said
minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact
sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit.[19]
Private respondent, might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to that of her step-fathers
legitimate children, a plausible reason the petition for change of name was filed in the first place.
Moreover, it is laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter, providing
for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood. However, legal constraints lead us to
reject private respondents desire to use her stepfathers surname. Further, there is no assurance
the end result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of bringing a stop to
questions, the very change of name, if granted, could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her
parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private respondent was already 18
years old but still considered a minor because Republic Act 6809,[20] lowering the age of
majority, was then in effect. However, regardless of private respondents age, our conclusion
remains considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any legally justifiable cause for
allowing the change of her surname.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the insta
nt
petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.

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