REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR

NAGA CITY
X x x,

Complainant,
I.S. No. _______
ESTAFA

For:

Xxx
(Alias: x x x),
Respondent.
x---------------------------------x

COMPLAINT-AFFIDAVIT
THE UNDERSIGNED COMPLAINANT respectfully alleges:
COMPLAINANT. The complainant is x x x, of legal age, married,
Filipino and, for purposes of this criminal complaint, with postal address at:
Xxx
RESPONDENT. The respondent is x x x, aka, of legal age, married,
xxx national, and with the following three (3) addresses, where summons and
notices may be served, to wit:
X x x.
NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT. This is a criminal
complaint for ESTAFA and for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involving the sum of
Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) arising from various checks issued by the
respondent to the complainant.

ULTIMATE FACTS
For the record, and to form part hereof, by incorporation and reference,
attached hereto are copies of the following supporting documents, to wit:
X x x.
DISCUSSION
APPLICABLE LAWS
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code on deceit/swindling (estfa) provides any
person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned therein shall
be punished by the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds
the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the
total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years; provided
that the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
X x x.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another,
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or
other property.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
X x x.
(a) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee,
without prejudice to the action for calumny which the offended
party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty.

[if !supportLists](b)]By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in

payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover
the amount of check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)
days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)
[if !supportLists]5.2.
[endif]Article 316 (other forms of swindling) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused
and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon any
person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any
fictitious contract.

[if !supportLists]5.3.
[endif]Article 318 (other deceits) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the
amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any
other deceit not mentioned in the preceding articles of this
chapter.
[if !supportLists]5.4.
provides:

[endif]Further, B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)

[if !supportLists]5.4.1.
[endif]Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand pesos, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
[if !supportLists]5.4.2.

[endif]The same penalty shall be imposed upon

any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which
reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
[if !supportLists]5.4.3.
[endif]Where the check is drawn by a corporation,
company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
[if !supportLists]5.4.4.
[endif]The making, drawing and issuance of a
check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds
in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the
date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder
thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full
by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving
notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.
[if !supportLists]5.4.5.
[endif]It shall be the duty of the drawee of any
check, when refusing to pay the same to the holder thereof upon presentment,
to cause to be written, printed or stamped in plain language thereon, or
attached thereto, the reason for drawee's dishonor or refusal to pay the same:
Provided, That where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such
drawee bank, such fact shall always be
explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal. In all prosecutions under
this Act, the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check,
having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached
thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of
the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee
for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly
dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such
dishonored check.
[if !supportLists]5.4.6.
[endif]Notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop
payment, the drawee shall state in the notice that there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of such check, if such
be the fact."
[if !supportLists]5.5.
crime to be

[endif]BP Blg. 22 enumerates the elements of the

(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the
maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee
bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is presented within 90 days
from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to
make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose.
[if !supportLists]5.5.1.
[endif]The statute has created the prima facie
presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind
would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when
the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of
such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee bank. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides
that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and
issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay
the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment in full by the drawee of such check.

LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: ESTAFA

[if !supportLists]5.6.
[endif]In PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANER, G.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011,
the accused was convicted for the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized
under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information
alleged that on or about May 17, 1996 in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
accused Virginia (Baby) P. Montaner did then and there willfully, unlawfully

and feloniously defraud one Reynaldo Solis in the following manner: said
accused by means of false pretenses and fraudulent acts that her checks are
fully funded draw, make and issue in favor of one Reynaldo Solis ten (10)
Prudential Bank Checks, all having a total value of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) and all aforesaid checks were postdated June 17, 1996 in
exchange for cash knowing fully well that she has no funds in the drawee bank
and when the said checks were presented for payment the same were
dishonored by the drawee bank on reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED and
despite demand accused failed and refused to pay the value thereof to the
damage and prejudice of Reynaldo Solis in the aforementioned total amount
of P50,000.00.
To exculpate herself from criminal liability, accused Virginia Baby P.
Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in private
complainants favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her
by one Marlyn Galope because the latter needed money. She gave the ten
checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the space for the date, amount and
payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any negotiation.
She further told Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned
that a case was filed against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and
the latter told her that money will not be given to her if she will not issue the
said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor sent to her by
private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received
the notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a
year, that is, in 1997.
In a Decision dated April 8, 2003, the trial court convicted appellant for the
crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code and sentenced her to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty-two (22) years of reclusion perpetua as maximum and to indemnify
complainant Reynaldo Solis in the amount of P50,000.00.
Appellant elevated the case to the Court of Appeals but the adverse ruling was
merely affirmed by the appellate court in its Decision dated February 12,
2008.
Hence, appellant interposed an appeal before the Supreme Court and put
forth a single assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315, PAR. 2 (D) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

Appellant maintains that she entrusted the subject checks, purportedly signed
in blank, to Marilyn Galope (Galope) out of pity in order for the latter to
secure a loan. Thus, there is purportedly no certainty beyond reasonable
doubt that she issued the checks purposely to defraud Reynaldo Solis (Solis)
into lending her money. She further claims that no transaction had ever
transpired between her and Solis. Admitting that she may have been
imprudent, she nonetheless insists that her simple imprudence does not
translate to criminal liability.
The Supreme Court was not persuaded.
The Court cited Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow x x x:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when
the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days
from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
According to the Court, the elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in
payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack
of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.[if !
supportFootnotes][1][endif]
In the said case, the prosecution sufficiently established appellants guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the

Revised Penal Code. According to Soliss clear and categorical testimony,

appellant issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank checks, each in the
amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for
their cash equivalent.
From the circumstances, the Court held that it was evident that Solis would
not have given P50,000.00 cash to appellant had it not been for her issuance
of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were undoubtedly
issued by appellant to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis
attempted to encash them, they were all dishonored by the bank because the
account was already closed.
Solis wrote appellant a demand letter dated October 13, 1996 which was
received by appellants husband to inform appellant that her postdated checks
had bounced and that she must settle her obligation or else face legal action
from Solis. Appellant did not comply with the demand nor did she deposit the
amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice.
This gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the
crime of estafa, constituting false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the
second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
As for appellants claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but
signed checks imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a
guarantee for a loan, the Court viewed such statements with the same
incredulity as the lower courts.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
The Court has no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity
to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.[if !
supportFootnotes][2][endif]
Appellant wished to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with
her blank but signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion
that the same may be used to defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily,
appellants assertion defies ordinary common sense and human experience,
the Court stated.
Moreover, the Court added, it is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by

clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence which has
far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] It agreed with the
lower courts that appellants bare denial cannot be accorded credence for lack
of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the trial court, appellants failure to
produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her cause. In
all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the conviction of
appellant for estafa. Hence, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the two decisions
of both the trial court and the appellate court.
LATEST APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE: B.P. BLG. 22
[if !supportLists]5.7.
[endif]In EUMELIA R. MITRA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and FELICISIMO S. TARCELO, G.R. NO.
191404, July 5, 2010, the petitioner Eumelia R. Mitra (Mitra) was the
Treasurer, and Florencio L. Cabrera (deceased), Jr. was the President, of
Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged in money
lending activities. Between 1996 and 1999, private respondent Felicisimo S.
Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money
placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts
he invested plus the interest on his investments by Mitra and Cabrera, were
issued by LNCC to Tarcelo.
When Tarcelo presented these checks for payment, they were dishonored for
the reason account closed. Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for
the payment of these checks but he was frustrated. Constrained, in 2002, he
caused the filing of seven informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
(BP 22) in the total amount of P925,000.00 with the MTCC in Batangas City.
After trial on the merits, the MTCC found Mitra and Cabrera guilty of the
charges and ordered them to respectively pay the mandated fines for each
violation and with subsidiary imprisonment in all cases, in case of insolvency
and it further adjudged them civilly liable and ordered them to pay, in
solidum, private complainant Felicisimo S. Tarcelo the amount of NINE
HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P925,000.000).
Mitra and Cabrera appealed to the Batangas RTC contending that: they signed
the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and no
date of maturity; they did not know when and to whom those checks would be
issued; the seven checks were only among those in one or two booklets of
checks they were made to sign at that time; and that they signed the checks so

as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold
office there. The RTC affirmed the MTCC decision.
Meanwhile, Cabrera died. Mitra alone filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals claiming, among others, that there was no proper service of
the notice of dishonor on her. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition for
lack of merit.
Mitra went up to the Supreme Court on a petition for review and submitted
the issues: WHETHER OR NOT THE ELEMENTS OF VIOLATION OF
BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 MUST BE PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AS AGAINST THE CORPORATION WHO
OWNS THE CURRENT ACCOUNT WHERE THE SUBJECT CHECKS
WERE DRAWN BEFORE LIABILITY ATTACHES TO THE
SIGNATORIES; and WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS PROPER
SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DEMAND TO PAY TO
THE PETITIONER AND THE LATE FLORENCIO CABRERA, JR.
The Supreme Court denied the petition.
The Court held that a check is a negotiable instrument that serves as a
substitute for money and as a convenient form of payment in financial
transactions and obligations. The use of checks as payment allows
commercial and banking transactions to proceed without the actual handling
of money, thus, doing away with the need to physically count bills and coins
whenever payment is made. It permits commercial and banking transactions
to be carried out quickly and efficiently. But the convenience afforded by
checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect confidence in our
commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest.
BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law was enacted for the specific purpose of
addressing the problem of the continued issuance and circulation of unfunded
checks by irresponsible persons. To stem the harm caused by these bouncing
checks to the community, BP 22 considers the mere act of issuing an unfunded
check as an offense not only against property but also against public order.[if !
supportFootnotes][4][endif] The purpose of BP 22 in declaring the mere
issuance of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to punish the offender
in order to deter him and others from committing the offense, to isolate him
from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order.[if !
supportFootnotes][5][endif] The penalty is stiff. BP 22 imposes the penalty of
imprisonment for at least 30 days or a fine of up to double the amount of the

check or both imprisonment and fine.

Specifically, BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks Without Sufficient Funds. Any person who makes or
draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall
be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than
one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount
of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a
check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full
amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the
date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable
under this Act.
SECTION 2. Evidence of Knowledge of Insufficient Funds. The making,
drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented
within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie
evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such
maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
Mitra posited in the petition that before the signatory to a bouncing corporate
check can be held liable, all the elements of the crime of violation of BP 22
must first be proven against the corporation. The corporation must first be
declared to have committed the violation before the liability attaches to the
signatories of the checks.

The Court stated that it found itself unable to agree with Mitras posture. The
third paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the
check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This provision
recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers.
Hence, its wording is unequivocal and mandatory that the person who
actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for a violation of BP
22. This provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation.
The Court cited the case of Llamado v. Court of Appeals,[if !
supportFootnotes][6][endif] where it ruled that the accused was liable on the
unfunded corporate check which he signed as treasurer of the corporation. He
could not invoke his lack of involvement in the negotiation for the transaction
as a defense because BP 22 punishes the mere issuance of a bouncing check,
not the purpose for which the check was issued or in consideration of the
terms and conditions relating to its issuance. In this case, Mitra signed the
LNCC checks as treasurer. Following Llamado, she must then be held liable
for violating BP 22.
Another essential element of a violation of BP 22 is the drawers knowledge
that he has insufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank to cover his
check. Because this involves a state of mind that is difficult to establish, BP 22
creates the prima facie presumption that once the check is dishonored, the
drawer of the check gains knowledge of the insufficiency, unless within five
banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the drawer pays the
holder of the check or makes arrangements with the drawee bank for the
payment of the check. The service of the notice of dishonor gives the drawer
the opportunity to make good the check within those five days to avert his
prosecution for violating BP 22.
Mitra alleged that there was no proper service on her of the notice of dishonor
and, so, an essential element of the offense is missing. This contention, the
Court said, raised a factual issue that was not proper for review. It is not the
function of the Court to re-examine the finding of facts of the Court of
Appeals. Our review is limited to errors of law and cannot touch errors of
facts unless the petitioner shows that the trial court overlooked facts or
circumstances that warrant a different disposition of the case[if !
supportFootnotes][7][endif] or that the findings of fact have no basis on
record. Hence, with respect to the issue of the propriety of service on Mitra of
the notice of dishonor, the Court gives full faith and credit to the consistent
findings of the MTCC, the RTC and the CA.

The defense postulated that there was no demand served upon the accused,
said denial deserves scant consideration. Positive allegation of the prosecution
that a demand letter was served upon the accused prevails over the denial
made by the accused. Though, having denied that there was no demand letter
served on April 10, 2000, however, the prosecution positively alleged
and proved that the questioned demand letter was served upon
the accused on April 10, 2000, that was at the time they were
attending Court hearing before Branch I of this Court. In fact, the
prosecution had submitted a Certification issued by the other Branch of this
Court certifying the fact that the accused were present during the April 10,
2010 hearing. With such straightforward and categorical testimony of the
witness, the Court believes that the prosecution has achieved what was
dismally lacking in the three (3) cases of Betty King, Victor Ting and
Caras evidence of the receipt by the accused of the demand letter sent to
her. The Court accepts the prosecutions narrative that the accused refused to
sign the same to evidence their receipt thereof. To require the prosecution to
produce the signature of the accused on said demand letter would be imposing
an undue hardship on it. As well, actual receipt acknowledgment is not and
has never been required of the prosecution either by law or jurisprudence.
[emphasis supplied]
With the notice of dishonor duly served and disregarded, there arose the
presumption that Mitra and Cabrera knew that there were insufficient funds
to cover the checks upon their presentment for payment. In fact, the account
was already closed.
To reiterate the elements of a violation of BP 22 as contained in the abovequoted provision, the Court said, a violation exists where:
1. a person makes or draws and issues a check to apply on account or for value;
2. the person who makes or draws and issues the check knows at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the full payment of the check upon its presentment; and
3. the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency
of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. [if !
supportFootnotes][8][endif]

The Court added that there was no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and
that the bank dishonored the checks because the account had been closed.
Notice of dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or
make arrangements for their payment within five days from notice. With all
the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal
liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif]

[if !supportLists]6.

[endif]PRAYER.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that after

notice and hearing the respondent be indicted for ESTAFA and VIOLATION
OF B.P. BLG. 22 to protect/preserve the right/interest of the complainant to
recover his claim of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), plus
exemplary damages of P100,000.00, moral damages of
P100,000.00, attorneys fees of P125,000.00 plus 5% of the
recoverable amounts, and costs of suit.
X x x City, October 18, 2011.

Xxx
Complainant
LTO Drivers License No.
__________________
Expiring on _________
Assisted By:
LASERNA CUEVA-MERCADER LAW OFFICES
Counsel for the Complainant
Unit 15, Star Arcade. C.V. Starr Ave.
Philamlife Village, Las Pinas City 1740
Tel. No. 8725443; Fax No. 8462539.
MANUEL J. LASERNA JR.

Roll No. 33640, 4/27/85

IBP Lifetime Member No. 1907
IBP Leyte Chapter
PTR 1016909, 1/7/11, Las Pinas City
MCLE Compliance No. IV-1326, 2/3/11
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before in Muntinlupa City me this ___
day of October 2011, affiant/complainant showing his official identification
document as stated above.
Administering Assistant City Prosecutor

Annexes: A to L, supra.
[if !supportFootnotes]
[endif]
[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif]
Cajigas v. People, G.R. No. 156541,
February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 54, 63.
[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif]
People v. Garin, 476 Phil. 455, 474 (2004);
People v. Samus, 437 Phil. 645, 659 (2002).
[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif]
Gomba v. People, G.R. No. 150536,
September 17, 2008, 565 SCRA 396, 400, citing People v. Magbanua, G.R. No.
133004, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 617, 630.
[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Lozano v. Martinez, 230 Phil. 406, 428 (1986).
[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] Rosario v. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26,
2008, 563 SCRA 239, 253.
[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] 337 Phil. 153, 160 (1997).
[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] American Home Assurance Company v. Chua,
368 Phil. 555, 569 (1999).
[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif] Rigor v. People, 485 Phil. 125, 139 (2004).
[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] In Gosiaco v. Ching, G.R. No. 173807, April 16,
2009, 585 SCRA 471, 483, we held an accused corporate officer free from
civil liability for the corporate debt after the lower court acquitted the accused
of criminal liability under BP 22. Note that this is a totally different case from
the present case as the issue here is both criminal and civil liability.