2014 AND 2015

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON POLITICAL LAW

BY: JACINTO D. JIMENEZ
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
A.

Compliance with Principles of International Law

A taxpayer can avail itself of the preferential tax rates in a tax treaty even if the taxpayer
did not comply with a regulation requiring filing an application for tax relief The obligation to
comply with a tax treaty prevails over the objective of the regulation (CBK Power Company
Limited vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G. R. No 193407, January 14, 2015).
B.

Protection of Family
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act, Section 7 of the law provided that minors will not be allowed access
to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardians
except when the minor is a parent or has a miscarriage. HELD: This is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable institution. It
disregards the constitutional mandate that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character should
receive the support of the Government.
There is no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor under
the exception that will enable her to take care of her body and that of the unborn child. In lifethreatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures, the life of the minor
who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at a grave
risk simply for lack of consent.
The second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(3i) should be struck down. By limiting the
requirement of parental consent to elective surgical procedures, it denies parents their right of
parental authority in cases where what is involved are non-surgical procedures. Save in the
case of the two exceptions and in the case of an abused child, the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA
146)
C.

Protection of Life of Mother

Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. Section 23 (a) (3) of the law provides that a health care service
provider who objects because of religious convictions to render health care services shall be
excused from such obligations, provided the person seeking such service is not in an
emergency condition or serious case. HELD: An exception must be made in life-threatening
cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. The right to life of the mother
should be given preference. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
D.

Protection of Life of Unborn

Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act, because Section 4(a) allows the use of contraceptives. HELD: The
Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. Conception means fertilization of
the ovum by the sperm. Contraceptives which prevent the union of the sperm and the ovum is
constitutionally permissible. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.721 SCRA 146)
E. Protection of Right to Health
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproduction Health Act. The petitioners claimed that it violated the right to health, because it
required the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices and injectibles in the
National Drug Formulatory and the risk of breast and cervical cancer is increased in women
who use oral contraceptives and that the use of contraceptive pills increases the risk of
thromboembolism and stroke. HELD: Republic Act No. 4729 places adequate safeguards to

ensure that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. Contraceptives
can only be dispensed in duly licensed drug stores or pharmaceutical companies and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
II. BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Due Process
Substantive Due Process
a) Police Power
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, for
violation of due process because it is unduly oppressive and infringes the constitutional
prohibition against deprivation of property without due process. They stressed that the law
requires real estate developers to employ real estate brokers to sell, market and dispose of
their properties and real estate developers will have less control in managing their business
and will be burdened with additional expenses. HELD: The contention has no basis. The
requirement of engaging the services of licensed real estate professionals in the sale and
marketing of their properties is an unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory
measure. The proper regulation os a business or trade is a legitimate subject of the exercise of
police power, particularly, when its conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental
functions and public welfare. Where the liberty curtailed affected properly rights, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is much wider. The legislature recognized the
importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners by increasing their
competence and raising ethical standards (Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA 293)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproduction Health Act. The petitioners argued that it violated the constitutional prohibition
against involuntary servitude because it required health care service providers to provide 48
hours of pro bono reproductive health services. HELD: The practice of medicine is imbued with
public interest. It is a power and a duty of the state to regulate and to promote the public
welfare. The provision only encourages government reproductive health care service providers
to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed. This is not an unreasonable burden but a necessary incentive in furtherance of a
legitimate state interest. (Imbong v. Ochoa, 721 SCRA 146)

Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation owned a parcel of land at the right
side of an exit of the North Luzon Expressway. The parcel of land was bounded by an access
fence along the North Luzon Expressway. Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation
requested to be granted on easement of right of way, because the access fence had barred its
entry into and exit from the North Luzon Expressway. The Toll Regulatory Board denied the
request. Hermano Oil Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation filed a case for the grant of an
easement of right of way. It argued that it was denied of its property without due process and
just compensation and was denied equal protection. HELD: The putting up of the fence was a
valid exercise of police power. It did not partake of a compensable taking. The property was
not taken and devoted to public use. Instead, it was subjected to a certain restraint to secure
the general safety of the motorists using the North Luzon Expressway. (Hermano Oil
Manufacturing & Sugar Corporation v. Toll Regulatory Board, 742 SCRA 397)
B. Vagueness and Overbreadth
i.

Presence of Violation

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act authorizes law enforcement authorities,

with due cause, to collect or record by terminal or electronic means traffic data in real time
associated with specific communications transmitted by a computer ystem. Traffic data refer to
the communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying
service, but not content nor identities. The petitioners argued that this violates the right to
privacy. HELD: When seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled and
analyzed, they record patterns of activity which can be used to create profiles of the person
under surveillance. The phrase "with due course does not even relate the collection of data to
the probable cause of a particular crime. The authority it gives law enforcement agencies is too
sweeping. The power is virtually limitless. It threatens the right to privacy. Section 12 cannot be
stricken due for vagueness or overbreadth. It does not regulate or punish any type of speech.
It should be narrowly drawn to prevent abuses. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
ii.

Absence of Violation

Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners argued that it violated due process because of
vagueness, since Section 23(a)(1), which penalizes knowingly withholding information and
providing incorrect information, does not define health care provider and incorrect information.
HELD: Section 4(m) of the law defines a public health service provider. The exemption from
the obligation to render reproductive health services necessarily includes exemption from
being obligated to give reproductive health information. The word incorrect means failing to
coincide with the truth. The word knowingly means intentionally. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721
SCRA 146)
C. Procedural Due Process
i. Absence of Violation
The issuance of a temporary protection order without notice and hearing to the
defendant is valid because of the necessity to protect women and children from violence. (Tua
v. Mangrobang, 714 SCRA 248)
Ray Shu filed a complaint against Jaime Dee, Enriqueto Magpantay, Ramon Miranda,
Larry Maciiian, and Edwin So with the National Bureau of Investigation for falsifying two deeds
of real estate mortgages submitted to the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.
After an investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a complaint against them for
falsification of public documents with the City Prosecutor of Makati.
The respondents argued that they were denied due process during the investigation by
the National Bureau of Investigation, because they and the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company were not required to submit standard sample signatures of Ray Shu for comparison.
HELD: The functions of the National Bureau of Investigation were merely investigatory. It has

no judicial or quasi-judicial powers. No denial of due process could have taken place. (Shu v.
Dee, 723 SCRA 512)
The Ombudsman issued a resolution directing the filing of a criminal case against
Senator Jinggoy Estrada for plunder. He claimed that he was denied due process, because he
was not furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of the other respondents. HELD: There is no
law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counteraffidavits of co-respondents. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212140, January
21, 2015)
ii. The Commission on Elections approved Resolution No 4615, which fixed the airtime
limitation in Section 6 of the Fair Election Act for advertisements of candidates and political
parties to 120 minutes of television advertisements and 180 minutes of radio advertisements
for candidates and political parties for national candidates and 60 minutes of television
advertisements and 90 minutes of radio advertisements for local candidates and political
parties on aggregate basis rather than per station. Radio and television networks questioned
validity of Resolution No. 4615 for being contrary to the purpose of the law. HELD: The law
does not justify the conclusion that the maximum allowable airtime should be based on the
totality of broadcasts in all television and radio station. Resolution 9615 goes against the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech, and of the press. It unduly
restricts the ability of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies,
platforms and programs of government. For absence of a prior hearing the new rule on
aggregate airtime regulation is not valid. (GMA Network, Inc. v. Commision on Elections, 734
SCRA 88)
For failure of the old locators to develop and put to productive use the mineral
properties found in the area, Apo Cement Corporation submitted a mineral production sharing
agreement for the area held of by Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corporation. The Regional Office of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources declared the mining claims abandoned
and open for location to other parties. Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corporation appealed. Misson
Mining Industries Corporation assailed the declarations on the ground that they overlapped
with its own mining claims.
The Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources decreed that
portions of the mining claims be awarded to Mingson Mining Industries Corporation because
they encroached on its claims. Apo Cement Corporation filed a motion for reconsideration. The
Regional Office recommended that the mining claims be awarded to Apo Cement Corporation
subject to the outcome of the appeal of Luzvimin Cebu Mining Corporation. The Panel of
Arbitrators affirmed the orders without requiring the parties to file any pleading or setting the
matter for hearing. HELD: The right of Mingson Mining Industries Corporation to due process
was violated, thereby rendering the decision null and void. (Apo Cement Corporation v.
Mingson Mining Corporation, 740 SCRA 383)
B. Equal Protection
1. Absence of Violation
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, for
violation of equal protection, because it exempted from its coverage natural juridical persons
dealing with their own properties and receivers, trustees and assignees in insolvency
proceedings. HELD: The Real estate developers constitute a sector that employees the largest
number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the number of products
they advertise and sell nationwide. Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions
over their own property, real estate developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the
ordinary course of business. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of
Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA 293)
The officials of the Local Water Utilities Administration sought reimbursement of
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses. They submitted certifications attesting that they
incurred the expenses. The Commission on Audit disallowed the claims, because they were

not supported by receipts and other documents evidencing the disbursements, as required by
COA Circular No. 2006-01 .The officials of the Local Water Utilities Administration claimed that
the circular violated equal protection, because officials of national government agencies were
permitted to claim reimbursements on the basis of certifications. HELD: National Government
Officials are empowered by law to use appropriated funds for emergency and financial
miscellaneous expenses. The exclusion of COA Circular No. 2006-01 is a control measure to
regulate the incurrence of the expenditures and to ensure prevention of irregular expenses.
The government-owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions
appropriate through resolution funds for extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses. The
extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses for national government agencies is provided by
law. There is a reasonable classification which is germane to the purpose of COA Circular No.
2006- 01. (Espinas v. Commision on Audit, 720 SCRA 302)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners claimed that it violated equal protection, because it
targeted the poor for promotion of the use of contraceptives and it excluded private schools
from the mandatory reproductive health education program. HELD: To provide that the poor
are to be given priority in the reproductive health care program is pursuant to Section 11,
Article XIII of the Constitution. It provides that there shall be priority for the needs of the
underprivileged. There is a substantial distinction between public and private schools because
of the academic freedom of private schools, especially with respect to religious instruction.
(Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes the acquisition of domain name
over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from
registering it, if the domain name is:
(i)
Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing registered trademark;
(ii)
Identical or similar with the name of any person other than the registrant, in case
of a personal name; and
(iii)
Acquired without right or with intellectual property interest in it.
The petitioners argued that this violated equal protection, because it will cause a user
using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, spoof, or any other literacy name. HELD: The challenge is baseless.
The law is penalizing acquiring the domain name in bad faith. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice,
716 SCRA 237)
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act makes the commission of crimes penalized
by the Revised Penal Code and special laws through the internet a qualifying circumstance by
making the penalty one degree higher. HELD: There is a substantial distinction between
crimes committed through the use of information and communication technology and similar
crimes using other means. In every cybercrime, the offender often evades identification and is
able to reach more victims or cause greater harm. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA
237)
2. Presence of Violation
Section 5.24 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Reproductive Health Act
provides that public health officers cannot be considered as conscientious objectors. HELD:
This violates the equal protection clause. The protection accorded to conscientious
objectors should apply equally to all medical practitioners. Freedom to believe is intrinsic in
every individual. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. Section 23(a)(3) provides that a conscientious objector because of
religious convictions can refuse to extend health care services to a person seeking care.
Section 5.24 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provided that provincial, city, or
health officers, chiefs of hospitals, head nurses, and supervising midwives cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors. HELD: This is violative of the equal protection clause.
There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The exemption should apply to all medical practitioners without

distinction, whether they belong to the public or private sector. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721
SCRA 146)
The accused was charged with marital rape. His counsel argued that marital rape
should be treated differently from non-marital rape in terms of the elements of the crime and
the rules of proof. HELD: To treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules of proof infringes on the equal
protection clause. (People v. Jumauan, 722 SCRA 108)
John Colcol was adopted by his great grandfather. John Colcol was employed on board
a vessel. He died in an accident. His mother, Bernardina Bartolome, filed a claim for death
benefits with the Social Security System. Her claim was denied on the ground that she was no
longer considered as the legitimate parent of John Colcol because of his objection. HELD:
There is no reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. The classification is
not germane to the law. There is no pressing government interest that requires classification.
The policy of the law is to secure adequate benefits to employees and their dependents in the
event of work-connected death. (Bartolome v. Social Security System, 740 SCRA 78)
D. Searches and Seizures
1. Probable Cause
i. Presence
The National Bureau of Investigation obtained two search warrants to search a
warehouse and an office at the Probest International Trading allegedly owned by Michael Tan
for counterfeit Unilever shampoo products intended to be disposed of in relation of Section
168, in relation to Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code. In the course of their search,
the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation seized sachets containing counterfeit hair
conditioner and shampoo. The National Bureau of Investigation filed a case for unfair
competition.

The respondent claimed that he was Paul Tanand not Michael Tan, that his business
was selling leather goods and materials for leather products, that his business was named
Probest International Trading, that he was not selling counterfeit Unilever shampoo products,
that he did not own or operate the warehouse, and the sachets of Unilever shampoo products
contained genuine shampoo products used for his personal consumption. HELD: The pieces of
evidence were sufficient to form a reasonable ground to believe that Paul Tan committed unfair
competition. First, the huge volume and the location of the shampoo products belie the claim
that they are for personal consumption. Shampoo products for personal consumption are
ordinarily found inside the house. Second, ownership of the warehouses is not crucial to a
finding of probable cause. Third, the striking similarities between the genuine Unilever
shampoo products and the counterfeit sachets support the belief that Paul Tan is distributing
counterfeit Unilever shampoo products. Finally, Paul Tan resumed his operations involving
counterfeit Unilever products. (Unilever Philippines, Inc. v. Tan, 715 SCRA 36)
Microsoft Corporation owned all rights, including copyrights relating to all versions and
editions of Microsoft software and the users manuals and the registered owner in the
Philippines of the trademarks Microsoft" and MS DOS". Adobe Systems, Inc. owned all
rights, including copyrights to all versions and editions of Adobe Software. They were informed
that New Field (Asia Pacific), Inc. was illegally reproducing and using unlicensed versions of
their software. They hired Orion Support, Inc. to verify the information. Orion Support, Inc.
asked two market researchers, Norma Serrano and Michael Morado to confirm the tip.
The two companies also filed a complaint with the Philippine National Police. A police
officer, Ernesto Padilla, was assigned to the case. Using business pretext, the three were able
to use two computers owned by New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc. They discovered that the two
computers were using the same Microsoft and Adobe software, because they were using the
same identification numbers. Since software can be used in one computer only, this indicated
that the software being used was illegally copied. Ernesto Padilla applied for search warrants.
The application was granted. However, later on, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion to
quash the search warrants on the ground that the witnesses had no personal knowledge.
HELD: The three witnesses were able to personally verify the tip of their informant. (Microsoft
Corporation v. Farajallah 735 SCRA 34)
b. Absence
The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company applied for search warrants for theft
against Abigail Razon Alvarez and Vermon Alvarez. Prepaid cards were being sold to Filipinos
abroad. The prepaid cards could be used to make calls which would be received by the
telephone of Abigail Razon Alvarez and Vermon Alvarez, which was equipped to reflect that
the telephone calls originated from a telephone in Metropolitan Manila. The Regional Trial
Court issued two search warrants for theft in violation of Article 308 and 309 of the Revised
Penal Code and two search warrants for installation of telephone connections without the
authority of Philippine Long Distance Company in violation of Presidential Decree No. 401.
HELD: The fact that the printers and scanners may be connected to illegal convertions to the
telephone laws does not make them the subject of the offense, the fruits of the offense, and
the means of committing the offense. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company did not
show that the installation of printers, scanners, diskettes or tapes to a computer, even if
connected with a telephone line, requires its prior authorization. (Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company v. Alvarez, 718 SCRA 94)
Ariel Escobedo was picked up by unknown persons believed to be police officers for
selling drugs. Later on, Jaime dela Cruz demanded money in exchange for his release.
A complaint was filed with the National Bureau of Investigation. Jaime dela Cruz was
nabbed while receiving the marked money. He was required to submit to a urine test for drug
testing. As the test yielded a positive result, he was charged with violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. HELD: A drug test does not cover persons arrested for
unlawful acts but only for unlawful acts under Republic Act No. 9165. Jaime de la Cruz was
arrested for extortion. His urine sample was the only evidence used to convict him for the use

of illegal drugs. The drug test violated his right to privacy. (Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA
655)
2. Particularity of Description
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas applied for warrants to search the offices of
Worldwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation, because they were conducting
illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No.
401.
Jose Enrico Rivera, an employee of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
testified that a legitimate long distance call should pass through the public switch telephone
network and on to the toll center of the international gateway facilities in the Philippines. The
call was then transmitted to the other country through voice destination country. The toll center
would meter the call and pass through the public switch telephone network of the called
number to complete circuit. The two companies that were searched were able to provide
international long distance call services by using the telephone lines of Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company by bypassing its international gateway facilities.
Raymond Gali, another employee of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
testified that a telephone number serviced by it and registered to Worldwide Web Corporation
was used to provide Global Talk, an internet-based international call service, which can be
availed of by prepaid or post-paid accounts. The international call using Global Talk would
bypass the international gateway facilities of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company.
The Regional Trial Court granted the application for search warrants. Over a hundred
items were seized. The two companies moved to quash the search warrants for lack of
probable cause. HELD: Toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls. It
deprives Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company of the compensation to which it is
entitled had the call has been routed through its network. Toll bypass operation constitutes
theft.
Toll bypass operations cannot be accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the telephone lines of Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company. This is violation of Presidential Decree No. 401. (Worldwide Web Corporation v.
People of the Philippines, 713 SCRA 18)
A search warrant was issued for the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation for
theft. Another search warrant for the office premises of Planet Internet Corporation was issued
for violation of Presidential Decree No. 401. Both were issued with Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company as the offended party. Over a hundred items were seized as a result of
the issuance of the search warrants. The two companied argued that the search warrants were
general warrants. HELD: A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the
description of the things to be seized when the things described are limited to those that bear a
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company was able to establish the connection between the items to be
searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of the telephone services and
business. (Worldwide Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines, 713 SCRA 18)
Judge William Simon Peralta issued a search warrant to search three caves in the Land
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Mo-a, Davao City, where the remains of victims summarily
executed by the Davao Death Squad were buried. It was argued that the search warrant did
not particularly describe the things to be seized. HELD: The search warrant particularly
described the place to be searched, the three caves inside the Land Compound, and the
things to be seized, the remains of six victims who were killed and buried in the premises.
(Laud v. People of the Philippines, 741 SCRA 239)
3. Warrantless Search and Seizure
a. Incident of Arrest

A driver of a towing truck asked for police assistance, because the passengers of a
taxicab with which he had a traffic dispute fired their guns at him. The police officers acted on
the complaint and found the taxicab. The two armed men alighted, fired at them, and ran away.
The police officers chased them and subdued them. One of them, Medario Calantiao had in his
possession a black bag. They found marijuana fruiting tops in the bag. Madorio Colantiao
claimed the warrantless seizure was unconstitutional, because it was not in plain view. HELD:
The search and seizure was valid because it was incident to a lawful arrest. (People v.
Colantiao, 727 SCRA 20)
A female informant went with four police officers to conduct an entrapment operation.
When Oliver Edano arrived riding in a wagon, the informant approached and talked to him
inside the wagon. Afterwards, the informant waved to one of the police officers, but this was
not a signal that the sale of drugs had been consummated When the police officer
approached, Oliver Edano ran away. The police officers chased him. One of them grabbed
Oliver Edano and got a plastic bag from his hand. The plastic bag contained
methampethamine hydrochloride. He was arrested and charged with violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. HELD: There was no overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise to arouse the suspicion that Oliver Edano had just committed, was committing or
was attempting to commit a crime. Oliver Edano and the informant were just talking when he
was apprehended. The plastic bag containing white crystalline substance is inadmissible in
evidence, as it came from an invalid search and seizure. (People v. Edano, 729 SCRA 255)
b. Plain view of Prohibited Object
Acting on an information, forest rangers went to the house of Ma. Mimie Cresencio.
They saw forest lawless lying under her house and at the shoreline two meters away from the
house. Ma. Mimie Cresencio admitted ownership of the lumber. The forest rangers entered the
premises without a search warrant. Ma. Mimie Cresencio could not present any receipt for the
purchase of the forest products. She was charged with illegal possession of them. HELD: The
lumber was plainly in sight. The seizure of the lumber fails within the purview of the plain view
doctrine. (Cresencio v. People, 741 SCRA 319)
Unlicensed firearms seized while enforcing a search warrant may be the basis for prosecution
for illegal possession of firearms even if they were not included in the search warrant if they
were found in plain view. (Castro v. People, G.R No 212260 November 26, 2014)
c. Invalid Search and Seizure
Rizaldy Sanchez was charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. One of the arresting police officers testified that he and his companion were
conducting an operation because of information that tricycle drivers were buying drugs in a
certain house, that a tricycle driver with a passenger entered the house, they chased the
tricycle and caught up with it, they requested Rizaldy Sanchez to alight, he was holding a
match box, Rizaldy Sanchez agreed to show its contents, and it contained a regulated drug,
that Rizaldy Sanchez brought to the police station, and a chemist found out that the substance
examined was methamphetamine hydrochloride. HELD: Neither the in flagrante arrest nor the
stop-and-frisk principle is applicable to justify the warrantless search and seizure. For the
arrest to be lawful, it must precede the search. In this case, the search preceded the arrest.
The circumstances do not justify a stop- and-frisk search. Coming out from the house of the
pusher and boarding a tricycle, were innocuous movements and they themselves could not
give rise to any belief that Rizaldy Sanchez had methamphetamine hydrochloride in his
possession.
The seizure could not be considered as seizure in plain view. The methamphetamine
hydrochloride was not inadvertently discovered. It was not plainly exposed to sight. It was
inside a match box. (Sanchez v. People, 741 SCRA 294)

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act authorizes the Secretary of Justice to restrict or
block access to computer data found to be in violation of the law. The petitioners argued that
this violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD: Section 19
precludes judicial intervention. It disregards guidelines to determine the validity of restrictions
on speech. It violates the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against
unreasonable searches and seizures. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
4. Warrantless Arrest
a. Void Warrantless Arrest
Because of a text message that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana,
the police officers set up a checkpoint. When a passenger jeepney arrived at the checkpoint,
the driver disembarked and signaled that the two male passengers were carrying marijuana.
The police officer questioned the two passengers, Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao about
the contents of the bags. They answered that they did not know, because they were
transporting the bags as a favor for Marvin. When the bags were opened, marijuana bricks
were found inside. Victor Cogaed and Santiago Dayao were charged with illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. The case against Santiago Dayao was dismissed, because he was only 14
years old. HELD: Victor Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and travelling aboard
a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious about this. The assessment of suspicion was not
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It is the police officer who should observe
facts that would lead to a reasonable suspicion of a person. (People v. Cogaed, 731 SCRA
427)
The police officers manning a checkpoint observed that the motor vehicle which
Edmund Sydeco was driving was swerving. They flagged down the vehicle asked him to alight
from the vehicle. Because of an altercation, the police officers arrested Edmund Sydeco and
charged him with driving under the influence of liquor. HELD: Swerving does not necessarily
constitute reckless driving. A willful and reckless disregard of the consequences is required.
When he was flagged down, Edmund Sydeco had not committed a crime or performed an
overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. (Sydeco v. People of the
Philippines, 740 SCRA 288)
b. Valid Warrantless Arrest
Atty. Moreno Generoso called a police station to report an altercation between him and
five persons. The desk officer dispatched a police officer to proceed to the scene of the crime.
Together with another police officer and an airman, he arrived at the scene of the crime less
than an hour after the altercation. They saw Atty. Moreno Generoso badly beaten. He pointed
to the five persons as the ones who mauled him. Two police officers brought them to the police
station. HELD: The phraseology of Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires for warrantless arrest probable cause, immediacy of the arrest, and
personal knowledge of the facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it.
The warrantless arrest took place less than an hour from the time of the commission of the
crime The police officers personally observed the bruises of Atty. Moreno Generoso. He
positively identified the persons who mauled him, and the two of them admitted that Atty.
Moreno Generoso suffered bruises, although they invoked self-defense. The warrantless arrest
of the perpetrators was proper. (Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337)
c. Private Parties
The constitutional guaranty against illegal searches and seizures does not apply against
private parties. (Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, 720 SCRA 107)
d. Absence of Search and Seizure

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that when a search warrant has
been properly issued, law enforcement authorities shall have the power:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

To make and retain a copy of the computer data;
To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
To conduct forensic examination of the computer data storage medium; and
To render inaccessible or remove the computer data in the accessed computer
or computer and communications network.

The petitioners argued that this supplants the search and seizure procedure. HELD:
Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of the enforcement authorities to insure the proper
collection, preservation, and use of the computer system or data. It does not supersede search
and seizure rules but merely supplements them. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA
237)
D. Freedom of Speech and of the Press
a. Scope of Protection
Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act prohibits the transmission of
commercial electronic communication with the use of a computer system to advertise, sell or
offer for sale products and services unless:
(i)
There was prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii)
The primary intent is for service and/or administrative announcements from the
sender to the users, subscribers or customers;
(iii)
The following conditions are present:
(a) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic
messages from the same source,
(b) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and
(c) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include
misleading information to induce the recipients to read the message.
The Solicitor General argued that spams waste the storage and natural capacities
internet service process, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology; interferes with
the peaceful enjoyment by the owner of his property; and transmitting spams amount to
violation of privacy. HELD: Even before the arrival of the age of computers, people have been
receiving unsolicited ads by mail. The recipients always have the option to delete or not read
them. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads will violate the right to read emails, even
unsolicited ads. Commercial speech is entitle to protection. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716
SCRA 237)
Bishop Vicente Navarra posted in the compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
a tarpaulin which listed the names of the legislators who voted against the Reproductive Health
Law and the names of the legislators who voted in favor of it. The Law Department of the
Commission on Elections ordered it removed, because it exceeded the size of election
propaganda allowed by the Commission on Election. HELD: Speech is not limited to vocal
communication; Freedom of information applies to the entire continuum of speech.
The form of expression is just important as the information it conveys. A larger tarpaulin
allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages. The size of the tarpaulin may
underscore the importance of the message. Larger spaces allow for more messages. Large
tarpaulins are not analogous to time and place.
Freedom of expression relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.

Expression is a marker for group identity. Free speech must be protected as a vehicle to
find those who have similar values and ideas. Free speech is intended to protect minorities
against majority abuses perpetrated through the framework of democratic government. Lastly,
free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. Non-violent manifestation of
dissent reduces the likelihood of violence. To prevent people from resorting to violence there is
a need for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent.
Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoy a high degree of
protection. The petitioners invoke their constitutional right to communicate their openness
about issues and candidates. The tarpaulin was their statement of approval of public officials
who voted against the RH bill and their criticism of those who voted in its favor Political speech
refers to speech intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some
issues, fostering informed and civic-minded deliberation. The expresion resulting from the
content of the tarpaulin is political speech. The tarpaulin was not posted in return for
consideration from any candidate, political party or party-list group. Speech with political
consequences is not the core of freedom of expression. The regulation involved in the case is
content-based.
Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin is not regulation unrelated to suppression of
speech.
The tarpaulin remains private property. Their right to use their property or protected by
the Constitution.
The position of the Catholic religion as regards the RH Law does not suffice to quality it
as religious speech. The enumeration of the candidates shows that it is a speech of political
consequences. (Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 205728, January 21,
2015)
2. Overbreadth Doctrine
a. Presence
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes abetting or aiding in the
commission of any offense enumerated in the law or attempting to commit any offense
enumerated in the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The petitioners argued that Section 5 is
overbroad. HELD: Penalizing, aiding or abetting wrongdoings on line threatens the popular and
unchallenged dogmas or cyberspace use. Two of the more popular social networking sites are
Facebook and Twitter.
A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook. If the post is made
available to the public, anyone can react by clicking "Like to specify he likes the posting.
"Comment enables him to post on line his feelings or views. "Share makes it visible to his
friends.
On the other hand, Twitter is an internet social networking and microblogging service
that enables users to send and read short text-based messages. These are "Tweets".
"Microblogging is the posting of small pieces of digital content. A twitter user can make his
tweets available only to his Followers", those who subscribed to his posts, or to the general
public.
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest are knee-jerk
sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the posting.
Unless the law takes to account the unique circumstances and culture of cyberspace, such a
law will create a chilling effect in the millions that use this new medium of communication in
violation of their freedom of expression.

The term aiding or abetting constitutes a broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace. Section 5 which punishes aiding or
abetting libel on the cyberspace is void.
In regard to child pornography, when Google facilitates the dissemination of child
pornography, does this make Google and the users, aiders and abettors in child pornography
crimes? When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he republishes it.
Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child pornography? The
legislature should address this clearly to relieve users of fear of criminal prosecution. Section
4(c)(2) on child pornography cannot stand scrutiny. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA
237)
b. Absence
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes the intentional or recklessalteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic documents, or
electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of virus. The
petitioners claimed that this is overbroad. HELD: It does not encroach on freedom of speech. It
simply penalizes a form of vandalism. There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer
systems and their private documents. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice 716 SCRA 237)
Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes access to the whole or any
part of a computer system without right. The petitioners argued that it failed to meet the strict
scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with fundamental rights. HELD: No
fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing a universally condemned act accessing the computer system of another without right. HELD: The charge of invalidity
because of overbreadth is baseless, since the penalized conducts do not intrude into freedom
of speech. There is no right to acquire the personal data of another. (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
c. Absence of Prior Restraint
Section 4(c)(1) penalizes cybersex. The petitioners claim that this violates freedom of
expression, because private communication of sexual character between spouses or
consenting adults would become a crime. HELD: The element of engaging in a business is
necessary to constitute illegal cybersex. The law seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white
slave trade, and pornography for consideration. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
Section 5 penalizes any person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempt
to commit a cybercrime. The petitioners assailed its constitutionality from being overbroad.
HELD: The crime of aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime under Section 5 should
be punishable to offenses that do not involve freedom of expression, under Section 4(a)(1) on
illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on illegal Interference, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5)*on Misuse of Devices. Section 4(a)(6)
on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer- related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on computer- related Identity Theft, and Section
4(c)(1) on Cybersex. For the same reason, the crime of willfully attempting to commit any of
these offenses is not objectionable. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
Resolution No. 9615, required that all political parties, party-list groups or coalition and
candidates are granted the right to reply to the charges against them. The television and radio
stations argued that this constituted a prior restraint. HELD: The Constitution itself provides for
a right to reply. (GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA 88)
To enable the Commission on Elections to ensure that political parties and candidates
are afforded equal opportunities, the television and radio stations were required to give it prior
notice of advertisements. The television and radio stations argued that this constituted prior
restraint. HELD: The requirement is a reasonable means to ensure that political parties and

candidates are afforded equal opportunities to promote their candidacy. It cannot be

characterized as prior restraint. (GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 734 SCRA
88)
5. Valid Limitation
a. Libel
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act incorporated the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on libel. The petitioners argue that violated freedom of expression. HELD:
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and the government has an obligation to protect
private individuals from defamation. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice 716 SCRA 237)
b. Equality of Political Opportunity
A petition to disqualify Emilio Ramon Ejercito as candidate for governor was filed on the
ground that he exceeded the maximum allowable election expenses that a candidate for
governor can render. Emilio Ramon Ejercito argued that the inclusion in the computation of the
contributions of his donors violated their freedom of speech. HELD: As a content-neutral
regulation, the concern of the law is not to curtail the content of the advertisements promoting
a particular candidate but to ensure equality among candidates. Any restrictions in speech
merely incidental to the achievements of the governmental interest of promoting equality of
opportunity in political advertisement. It bears a reasonable connection with the objectives set
out in Section 26. Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Article XIII of the
Constitution. (Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 742 SCRA 210)
E. Freedom of Religion
1. Prohibition against Establishment of Religion
a. Presence of Violation
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act, Section 10 of the law required the Department of Health to procure
and distribute to local government units family planning supplies. The petitioners argued that
the expenditures of taxes on contraceptives violates religious freedom, because the use of
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. HELD: Because of the prohibition against the
establishment of religion, religious sects cannot cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone. Petitioners are erroneous in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the promotion of the use of
contraceptives, because it is contrary to their religious beliefs. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 721
SCRA 146)
b. Absence of Violation
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen went to Sta. Rosa Catholic Church to get married.
As they did not have a marriage license, the priest refused to solemnize their marriage. The
couple proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, an Aglipayan Church. They
requested Rene Romulo to perform a ceremony. He agreed although he was informed that the
couple had no marriage license. Rene Romulo was charged with violation of Article 352 of the
Revised Penal Code for performing an illegal marriage. He argued that he merely blessed the
couple and that because of the separation of church and state, the state could not interfere in
ecclesiastical affairs and convert the blessing into a marriage ceremony. HELD: Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that no particular form for the solemnization of marriage is required.
Article 3(3) of the Family Code defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two
witnesses of legal age. The prosecution proved these requirements. The principle of
separation of church and state does not preclude the state from qualifying the blessing as a
marriage ceremony. This principle was preserved when Article 6 of the Family Code provided

that no prescribed form for the solemnization of marriage is required. (Romulo v. People, 728
SCRA 675)
2. Free Exercise of Religious Freedom
a. Absence of Violation
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. Section 15 of the law provides that no marriage license shall be
issued unless the applicants present a certificate from the Family Planning Office stating that
they had received adequate information on family planning. Petitioners denied that the
requirement violates the freedom of religion of individuals by forcing them to participate in the
implementation of the law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. HELD: Those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to
accept the information and retain the freedom to reject the information. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,
721 SCRA 146)
b. Presence of Violation
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproduction Health Act. Section 23(a)(3) of the law provides that if a health care service
provider objects because of religious convictions to render reproductive health procedures, he
shall immediately refer the person seeking such care and services to another health care
service provider. HELD: The obligation to refer imposed by the law violates the religious belief
and convictions of the conscientious objectors. In case of conflict between the religious beliefs
and moral convictions of individuals and the interest of the State to provide access to
reproductive health services, the religious freedom of the health care provider should be
accorded primacy. There is no more compelling State interest which can limit the freedom of
religion of the conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to the life or health of the
person seeking such services. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
The petitioners claimed that the promotion by the Reproductive Health Act of the use of
contraceptives violates their religious freedom, because it is against their religious belief.
HELD: The petitioners cannot cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as
policy for everyone, because the promotion of the use of contraceptives is contrary to their
religious beliefs. To do so will cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and establish a
state religion.
Sections 7, 23 and 24 of the Reproductive Health Act requires a hospital or a medical
practitioner to refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another
accessible health care provider in case of conscientious objections based on religious belief.
The obligation violates the religious belief of a conscientious objector.
The guarantee of religious freedom is intertwined with the right of free speech, it being
an externalization of ones conscience. This includes the right to be silent.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
operated by a religious group or health care service providers.
In case the free exercise of religious freedom is burdened by government legislation,
the claim of a conscientious objector to religious freedom warrants an exemption unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest. The plea of the
conscientious objector for exemption deserves strict scrutiny. There is no more compelling
state interest which would limit the freedom of religion of the conscientious objector. There is
no immediate danger to life or health. A couple who plans the birth of their children refers to a
future event and that is contingent. The burden placed on the conscientious objector is
immediate.
An exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
emergency procedures. The right to life of the mother should be given preference

Requiring receipt of instructions and information on responsible parenthood, and family

planning as a condition for the issuance of a marriage is a reasonable exercise of police
power. No religious freedom is violated. Those who receive the information are free to reject
the information and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
F. Prohibition against Impairment of Obligation of Contract
Pryce Corporation filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. The Regional Trial Court
gave due course to the petition. The rehabilitation receiver submitted an amended
rehabilitation plan. The Regional Trial Court approved it. It also identified the assets to be held
and disposed by Pryce Corporation and the manner by which the liabilities would be paid. The
Order provided that the indebtedness to China Banking Corporation would be paid by dacion
en pago of developed real estate assets of Pryce Corporation. China Banking Corporation
contended that the approval without its consent impaired the obligation of contract. HELD: This
case does not involve a law or executive issuance declaring the modification of the contract.
Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. The non-impairment clause must yield
to the police power of the State. Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will
benefit its debtors, creditors, employees and the economy in general. (Pryce Corporation v.
China Banking Corporation, 716 SCRA 207)
This ruling was reiterates in Victorio-Aquino v. Pacific Plans, Inc., G.R. No. 193108,
December 10, 2014)
G. Rights During Investigation
1. Applicability
Mark Jason Chavez was charged with robbery with homicide. He voluntarily
surrendered to the police station. He was investigated without the presence of counsel in
connection with the offense he was suspected to have committed. HELD: Even those who
voluntarily surrendered to a police officer are covered by the right to counsel. However, the
evidence sufficiently proves that Mark Jason Chavez is guilty of homicide and not robbery with
homicide. (People v. Chavez, 735 SCRA 728)
2. Inapplicability
The rights under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights are not applicable to administrative
investigations. (Anonymous Complaint against Lyn Maceda, 720 SCRA 27; Luspo v. People,
739 SCRA 133; De Castro v. People of the Philippines, G R No. 171672, February 2, 2015.
H. Right of the Accused
1. Right to be Informed
Venancio Sevilla, a city councilor, was charged with falsification of public documents,
because he stated in his personal data sheet that he had no pending criminal case when in
fact he had a pending criminal case for assault upon an agent of a person in authority. The
Sandiganbayan convicted him of falsification of a public document, through reckless
imprudence, because he did not act with malicious intent Venancio Sevilla argued that his
conviction violated his right to be informed. HELD: Reckless imprudence resulting the
falsification of public document is included in willful falsification of public documents, because
the latter is a greater offense. (Sevilla v. People, 732 SCRA 687)
Police officers found Chi Chan Liu and Lui Lao Cheng on board a speed boat with
plastic bags containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. They were charged with illegal
importation of the methamphetamine hydrochloride. HELD: In the absence of proof that it
was imported from a foreign port, the accused cannot be convicted of illegal importation of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, they are not tree from criminal liability for illegal
possession of it is an element of and is necessarily included in its illegal importation.

Convicting the accused of illegal possession does not violate their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them (People v Chi Chan Liu G.R No 189272,
January 21. 2015)
2. Right to Speedy Trial
Three cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Big 22 was filed against William Co. It was
provisionally dismissed on June 9. 2003 because of the absence of the complainant and the
private counsel On July 2, 2004, the private counsel filed a motion for revival of the cases. The
motion was granted Because the judge trying the case granted the motion of William Co for his
inhibition, the case was re-raffled. On July 13, 2006, William Co moved that the dismissal of
the case be made permanent because of violation of his right to a speedy trial. HELD: The
argument is untenable William Co failed to show that the delay was attended with malice or
that it was without good cause. The issues raised in the motion were earlier raised before the
Supreme Court and were resolved by it with finality (Co v. New Property Plastic Products, 727
SCRA 503)
Segundo Bonsubre. Inc. filed a criminal case against Erwin Yerro Enrico Yerro, and
Ritchie Yerro. The private prosecutor informed the court of the on-going negotiation for
settlement and undertook to file the necessary motion. The court gave the prosecution ten
days to file the motion Although the parties reached a compromise agreement on the civil
aspect, the prosecution did not furnish the court a copy of it and did not file the promised
motion The court dismissed the case for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial
for failure of the prosecution to comply with the order of the court to submit the necessary
motion even when Erwin Yerro Enrico Yerro. and Ritchel Yerro failed to pay all the 36 monthly
installments. Segundo Bonsubre, Jr failed to prosecute the case. Such inordinate and
unjustified delay violated their right to speedy trial. (Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro. G.R. No. 205952.
February 11, 2015)
3. Right Against Self-Incrimination
Subjecting the hands of the accused to a paraffin test does not violate his right against
self-incrimination, because their right applies only to testimonial compulsion (People v Fieldad.
737 SCRA 455)
I. Right Against Disproportionate Penalty
Lito Corpus offered to seil on commission basis the pieces of jewelry worth P98,000.00
which Danito Tangcog was selling. He agreed. They agreed that Lito Corpus would remit the
proceeds of the sale within 60 days or return the unsold items. As Lito Corpus did not remit the
proceeds of the sale or return the pieces of jewelry. Damlo Tangcog filed a criminal complaint
against him for estafa.
The Regional Trial Court convicted Lito Corpus and imposed a penalty of 14 years and
8 months of reclusion temporal and four years and two months of prision correccional as
minimum. He appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction but reduced the penalty
to 8 years of prision mayor plus 1 year for each additional PI 0,000 as maximum and four
years and two months of prision correccional as minimum There seemed to be an injustice
because the penalties for crimes against property are based on the value of property in 1932
HELD: The Supreme Court cannot modify the range of penalties, because that would
constitute judicial legislation. Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, an amicus curiae, argued that the
incrimental penalty provided under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code violates equal
protection. The incremental penalty does not rest on substantial distinctions,' as P10,000 might
have been substantial in the past but it is not so today. A person who steals P142.000.00
would receive the same penalty as someone who steals hundred of millions of pesos. The
propositions pose more questions than answers. What then is the penalty in case the amount
of the subject matter of the crime exceeds P22.000.00? (Corpuz v. People, 724 SCRA 1)
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes child pornography. The
petitoners claimed that this merely expanded the scope of. the Anti-Child Pornography Act.

HELD: The definition of child pornography in the Anti-Child Pornography Act already includes
the use of electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means. The law makes
the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in Cyberspace. The duration of
the penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for a higher penalty
because of a potential for uncontrolled proliferation of child pornography (Disini v. Secretary of
Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act prescribed severe penalties for deterious
cybercrimes. HELD: The fixing of penalties for a crime is a legislative prerogative. They are
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
J. Prohibition against Double Jeopardy
1. Lack of Jurisdiction
'
Two informations were filed against Bonificio Sumbilla and Aderito Yujuico for violation of
Section 74 of the Corporation Code. They filed a motion to dismiss the cases on the ground
that their refusal to turn over the stock and transfer books was not a criminal offense. The
Metropolitan Trial Court denied the motion. The accused filed a petition for certiorari in the
Regional Trial Court. It ordered the dismissal of the case. The complainant appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Metropolitan Trial Court dismissed the case because of the order of the
Regional Trial Court. Upon learning that the order of the Regional Trial Court was appealed to
the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan Trial Court recalled the dismissal of the case. The
accused claimed double jeopardy. HELD: From the moment the issue of probable cause was
elevated to the Supreme Court, the Metropolitan Trial Cgurt had no authority to act on the
issue It acted without jurisdiction when it issued the order of dismissal (Quiambao v. People,
735 SCRA 345)
2. Identity of Offenses ,
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that prosecution under it shall be .without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code of special
laws. It is claimed that this violates the prohibition against double jeopardy. HELD: A single set
of facts may be penalized simultaneously under a special law and the Revised Penal Code.
This does not apply to libel and child pornography. In Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
and Section 40(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the elements of the offenses are the
same. Section 49c)(4) merely establishes the computer system as another means of
publication. The same is true with child pornography. The offenses of child pornography in the
Anti-Child Pornography Act already covers, the use of electronic, mechanical, digital, optional,
magnetic or any other means. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
Atty. Segundo Bonsubre, Jr. filed a criminal case for estafa against Erwin Yerro, Enrico
Yerro, and Ritchie Yerro. The private prosecutor told the court that there was an on-going
settlement between the parties and that they would file the necessary motion. In an order
issued on September 1,2 2000, the court gave the parties ten days to file the corresponding
motion. Although a compromise agreement on the civil aspect of the parties was reached, the
private prosecutor did not furnish the court a copy of it and did not file the necessary motion.
On September 18, 2001, the court issued an order directing the parties to comply with the
earlier order and to prosecute the case. On June 15, 2004, a new lawyer filed a motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the case. HELD: The dismissal was grounded on violation
of the right of the accused to speedy trial for failure to prosecute. The dismissal has the effect
of the acquittal and will bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.
(Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro, G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015)
3. Review of Acquittal
a. Prohibition
The acquittal of the accused cannot be questioned by filing a petition for review on the
ground of grave error in the evaluation of the evidence. (Villareal v. Aliga, 713 SCRA 52)
b. Allowance

The Orient Commercial Banking Corporation appeared to have granted loans to

Timmys, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. The proceeds of the loan were released in the form of
managers checks. The checks were deposited in the savings account of Jose Go with Orient
Commercial Banking Corporation and were automatically transferred to his current account.
Two cases of estafa through falsificaiton of commercial documents were filed against him.
After the prosecution rested its cases, Jose Go filed a demurrer to evidence. The
Regional Trial Court granted it. The prosecution questioned the acquittal of Jose Go by filing a
petition for certiorari. HELD: The managers checks were deposited in the savings account of
Jose Go at Orient Commercial Banking Corporation although he was not the payee, and the
money was used to fund his seven personal checks. Jose Go misappropriated the funds for his
own use. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where there is evidence of
misappropriation.
Simulating loan documents and counterfeiting the signatures of the payees constitute
falsification of commercial documents. The evidence shows that Jose Ong had a direct hand in
the falsification and creation of fictitious loans. The act of the trial court was so patent and
gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty. (People v. Go, 732 SCRA 216)
The complainant told her father that she would attend a graduation party with her
friends. After eating, one of them suggested that they go to the nearby Alsons Palace. They
went inside and engaged in a drinking spree. The Regional Trial Court convicted three of the
accused of rape. One appeal, the Court of Appeals acquitted the accused on the ground that
the complainant, consented to the sexual intercourse and was aware of what the accused
were doing. The private counsel of the complainant questioned the acquittal by filing a petition
for certiorari in the Supreme Court. HELD: The Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of
discretion. It merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and the narration of facts
was simply lifted from the testimonies of the accused as though they were the established
facts of the case, the decision utterly disregarded the evidence of the prosecution. The blatant
disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias in the favor of the evidence of the
defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of the right of the
complainant to due process. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the
accused had the burden to prove their defense. They failed to discharge the burden. The
complainant was seriously intoxicated and could not have given a valid consent. (People v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015)
K. Prohibition against Ex-Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
1. Ex-Post Facto Law
Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Ombudsman, 740 SCRA 368 ruled
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, which extended the prescriptive period for violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act to 15 years, cannot be applied retroactively to crimes
committed before the effectivity.
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provided the failure to comply with the
provisions of Chapter IV regarding orders from law enforcement authorities should be
punished as obstruction of justice under Presidential Decree No. 1829. The petitioners allege
that this is a bill of attainder. HELD: there will be a judicial determination of guilt. The provision
is valid. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice 716 SCRA 237)
L. Writ of Amparo
Edita Burgos, the mother of Jonas Joseph Burgos, filed a petition for a writ of amparo
because of the disaaperance of her son. HELD: In view of the final ruling of the Court of
Appeals to which the case was referred, that confirmed the validity of the writ of amparo and
the determination of the entities responsible for the enforced disappearance of Joseph Jonas
Burgos, the petition should be denied. (Burgos vs. Esperon, Jr., 715 Sera 208)

Maria Cristina Yusay Caram gave birth to a child out of wedlock. She surrendered the
baby to the Department of Social Welfare and Development. Later on, she decided to get back
the baby. The Department of Social Welfare and Development declared the baby legally
available for adoption. To stop the adoption, Maria Christina Yusay Caram filed a petition for a
writ of amparo. HELD: The writ of amparo covers extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats of them. There was no enforced disappearance of the baby. (Caram
vs. Segui, 732 SCRA 86).
M. Writ of Habeas Data
Nenita Julia Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara, both minor students of St. Theresas
College, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their brassieres while changing into
swimsuits for a beach party. Angela Tan uploaded the pictures on her Facebook profile. When
a teacher learned of the pictures, her students logged in to their Facebook accounts and
shared her photographs of Nenita Julia Daluz and Julienne Vida Suzara. Their parents filed a
petition for a writ of habeas data. They asked that St. Theresas College be ordered to
surrender all copies of the digital images of their children and declare that they were illegally
obtained in violation of the right to privacy of their Children. HELD: The applicability of the writ of
habeas data is not limited to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It can be availed
of as a remedy to enforce the right to informational privacy. The writ of habeas data is a
protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting or storing data about the aggrieved party, his
correspondences, or his family. It is not necessary that the activity be done in pursuit of a
business.
Having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with
engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in online social network. Before
one can have an expectation of privacy in his online social network, the user must manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private through the use of measures to prevent access to it or to
limit the visibility In the absence of proof that the children positively limited the disclosure of the
photographs, they cannot invoke the protection attached to informational privacy. (Vivares vs.
St. Theresas College, 727 SCRA 92).
Neri Ilagan and Joy Margate Lee once lived in a common-law relationship. Once Neri
Ilagan visited Joy Margate Lee in her office. When he returned to his office, he noticed that his
digital camera was missing. Joy Margate Lee confronted Neri Ilagan about a sex video
involving another woman she discovered from the camera. She used it as evidence in various
criminal complaints she filed against Neri Ilagan.
Neri Ilagan filed a petition for a writ of habeas data. He claimed that the reproduction of
the video and its uploading to the internet violated his right to life, liberty, security and privacy.
Joy Margate Lee contended that the petition was merely filed to suppress the evidence against
him in the cases he filed and that she was not engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data
regarding Neri Ilagan. HELD: The petition for a writ of habeas data should allege how the right
to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security' of the
aggrieved party. Neri Ilagan did not sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or
security would be violated through the production and dissemination of the video. (Lee v.
Hagan, 738 SCRA 59)
Sandra Cam alleged that from April 30, 2014 to May 3,2014, motor vehicles without
plate numbers conducted surveillance around Nazareth Institute of Alfonso, a school she
mahaged and where she lived. Alex Almario, an Assistant Secretary in the Department of
Agrarian Reform, requested to talk to her about an alleged list of cabinet officials and
legislators involved in the pork barrel scam. Sandra Cam filed a petition for habeas data.
HELD: The petition should be dismissed. The allegations of surveillance are inadequate to
merit the issuance of the writ of habeas data, which is reserved for serious and credible
threats to the right to privacy in relation to the right to life, liberty or security.
First, Sandra Cam did not establish that Alex Almario was behind the surveillance over
her person. Second, the right of Alex Almario to meet with Sandra Cam does not involve a

threat to her right to privacy. Third, the writ of habeas data is a remedy against a person or
entity engaged in collecting or storing data regarding the person, family, or home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. The functions of Alex Almario do not involve this. The
information allegedly being gathered does not concern Sandra Cam. Fourth, nowhere was it
alleged that Alex Almario was in charge, in possession or in control of the data. Finally, the
allegation that the right of the person to information regarding the list of officials involved in the
pork barrel scam is outside the ambit of the writ of habeas data. (Cam v. Almario, G.R. No.
212174, October 14, 2014)
N. Writ of Kalikasan
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority entered into a contract for the construction of a
coal-fired power plant in Subic. The Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued
an environment compliance certificate for the project. The opposite filed 9 petitions for a writ of
kalikasan against the project on the ground that it would cause environmental damages and
pollution. HELD: To avail of the writ of kalikasan, the following requisites must be present: (1)
there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual and entity; and (3) the actual or threatened
violation involved or will lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The reliefs that may be granted include the following:
1) Permanently .ceasing and desisting from acts or neglecting a duty in violation of
environmental laws resulting Jn environmental damage;
2) Directing protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment;
3) Directing monitoring of strict compliance with the court decision or order;
4) Directing periodic reports on execution of the final judgment; and
5) Other reliefs relating to the right to a balanced and healthful ecology or protection,
preservation or restoration of the environment, except award of damages.
If no causal link was proven between defects in issuance of the environment compliance
certificate and actual or threatened violation of right to balanced and healthful ecology of the
contemplated magnitude, the petition should be dismissed.
Lack of approval by concerned sanggunians and the lack of certification of absence of
overlapping with environmental damage, without connection to environmental damages, would
result in writ of kalikasan but resort to remedies from proper administrative bodies.
The signing of the Statement of Accountability is a significant component of the
Environmental Implementation Accountability Process. The purpose is to bind the project
proponent to the Environment Compliance Certificate conditions, which will ensure the project
will not cause significant negative environmental impact by the implementation of specified
measures to comply with .environmental regulation. The signature of the representative of the
project, proposed is necessary for validity of the Environment Compliance Certificate.
The Environment Impact Assessment process is mandatory for projects that may affect the
quality of the environment. It involves predicting the likely impact of the project on the
environment, designing preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures.
When a new Environment Impact Assessment was required because of amendments, to
the Environment Compliance Certificate, the amendments are valid.
The Environment Compliance Certificate does not of itself authorize the implementation of
a project. It is intended to provide guidance to government agencies which have the final
authority to grant permits.
Even if an indigenous community does not reside in a proposed lease site, a Certificate of
No Overlap with ancestral domain is required to prevent implementation of a project which may
impair the rights of indigenous people to their ancestral domains. It is not inapplicable before

the issuance of the Environment Clearance Certificate. It may be obviously inapplicable to the
planned lease.
Prior approval of the concerned sanggunian is not required, before the issuance of
Environment Compliance Certificate, because its issuance does not by itself result in
implementation of the project. The law provides that local government units do not release that
basic autonomy in matters falling under the power of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority. The
power to approve projects is one such power. (Paje v. Casino, G.R. No. 20757, February 3,
2015)
III. CITIZENSHIP
Renato David migrated to Canada and became a Canadian citizen by naturalization.
Upon his retirement, he and his wife returned to the Philippines. On 2004, he bought a parcel
of land in Oriental Mindoro and constructed a house on it. When he discovered that the parcel
of land Was public land, on April 12, 2007 he applied to lease it from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. He stated in his application that he was a Canadian
citizen. Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that he was a Canadian citizen.
She also filed a case against him for falsification of public documents. On October 11, 2007,
he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause to file a case against Renato David for
falsification of a public document. The application of Renato David was rejected on the ground
that his re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his application. HELD:
Under Republic Act No. 9225, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization
in a foreign country before the effectivity of the law, shall re-acquire their Philippine citizenship
upon taking of an oath of allegiance. Natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a
foreign country after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the same oath. Since Renato David became a naturalized citizen of a foreign
country before the effectivity of the law, he re-acquired his Filipino citizenship when he took his
oath of allegiance. Renato David made an untruthful statement in a public document when he
stated that he was a Filipino citizen at the time of its filing. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No. 199113,
March 18, 2015)
IV. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
A. Delegation of Rule-Making Power
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Prevention Law created the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center for policy coordination among concerned agencies and
for the formulation of a national cyber security plan and extend immediate assistance in case
of commission of cybercrimes through a computer emergency response team. The petitioners
contended that this was an invalid delegation of power to the Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center. HELD: The law is complete when it directed the Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center to formulate and implement a national cyber security plan. This is
consistent with the policy to prevent and combat cyber offenses by facilitating the detection,
investigation, and prosecution and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable operations.
This policy is adopted in the interest of law and order. That has been considered a sufficient
standard. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
The petitioners claimed that the power delegated to the Food and Drug Authority to
determine whether or not a supply or of product should be included in the Essential Drug Law
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. HELD: From the declared policy,
Congress intends that the public be given only medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
B. Title of Bill
Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, is entitled An Act Regulating the
Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other

Purposes. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association claimed that Republic Act No. 9646 is unconstitutional, because the requirement
that partnerships and corporations engaged in the marketing or selling of real estate
development projects in the regular course of business are required to be handled by full-time,
registered and licensed real estate brokers and this is not reflected in the title. HELD: Republic
Act No. 9646 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution scheme. The
inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the primary goal of the law of developing a
corps of technically competent, responsible and respected real state service practitioners
whose standards of procedure shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the
real estate industry., Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails
the performance of the acts and transactions defined as real estate practices under Section
3(g) of Republic Act No. 9696, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to
professionalize the entire real estate sector. (Remman Enterprises Inc. v. Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA 293)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Act on
the ground that it violated the constitutional requirement that a bill should contain only one
subject which must be expressed in its title. HELD: The objective of the law is to reduce the
number of births in the country. A large portion of the law covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically safe, non-safe reproductive health care
services, methods, devices and medically safe, non-abortifacient, effective legal, affordable,
and quality reproductive health care services, nullified devices and supplies which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy. The other provisions, such as those on skilled birth
attendance, maternal care and prevention and management of reproductive tract infections are
already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women. (Imbong v. Ochoa,. Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners contested that it violated the constitutional
requirement that a bill should have only one subject. HELD: Reproductive Health and
responsible parenthood are inter-related and germane to the objective to control the population
growth. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
C. Augmentation of Appropriation
The Department of Budget and Management pooled unprogrammed funds, savings
from unreleased appropriations, unreleased appropriations from slow-moving projects and
discontinued projects; and withdrawal of unobligated allotments released for slow- moving
programs and projects and used them for the Disbursement Acceleration Program to support
various projects. Petitions were filed questioning the Constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program. HELD: Under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, for the
transfer of funds to be valid, the following requisites must concur.
1. There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
2. The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their
respective offices; and
3. The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices.
In the 2011 and the 2012 General Appropriation Act, the empowering provisions
allowed the transfer of funds to augment any item in the General Appropriation Act even if it
belonged to an office outside the Executive. They contravened the Constitution. They cannot
be used to transfer funds to another branch or to a constitutional commission.
The funds used in the Disbursement. Acceleration Program, the unreleased
appropriation and withdrawn unobligated allotments, were not savings.
The savings should be actual.. They should exist presently in fact and and not merely
be theoretical, possible, potential, or hypothetical. The power to augment is to be used only

when the purpose for which the funds were allocated was already satisfied or the need for the
funds had ceased to exist. Unreleased or unalloted appropriation are not savings.
Unobligated allotments are portions or balances of any programmed appropriation free
from any obligation or encumbrance. Unobligated allotments cannot be declared as savings
unless (i) they are still available after completion or final abandonment of the purpose; (ii) they
are balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay; or (iii) balances resulting from improved systems
and efficiencies enabled agencies to deliver the required services at a lesser cost.
National Budget Circular No. 541 targeted the withdrawal of unobligated allotments,
agencies with low levels of obligations. The fact that they can be reissued for the original
projects show that the original projects had not been abandoned.
National Budget Circular No. 541 immediately considered for withdrawal all released
allotments in the 2011 General Appropriation Act although they were available for two years.
The 2012 General Appropriation Act provided for availability of the funds for one year.
Yet, the Secretary of Budget and Management consolidated the unused balances on a
quarterly basis.
Under Section 28, Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code, the balances of
appropriations that remained unexpended at the end of the year are reverted to the General
Fund.
This cannot be circumvented, by declaring them as savings before the end of the year.
For a transfer of funds to be valid, it must first be determined that an appropriation for a
project is efficient. The Disbursement Appropriation Program supported projects that had not
been covered with appropriation.
Funds appropriated for one office cannot be transferred to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of deficient items. Funds amounting to P143,700,000.00 and
P250,000.00 were transferred to the Commission on Audit and the House of Representatives.
Funding under the Disbursement Acceleration Program was sourced from
unprogrammed funds. The Solicitor General stressed that they were not brought as savings
but as separate sources of funds and were not subject to restrictions under Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution. One condition for the release of the unprogramed funds was that
the revenue collections must exceed revenue targets and such condition was met. (Araullo v.
Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1)
An item as specified in Section 25(5) of Constitution is distinct from all expense
category or allotment class. There is no requirement in the Constitution or in the General
Appropriation Act that the object of augmentation should be an expense categorically or
allotment class. So long as there is an item in the General Appropriation Act for which
Congress set aside a specified amount of public funds, savings may be transferred to it for
augmentation purposes.
Since information on actual revenue collections and targets are made available every
quarter or at such time as the Department of Budget and Management may prescribe, actual
revenue surplus may be determined accordingly and released from unprogrammed funds may
take place even before the end of the year.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of good faith. The doctrine of operative fact
applies in their favor. The doctrine should apply to the projects funded by DAP. (Araullo v.
Aquino, III, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015)

D. Appropriation
The General Appropriation Acts for 2004 to 2007 authorized the payment of certain
officials of the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority who were listed in the
provision and the maximum amounts of the extraordinary expenses. The Technological
Education and Skills Development Authority granted payment for miscellaneous expenses in
excess of what was provided in the law and aid to officials not authorized by the law. The
Commission on Audit disallowed the expenses. The Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority argued that the laws did not prohibit its officers from receiving
additional emergency expenses from another fund. HELD: The Constitution provides that no
money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
The Technical Education and Skills Development Authority failed to point out any law
specifically authorizing it to grant additional extraordinary expenses. (Technical Education and
Skills Development Authority v. Commission on Audit, 718 SCRA 462)
V. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
A. Political Agency
The approval by the Secretary of Transportation and Communications of a franchise
which is required to be approved by the President is valid under the political agency doctrine.
B. Conduct of Foreign Relations
1. Executive Agreement
The Land Bank of the Philippines entered into a loan agreement with the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development for local development and investment projects. The
Land Bank of the Philippines granted a loan to lligan City to finance the development and
expansion of its water supply system.
Atlantic Industries, Inc., who was going to participate in the bidding, claimed that the
bidding documents did not comply with Republic Act No. 9184 and its Implementing Rules aNd
Regulations. The Bids and Awards Committee answered that the bidding was exempted from
the application of Republic Act No. 9184, because the loan agreement between the Land Bank
of the Philippines and the City of lligan City was subordinate to the loan, agreement with the
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, which was an executive agreement.
HELD: The Loan Agreement between the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development and the Land Bank of the Philippines is an executive agreement. Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 9184 provides that any treaty or executive agreement to which the Philippine
Government is a signatory shall be observed. The terms and conditions of the loan agreement
with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were incorporated in the loan
agreement between Land Bank of the Philippines and the City of lligan. The loan agreement
provides that the procurement of goods to be financed from the proceeds of the loan from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be in accordance with its
guidelines and the provisions of Section 4 and that the loan agreement between the
Development Bank of the Philippines and the City of lligan merely follows its terms and
conditions. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Atlantic Industries, Inc., 729 SCRA 12)

C. Claims against Foreign State

Petitioners, who were victims of sexual slavery during the Second World War, filed a
petition asking the Executive Department to espouse their claims for reparations from Japan.
HELD: Whether or not to espouse the claim of petitioners against the Government of Japan is
left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Supreme
Court cannot interfere with the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department (Vinuya. Romulo, 732 SCRA 595)
D. Executive Clemency
The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Joseph Estrada of plunder. The penalty
imposed upon him included perpetual absolute disqualification to hold public office. Former
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo pardoned him. The pardon state that he was being
restored to his civil and political rights.
Former President Joseph Estrada ran for mayor of the City of Manila. Alicia-ResosVidal filed a petition for his disqualification, because the penalty imposed upon him sentenced
him to perpetual absolute disqualification. HELD: President Joseph Estrada was granted
absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights. This includes the right to seek
public election officials. (Resos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 266066, January
21, 2015)
VIII. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
A. Scope
The City of Manila assessed the SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Watsons
Personal Care Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippine Corporation, Surplus Marketing Corporation,
and Signature Lines for additional taxes under Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of
Manila in addition to the taxes imposed under its Section 14, 15, 16, and 17. The business
establishments paid under protest so that their business permits would be issued and sued for
refund in the Regional Trial Court. They applied for a writ of preliminary injunction. The
Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The City of Manila assailed the order by filing a
petition for certiorari in t the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the petition
should be filed with the Court of Tax Appeals. HELD: Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and in the lower courts established by laws. Judicial
power includes the power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. The judicial power of the Court of
Tax Appeals includes the determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Regional Trial Court in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals is vested with jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in these cases.
For any appellate courts to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
authority to issue writs of certiorari. Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides that
when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes, and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by it. (City of Manila v. GreciaCuerdo, 715 SCRA 182)
B. Expansion
1. Facial Challenge
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. The Solicitor General argued that since the law had not yet been
enforced and applied to the petitioners, the facial challenge to its constitutionality cannot
prosper; since it is not a speech regulating measure. HELD: Since the petitions alleged that
constitutional human rights to life, speech, religion, and other fundamental rights have been

violated by the law, and since the Constitution has expanded the scope of judicial power, the
Supreme Court has authority to take cognizance of the petitions. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721
SCRA 146)
2. Comprehensiveness
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Appropriation Program, National Budget Circular No. 541, and other related
issuances. The Solicitor General argued that the special civil actions for certiorari and
prohibition are not proper action for questioning the constitutionality of any act of the
Government. HELD: The Constitution has expanded the concept of judicial power and included
the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of the government. With respect to
the Supreme Court, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope
and may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions and also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion by any
branch of the government, and even if it does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. (Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1)
C. Judicial Review
1. Locus Standi
The petitioner has no standing to question the validity of a proposed bill. The petitioner
has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed
into law.
A mere invocation of transcendental importance is not enough. It must be supported by
the proper allegations. (In re: Save the Supreme Court Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movement, UDK-15143 January 21, 2015.)
Presidential Decree No. 1113 granted the Philippine National Construction Corporation
a franchise to maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. Later on,
the Toll Regulatory Board executed a Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement with the
Philippine National Construction Corporation as operator. The operation and maintenance of
the project roads became the exclusive privilege of the PNCC Skyway Corporation, a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Philippine National Construction Corporation, which undertook its
obligation under the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement. Later on, the Toll Regulatory
Board entered the Amendment to the Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement. Under it the
Skyway O & M Corporation replaced the PNCC Skyway Corporation.
Legislators and labor unions filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the
replacement of the PNCC Skyway Corporation, because it breached the terms of the franchise
of the Philippine National Construction Corporation, as there was no public bidding and that
Skyway O & M Corporation was not qualified to operate the toil facility. The petitioners who
were legislators alleged that the Amended Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement
encroached upon the constitutional power of Congress to grant franchises for public utilities.
HELD: Unless there is a law which requires a legislative franchise for the operation of a public
utility, agencies in the Executive Department may issue authorization for the operation of
certain classes of public utilities. The rule in private litigation that only a real party in interest
has standing should be applied.
The labor unions have standing to file the case. With the transfer of the toll operation,
comes the separation of all employees of PNCC Skyway Corporation. (Hontiveros- Baraquel v.
Toll Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 181293, February 23, 2015)
Dennis Funa filed a petition to compel the Commission on Audit to audit the accounts of
the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. HELD: The petition raises issues of transcendental

importance as they involve the performance of a constitutional duty Allegedly neglected by the
Commission on Audit. As a concerned citizen, Dennis Funa has legal standing to file the
petition. (Funa v.' Manila Economic and Cultural Office, 715 SCRA 247)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Reproductive Health Act. The
Solicitor General argued that the petitioners had no legal standing to question its
constitutionality as it has not yet been applied against them. HELD: The rule on legal standing
is merely procedural and can be relaxed when the matter is of transcendental importance. The
law drastically affects the right to life and health, freedom of religion, and other constitutional
rights. The petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
2. Actual Controversy
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
gram adopted by the Secretary of Budget and Management to support various projects. The
Solicitor General argued that the petitioners lacked standing to sue. HELD: the petitioners
invoked their capacities as taxpayers who by alleging that the issuance and implementation of
the Distribution Acceleration Program involved the disbursements of public funds, have an
interest in preventing the further dissipation of public funds. In addition, the cases pose issues
that are of transcendental importance. (Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1)
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. Section 14 of the law required the teaching of reproductive health
education to adolescents. The petitioners argued that this violated academic freedom. HELD:
The attack was premature, because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet
to formulate a curriculum on the reproductive health education. , One can only speculate if it
will violate religious beliefs. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
A petition for mandamus was filed to compel the Supreme Court to exercise its judicial
independence and fiscal autonomy. Bills proposed to abolish Judiciary Development Fund and
to replace it with the Judiciary Support Fund, whose collection would be remitted to the
National Treaty and Congress would determine how the funds would be spent. HELD: One of
the requirements for the exercise of the power of judicial review is the existence of an actual
controversy. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty. The Supreme Court has no
power to declare a proposed bill unconstitutional. (In re: Save the Supreme. Court Judicial
Independence and Fiscal Autonomy Movement UDK-15143, January 21, 2015.)
Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Acts provided for the licensing of real estate
service practitioners and placed them under the supervision of the Professional Regulation
Commission through a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service. The Remman
Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association questioned the
constitutionality of the law. HELD: The petitioners are real estate developers and are directly
affected by the prohibition against the performance of acts constituting practice of real estate
service without complying with the registration and 'licensing requirements. They assert that
the prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose of their properties. A
justiciable controversy calls for immediate resolution. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. v.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, 715 SCRA 293)
Secretary of Interior and Local Government Jesse Robredo issued the following
regulations:
1. Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83, which required the full disclosure of local
budgets and finances, and bids and public biddings;
2. Memorandum Circular No. 2010-138, which listed the expenses for which the
internal revenue allotment of local, government units should not be used; and
3. Memorandum Circular No. 2011-08, which required strict adherence to Section 90 of
the General Appropriation Acts requiring publication or posting in three public places

of the income and expenditures and the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to
proceed, and approved procurement contracts.
Governor Luis Raymund Villafuerte, Jr. questioned the constitutionality of the
memorandum circulars. The Solicitor General argued that the case was not ripe for judicial
review, because there was yet no actual controversy. HELD: An actual controversy already
exists. Governor Luis Raymund Villafuerte, Jr. received a memorandum requiring him to
comment on the findings of the audit teams that the transactions and documents required by
Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83 had not been posted. (Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robredo, G.R. No.
95390, December 10, 2014)
Bishop Vicente Navarra posted in the compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral
a tarpaulin which listed the names of the legislations who vote against the Reproductive Health
Law and the names of the legislators who voted in favor of it. The 'Law Department of the
Commission on Elections ordered the removal of the tarpaulin, because it exceeded the
allotted size for election propaganda allowed by the Commission on Elections. The Diocese of
Bacolod and Bishop Vicente Navarra filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Commission on Elections argued that the
petition was not the proper remedy, because the order was not a final ruling of the Commission
on Elections en banc. HELD: The subject matter of the case is the alleged violation of the
freedom of speech. Direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed to avoid the chilling effect of
the order. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy against grave abuse of
discretion. The constitutionality of the notice is within the power of review of the Supreme
Court. A direct resort to the Supreme Court is allowed, because there are issues of
constitutionality which must be addressed immediately. Second, the issues involved are of
transcendental importance. Third, this is a case of first impression. Fourth, it is the Supreme
Court that can rule with finality on whether the Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion. Fifth, the fact that future cases may be filed necessitate urgency. Sixth, the
petition involves review of the act of a constitutional agency. Seventh, the petitioners have no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Eighth, the petition involves questions that must be
resolved because of the broader interest of justice. This case involves the right to free speech.
It does not involve a political question.
This case falls within the exceptions to the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. First, the issue involved is a purely legal question. Judicial intervention is urgent
because of the upcoming elections.
The petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any party. The
Commission on Elections does not have authority to regulate their enjoyment of freedom of
expression under the enumeration of the acts that may be penalized under Article IX- C,
Section 2(7) of the Constitution. The provision applies to candidates only. Section 9 of the Fair
Election Act and Section 17 of the Comelec Resolution No. 9615 apply only to candidates and
political parties.
While this case does not involve a law but an opinion of the Law Department of the
Commission on Elections, Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution applies even to
governmental acts. (Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections, G.R No. 205728,
January 21, 2015)
The Reproductive Health Act provided access and information on the full range of
modern family planning methods, and required .health service providers to provide information
on the full range of family planning methods and required schools to provide reproductive
health education. Petitions were filed to declare it unconstitutional.
The Solicitor General argued that there was no actual controversy, as no one has been
charged with violation of the law and that no right of the petitioners had been affected by its
operation and that a facial challenge is allowed only to assail statute concerning protected
speech. HELD: An actual case exists, because the law and its implementing rules have

already taken effect and budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed,
and medical practitioners are in danger of criminal prosecution for violations of the law.
The Supreme Court has expanded the scope of the facial challenge to cover religious
freedom and other fundamental rights. The Constitution has expanded the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to settle actual controversies to determine if there has been grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Imbong v. Ochoa,
Jr. 721 SCRA 146)
The Department of Budget and Management pooled unprogrammed funds; savings
from unreleased appropriations, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projects and
discontinued projects, and withdrawal of unobligated allotments released for slow-moving
programs and projects and used them for the Disbursement Acceleration Program to support
various projects. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed questioning the
constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program.
The Solicitor General argued that there was no actual controversy that was rise for
adjudication. HELD: The fact that public funds have been allocated, disbursed or utilized by
reason of the challenged executive gets gave rise to an actual controversy that is ripe for
adjudication. (Araullo v. Aquino, III, 728 SCRA 1)
3. Lis Mota
Dennis Funa filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Commission on Audit to audit
the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. It claimed that since it had issued
Office Order No. 2011-698, it had already conceded its jurisdiction over the accounts of the
Manila Economic and Cultural Office. HELD: The Supreme Court should refrain from
dismissing the case. First, the petition alleges that the Commission on Audit had been remiss
in its constitutional duty to audit the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office.
Second, there is a paramount public interest in the resolution of this issue. Third, there is
paramount public interest in resolving the issue regarding the legal status of the Manila
Economic and Cultural Office, a novelty. The case is capable of being repeated yet evades
review. (Funa v. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, 715 SCRA 247).
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. The Solicitor General contended that the petitioners had no standing
to question its constitutionality, since the law has yet to be enforced and applied against the
petitioners. HELD: In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, the issues
must be resolved for the guidance of all. The law affects the constitutional provisions on the
right to life and health, freedom of religion, freedom of expression and other constitutional
rights. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
Despite the conversion of the Mineral Production Sharing Agreement of three
corporations, controlled by a Canadian corporation, with Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreements, the validity of the previous agreements should still be decided since it involves a
grave violation of the Constitution, the scheme used involves paramount public interest, the
issue requires formulation of principles to be applied in similar cases, and the case is capable
of repetition. (Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated
Mines Corporation, 722 SCRA 382)
Petitioners filed cases questioning the constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration
Program adopted by the Secretary of Budget and Management to support various projects.
The Solicitor General argued that since, the program had been discontinued, the cases had
become moot. HELD: The Supreme Court has exercised its power of judicial review even if the
case has been rendered moot: (1) when there was a grave violation of the Constitution, (2)
when the case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount interest; (3)
when the constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide
the bench, the bar, and the public, and (4) when the case is capable of repetition and yet
evades review. These cases come under all the exceptions. (Araullo v. Aquino, III; 728 SCRA
1)

D. Basis for Judicial Review

Petitions were filed questioning the validity of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners argued that it violated natural law. HELD: The
Supreme Court does not recognize natural law as a legal basis for natural invalidating law. The
only guide post of the Supreme Court is the Constitution. Natural law is not enacted by an
acceptable legitimate body. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
E. Effect of Annulment of Law
Sameer Overseas Employment Agency; Inc. deployed Joy Cabiles for work in Taiwan
on June 26,1997. On July 14,1997, she was terminated. She filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The National Labor Relations Commission ruled that she was dismissed illegally but
awarded her back wages for three months only in accordance with Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 10027. HELD: In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Service, Inc. the Supreme Court ruled that
Section 10 of the Republic Act No. 8042, which limited the award of back wages for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever was less, was unconstitutional. It was
reinstated by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022. HELD: When a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reenactment of
the same law. (Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Joy Cabiles, 732 SCRA 531)
F. Inapplicability of Judicial Review
The petitioners received notices of eviction and demolition from the mayors where the
parcels of land they were occupying were located to give way to the construction of
[infrastructure projects. They claimed that their eviction without a court order violated their right
to. due process. HELD: It has already been ruled that demolitions and evictions can be carried
without a court order when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about
to be implemented. (Katipunan v. Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322)
'
VIII. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
The validity of the allowances allegedly granted to the Maritime Industry Authority
cannot be ruled upon. The Maritime Industry Authority failed to prove its existence. It
presented a mere photocopy of it. No copy of it is in the Malacanang Records Office.
The benefits and allowances disallowed by the Commission on Audit were deemed
already given when the officials and employees received their basic salary. Their receipt of the
disallowed benefits and allowances was tantamount to double compensation. (Maritime
Industry Authority in Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015)
Janet Nacion was assigned by the Commission on Audit as auditor to the Metropolitan
Waterworks Sewerage System. She received benefits and bonuses from it. She also awaited
herself of its housing projects and obtained a car loan. As a result, an administrative charge
was filed against her. HELD: The acts of Janet Nacion are prohibited. Section 18 of Republic
Act No. 6788, prohibited the officials of the Commission on Audit from receiving bonuses or
other emoluments from any government entity except compensation paid directly by the
Commission on Audit. Her availment of the benefits of the car and housing programs led to the
same results that the prohibition on additional compensation sought to avoid. (Nacion vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015)
IX. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
A petition for the recall of Mayor Lucilo Bayron of Puerto Princesa was filed. The
Commission on Elections found it sufficient in form and substance but suspended all further
procedures because of the lack of appropriation in its budget for the conduct of a recall
election. HELD: THE Constitution grants the Commission on Election power to administer the

laws relative to the conduct of a recall. It also guaranteed its fiscal autonomy. The General
Appropriation Act authorized the Chairman of the Commission on Election to augment items in
its appropriation from savings. The General Appropriation Act expressly provided for an
appropriation for the conduct of recall election. This is a line item which can be augmented
from savings. The conduct of recall elections required only operating expenses, not capital
outlays. (Go v. Bayron 742 SCRA 303).
X COMMISSION ON AUDIT
A. Scope of Power
Dennis Funa filed a petition for mandamus to compel the commission on Audit to audit
the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. HELD: The Manila Economic and
Cultural Office is not-a government-owned or controlled corporation. It was organized as a
non-stock, non-profit corporation under the Corporation Code. None of its money is
distributable as dividends. It seeks to promote the general interest of the Filipino people in a
foreign land. It performs functions which partake of the nature of government function. Its
functions are of the kind that would otherwise be performed by the diplomatic and consular
offices of the Philippines. None of the members are officers of the Manila Economic and
Cultural Office are government officials. It is not a government instrumentality. It is sui generis.
The Manila Economic and Cultural Office collects verification fees from Taiwanese
employers on behalf of the Department of Labor and Employment. It is mandated to remit a
portion of the verification fees to the National Government. The accounts pertaining to the
verification fees are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. The Manila
Economic and Cultural office also collects consular fees. The consular fees may be audited by
the Commission on Audit. (Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, 715SCRA 241)
A private law office retained by a government corporation without the written conformity
both the Government Corporate Counsel and the written concurrence of the Commission on
Audit is not entitled to compensation because the hiring of the law firm is unauthorized. (Law
Firms of Laguesma, Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No.
185544, January 13, 2015)
In accordance with a Memorandum of Agreement between the Provincial Government
of Antique and Fortune Life and General Insurance Company, Inc., the latter provided group
insurance coverage to barangay secretaries, treasurers, and tanod. When Fortune Life and
General Insurance Company, Inc. filed its claim for payment, the Commission oh Audit denied
it on the ground that under Sections 447 and 458 of the Local Government Code, only
municipal and city governments are authorized to secure group insurance coverage for
barangay workers and there was no compliance with the requirement of publication under
Section 21 of the Government Procurement Reform Act. Fortune Life and General Insurance
Company, Inc. questioned the decision of the Commission on Audit on the ground that it aicted
with grave abuse of discretion. HELD: The Commission on Audit acted within its authority in
denying the claim. (Fortune Insurance Company, Inc., vs. Commission on audit, G.R. No.
213629, January 27, 2015)
On appeal by the Maritime Industry Authority from the disallowance of the benefits and
allowances by the auditor, the Commission on Audit relied upon other grounds to affirm the
disallowance. The Maritime Industry Authority argued that this amounted to denial of due
process. HELD: In consonance with the general audit power, the Commission on Audit is not
restricted to reviewing the validity of the ground relied upon by the auditor of the government
concerned and may make its own assessment of the merits of the disallowance disbursement,
To hold otherwise will render its power unduly limited, useless and ineffective. (Maritime
Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812, January 3, 2015)
B. Appeal to Supreme Court
The Commission on Audit denied the claim of Fortune Life and General Insurance
Company, Inc. for payment of the premium for the group insurance coverage it granted to

barangay secretaries, treasurers and tanod in accordance with an agreement with the
Province of Antique. Fortune Life and General Insurance Company, Inc. questioned the
decision of the Commission on Audit by filing a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
HELD: Fortune Life and General Insurance Company, Inc. received the decision on December
14, 2012. It filed a motion for reconsideration on January 14, 2013. It received the notice of
denial of its motion on July 14, 2014. If filed its petition in the Supreme Court on August 13,
2014. HELD: The petition was filed late. Under Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, the
petition should be filed within thirty days from notice of the decision. The filing of a motion for
reconsideration will interrupt the period to file the petition. If the motion is denied, the petition
may be filed within the remaining period but which shall not be less than five days, counted
from notice of the denial. The motion for reconsideration was filed on January 14, 2013, which
is 31 days after receipt of the decision on December 14, 2012. The notice of the denial of the
motion for reconsideration was received on July 14, 2014. The petition for certiorari was filed
late on August 13, 2014. Contrary to the claim of Fortune Life and General Insurance
Company, Inc. there is no fresh period to file the petition. (Fortune Life and General Insurance
Company, Inc. v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015)
XI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Local Autonomy
The petitioners argued that the Reproductive Health Law violated the autonomy of local
governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. HELD: Section 17(c) of the
Local Government Code exempts from the devolution of powers cases involving nationally
funded projects, facilities, programs and services. This applies equally to the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. Except for the express and implied : limitation imposed by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted in the exercise of its plenary power to legislate on
all matters of common interest. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
B. Presidential Power of Supervision
Governor Luis Raymund Villafuerte, Jr., questioned the constitutionality of the
Memorandum Circular Nos. 2010-83, 2010-138 and 2011-08 on the ground that they violated
the local and fiscal autonomy1 granted by the Constitution to local government units HELD:
Memorandum Circular No, 2010-38 is a merely reiteration of Section 287 of thie Local
Government Code. Despite the local fiscal autonomy of local government units, they are still
under the supervision of the President. This power of supervision of the President is not
antithetical to investigation and imposition of sanctions.
Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83 and Memorandum Circular No. 2011-09 are merely
implementations of the requirements of Section 352 of its Local Government Code and
Sections 3(a) and 3 (e) of the Government Procurement Reform Act. (Villafuerte, Jr. v.
Robledo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10, 2014)
C. Term Limitation
Angel Naval was elected as member of the Sanggunian from the second district of
Camarines Sur. Republic Act No. 9716 reapportioned the legislative districts into five districts.
Eight of the ten municipalities of the second district formed the third district. The two remaining
municipalities were retained in the second district and merged with five municipalities which
were transferred from the first district. At the immediately following election, Angel Naval was
elected member of the Sanggunian from the third district. At the next election, Angel Naval was
re-elected as member of the Sanggunian from the third district.
Nelson Julio, a candidate for member of the Sanggunian from the third district .claimed
that Angel Naval was disqualified, because he had fully served for three consecutive terms as
member of the Sanggunian although he was elected in different districts. Angel Naval argued
that the voters from the third district were different from the voters from the second district.
HELD: Republic Act No. 9716 stated that a new second district was to be created, but the third
district was to be renamed. The lawmakers intended the old second district to be renamed

merely as the new third district. The district which elected Angel Naval for the third and the
fourth time is the same.which elected him during his first two terms. Hence, he is ineligible.
(Naval v. Commission on Audit 729 SCRA 299)

D. Plebiscites
Pursuant to Section 453 of the Local Government Code, which authorized the President
to declared a city as highly urbanized if its meets the minimum requirements, upon ratification
in a plebiscite, the President proclaimed the City of Cabanatuan as a highly urbanized city,
subject to ratification in a plebiscite. The Commission on Elections ordered a plebiscite among
the residents of City of Cabanatuan. Aurelio Umali, the governor of Nueva Ecija, argued that
the voters of the province should be included in the plebiscite, because it would affect the
province. HELD: While conversion to a highly urbanized city is not explicitly provided in Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, it is a substantial alteration of boundaries. The word
boundaries should not be limited to physical but also to the political boundaries. Article 12(c)
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code provides that the
conversion of a component city to a highly urbanized city shall make it independent of the
province. This will result in reduction of the revenue allotted to the province. The province will
lose its share in taxes imposed by the City of Cabanatuan. (Umali v. Commission on Elections,
723 SCRA 170)
XII.

OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN
A. Intervention in Appeal

The Deputy Ombudsman fpr the Visayas found Prudencio Quimbo guilty of oppression in
the administrative case filed against him and imposed suspension for six months as penalty.
He filed a Petition for Review in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling. The Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention and reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals denied the motion on the ground of lack of legal standing. HELD: The Office of the
Ombudsman may intervene because of its legal interest in the subject matter as guardian of
public trust and accountability. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Quimbo, G.R. No. 173277,
February 25, 2015)
B. Disciplinary Authority
Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 conferred upon, the President the disciplinary
authority over Deputy Ombudsmen. HELD: The alter egos of the President and the officials of
the Executive Department are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. The
Deputy Ombudsman act as agents of the Ombudsman in the .performance of their duties.
Subjecting them to the power to discipline and removal by the President will seriously place at
risk the independence of the Ombudsman. Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
declared void. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress to provide the manner
and the cause of removal of other public officers must be consistent with the principle of
independence of the Ombudsman. However, Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 is valid
insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned, because, he is not within the Office of the
Ombudsman. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President, 714SCRA611)
XIII.

NATIONAL PATRIMONY

Sara Marie Mining, Inc. was issued a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement and
Exploration Permit. These were transferred to Madridejos Mining Corporation and then to
MacArthur Mining, Inc.
Alpha Resources and Development Corporation and Patricia Louise Mining and
Development Corporation were issued Mineral Production Sharing Agreements. These were
assigned to Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corporation.
Sara Marie Mining, Inc. was issued a Mineral Production Sharing Agreement. It
conveyed its rights over the agreement to Tesoro Mining and Development, Inc.

Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation filed a petition for the denial of the application
of the three corporations on the ground that since at least 60 per cent of their capital stocks
were owned by MBMI Resources, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by Canadians, they were
disqualified to engage in mining.
The three companies claimed that since at least 60 percent of the capital stocks of each of
them was owned by Filipino citizens, under Section 3(9) of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,
they were qualified to engage in mining. HELD: Corporate layering is allowed by the Foreign
Investment Act, but if it used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, it becomes
illegal. It is the intention of the framers of the Constitution to apply the grandfather rule in cases
where corporate layering is present. This case presents a situation which exhibits a scheme
employed by stockholders to circumvent the law. This makes the corporations non-Filipino
corporation and thus disqualified to participate in the exploration of our natural resources. The
three corporations are not Filipino, since MBM Resources, Inc, a 100 percent Canadian
corporation, owns 60 percent or more of their equity, directly and indirectly. (Narra Nickel
Mining and Development Corporation v. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corporation, 722 SCRA
382)
XIV.

EDUCATION

Section 23(1)(2)(i) of the Reproductive Health Act prohibits any health care provider from
performing any legal and medically safe reproductive health procedure on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent of the spouse in case of married spouses and in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedure shall prevail HELD: The
reproductive health procedure should require mutual consent. Section 3, Article XV of the
Constitution provides the State shall defend the right of spouses to found a family and the right
to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them is
shared by both spouses. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146)
First Class Cadet Aldrin Jeff Cudia of the Philippine Military Academy came two minutes
late for a lesson examination. He explained that the instructor dismissed the class late. The
instructor denied it. As a result, Aldrin Jeff Cudia was penalized with 11 demerits of 13 touring
hours. He appealed and reiterated his explanation. Because it was established that the class
was not dismissed late, the penalty was sustained. He was charged with violation of the Honor
Code by lying. Aldrin Jeff Cudia was found guilty and dismissed. He questioned the decision.
HELD: The power of schools to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom. The right includes the power to dismiss students who violate disciplinary rules. As the
primary educational institution of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Military
Academy has the right to invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its rules and
regulations. The Honor Code is justified as the primary means of achieving character
development. Assistance of counsel is not an absolute requirement in administrative hearings.
(Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, G.R. No. 211362 February 24
2015)
XV.

FAMILY

Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and.
Reproductive Health Act. The petitioners argued that Section 23(6)(2)(ii) of the law, which
requires a married person who wishes to undergo a reproductive health procedure should
obtain the consent of the spouse violates marital privacy and autonomy and fosters animosity
rather than solidarity. HELD: Reproductive health procedures like tubal ligation and vasectomy,
by their very nature, should require mutual consent, as they affect issues related to the
founding of afamily. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr, 721 SCRA 146)
XVI. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT
A. Governmental Functions
Diosdado Mendoza was the winning bidder for the construction of a road in Benguet, the
quarters of the engineers, and the laboratory. On March 3,1989 he received a notice to

proceed. Diosdado Mendoza claimed that he discovered that there was no right of way for the
project, and it was only on November 29, 1989 that the affected landowners allowed passing.
Diosdado Mendoza alleged that it was made to appear that he incurred a negative slippage of
29%, a rebidding was recommended, and he was blacklisted from participating in any bidding
for one year. Diosdado Mendoza filed a case for specific performance against the Department
of Public Works and Highways and asked that the rebidding be restrained. HELD: The State
will be deemed to have impliedly waived its immunity from suit if it entered into a contract in its
proprietary capacity. When the contract involves its governmental capacity, no waiver may be
implied. The Department of Public Works and Highways is an unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality and enjoys immunity from suit, it performs
governmental functions, since it has the power to undertake public works projects. (Heirs of
Diosdado Mendoza v. Department of Public Works and Highways, 729 SCRA 654)
B. Execution of Judgment
A road encroached upon the parcels of land owned by the Star Special Watchman and
Detective Agency, Inc., Celso Fernandez, and Manuel Fernandez. They sued Puerto Princesa
City for just compensation. They obtained a favorable judgment from the Regional Trial Court.
Upon its finality, a writ of execution was issued. Celso Fernandez claimed that after they
received a partial payment, there were no more payments and that there was an unpaid
balance. Celso Fernandez requested the Commission on Audit to order Puerto Princesa City
to pay, but if answered that it had no jurisdiction over the matter. The Star Special Watchman
and Detective Agency, Inc., Celso Fernandez and Manuel Fernandez filed a petition for
mandamus to compel it to pay the amount awarded by the judgment. HELD: The remedy of
mandamus is improper if the standard forms of remedy are still available. The legal remedy is
to seek relief from the Commission on Audit pursuant to Administrative Circular 10-2000, which
provides that all money claims must first be filed with the Commission on Audit. Under Section
49 of the Government Auditing Code, it has power to settle all claims due from the government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. (Star Special Watchman and
Detective Agency, Inc. v. Puerto Princesa, 722 SCRA 66)
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
I. Recall
A petition to recall Governor Wilhelmina Sy-Alvarado of Bulacan was filed with the
Commission on Elections. The Provincial Election Supervisor found that petition was sufficient
in form and substance. The Deputy Director for Operations reviewed the recommendation. The
Commission on Elections issued a resolution affirming the recommendation. Governor
Wilhelmina Sy-Alvarado insisted that the petition was not sufficient in form and substance as
the signatures had not been authenticated. HELD: The determination whether the signatories
in the petition were registered voters of the local government unit and were registered as such
during the election of the local officials sought to be recalled is not done during the
determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency in form and substance of the petition but rather
during the determination of the names, signatures or thumbmarks of the petitioners. (SyAlvarado v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216457, February 17,-2015)
II.

Legal Officer

The former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran filed a petition for mandamus
to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to pay their unpaid terminal leave benefits under
Section 5 of Civil Service Commission. Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1998 and 14,
Series of 1999. The Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer filed an answer. The
Regional Trial Court directed the Municipality of Saguiran to include in the budget the payment
of the terminal leave benefits.
The Municipality of Saguiran appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
required the Office of the Solicitor General to file a memorandum for the Municipality of
Saguiran. HELD: Section 481 of the Local Government Code provides that it is optional for a
municipal government to appoint a legal officer. It is the duty of the legal officer to represent

the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings in which it is a party.
Section 481 of the Local Government Code restricts the lawyer who may represent a local
government unit as counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of
representation in court, the Local Government Code must prevail over the provision in Section
35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the
Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the instrumentalities of the government in any
litigation in the Court of Appeals. (Office of the Solicitor General v. Court of Appeals, 725
SCRA 469)
III.

Protection by Barangay Officials against Abuse

Rossana Honrado-Fua filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court for herself and her
children for a temporary protection order pursuant to the Anti-Violence against Women and
their Children against her husband, Ralph Fua. The Regional Trial Court issued a temporary
protection order ex-parte, Ralph Fua claimed that the issuance of the order violated his right to
due process and the grant of the power to the Regional Trial Court and to barangay officials to
issue temporary protection orders constituted an invalid delegation of legislative power. HELD:
The law entrusting to the courts the issuance of the temporary protection order is in pursuant
of their authority to settle justiciable disputes. The issuance of a barangay protective order is
pursuant to the duty of the punong - barangay to maintain public order in the barangay. (Fua v.
Mangrobang, 714 SCRA 428)
IV.

Separation Benefits for Employees

Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009 so provided that employees of General Santos City who
were below 60 years of age but not less than fifty years of age and sickly employees below 50
years of age but not less than 40 years of age could avail themselves of early retirement and
receive a cash of P50,000.00 for sickly employees, lifetime free medical consultation, annual
aid with maximum amount of P5,000.00, if admitted at the General Santos City Hospital, and a
gold ring.
The Commission on Audit held that Ordinance No. 08, Series of 2009 was a supplementary
retirement benefit plan prohibited by the law creating the Government Service Insurance
System. Ordinance No. 8, Series of 2009 was amended to exclude the payment by the
Government Service Insurance System and the Home Development Mutual Fund which are
passed on to the employer to ensure that no employee would be paid twice. HELD: Section 5,
paragraph (a) of the Local Government Code states that any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor. Section 5, paragraph (c) provides that
the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code shall be liberally interpreted. The
prohibition in Section 28, paragraph (b) of the law creating the Government Service Insurance
System against the creation of any other insurance or retirement plan was intended to prevent
the proliferation of retirement plans. Under Section 2 of Circular No. 008, Series of 2009, even
employees other than those unproductive due to health reasons could apply. The benefits
provided served to induce employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to retire
early.
The benefits were given only-to a select few. This negates the position that the benefits
provide for supplementary retirement benefits. (City of General Santos v. Commission on
Audit, 723 SCRA 77)
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
I. Administrative Rules and Regulations
A. Void Regulations
Petitions were filed questioning the constitutionality of the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act on the ground it would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectibles which are abortifacients. HELD: Section 9
of the law provides that any product or supply to be included in the emergency drugs list must

be certified by the Food and Drug Authority that it is made available on the condition that it is
not to be used as an abortifacient. However, Section 301(a) of the implementing Rules and
Regulations provides that abortifacients refer to any drug or device that primarily induces
abortion. Section 3(01) (j) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations defines contraceptives
as any family planning method, device, or health product that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent its implantation in the womb of the mother.
Because of the insertion of the word primarily, Section 3(01 )(a) and (j) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations should be - declared invalid. It means that a contraceptive will be
considered as an abortifacient if its sole known effect is abortion. (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 721
SCRA 146)
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio, who were both married, maintained an illicit
relationship and begot two children named Andre Lewis and Gerard Patrick. They became
estranged and Grace Grande left for the United States with the two children. Patricio Antonio
filed a petition in which he asked the court to approve his recognized of his children and the
change of the surnames of his children to his own surname. HELD: Republic 9255 amended
Section 176 of the Family Code to provide that illegitimate children may use the surname of
their father if their filiations was expressly recognized by their father. Rule 7 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations provided that the r illegitimate children shall use the
surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father. A regulation cannot
amend a legislative act. (Grande v. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698)
B. Inexistence of Regulation
Section 26(a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act authorized the Secretary of Health
to issue the rules and regulations to implement its provisions. In 1989, the Secretary of Health
issued Administrative Order No. 67, which required drug manufacturers to register certain
drugs and medicines with the Food and Drug Administration before selling them to the market
and required a satisfactory bio-availability/bio-guidance list. The implementation was deferred
because of lack of local facilities for testing. With the establishment of testing facilities in 1997;
the Food and Drug Administration issued Circular No 1, which implemented the testing
required, and Circular No. 8, which provided additional details for the testing requirements.
The Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc., and Terramedic, Inc. questioned the validity of Circular
Nos. 1 and 8 on the ground that it was the Secretary of Health who was authorized to issue
implementing rules and regulations for the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and that there was
no prior policy. HELD; Administrative Order No. 67, which introduced the regulations, is an
administrative regulation issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express
authority granted to him by the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act The only purpose of Circular
Nos. 1 and 8 is to administer and supervise the implementation of Administrative Order No. 67.
The Food and Drug Authority has sufficient authority to issue them and no prior hearing,
consultation and publication are needed for their validity, as they are not administrative
regulations. (Republic v. Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc. 718 SCRA 153)
II.
Interpretation of Law
The Commission on Internal Revenue assessed cigarette manufacturers excise taxes for the
purchase and importation of stemmed leaf tobacco. The cigarette manufacturers claimed that
since for a long the purchase and importations were not subjected to excise taxes, the practice
was the correct interpretation of the law. HELD: Prolonged practice of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue cannot validate an erroneous application of the law. The government is not estopped
from collecting legitimate taxes because of the error committed by its agents. (La Suerte Cigar
and Cigarette Factory v. Court of Appeals, 739 SCRA 489)
III.
Issuance of Subpoenas
Section 14 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that upon securing a court warrant, law
enforcement authorities shall order any person or service provider to disclose subscribers
information, traffic data or relevant data in hjs possession or control within 72 hours from

receipt of the order in relation to an investigation. The petitioners claimed the order is like a
subpoena and the issuance of a subpoena is a judicial form. HELD: The power to issue
subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to issue a
subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. Section 14 merely enforces the court
warrant. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237)
IV.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A. Applicability of Doctrine
When the Provincial Agriculturist retired, Marichu Ejera applied for the position. Beau Henry
Merto instead was appointed. She protested his appointment, but the Civil Service
Commission dismissed the protest. Beau Henry Merto issued an order reassigning her. When
she refused to obey, he asked her to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against her. Instead, she filed in the Regional Trial Court an action to enjoin her reassignment.
HELD: The subject of the order was a reassignment and not a transfer. A transfer is a
movement from one position to another of equivalent rank. Reassignment is the movement of
an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department. The Superior of
Beau Henry Merto was the Provincial Governor. She could have challenged her reassignment
before the Provincial Governor. Her immediate resort to the Regional Trial Court was
premature. (Ejera v. Merto, 714 SCRA 397)
The Land Bank of the Philippines obtained a loan from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for local development and investment projects. The Land
Bank of the Philippines granted a loan to lligan City to finance the development and expansion
of its water supply system. The City Government conducted a public bidding. Atlanta
Industries, Inc. participated in the bidding.
The bidding was declared a failure, because the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development did not concur with the bid evaluation report. A new bidding was scheduled.
Atlanta Industries, Inc. wrote the bidding and Awards Committee that the Bidding documents
did not comply with the Republic Act No. 9184 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The Bidding and Awards Committee declared that the project was not covered by Republic Act
No. 9184 and that it would proceed. Atlanta V Industries, Inc. filed a petition for prohibition to
stop the bidding. HELD: The case should be dismissed outright for failure of Atlanta Industries,
Inc. to exhaust administrative remedies. Under Republic Act No 9184, the decision of the Bids
and Awards Committee in all stages of procurement may be protested to the head of the
procuring entity. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Atlanta Industries, Inc. 729 SCRA 12)
B. Exception to Applicability of Doctrine
1. Purely Legal Question
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to cases involving the
validity of regulations. (Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robledo, G.R. No.195390, December 10, 2014)
2. Urgency and Futility
The Bureau of Treasury issued ten-year zero-coupon treasury bonds. Upon the query of
the Secretary of Finance, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued BIR Ruling No. 370- 2011
which declared that they were deposit substitutes and subject to a twenty per cent final tax.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul the ruling. The
Republic of the Philippines and its officers argued that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies first, because the ruling was subject to review by the Secretary of
Finance. HELD: There are applicable exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies. First, whether the bonds were deposit substitutes, and whether the imposition of a
twenty per cent final tax on the bonds violated the constitutional prohibition against the

impairment of contracts and due process are purely legal questions. Second, judicial
intervention was urgent because of the impending maturity of the bonds. Besides, an appeal to
the Secretary of Finance would be futile, because it was upon his request that the ruling was
issued and he adopted the opinion of the Commissioner of Customs as his own. (Banco de
Oro v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198756, January 13, 2015)
LAWS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
I. Appintment
A. Nepotism
The Commission on Human Rights en banc approved the appointment as information officer of
Maricelle-Cortes, the daughter of Commissioner Elegio Mallari. Commissioner Elegio Mallari
abstained from voting. The Civil Service Commission declared the appointment as invalid,
because it was covered by the prohibition against nepotism. Maricelle Cortes argued that the
appointing authority was the Commission on Human Rights en banc and not the individual
Commissioner. HELD: To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commissioner and not to
its members will render the prohibition meaningless. The Commission, a body created by law,
can never have relatives. It is absurd to declare that the prohibition does not include
appointments made by a group of individuals acting as a body. (Civil Service Commission v.
Cortes, 723 SCRA 609)

B. Qualification
Herminio Dela Cruz was appointed City Assessor. The City Assessor was given the
item of Department Head III. The Sangguniang Panlungsod concurred in the appointment.
Angel Abad, the Local Assessment Operations Officer V, protested the appointment on the
ground that the position corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine grades higher than that of his
former position, Salary Grade 18. According to him, promotions to a position- more than three
salary grades higher were prohibited. Angel Abad argued that as the employee next-in-rank
rule is merely a rule of preference, it does not give the next-in-rank employee a vested right to
the next higher position in case of vacancy. So long as the appointee possesses the required
qualification, the appointment is valid.
The three-salary-grade rule is subject to exceptions in case of very meritorious cases.
Out of 9 candidates, Herminio dela Cruz ranked first with a grade of 90.67. (Abad v. Dela Cruz,
G.R. No. 207422, March 18, 2015)
II. De Facto Officers
Lutgarda del Rosario applied with the Department of Agrarian Reform for exemption of
her two lots from coverage of agrarian reform. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform granted it.
The farmers filed a motion for reconsideration. The new Secretary of Agrarian Reform granted
the motion. Lutgarda del Rosario appealed to the Office of the President. On May 7, 2009,
Deputy Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite denied the appeal for lack of merit. Lutgarda del
Rosario claimed that the decision was void, because he had been appointed to the Securities
and Exchange Commission on March 16, 2009. HELD: Even if the appointment of Deputy
Executive Secretary Manuel Gaite became effective on March 16, 2009, he could be
considered a de facto officer, when he rendered the decision dated May 7, 2009. His decision
was valid. (Espiritu v. Del Rosario, 738 SCRA 4641)
Judge William Simon Peralta issued a search warrant to search three caves in the Land
Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the remains of victims summarily
executed by the Davao Death Squad could be found. The validity of the search warrant was
questioned on the ground that since several administrative penalties were imposed on Judge
William Simon Peralta by the Supreme Court, he was divested of his authority to act on the
application for a search warrant. HELD: The divestment of the authority of Judge William
Simon Peralta as Vice Executive Judge did not result in the invalidity of the search warrant. He
may be considered to have made the issuance as a de facto officer whose acts remained
valid. (Land v. People of the Philippines, 741 SCRA 239)
Francisco Duque III was appointed Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Later on,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No 864, which made him a
member of the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Home
Development Mutual Fund. Dennis Funa questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
864, and of Section 14, Chapter 3, Title l-A, Book V of the Administrative Code. HELD: Section
14, Chapter 3, Title l-A, Book V of the Administrative Code provides that the membership of
the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission in a governing body is dependent on the
condition that the functions must affect the career development, employment status, rights,
privileges, and welfare of government officials and employees. The Government Service
Insurance System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, the Employees Compensation
Commission, the Health Development Mutual Fund also perform other corporate powers and
functions that are not personnel related. When the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
sits as a member of their governing bodies, he may exercise the powers and functions, which
are not derived from his position as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. Francisco
Duque III entitled him to receive per diems, which is disallowed by the concept of an ex- officio
position. This situation must be held unconstitutional. The members of the governing boards of
the Government Service Insurance System, the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, the
Employees Compensation Commission, and the Home Development Mutual Fund are under
the control of the President. The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission cannot be a

member of a government, entity that is under the control of the President without impairing the
independence of the Civil Service Commission.
Francisco Duque III was a de facto officer during his tenure as their director. All his official
actions are presumed valid. (Funa v. Duque III, 742 SCRA 166)
III.

Termination

Republic Act No. 9497 abolished the Air Transportation Office and replaced it with the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines. The employees of the Air Transportation Office
questioned its constitutionality. HELD:, The power to create includes the power to destroy.
Except where the office was created by the Constitution, it may be abolished by the legislature
which created it. For the security of tenure of the employees of the Air Transportation Office to
be impaired, its abolition must be done in bad faith. The purpose of the abolition of the Air
Transportation Office is to provide safe and efficient air transport and regulatory services in the
Philippines. The proposition that all the employees of the Air Transportation Office should be
automatically absorbed cannot be accepted. There is no absolute right to hold public office.
(Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines Employees Union v. Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines, 739 SCRA 570)
IV.

Administrative Cases .

A. Complaint
A written complaint need not be required to be under oath if it was filed by the superior of
the employee. (Nacias v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 204757, March 17, 2015)
B. Effect of Retirement
The pending administrative case against a public officer can continue even if he has retired,
because the penalties of cancellation of eligibility end perpetual disqualification for
reemployment in the government service can still attach. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Mallari,
G.R. No. 183161, December 3, 2014)
C. Effects of Exoneration on Preventive Suspension
A government employee who was placed-under preventive suspension is not entitled to
payment of back wages in case of exoneration. (Barcelona v. Lim, 743 SCRA 587)
D. Right to Appeal
The Light Rail Transit Authority dismissed Aurora Soldano as a result of an administrative
case. She appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission found her
guilty of simple dishonesty and reduced the penalty to suspension for six months. The Light
Rail Transit Authority appealed. HELD: Section 49(1) of the Administrative Code provides that
the party adversely affected by the decision has the right to appeal. A government party is a
party adversely affected for purposes of appeal provided that it is the office prosecuting the
case. (Light Rail Transit Authority v. Soldano, 726 SCRA 141)
V. Fringe Benefits
A. Cost of Living Allowance
Pursuant, to the Salary Standardization Law, the cost of living allowance has been deemed
integrated into the standard salaries. (Land Bank of the Philippines v. Naval, 720 SCRA 796)
B. Refund in Case of Disallowance
It is within the authority of the constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy provide
additional allowances and benefits to its officials and employees deemed necessary and

relevant in the performance of their duties. Nonetheless, the expenditures were still audited by
the Commission.
General officers who received allowances which were disallowed may keep them if there is
no finding of bad faith. However, officers who approved the disallowed allowances are required
to refund the awards received when they are in bad faith or grossly negligent.
The amount given to Erlinda Baltazar is exorbitant. She and the approving officers are
solidarity liable to refund the amount disallowed by the Commission on Audit.
The officers and employees who received the disallowed benefits are presumed to have
acted in good faith. The Commission on Audit failed to show bad faith on the part of the
approving officers. (Maritime Industry Authority v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 185812,
January 13, 2015)
The Commission on Audit disallowed the grant by the management of the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority of a healthcare maintenance allowance to all
officers and employees and ordered the responsible officers to pay for the disallowed amount.
HELD: Memorandum Circular No. 33 issued by the Civil Service Commission provided for
hospitalization services and annual mental medical-physical examination. The giving of health
care maintenance allowance was not included. The personnel who received the allowance in
good faith need not reimburse them. The officials who granted the allowance in good faith
need not reimburse the government. (Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 96418, February 10, 2015)
ELECTION LAW
I. Disqualification
A petition to disqualify Emilio Ramon Ejercito as candidate for governor was filed on the
ground that he distributed Orange Cards, which could be used in any public hospital in the
province for medical services, because they were intended to influence voters, and that he
exceeded the allowable maximum election expenses that a candidate for governor could incur.
Emilio Ramon Ejercito argued that the petition was moot, because he had been proclaimed
elected. HELD: The purpose of a disqualification case is to prevent a candidate from running
or, if elected, from serving. The reports and logo submitted by broadcast stations to the
Commission on Elections, as required by the Fair Election Act, showed that Emilio Ramon
Ejercito exceeded his authorized expenditure limit, this Is a ground for disqualification under
Section 68 (c) and an offense under Section 100 of the Omnibus Election Code. The law
regulates not only the expenses of the candidate but also those contributed by his contributors,
supporters and donors. (Ejercito v. Commission on Elections, 742 SCRA 210)
Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica filed a certificate of candidacy for city councilor. Her
certificate of candidacy stated that she would be 20 years old on election day. The
Commission on Election summoned her for a hearing regarding her age. Kimberly Da Silva
Cerafica decided to withdraw her certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate. The
Commission on Elections cancelled the certificates of candidacy of Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica
and denied her substitution by Olivia Da Silva Cerafica. HELD: It is the ministerial duty of the
Commission on Elections to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form.
Since Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica was an official candidate, she was validly substituted. She
validly withdrew here certificate of candidacy after the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy. Olivia Da Silva Cerafica belonged to her political party and filed her certificate of
candidacy not later than mid-day of election day. If Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica made a
misrepresentation as to her age, her eligibility may be questioned only through a petition to
deny due course or to cancel her certificate of candidacy. (Cerafica v. Commission on
Elections, 743 SCRA 426)
II. Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
A. Absence of Basis

Luis Villafuerte and Miguel Villafuerte were opposing candidates for governor of Camarines
Sur. Miguel Villafuerte stated in his certificate of candidacy that his nickname was L-Ray Jr.Migz. Luis Villafuerte fried a petition to cancel his certificate of candidacy because of material
misrepresentation. HELD: For the petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy, the material
misrepresentation must involve his eligibility or qualifications for the office to which he seeks
election, such as residence, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification. The nickname is
not a qualification for public office. (Villafuerte v. Commission on Elections, 717 SCRA 312)
John Henry Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor of Toledo City. A
petition to deny due course and to cancel his certificate of candidacy and to disqualify him was
filed. It was alleged that he falsely declared under oath that he had been a resident of Toledo
City for fifteen years before the election. HELD: John Henry Osmea sufficiently established
his residence in Toledo City. In April 24, 2006, he applied for the transfer of his voters
registration record to Toledo City. He purchased a parcel of land in Toledo City in 1995 and
constructed an improvement, which served as his residence since 2004. He acquired another
parcel of land in Toledo City in December 2011 and transferred his headquarters to Toledo
City in 2011. (Jalover v. Osmena. 730 SCRA 267)
B. Existence of Basis
Gamal Hayudini filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi.
Mustapha Omar filed a petition to deny due course or cancel his certificate of candidacy on the
ground of false representation, because he was actually residing in Zamboanga City.
Gamal Hayudini filed a petition for inclusion in the list of voters in South Ubian. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court granted it. On the same day, the Commission on Elections
dismissed the petition of Mustapha Omar for insufficiency of evidence.
The decision ordering the exclusion of the name of Gamal Hayudini from the list of voters
was appealed to the Regional Trial Court and reversed. Mustapha Omar filed in the Commission
on Elections a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Gamal Hayudini;
Meanwhile, he appealed the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Gamal Hayudini was proclaimed elected as mayor. The Commission on Elections
issued a resolution cancelling the certificate of candidacy of Gamal Hayudini. He filed a motion
for reconsideration, but it was denied. HELD: By virtue of the finality of the decision deleting
the name of Gamal Hayudini from the list of voters, he was rendered ineligible to run for public
office. Since he was never a valid candidate, the votes cast for him are stray. Salmo Omar,
who got the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, was properly proclaimed
as the duly elected mayor. (Hayudini v. Commission on Elections, 723 SCRA 223)
III. Transfer of Employees
On May 28, 2010, Mayor Hernando Biron issued an order detailing Elsie Causing, the
civil registrar, at his office. Elsie Causing filed a complaint against Mayor Hernando Biron for
violation of Section 26(h) of the Omnibus Election Code because he transferred or detailed her
to another office during the election period without the authorization from the Commission on
Elections: HELD: Transfer and detail have been defined as movement ffom one agency to
another. The movement of Elsie Cansing did not involve a transfer or detail. Her office was
transferred physically a few steps away from her old office. There was a mere change of office
location. She continued performing her tasks and receiving her salaries as municipal registrar.
(Causing v -Commission on Election, 734 SCRA 495)
Rey Aquino, the president of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, reassigned
several officers and employees during the election period without the prior consent of the
Commission on Elections. The Commission on Election filed a case against him for violation of
Section 26(h) of the Omnibus Elections Code. HELD: Transfer includes reassignment,
because the terms transfer and detail are modified by the terms whatever. The term

"whatever means anything at all. Rey Aquino completed the cast of causing the
reassignment of the affected officers and employees before the start of the election period. He
cannot be held liable for Violation of Section 26(h) of the Omnibus Election Code. (Aquino v.
Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 211789, March 12,2015)