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71Wash.U.L.Q.1189

SentencingandPunishment

WashingtonUniversityLawQuarterly

SentencingGuidelines
NatureofDefendantObstructiveConductand
DegreeofDefendant'sAcceptanceof
Responsibility

WILLFULBLINDNESS:APERMISSIBLESUBSTITUTEFORACTUALKNOWLEDGEUNDERTHEMONEYLAUNDER
1993
FransJ.VonKaenel

WashingtonUniversityLawQuarterly (Approx.40pages)

SecondarySources

Note

WILLFULBLINDNESS:APERMISSIBLESUBSTITUTEFOR
ACTUALKNOWLEDGEUNDERTHEMONEYLAUNDERING
CONTROLACT?
FransJ.VonKaenel
Copyright(c)1993bytheWashingtonUniversityFransJ.VonKaenel
1

P17.02SELECTEDGUIDELINE
ADJUSTMENTSANDMULTIPLE
COUNTTREATMENT
TaxFraud&Evasion17.02
...ChapterThreeofthesentencingguidelines
isentitledAdjustments.Thischapterpermits
theoffenseleveldeterminedbyChapterTwo
foratax,moneylaundering,orcurrency
reportingoffensetobe...

APPENDIXIFEDERALSTATUTES

Moneylaundering isthewhitecollarcrimeofthe1990s. Prosecutionsunderthe


MoneyLaunderingControlActof1986(MLCA), 3 onceconfinedexclusivelytodrug
traffickers, 4 haveexpandedtoensnareattorneys, 5 automobiledealers, 6 arealestate
agent, 7 aformerstate*1190legislator, 8 andevenarabbi. 9 GiventheMLCA'sbroad
definitionofpredicateunlawfulactivity,therangeofconceivablemoneylaundering
prosecutionsislimitedonlybyaprosecutor'simagination. 10 Accordingly,itisnowlikely
thatmoneylaunderingchargeswillbeincludedineveryfederalprosecutioninvolving
money. 11

FDAEnforcementMan.AppendixI

Ostensibly,theMLCAseekstotransformmoneylaunderersintocommercialpariahs
thatlegitimatebusinesseswillshun. 12 Recentprosecutionsunderthestatute,however,
havesignificantlyweakenedthe*1191requirednexusbetweenunderlyingcriminal
activityandliability. 13 TheMLCA'slegislativehistorycontemplatesbroadapplicationto
reachallindividualswhoknowinglyfacilitatethemoneylaunderingprocess. 14 Courts
haverelaxedtheMLCA'sscienterrequirementandtherebyplacedasignificant
investigatoryburdenuponbusinesspersonswhoriskprosecutionunderwhathas
becomethestatute'salternatescienterrequirementofwillfulblindness. 15 TheMLCA,
ascurrentlyapplied,requiresindividualstodeterminewhichclientsaremoney
launderersandwhicharenot. 16 Thisburdeniscompoundedbyuncertaintyinthelaw
astotheproperuseofwillfulblindnessasasubstituteforactualknowledgeincriminal
prosecutions. 17 Nevertheless,everyfederalcourtofappealshasadoptedsomeformof
adeliberateignoranceinstructionequatingwillfulblindnesswithactualknowledge. 18

43A.L.R.Fed.2d365(Originallypublishedin
2010)

*1192Initially,applicationofthewillfulblindnessdoctrineinmoneylaunderingcases
appearswellsettled.However,closeranalysisrevealslatentandunresolved
philosophicalandlegalquestions. 19 Theprimaryphilosophicalquestioniswhether
willfulblindnessrequiredthatfactfindersimputesubjectiveknowledgetocriminal
defendantsintheabsenceofactualknowledgeorobjectiveconfirmation. 20 Two
correspondinglegalissuesareraised.First,doesamoneylaunderingprosecution
premisedonwillfulblindnessimpingeupontheconstitutionaldueprocessrequirement
ofproofofknowledgebeyondareasonabledoubt? 21 Second,ifthejudiciarydeparts
fromthestatutoryrequirementofknowledge,albeItwithimplicitcongressionalconsent,
doesitunjustifiablyencroachupontheexclusivelegislativemandatetodefinecriminal
conduct? 22
ThisNoteaddressesthedisparitybetweentheMLCA'sexplicitscienterrequirementof
actualknowledgeandtheimpositionofadefactostandardofimputedknowledgeunder
thedoctrineofwillfulblindness.PartIanalyzesthestatutorylanguageoftheMLCAand
Congress'adoptionoftheknowingscienterrequirement.PartIIexploresthedoctrineof
willfulblindnessanditsroleinAmericanjurisprudence.Inparticular,PartIIanalyzes
theproprietyofequatingwillfulblindnesswithactualknowledgeorrecklessness.Part
IIIexaminestworecentfederalprosecutionsundertheMLCAthatillustratehowcourts
areapplyingthewillfulblindnessdoctrineunderthestatute.PartIVhighlightsthe

...Whoevermakesorpresentstoanyperson
orofficerinthecivil,military,ornavalservice
oftheUnitedStates,ortoanydepartmentor
agencythereof,anyclaimuponoragainstthe
UnitedStates,or...

ConstructionandApplicationof
U.S.S.G.,s3B1.1(a),18U.S.C.A.,
ProvidingSentencingEnhancementfor
OrganizerorLeaderofCriminal
ActivityDrugOffenses

...Thisannotationcollectsanddiscussesthe
caseswhichhaveconsideredthepropriety,in
drugoffensecases,ofthesentencing
enhancementprovidedforinU.S.S.G.
3B1.1(a),forthosewhoactas"org...
SeeMoreSecondarySources

Briefs
BriefofAppellee
2004WL2732381
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,Appellee,v.
TravisZIESMAN,Appellant.
UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,EighthCircuit.
2004
...I.WHETHERTHEDISTRICTCOURT
ABUSEDITSDISCRETIONINREFUSING
TODISQUALIFYTHEPROSECUTOR
WHENDEFENDANTFAILEDTO
DEMONSTRATETHATTHEPROSECUTOR
WASANECESSARYWITNESS.Gajewskiv.
UnitedStates,...

BriefofAppellee
2009WL1699644
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,Appellee,v.
RamonaCUNNINGHAM,Appellant.
UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,EighthCircuit.
May29,2009
...FN1.Inthisbrief,RreferstotheDistrict
CourtClerk'sRecord,followedbydocket
numberofthereferenceddocument.PT
referstothetranscriptofthechangeofplea
hearing,followedbypage...

BriefofAppellee
2009WL1849318
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,Appellee,v.
RamonaCUNNINGHAM,Appellant.
UnitedStatesCourtofAppeals,EighthCircuit.
May29,2009
...RamonaCunningham,defendantappellant,
appealshersentenceonconvictionpursuant

problemsinherentinMLCAprosecutionsapplyingthewillfulblindnessstandardand
suggeststhatCongressamendtheMLCAtoincludeawillfulblindnessscienter
requirement.
I.LegislativeHistoryoftheMLCA
23

CongressenactedtheMLCA tocurbthegrowthofmoneylaundering*1193inthe
UnitedStates. 24 Previouseffortstothwartthisactivitywerelimitedbytheshortcomings
ofthefirstmoneylaunderingstatute,theBankSecrecyActof1970. 25 TheMLCA
significantlyenhancesthefederalgovernment'sabilitytocombatmoneylaunderingby
imposingburdensomesentencingandforfeitureprovisions. 26
TheMLCAiscomprisedoftwocomplementarysectionsthattargetdifferentaspectsof
moneylaundering. 27 Section1956specifiestwocategoriesofoffensestransactional
offenses 28 andtransportational*1194offenses. 29 Bothcategoriesrequirethe
governmenttoprovethatthedefendant:(1)tookpartinafinancialtransactioninvolving
theproceedsofaspecifiedunlawfulactivity(2)knewthatthepropertyinvolvedwasthe
proceedsofaspecifiedunlawfulactivityand(3)knewthatthetransactionwasdesigned,
inwholeorinpart,eithertoconcealordisguisetheproceeds,oravoidatransaction
reportingrequirement. 30
Section1957ismuchbroaderinscopethansection1956. 31 Section1957prohibitsone
fromknowinglyengaginginamonetarytransactioninvolvingproceedsfromspecified
unlawfulactivitiesinexcessof$10,000. 32 Significantly,thisprohibitionextendstothe
provisionofgoodsandservices,includinglegalservices. 33
A.TheStatutoryKnowledgeRequirement
TheMLCA'sscienterrequirementistheproductoflegislativecompromise*1195and
hasteratherthanawellreasonedpolicydecision. 34 Inordertosustainamoney
launderingconviction,sections1956and1957bothrequireknowledgethattheproperty
involvedisderivedfromorrepresentstheproceedsofsomeunlawfulactivity. 35 Because
Congresshadpreviouslyrejectedbillsincorporatingreasontoknow 36 andreckless
disregard 37 standardsofknowledge,Congress'adoptionofthisstandardwasbyno
meansintuitive. 38
Ultimately,thehigherknowingstandardprevailed,butonlywiththe*1196understanding
thatitwouldbeconstruedlikeexistingknowingscienterrequirementstoinclude
instancesofwillfulblindness. 39 However,Congressoverlookedthelackofjudicial
consensusonthepropercorrelationbetweenthetwomentalstates. 40 Congressthusput
itsimprimaturontheindeterminacyofresultinherentinmoneylaunderingprosecutions
premisedonwillfulblindness.
ThestatutorylanguageoftheMLCArequiresamentalstateofknowledge.Inpractice,
however,theactualscienterrequirementissignificantlyreduced. 41 Ratherthandilutethe
knowledgerequirementdirectlybyadoptingalowerscienterrequirement,Congressdid
soindirectlybyerodingtheburdenofproof. 42 ASenatereportoutliningtherequirements
forprosecutionundersection1956providesthataparticipantneednotknowthatthe
proceedsweretheproductofaspecifiedillegalactivity,onlythattheyweretheproductof
someillegalactivity. 43 Whilethisconstructionpreventsadefendantfrompleading
ignorance,orintentionallyeludingthepredicateactscontainedinthesection,its
seeminglylimitlessapplicationisunacceptablybroad. 44
Asenacted,theMLCA'sscienterrequirementisilldefinedandunworkable.TheSenate
reportprovidesseveralhypotheticalsthatinadequatelydescribeapplicationofthewillful
blindnessdoctrineunderthestatute. 45 Inhisanalysisofthehypotheticals,G.Richard
Strafernotes*1197howtheyunderscorethevaguenessoftheMLCA'sscienter
requirement. 46 IncorporatingthewillfulblindnessdoctrineintheMLCApurportsto
movethescienterrequirementawayfromactualknowledge,butsuchintentisnot
reflectedinthestatutorylanguage.Strafercommentsthatthewillfulblindness
inferenceimpermissiblyshiftstheburdenofprooftothedefendantbecausethe
prosecutorisnotrequiredtoproducedirectevidenceindicatingpreciselywhatknowledge
thedefendantisallegedtohaveconsciouslyavoided. 47 Afactfinderispermittedtoinfer
thatthedefendant,infact,harboredsuchunspecifiedknowledge. 48 Thisburdenofproof
shiftisundesirablebecauseittendstocreateapresumptionofguilt. 49
WhenCongressadoptsalegaltermofartwithwellproscribedmeaning,itpresumably
knowsandadoptsthatwidelyheldinterpretation. 50 Theproperapplicationofthisruleof
statutoryconstructionislimitedinthecaseofthedoctrineofwillfulblindness.Thereis

toapleaagreementofonecountof
conspiracytocommitfraudormisapplication
concerningfederalfundsunderWorkf...
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TrialCourtDocuments
Tisiusv.State
2004WL5905429
MichaelTISIUS,Movant,v.StateofMissouri,
Respondent.
CircuitCourtofMissouri.
Nov.04,2004
...ComesnowtheCourtandmakesits
FindingsofFactandConclusionsofLawand
Judgment:AsanoverviewoftheCourt's
hereinafterdetailedFindingsandConclusions,
theCourtfindsthattheguiltphase...

DavidL.HINTON,Plaintiff,v.SIGMA
ALDRICHCORPORATION,Defendant.
2002WL34127561
DavidL.HINTON,Plaintiff,v.SIGMA
ALDRICHCORPORATION,Defendant.
CircuitCourtofMissouri.
Jan.28,2002
...ThismattercomesbeforetheCourton
Defendant'sMotiontoDismiss.TheCourthas
consideredthepleadings,motions,and
argumentsofthepartiesandnowrulesas
follows.Plaintiff,DavidL.Hinton,...

JohnC.CRAFT,SpecialDeputy
LiquidatorofMeadowlarkInsurance
Company,Plaintiff,v.StephenJ.
RHOADES,etal.,Defendants.
2002WL33946299
JohnC.CRAFT,SpecialDeputyLiquidatorof
MeadowlarkInsuranceCompany,Plaintiff,v.
StephenJ.RHOADES,etal.,Defendants.
CircuitCourtofMissouri.
June17,2002
...Inresponsetotheparties'motionsfornew
trial,thecourtdoes,thisdate,entersthese
amendedfindingsoffactandconclusionsof
law.Thiscasepresentsasetoffactsdifferent
fromtheusualcl...
SeeMoreTrialCourtDocuments

asurprisinglackofuniformitysurroundingthecommonlawevolutionofthedoctrineof
willfulblindness. 51 Asaresultofthediscrepancybetweencongressionalintent*1198
andstatutoryconstruction,thejudiciaryislefttodivinetheproperstandardtoapply.
Courtshavenothesitatedtoexercisethisinterpretivepower,whichhasresultedinthe
promulgationofinconsistentstandards. 52 Forpreciselythisreason,thefederal
judiciary'spowertodeterminecriminalactivityisgenerallyconfinedtothelanguageused
incriminalstatutes. 53
Atbest,Congress'adoptionofthewillfulblindnessstandardasevidencedby
statementsintheCongressionalRecordservesasarebuttablepresumptionofimputed
knowledge.Willfulblindnessiswellestablishedasanindependentmentalstate. 54
However,theroutinesubstitutionofwillfulblindnessforactualknowledgehasno
foundationinthestatutorylanguage 55 andcannotbejustifiedbyrelianceonthe
legislativehistoryoftheMLCA. 56
*1199II.TheDoctrineofWillfulBlindness
Thedoctrineofwillfulblindnessexpandsthetraditionalstandardofknowledge,which
requiresactualawarenessoftheexistenceofaparticularfact. 57 Willfulblindness
requiresananalysisofsubjectivemensreaandanobjectiveassessmentofblamein
accordwithwhatisreasonable. 58 Thedoctrinethusconstructsagreatermentalstate
thananactormayhaveactuallyhadandisjustifiedbythedeliberateactionof
disregardingapreviouslyrealizedpossibility. 59 ProfessorGlanvilleWilliams'influential
analysisofwillfulblindnessconcludesthatwillfulblindnessrequiressuspicion,
realizationofprobabilityandavoidanceofconfirmation. 60
Irregularcircumstancesmayengendersuspicionthatone'sintendedactivitymayproduce
aresultcontrarytoestablishedlegalnorms. 61 Ifoneimplementsaplan,withoutfurther
investigation,thecommonlawimputes*1200tohimknowledgeofwhathewouldhave
knownhadhenotchosentoremainignorantofthefact. 62 Suchculpableconducthas
assumedvariousnames, 63 butsemanticsaside,theimportofthedoctrineistoestablish
alinkbetweenknowledgeanddeliberateignorancebyassigningequalculpabilityto
each. 64
InAmericanjurisprudence,thedoctrineofwillfulblindnesshasbeenrecognizedasa
substituteforactualknowledgefornearlyacentury. 65 Initially,however,judgeswere
hesitanttoendorsethedoctrineandmostdecisionsthatrelieduponthetheorydidso
withlittlesupportfortheirconclusions. 66 Duringthe1970s,themoderndoctrineof
willfulblindnessemergedasaresultoffederalnarcoticsprosecutions.
Theinterplayoftwoeventswasinstrumentalintheestablishmentofthemoderndoctrine.
First,CongresspassedtheComprehensiveDrugAbusePreventionandControlActof
1970. 67 Thisstatuteprohibitsknowingimportationofcontrolledsubstances 68 and
knowingpossessionofsuchsubstanceswithanintenttodistribute. 69 However,because
thedefinitionofknowledgeatthetimewaslargelyconfinedtoactualknowledge,drug
traffickersanduserschargedunderthestatutewereabletosuccessfullyinvokethe
deliberateignorancedefense. 70 Second,inTurnerv.UnitedStates, 71 theSupreme
CourtadoptedtheModelPenalCodedefinitionof*1201knowledge,whichrecognizes
deliberateignoranceasasubstituteforknowledge. 72
TheModelPenalCodesignificantlylimitsthecommonlawmensreaconceptof
knowledge. 73 UndertheModelPenalCode,willfulblindnessrequiresawarenessofa
highprobabilityoftheexistenceofafactandanabsenceofanactualbeliefthatthefact
doesnotexist. 74 Thisstandard,explicitlyadoptedinTurner, 75 isanawkward
restatementofthewillfulblindnessdoctrine 76 andpresentstwodilemmas.First,the
highprobabilitylanguageencompassesthestandardofbothknowledgeand
recklessness,aproblemwhichthedraftersrecognizedbutleftunresolved. 77 Second,it
isinconceivablethatonecanrecognizethehighprobabilitythatheisinreceiptof
proceedsderivedfromcriminalactivity,yetstillbelievethattheproceedsarenotinfact
criminallyderived. 78
Turnerlegitimatestheuseofwillfulblindnessasasubstituteforknowledge,butitoffers
noexplanationorguidancebeyondthatprovided*1202intheModelPenalCode. 79 As
theCourtfailedtodelineateadefinitivewillfulblindnessstandard,thetaskfelltothe
trialcourts. 80 Thus,thedoctrinedevelopedinanadhocfashionwithoutsufficientcritical
analysisoftheculpabilityrequirementsofknowledgeasdistinctfromtheculpability
requirementsofwillfulblindness. 81 Theresulthasbeenconfusionandrampant
indeterminacy. 82

A.UnitedStatesv.Jewell
UnitedStatesv.Jewell 83 isthetouchstoneforthemoderndoctrineofwillfulblindness
andprovidesthedefinitivejudicialanalysisofthedoctrine.InJewell,thedefendantwas
convictedofimporting110poundsofmarijuana.Themarijuanahadbeenconcealedina
secretcompartmentinacardrivenintotheUnitedStatesfromMexico. 84 Thestatute
underwhichJewellwasprosecutedrequiresknowledgeofthepresenceofthecontrolled
substance. 85 Jewelltestifiedthathedidnotknowthatmarijuanawascontainedinthe
compartment. 86 However,therewasevidencethatJewellknewofthecompartmentand
hadknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatitcontainedmarijuana.Moreover,evidence
indicatedthatJewell*1203deliberatelyavoidedpositiveknowledgeofthecontrabandto
avoidresponsibilityintheeventofdiscovery. 87
Affirmingtheconviction,theNinthCircuitusedathreesteprationaleforequating
deliberateignorancewithknowledge. 88 First,thecourtnotedthatthedeliberate
ignorancedoctrineisfoundthroughoutthecriminallaw. 89 Second,thecourtnotedthat
substantivejustificationfortheruleexistsbecausedeliberateignoranceandpositive
knowledgeareequallyculpable. 90 Finally,fortextualjustification,thecourtadoptedthe
ModelPenalCodedefinitionofknowledge,whichreflectsthebeliefthatoneknows
factsevenintheabsenceofsubjectivecertainty. 91 Citingsociety'sinterestinpunishing
thosewhoareequallyculpable, 92 thecourtsoughttoevisceratethedeliberate
ignorancedefensebyacknowledgingaseparatemensreaofwillfulblindness. 93
Thecourt'sdecisionwasnotunanimousandcontainsaspiriteddissentreflecting
disagreementovertheproperapplicationofthedoctrine.JudgeKennedycriticized
relaxationoftheModelPenalCodestandard 94 toallowconvictionbaseduponan
objectivetheoryofknowledge. 95 Stressingtheimportanceofevidenceofsubjective
belief,albeitcircumstantial,Kennedyreadsection2.02(7)oftheModelPenalCodeasa
definitionratherthanasubstituteforknowledge. 96 Althoughequallyculpable,Kennedy
viewedapplyingwillfulblindnessunderastatutespecificallyrequiringknowledgeasan
elementofthecrimeasanunjustifiedexpansionofthestatutory*1204language. 97
JudgeKennedyconcludedthatwhenastatutespecifiesamensreaofknowledge,the
substitutionofanothermentalstateisunjustifiedevenifthecourtdeemsthatbothmental
statesareequallyculpable. 98
B.DeconstructingWillfulBlindness
Despiteitswideacceptance,thereisanundercurrentofdissatisfactionwiththewillful
blindnessinstruction 99 andcourtshavenothesitatedtoimposetheirownrestrictions
uponitsapplication. 100 Equatingwillfulblindnesswithactualknowledgeisinherently
problematicasthetwostandardsarenotinterchangeable. 101 Judicialsubstitutionof
willfulblindnessforactualknowledgepushesthelimitsofjudicialdiscretion 102 and
maycontravenetheDueProcessClauseoftheConstitution. 103 In*1205addition,there
isconcernaboutajury'sabilitytoproperlyapplythestandard. 104
InUnitedStatesv.Ramsey, 105 theSeventhCircuitaddressedtheinadequacyofitsown
willfulblindnessinstruction, 106 whichitdeemedsomewhatopaque 107 andunhelpful
tojurors. 108 Thecourtinitiallynotedthat,althoughthedoctrinemaybeusefulasa
judicialconcept,itonlyconfoundsthelayjuror. 109 Thecourtobservedthatthedoctrine's
inherentambiguitiesandarcanelanguagedonotfullyconveytoajurythatadefendant
whohasenoughknowledgetopromptaninvestigation,butthenfailstodoso,reallydoes
knowallthatthelawrequiresforconviction.*1206 110 Conversely,thecourtstatedthat
itisimportanttomakethejuryunderstandthatalargeamountofinformationisrequired
topromptfurtherinvestigationotherwise,theprosecutionisrelievedofitsburdenof
provingknowledgebeyondareasonabledoubt. 111 Thecourtdidnotgosofarasto
condemnthedeliberateignoranceinstruction,butiturgedtheadoptionofanew
instructionthatwouldbetterexplainthepurposeofthedoctrineandthefactualbasis
requiredtosupportafindingofculpabilityunderitsterms. 112
SoonaftertheJewelldecision,theNinthCircuitrecognizedthedangersofjury
indecisivenessandsoughttolimittheapplicationofthewillfulblindnessinstruction.In
UnitedStatesv.MurrietaBejarano, 113 thedefendantchallengedtheproprietyofan
instructionbasedontheModelPenalCode. 114 Thecourtupheldtheconvictionbut
cautionedthattheJewellinstructionshouldnotbegiveninallcasesinwhichthe
defendantclaimslackofknowledge,butonlyinthosecomparativelyrarecases*1207
where,inaddition,therearefactswhichpointinthedirectionofdeliberateignorance. 115
Failuretorestricttheinstructionwouldcreateanimpermissiblepresumptionofguiltand
allowajurytoinferknowledgewhenitotherwisewouldnothavedoneso. 116

Incorporatingtheabovementionedlimitations,thewillfulblindnessinstructionhas
survivedjudicialscrutinyrelativelyintact.Althoughwillfulblindnessisrecognizedasa
distinctmentalstate, 117 itoccupiesatenuousmiddlegroundbetweenactualknowledge
andrecklessness.Asahybridmentalstate,willfulblindnessisaproductofboth
knowledgeandrecklessness.Nevertheless,itcannotbeusedinterchangeablywitheither
ofthesetraditionalconceptsofculpability. 118 Thetaskthenistodeterminewhatactivity
thewillfulblindnessdoctrineintendstopunishandtoformadefinitionthatisdistinct
fromrecklessnessandlessculpablethanactualknowledge.
C.TheConflictofObjectiveandSubjectiveKnowledge
UndertheMLCA,onewhoengagesinamonetarytransactionknowingthattheproperty
involvedisderivedfromsomeunlawfulactivityissubjecttoprosecution. 119 Itisunclear,
however,whetherthestatuterequires*1208objectiveorsubjectivecriteria. 120 Subjective
knowledgeimpliesknowledgeofaparticularfactorcircumstancepossessedbysome
knowingsubjectwhileobjectiveknowledgeconsistsofthelogicalcontentofour
theories,conjectures,andguesses. 121 Viewedseparately,thedistinctionbetween
objectiveandsubjectiveknowledgeisreadilyapparent.However,whenintertwinedwithin
thecontextofthewillfulblindnessdoctrine,impositionofobjectivestandardsupon
subjectiveperceptionblursthedistinction.
Inwillfulblindnessprosecutions,subjectiveknowledgeistaintedbytheimpositionof
objectivestandardsincompatiblewithaknowingscienterrequirement.Tohave
knowledge,onemusthavesubjectivecertainty. 122 Subjectivecertaintyrequires
awarenessoftheexistenceofaparticularfactorcircumstance. 123 Conversely,absence
ofabeliefofaparticularfactnegatesknowledgeofthatfact. 124 Thus,asamensrea
requirement,knowledgerequiresasubjectiveratherthananobjectivetest. 125 Inshort,a
findingofknowledgeundertheMLCArequires:(1)abelieforfeelingofnearcertainty,(2)
thatissubjectiveand(3)thatiscorrect. 126
Anobjectivesearchforsubjectiveknowledgeisproblematic.Astandardrequiringthefact
findertodeterminewhetherthedefendantharboredtherequisiteknowledgeofsome
unlawfulactivityisrenderedunworkablebytheproblemofverification. 127 Thefact
finder'sinquiryinevitablybecomesindirectandimposesobjectivestandardsuponthe
defendant'sstateofsubjectiveknowledge. 128 Withoutresortingtoobjectivecriteria,for
example,oughttohaveknownorthereasonablepersonwouldhave*1209known,
thefactfinderisincapableofidentifyingsubjectiveintent.Thus,thesearchforsubjective
knowledgeinevitablyleadsfullcirclebacktoimposingobjectivecriteria. 129 Theresulting
interpretivedilemmaforcesajurytosearchinvainfortheelusivecorrespondence
betweensubjectiveknowledgeandobjectiveproof. 130 Theresultingillegitimatechainof
inferencesleavesjurorsindoubtandtherebydilutesthecriminallaw. 131
Objectiveassessmentofanotherperson'sstateofmindnecessarilydependsupon
circumstantialevidence.However,theMLCAprovidesnoguidancedetailinghowafact
finderistoascertaintheexistenceofevidencesufficienttosustainaconviction.Judges
andjuriesareleftnochoicebuttoimposeatleastsomedegreeofobjectivityintotheir
assessmentofmensrea. 132 Thisindeterminacyallowsalooseinterplaybetween
objectiveandsubjectivestandardswithinwhichafactfindercanjustifyfindingornot
findinganydesiredresultinagivencase. 133
III.ApplicationoftheWillfulBlindnessDoctrineinMoneyLaundering
Prosecutions
TheMLCA'slackofaclearscienterrequirementfostershaphazardapplicationofthe
statuteandcontradictoryresults.InUnitedStatesv.Antzoulatos, 134 theSeventhCircuit
attemptedtodeterminewhenamerchantorsellerknowsthatatransactionisbeing
consummatedwithtaintedmoney. 135 Concludingthatitiswellsettledthatwillful
blindnessistheequivalentofknowledge,thecourtendorsedtheconscious*1210
avoidanceinstructionwhensupportedbytheevidence. 136
TheSeventhCircuitfirstrejectedthedefendant'sclaimthattheDueProcessClauseof
theFifthAmendmentprotectsmerchants'rightstocontractorengageinalawful
occupation. 137 InterpretingsubstantivedueprocessrightsinthepostLochner 138 era,
thecourtnotedthatdueprocessdoesnotprovideblanketprotectionagainst
governmentinterferencewithpropertyrights. 139 ThecourtheldthattheMLCAdoesnot
violatedueprocessbecauseitplacesonlyanarrowrestrictionuponamerchant'sright
tosellhisproperty. 140 Merchantscanstillengageintransactions,theyaremerelybarred
fromsellingtothosewhomtheyknowtobemoneylaunderers. 141

Addressingtheproblemofhowtoidentifyknowledge,thecourtfashionedatestpremised
uponthedefendant'sdirectobservationofunlawfulactivityoradmissionbytheclientthat
thetransactionmoneyistainted. 142 Recognizingtheproblemsinherentinitsown
test, 143 the*1211courtneverthelessexpressedconfidencethatcourtsarecapableof
ferretingoutprosecutionsthatrelyuponinsufficientevidence. 144 Wishfulthinking,
however,doeslittletofleshouttheparametersofknowledgeundertheMLCAand
underscoresthepotentialforcapriciousandirreconcilableresults.
TheFourthCircuit'sdecisioninUnitesStatesv.Campbell 145 typifiestheinherent
ambiguityintheapplicationofwillfulblindnessinmoneylaunderingprosecutions.In
Campbell,theevidenceshowedthatEllenCampbell,arealtor,hadincludedunreported
cashinthesaleofahometoareputeddrugdealer. 146 Campbellwasconvictedoftwo
countsofmoneylaundering. 147 However,thefederaltrialjudgeoverturnedthejury's
guiltyverdictandacquittedCampbellonthebasisofherposttrialmotion. 148 After
correctlyreadingtheelementsoftheoffense,thetrialjudgestatedthatinaprosecution
ofapersonotherthantheactualmoneylaunderer,theGovernmentmustprovea
purposeofconcealmentandknowledgeofthe...moneylaunderer'sactivities. 149
Onappeal,theFourthCircuitconcludedthatthedistrictcourthaderredininterpretingthe
correctelementsoftheoffense. 150 Theplainlanguage*1212ofthestatuterequiresthe
Governmenttoproveonlythatthedefendantknewthatthetransactionwasdesignedto
concealillegalproceeds. 151 Inshort,theknowledgecomponentcollapsesintoasingle
inquiry:DidCampbellknowthatthefundswerederivedfromanillegalsource? 152
Basedupontheevidencepresented, 153 thecourtconcludedthatareasonablejurycould
notonlyfindCampbellwillfullyblindtothefactthatherclientwasadrugdealer,but
alsothatthepurchaseofthepropertywasintendedtoconcealtheproceedsofhisillegal
drugoperation. 154
TheCampbellcourtplaceditsfaithinthereasonablejury.However,jurieshaveproven
nomoreablethanjudgesatinterpretingthewillfulblindnessdoctrine. 155 Theburden
thusshiftstoCongresstoincorporateanadequatewillfulblindnessprovisioninthe
MLCAthatwillredressthecurrentstateofaffairs.
IV.ProposalforAmendingtheMLCA
Congressshouldcodifyitstacitapprovalofthesubstitutionofwillfulblindnessforactual
knowledgeinmoneylaunderingprosecutions. 156 Thefailuretodosohasengendered
adiscrepancybetweentheMLCA'sstatutoryrequirementofactualknowledgeandthe
judiciary'sadoptionofawillfulblindnessdefinitionthatdoesnotcomportwithwhatis
traditionallyunderstoodtobeknowledge. 157 Thedangersinherentinmaintainingthe
statusquoaretwofold.First,thejudiciary'sadoptionofaninconsistentwillfulblindness
standardthreatenstousurptheexclusivecongressionalmandatetolegislate. 158
Second,willfulblindnessissimplynotthe*1213equivalentofrecklessnessoractual
knowledge. 159 Congressclearlyintendedthatwillfulblindnesssufficeasaculpable
mensreaforprosecutionundertheMLCA,butitfailedtodosoexplicitly. 160 This
oversightshouldnowberemediedbyadoptionofaclearlydefinedwillfulblindness
provisionintheMLCA.
Thewillfulblindnessdoctrinedefiescategorizationbecauseitoccupiestheattenuated
middlegroundbetweenactualknowledgeandrecklessness. 161 Nevertheless,courtsand
commentatorsalikehavepersistedincategorizingwillfulblindnessaccordingtoModel
PenalCodebased, 162 *1214recklessnessbased, 163 andwillfulnessbased 164
definitionsthatarerespectivelyillsuitedtothetraditionalnotionofwillfulblindness.
ProfessorRobinCharlowadvocatesamoreculpableformofwillfulblindnessthat
circumventsthesecompetingdefinitionsentirelybyfocusingonwhatbehaviorthelaw
seekstopunish. 165 However,giventhe*1215harshnessofsanctionsimposedunderthe
MLCA, 166 caremustbetakentoavoidpunishingthosewhoaretrulyignorantormerely
reckless. 167
Properapplicationofthewillfulblindnessdoctrinerequiresatwostepanalysis.First,
thefactfindermustassesstheactor'ssubjectivementalstatetodeterminewhetheran
inferenceofactualknowledgeofthetransaction'spurposeiswarranted.Second,thefact
findermustthendeterminewhytheactorfailedtonoticeanyobviousrisksortelltale
signsofillegalpurpose. 168 Itisnotinconceivablethatamerchantmaybeunawareof
obvioussignsofillicitconductthatheshouldhavenoticed.However,thisdoesnot
precludethepossibilitythatatthetimeofthetransactionthemerchantwasvirtually
certainof,orwillfullyblindto,theriskofthemoneylaunderingpotentialofthe
transaction. 169 Therefore,itiscrucialtodistinguishawillfullyblindactor,whowantsor

needstobeignorantofsomefactorrisk,fromonewhodoesnotnoticeitbecausehe
simplydoesnotcareorissimplythenaivepawnofhisclients. 170
ImpositionofawillfulblindnessstandardasanalternatemensreaundertheMLCA
safeguardsagainsttheconvictionofunsuspectingmerchantsandremovestheconfusion
surroundingproperapplicationofthedoctrine.Inaddition,establishmentofaseparate
mentalstatebetweenknowledgeandrecklessnessbestcomportswiththebehaviorthat
societywantstopunish.BothAntzoulatos 171 andCampbell 172 areeasycasesbecause
ofthe*1216highlyirregularnatureoftherespectivetransactions. 173 Adecidingfactorin
Campbellwasthegrossdeparturefromstandardbusinesspractices. 174 Suchconduct
justifiablytriggersaheightenedscrutinyofanotherwiseroutinecommercialtransaction.
AnymodificationoftheMLCAscienterrequirementshouldincludearebuttable
presumptionofknowledgeonthepartofthemerchantwhenthetransactioninquestion
departsfromacceptedindustrynorms.
Thefollowingdefinitionofwillfulblindnessincorporatesthenecessarychanges
discussedabove. 175 TheMLCAshouldbeamendedtoprovide:
Willfulblindnessisanappropriatesubstituteforactualknowledgeunder
thisprovision.Apersoniswillfullyblindofamaterialfactorriskifthe
person:(1)isinvolvedinafinancialtransactionthatsubstantiallydeparts
fromreasonableandfamiliarbusinesspractices(2)contemplates,
recognizes,orsuspectsthelikelihoodthataparticularfactorriskexists
and(3)closeshisorhermindtothefactorriskandtherebydeliberately
avoidsconfirmationofthesuspicion,regardlessofanymotivefordoingso.
V.Conclusion
Jewellanditsprogenyrecognizewillfulblindnessasasubstituteforactualknowledge.
Theradicallydifferentstandardsthatcourtscanderivefromthislineofcaseshas
engendereddisparateapplicationofthedoctrine.Culpability,however,shouldnotdepend
uponthevenueinwhichoneisprosecuted. 176 Therefore,Congressshouldamendthe
MLCAtoprovideexplicitguidancetocourtsbyenactingadefinitionofwillfulblindness
suchastheoneproposedinthisNote.

Footnotes
1

Moneylaunderingistheprocessoflegitimizingillicitcashproceedsby
disguisingitssourceandownership.W.JohnMoore,NixingtheCash
Injection,Nat'lL.J.,Dec.2,1989,at2924.Threehundredbilliondollarsis
launderedannuallyworldwide.FocusonDrugMoneyReportUrges,
MoneyLaunderingAlert(AlertInt'l,Inc.),March1990,availableinLEXIS,
NexisLibrary,NwltrsFile.IntheUnitedStates,moneylaunderingisa
$100billionperyearindustry.Thistranslatesroughlyinto26millionpounds
of$20bills.Moore,supra,at2924.Drugtraffickersinparticularare
notoriousdruglaunderersandareliterallydrowningintheirowncash.The
launderingofillicitproceedsisaproblemendemictodruglordsand
commonplacestreetlevelpushersalike.Id.

Intheperiodfrom19881990,theU.S.DepartmentofJusticecharged375
banks,businessesandindividualswithmoneylaundering.Rosalind
Resnick,MoneyLaundering,Nat'lL.J.,May7,1990,at2.Intheperiod
from19851990,46U.S.financialinstitutionswereassessedcivilpenalties
totaling$21millioninmoneylaunderingcases.Id.TheMLCAispoisedto
supplantRICOastheprosecutor'sstatuteofchoice.TheMLCAis
straightforward,yetextremelybroadinscope,andcontainsonerous
sentencingandforfeitureprovisionssimilartothoseinRICO.Elkan
Abramowitz,MoneyLaundering:TheNewRICO?,N.Y.L.J.,Sept.1,1992,
at2.

18U.S.C.1956,1957(1988).ThestatutewasintroducedintheHouse
aspartoftheOmnibusDrugEnforcementEducationandControlActof
1986.SeeH.R.5077,99thCong.,2dSess.(1986).

TheMLCAwasdraftedprimarilytoredressnarcoticstrafficking.SeeUnited
Statesv.Jackson,935F.2d832(7thCir.1991)UnitedStatesv.Lee,886
F.2d998(8thCir.1989)UnitedStatesv.Giles,768F.Supp.101(S.D.N.Y.
1991),aff'd953F.2d636(2dCir.1991)UnitedStatesv.Kimball,711

F.Supp.1031(D.Nev.1989)UnitedStatesv.Manieri,691F.Supp.1394
(S.D.Fla.1988).
5

SeeLoopLawyerGuiltyofMoneyLaundering,UPI,Jan.12,1993,
availableinLEXIS,NexisLibrary,UPIFileLawyerReceives30year
Sentence,MoneyLaunderingAlert(AlertInt'l,Inc.),Nov.1991,availablein
LEXIS,NexisLibrary,NwltrsFile(lawyersentencedto30yearsinprison
andfined$176,000foroverseeingmoneylaunderingoperation).

SeeUnitedStatesv.Antzoulatos,962F.2d720(7thCir.),cert.denied,113
S.Ct.331(1992).Nineteenmanagersandsalesmenofthetenthlargest
automobiledealershipinthecountrywerearrestedafterselling70carsto
undercoverfederalagentswhoinformedthemthatthecarswerebeing
purchasedwiththeproceedsofillegaldrugsales.StephenLabaton,Car
DealersHeldinLaunderingCase,N.Y.Times,Jan.15,1993,atA10.

SeeUnitedStatesv.Campbell,977F.2d854(4thCir.1992),cert.denied,
113S.Ct.1131(1993).

SeeUnitedStatesv.Montoya,945F.2d1068(9thCir.1991).InMontoya,
thefederalgovernmentprosecutedaformerCaliforniastatelegislatorwho
depositeda$3,000checkfromafictitiousFBIfrontcompanyintohis
personalcheckingaccount.Id.at1071.Significantly,reversalofthe
defendant'sHobbesActconvictionforextortionunderthecolorofofficial
rightdidnotrequirereversalofthemoneylaunderingconviction.

MathisChazanov,RabbiOwedMillionsinLoans,CongregantsSay,L.A.
Times,January14,1993,atB1.

10

See18U.S.C.1956(c)(7).Section1956(c)(7)providesalaundrylistof
predicateoffensesthatqualifyasspecifiedunlawfulactivity.SeeUnited
Statesv.Lee,927F.2d1388(9thCir.1991),cert.denied,112S.Ct.9277
(1992)(illegalacquisition,sale,andimportationofsalmoncaughtin
NorthernPacificwaters)UnitedStatesv.Swank,797F.Supp.497(E.D.Va.
1992)(bank/mailfraudprosecution)UnitedStatesv.Gleave,786F.Supp.
258(W.D.N.Y.1992)(bankruptcyfraudprosecution).
SeealsoRobertW.Blanchard&GordonA.Greenberg,WhenMoney
LaunderingLawMeetsEnvironmentalRisks,A.B.A.BankingJ.,July1992,
at66.Blanchard&Greenbergdescribeahypotheticalenvironmental
prosecutionundertheMLCA.Id.at6667.Theauthorsconcludethatthe
MLCAiswronglyconceivedasonlyanantidrugmeasure.Id.Inthe
environmentalarea,thestatutecoversviolationsoftheFederalWater
PollutionControlAct,theSafeDrinkingWaterActandtheResource
ConservationandRecoveryAct.See18U.S.C.1956(c)(7)(E).Blanchard
&Greenbergposedthefollowinghypotheticalthatillustratestheperils
inherentintheMLCA:
RustBelthasbeenaskedtomodifyarevolvingloancommitmentwith
GreenValleyMills.GreenValleyrequiresadditionalfundstoimprovean
antipollutionsysteminstalledwiththeoriginalloanproceeds.Thesystem
isn'tworkingsatisfactorilyanditisprobablethathazardouschemicalshave
beenreleasedinexcessoffederalstandards.
GreenValleymanagementproposestocontinueoperatingduringthefour
monthsitwilltaketoinstalltheimprovements.Shuttingtheplantdown
wouldlikelydrivetheloanintodefault.Atthesametime,GreenValley
assuresthebankthatanyreleaseinexcessoffederalstandardswon'tlikely
besignificantandisunlikelytobedetected.Thebank,thoughconcerned,
doesn'tseethatithasmuchchoicebuttoextendtheadditionalcredit.
Oneyearlater,GreenValleypleadsguiltytoaviolationoftheCleanWater
Act.Subsequently,thebankissubpoenaedbeforeafederalgrandjury
investigatingpotentialviolationoftheMLCA.BecauseGreenValleyofficials
testifiedthatthecompanytoldthebankthatreleasescouldexceedfederal
standards,theEPAintendstodemonstratethattheloanpaymentsreceived
bythebankwhileGreenValleywaspollutingconstitutereceiptofproceeds
ofspecifiedunlawfulactivityinviolationof1956.

Id.
11

Resnick,supranote2,at1.

12

G.RichardStrafer,MoneyLaundering:TheCrimeofthe90's,27
Am.Crim.L.Rev.149,167(1989).

13

See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Antzoulatos,962F.2d720,724(7thCir.),cert.
denied,113S.Ct.331(1992).TheAntzoulatoscourtwasunabletolocate
anycasesdiscussingtheconstitutionalityofasection1956money
launderingprosecutionofamerchantorsalespersonnotchargedwithan
underlyingcriminalact.Id.Nevertheless,thecourtconcludedthat[n]othing
inthelanguageofSection1956(a)(1)(B),however,distinguishesbetween
personsdirectlyinvolvedintheunlawfulactivityandthoseinvolvedonlyin
launderingtheproceedsoftheunlawfulactivity.Id.

14

SeeH.R.Rep.No.855,99thCong.,2dSess.1315(1986)[hereinafter
HouseReport].Stockbrokers,realestateagents,autodealers,jewelers,
andpreciousmetaldealersaresingledoutaspotentialtargetsof
prosecution.Id.Inshort,[i]fyouknowthat[a]personisatraffickerandhas
thisincomederivedfromtheoffense,youbetterbewareofdealingwiththat
person.Id.at14.

15

Thedoctrineofwillfulblindnessimputessubjectiveknowledgeofillegal
activitytoadefendantandisusedinbothcivilandcriminalproceedingsas
asubstitutementalstatethatfullysatisfiesarequiredmeansreaof
knowledge.Seeinfranotes5764andaccompanyingtextforanindepth
discussionofthewillfulblindnessdoctrine.
InthisNote,thetermwillfulblindnessisusedinterchangeablywitha
varietyofotherlabelsforthedoctrine,including,consciousavoidance,
deliberateignorance,andtheostrichinstruction.

16

SeeStrafer,supranote12,at172(Thebankerorbusinessmanissimply
supposedtoknowonewhenheseesoneandrefrainfromwhatwould
otherwisebenormalcommercialactivity.)Moore,supranote1,at2928
(Basically,thebankerhasbecomeajuniorGman.).

17

SeeTomalav.UnitedStates,112S.Ct.1997(1992)(White,J.,dissenting).
JusticeWhite,dissentingfromtheCourt'sdenialofcertiorari,expressed
concernabouttheindeterminacyofthewillfulblindnessdoctrineas
interpretedbythecourts:[T]heoutcomeofaFederalcriminalprosecution
shouldnotdependuponthecircuitinwhichthecaseistried.Id.InTomala,
theGovernmentconcededthattheoutcomeofthepetitioner'scasemight
havebeendifferenthaditbeentriedinanothercircuitandcitedconflicting
decisionsbythecourtsofappealsfortheNinthandTenthCircuits.Id.See
UnitedStatesv.deFranciscoLopez,939F.2d1405,1410(10thCir.1991)
(Thedeliberateignoranceinstructionmustnotbegivenunlessevidence,
directorcircumstantial,showsthatdefendant'sclaimedignoranceofan
operantfactwasdeliberate.).ButseeUnitedStatesv.SanchezRobles,
927F.2d1070,1073(9thCir.1991)(statingthatdeliberateignorance
instructionrequiresfactsandcircumstancescreatingahighprobabilityof
criminalactivitythatthedefendantthenignored).

18

See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Campbell,977F.2d854,85859(4thCir.1992),
cert.denied,113S.Ct.1331(1993)UnitedStatesv.Antzoulatos,962F.2d
720,724(7thCir.),cert.denied,113S.Ct.331(1992)UnitedStatesv.
White,794F.2d367(8thCir.1986)UnitedStatesv.MacKenzie,777F.2d
811(2dCir.1985),cert.denied,476U.S.1169(1986)UnitedStatesv.
Aleman,728F.2d492(11thCir.1984)UnitedStatesv.Glick,710F.2d639
(10thCir.1983),cert.denied,465U.S.1005(1984)UnitedStatesv.
Cincotta,689F.2d238(1stCir.),cert.denied,459U.S.991(1982)United
Statesv.RestropoGranda,575F.2d524(5thCir.),cert.denied,439U.S.
935(1978)UnitedStatesv.Jewel,532F.2d697(9thCir.),cert.denied,
426U.S.951(1976).

19

IraP.Robbins,TheOstrichInstruction:DeliberateIgnoranceasaCriminal
MensRea,81J.Crim.L.&Criminology191,19192(1990).

20

Id.at194.Seeinfranotes11929andaccompanyingtextdiscussingthe
relationofobjectiveandsubjectiveknowledge.

21

Robbins,supranote19,at194.Seeinfranotes10203andaccompanying
text.

22

Robbins,supranote19,at194.Seeinfranote57andaccompanyingtext.

23

18U.S.C.1956,1957(1988).

24

SpurredbythehighprofileprosecutionsoftheFirstNationalBankof
Boston,seeTheFirstNationalBankofBoston:HearingsBeforethe
SubcommitteeonFinancialInstitutionsSupervision,Regulation,and
InsuranceoftheHouseCommitteeonBanking,FinanceandUrbanAffairs,
99thCong.,1stSess.(1985),andtheBankofNewEnglandforflagrant
violationsofexistingmoneylaunderinglaws,seeUnitedStatesv.Bankof
NewEnglandN.A.,821F.2d844(1stCir.),cert.denied,484U.S.943
(1987),Congressmademoneylaunderingafederalcrimeandenhanced
penaltiesunderthepreexistinglaw.

25

Thefirstfederalmoneylaunderingstatute,TheBankSecrecyAct,31
U.S.C.53115324(1988),wasanattempttodetectmoneylaundering
byrequiringfinancialinstitutionstoreportcashtransactionsofover
$10,000.Butsignificantly,itdidnotprohibitthestructuringoftransactionsto
avoidthereportingrequirement.Thus,[s]olongasdepositsof$10,000or
lessweremadewithdifferentbanks,ratherthanbranchesofthesame
bank,nofilingrequirementwastechnicallyviolated.Strafer,supranote12,
at160.Althoughthegovernmenthaddemonstratedtheabilityandthe
resolvetoprosecuteoffendinginstitutions,seesupranote24,individuals
structuringtheirtransactionstoavoidthereportingrequirementswere
essentiallyimmunefromprosecution.SeeS.Rep.No.433,99thCong.,2d
Sess.3(1986).ThisshortcomingwasnotlostuponCongresswhichheld
extensivehearingsonhowtoimplementeffectivemoneylaundering
prohibitions.SeeTheFirstNationalBankofBoston:HearingsBeforethe
SubcommitteeonFinancialInstitutionRegulation,95thCong.1stSess.
(1985).

26

Abramowitz,supranote2,at3.

27

Thisseparationresultedfromtheindependentcreationofeachsection.
Section1956evolvedprimarilyintheSenate.S.2683,99thCong.,2dSess.
(1986).Section1957wascreatedintheHouse.H.R.5077,99thCong.,2d
Sess.(1986).

28

Subsection(a)(1)provides:
Whoever,knowingthatthepropertyinvolvedinafinancialtransaction
representstheproceedsofsomeformofunlawfulactivity,conductsor
attemptstoconductsuchafinancialtransactionwhichinfactinvolvesthe
proceedsofspecifiedunlawfulactivity
(A)(i)withtheintenttopromotethecarryingonofaspecifiedunlawful
activityor
(ii)withintenttoengageinconductconstitutingaviolationofsection7201
or7206oftheInternalRevenueCodeof1986[26U.S.C.7201or7206]
or
(B)knowingthatthetransactionisdesignedinwholeorinpart
(i)toconcealordisguisethenature,thelocation,thesource,theownership,
orthecontroloftheproceedsofspecifiedunlawfulactivityor
(ii)toavoidatransactionreportingrequirementunderStateorFederallaw,
shallbesentencedtoafineofnotmorethan$500,000ortwicethevalueof
thepropertyinvolvedinthetransaction,whicheverisgreater,or
imprisonmentfornotmorethantwentyyears,orboth.
18U.S.C.1956(1988).

29

Subsection(a)(2)provides:
Whoevertransports,transmits,ortransfers,orattemptstotransport,
transmit,ortransferamonetaryinstrumentorfundsfromaplaceinthe
UnitedStatestoorthroughaplaceoutsidetheUnitedStatesortoaplacein
theUnitedStatesfromorthroughaplaceoutsidetheUnitedStates
(A)withtheintenttopromotethecarryingonofspecifiedunlawfulactivity
or
(B)knowingthatthemonetaryinstrumentorfundsinvolvedinthe
transportationrepresenttheproceedsofsomeformofunlawfulactivityand
knowingthatsuchtransportationisdesignedinwholeorinpart
(i)toconcealordisguisethenature,thelocation,orthesource,the
ownership,orthecontroloftheproceedsofspecifiedunlawfulactivityor
(ii)toavoidatransactionreportingrequirementunderStateorFederallaw,
shallbesentencedtoafineof$500,00ortwicethevalueofthemonetary
instrumentorfundsinvolvedinthetransportation,whicheverisgreater,or
imprisonmentfornotmorethantwentyyears,orboth....
18U.S.C.1956(1988).

30

UnitedStatesv.Antzoulatos,962F.2d720,724(7thCir.),cert.denied,113
S.Ct.331(1992)(summarizing18U.S.C.1956(a)(1)(1988)).Seealso
supranote28.

31

Section1957providesinpart:
(a)Whoever,inanyofthecircumstancessetforthinsubsection(d),
knowinglyengagesorattemptstoengageinamonetarytransactionin
criminallyderivedpropertythatisofavaluegreaterthan$10,000andis
derivedfromspecifiedunlawfulactivity,shallbepunishedasprovidedin
subsection(b).
(b)(1)Exceptasprovidedinparagraph(2),thepunishmentforanoffense
underthissectionisafineundertitle18,UnitedStatesCode,or
imprisonmentfornotmorethantenyearsorboth.
(2)Thecourtmayimposeanalternatefinethanthatimposableunder
paragraph(1)ofnotmorethantwicetheamountofthecriminallyderived
propertyinvolvedinthetransaction.
18U.S.C.1957(1988).

32

Id.

33

BarryS.Engel,TheMoneyLaunderingActof1986:APrimer,21Colo.
Law447,448(1992).

34

S.Rep.No.433,99thCong.,2dSess.59(1986)[hereinafterSenate
Report].MostwitnessesattheCommitteehearings,whatevertheirposition
onthescienterrequirement,recognizedtheneedfornewlegislationtofill
gapingloopholesintheBankSecrecyAct(BSA).Thissenseofurgencywas
instilledbythreefederalcourtdecisionsthatrefusedtoapplytheprovisions
oftheBSAtostructuringarrangementsdesignedtoevadethereporting
requirementsoftransactionsover$10,000.SeeUnitedStatesv.Anzalone,
766F.2d676(1stCir.1985)UnitedStatesv.Varbel,780F.2d758(9th
Cir.1986)UnitedStatesv.Bismark,779F.2d1559(11thCir.1986).Seealso
SenateReport,supra,at7.
SenatorD'Amato,asponsorofoneofthecompetingbills,andJames
HarmonofthePresident'sCommissiononOrganizedCrimeboth
emphasizedthattheirprimaryconcernwasthepassageofsomemoney
launderinglegislation,whateverformitmighttake.SenateReport,supra,
at56.SenatorBidenstated:Wecannotaffordtowasteanytime.Weneed
thisweaponagainstdrugtraffickersandorganizedcriminalsandweneedit
now.Id.at9.

35

See18U.S.C.1956(a)(1)(1988)(Whoever,knowingthattheproperty
involvedinafinancialtransactionrepresentstheproceedsofsomeformof
unlawfulactivity....)18U.S.C.1957(a)(1988)(Whoever...knowingly
engagesorattemptstoengageinamonetarytransactionincriminally
derivedproperty...derivedfromspecifiedunlawfulactivityshallbe
punished...).

36

ThefirstmoneylaunderingbillintroducedintheSenateduringthe99th
CongresswasS.572,whichincorporatedtherecommendationsofthe
President'sCommissiononOrganizedCrime.SenateReport,supranote
34,at4.

37

Asubsequentproposal,S.1335,containingtherecklessdisregard
language,wasadvancedbytheDepartmentofJusticeattherequestofthe
administration.SenateReport,supranote34,at45.
Athirdbill,S.1385,wasproposedbySenatorDeConcini(DAriz).Thisbill
wassimilartoS.572exceptthatitproposedadditionalpenaltiesfor
violationoftheBSA.Id.at5.

38

DuringhearingsonmoneylaunderingheldbytheCommitteeonthe
Judiciary,theappropriatescienterrequirementwasthesubjectof
considerabletestimony.Id.at58.Thescienterrequirementwasalso
discussedduringtheCommittee'shearingsonwhitecollarcrime.Id.at5.
AssistantAttorneyGeneralStephenS.Trottemphasizedthatthereasonto
knowstandardcouldbeinterpretedtoincludenegligentparticipationina
prohibitedtransaction.Id.at6.Trotturgedadoptionofthehigherreckless
disregardstandard.Id.NeilSonnetoftheNationalAssociationofCriminal
DefenseLawyersexpressedoppositiontobothstandards,aseithercould
leadtotheprosecutionofindividualswhowerenotinanywayinvolvedin
moneylaundering.Id.
TheappropriatescienterstandardwasalsodebatedintheHouseof
Representatives.HouseReport,supranote14,at1314.Representative
LungrenreiteratedhisunderstandingoftheCommittee'suseoftheterm
knowinglyasfollows:Itisaknowingstandard....Itisnotshouldhave
known,mighthaveknown,areasonablepersonwouldhaveknown,itis
thispersonknewthesourceofthe[unlawful]income.Id.at14.

39

SenateReport,supranote34,at910.

40

Seesupranote18andaccompanyingtext.

41

SeeStrafer,supranote12,at166.

42

Id.at16669.

43

TheSenatereportprovides:
[I]nordertofallwithinthissection,theparticipantneednotknowthatthe
propertyinvolvedinthetransactionrepresentstheproceedsofspecified
unlawfulactivity.Heorsheneedonlyknowthatitrepresentstheproceeds
ofsomeformofunlawfulactivity....[T]hesignificanceofthisphraseisthat
thedefendantneednotknowexactlywhatcrimegeneratedthefunds
involvedinatransaction,onlythatthefundsaretheproceedsofsomekind
ofcrimethatisafelonyunderFederalorStatelaw.
SenateReport,supranote34,at1112.
Byadoptingtherelaxedstandardofknowledgeofsomeunlawfulactivity,
Congresssoughttoevisceratethedefensethatthedefendantknewthe
proceedsresultedfromcriminalactivity,butthoughttheparticularcrimewas
notamongthelistofspecifiedcrimesinsection1956(c)(7).Id.at12.

44

See18U.S.C.1956(c)(7)(A)(E)foralistingofthepredicateactsthat
qualifyasspecifiedunlawfulactivity.

45

SeeSenateReport,supranote34,at10.

[A]currencyexchangerwhoparticipatesinatransactionwithaknowndrug
dealerinvolvinghundredsofthousandsofdollarsincashandacceptsa
commissionfarabovethemarketrate,couldnotescapeconviction,from
thefirsttieroftheoffense,simplybyclaimingthathedidnotknowforsure
thatthecurrencyinvolvedinthetransactionwasderivedfromcrime.Onthe
otherhand,anautomobilecardealer[sic]whosellsacaratmarketratesto
apersonwhenhemerelysuspectsofinvolvementwithcrime,cannotbe
convictedofthisoffenseintheabsenceofashowingthatheknew
somethingmoreaboutthetransactionorthecircumstancessurroundingit.
Id.
46

SeeStrafer,supranote12,at167.Straferproposesthefollowingvariations
ontheSenate'shypotheticalstoexposetheinsufficiencyofthehybrid
standardofknowledgeenvisionedbyCongress:
Iftheautomobiledealerinthesecondexamplesellsavehicleatthemarket
ratetotheknowndrugdealerinthefirstexample(ratherthanmerelythe
suspecteddrugdealerinthesecondexample),hashethenviolatedsection
1956?Ifthecurrencyexchangerinthefirstexampleacceptsonlya
reasonablecommission,ishenolongerguilty?Whatifthecurrency
exchangeracceptsahugecommission,butmerelysuspectstheindividual
heisdealingwithisadrugdealerdoesthesizeofthecommissionplus
suspicionsatisfythegovernment'sburdenofproof?
Id.

47

Strafer,supranote12,at169.

48

Id.

49

Id.(quotingUnitedStatesv.MurrietaBejarano,552F.2d1323,1325(9th
Cir.1977)).

50

Seesupranote18andaccompanyingtext.SeealsoRobinCharlow,Willful
IgnoranceandCriminalCulpability,70Tex.L.Rev.1351,1354nn.79
(discussingdevelopmentofthewillfulblindnessdoctrineandthe
confusionsurroundingitsproperapplication).

51

SeeMorisettev.UnitedStates,342U.S.246,263(1952)(Thespiritofthe
doctrinewhichdeniestothefederaljudiciarypowertocreatecrimes
forthrightlyadmonishesthatweshouldnotenlargethereachofenacted
crimesbyconstitutingthemfromanythinglessthantheincriminating
componentscontemplatedbythewordsusedinthestatute.)G.Williams,
CriminalLaw:TheGeneralPart126(2ded.1961)(Thecourtsoughtnotto
extendamensreabyforcedconstruction.If,whenParliamentsays
knowingorknowingly,itdoesnotmeanactualknowledge,itshouldbeleft
tosayasmuchbyamendingthestatute.).Butsee2AJ.Singer,Sutherland
StatutoryConstruction45.02,at7(5thed.1992),whoassertsthatwhena
statute'smeaningisambiguous,[i]tisthefunctionofthecourttomakethe
referentclearorasclearaspossiblefromtheinformationandevidence
whichispresentedtoit.
SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Thompson/CenterArmsCo.,112S.Ct.2102
(1992)inwhichJusticesScaliaandSouterdebatetherelevanceof
legislativehistory.JusticeScalia,anardentcriticoflegislativehistory,
criticizesthepluralityopinionforresortingtothatlasthopeoflost
interpretivecauses,thatSt.Judeofthehagiologyofstatutoryconstruction,
legislativehistory.Id.at2111.ReferringtoUnitedStatesv.R.L.C.,112S.Ct.
1329(1992)(Scalia,J.,concurringinpartandconcurringinjudgment),
Scaliareiteratedthatrelianceonthatsource[legislativehistory]is
particularlyinappropriateindeterminingthemeaningofastatutewith
criminalapplication.112S.Ct.at2111.
JusticeSouterrespondedtoJusticeScalia'sargument,noting:
[t]heShrine[ofhagiology],however,iswellpeopled(thoughithasroomfor
onemore)anditscongregationhasincludedsuchnotedeldersasMr.
JusticeFrankfurter:

Astatute,likeotherlivingorganisms,derivessignificanceandsustenance
fromitsenvironment,fromwhichitcannotbeseveredwithoutbeing
mutilated....Themeaningofsuchastatutecannotbegainedbyconfining
inquirywithinitsfourcorners.Onlythehistoricprocessofwhichsuch
legislationisanincompletefragmentthattowhichitgaveriseaswellas
thatwhichgaverisetoitcanyielditstruemeaning.
Id.at19n.8(quotingUnitedStatesv.Monia,317U.S.424,432(1943)
(Frankfurter,J.,dissenting)).
52

Morisette,342U.S.at263.

53

SeeCharlow,supranote50,at1353.

54

SeeinfraPartIIforadiscussionofthedevelopmentofthewillful
blindnessdoctrine.

55

Seesupranote51andaccompanyingtext.

56

SeeMorisette,342U.S.at263(notingthattheCourtshouldnotenlarge
thereachofenactedcrimesbyconstitutingthemfromanythinglessthen
theincriminatingcomponentscontemplatedbythewordsusedinthe
statute.).
AsRobinCharlowobserves,JusticeScalia'sskepticismastothevalueof
legislativehistoryindeterminingstatutorymeaningisfoundedonhisbelief
thatlegislativehistoryisnotanauthoritativesourceforassessing
congressionalintent.Charlow,supranote50,at1354(citingWisconsinPub.
Intervenorv.Mortier,111S.Ct.2476,2487(1991)(Scalia,J.,concurring)
(WeareaGovernmentoflawsandnotofcommitteereports...[andthis
Courthasrejected]utilizinglegislativehistoryforthepurposeofgiving
authoritativecontenttothemeaningofthestatutorytext.)).
ButseeStephenBreyer,OntheUsesofLegislativeHistoryinInterpreting
Statutes,65S.Cal.L.Rev.845(1992)(assertingthatScalia'sviewisnotthe
dominantone).

57

Robbins,supranote19,at193seealsoRollinM.Perkins,Knowledgeas
aMensReaRequirement,29HastingsL.J.953,956(1978)(Theholding
thatknowledge,asamensreaconcept,includesaguiltbelief,doesnot
exhaustitsmeaning.).

58

M.Wasik&M.P.Thompson,TurningaBlindEyeAsConstitutingMens
Rea,32N.Ir.L.Q.328,342(1981).Theauthorsrejecttheobjective
assessmentaltogether.Theyarguethatanactorshouldbefoundtohave
therequisitementalstateonlyifatthetimeoftheactusreus,orsome
closelyrelated[time]thenecessarymentalelementofadvertencetothe
factorrisk,wasattheforefrontoftheactor'smind.Id.Failuretodoso,they
argue,wouldfacilitateaslidefromthesubjectivestandardtoan
unacceptableobjectivestandardpremisedontheactor'spassiveknowledge
determinedbywhatheoughttohaveknown.Id.

59

Id.at33031.Theauthorsperceivewillfulblindnessasinvolvingthe
problemofnoncoincidenceofmensreaandactusreus.Id.R.A.Duff
perceivestheirtheoryasconstitutingthreedistinctandsuccessivemental
processes.Att1theactoravertstheactualriskatt2,hecloseshismindto
it.Therefore,att3heiswillfullyblindtotheriskcreatedbyhisactionatt1.
R.A.Duff,CaldwellandLawrence:TheRetreatfromSubjectivism,3Oxford
J.ofLegalStud.77,92(1983).However,intheallegoryofthemanwhois
willfullyblindtotheinfidelityofhiswife,Duffcriticizesthistimebased
analysisasfailingtorecognizethatknowledgemaybeactualwithoutbeing
explicit.Id.Thehusband'sstructuringofhisconduct,soastoavoid
confirmationofthetruthpresupposesanimplicitawarenessofthe
possibility,butheisunlikelytomakethatrealizationexplicittohimself.Id.

60

Williams,supranote51,at159(Acourtcanproperlyfindwillfulblindness
onlywhereitcanalmostbesaidthatthedefendantactuallyknew.He
suspectedthefactherealizeditsprobabilitybutherefrainedfrom

obtainingthefinalconfirmationbecausehewantedintheeventtobeable
todenyknowledge.This,andthisalone,iswillfulblindness.).
61

Perkins,supranote57,at956.Atypicalexampleofwillfulblindnessis
exhibitedbythetravelerwhoagreestotransportapackageforastranger
whointurnofferspaymentfortheservice.Clearly,thetravelerharborsa
reasonablesuspicionthattheparcelcontainscontraband,butwithout
furtherinquiry,itcannotbesaidthatheorshedefinitelyknowstheillicit
contentsoftheparcel.Thedoctrineofwillfulblindnesspermitssuchan
inference.Ifapprehended,thetravelerwillundoubtedlyclaimignorance,
however,thedoctrinecircumventsboththedefenseandthesubjective
requirementofactualknowledgebyimputingsuchknowledgetothe
traveler.

62

Id.

63

Willfulblindnesshasassumednumerousaliasesincluding:willful
shuttingoftheeyes,deliberateignorance,studiedignorance,connivance,
purposelyabstainingfromallinquiryastothefacts,consciousavoidance,
avoidanceofanyendeavortoknow,aconsciouspurposetoavoidlearning
thetruth,studiedignorance,andknowledgeoftheseconddegreeand
deliberatelychoosingnottolearn.See,e.g.,Perkins&Boyce,CriminalLaw
4,at86768(3ded.1982)Charlow,supranote50,atn.1.

64

Robbins,supranote19,at196.

65

SeeSpurrv.UnitedStates,174U.S.728,73839(1899)(endorsingjury
instructionthatifdefendanthadshuthiseyestothefactandpurposely
refrainedfrominquiryorinvestigationforthepurposeofavoiding
knowledge,convictionwaswarranted)Peoplev.Brown,16P.1(1887)
(rejectingdeliberateignorancedefenseofdefendantchargedwithprocuring
falseevidence).

66

Robbins,supranote19,at203.

67

TheActprovidesinpartthatitshallbeunlawfulforanypersonknowingly
orintentionally...tomanufacture,distributeordispense...acontrolled
substance.21U.S.C.841(a)(1)(1988).

68

21U.S.C.952(a)(1988).

69

21U.S.C.841(1)(1988).

70

Robbins,supranote19,at200.

71

396U.S.398(1970).Eightmonthspreviously,inLearyv.UnitedStates,395
U.S.6(1969),thecourtlaidthegroundworkforTurner.InLeary,the
defendantwaschargedwithknowinglytransportingillegallyimported
marijuanainviolationof21U.S.C.176(a).Id.at8.Atthetimeofthe
offense,thestatutepermittedaninferencethatmerepossessionof
marijuanawassufficienttochargethedefendantwithknowledgeofillegal
importation.Id.at46.ApplyingtheModelPenalCodedefinitionof
knowledge,id.at46n.93,theCourtconcludedthat,becauseofthelarge
domesticsupplyofmarijuana,itcouldnotbesaidthatthemajorityof
marijuanauserswereawarethattheirmarijuanahadbeenimported.Id.
InTurner,theCourtinterpretedasimilarsection,21U.S.C.174,which
prohibitedknowinglyreceiving,concealing,andfacilitatingtransportationof
heroin.Section174providedthatpossessionofadrugwassufficientto
indicateknowledgeofitsimportation.Id.at416.BecausetheCourt
presumedthatlittleornoheroinwasproducedintheUnitedStates,itheld
thepresumptiontobevalidastotheheroincharge.Id.at40816.The
presumptionwasheldunconstitutionalasappliedtoTurner'scocaine
charge,asasignificantportionofcocainewasproduceddomestically.Id.at
41819.

72

ModelPenalCode2.02(7)(1962).

73

Perkins,supranote57,at959Perkins&Boyce,supranote63(TheModel
PenalCodewouldrestrictverygreatlyanycriminalliabilitybasedupon

knowledge.).
74

TheModelPenalCode'sinterpretationofwillfulblindnessiscontained
withinitsdefinitionofknowledge:Whenknowledgeoftheexistenceofa
particularfactisanelementofanoffense,suchknowledgeisestablishedif
apersonisawareofahighprobabilityofitsexistence,unlessheactually
believesthatitdoesnotexist.ModelPenalCode2.02(7)(1962).

75

Seesupranotes7172andaccompanyingtext.

76

KennethW.Simmons,RethinkingMentalStates,72B.U.L.Rev.463,500
n.128(1992).Simmonsargues:
First,byrequiringsubjectiveawarenessofahighprobability,itbarely
recognizesthedoctrine,sincethereisoftenathindistinctionbetween
believingsomethingandbelievingthatitishighlyprobable.Second,it
liberalizesthedoctrinebyeliminatingtheusualrequirementthattheactor
musthavedeliberatelyavoidedknowledgeinordertoremaininignorance.
Id.

77

SeeModelPenalCode2.02cmt.9(1962)(Whethersuchcasesshould
beviewedasinstancesofactingrecklesslyorknowinglypresentsasubtle
butimportantquestion.).

78

Simmons,supranote76,at500n.128(citingMichaelS.Moore,Lawand
Psychiatry:RethinkingtheRelationship86(1984)).Mooreconcludesthat
theModelPenalCodeassumesinconsistentbeliefs.Simmonsnotesthat
Moore'shypothesismaybeincorrect,butitisneverthelesssupportable
underthelanguageoftheModelPenalCode.

79

Turner,396U.S.at416n.29.SeeRobbins,supranote19,atn.65and
accompanyingtext.Nevertheless,relyinguponLearyandTurner,the
judiciary'suseofwillfulblindnessasasubstituteforknowledgequickly
progressedbeyonddrugtraffickingtoavarietyofotheroffenses,including:
filingfalsestatementsonincometaxreturnsmakingfalsestatementstothe
ImmigrationandNaturalizationServicefraudulentuseofthemailsand
wiresinterstatetransportofstolentreasurybillsandwillfullyharboringor
concealinganescapedfederalprisoner.See,e.g.,Robbins,supranote19,
atnn.6671.

80

Charlow,supranote50,at1353n.8.

81

Id.at1353nn.78.

82

Id.at1353n.8.Charlowprovidesanextensivelistingofcitationsnotingthe
seeminglyrandomapplicationofthewillfulblindnessdoctrine.

83

532F.2d697(9thCir.1976).InJewell,thedefendantrequestedan
instructionrequiringafindingofactualknowledge.Id.at698.Rejectingthe
request,thetrialjudgeinstructedthejurythatknowinglymeantvoluntarily
andintentionallyandnotbyaccidentormistake.Id.at699.Thecourtof
appeals,quotingthedistrictcourt,stated:
Thegovernmentcancompletetheirburdenofproofbyproving,beyonda
reasonabledoubt,thatifthedefendantwasnotactuallyawarethatthere
wasmarijuanainthevehiclehewasdrivingwhenheenteredtheUnited
Stateshisignoranceinthatregardwassolelyandentirelyaresultofhis
havingmadeaconsciouspurposetodisregardthenatureofthatwhichwas
inthevehicle,withaconsciouspurposetoavoidlearningthetruth.
Id.at700.
Onappeal,themajorityconcludedthat[t]helegalpremiseofthese
instructionsisfirmlysupportedbytheleadingcommentators....Id.

84

Id.at698.

85

532F.2dat698.See21U.S.C.841(a)(1),discussedsupranote67.

86

Therewascircumstantialevidence,however,thatJewellhadpositive
knowledgeofthecontrabandandthathiscontrarytestimonywasfalse.532
F.2dat69899.

87

Id.

88

Robbins,supranote19,at204.

89

532F.2dat700(quotingWilliams,supranote57,at157).Thecourtrelied
uponProfessorWilliams'conclusionthat[t]herulethatwillfulblindnessis
equivalenttoknowledgeisessential,andisfoundthroughoutthecriminal
law.Williams,supranote57,at157.

90

532F.2dat700.ThecourtexplicitlyadoptedtheModelPenalCode
formulationofwillfulblindnesscontainedinsection2.02(7).Toact
knowingly,therefore,isnotnecessarilytoactonlywithpositiveknowledge,
butalsotoactwithanawarenessofthehighprobabilityoftheexistenceof
thefactinquestion.Whensuchawarenessispresent,positiveknowledge
isnotrequired.532F.2dat700.

91

Id.at70001.

92

Id.at704.

93

Id.at703.Toconstrueknowinglyasrequiringpositiveknowledgewould
stymietheDrugControlAct'sgeneralpurposetoaddressdrugabuseinthe
UnitedStatesasitcannotbedoubtedthatthosewhotrafficindrugswould
makethemostof[thedeliberateignorance].Id.at703.

94

Seesupranote74.

95

Jewell,532F.2dat707.

96

Id.Thisprovisionrequiresanawarenessofahighprobabilitythatafact
exists,notmerelyarecklessdisregard,orasuspicionfollowedbyafailure
tomakefurtherinquiry.Id.at707.Thecourtsupportedthisstatementwith
citationstoTurnerv.UnitedStates,396U.S.398,416&n.29(1970),and
Learyv.UnitedStates,395U.S.6,46n.93(1969).

97

Jewell,532F.2dat706.

98

Id.at706.JudgeKennedycriticizedthemajority'sdecisiononseveral
alternategroundsaswell.First,hearguedthattheconsciouspurpose
instructionwasinconsistentwiththemensreaofintent.Id.at705.Itis
difficulttoexplainthatadefendantcanspecificallyintendtodistributea
substanceunlessheknowshepossessesit.Id.Second,JudgeKennedy
foundthewillfulblindnessdoctrineuncertaininscope.Id.Last,he
inexplicablyexpressedconcernthatoneproblemwiththewillfulblindness
doctrineisitsbiastowardsvisualmeansofacquiringknowledge.Id.

99

UnitedStatesv.Ramsey,785F.2d184,189(7thCir.),cert.deniedsub
nom.McCrearyv.UnitedStates,476U.S.1186(1986).

100

See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Garzon,688F.2d607,609(9thCir.1982)(The
instructionshouldbegivenrarelybecauseoftheriskthatthejurywill
convictonastandardofnegligence:thatthedefendantshouldhaveknown
hisconductillegal.)UnitedStatesv.ValleValdez,554F.2d911,914(9th
Cir.1977)(dismissingindictmentbecauseofdeficientjuryinstructionwhich
failedtostatethatdefendantisculpableonlyifhewasawareofthehigh
probabilitythatthevehiclecarriedcontraband.)UnitedStatesv.Murrieta
Bejarano,552F.2d1323,1325(9thCir.1977)(concludingthatawillful
blindnessinstructionshouldnotbegivenineverycasewhereadefendant
claimsalackofknowledge,butonly...where,inaddition,therearefacts
thatpointinthedirectionofdeliberateignorance.).AccordUnitedStatesv.
Aleman,728F.2d492,494(11thCir.1984)UnitedStatesv.Battencourt,
592F.2d916,918(5thCir.1979).
InUnitedStatesv.EsquerGomez,550F.2d1231(9thCir.1977),thecourt
reversedthedefendant'sconvictionbecausethejudgehadnotgiventhe
balancingportionofthewillfulblindnessinstruction.Id.at1235.The

judgedidnotinstructthejurythatknowledgeisestablishedbyawarenessof
ahighprobabilityunless[thedefendant]actuallybelievesitdoesnotexist.
Id.at1235(quotingJewell,532F.2dat704n.21).Thejudgegaveonlythe
partoftheinstructionthatfavoredthegovernment.Id.
101

See,e.g.,Robbins,supranote19,at22027(notingthatwillfulblindness
isevidenceofrecklessnessandnotknowledge)Comment,Willful
BlindnessasaSubstituteforCriminalKnowledge,63IowaL.Rev.466,473
(1977)(applyingstandardsofstrictconstruction,awillfulblindnessjury
instructionpermitsfindingguiltfrommeresuspicionandshouldnotbe
permittedbecause[s]uspicionimpliesalackof,ratherthanthepresenceof
knowledge.).

102

Seesupranotes5153.

103

Severalauthorshavecommentedthatuseofthewillfulblindnessdoctrine
asasubstituteforknowledgeisunconstitutional.See,e.g.,Robbins,supra
note19,at19495,23132Comment,supranote101,at46667,47273.
Theoutlineoftheargumentisasfollows:First,relyingontheseparationof
powersprincipleasenunciatedinMorisette,legislators,notcourts,make
law.Thus,courtsareactingunconstitutionallywhentheysubstitutea
differentmensrearequirementthancontainedinthestatute.SeeUnited
Statesv.Morisette,324U.S.246,263(1962)([T]hefederaljudiciary...
shouldnotenlargethereachofenactedcrimesbyconstitutingthemfrom
anythinglessthantheincriminatingcomponentscontemplatedbythewords
usedinthestatute.)UnitedStatesv.Wiltberger,18U.S.(5Wheat.)76,93
(1820)(Itisthelegislature,notthecourt,whichistodefineacrime,and
ordainitspunishment.).Second,theDueProcessClauseoftheFifth
Amendmentrequiresthateachelementofacrimebeprovedbeyonda
reasonabledoubt.SeeInreWinship,397U.S.358,364(1970)([T]hedue
processclauseprotectstheaccusedagainstconvictionexceptuponproof
beyondareasonabledoubtofeveryfactnecessarytoconstitutethecrime
withwhichheischarged.).ButseeSinger,supranote51,at7.See
generallyCharlow,supranote50,at1355n.11(discussing
unconstitutionalityofjudicialsubstitutionofmensrearequirements).

104

ForananalysisofJewellbasedinstructionsandadiscussionofpotential
inconsistentjuryconclusions,seeCharlow,supranote50,at141923.
Charlowquestionswhetherajuryiscapableofdiscerningthesubtle
distinctionbetweenrecklessnessandwillfulblindness.Thedangerhere
isthattherecklesswillbeconvictedasreadilyastheknowing,andthat
resultisnotwhateitherthelegislatureortheModelPenalCodeintended.
Id.at1422(footnoteomitted).

105

785F.2d184(7thCir.1986).

106

Thecourtanalyzedinstruction4.05fromtheSeventhCircuit'sManualon
JuryInstructionsinFederalCriminalCases(1965).Thefollowinginstruction
wasgivenbythedistrictcourt:
Thewordknowingly...meansthattheact(oromission)wasdone
voluntarilyandpurposefully,andnotbecauseofmistakeoraccident.
Knowledgemaybeprovenbythedefendant'sconduct,andbyallthefacts
andcircumstancessurroundingthecase.Nopersoncanintentionallyavoid
knowledgebyclosinghisorhereyestofactswhichshouldprompthimor
hertoinvestigate.
785F.2dat189.
Citingcasesrejectingeverypossiblechallengetotheinstruction,the
SeventhCircuituphelduseofinstruction4.05despitethedefendant'sclaim
thatitcoercestestimonybyplacingpressureupondefendantstoexplain
preciselywhatheorsheknewandwhatinquiry,ifany,wasmade.Thecourt
rejectedthislineofreasoningconcludingthatthepressuretotestifycomes
fromtheevidence,notfromtheinstruction.Id.

107

Id.(quotingUnitedStatesv.Burns,683F.2d1056,1061(7thCir.1982),
cert.denied,459U.S.1178(1983)).

108

Ramsey,785F.2dat18990.
109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.at19091.Thecourt's1980patterninstructionsomittedthedeliberate
ignoranceinstructionaltogethersuggestingthatthesubjectshouldbeleft
toargumentbycounselratherthanformalinstructionsfromthejudge.Id.
at191.Previously,inUnitedStatesv.Josefik,753F.2d585,589(7thCir.),
cert.deniedsubnom.,Suterasv.UnitedStates,471U.S.1055(1985),the
courtsuggestedseveralalternativewillfulblindnessinstruction
formulations.785F.2dat189.Thecourtwentontocriticizethelast
sentenceofinstruction4.05asobscureandprofferedtwoalternate
instructionsthatexplaininstruction4.05inplainlanguage.Thecourt'sfirst
instructionreadasfollow:
Youmayinferknowledgefromacombinationofsuspicionandindifference
tothetruth.Ifyoufindthatapersonhadastrongsuspicionthatthingswere
notwhattheyseemedorthatsomeonehadwithheldsomeimportantfacts,
yetshuthiseyesforfearofwhathewouldlearn,youmayconcludethathe
actedknowinglyasIhaveusedtheword.
Id.at190(quotingPerkins&Boyce,supranote63).
Thecourt'ssecondinstructionstated:
Theelementofknowledgemaybesatisfiedbyinferencesdrawnfromproof
thatadefendantdeliberatelyclosedhiseyestowhatwouldotherwisehave
beenobvioustohim.Afindingbeyondareasonabledoubtofaconscious
purposetoavoidenlightenmentwouldpermitaninferenceofknowledge.
Statedanotherway,adefendant'sknowledgeofafactmaybeinferredfrom
willfulblindnesstotheexistenceoffact.Itisentirelyuptoyouasto
whetheryoufindanydeliberateclosingoftheeyes,andtheinferencetobe
drawnfromanysuchevidence.Ashowingofnegligenceormistakeisnot
sufficienttosupportafindingofwillfulnessorknowledge.
Id.at19091(quoting1Devitt&Blackmar,FederalJuryPracticeand
Instructions14.09(3ded.1977)).

113

552F.2d1323(9thCir.1977).

114

Id.at1324.Thetrialcourt'sinstructionprovidedinpartthat[t]he
governmentcancompletetheirburdenofproofbyprovingbeyonda
reasonabledoubtthatthedefendantwasawareofahighprobabilityofthe
existenceofacontrolledsubstanceinthevehiclehewasdrivingwhenhe
enteredtheUnitedStates.Id.

115

Id.at1325.

116

Id.SeealsoUnitedStatesv.Picciandra,788F.2d39,46(1stCir.),cert.
denied,479U.S.847(1986).InPicciandra,theFirstCircuitproposeda
concisethreesteptesttodeterminewhenthedeliberateignorance
instructionisappropriate:(1)whenadefendantclaimsalackof
knowledge(2)thefactssuggestaconsciouscourseofdeliberate
ignoranceand(3)theinstructionisformulatedsothatthejury[knows]
thatit[is]permitted,butnotrequired,todrawtheinference.Id.

117

Seesupranotes5760andaccompanyingtext.

118

SeeCharlowsupranote50,at1355n.10,citingRobbins,supranote19,at
22027Comment,supranote101,at473.SeealsoWilliams,supranote
51,at159(statingrecklessnessisnotquitethesamethingaswillful
blindness.)ButseeRobbins,supranote19,at196,23334([A]frank
admissionthatdeliberateignoranceisinfactrecklessnesswilllikelyresultin
moreaccurateandlessprejudicialjuryinstructions,asjudgeswouldbe
applyingafamiliarstandard.)J.Edwards,TheCriminalDegreesof
Knowledge,17Mod.L.Rev.294,298,30305(1954)(referringtotheclose

relationshipbetweenrecklessnessandwillfulblindnessandcitingwith
approvalthepropositionthatwillfulblindnessisindistinguishablefrom
recklessness.).
However,unlikeknowledge,recklessnesscontainsbothobjectiveand
subjectiveelements.SeeCharlow,supranote50,at1377.Recklessnessis
aconsciousdisregardofasubstantialandunjustifiableriskrepresentinga
significantdeviationfromthereasonablepersonstandardofcare.See
ModelPenalCode2.02(2)(C)(1962).Knowledgeandrecklessnessare
distinguishableinthatknowledgerequiresanawarenessoftheexistenceof
afactwhilerecklessnessrequiresonlyrecognitionofitsprobability.See
Robbins,supranote19,at222.
119

Seesupranotes2733andaccompanyingtext.

120

TheSupremeCourthasnothesitatedtostrikedownambiguousstandards.
InColauttiv.Franklin,439U.S.379(1970),theCourtrejecteda
Pennsylvaniaantiabortionstatuteasunconstitutionallyvague.Thestatute
prohibitedabortionsexceptwheretheadministeringphysiciandetermined
thatbasedonhisexperience,judgementorprofessionalcompetence,the
fetusisnotviable.Id.at391.Notingtheinherentambiguityinsucha
standard,theCourtconcludedthatitisunclearwhetherthestatuteimports
apurelyobjectivestandard,orwhetheritimposesamixedsubjectiveand
objectivestandard.Id.TheCourtrefusedtoendorseaprovisionthat
imposescriminalliabilityonsuchconfusingandambiguouscriteria.Id.at
394.

121

Robbins,supranote19,at218(quotingK.Popper,ObjectiveKnowledge:
AnEvolutionaryApproach72(1972)).

122

Robbins,supranote19,at21920.

123

ModelPenalCode2.02(2)(b)(1962).

124

Charlow,supranote50,at1373.

125

Perkins&Boyce,supranote63.

126

Charlow,supranote50,at1376.

127

ClareDalton,AnEssayintheDeconstructionofContractTheory,94Yale
L.J.997,1025(1985).

128

Id.

129

Id.at1026.

130

Id.at1100.Seesupranotes10508andaccompanyingtext.

131

InreWinship,397U.S.358,364(1970).

132

SeeWasik&Thompson,supranote58,at329(assertingthat
subjective/objectivedichotomywillremainanissueduetoproblems
inherentinapplying...purelysubjectiveprinciplesincourtsoflaw).

133

Dalton,supranote127,at1034.

134

962F.2d720(7thCir.1992).

135

Id.at726.GiventhevastamountofdirectevidencethatAntzoulatos
actuallyknewthathewasdealingwithdrugdealers,theapplicationofthe
willfulblindnessdoctrineisalmostanafterthought.However,Antzoulatos
isnonethelessusefulasitisdemonstrativeofhowcourtsapplythedoctrine
inmoneylaunderingprosecutionsofindividualsnotchargedwitha
predicateoffenseunderthestatute.Theevidenceatthetimeofsentencing
demonstratedAntzoulatos'complicityinthemoneylaunderingscheme.Id.
at72123.Antzoulatosallowedonedrugdealeraccesstohiscompany's
checkstopurchasecarsatareaautoauctions.Id.at722.Heallowedthis
dealeronseveraloccasionstopayhimbackincashincrementsdesignedto
avoidcurrencytransactionrequirements.Id.Severalofthecustomerswere
preparedtotestifyattrialthattheytoldAntzoulatosdirectlythattheywere

drugdealersandneededtoconcealtheirdrugprofits.Id.at72223.Onone
occasion,Antzoulatostitledacarinthenameofaclient'soneyearold
nephew.Id.at722.
136

Id.at724(citingJewell,532F.2d697,700(1976)).Althoughitultimately
rejectedAntzoulatos'claimthattheMLCAisvoidforvagueness,thecourt
recognizedtheclosenessofthequestionwhenthestatuteisappliedtoa
cardealernotdirectlyinvolvedintheactualdrugdealing.Thecourtnoted
that[a]drugdealer,ifconvictedonbothanarcoticscountandamoney
launderingcount,byhypothesisknowsthatheisusingtaintedproceedsin
thetransaction,andalsoknowsthathispurposeistoconcealthenatureor
sourceoftheproceeds.Themerchant,ontheotherhand,hasnotbeen
involvedwiththeproceedspriortothetransaction.Id.at726.

137

Id.at725.TheSeventhCircuitcitedseveralcasesaffirmingthecontinued
importanceofsubstantivedueprocessrights,including:Moorev.Cityof
EastCleveland,431U.S.494(1977)(findingdueprocessrightforfamily
memberstolivetogether)Roev.Wade,410U.S.113(1973)(findingdue
processrightofwomentochoseabortionincertaincircumstances)
Wisconsinv.Yoder,406U.S.205(1972)(holdingparentsentitledto
educatetheirchildrenoutsideofpublicschools).However,thecourt
observedthat[s]incetheLochnerera...anysubstantivedueprocess
righttocontract,ortoengageinalawfuloccupationhasbeensharply
curtailed.Id.(citingMoore,431U.S.at501).

138

Lochnerv.NewYork,198U.S.45(1905)(holdingthatthefederal
governmentcannotinterveneintheindividualrighttocontract).Lochner
hasbeenconsiderablyerodedtothepointwhereanyrationalexplanation
forexerciseofstatepolicepowerwillbeupheld.See,e.g.,Moorev.Cityof
EastCleveland,431U.S.494,501(1977).

139

Antoulatos,962F.2dat725(quotingSchroederv.CityofChicago,927F.2d
957,961(1991)([W]edonotconsider[substantivedueprocess]ablanket
protectionagainstunjustifiableinterferenceswithproperty.Thatway
Lochnerlies.)).

140

962F.2dat725.AssumingarguendothatAntzoulatoshadadueprocess
righttoselllawfullyacquiredcars,thecourtconcludedthatsucharightdid
notimmunizehisconductandtherestrictioncouldnotamounttoa
governmenttaking.Id.Section1956'snarrowrestrictiononlyprohibited
Antzoulatosfromsellingtopersonsheknowsaredrugdealers,andonly
thenwhentheknownpurposeofthesaleistoconcealthesource,nature,
orownershipoftheproceeds.Id.

141

Id.

142

Id.at72627.Knowledgecanreasonablybeattributedtoamerchantwhen
themerchantpersonallyobservestheunlawfulactivityandseesthatthe
proceedsarebeingusedtobuygoodsfromhim.Italsoispresumably
sufficientifthebuyersaysdirectlytothemerchant:thismoneyistainted.
Id.

143

Id.Thecourtrecognizedtheproblematicsituationinwhichamerchantis
askedtorelyuponthewordofathirdperson.Id.Inaddition,thecourt
acknowledgedthedifficultyinpermitting,orinsomeinstancesrequiring,the
merchanttorelyuponthephysicalappearanceofclientsorthepresenceof
unexplainedwealth.Id.Seeinfranotes14555andaccompanyingtext
(discussingmoneylaunderingprosecutionofrealestateagentinwhich
physicalappearanceofclientproveddecisive).

144

962F.2dat727.AsagoodexampleofcarefulapplicationofSection
1956(a)(1)(B)toamerchant,thecourtcitedUnitedStatesv.Campbell,777
F.Supp.1259(W.D.N.C.1991).

145

977F.2d834(4thCir.1992).

146

777F.Supp.1259,126162(1991).Unabletosecurealoanforthe
purchasepriceof$182,500,thepurchaser,MarkLawing,askedthesellers
toaccept$60,000incashunderthetableandreducethesellingpriceto

$122,500.Theyconsented.Id.at1261.Campbellhadbeeninformedbya
coworkerthatthebrokerinchargehadpreviouslyhandledacash
transactioninthatmanner.Id.
Attheclosing,Lawingarrivedinthebroker'sofficewithabrownpaperbag
containingthecash.Themoneywascountedandturnedovertothe
sellers.Oneofthesellerstestifiedthatuponinquiryastothesourceofthe
money,Campbellrepliedthatshedidn'tcarewherethemoneycame
from.Id.at1262.Inaddition,emphasiswasplacedonCampbell'salleged
statementthatthecashinvolvedmayhavebeendrugmoney.Id.at1262.
Thetrialcourtdiscountedtheevidentiaryvalueofthetestimonybecauseit
wasatoddswithherpriorgrandjurytestimony.Id.at126667.TheFourth
Circuitcriticizedthetrialjudgeformakinganimpermissiblejudgmenton
witnesscredibilitywhichshouldhavebeenlefttothejury.977F.2dat858
59.
147

777F.Supp.at1259.

148

Id.at1267.

149

Id.at1265.

150

977F.2dat85758.

151

Id.at858.

152

Id.

153

TheotherevidenceincludedCampbell'sstatementconcerningtheoriginof
thecash,thefraudulentnatureofthetransaction,andtestimonyconcerning
Lawing'slifestyle.Id.at857.TheevidenceshowedthatLawingdroveanew
Porsche,carriedacellularphone,flashedlargeamountsofcash,and
consumedbeerwhileawayfromhispurportedlylegitimatebusinessduring
workinghours.777F.Supp.at1261.Thetrialcourtdiscountedthisbehavior
asnotinconsistentwiththatofotheraffluentresidentsoftheareawhowere
notmoneylaunderers.Id.at126566.

154

977F.2dat85960.

155

Seesupranotes10416andaccompanyingtext.

156

Seesupranotes4550(discussingCongress'tacitadoptionofwillful
blindnessasasubstituteforactualknowledge).

157

Charlow,supranote50,at1429(Althoughwillfulignoranceisusually
employedtosatisfyastatutorymensreaofknowledge,themostprevalent
definitionsofthedoctrinedescribeastateofmindthatissignificantly
differentfromwhatwegenerallyunderstandtobeknowledge,andthatis
notasculpableasknowledgeinallormostcircumstances.).

158

Seesupranotes5152(discussingMorisetteandlimitationsimposedupon
thejudiciarywhenitseekstoactivelyinterpretCongressionalintent).See
alsoRobbins,supranote19,at232(statingthatthejudiciary'sadoptionof
alternatewillfulblindnessstandardinfringesonthelegislature'sprovince
ofdefiningcriminalconduct).

159

SeediscussionsuprapartII.C.

160

SeeSenateReport,supranote34,at910(citingJewell)(Theknowing
scienterrequirementsareintendedtobeconstrued,likeexistingknowing
scienterrequirements,toincludeinstancesofwillfulblindness.).

161

SeeCharlow,supranote50,at1390([M]ostdefinitionsofwillfulignorance
delineateamensreathatistheequivalentneitherofknowledgenor
recklessness.)Robbins,supranote19,atnn.223,22731(notingthat
ModelPenalCodedefinitionofwillfulblindnessblursthedistinction
betweenrecklessnessandknowledgeleadingcourtstoadministerimproper
instructionsallowingforconvictionsbaseduponnegligence)Comment,
supranote101,at477(discussingwillfulblindnessinstructionthatfailed
todifferentiatebetweennegligenceandrecklessness).

162

Seesupranotes7378(discussingModelPenalCode'sinterpretationof
willfulblindnessanditssubsequentadoptionbytheSupremeCourtin
Turner).ProfessorRobbins,forexample,proposesbridgingthegap
betweenwillfulblindnessandknowledgebydiscardingtheModelPenal
Code'shighprobability/unlessstandardandaddingrecklessnessorspecific
deliberateignoranceprovisionstostatutesrequiringactualknowledgeasa
prerequisiteforconviction.SeeRobbins,supranote19,at233.He
proposesthefollowingsamplestatuteandcorrespondingjuryinstructions
prohibitingtheimportationofdrugs:
(1)Itshallbeunlawfulforanypersonknowinglyorrecklesslytoimportinto
theCustomsterritoryoftheUnitedStatesanycontrolledsubstancewithout
properauthorization[asdescribedelsewhere].
(2)Oneactsknowinglywithrespecttofacts,conduct,attendant
circumstances,orresultsifheisawarethatsuchfacts,circumstances,
conduct,orresultsexistorwillbecreatedorifheisvirtuallycertainthat
suchfacts,circumstances,conduct,orresultsexistorwillbecreated.
(3)Oneactsrecklesslywithrespecttofacts,attendantcircumstances,
conduct,orresultsifheconsciouslydisregardsasubstantialriskthatsuch
facts,circumstances,conduct,orresultsexistorwillbecreated.
Oneconsciouslydisregardsasubstantialriskifherecognizesahigh
probabilitythatsuchfacts,circumstances,conduct,orresultsexistorwillbe
created,unlessheactuallybelievesthattheydonotexistorwillnotbe
created.
Id.
ProfessorCharlowidentifiesthreeproblemswithRobbins'proposedstatute.
First,Robbins'statutedoesnotrecognizethatModelPenalCodebased
willfulblindnessismoreculpablethanrecklessness.Charlow,supranote
50,at138586.Second,theproposalrendersrecklessnessasculpableas
willfulblindness.Thus,byequatingwillfulblindnesswithknowledgeand
equatingwillfulblindnesswithrecklessness,knowledgeisequatedwith
recklessness.Id.at1386.Third,liketheModelPenalCode,Robbins'
proposalincludestheproblematicbalancingprovision.Id.Thenetresultis
toexculpateonewhoactuallybelievesthecontraryifherecognizesahigh
probabilityofthefact,butinculpateonewhoactuallybelievesthecontraryif
hemerelyrecognizesasubstantialriskofthefact.Id.at1385.
SeealsoPerkins&Boyce,supranote63,at875(providinganotherModel
PenalCodebaseddefinitionofwillfulblindness).ThePerkins&Boyce
definitionismoredemandingthanrecklessness:
Wheneverknowledgeoftheexistenceofaparticularfactisanelementof
anoffense,suchknowledgeisestablishedifapersonbelievesthatit
probablyexists.Andoneisdeemedtohaveknowledgeofwhathewould
haveknownifhehadnotdeliberatelyavoidedknowing.Deliberate
avoidanceofknowledgemaybeestablishedbydirectproof,orbyproofthat
apersonisawareofahighprobabilityoftheexistenceofthefactunlesshe
actuallybelievesthatitdoesnotexist.
Id.

163

Definitionsofwillfulblindnessrelyingsolelyuponrecklessdisregardor
indifferencetothetruthdescriberecklessnessanddonotsufficiently
substituteforactualknowledge.Becauserecklessnessisnotknowledge,
definitionsofwillfulignoranceusingrecklessnessbasedlanguagealoneor
asanalternativetowillfulnessbasedlanguagedescribeastateofmind
thatisnotknowledgeandshouldnotbeusedtosatisfyaknowledge
requirement.Charlow,supranote50,at138788.ProfessorCharlowlistsa
numberofNinthCircuitcasestodemonstratethatrecklessdisregardis
neitherknowledgenordeliberateignorance.See,e.g.,UnitesStatesv.
PacificHide&FurDepo,Inc.,768F.2d1096,1098(9thCir.1985)(holding
willfulignoranceinstructioninappropriatewhendefendantwasmistaken,
recklesslydisregardedthetruth,ornegligentlyfailedtoinquire)United

Statesv.McAllister,747F.2d1273,1275(9thCir.1984),cert.denied,474
U.S.829(1985)(Thegovernmentmaynotcarryitsburdenby
demonstratingthatthedefendantwasmistaken,recklesslydisregardedthe
truth,orwasnegligentinfailingtoinquire.)UnitedStatesv.Williams,685
F.2d319,321(9thCir.1982)(Althoughconsciousavoidanceofthetruth
mayconstituteknowingconduct,recklessconductaloneisnotsufficient.)
Jewell,535F.2dat704n.21.
164

Willfulnessbasedinstructionsimplythatanindividualintentionallyavoided
knowledgeandwassuccessfulindoingso.Charlow,supranote50,at
1388.

165

Id.at1429.Charlowassertsthatherdefinitionisnearlyasculpableas
knowledgeandcomportsmorecloselythancurrentdefinitionswiththe
behaviorthatsocietydesirestopunish.Id.Charlowproposes:
Apersoniswillfullyignorantofamaterialfactiftheperson(1)isawareof
verygoodinformationindicatingthatthefactexists(2)almostbelievesthe
factexistsand(3)deliberatelyavoidslearningwhetherthefactexists(4)
withaconsciouspurposetoavoidthecriminalliabilitythatwouldresultifhe
orsheactuallyknewthefact.
Id.
Charlowremarksthatsocietydesirestopunishtheknowingactorbecause
wewanttocondemnhiswillingnesstoactonhiscorrectbeliefthatwhathe
isdoingiswrong.Id.at1414.Theactisdoublyrepugnantbecausethe
actorknowshisactionsareillegalbutproceedsnonetheless.Id.When
societypassesjudgmentonawillfullyblinddefendant,butnotareckless
actor,tothesamedegreeasaknowingactor,thepurposeistoredressan
actequallyasoffensiveasknowing.Id.at141415.Inshort,wewantto
punishtheindividualwhomaynotknowbutisonthevergeofknowing,and
whodisplaysthekindofcallousnessthatwefindinaknowingactor.Id.
(citationsomitted).
Withtheexceptionofthefourthelement,however,Charlow'sproposalis
simplyarestatementofexistingwillfulblindnessdoctrine.See,e.g.,Duff,
supranote59,at92(citingG.Williams,TextbookofCriminalLaw78
(1978)).Thefourthelementimposesamotivationrequirementthatis
largelyirrelevanttothemensrearequirementofknowledge.Inawillful
blindnessprosecutionofamerchant,theonlyrelevantinquiryisnothis
purposeormotivation,butratherhisknowledgeoftheclient'spurposeor
ulteriormotiveinconsummatingthetransaction.SeeCampbell,977F.2dat
857.

166

Afirsttimemoneylaunderingconvictionundersection1956involving
morethan$100,000canresultinanywherefrom5163months
imprisonment.UnitedStatesSentencingCommission,GuidelinesManual
251.1(1992).

167

ThisworryreflectsasimilarconcernexpressedintheSenate,whichraised
thescienterrequirementfromareasontoknoworrecklessdisregard
standardtooneofknowing.SeeSenateReport,supranote34,at8.
Perilsexistforprosecutorsaswell.InRicciv.KeyBancsharesofMaine,
Inc.,662F.Supp.1132(D.Me.1987),theFBIandstatelawenforcement
officialsinformedseveralbanksthatRicciwasinvolvedwithorganized
crime.Id.at1137.Inanefforttocomplywithsection1956,thebanks
terminatedRicci'slinesofcredit.RiccisubsequentlysuedundertheEqual
CreditOpportunityActandwasawarded$15millioninexemplarydamages
and$10,000inpunitivedamages.Id.at113940.

168

SeeCampbell,977F.2dat858([T]heknowledgecomponentsofthe
moneylaunderingstatutecollapseintoasingleinquiry:Did...[theactor]
knowthat...[theclient's]fundswerederivedfromanillegalsource?).

169

SeeDuff,supranote59,at92.

170

Id.at93.

171

Seesupranotes13444andaccompanyingtext.

172

Seesupranotes14555andaccompanyingtext.

173

Evenso,theCampbellcourtadmittedthattheevidenceofdefendant's
knowledgeofherclient'sillegalactivitieswasnotoverwhelming.Campbell,
977F.2dat85857.

174

Campbell,977F.2dat858n.5(Thepresentcase,bycontrast,presentsa
highlyirregularfinancialtransactionwhich,byitsverystructure,was
designedtomisleadonlookersastotheamountofmoneyinvolvedinthe
transaction.).SeealsoAntzoulatos,962F.2dat72023(detailing
defendant'scloseaffiliationandongoingrelationshipwithavoweddrug
dealers)UnitedStatesv.Isabel,945F.2d1193,120203(1stCir.1991)
UnitedStatesv.Massac,867F.2d174,17778(3rdCir.1989).

175

Thefirstprongoftheproposedamendmentcircumventstheobjective
criteria/subjectiveperceptiondilemma,seesupranotes119133and
accompanyingtext,byprovidingabrightlineruletoobjectivelyguidefact
findersintheirassessmentofculpablemensrea.Byshiftingtheinquiry
fromidentifyingsubjectiveintenttofocusingonovertbehavioral
manifestationofthatintent,theproposedstandardcomportswithtraditional
notionsofrightsandwrongandpunishesdeviationsfrombehavioralnorms
endemictosocietyand/ortheaccused.Thus,anydeviationfrom
reasonableandfamiliarbusinesspracticesisaredflagdenotingthe
existenceofsubjectiverecognitionrequiredbythesecondprongofthe
proposedamendment.Failureoftheaccusedtoconformtoexisting
reasonableorpastpersonalbusinesspracticessatisfiesthethirdprongof
theproposedamendmentandisindicativeofculpablewillfulblindness.

176

Tomalav.UnitedStates,112S.Ct.1997(1992)(White,J.,dissenting).

EndofDocument

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