Giorgio Micolitti - Regulations Guidelines For Fire Safe Design in Rail Tunnels

Technical Report – Part 2
Fire Safe Design – rail

tunnels
Rapporteur Rail Tunnels, Giorgio Micolitti, RFI
Contributions:
Paul Scott, ARUP
Technical review:
Richard Bettis (HSE), Ulla Eilersen (Sund & Bealt)
Workpackage Members
Bruno Brousse (CETU), Didier Lacroix (CETU), Paul Scott (ARUP),
Niels Peter Hoj (COWI), Enrique Fernandez (Dragados), Gabriel Khoury
(FSD), Yngve Anderberg (FSD)Walter Frey (GRS), Hermann Otremba
(Hochtief), Daniel Gabay (RATP), Arnaud Marchais (RATP), Giorgio
Micolitti (RFI)Ilse Roelants (Traficon), Esko Mikkola (VTT)
Tables of contents
Table of Contents
1 List of collected guidelines 155
1.1 Table of references (national# Guidelines) 156
1.2 Table of references (other reference documents) 164
1.3 Analytical summaries (national# guidelines) 167
1.3.1 Italy 167
1.3.2 Switzerland 169
1.3.3 Germany 171
1.3.4 France 172
1.3.5 Norway 173
1.3.6 Austria 173
1.3.7 Spain 175
1.3.8 United Kingdom 176
1.3.9 The Netherlands 177
1.3.10 Sweden 177
1.3.11 Finland 177
1.3.12 USA 178
2 Comprehensive list of safety measures 179

2.1 General design characteristics 179
2.2 Structural measures relevant to safety 179
2.3 Safety equipment 179
2.4 Structure & equipment response to fire 180
2.5 Emergency management 180
3 Matrix of guidelines contents 181
4 Detailed comparison 184

4.1 General Design Characteristics 184
4.1.1 G1 – Range of Applicability 184
4.1.2 G2 – Geometric configuration 186
4.2 Structural measures relevant to safety 188
4.2.1 S1 - Emergency passenger exits 188
4.2.2 S2 - Emergency access for rescue staff 195
4.2.3 S3 – Drainage of flammable liquids 197
4.2.4 S4 – Open areas 199
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Tables of contents
4.3 Safety equipment 200

4.3.1 E1 - Smoke control ventilation 200
4.3.2 E2 - Emergency exits and rescue access ventilation 203
4.3.3 E3 – Lighting systems 203
4.3.4 E4- Escape signs in tunnels 206
4.3.5 E5 - Communication and alarm system 209
4.3.6 E6 - Operation and traffic management 212
4.3.7 E7 – Power supply 214
4.3.8 E8 – Fire suppression 216
4.3.9 E9 – General safety equipment 218
4.4 Structural & equipment response to fire 221
4.4.1 R1 – Reaction to, and resistance to, fire 221
4.5 Emergency management 224
4.5.1 4.5M1 – Organisational measures 224
5 Appendix 1: Tables of contents of national guidelines

(translated into English) 226
5.1 ITALY (I) 226
5.2 Switzerland 232
5.3 GERMANY 237
5.4 FRANCE 244
5.5 NORWAY 245
5.6 AUSTRIA 246
5.7 UNITED KINGDOM 252
5.8 SPAIN 254
5.9 THE NETHERLANDS Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.
5.10 SWEDEN 257
5.11 FINLAND 258
5.12 USA 261
6 Appendix 2: Tables of contents of other reference documents

(translated into English). 262
6.1 UIC 262
6.2 U.N. 264
6.3 AEIF – European Association for Railway Interoperability 269
6.4 SBB-CFF-FFS 269
6.5 ALPETUNNEL GEIGE 271
6.6 RFF 272
6.7 DB 273
6.8 BBT 274
6.9 DENMARK 275
6.10 THE NEDERLANDS 275
6.11 UFT (SWISS FEDERAL OFFICE OF TRANSPORT) 276
Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

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List of collected guidelines
Rail Tunnels
In accordance with the description of work package 3.1 and discussions at the network
meetings, this section of the report covers:
• Structural safety facilities
• Safety equipment
• Reaction/resistance to fire
In addition some typical provisions on the following topics are also showed:
General design characteristics of railway tunnels
Emergency management
The work in WP3 includes both a listing of relevant guidelines and comparisons between
those selected.
(The contents of the present document will be incorporated into the WP3 part of the FIT
report. The section numbers will be subsections to the section 3.4 Rail Tunnels. For practical
reasons the two first digits in the section numbers have been left out in this document.)

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1 LIST OF COLLECTED GUIDELINES
The first part of the activity concerns the listing of relevant guidelines. It has been agreed that
this should include regulations, guidelines, standards, and to some degree current best
practices. Guidelines concerning construction are beyond the scope. Guidelines include
relevant documents from European and international organisations and European countries,
supplemented when relevant with guidelines from other important rail tunnel countries.
Based on available documents, specific searches and reference to similar work by UIC and
UN/ECE, a number of relevant documents have been identified.
In addition a state-of-the-art report from USA is included together with reports from the task
forces of UN/ECE and UIC.
The following countries are the main "rail-tunnel-countries" in Europe, i.e. those countries
whose railway networks include by the highest total length of tunnels over 1000m long: Italy
(608 km), Switzerland (298km), Germany (274 km), France (197 km), Norway (126 km),
Austria (89 km), UK (90 km) and Spain (79 km).
The selection of guidelines has also been based on an evaluation, made by the authorities of
each European country, concerning validity and sufficiency of their standards. According to
the review made by UN/ECE the guidelines of the Netherlands and Sweden are also worthy
of inclusion. The US standard is included as an important international reference.
The first level of reporting is a list of the documents including:

- Title, reference and date of the document
- The administrative status of the document in the country concerned
The second level includes
- An analytical summary in English of the contents stating the essential items beneficial for
the topics compiled by WP3.
- The table of contents translated into English (as shown in the appendices)

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1.1 Table of references (national# Guidelines)
Referenc Administrative
Country Title / Issued by Date Comments
e status
Italy • Linee guida per il miglioramento della sicurezza nelle Jul. 1997 Guideline for -This guideline is the result of a
gallerie ferroviarie”, 25 Luglio 1997 Italian Railway working party with F.S. S.p.A,
• Ministry of the Interior, FS S.p.A., National Fire Network RFI Ministry of the Interior and Fire
Brigade Corp. issued by the Brigade Corp.
standardization **** Specific methodology for
working party risk assessment and risk
management for tunnel is
covered by national regulations.
- This document applies only to
FS-RFI
[2] Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione di piazzali di Aug. Technical - These documents apply only
emergenza, le strade di accesso e le aree di atterraggio 1998 Specification to FS-RFI
degli elicotteri ai fini della sicurezza delle gallerie ferroviarie
(Agosto 98)
FS – RFI
[3] “Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione degli impianti idrico Apr. Technical
antincendio, elettrico e illuminazione, telecomunicazione, 2000 Specification
supervisione” (Aprile 2000)
FS – RFI
“Linee guida per la realizzazione del piano generale di Oct. Guideline

emergenza per lunghe gallerie ferroviarie” (Ottobre 98) 1998
FS – RFI
“Linee guida per l’elaborazione del piano interno di Jun. Guideline

emergenza” (Giugno 2000) 2000
FS-RFI
Linee guida per il tracciamento e la posa in opera di sistemi di Apr. Guideline

supporto per cavo radiante nelle gallerie ferroviarie” (Aprile 01) 2001
FS-RFI
RFI circular n° di/a1007/p/01/000562 del Nota RFI Jun. Circular -These circulars constitute a
04.06.2001: “Piano interno di emergenza per n°di/a10 2001 further improvement to the
gallerie di lunghezza compresa tra i 5000m e 07/p/01/0 1997 Guidelines.
3000m” 00562
FS-RFI
RFI circular n° rfi/tdr/a1007/p/01/000512 del Nota RFI Dec. Circular
17.12.2001: “Standard di sicurezza per nuove n°rfi/tdr/a 2001
gallerie ferroviarie” 1007/p/0
FS-RFI 1/000512
Switzerland • Raccomandazione comune delle autorità Sept Recommendation **** Specific methodology for
di vigilanza sulle ferrovie della Germania, . risk assessment and risk
dell’Austria e della Svizzera in merito alla 1992 management for tunnels is
sicurezza dei viaggiatori in gallerie covered by national
ferroviarie molto lunghe, 24.09.1992 regulations specific
• Swiss Federal office of Transport methodology developed by
[2] Prescrizioni svizzere sulla circolazione dei PCT(R30 Dec. Regulation Swiss Federal Railways.
treni (14.12.2003) 0.1-.15), 2003
UFT Swiss Federal office of Transport The requisites set out therein
[3] Weisung I-AM-EB-31/00: Sichereith in Weisung Dec. Technical are not deemed sufficient by
bestehenden Tunnels, I-AM-EB- 2000 specification the Swiss Authorities. The
Infrastrukturmassnahmen zur Erleichterung der 31/00 present shortcomings have
Selbstrettung , 06.12.2000. been remedied in a draft
• Swiss Federal Railways
Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 157/329

[4] Ausfuhrungsbestimmungen zur AB-EBV Oct. Law Swiss standard SIA 198 e
Eisenbahnverordvom 16 nung Oktober 2002 SR 2002 SIA 198/1. In particular,
742.141. safety in the Gotthard (57
11 km) and Lotschberg (34 km)
tunnels was evaluated and
implemented by the
authorities on the basis of a
special project called
Projektorganisation
Sicherheitsbericht Alp
Transit.
[5] Verordnung vom 27 Februar 1991 über den StFV Feb. Regulation
Schutz vor Störfällen SR 2001
Störfällverordnungen StFV, SR 814.012 814.01
[6] Verordnung vom 23 November 1983 über Bau EVB SR Nov. Regulation
und Betrieb der Eisenbahnen 742.141. 2003
Eisenbahnverordnung EVB 1
Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 158/329

Germany [1] Richtlinie Jul. Guideline

Anforderung des Brand- und 1997
Katastrophenschutzes an den Bau und Betrieb
von Eisenbahntunneln (01.07.1997 with
ammendments from 30.07.1999)
Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA)
[2] Leitfaden für den Brandschutz in Jan.
Personenverkehrsanlagen der Eisenbahnen des 2001
Bundes und der Magnetschnellbahn Jan. 2001
[3] Anforderungen der DB Station&Service AG an Mar. Guideline
den 2001
Brandschutz in Personenverkehrsanlagen
Draft Version 15.03.2001
Deutsche Bahn AG (DB)
[4] Fire and Disaster protection in railway tunnels Mar. Guideline
Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) 2004
France [1] Instruction technique interministérielle relative à IT Jul. Ministerial instruction **** Public security services
la sécurité dans les tunnels ferroviaires N°98- 1998 aim at reinforcing measures.
(08.07.1998) 300 **** Specific methodology for
Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transportes et risk assessment and risk
du Logement management for tunnels is
covered by national
[2] Décret relatif a la sécurité' du réseau ferre Mar. Legislative Decree regulations
national, 30.03.2000 2000
Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transportes et
du Logement

Norway [1] Substructure, regulations for new lines, tunnels Doc.nr. Gen. Regulation This applies to new tunnels
– safety requirements, (01.01.2000) JD 520 2000 only. Further refinements are
Jernbaneverket needed in case of special
conditions.
**** Specific methodology for
risk assessment and risk
management for tunnel is
considered by Norwegian
council for building
standardization.
- This document applies only
to Jernbaneverket
Austria [1] Richtlinie ÖBFV- Guideline supported **** Texts are considered
Bau und Betrieb von neuen Eisenbahntunneln RL Ed. by the Federal Fire sufficient to ensure safety,
bei Haupt- und Nebenbahnen, Anforderungen A-12 2000 Brigade association. but need harmonization.
des Brand- und Katastrophenschutzes (1. **** Specific methodology for
Ausgabe 2000) risk assessment and risk
Österreichischer Bundesfeuerwehrverband management for tunnels is
[2] Eisbav: Eisenbahn- BGBI n° Jun. Law covered by national
ArbeitnehmerInnershutzverordnung 364/1999, 2001 regulations (EB and Partner).
Verkehrs-Arbeitsinspektorat n°
444/1999
[3] Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für mittlere Doc n° Dec Technical Addendum
Tunnel 94086-4 1995
OBB - Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport - dec.
Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG 1995
RB/PJ/C
F/HF
[4] Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für mittlere Doc n° Aug. Technical Addendum
Bestandestunnel 94086- 1996
OBB- Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport - 20 Aug.
Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG 1996
GLA/CF/
PJ

[5] Richtilinien für das Entwerfen von Bahnanlagen Guideline

- Hochleistungsstrcken (HL- Richtilinien )
[6] Handbuch „Feuerwehreinsatz im Gleisbereich“ Manual

ÖBB - ÖBFV
UK «Railway Safety Principles and Guidance, Part 2, Part 2, Mar. Regulation issued by This guidance is not
Section A, Guidance on the infrastructure». Section 2002 the Health and Safety compulsory and one is free to
Chapter 5 : TUNNELS A Executive. take any other action that
UK Health and Safety Executive ISBN 0- complies with the (risk
7176- assessment based) safety
1732-7 laws. However, compliance
with the guidance is taken to
give compliance with all legal
requirements.
**** Specific methodology for

risk assessment and risk
management for tunnels is
covered by national
regulations. All operators
must submit and have
approved a Railway Safety
Case before they are allowed
to operate.
System Safety Requirements for New and Re- RGS Dec Guideline Railway Group Guidance
opened Tunnels GC/RT 2002 Notes are non-mandatory
Railway Safety 5114 documents providing helpful
Draft 3f information relating to the

Guidance on System Safety Requirements in New RGG Dec Guideline control of hazards and often
and Re-opened Tunnels GC/GN 2002 set out a suggested
Railway Safety 5614 approach, which may be
Draft 2f appropriate for Railway
Group members to follow

Spain • Instruccion obras subterraneas BOE Dec. Regulation **** Existing text are
(01.12.1998) n°287 1998 considered partially sufficient
• RENFE - Ministirio de Fomento to ensure safety in tunnels.
[2] Medidas de seguridad en nuevos tuneles Apr. Guideline **** Specific methodology for
ferroviarios (04.2000) 2000 risk assessment and risk
• RENFE management for tunnels is
covered by national
regulations.
The The Dutch Vision on Safety in Road and Rail UN/ECE 2003 **** Specific methodology for
Netherlands Tunnels (Draft) Inland risk assessment and risk
Ministries of transports and of Inland Affairs Transpor management for tunnels is
t covered by national
Committ regulations: quantitative risk
ee assessment and deterministic
informal or scenario analysis.
Doc. N°1
Sweden Säkerhet i järnnvägstunnlar, Ambitionsniva Handbok Sept Guideline
och värderingsmethodik, Handbok BVH BVH .
585.30 (01.09.1997) 585.30 1997
Zusammenfassung auf Englisch
Banverket
Finland • Technical Regulation and Guidelines for RAMO Oct. Technical Regulation
Railways” “Railway Tunnels” section 2002
• RAMO, Finnish Rail Administration Board n°18
USA • NFPA 130 Standards for Fixed Guideway NFPA May. American National ***
Transit and Passenger Rail Systems 130 2003 Standard, issued by
• National Fire Association Standards Council.
# Not all the guidelines can be considered truly national in scope (e.g. Italian guidelines are valid only for FS-RFI, the Norwegian for Jernbaneverket, etc)
**** Comments by Governmental representatives (National Road Administrations or Traffic Ministries) to the questionnaire issued by UN/ECE in 2000 to the
question: "(Are there any legislation, regulations, recommendations on safety in road tunnels in your country and) do you consider the above texts sufficient?"
*** USA was not included in the UN/ECE review

1.2 Table of references (other reference documents)

Organisation Title Reference Date Administrative status Comments
UIC Safety in Railway Tunnels -Recommendations Fiche Sept. Compendium of safety
International Union for Safety Measures Final Report. 779-9 2002 measures. Guideline.
of Railways Measures to limit and reduce the risk of UIC June Guideline
accidents in underground railway installations Report 1991
with particular reference to the risk of fire and IF 4/91
the transport of dangerous goods.
UN Report of the ad hoc multidisciplinary group of Trans/ac 30 Recommendations
United Nations experts on safety in tunnels (Rail). .9/8 July
2003
Questionnaire on safety in railway tunnels UN 2002 Replies to questionnaire
Replies by different Countries. Inf. Doc. 14-15-16
(France – Norway – UK)
A summary of accidents in railway tunnels UN Sept. Report
Department Of Transport, UK Inf. Doc N°8 2002
Railways Tunnels in Europe and North UN May Note
America. Inf. Doc N°7 2002
UN Secretariat
Vehicles fire and fire safety in tunnels UN Sept. ARTICLE
Centre For Fire Safety In Transport, UK Inf. Doc N° 9 2002
Peut-on garantir la sécurité des voyageurs UN Jun.
dans les longs tunnels ferroviaires? Inf. Doc N°1 2003
ALPTRANSIT GOTHARD SA
The Safety of the Swiss railway tunnels UN Jun. Summary Report
analysis of the federal office of transport Inf. Doc N°2 2003
UN-Secretariat
Protection against fire and other catastrophic UN Feb.
events in railways tunnels. Inf. Doc N°12 2002
Deutsche Bahn AG
[9] Fire protection in transport tunnels UN Jun. Summary Report
(Germany) Inf. Doc N° 13 2003


[10] Report of the ad hoc multidisciplinary Trans/ac Dec Recommendations
group of experts on safety in tunnels (Rail). .9/9 2003
AEIF Mandate for CR second priority TSIs (version Jun.

European 04) 2002
Association for
Railway
Interoperability
SBB-CFF-FSS Nutzungsanforderungen an neue Mar. Recommendation
Swiss Railway Eisenbahntunnel 2001
ALPETUNNEL Safety Criteria for Operation, Lyon-Turin, base A96074/r01- Apr. Summary of guidelines
GEIGE tunnel D/RR/NR 1997
RFF Safety principles for new long tunnels for Reseau Ferr. Mar. Note
Réseau Ferré de freight and the rail motorway. 25/03/2003 2003
France Official Policy for making existing tunnels safer Dir.Reseau Ferr. Mar. Note
during renovation and/or widening work on the 28/03/2003 2003
National Railway Network.
DB Fire Disaster Control on the Cologne-Frankfurt Dec. Safety Concepts
Deutsche Bahn new build line 2002
BBT Sicurezza nelle grandi gallerie di base alpine Oct. Safety Concepts
Brenner Basis Brenner Basis Tunnel 2001
Tunnel
Danish National The Great Belt Link, Safety Concepts
Railway Agency - Banestyrelsen –
Denmark
The Netherlands Integraal Veiligheidsplan HSL-Zuid 2001 Safety Concepts
HSL-Zuid
Memo Brandcurve HSL-Zuid 2001 Safety Concepts
HSL-Zuid


Beveiligingsconcept HSL-Zuid, Teile A, B1, B2, 2001 Safety Concepts
B3
HSL-Zuid
High speed line south: safety concept- Green UN-Informal Doc Sept. Safety Concepts
Heart Tunnel N°10 2002
Government of Netherlands
OFT Swiss Federal Rapport final sur la Sécurité dan le tunnels Jan. Technical report
Office of Transport ferroviaires suisses 2001

1.3 Analytical summaries (national# guidelines)
1.3.1 Italy
1.3.1.1 Linee guida per il miglioramento della sicurezza nelle gallerie ferroviarie”, 25 July
1997
Ministry of the Interior, FS S.p.A., National Fire Brigade Corp.

Summary:
These guidelines were defined within the framework of a mixed working party (F.S. S.p.A. –
Ministry of the Interior, C.N. V.V.F.) and came into force in July 1997. The related document
does not have the force of law, although it summarises the recommendation of the working
party. The document identifies appropriate safety measures to be observed during the design
and management stages prior to the construction of new infrastructure and the upgrading of
existing works. These are designed to safeguard the wellbeing of persons (passengers and
rescuers) with regard to accident risks in tunnels and especially in the event of fire. The
document is divided into three chapters dealing, respectively, with existing tunnels (chapter
1), tunnels under construction (chapter II) and tunnels yet to be constructed (chapter III).
The areas of application of the document up to 1997 are: Mixed traffic lines; Tunnels of
between 5 and 20 km in length. In major base tunnels (L> 20 km) the right to make use of
specific studies is guaranteed. The document does not consider either station tunnels or
metro tunnels as these are subject to specific regulations.
1.3.1.2 Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione di piazzali di emergenza, le strade di accesso e

le aree di atterraggio degli elicotteri ai fini della sicurezza delle gallerie ferroviarie
(Agosto 98)
FS – RFI
Summary:
This document indicates the design criteria for emergency areas used for stationing rescue
vehicles, and for access roads and helidecks, related to railway tunnels of between 5 and 20
km, as indicated in the Guidelines for improving safety in railway tunnels [1.3.1.1].
1.3.1.3 Linee guida per la realizzazione del piano generale di emergenza per lunghe gallerie
ferroviarie (Ottobre 98)
FS – RFI
Summary:
This document supplements the Guidelines by indicating about the definition and readiness
of specific emergency plans to be used in order to deal with every possible and foreseeable
accident scenario concerning so-called residual risks. The document sets out to provide an
objective, clear and practical instrument, that is applicable in every situation and risk
scenario. The document indicates the fundamental criteria and the reference contents for the
design and execution of an emergency plan whose preparation should, in any case, take the
form of an omni-comprehensive edition within the framework of a programme designed to
keep all risks to a minimum by the competent and responsible authorities (Decree Law
626/94).

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1.3.1.4 Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione degli impianti idrico antincendio, elettrico e
illuminazione, telecomunicazione, supervisione (Aprile 2000)
FS – RFI
Summary:
This document represents a primer and a guide for compiling the project and has been
drawn up on the basis of the requirements of the Guidelines. The instructions set forth in the
document must be supplemented and adapted in relation to the real characteristics of the
tunnel to be fitted out, and must take account of the condition of the places. Although the
subject matter of the document concerns the first two chapters of the Guidelines [1.3.1.1],
referring to existing tunnels and those under construction, it also represents an obligatory
reference for future works in terms of the basic technical choices of the plant and equipment
to be used.
1.3.1.5 Linee guida per l’elaborazione del piano interno di emergenza (Giugno 2000)
FS-RFI
Summary:
This document is a guide for the preparation of an Internal Emergency Plan in long railway
tunnels. The document is concerned with ways of dealing with an accident in the shortest
possible timescale while limiting the inconvenience to the persons involved, preventing the
spread of the damage and guaranteeing the continuance of normal operations in total safety.
The document was drawn up for rescue operations in railway tunnels, whatever the timetable
for work to upgrade tunnel safety. It proposes the planning and coordination of all operational
aspects of alarm and intervention of personnel for events that affect movement within a
tunnel, even when the intervention of non-FS rescue agencies is requested, as provided for
by the Guidelines. Example Emergency-action flow-charts are provided for each accident
scenario, which constitute a guide for the compilation of the plan and are to be supplemented
wherever necessary.
1.3.1.6 “Linee guida per il tracciamento e la posa in opera di sistemi di supporto per cavo
radiante nelle gallerie ferroviarie” (Aprile 01)
FS – RFI
Summary:
These instructions give model solutions and the guidelines to be followed in designing and
building support systems for the ‘leaky’ cables used to promulgate external communication
network signals inside railway tunnels. In addition, model solutions to be adopted are laid
down regarding the tracing, boring and laying of ducting for power cables and optical fibre
feeding radio propagation plant in the tunnel, when special culverts or conduits are not
available or when no space is available in them. The purpose of the instructions is to make
such activities possible in parallel with retrofitting or upgrading work on the power lines or
reinforcement in railway tunnels. The tracing, boring or laying operations to be conducted in
order to implement the various plant solutions are described, with reference to the type of
cables to be successively laid, the type of support, the type of railway line, the type of
suspension to be used and the type of tunnel.

1.3.1.7 RFI circular n° di/a1007/p/01/000562 del 04.06.2001: “Piano interno di emergenza per
gallerie di lunghezza compresa tra i 5.000m e 3.000m
FS-RFI
Summary:
This circular makes a provision that Internal Emergency Plans shall be drawn up for tunnels
of between 3 and 5 km in length, therefore extending the requirement to all tunnels whose
length is >3 km.
1.3.1.8 RFI circular n° rfi/tdr/a1007/p/01/000512 del 17.12.2001: “Standard di sicurezza per

nuove gallerie ferroviarie”
FS-RFI
Summary:
This circular confirms model solutions for the most appropriate cross-sections for new
tunnels (single or double bore) on the basis of their length in order to adopt a design
standard that will ensure a level of safety in line with that of the other European networks,
also taking into account the high operating speeds used and the mixed traffic involved.
Furthermore, the circular, lays down the infrastructure features which should be included to
enhance safety: bypasses, refuges, signalling plant that prevents other trains from arriving
once the alarm is given.
1.3.2 Switzerland
General comments:
Safety in Swiss railway tunnels is based on various special purpose regulations, especially
AB-EBV, SR 742.141.1, the law on railway infrastructure and the recommendations of the
Federal Transport Office. The requisites set out in these regulations are no longer deemed
sufficient by the Swiss authorities, especially the law AB-EBV, that will be changed
appropriately. Moreover, the shortcomings have been remedied in the drafts of the Swiss
standard SIA 198 and SIA 198/1. Safety in the Gotthard (57 km) and Lotschberg (34 km)
tunnels was evaluated and implemented by the authorities through a special project called
Projektorganisation Sicherheitsbericht ALP TRANSIT. Specific handbooks issued by the
Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) deal with the safety measures to be adopted in railway
tunnels in a special manner: " Sichereith in bestehenden Tunnels, Infrastrukturmassnahmen
zur Erleichterung der Selbstrettung " and "Sicherheitsstandards für unterirdische
Verkehrsanlagen der SBB” (the latter is now out of date). Recently, the Federal Transport
Office (OFT) has instructed the railway companies to propose new measures to improve
safety standards in long Swiss railway tunnels, since it has considered not appropriate to
establish generalised standard measures for all tunnels.

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1.3.2.1 Raccomandazione comune delle autorità di vigilanza sulle ferrovie della Germania,
dell’Austria e della Svizzera in merito alla sicurezza dei viaggiatori in gallerie
ferroviarie molto lunghe, 24.09.1992
Swiss Federal Office of Transport

Summary:
This recommendation refers to the safety of travellers in very long railway tunnels such as
those designed for the Brenner, Gotthard and Loetschberg tunnels. First of all it aims at
producing a harmonised approach to the concept of safety and presents a series of safety
principles. The recommendation applies to new railway tunnels longer than 25 km.
1.3.2.2 Railway regulation: application rules, 01.01.1994
(Swiss Federal Railways).

Summary:
This document derives some safety principles for travellers in very long tunnels.
1.3.2.3 Weisung I-AM-EB-31/00: Sichereit in bestehenden tunnels,

Infrastrukturmassnhamen zur Erleichterung der Selbstrettung,
06.12.2000
(Swiss Federal Railways).

Summary:
This document sets out the technical standards and functional requirements for the hardware
which allows people directly involved in an incident to initiate an emergency response. The
standard represents the application to the Swiss railway network of those safety criteria
envisaged for authorized existing tunnels on the basis of the analysis of risk factors
conducted by the Board of Directors of the SBB on 28/10/1998. The technical standards set
out therein are valid for the design and improvement of the equipment and systems used for
facilitating “self-help emergency action”, giving a sufficiently advantageous cost/quality ratio.
1.3.2.4 Ausfuhrungsbestimmungen zur Eisenbahnverordnung, 01.2001
Summary:
This regulation gives the reference law for railway infrastructures. For safety in Swiss railway
tunnels, reference must be made to the various laws and, in particular, to the regulations
given above, although it should be noted that the requisites set out therein are no longer
regarded as sufficient by the Swiss authorities.
1.3.2.5 Verordnung vom 27 Februar 1991 über den Schutz vor Störfällen“
(Störfallverordnung, StFV, SR 814.012)
Summary:
This decree aims to protect population and environment from serious consequences
following major incidents.

1.3.2.6 Verordnung vom 23 November 1983 über Bau und Betrieb der Eisenbahnen
(Eisenbahnverordnung, EBV, SR 742.141.1)
Summary:
The present decree gives regulations on construction, operation and maintenance of the
railway structures, systems and vehicles. It is mainly focused on railway safety.
1.3.3 Germany
Richtlinie
Anforderung des Brand- und Katastrophenschutzes an den Bau und Betrieb von
Eisenbahntunneln (01.07.1997 with ammendments from 30.07.1999)
Summary:
This document was drawn up by the technical staff of the various Lander (regional
authorities) and by a working party made up of executives from the Fire Brigade, DB SpA
and the Federal Railway Office. The directive defines the safety measures necessary for the
construction and operation of tunnels in order to guarantee (in railway tunnels) not only the
actuation of emergency measures by travellers and personnel but also the use of rescue
vehicles/equipment. This directive applies to new railway tunnels and does not cover urban
line tunnels. For purposes of the document “tunnels” refers to engineering works whose
length exceeds 500 m. In particular, the document covers new tunnels with a length (L)
between 1 km and 15 km. Tunnels are classified by length: long tunnels (1 km ≤L≤ 15 m),
very long tunnels (L>15 km). The minimum safety requirements increase with the length
class. For tunnels in excess of 15 km measures must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
In the case of existing lines, the appropriateness of applying such measures has to be
evaluated in relation to the level of safety provided. However, the directive only applies when
substantial elements of an existing tunnel are intended to be modified in the context of
modernisation/retrofitting design work. The same principle applies to measures referring to
service reorganisation undertaken to reduce operating costs.
1.3.3.1 Leitfaden für den Brandschutz in Personenverkehrsanlagen der Eisenbahnen des

Bundes und der Magnetschnellbahn Jan. 2001
Summary:
This guidance document is concerned with fire protection measures in facilities with
passenger traffic. These are defined as Station buildings, platforms and access ways to and
from platforms. It is not specifically concerned with tunnels, but does contain general fire
safety regulations which should also be followed in underground stations. It has not been
included in the detailed comparison which follows, as this concentrates on running tunnels.

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1.3.3.2 Anforderungen der DB Station&Service AG an den Brandschutz in

Personenverkehrsanlagen - Draft Version 15.03.2001

Summary:
This draft document supplements the EBA Leitfaden above [1.3.3.2] and is also concerned
with passenger facilities. Again, it has not been included in the detailed comparison, which
concentrates on running tunnels.
1.3.4 France
1.3.4.1 Instruction technique interministérielle relative à la sécurité dans les tunnels

ferroviaires (08.07.1998)
Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transportes et du Logement

Summary:
This directive mainly addresses questions of infrastructure, but it also considers rolling stock
and operational procedures. The document deals with urban lines, mixed traffic lines and
passenger traffic lines (modern or upgraded rolling stock) or freight lines during periods when
there is no passenger traffic. The document allows for alternative safety solutions in addition
to established minimum safety measures, but they must, in any case, be approved by
competent authority. The diractive covers new tunnels whose length is between 400 m and
10 km. For tunnels of between 400 and 800 m there are lesser requirements. For tunnels in
excess of 10 km (or 5 km for the “Railway Motorway”) safety measures must be evaluated on
a case-by-case basis.
1.3.4.2 Décret relatif a la sécurité' du réseau ferre national (30.05.2000)

Summary:
This decree, referring to safety on the national railway network, is addressed to the French
Railway Network (RFF), the National Company of French Railways (SNCF) and appointed
railway companies. It sets out provisions that must be applied in the specification, design and
construction of all systems comprising the infrastructure, technical and safety plant and
rolling stock that belongs to or is used on the National Railway Network. The document is
divided into three parts: the first concerns the construction of systems belonging to the
Railway Network or for its use. The second refers to railway operating safety and the third
sets out derogations from the decree’s scope of application.

1.3.5 Norway
1.3.5.1 Substructure, regulations for new lines, tunnels –

safety requirements, (01.01.2000)
Jernbaneverket
Summary:
These regulations cover all safety measures which must be considered when designing
railway tunnels. The requirements are to be understood as the absolute minimum
requirements. Whenever there are exceptional situations, such as tunnel stations or
dangerously heavy goods traffic, then additional, case-specific measures should be adopted.
These regulations only apply to newly-built tunnels with a length over 1 km. The document is
divided into 6 chapters. The first three provide an introduction to the regulations, their scope
and the classification of tunnels into 4 classes (A-B-C-D) by length, average daily traffic
(trains/day) and maximum daily traffic (train/h). The fourth chapter lays down, with a specific
table, the minimum safety requirements for each class of tunnel. The regulations also set out
a table listing the supplementary measures to be adopted in various circumstances along
with a description of the minimum requirements. The final two chapters provide indications
for the maintenance of plant and equipment and for drawing up emergency plans.
1.3.6 Austria
General comments
In Austria there are regulations for the construction of tunnels called "HL Richtlinien" or
"Guidelines for High Performance Lines". These regulations refer to the geometry of the
basic infrastructure, the signalling systems and the basic technological systems of the tunnel.
Furthermore, the authorities and the Fire Brigade have issued recommendations, which are
also mandatory, that refers to infrastructure, technological systems and operation
(“Guidelines for the construction and operation of railway tunnels”). The Austrian Federal
Railways (OBB) also have regulations for training train personnel. In general the foregoing
regulations and the recommendations are sufficient even if there is a need to integrate the
various subjects together. The Austrian Federal Railways class tunnels by accident risk and
importance, and for every class, specify specific risk factors (length, infrastructure,
technological systems, traffic density, number of passengers).
1.3.6.1 Richtlinie
Bau und Betrieb von neuen Eisenbahntunneln bei Haupt- und Nebenbahnen, Anforderungen
des Brand- und Katastrophenschutzes (1. Ausgabe 2000)
Österreichischer Bundesfeuerwehrverband
Summary:
This document forms the reference regulations for preparing opinions and conducting
surveys as well as for decisions (by the competent authorities) on procedures for the
construction and operation of railway tunnels. It applies to new tunnels whose length is
between 1.5 km and 25 km. The document classes the tunnels as: short (L≤ 1.5 km),
medium (1.5 km ≤ L < 15 km), long (5 km ≤ L ≤ 25 km) and very long (L > 25 km). Very long

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tunnels need safety measures that must be defined on a case-by-case basis. For existing
tunnels, the degree to which each of the the provisions can be applied must be verified.
1.3.6.2 Eisbav: Eisenbahn-ArbeitnehmerInnershutzverordnung
Verkehrs-Arbeitsinspektorat
Summary:
The railway companies’ guidelines already contain many regulations concerning the
protection of employees working on the trackside. These safety measures have been
standardized and summarized in a decree of safety for railway employees. In these
instructions, the Transport Department for safety at work brought together some explanations
of the safety decree for railway employees in order to make the practical application of the
regulations easier. The first edition of these instructions was published in spring 2000. They
are a simple and easily readable aid for employers and employees.
1.3.6.3 Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für mittlere Tunnel
OBB- Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport - Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG

Summary:
This document contains the criteria for the preparation of a general operational safety plan
for existing medium-length tunnels, that is between 1.5 and 15 km. In particular, it defines
methods for analysing risks and implementing possible measures for improving safety
conditions. The document is divided into four chapters: risk evaluation, the examination of
safety provisions, the evaluation of provisions, and conclusions.
1.3.6.4 Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für mittlere Bestandestunnel
OBB- Austrian Federal Minstry of Transport - Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG

Summary:
This document contains the general safety regulations for existing, medium-length tunnels
(1.5 – 15 km). The contents of the document can be applied in a simplified form when
planning for safety in newly-designed tunnels.
1.3.6.5 Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für lange Tunnel
OBB- Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport - Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG

Summary:
Not available.
1.3.6.6 Richtilinien für das Entwerfen von Hochleistungsstrecken
(HL- Richtilinien)
Summary:
These regulations deal with geometry, basic infrastructure and basic tunnel equipment.

1.3.6.7 Handbuch „Feuerwehreinsatz im Gleisbereich “Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept

für mittlere Bestandestunnel
ÖBB- ÖBFV
Summary:
Not available.
1.3.7 Spain
1.3.7.1 Instruccion obras subterraneas (01.12.1998)
RENFE - Ministirio de Fomento

Summary:
This document issued by the Spanish National Railway Network (RENFE) indicates
objectives for improving safety and possible approaches to adopt in risk analysis and
evaluation. The instructions, which mainly focus on prevention, describe a series of
measures to be adopted, divided into standard and supplementary measures.
The instructions are divided into 5 chapters. The first presents the essential requirements for
engineering works and general considerations on their classification by geometry and the
construction method. The second concerns the obligations of the network operator during an
emergency or maintenance. The third and fourth chapters stipulate the criteria to follow in the
design and construction phases. The last chapter sets out the criteria for the installation of
the various items of equipment and for the operational phase.
1.3.7.2 Medidas de seguridad en nuevos tuneles ferroviarios (04.2000)
RENFE
Summary:
These specifications describe the type and objectives of the minimum safety measures which
must be adopted in order to facilitate the following of emergency procedures by passengers
and railway personnel inside railway tunnels. The document also lays down the intervention
procedures to be followed by non-railway rescue teams, without prejudice to any further
safety measures. The subject matter covers measures to prevent risks and limit damage, as
well as emergency response to be deployed by travellers/ on-board personnel, and how to
exploit the intervention of external rescue facilities to the full. These measures are mainly
directed towards the protection and evacuation of people. The scope of application for the
specifications covers new urban railway tunnels but excludes underground railways. Their
application to existing tunnels would be contrary to the principle of proportionality and for this
reason application to existing tunnels is only justified when/if they are to be upgraded.

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1.3.8 United Kingdom
1.3.8.1 «Railway Safety Principles and Guidance, Part 2, Section A,

Guidance on the infrastructure». Chapter 5 : TUNNELS
UK Health and Safety Executive

Summary:
The document gives official guidance on safeguarding safety and health in railway
environments. Chapter 5 provides the most direct reference to problems concerning safety in
metropolitan tunnels and long tunnels (L≥1.500 m). The regulations indicate the factors to
bear in mind in designing tunnels. While the final geometrical configuration of the tunnel will
depend on the type of rolling stock to be used, the means foreseen for evacuation and the
possibility that the tunnel is an extension of an existing tunnel. Usually a double bore
configuration is envisaged for metropolitan and long railway tunnels. Solutions that derive
from the internal division of a larger tunnel may be acceptable. The scope of application of
the regulations is metropolitan line and railway tunnels whose length is L≥ 1.500m.
1.3.8.2 «System Safety Requirements for New and Re-opened Tunnels»
Railway Group Standard- Railway Safety GC/RT 5114 Draft 3f December 2002
Summary:
This document sets out the system safety requirements to be considered for new and re-
opened tunnels.
1.3.8.3 «Guidance on System Safety Requirements in New and Re-opened Tunnels»
Railway Group Guidance Note- Railway Safety GC/GN 5614 Draft 2f December 2002
UK Health and Safety Executive
Summary:
This document provides guidance on the system safety required in tunnels to ensure their
safe operation in support of GC/RT5114.

1.3.9 The Netherlands
1.3.9.1 The Dutch Vision on Safety in Road and Rail Tunnels (Draft)
Ministries of transports and of Inland Affairs

Summary:
The Dutch Tunnel Safety project group has conducted a detailed study on this question,
published with the title “Tunnel ahead”, which included the cooperation of the Ministry of
Transport and the Ministry of the Interior. The document mainly addresses the following
problems: the lack of transparency in decision-taking procedures regarding options for
providing safety in tunnels, the lack of standards and an adequate level of safety in tunnels,
safety management during the operation of tunnels, and the organisation of safe procedures
to be followed by engine drivers and on-board personnel in tunnels (training courses and
periodic drills).
1.3.10 Sweden
1.3.10.1 Säkerhet i järnvägstunnlar, Ambitionsnivå och värderingsmetodik, Handbok BVH

585.30 (01.09.1997) - Zusammenfassung auf Englisch
Banverket
Summary:
The handbooks sets out to establish and identify a clear method for ascertaining that an
adequate level of safety has been reached in tunnels and specifies the various subjects
involved. The handbook refers to newly built tunnels but it can also be consulted for the
purpose of verifying traffic safety in existing tunnels.
1.3.11 Finland
1.3.11.1 Technical Regulation and Guidelines for Railways”

“Railway Tunnels”
RAMO, Finnish Rail Administration Board

Summary:
This document deals with all aspects of tunnel design, from general principles for tunnel
design to the requirements for the rails, from the structural size of engineering plant to
guidance on construction and maintenance. In the part covering design, the risk-analysis
procedures to be followed are set out along with an analysis of the safety requirements in the
event of an accident (material, plant, communication, power-supply requirements etc.)

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1.3.12 USA
1.3.12.1 NFPA 130 Standards for Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems
National Fire Association

Summary:
This standard covers fire protection requirements for passenger rail, underground, surface,
and elevated fixed guideway transit systems including trainways, vehicles, fixed guideway
transit stations, and vehicle maintenance and storage areas; and for life safety from fire in
fixed guideway transit stations, trainways, vehicles, and outdoor vehicle maintenance and
storage areas. Fixed guideway transit stations pertain to stations accommodating only
passengers and employees of the fixed guideway transit and passenger rail systems and
incidental occupancies in the stations. This standard establishes minimum requirements for
each of the identified subsystems. The purpose of this standard is to establish minimum
requirements that will provide a reasonable degree of safety from fire and its related hazards.

Comprehensive list of safety measures
2 COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF SAFETY MEASURES
2.1 General design characteristics
G1 Range of Applicability
G11 Limits on Applicablity
G2 Geometric configuration
G21 Geometric configuration of new tunnels
2.2 Structural measures relevant to safety
S1 Emergency passenger exits

S11 Parallel service and safety tunnels
S12 Emergency cross-passages (distance)
S13 Safe places
S14 Escape routes
S15 Vertical exits/rescue shafts
S16 Lateral exits/access tunnels
S2 Emergency access for rescue staff

S21 Tunnel access for emergency vehicles
S22 Rescue forces’ emergency vehicles (train, bimodal…)
S3 Drainage of flammable liquids

S31 Inclination of tunnel axis
S32 Track drainage system (drainage and retaining basins)
S4 Open areas
S41 Rescue areas
2.3 Safety equipment
E1 Smoke control ventilation

E 11 Natural ventilation
E 12 Forced ventilation
E2 Emergency exit and rescue access ventilation

E 21 Emergency exit/rescue access ventilation
E3 Lighting systems
E31 Emergency tunnel lighting
E32 Emergency exit/rescue access lighting
E4 Escape signs in tunnels

E41 Pedestrian exit signs
E44 Other
E5 Communication and alarm system

E51 Emergency telephones
E52 Alarm push buttons
E53 Fire/smoke detection

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Comprehensive List of Safety Measures
E54 Radio rebroadcast

E55 Loudspeakers
E6 Operation and traffic management

E61 Speed and density monitoring
E62 Traffic classification and control
E63 Tracking status of the train before entering a tunnel
E7 Power supply
E71 Power supply
E8 Fire suppression
E81 First and fire fighting
E82 Fire extinguishing systems (in technical rooms)
E83 Other
E9 General safety equipment

E91 General Safety Equipment (Running Tunnels)
E92 General Safety Equipment (Cross-passages )
2.4 Structure & equipment response to fire
R1 Reaction to fire
R11 Reaction to fire
R12 Fire protection requirements for structures
R13 Fire resistance requirements for equipment
R14 Additional measures
2.5 Emergency management
M1 Organisational measures
M1 Safety plans

Matrix of Guidelines Contents
3 MATRIX OF GUIDELINES CONTENTS

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Switzerland
Germany
France
U.S.A.
U.K.
Italy
Overview of Contents
Available national guidelines: 8 4 4 2 3 1

Category Element (safety measure)
General design characteristics
G1 Range of G11 Limits on Applicability
A,1,8 A,1,3 A,1 A,1 A,1,2,3 A,1
Applicability
G2 Geometric G21 Geometric configuration of new tunnels
A,8 A,,3, ! A,,1,4 A,,1 A,1,2,3 A,1
configuration
Structural measures relevant to safety
S1 Emergency S11 Parallel service and safety tunnels A,1 0 A,1 A,1 A,2,3 0
passenger exit
S12 Emergency cross-passages (distance) A,1,8 ! A,1,4 A,1 A,1,2,3 A,1
S13 Safe places A,1 A,1 A,1,4 0 A,2,3 A,1
S14 Escape routes (lateral walkways) A,1 A,3,! A,4 A,1 A,1 A,1
S15 Vertical exits/rescue shafts 0 0 A,1,4 0 A,1 A,1
S16 Lateral exits/access tunnels A,1 0 A,4 A,1 A,1,2,3 A,1
S2 Emergency S21 Tunnel access for emergency vehicles A,1 A,3 A,1,4 A,1 A,1 A,1
access for rescue S22 Rescue forces emergency vehicles (train,
staff A,1 !, A,1,2 A,1,4 A,1 0 0
bimodal..)
S3 Drainage of S31 Inclination of tunnel axis 0 0 A,1,4 0 0 0
flammable liquids S32 Track drainage system (drainage and retaining
0 A,3 0 A,1 A,1 0
basins)
S4 Open areas S41 Rescue areas A,1 A,3 A,1,4 A,1 A,1 0
Safety equipment
E1 Smoke control E11 Natural ventilation A,1 0 0 A,1 0,A,1,2,3 -
ventilation E12 Forced ventilation 0, A,1 ! 0 A,1 0,A,1,2,3 A,1
E2 Emergency
exit and rescue E21 Emergency exit / rescue access ventilation A,1 0 A,1,4 0 0 0
access ventilation
E3 Lighting E31 Emergency tunnel lighting A,1 A,3 A,1,4 A,1,! A,1 A,1
systems E32 Emergency exit / rescue access lighting A,1 0 A,4 A,1 A,1 A,1
E4 Escape signs E41 Pedestrian exit signs A,1 A,3 A,4 A,1 A,1,2,3 A,1
in tunnels E42 Other A,1 0 0 0 0 0
E5 E51 Emergency telephones A,1 A,3 A,4 A,1 A,1,2 A,1
Communication E52 Alarm push buttons 0, ! 0 A,4 0 0 0
and alarm system
E53 Fire/smoke detection 0, ! 0,! 0 0 A,2,3 A,1
E54 Radio rebroadcast A,1 A,3 A,1,4 A,1 A,1,2,3 A,1
E55 Loudspeakers A,1 0 0 0 0 0
E6 Operation E61 Speed monitoring and intensity 0 ! A,1,4 A,1 0 0
and traffic E62 Traffic classification and control O, ! ! A,1,4 A,1 0 0
management E63 Tracking status of the train before entering a
0 0 0 0 0 0
tunnel
E7 Power supply E71 Power supply A,1 A,3 A,4 A,1 A,1 A,1
E8 Fire E81 First and fire fighting A,1 A A,1,4 A,1 A,1 A,1
suppression E82 Fire extinguishing systems (in technical rooms) 0 A* 0 0 0 0
E83 Other 0 0 0 0 0 0
E9 General safety E91 General Safety Equipment (Running Tunnels) A* A* A* A* A* -
equipment E92 General Safety Equipment (cross-passages etc) A* A* A* A* A* -
Structure & equipment response to fire
R1 Reaction and R11 Reaction to fire A,1 ! A,1,4 A,1 A,1,2,3
resistance to fire A,1
R12 Fire protection requirements for structures A,1 A,3 A,1,4 A,1 A,2,3 A,1
R13 Fire resistance requirements for equipment A,1 A,3 A,1,4 A,1 0,A,2,3 A,1
R14 Additional measures 0 0 0 0 0 0
Emergency Management
M1Organizational
M11 Safety plans A,1,7 !, A,3 A,1,4 0 0 A,1
measure
0: No requirements, little information. A: Normative/guideline information *: Information derived from the

Legend: ! : Information derived directly from the national N: national document number whole of available norms /
railway network. (ref. Chapter 1) regulations.

Figure 1 - Overview (matrix) giving types of requirements, amount of information and

reference to the documents.
Notes:
The table shows only those parameters which appear to be dealt with consistently in the
various national documents.
The numbers used are a reference to the individual National guidelines, see Chapter 1 §1.1.
The same convention is used to refer to the national regulations/guidelines in the column
headed “ref.” of each of the element tables given in chapter 4.

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Detailed comparison
4 DETAILED COMPARISON
The detailed comparison comprises a description of the role of each safety measure,
comparison of the requirements in form of direct quotes from the text of the guideline ([…])
or sometimes in form of a synthesis of the different available documents ([*]), or as
information directly derived from the National Railway network ([!]).
The matrix shown in Figure 3.1 gives a comprehensive list of 39 safety measures in five
categories: G: General design characteristics, S: Structural measures relevant to safety, E:
Safety equipment, R: Structure & equipment response to fire, and M: Emergency
management. The main categories have been subdivided into 2, 11, 21, 4 and 1 categories
respectively. For each of the elements identified, the reference is made to the national
guidelines of 6 selected countries (5 western European countries + USA). Where available,
information from some other European countries including Spain, Finland, Sweden, Norway
and Denmark is also provided. This has been obtained from the National Railway
Infrastructure Manager. This additional information is given in rows titled “other + name of
the country”.
Each measure for detailed comparison is prefaced by general comments that define the role
of the measure, and that mostly reflects the point of view of the International Union of
Railways (UIC). All the comparisons are followed by quotations from UN/ECE
Recommendations.
4.1 General Design Characteristics
4.1.1 G1 – Range of Applicability
4.1.1.1 Role of the measure
As a rule, regulations set a minimum length for tunnels to which they apply. The necessity of
tunnel-specific measures is often indicated for very long tunnels. The regulations are
generally applied to newly constructed tunnels, and may be applicable (either fully or in part)
when relevant restructuring works are required on existing tunnels or those under
construction.
4.1.1.2 Synthesis – comments
Analysis of the various regulations reveals that the range of applicability of safety regulations
is similar for almost all of the principal western European countries. Italy, France, Germany,
Austria and the U.K. have similar ranges over which their regulations apply, beginning
between 1 km to 1.5 km and extending to 20 km to 25 km for new tunnels.
Among the various regulations on new construction of tunnels, those of Switzerland give only
general guidelines on the subject of safety, these guidelines being applied to particularly long
tunnels (L>25 km). For existing tunnels, only the Italian regulations precisely specify the
range of applicability for the standards contained in their guidelines, giving a detailed
illustration.
In this regard, other European regulations are limited simply to suggesting the possible
application of the ‘new-build’ standards, but only in case of substantial modifications. Unlike
Germany, Austria, France and the U.K., Switzerland provides a special regulation covering
all existing tunnels, which gives infrastructure standards to facilitate rescue services.

Detailed comparison
4.1.1.3 Comparison tables
• G11 Limits on Applicability

Country Ref. Requirement Comment
Italy [1,8] Tunnels on mixed traffic lines.
Existing tunnels and those in course of construction in 1997, having
lengths of between 5 and 20 km.
Applicability extended (according to the RFI note of 17/12/2001) to
future new tunnel construction with lengths between 2 and 20 Km.
Long base tunnels (L>20 Km) must have individual study.
The document does not take into consideration stations in tunnels or
Metro tunnels, for which there is a specific regulation.
Switzerland [1,3] [1] New tunnels having lengths of over 25 km
New and existing tunnels (Weisung I-AM-EB 31/00) – 06.12.2000
Germany [1] New tunnels having lengths of between 1 and 15 km
For tunnels of over 15 km, individually tailored measures shall be
provided.
Possible application to existing tunnels, but only in the case of
substantial modifications
France [1] Tunnels for urban routes, passengers and mixed
New tunnels, having lengths of between 400 and 10,000 m
A few measures are required for tunnels between 400 and 800 m
Safety measures must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for tunnel
lengths over 10 km. or lengths over 5 km. for heavily used railway lines.
U.K. [1] Low-cover (shallow) railway tunnels.
[1,2, [1] Tunnels for metro lines and heavy rail, having lengths of ≥1.5 km.
3] [2,3] New tunnels and re-opened tunnels
U.S.A. [1] (1-1.1) …This standard establishes minimum requirements for
…passenger rail, underground, surface, and elevated, fixed guidepath
transit systems including tramways,…
UNECE [10] These measures shall be applied to all railway tunnels. They may be
reduced for short tunnels (<1 km), but shall be adapted or increased for
very long tunnels (>15 km), undersea tunnels and steep mountain
tunnels. Measures for existing tunnels, requiring alterations through civil
works, may only be applied at reasonable costs during significant
reconstruction works. However, safety requirements must also be
achieved through measures regarding rolling stock and management.
Other New tunnels, having lengths between 1.5 and 25 km
Austria Very long tunnels (L>25 km) require safety measures to be defined
case by case.
The extent the provisions provided can be applied to existing tunnels
has yet to be verified.
Other Tunnels, having lengths of over 1km
Norway 3 categories of tunnels (A,B,C) shall be identified based on the length,
trains/day and maximum timetable frequency.

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Detailed comparison
4.1.2 G2 – Geometric configuration
For new projects, there is a clear trend among authorities to define minimum escape
distances and requirements / precautions for mixed traffic. If these requirements cannot be
fulfilled with double-track tubes and escape facilities, double-tube single-track tunnels may
be the solution. In any case the definition of the tunnel system - double-track tube or double-
tube, single-track tunnel - is often a multicriteria decision based on: construction costs,
construction time and risks, operation (maintenance concept, crossovers), topography
(including space at the portals), aerodynamic aspects and safety.
Analysis was performed with reference to mixed-traffic lanes (the righthand column in the
table). A comparison reveals that Italy, Germany, France and the U.K. have regulations that
clearly indicate the geometric configuration that must be adopted for new tunnels, based on
traffic considerations and on the length of the tunnel to be constructed. Swiss and Austrian
regulations do not address the subject explicitly.
The configuration suggested in some regulations is double-tube, starting from lengths below
1 km in Italy, this configuration is only ‘recommended’ for tunnels of 1 km, but is compulsory
for tunnels of 2 km or more. Emphasis is placed on the fact that, within the context of safety,
both the single-tube double-track and double-tube single-track solutions have advantages
and disadvantages. The double-tube solution may be safer, since it prevents the risk of
derailment accidents, which obstruct the adjacent track, and allows use of the track, not
involved in the accident, as a safe haven. On the other hand, the single-tube configuration
supplies more space for rescue operations, and also a greater volume into which fire and
smoke can spread (giving more time for evacuation). For high-speed trains, the single-tube
double-track solution could be preferable, whereas for mixed traffic, the double-tube
configuration may be more suitable, keeping aerodynamic factors in mind (UN/ECE
Recommendation). In any case, international organisations (UN/ECE and UIC) find that the
choice should be the result of a thorough evaluation of all parameters related to safety as
well as accurate economic assessments.

Detailed comparison
• G21 Geometric configuration of new tunnels

Italy [1,8] Single tube or double-tube, without distinction, down to 1,000 m Parameters
Single tube or double-tube based project specificity, focussing on comprised
double-tube solutions for lengths of between 1,000 and 2,000 m within
Double-tube for tunnel lengths of over 2,000 m category G2
have been
compared
with
reference to
mixed traffic
operations.
Double track
– single tube:
L < 2.000 m
Single track –
single tube:
L ≥ 2.000 m
Switzerland [3,!] The choice of the single-tube or double-tube tunnel system should be [[!]
the result of a thorough evaluation that takes into consideration all Information
parameters related to: safety, the level of traffic and length of the line as obtained
well as cost/benefit economic considerations; thus, a field of lengths for directly from
differentiating the most suitable solution is not defined a priori [1] railway
network.
Germany [1,4] [4] On double-track lines, long and very long tunnels are to be designed Double track
as parallel, single-track tubes, when the operating programme provides – single tube:
for unrestricted mixed operations of passenger and freight trains. Undefined
[1] The double-tube configuration for mixed-traffic lines must be Single track –
adopted for tunnel lengths of over 1,000 m. single tube:
L ≥ 1.000 m
France [1] The adoption of the single-tube double-track configuration or double- Double track
tube single-track configuration depends on the type of traffic and length – single tube:
of the tunnel. Undefined
The double-tube configuration, starting at lengths of 800 m., is adopted Single track –
for mixed-traffic lines. single tube:
800<L<10.00
0m for mixed-
traffic lines,
ad hoc
solutions for
L ≥ 10.000m
U.K. [1,2, [2]….The choice between two single track tunnels or one double track
3] tunnel shall be justified by a risk assessment, so as to provide
acceptable safety during normal, degraded and emergency operating
conditions.
[1] As a rule, double-tube configuration is foreseen for long railway
tunnels (>1,500 m).
[1] Double-tube solutions, derived from an internal division of a broader
tunnel, are acceptable (divider partition).
U.S.A. [1] Various types of section are taken into consideration: double bore with
connections, single bore with a partition and simple single tube.

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Detailed comparison
UNECE [10] (C.1 01) …both single-tube double-track and double-tube single-track
tunnels have their advantages and disadvantages. Double-bore single-
track tunnels might be safer as they avoid accidents caused by
derailments obstructing the adjacent track and they provide the second
tube as a possible safe haven. …..double-track tunnels have more
space for possible rescue operations but they also have more space for
smoke and fire to spread. …. The choice should be the result of a
thorough evaluation of all parameters (such as, for example, length of
the tunnel, type of traffic, etc.) related to safety as well as cost
considerations.
4.2 Structural measures relevant to safety
4.2.1 S1 - Emergency passenger exits
Emergency exits for tunnel users are installed with the purpose of having a safe haven in
case of accidents in the tunnel. The exits will mainly be used in case of a fire in the tunnel.
The emergency exit can be connected to an adjacent running tube, to a dedicated service
tunnel or may lead to the outside. The connection can be direct or through a cross passage,
shaft or similar. In some cases shelters are arranged as safe havens, where tunnel users can
stay temporarily.
All of the guidelines indicate that the adoption of a parallel tube as a smoke-free escape
route is generally required for new tunnels, with the distance between emergency exits
varying from 250m to a maximum of 500m. For new, shorter tunnels, a double-tube single-
track configuration is generally preferred and the distance between emergency exits in this
latter case may vary from 1000m to 2000m.
For newly constructed, single-tube, double-track tunnels, exits (vertical and/or horizontal:
shafts, service tunnels, etc) are generally provided, which lead directly outside, with
maximum separation distances varying from 500 to 1,000m. In practice, the distance actually
adopted between exit passages varies depending on the local situation, operating conditions
and the view of the safety concept based on the applicable regulations.

Detailed comparison
• S11 Parallel service and safety tunnel

Italy [1] Mentioned but not prescribed. (3.1.3) If a single-tube, double-track
solution is chosen for new tunnels having lengths of less than
2,000m, a parallel service tunnel shall be provided that is equipped
with appropriate connections or, alternatively, protected
passageways shall be built that lead directly to the open. A double-
tube solution with cross-passages every 250m shall be chosen for
tunnels having lengths of over 2,000m.
Switzerland No reference.
Germany [1] Mentioned but not prescribed. The whole concept is defined by the
main rule that a safe place must be accessible within 500m of each
point in the tunnel. ‘Safe places’ are defined as portals, escape
tubes, escape shafts and cross passages or passageways that lead
to an escape tube, escape shaft or the other tube. If the tunnel is
shorter than 1km (category 1) then the above- mentioned measures
are not mandatory. If it is longer, a combination of the above
mentioned measures (which are then called emergency exits) is
needed. If an escape tube is used, then it must have a minimum
cross section of 2.25 x 2.25m, a longitudinal gradient < 10%, and a
length of no more than 150m if it ends in an escape shaft
If the length is more than 300m, it must allow vehicular access.
France [1] (4.1.3)…Where parallel escape tube is available, it must be provided
with cross passages at least 2.2m tall, 4 ‘passage units’ wide and no
more than 800 m apart. The cross passages must have 2 doors (fire
resistance of 120 minutes, minimum width of 2 ‘passage units’)
U.K. [1] Mentioned but not prescribed.
[1,2,3] [2,3] For long tunnels the place of relative safety could be a parallel
tunnel, a service tunnel, specially constructed underground spaces,
cross passages, etc. For shorter tunnels, an external place of
relative safety, such as adjacent to the portal, would normally suffice.
U.S.A. No reference.
UNECE [10] (C.3 10)…construction of a parallel service and safety tunnel…
should be based on an assessment of the geotechnical and
operating conditions and cost-benefit considerations for each tunnel.
Possible benefits: pilot tunnel…, advance knowledge of …the
ground for the main tunnel, logistic opportunities in construction and
service, cable and pipe runs clear of the railway, maintenance
access to technical rooms at any time.

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Detailed comparison
• S12 Emergency cross-passages (distance)

Italy [1,8] For tunnels equipped with a parallel service tunnel for evacuating
persons and for double-tube tunnels, connections shall be provided
that guarantee sealing against smoke and flames, so as to make
escape routes safe. (3.1.3.b). Double-tube tunnels: distance
between cross-connections, 250m; Single-tube tunnels: maximum
acceptable walking distance along a lateral walkway, 2,000m.
Alternative solutions must be shown to guarantee equivalent safety
criteria. (3.1.3.1.a). The following equipment and/or systems must
be provided within the emergency cross-passages: • overpressure
systems • telephones • illuminated signs • emergency lights • fire
and smoke-proof doors fitted with anti-panic handles (crash bars).
Switzerland [!] Cross-passages are provided in double-tube tunnels. Maximum [!]
distance between passages: 500m Information
The following installations and/or systems are provided: • obtained
Emergency lights • handrails • signs • telephones • plenum directly from
systems. railway
network.
Germany [1,4] For long and very long tunnels intended for mixed traffic, a double-
tube system must be adopted. In this case cross-connections and
the parallel tube can be used for escaping persons and rescue
teams. A safe place must be available at a maximum distance of
500m from any point in the tunnel. Maximum distance between
cross-connections: 1000m. These must be equipped with fire and
smoke-proof, doors (fitted with anti-panic handles) that close
automatically and are at least 1.0m wide. They must also be
equipped with emergency lighting.
France [1] (4.1.3) Where a parallel escape tube is available, cross passages
must be provided (at least 2.2m in height, 4 ‘passage units’ wide,
maximum distance of 800m). The cross-passages must have 2
doors (fire resistance of 120 mins, minimum width of 2 ‘passage
units’) to keep both the cross passages and the adjacent tube free
from smoke.
U.K. [1] (52)…..Cross-passages between single-track running tunnels or
[1,2,3] to a service tunnel should be provided on the basis of safety
assessments. Their max spacing is based on: • the length of train, •
the method of evacuation; • the needs of the emergency services.
…If …between the running tunnels, consideration should be given
to: • the passage of smoke and heat; • the opening and closing of
doors if provided; • risk to people from trains in any parallel tunnel,
including any aerodynamic effects. The most common installations
are: • Ventilation systems providing fresh air to the space and
keeping it smoke-free • Fire and smoke-proof doors.
[2,3] Distances between any cross passages ….should be
determined by a risk assessment.

Detailed comparison
U.S.A. [1] (3-2.4.3)…cross passageways shall not be farther than 800 ft (244
m) apart. Openings in open passageways shall be protected with
fire door assemblies having a fire protection rating of 1½ hour with a
self-closing fire door.
UNECE [10] (C.3 09)…Cross passages should … connect the main tunnel with
safe places. … constructed between the tubes of double-tube
single-track tunnels or a double-track tunnel and a safety tunnel. …
should be lit and have means of communication and be designed to
prevent spreading of smoke into safe areas. … doors on exits to
cross passages should be able to resist fire for 30 minutes and be
able to resist the aerodynamic pressures found in the tunnel. …..
they should be easy to operate by hand or if heavy be motorized. In
some cases where natural airflow does not exist, installing two
doors (several metres apart) would ensure increased safety both by
raising resistance to fire and by ensuring a pressurized
environment.
• S13 Safe places

Italy [1] Single-tube tunnels: safe places must be able to be reached by means
of emergency routes not longer than 2000m. Double-tube tunnels: the
tube not involved in the accident constitutes a safe place with regard to
the other tube and access shall be through cross-passages placed
every 250m.
Switzerland [1] [1] Protected areas are foreseen: Emergency exits towards the outside;
tunnels or parallel service tunnels; underground emergency areas
equipped with a fresh air supply and communication with the train
control centre.
Germany [1,4] Reaching a safe place is the objective of self-rescue. The portals (the
open air) and the emergency exits after reaching the lock are deemed
safe places. Safe places are reached via escape routes and are
connected with each other by means of these. As an absolute principle,
it must be possible to reach safe places after 500 m at the furthest from
any place in the tunnel.
France Not mentioned
U.K. [2,3] [2,3] (C.3) The capacity…should be determined by an assessment of
potential incident circumstances, …. As an indication, …. it should be
assumed that the capacity should be sufficient for the maximum
potential occupants of a train at a space rate of at least 0.4 m2 per
person and an air supply rate of 30 m3/hour per person.
U.S.A. [1] Points of safety. See S15, S16. More detailed requirements requested
for subways.
UNECE [10] (C.3 06) It is recommended that a maximum distance between two safe
places (portal of the tunnel, cross passage leading to another tunnel,
emergency exit) be defined to enable easy and quick self-rescue. The
exact distance varies depending on the local situation, operating
parameters and the safety concept. In double-bore single-track tunnels
and parallel safety tunnels, this distance should not exceed 500 metres.
It is recommended to use cross passages between two parallel tubes
rather than exits to the surface. Construction shafts and places close to
the surface should be used for emergency exits.

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Detailed comparison
• S14 Escape routes (lateral walkways)

Italy [1] Existing tunnels: • (1.2.3.a) The maintenance passages should be used The guideline
as lateral walkways: their width is about 0.5m on average. includes:
Tunnels in progress: • (2.2.3.1.a/2.2.3.2.a) The maintenance passages chapter 1 for
should be used as lateral walkways: their width is about 50 cm on ‘existing
average. • Also lateral tunnels used during excavation period, if present, tunnels’,
will be used (6m wide and 5m high on av.). Such lateral tunnels should Chapter 2 for
be divided into 2 sections (for vehicles and for pedestrians). The ‘tunnels in
pedestrian walkway should be 1.2m wide, with lights at 2m above the progress’,
floor that provide 5 lux at 0.1m from floor. Chapter 3 for
New tunnels: • Lateral walkways: Walkway on one side of single - track ‘new tunnels
tunnels and on both sides of double – track tunnels. Min. width 0.85m, to be
optimal width 1.20m (new tunnels). Surface should be made of cast-in- realized’.
place concrete or pre-cast slabs. Non-slip hard and even surface. Height
0.2m above the rail bottom. No handrail is required. The centreline of
any cable duct should be 0.7 m from the tunnel wall or from alcove
threshold. • (3.3.4.1.a/3.3.4.2) Also any lateral tunnels used during the
excavation period, if present, will be used. Such tunnels will be divided
into 2 sections (for vehicles and for pedestrians, see tunnel in progress).
Switzerland [3,!] Lateral walkway must be free of obstacles, with adequate lighting, must [!]
be always be on the same side through the tunnel and, if possible, on Information
the outer side of a curve. Handrail dimensions: Cross section: 120x40 obtained
mm; Height above escape route: 1.30 m; Distance between anchorages: directly from
2.00 m. In narrow sections, the handrail may be replaced by touch-guide railway
panels, the size of each section being 200x30 mm. The handrail must network.
skirt any existing obstacles.
Germany [4] An escape route must be provided alongside obstacles and have
adequate lighting. Escape routes must have clear headroom of at least
2.20 m. Escape routes must be at least 1.20 m wide. The width is the
space between the widest rail vehicle standing with its doors open and
the guiding system (handrail) located on the tunnel wall In suburban
railway tunnels, it is permissible for the escape route to be limited to a
width of 80 cm in the area of the stationary vehicle. Away from the
vehicle, however, the width must be 1.20 m. Handrail must be present.
France [1] (3.1.2) …In single track tunnels there must be a walkway on one side.
For double track tunnels, there must be walkways on both sides, at a
minimum of 0.1m above the top of the rail. Width must be 0.5m at the
base and 0.7m at shoulder level and free of obstacles to a height of two
meters.
No handrail is required.
U.K. [1] - (53.a)…. a side walkway to permit evacuation through ….side doors of
the train should be provided. The side walkway should take into account
the floor height and stepping distance from all types of train using the
tunnel.
- The walkway may be designed to provide derailment containment on
that side.
- (53.c) …. free of obstruction, at least 850 mm wide with 2000 mm
headroom above the centreline of the walkway, even and anti-slip
surface. Any change in level should be achieved by ramps with a
gradient not steeper than 1 in 12. A continuous handrail should be
provided between access points
U.S.A. [1] (3-2.1.3) Walk surfaces designated for evacuation of passengers shall
be constructed of non-combustible materials. Walk surfaces shall have
a slip-resistant design.

Detailed comparison
Other Min. width > 1.2 m (0.9 m at some points). In double-track tunnels
Spain walkways are required on both sides of the tunnel. Handrail(s) must be
present.
Other An uncluttered exit route should be arranged on both sides of the rail
Finland tunnel. The free width of these exit routes should be at least 1,600 mm
and the free height at least 2,200 mm. The walk surface of the exit route
should be on the rail level and sufficiently smooth. The exit route should
be provided with a handrail as specified in Section 18.383.
Other Basic standard: Walkways on both sides of the tunnel. Height 0.6 m In Sweden
Sweden above rail top. Width 1.2 m. Hard and even floor, free of obstacles. No the code on
obstacles permitted within the walkway. safety is risk
Additional standard: Light coloured walls up to 2 m. based.
Therefore all
measures
are divided in
a basic
standard and
additional
standard.
Other In all tunnels, the distance from the tunnel wall to a train shall be min.
Norway 1.5 m and with 2.2 m free height in this area. A walkway shall be placed
on the same side as a handrail. If the ballast is to be used as the
walkway, then the ballast level shall be the same as the height of the
sleepers. Any cable duct shall be 0.7 m from the tunnel wall if the duct
top forms part of the walkway.
Other In single-track tunnels: Walkways on both sides of the tunnel. In double-
Denmark track tunnels: Walkways on both sides of the tunnel. Height 0.55 m
above rail top (in double-track tunnels 0.35 m). Width 1.45 m.
Obstacles in the walkway must be covered. No handrails are required.
UNECE [10] Walkways on both sides of the double-track tunnels. Height depends on
the specific tunnel situation.
Width at least 70 cm and preferably 120 cm. Handrails at an appropriate
height above walkway

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Detailed comparison
• S15 Vertical exits / rescue shafts

Italy No reference.
Germany [1,4] [4] Rescue shafts are vertical structures with stairs which permit exit
from the tunnel to the outside or access to the tunnel from the outside,
and which generally lead away from/to an emergency exit. They are
connected to the main tunnel via a lock and, possibly, a rescue passage.
On the countryside, the rescue shaft ends in a shaft building in which
also the fire and disaster protection equipment, such as the firewater
supply, is located. The maximum height of rescue shafts must not
exceed 60 m. Where the height of the rescue shaft is more than 30 m, a
lift with the minimum cage dimensions of 1.1 x 2.1m must be provided in
addition to stairs.
France No reference.
U.K. [1] - [1] Emergency access points to a tunnel should be provided at

distances determined by the ability of the fire brigade to penetrate
effectively into the fire zone (see S14).
- Current practice indicates that distances between access points should
be in the order of 1 km where there are twin-bore tunnels with adequate
intermediate cross-passages. In other circumstances this distance may
need to be reduced
U.S.A. [1] Emergency exit stairways shall be provided throughout the tunnels and
spaced so that the distance to an emergency exit shall not be greater
than 1250 ft (381 m) unless otherwise approved by the authority having
jurisdiction.
UNECE [10] (C3.07) Vertical exits/access should be provided in single-bore tunnels.
They may be feasible only if the tunnel lies near the surface. It is
recommended that vertical exits are equipped with proper lighting and
communication means. Where the shaft is higher than 30 m, a fire-
fighting lift might be installed. Stairways and lifts should be pressurized
and/or equipped to ensure a smoke-free environment.

Detailed comparison
• S16 Lateral exits / access tunnels

Italy [1] See S11, S12, S14
Germany [4] Lateral exits (rescue passages) may connect both the main tunnel with
a rescue shaft, lead directly from the main tunnel to the open air and
also be provided parallel to the main tunnel over its entire length. Any
rescue passage longer than 300 m leading directly to the open air must
be suitable for road vehicles. The cross-section of rescue passages
must be at least 2.25 x 2.25 m. They must not be more than 150 m long
if they do not lead directly but via rescue shafts to the open air. Rescue
passages longer than 300 m must be suitable for motor vehicles. The
gradient should not exceed 10%. A combination of rescue passages
and rescue shafts is permitted.
France [1] (3.1.1) ...access passages must allow for rescue vehicles to pass and
cross the track, if necessary.
U.K. [1,2,3] [1] Emergency access points to a tunnel should be provided at
distances determined by the ability of the fire brigade to penetrate
effectively into the fire zone. Current practice indicates that distances
between access points should be in the order of 1 km where there are
twin-bore tunnels with adequate intermediate cross-passages.
[2,3 ] Doors should be provided to prevent smoke from spreading.
U.S.A. [1] (3.2.4.1)…Emergency exits shall be provided from tunnels to a point of
safety. See S15.
UNECE [10] (C3.08) Lateral exits/access should be provided in single-bore tunnels,
they should be located in the areas near the surface to limit their length
as well as in places for easy exit and access by emergency services.
The cross section of these exits should be determined on the basis of
other safety elements but ideally their dimension should be 2.25 m x
2.25 m with a maximum length of about 150 metres. Lateral exits longer
than 150 metres should be made accessible by road vehicles. The
same installations that ensure a smoke-free, visible and otherwise safe
environment in vertical exits should also be installed in lateral exits.
4.2.2 S2 - Emergency access for rescue staff
In case of an emergency, e.g. a fire or serious accident, rescue staff may not be able to
access the accident site directly but may have to gain access through an adjacent tunnel
(service or traffic tunnel) or through shafts. Access from the adjacent tunnel may make it
possible to drive the vehicles (bimodals or trains) directly to the accident site. Rescuers may
also enter on foot.

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Detailed comparison
The relevant fire brigades should have road/rail vehicles, which are able to run on tracks to
convey staff and equipment rapidly to the accident site. The main goals are to support self-
rescue, provide first aid and initial fire-fighting. Some countries use trainway vehicles to
reach the site of the accident. Only in some countries are the operations coordinated by fire
brigades. The tables below give descriptions of rescue vehicles and some features of safe
places mandated by the different regulations/guidelines.
• S21 Tunnel access for emergency vehicles

Italy [1] Existing tunnels – Tunnels already under construction: The guideline
(1.1.1) (2.1.1)..• Access gate: the area adjacent to the railway includes:
infrastructure is normally fenced off and, hence, inaccessible. An Chapter 1 for
appropriate opening is required for rescue teams …. the so-called ‘existing
“access gate” should be linked to public roads and identified by a sign tunnels’,
stating: “emergency access”: This gate shall be generally kept closed Chapter 2 for
….. The gate shall be not less than 4m wide. • Access road: this road ‘tunnels
shall be not less than 4m wide and expand to 6 m every 250m to allow already under
rescue vehicles to pass each other. Slope must be less than 16%. construction’,
Bend radius of ≥ 11 m. Chapter 3 for
New tunnels: ‘new tunnels’.
As above, except: • Access gate: width not less than 6m. • Access
road: width not less than 6m to allow for the movement of rescue
vehicles in both directions. (3.2.2).
Switzerland [3] Access to both ends of the tunnel, with rescue trains driven by railway
staff. Areas for sheltering the injured and parking rescue vehicles are
located near tunnel portals.
Germany [1,4] See S16
If a lateral exit leads to a rescue passage longer than 300 m, which
leads, in turn, directly to the open air, then it must be suitable for use
by road vehicles. In case of two parallel single-track tubes, the safety
concept will be based on use of the unaffected tube. In this case,
escape and rescue measures can be carried out via the unaffected
tube. Since it is not necessary to build rescue shafts in this case, the
only means of access into the tunnel is via the portals. In order to
minimise the length of travel for fire brigades to reach the fire, it must
be possible for their vehicles to reach all cross-passages. Access
routes to the tunnel portals must lead from rescue areas, when these
are required. The access routes to the tracks must be secured by
means of lockable barriers. This lock must be a fire brigade lock, since
only the fire brigade is authorised to enter the tunnel with road
vehicles.
France [1] (3.1.1) …For 2-bore tunnels, facilities must be provided to let
emergency vehicles pass from one bore to the other.
U.K. [1] Rescue teams shall gain access from tunnel entrances and
intermediary access ways, protected by a filter zone.
U.S.A. [1] Rescue teams shall gain access from tunnel entrances and
intermediary access ways.

Detailed comparison
• S22 Rescue forces’ emergency vehicles (train, bimodal…)

Italy [1] - Bimodal road /rail vehicle from the Fire Brigade + roads and loading
areas at each entrance
- Railway carriages (type: MM 380 G) for rescue operations
Switzerland [!,1,2] Trains equipped for extinguishing fires and for rescue operations, [!] Information
stationed at both ends of the tunnel. obtained
directly from
railway
network.
Germany [1,4] - Normal vehicles from the Fire Brigade., bimodal road / rail vehicle +
access ways, rescue areas
- Rail wagons for conveying the injured out of or heavy equipment
into the tunnel
France [1] - (3.3.3)…At the tunnel entrances, two rail wagons equipped with a
braking system must be available for rescue operations. They must
have a minimum carrying capacity of 500 kg and allow for the
evacuation of an injured party lying on a standard-size stretcher.
U.K. No reference.
UNECE [10] (C.4 12) …Fire brigade and other rescue services should get into the
tunnel with their equipment as fast as possible, regardless of the type
of vehicles used. In some places specialized rail vehicles are
recommended as a part of the rescue concept. Rail/road vehicles for
rescue are only recommended as a part of the comprehensive
rescue equipment provided by the fire brigade. It is recommended
that rescue trains be manned by the railway operator’s staff and not
fire brigade staff, who may not be familiar with the use of railway
vehicles, equipment and special railway procedures. It is
recommended that the fire brigade utilize either the road vehicles
they use in their daily work or rail/road vehicles.
Other [*][!] Standard rescue vehicles that can only access the tunnel if: • a
Austria suitable traffic lane is available; • the vehicles allow for mixed
road/rail use. • suitable vehicles from the railways are used
4.2.3 S3 – Drainage of flammable liquids
If flammable liquids are spilled in a tunnel, there is a risk that the spill will ignite and give rise
to a serious fire. If the tunnel is well drained and the flammable liquids are collected in a
system suitable for the purpose, this risk can be reduced.
Drainage systems capable of draining flammable liquids are sometimes required. Many
countries do not require such measures, holding basins in particular; while others prefer to
use the systems used to drain surface water.

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Detailed comparison
• S31 Gradient along tunnel

Italy No reference.
Germany [1,4] Tunnels should have a uni-directional gradient (falling or rising, not
changing between falling and rising) greater than the rolling resistance
of trains.
(This requirement is not designed for drainage of flammable liquids
but probably enables a train without power supply to roll out of the
tunnel.)
U.K. No reference.
• S32 Track drainage system (drainage and basin)

Italy [1] Not mentioned in relation to flammable liquids.
Switzerland [3] The track drainage system (in general a combined system) is equipped
with a stopping device at the portal and leads to a holding basin
(MN11). It is recommended that specific cases are checked for NT
considering the local situation (e.g. contamination of ground or surface
water)
Germany [1] Not mentioned in relation to flammable liquids.
France [1] (4.1.1) Drainage system in tunnels with length over 5km on lines with
transport of dangerous goods. Basin for 80m ³ released liquid.
U.K. [1] Not mentioned in relation to flammable liquids.
(56.c) Adequate and reliable means of draining any reasonably
foreseeable leakage of water should be provided. The drainage
capacity should also take into account the amount of water likely to be
used in fire fighting
UNECE [10] (C.2 06) Track drainage system of the appropriate dimensions is safety
and environment protection measure. The system should be designed
to remove ground water infiltrating through the lining, snow or rain
brought into the tunnel by trains, spillage from bulk liquids in transit or
fire-fighting water. It is suggested that there should also be a retention
basin. This is not an essential measure for passenger- only tunnels but
is highly recommended for freight traffic, especially if dangerous goods
are frequently transported. The retention basin could be used to retain
polluted spillage or fire-fighting water for appropriate disposal without
environmental damage. If this basin is enclosed, the risk of fire or
explosion should be considered.

Detailed comparison
4.2.4 S4 – Open areas
Areas can be specifically set aside for use by the emergency services, to provide standing
and access for rescue vehicles, triage and first-aid areas, helicopter landing areas and ready
access to tunnel entrances. This minimises the difficulty in reaching the incident scene and
evacuating casualties, and allows specialist equipment to be positioned as needed.
The provision of open areas near tunnel portals is seen as an important measure needed
everywhere. No major differences among the national regulations/guidelines have been
identified.
• S41 Rescue areas.

Italy [1] [3.2.3]…Emergency rescue area: illuminated, with a surface of not
less than 500m². Street-level area: not less than 20m in length, for
placing a bimodal vehicle on the tracks, as well as to allow the
possibility of crossing the tracks with road vehicles. A raised water
tank with a storage capacity of at least 40m³ shall be provided in the
area. Assessment shall also be made of the possibility of connecting
the water reservoir to a permanent water main. [3.2.4].…Helicopter
landing areas: it is necessary to identify a suitable area for a helicopter
landing site near the main entrances, where a landing area can be
built that is easily reached by rescue vehicles situated in the
emergency lay-by. The instructions in the M.D. of March 10, 1988,
published in the Official Gazette no. 205 of 1/9/1988 and concerning
unmarked aircraft surfaces, shall be followed for all provisions inherent
to the emergency rescue areas.
[3.2.5]… Triage area: the creation of an area, having a total surface of
not less than 500 m², for emergency medical treatment is desirable
near the tunnel entrances, where an area for first-aid and handling the
injured can be created.
Switzerland [3] - Transfer points that can be reached by cars or helicopters should be
in place.
- Areas used to store matériel for rescue purposes should be in place
near tunnel portals.
Germany [1,4] Rescue areas should be provided in accordance with DIN 14090 and
must have a total area of at least 1,500 m2. At tunnel portals, rescue
areas should be set up at top-of-rail level. In those cases where such
a rescue area is not suitable for a rescue helicopter to land; possible
landing sites should be designated in the immediate vicinity. Dividing
up the required total area of the rescue area into several smaller areas
is permitted if this gives a reduction in the distance to the tunnel portal
or emergency exit.
France [1] (3.1.1) - …parking areas that allow for the stopping and reversing of
rescue vehicles; - …areas for helicopter landing near the tunnel
entrance.
U.K. [1] Emergency access provided at the tunnel portals and other access

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Detailed comparison

points should include: • adequate access from the highway for
vehicles and pedestrians; • hard standing for emergency vehicles.
UNECE [10] - (C.4 03) …Where possible, an area (ca. 500 m2) with road access
should be reserved for emergency services vehicles….. ..at both
portals and at any emergency exits. ….emergency services areas
including the access roads and passing places should have a suitable
all-weather surface able to support the vehicles likely to use it. If dual-
mode (road-rail) vehicles are to be used in an emergency, a ramp
suitable for mode changing should be installed adjacent to each
portal. ….a helicopter landing area should be provided additional to
the area provided for the emergency services.
- (C.4 04)…. Modification of the railway track to make it suitable for
road vehicles is only recommended if the use of road vehicles inside
the tunnel is part of a comprehensive intervention and rescue concept
based on the fire brigades plan.
4.3.1 E1 - Smoke control ventilation
Under normal operating conditions, a ventilation system is generally not necessary. This is a
clear difference from road tunnels. Rail tunnels typically have a higher blockage ratio than
road tunnels, and moving trains have a higher impact on airflow than moving road vehicles.
Thus higher efficiency ventilation systems are needed in rail tunnels. Also, these are only
likely to be effective once all train movement within the tunnel has stopped, because all trains
have either come to a halt or have left the tunnel.
It is possible to identify three situations where ventilation might be needed:

a) In the incident tunnel: mechanical smoke extraction system in the main running tunnel to
draw out smoke or create a defined airflow to keep one side of the fire smoke-free for
rescue and fire fighting.
b) Where twin tubes are used, to confine smoke to the incident tube, keeping the
unaffected tube free of smoke and preventing cross flows disturbing smoke extraction.
c) To maintain safe areas in emergency exits, cross-passages or a parallel escape tunnel
free from smoke (by producing an overpressure within the safe areas).
For railway applications, the positive effects of longitudinal ventilation are a matter of debate,
even controversy. The situation cannot be compared to road tunnels, where different
ventilation systems, e.g. transverse ventilation, can be installed relatively easily in longer
tunnels. In road tunnels, the cost-benefit of complex ventilation systems is different, as such
systems are an operational necessity to maintain air quality in the tunnel, where in many rail
tunnels a ventilation system is eventually only needed in an emergency.
The aspects that must be taken into consideration for parameters E11 and E12 are some of
the most important and controversial ones. This is in part due to the sizeable economic costs

Detailed comparison
associated with installing jet fans (the entire tunnel needs to be made larger to accommodate
the fans). Also there is some debate over the practical effectiveness of the longitudinal
ventilation of main tunnels in the event of a fire. The difficulty of controlling air flow, in terms
of both space (number and position of the Jet fans simultaneously in operation) and time (the
delay in detecting a fire and then setting the entire ventilation system in motion), means that
unquestioning belief in the effectiveness of longitudinal ventilation may be ill-founded.
Analysis of those regulations taken into consideration reveals two opposing conclusions: on
one hand, Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Germany substantially agree that minimal
advantage, and even major risks, can be derived from forced longitudinal ventilation and
maintain that natural ventilation (due solely to pressure differences between the tunnel ends
or induced by the openings to the surface) combined with the piston effect from moving trains
are sufficient to meet safety demands and are economically advantageous, (there are no
explicit reference regulations for Germany, but recent constructions, for example the new
Colone-Frankfurt link, give a clear indication of the current thinking); on the other hand,
France and the UK have regulations referring to the adoption of forced, longitudinal
ventilation systems. More specifically, the French regulations require the compulsory
establishment of permanent overpressure conditions in major tunnels, and for all mixed-
traffic tunnels over 5,000 m long.
• E11 Natural ventilation

Italy [1] (Recent developments 2001)… In double-tube tunnels, it is deemed
opportune not to establish permanent overpressure conditions in main
tunnels, but to maintain cross-connections in constant overpressure, so
as to prevent fumes from spreading into the tunnel constituting the “safe
place”. Hence, it is deemed opportune not to establish permanent
longitudinal ventilation in main tunnels.
Germany [1] Ventilation of main tunnels not mentioned, the principle of using natural
ventilation is implicitly agreed.
France [1] See E12.
U.K. See E12.
U.S.A. [1] See E12.
UNECE [10] See E12.

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• E12 Forced ventilation

Italy [1] - (2.2.5) Based on the results of studies conducted internationally
(Memorial Tunnel in Baltimore in the U.S., Project Eureka Fire-tun. in
Europe), the idea of longitudinal ventilation of tunnels does not seem
practicable, since the parameters that come into play are numerous
and difficult to manage. In many cases, the effect of this kind of
ventilation has not only been ineffective, but even counterproductive,
creating a “backlayering” effect. …..the presence of forced ventilation
equipment inside tunnels is thus not required, due to its limited
effectiveness and the impossibility of it working in the geometry
existing tunnels.
- (3.1.6)…Appropriate technical solutions should be adopted in order
to keep exit passages smoke-free. Suitable measures, pertaining to
railway tunnels, must be examined.
Switzerland [!] This aspect is not considered by the regulations listed in chapter 1. [!] Information
However, according to recent information: - in double-tubes, exit obtained
passages and cross-connections shall be maintained in directly from
overpressure; - in major tunnels, longitudinal ventilation systems railway
have never been foreseen. network.
Germany Smoke control ventilation in the main tube is not mentioned.
France [1] For tunnel lengths of length between 800m and 5000m ventilation
and smoke-extraction systems shall be assessed. For tunnel lengths
of length over 5000m, a smoke extraction facility is compulsory in
cases of the transit of trains carrying dangerous goods or standard
rolling stock. (4.2)…Minimum extraction speed of 1.5m/s. Ventilators
resistant up to 200°C. Two independent motors.
U.K. [1,2, - [1] The ventilation system should: achieve an acceptable
3] environment under normal operating conditions; control the
movement of smoke in case of emergency. If several trains are in the
tunnel simultaneously: - steps must be taken to keep other trains
from being assailed by smoke; - evacuation procedures must be
identified.
- [2,3] The decision …..and the corresponding performance
requirements for such a system should result from a risk
assessment.
U.S.A. [1] (3.2.4.3) A ventilation system for the contaminated tunnel shall be
designed to control smoke in the vicinity of the passengers. (4-3.1)
Such system is designated for use in fire emergencies .. in either the
supply or exhaust mode. Fan motors…designed to achieve their full
operating speed in no more than 30..- 60 seconds.
UNECE (C.2 05) The assessment of the airflow in a tunnel should consider
tunnel and train aerodynamics, the fresh air supply (for physiological
needs), the control of heat and smoke from a fire and the control of
pollution (diesel). Ventilation design should take into account the
associated risks and costs. Ventilation systems must be designed to
keep emergency exits, cross passages and safety tunnels free of
smoke.

Detailed comparison
4.3.2 E2 - Emergency exits and rescue access ventilation
The design of emergency exits and rescue access should include provisions to prevent the
spread of smoke into the safe areas, cross-connections, parallel tube and escape/rescue
accesses.
Beyond the emergency exits, good conditions should be maintained in order to let people
wait temporarily in areas free from smoke and/or toxic gases.
The requirements for emergency exits are briefly described below.
• E 21 Emergency exit / rescue access ventilation

Italy [1] (3.1.6)… Appropriate technical solutions must be adopted in order to
keep exit passages smoke-free. Suitable measures, pertaining to
railway tunnels, must be examined.
Germany [1,4] [1] Smoke control ventilation not mentioned.

[4] (3.2.3.4) …Should the minimum length of locks not be achieved,
appropriate compensation measures are required when demonstrating
the same safety level. At present, only mechanical systems for
overpressure ventilation can be considered for this purpose.
U.K. No reference.
4.3.3 E3 – Lighting systems
In case of an emergency it is important to have sufficient lighting in the tunnel. Light is

needed for evacuation and rescue operations. In case of a fire, additional directional lights
may indicate the route to the exits. Also in the escape routes (cross passages, escape tunnel
etc.) sufficient lighting is necessary to allow effective evacuation. Thus, emergency lighting is
provided to guide passengers and staff to a safe area, or to the outside once they have
entered a lateral/vertical exit, a cross-connection or shaft, in case of an emergency.

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Detailed comparison
The specific requirements vary significantly among the different guidelines.
• E31 Emergency tunnel lighting

Italy [1] (1.2.2/ 2.2.2/ 3.1.9) •Height of light: Height ≤ 2m over the walkways,
and directed onto them. •Location: Single track tunnel: one side (same
as walkway); Double track tunnel: both sides. •Luminosity: Luminance
of 5 lux at a height of 100 cm over the walkway surface. •Safety
concept: Lighting is off during normal operation, and is turned on in
case of an emergency. The emergency lightning in the tunnel is turned
on by a permanently lit emergency (push)-button. •Other lighting: In
some tunnels niches and refuges are permanently lit. Niches and
refuges can also be equipped with portable lamps to be used in case of
an emergency. •Autonomy and reliability: Independent electrical circuits
are required for emergency lighting. Cables must be protected against
water and heat through conduits or fireproof ducts. Cables connecting
the devices to the protected cables must have fireproof insulation (CEI
20-36). Cables must run from both tunnel portals to provide a
redundant supply should one circuit be damaged.
Switzerland [3] Emergency lighting: generally as floodlights every 50m on one tunnel Info derived
side, 80cm above escape route. Switches in tunnel to turn on lights. from first
For Existing Tunnels: An evaluation must be made based on a tunnel- issue of this
specific risk assessment and cost effectiveness criteria. (in general this report nov
means lighting for all new tunnels and for existing tunnels with a length 02.
over ~ 0.5 – 1km
Germany [1,4] Escape lighting, including illuminated exits, must be installed on both
sides of tunnels longer than 1000m, at a height of at least 2.50m.
Technical specifications based on DIN 5035 (harmonised with EN
1838). • Illumination: min. . 1 lux. • Luminosity: …minimum luminance
of 0.5 lux and uniformity of at least 1:40 (DIN 5035, Part 5) must be
ensured. It must be possible to turn on the emergency lighting from the
operation centre, each tunnel portal and from inside the tunnel (every
125m, 250m from the portal). Switches installed within the tunnel must
only switch the lights on, “off” switches are not permitted within the
tunnel. •Autonomy and reliability: Guaranteed emergency power supply
for at least 3 hours
France [1,!] - [!] Escape lighting must be installed both-sides in tunnels >1.000 m [[!]
including the exits. Technical specification based DIN 5035 Information
(harmonised with EN 1838). Illumination about min 1 lux. Switches obtained
installed within the tunnel should be at ~125m separation, and must directly from
only switch the lights on. “Off” switches are not permitted within the railway
tunnel. In single or double-track tunnels, lights should be on both sides network.
of the tunnel in staggered rows. General lighting (also for maintenance)
from fittings every 25 m on each tunnel wall, staggered, giving 2 lux on
walkways. These are normally switched on. In some tunnels there are
two categories of light; escape light and normal light. During normal
operations the escape lighting is switched off and is only switched on in
case of emergency.
- (3.2.2)…Emergency lighting of ‘B’ type, providing at least 2 lux at
ground level for 1 hour. The emergency lights are powered in such a
way that no fire can cause them to fail over a tunnel section longer than
100m. The maximum distance between two lights is 50m. In double
track tunnels on both sides with alternating arrangements

Detailed comparison

U.K. [1] (59.a) Running tunnels, cross-passages and access shafts should
be permanently equipped with adequate lighting. …In the event of a
total power failure, it should be possible to sustain emergency lighting
at not less than 5 Lux for at least the time required for evacuation and
not less than 3 hours.
U.S.A. [1] -(3-2.4.7.1.1) Emergency lighting systems…in accordance with NFPA
70…
-(3-2.4.7.1.2) Exit lights, essential signs, and emergency lights shall be
included in the emergency lighting system…
-(3-2.4.7.1.3) The illumination levels ….shall not be less than 0.25 ft-
candles (2.69 lux) at the walking surface.
Other Escape lighting and normal lighting must be installed on both sides of
Spain the tunnel, including at the exits. “Normal” lighting is switched on during
normal operations. Every 50 m on each tunnel wall, staggered to give
25 m between lights.
Other A safety lighting and sign illumination system as well as emergency exit
Finland signs should be located in railway tunnels to ensure that people can get
out and to safeguard rescue operations (1 to 3 h). The power supply to
the system must be through battery sets. The system must be designed
and built in accordance with the set of guidelines 147/01/87 issued by
the Rescue Department of the Ministry of the Interior, and [the
Standards] SFS 4640/1985-06-03 and SFS EN-60598-2-22. The sign
illumination must be switched on permanently during each operating.
The safety lighting must provide at least 1 lux at walkway level in the
running tunnel, and at least 2 lux in areas difficult to negotiate, such as
staircases. Arrangements must be in place for external control of the
safety lighting and for the monitoring of the battery sets. The operating
principles of the system should be selected separately for each
individual location (lighting unit/central accumulator system).
Other Basic standard: Light from fittings so that the light is at least 3 lux
Sweden between the lights. Normally switched off. To be switched on remotely.
Additional standard: Guaranteed power supply for emergency or
alternative system to ensure high reliability. Supply cables protected
against mechanical impact and fire. Power supply/lighting should be
supplied in sections.
Other Escape lighting shall be installed in all tunnels categorised A, B and C.
Norway The escape lighting shall provide:
• light during the evacuation period
• sufficient light for a safe evacuation
Light fittings are installed ca. 0.65m above the rail top. Maximum
distance between two lamps is 10 m. The escape lighting must function
in smoke-free and smoke conditions. The technical specification is
based on the new ISO-standard ISO/DIS 16069, which is not yet
approved.
Other Escape signs, exit signs and standard signs have clear bottom, so that
Denmark light is thrown down on the walkway. Common light (also for
maintenance) from fittings every 25 m on each tunnel wall, staggered,
gives 10 lux on walkways. Normally switched off. Switched on remotely.
UNECE [10] (C.3 04) Emergency tunnel lighting shall be installed on one or both
sides of the tunnel, especially in tunnels used by passenger trains.
Escape walkways shall also be properly lit. Emergency lighting shall be
reliable and operating under autonomous conditions, visible under
smoke and other poor visibility conditions.

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• E32 Emergency exit / rescue access lighting

Italy [1] Same used in the main tube, see E31
Switzerland [3] Not explicitly mentioned, see E31
Germany [4] Tunnels and emergency exits must be provided with emergency
lighting as safety lighting according to DIN 5035, Part 5, and VDE
0108. In the event of a loss of power or short circuit in the external
supply line, the emergency lighting must provide the required
illumination for a minimum of at least 3 hours.
France [1] See E31
U.K. [1] See E31
U.S.A. [1] See E31
4.3.4 E4- Escape signs in tunnels
This evacuation and rescue measure generally indicates the direction and distance to a safe
place. All signs should meet current European standards for safety signs. Emergency exit
signs are mostly produced with white text on a green background (CEN or ISO norm).
Escape signs are installed on the side walls (at different heights) and indicate the distances
to the nearest exits in each direction. The location of emergency equipment may also be
shown on signs.
Signage is described in all guidelines, but some requirements differ from one national
regulation/guideline to another.

Detailed comparison
• E41 Pedestrian exit signs

Italy [1] (3.3.3) …Escape signs can be either reflective or luminescent. Fire •Peculiarity:
reaction category: 0 •Shape: Square or rectangular. •Pictograms: Reflective
White on green background (green colour must cover at least the signs can
50% of the surface). •Location: Escape signs should be placed only be seen
every 100m, and indicate the closest escape exits or the distance to if directly
the tunnel portal. illuminated; if
Luminescent signs close to emergency exits show “emergency exit” illuminated
written in Italian and English. signs are
present these
are switched
off and lit
only in case
of an
emergency.
Signs are
typically
placed
adjacent to
niches,
where they
are visible
due to the
alcove lights.
Switzerland [3] Characteristics: • Dimensions: 0.60x0.20m; • Distance: every 100m;
• Colours: green sign; • reflective; • Mounted on walls, over escape
passages, at the height of the tunnel spotlights.
•Materials: Aluminium, covered by protective fire-proof film, and/or
materials having similar properties.
Germany [4] Marking is provided along the rescue routes in the main tunnel only.
The escape-route marking comprises direction arrows and rescue
signs. There are two kinds of rescue signs - those that indicate the
distance to the nearest safe place, and those that identify an
emergency exit. Separation of ca. 125m (to be located at light
switches). Indication of preferred escape direction and distances to
exits in both directions. Additional arrows at distances of ca. 25m,
indicating the nearest exit. Signs must be reflective and luminescent.
France [1] (3.2.3) …Indication of preferred escape direction and distance to the
nearest station or exit every 100 m.
U.K. [1,2,3] - [1] (51.f) (52.c) (53.e) Suitable signs should be provided to indicate
the direction and distance to the adjacent emergency access points
or cross-passageways.
- [2,3] Illuminated and uniquely identified signage, powered from the
emergency lighting system should identify any lateral points of
evacuation from the tunnel.
U.S.A. [1]
UNECE [1] (C.3.03)…Tunnels should be marked with standard signs

pictograms. Signs should be fixed in the tunnel to indicate the
direction and distance to any safety feature such as: exits, cross
passages, telephones, etc. Signs should indicate the emergency
equipment available to passengers and other potential users. The

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Detailed comparison

signs indicating “Emergency exits” should conform to the pictograms
proposed by the ISO 6309 standard or the CEN norm of December
2000. The background colour should be green.
Other Escape signs to be located at lighting points.
Spain Indication of both escape directions must be provided.
Other Signs for exit routes and emergency telephones must be located in
Finland each tunnel at intervals of one hundred (100) metres close to
emergency lights. The signs should indicate the walking distance to
the beginning of the compartmentalised exit route or to the open air.
The signs must be made in accordance with ISO Standard 3864 and
the Signalling Systems by the RHK (the Finnish Rail Administration
Board) /55*/.
Other Basic standard:
Sweden Escape signs on both tunnel walls every 100 m with information
about distance to safety and distance to alarm telephone. These are
permanently lit and they indicate direction and distance to nearest
exits (cross passages). Exit signs at exits: The signs have white text
on green background.
Other Escape signs in all tunnels categorised A, B and C indicating
Norway direction and distance to the two nearest exits.
The signs shall indicate:
• direction and distance to nearest exits
• tunnel gradient
• direction name, A and B.
The signs shall be photo luminescent.
Other Escape signs on both tunnel walls every 62 m. These are
Denmark permanently lit and indicate direction and distance to nearest exits
(eg. cross passages). “Exit” signs at exits: The signs have white text
on green background. Standard signs, white, permanently lit, with
SOS (on blue background), telephone and extinguisher at every exit.
Information signs at every exit, on far side, indicating the name of
the tunnel and the distance to the tunnel portals (only Great Belt).
Number of the exit to be seen by the engine driver while passing
through the tunnel
• E42 Other
Italy [1] - Signs with white pictograms on red background are used to indicate
the location of emergency equipment (telephones, extinguishers etc.).
- See E41.
Germany No reference.
U.K. No reference.

Detailed comparison
4.3.5 E5 - Communication and alarm system
It is important for the Train Control Centre to have all of the relevant information if an
emergency situation arises (including the presence of a fire). Such information is achieved by
surveillance of the tunnel and through various communication systems. Communication can
be automatic, using systems triggered by accident detection equipment or it can be manual,
e.g. by alarm push-buttons or emergency telephone. Onboard and line-side detection
systems are also crucial in increasing the likelihood of detecting an emergency situation/fire
and applying the appropriate intervention strategy. Furthermore, the communication system
is used to instruct tunnel users about what do. Announcements may be made by radio,
through emergency telephones or, in some cases, through loudspeakers in the tunnel or in
refuges. Emergency telephones or some similar means of communication, directly
connected to an operation centre (independent of train radio or mobile phone) can be
available so that passengers, too, can use them in emergencies. Emergency telephones
permit adequate and reliable communication during emergencies.
Emergency telephones are available in nearly all tunnels, but the distance between
telephones and other detailed arrangements, vary. As a rule, there is an alarm in the Train
Control Centre when safety equipment is used and radio coverage in the tunnel. GSM-R may
also provide a further mitigation measure. A general synthesis of the national guidelines
cannot be drawn up.
• E51 Emergency telephones

Italy [1] (1.2.4/2.2.4/3.3.5) Where GSM-
- Railway telephones: telephones at portals and every 500m inside R is present
tunnels. the
- Emergency phones for the public: connected with the operation installation of
centre, every 250m (same installation can be used by personnel for emergency
loudspeaker announcements inside the tunnel). telephones
might not be
necessary
Switzerland [3] Emergency telephones placed in specific points.
Germany [4] Tunnels must be equipped with emergency telephones, placed: at the
tunnel portals; within the main tunnel; in the immediate vicinity of the
emergency exits; within emergency exit routes inside the external
doors.
Locating emergency telephones within the locks is not permitted. In
double-track tunnels, the emergency telephones should be provided
opposite each other on both tunnel walls. Marking of phones according
VBG 125. Ground-train radio and fixed emergency telephones are
available for exchanging information during self-rescue.

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France [1] (3.2.5)…Two separate lines should be provided, at least, for

management of rescue operations and fire-fighting water supply
operations.
U.K. [1] (61) Telephones connected directly to the railway control should be
provided at appropriate intervals and in suitable locations including at
any cross-passages and access points.
U.S.A. [1] - (8-4.1) The system shall have a telephone network of fixed telephone See [1] (3-
lines and handsets… 1.5.)
- (8-4.2) …The location and spacing of telephones along the train-way
shall be determined by the authority having jurisdiction. Telephones
along the train-way shall have distinctive signs and/or lights for
identification.
UNECE [10] (C.3 05) …emergency telephones should always be installed at the
key points in tunnels – cross passages, on escape walkways and
shafts. Telephones should be able to function properly and work in the
tunnel environment with a potentially high noise and poor light. ….they
should be installed with a sound hood to avoid noise-affecting
conversation. Emergency telephones should be linked to the
emergency centre in the railway operations control centre. Emergency
telephones should not be linked directly to fire or other rescue
services. If the direct radio or GSM-R link between the train and the
operations centre exists, installation of emergency telephones might
not be necessary.
• E52 Alarm push-button (manual fire alarm)

Italy [1] When an emergency push-button is activated, this must connect [!] Information
directly to the train operating centre. On pressing the emergency obtained
button the emergency lighting will be switched on and the train control directly from
centre should be able to identify the location of the emergency “viva- railway
voice” device. The emergency (push)-button locations must be network.
permanently lit.
Switzerland [2] Suggested but not prescribed
Germany [4] The connection to the operations-monitoring office must be set up by
pressing an emergency button and without any further operations.
Pressing the emergency button must set off an acoustic signal in the
operations-monitoring office and the location of the telephone must be
transmitted automatically.
U.K. No reference.

Detailed comparison
• E53 Fire/smoke detection

Italy [!] Those niches containing electrical and signalling closets must be [!] Information
equipped with smoke and heat detectors in order to identify any obtained
possible ignition of a fire. directly from
railway
network.
Germany [4] Measure dismissed, as it is not regarded as being effective

U.K. [2,3] (c.11) The infrastructure controller shall carry out a risk assessment to
determine whether any surveillance or detection systems are required
in the new or re-opened tunnel so as to allow the safe operation of the
tunnel under normal, degraded and emergency operating conditions.
U.S.A. [1] (3-2.7.1) Heat and smoke detectors installed at traction power
substations and connected to the central supervising station.
• E54 Radio rebroadcast

Italy [1] Tunnels and service/lateral tunnels must be equipped with radio
communication systems to allow communications between Fire
Brigade and Railway emergency team.
Switzerland [3] Ensure radio communication between emergency and railway
personnel on fire fighting train (compatible sets) (MN23). Standard for
all tunnels.
Germany [1,4] The normal radio system used by the rescue services must be
available within a tunnel without any restrictions. This also applies to
the necessary radio connections between the site of the operation and
the operations command centre (BOS radio installations)
France [1] Not explicitly mentioned (3.2.1)…Connection between train and
operation centre must be assured.
U.K. [1] (60) A radio communication network should be provided. Discrete
radio between: • train drivers and train control centre (TCC); • TCC
and the public address to passengers on a train; • an 'open' radio
between TCC and all trains simultaneously, including public address to
passengers in them.
U.S.A. [1] (8-3.1) …passenger rail system shall have at least one radio network
that is capable of two-way communication with personnel on trains,
motor vehicles, and all locations of the system. (8-3.2) Wherever
necessary ….a separate radio network capable of two-way radio
communication for fire department personnel to the fire department
communication centre shall be provided.
UNECE [10] (C.4 07) Radio continuity should be provided for the fire and rescue
services linking fire fighters with their immediate command to ensure
operational efficiency during an emergency. The system must be
reliable and allow the rescue services to use their own communication
equipment when needed.

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Detailed comparison
• E55 Loudspeakers
Italy [1] (1.2.4/ 2.2.4/ 3.3.5) ….As a rule, on the most important trains, there is
an information system for passengers …that is used by on-board
railway personnel to make the necessary announcements. However,
…for managing emergencies, it is deemed necessary to equip tunnels
with an effective internal loudspeaker system that shall be used, when
necessary, by railway personnel or rescue teams.
Germany [1,4] [1] No reference.

[4] It must be possible to make loudspeaker announcements only on
passenger trains. Loudspeaker announcements offer support to the
self-rescue measures since the train staff can give instructions.
U.K. No reference.
4.3.6 E6 - Operation and traffic management
Traffic regulation and management is mainly a preventive measure. Monitoring traffic, its
speed and intensity makes it possible to take any actions necessary to mitigate possible
consequences of an accident.
An optimised timetable is a widely used measure to prevent trains (especially passenger and
freight trains) from crossing each other in tunnels. No other general synthesis can be
concluded.

Detailed comparison
• E61 Speed and traffic density monitoring

Italy No reference.
Switzerland [!] All the precautions must be taken, such as fire protection measures for [!] Information
the rolling stock, line side hot box detectors to stop a train before obtained
entering the tunnel. There are no general operational restrictions, but directly from
in some tunnels there is a timetable separation between passenger railway
and freight trains. network.
Germany [1,4] [1] Not mentioned
[4] The railway infrastructure manager is required to set up the
technical conditions and to issue working instructions to ensure that: a
train on which the actuation of the emergency brake has been
reported can leave the tunnel as quickly as possible; after the train
comes to a halt, its location can be determined by the operations-
monitoring office even without information from the train staff.
France [1] (3.3.2) …Speed monitoring system to prevent collisions caused by
driver error.
U.K. [1] No reference.
U.S.A. [1] No reference.
UNECE [10] (C.1 02) …the signalling system …to prevent one train colliding with
another train …It will include any train monitoring or protection system
intended to prevent a train from passing a signal set at danger or
exceeding a speed limit.
• E62 Traffic typology / regulation

Italy [!] No reference, …RFI has stated an operational speed limit of v≤160 [!] Information
km/h in case of crossing between passenger and dangerous goods obtained
trains, only on the High Speed line Rome - Florence. It has been also directly from
stated that no crossing between passenger and dangerous good trains railway
will be allowed on the new High Speed Bologna – Florence. network.
Switzerland [!] See E61. [!] Information
obtained
directly from
railway
network.
Germany [1] The passing of goods trains and passenger trains is prohibited in
single-tube tunnels.
France [1] The passing of trains carrying dangerous goods and passenger trains
is prohibited in single-tube tunnels having a length of L > 5000m, but
accepted in shorter, single-tube tunnels.
U.K. No reference.

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Detailed comparison
UNECE [10] (C. 1.09) The scenario of a passenger train colliding with a freight train
might be avoided if these trains are not allowed in a double track
tunnel at the same time. This …is not recommended as a standard
measure except for tunnels, which are very long or have mixed
passenger and freight trains with dangerous goods. … total separation
of traffic may not be necessary if an optimised timetable could prevent
passenger and freight trains with dangerous goods from passing
through a tunnel at the same time. …Very frequent traffic through
particular tunnels could be made safer by separation of operations of
passenger and freight trains with dangerous goods into day and night.
• E63 Tracking status of the train before entering a tunnel

Italy [!] Systems for detecting temperatures on a running train, by means of [!] Information
thermographical portals are current being trialled experimentally. obtained
These systems will be used to prevent accidents in long tunnels. directly from
The thermographical portals detects the very early stages of a fire, or railway
other situations with an high degree of risk (out of gauge loads, network.
unbalanced loading, temperature anomalies). The portal is a
diagnostic device which can be integrated with the signalling system
and the shut-down system of the railroad. If a dangerous situation is
detected, the combined system can stop a running train before it
enters the tunnel.
U.K. No reference.
UNECE [10] (C.1 03) …Line side detectors of vehicle faults (hot box detectors, etc.)
should be installed at a sufficient distance from the tunnel portal such
that a defective train may be stopped by the signals before entering
the tunnel in order to reduce the risk of an incident in the tunnel.
4.3.7 E7 – Power supply
In case of an emergency, especially a fire, it is necessary to have a reliable supply of power

to operate the safety systems such as lighting, information and communication systems etc.
For this reason, an emergency power supply or alternative scheme should ensure the
availability of power for a certain period of time.
All of the guidelines prescribe long-lasting power supply in tunnels.

Detailed comparison
• E71 Power supply

Italy [1] Location: •(1.2.7) …Inside the tunnel: electrical supply in niches.
•Outside: electrical supply in rescue area
Main features: •(3.1.8) … Each emergency facility …must be linked to
the normal power-distribution network and to a source of emergency
power that may be composed by: a) a storage batteries with automatic
recharging and inverters …autonomy may not be less than two hours,
if the system is not coupled to a generating set; b) self-starting
generating set. The batteries and generating sets … located in areas
not subject to fire risks and suitably ventilated. Any walls adjacent to
tunnels must be built with fire-resistant structures of at least R.E.I.
120’.
• …emergency electrical power may be installed, using wiring that is
independent of the primary system, under the conditions that: - the two
power sources are physically remote and under such conditions that,
in the event of an emergency, they are not engaged simultaneously; -
each system alone should be able to power-up the entire facility.
Switzerland [3] Electrical power must be supplied, if possible, from both entrances.
The system shall also be protected to at least IP 64 standard. In long
tunnels, the emergency lighting, in case of fire, must be subdivided into
sections of max. 500m, in which measures for electrical protection
shall be respected.
Germany [4] In tunnels > 1km an electrical breaker shall be located every 125m on
both sides of tunnel at the same positions as switches for emergency
lighting. It must be possible to switch off the electrical supply for trains
in the whole tunnel, actuated by the operation centre as well as
through switches in the tunnel. There must be indicators at the portals
to show whether the power supply is switched on or off. Cables and
plug connections are to be laid in such a manner that they cannot be
damaged as a result of an accident. The connections must comply with
the usual plug connections used by the rescue services. The supply
points to be provided in tunnels should have connections for the
operation of electrical equipment with a voltage of 230 V as well as
400 V. The operating power shall be at least 8 kW.
France [1] (3.2.1.)…Electric equipment must be connected either to a 1 hour
battery or a second independent main (provided with fire proof cables
etc.). Electrical supply on both sides of the tunnel (12kVA; 240/400 V)
every 200m with redundant power supply
U.K. [1] - [1]…Cable routes should be positioned to minimize damage from any
derailed train.
- (54.b) If conductor rails are used, they should be ... insulated or
shielded to prevent accidental contact by people and their tools.
- (54.c) Means should be provided throughout the tunnels…. for the
disconnection of traction current. In the case of conductor rail systems,
adequate means of instantaneous discharge of current should be
provided. The same system of discharging the current should be used
throughout.

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Detailed comparison
U.S.A. [1] - (3-2.4.7.1.2) Emergency fixtures, exit lights, and signs shall be wired
separately from emergency distribution panels.
- (4-7.1) The power for the emergency ventilation fan plants shall
originate from two separate and distinct utility sources.
- (4-7.2) All wiring materials and installations shall conform to the
requirements of NFPA 70.
UNECE [10] (C.4 06) The electricity power distribution system in the tunnel should
be suitable for emergency/rescue services’ equipment. Standard
socket outlets with residual current circuit breakers should be installed.
All power outlets for rescue services should be regularly maintained
and checked.
4.3.8 E8 – Fire suppression
In the event of a fire in a tunnel, it is best to fight the fire during its early stages. First-aid and
fire fighting equipment on board a train or in the tunnel can be used. In case this equipment
is not sufficient, there should be facilities for fighting the fire using external assistance from a
fire brigade or similar.
The provision of a water supply for use by the emergency services to fight fires is the most
widely used measure. This is achieved through a continuous water main into the tunnel
(either permanently filled or dry pipe), or through branch pipes to tunnel entrances (portals,
emergency exits). In some countries, automatic or manually triggered fire-extinguishing
systems are installed in plant rooms, in order to fight a fire at an early stage.
• E81 First response and fire fighting

Italy [1] (3.1.7.) The water fire fighting system comprises dry, steel pipes
(fig.6), placed at the base of the abutment and protected so as to
guarantee a minimum resistance to fire (REI 60), and nozzle
connections, UNI 45, located every 250m. Water storage is located at
each tunnel entrance near to the portal. Min Flow rate of water: 200
l/min at minimum pressure of 2bar. Capacity 40 m3.
Switzerland Water supply at tunnel entrance (in order to supply the fire fighting Info derived
train with water) (MN22). Standard for New Tunnels (giving synergy from first
with facilities required during construction). Water pipe in the tunnel issue of this
(dry or filled) (MN21). Check valves are not recommended in general, report nov
but may be installed in special cases (e.g. water line between two 02.
communities through the tunnel).
Germany [1,4] Water supply required at tunnel entrance with safe areas and
emergency exits, with a reserve of 96m³, capable of supplying 800
l/min. In each tunnel tube permanent water main along the whole
tunnel length, fed through emergency exits and tunnel portals,
connected at cross passages. Hydrants every 125m, static pressure 8
bar, 5 bar if in use, marked through signs.

Detailed comparison
France [1] - (3.2.4.1)…Urban tunnels: water supply via a 0.1m pipe (either dry or
protected against frost). Hydrants provided with 2 X 40 mm and 1 X 65
mm nozzles along the tunnel (max separation of 100m).
- (3.2.4.2) Urban tunnels: water storage of 120 m3. Supply via a pipe
protected against frost. Hydrants provided with 2 X 40 mm and 1 X 65
mm nozzles along the tunnel (max separation of 250m). Minimum flow
rate of water of 60m3/hr, at minimum pressure of 6 bar.
- (3.3.3)… Provision of rolling pallet for transport of materials and
casualties.
U.K. [1] - (56.a) ...fire-fighting main …with hydrant points at least at each end
of cross-passages and the lobbies of intermediate shafts … locations
and intervals … may be determined in consultation with the local Fire
Authority.
- (56.b) The… main should provide an adequate flow ….provide a
pressure at the hydrant outlets of 4.5 bars ± 0.5 bar. A system of leak
prevention and early warning in case of leaks should be provided as
appropriate.
U.S.A. [1] (3-2.7.2.1) A fire extinguishing system is required. It comprises
standpipes and hose systems and storage tanks. Standpipe lines shall
be a minimum size of 4 in. (101.6 mm) in diameter.
UNECE [10] (C.4.0.5) A fire-fighting water supply should be made available in all
tunnels covered by these Recommendations. The tunnel designer
should consult the fire brigade about the design of this water supply.
The water supply system should be regularly tested and checked.
• E82 Fire extinguishing systems (in plant/machinery rooms)

Italy No reference.
Switzerland Fire extinguishers in tunnels (MN7) Info derived

Fire detection and extinguishing systems in technical installations from first
(plant rooms) (MN6). Consideration is recommended for new long issue of this
tunnels (need will depend on specific case) and also for critical report nov
stretches of existing long tunnels 02.
Germany Not explicitly mentioned. Should the local rescue services’ existing
equipment not be sufficient for operations in tunnels, the railway
infrastructure manager is required to conclude special agreements with
the responsible bodies concerning the necessary supplementary
equipment.
U.K. No reference.
UNECE [10] (C.2.0.4) …extinguishing systems, for technical rooms should be

determined depending on the potential causes of fire. An effective fire
suppression system in the main tunnel is not generally practical and is
not recommended. Technical rooms, especially those containing safety
critical equipment should be suitably protected.

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Detailed comparison
• E83 Other
Italy No reference.
U.K. No reference.
4.3.9 E9 – General safety equipment
This section provides a general overview of the main equipment installed in running tubes
and cross-connections, in order to facilitate a comparison of the different national norms and
regulations at a glance.
From the point of view of safety and mitigation measures, some differences are noted among
the regulations covering the most important safety equipment. Almost all of the regulations
provide for the same basic level of fitting out, but not all supply a detailed description of the
required fire main, and in only a few cases anticipate longitudinal ventilation systems in
tunnels. However, these differences are due to different approaches to the same perceived
problem, exemplified by the use or otherwise of ventilation systems in the tunnel.
• E91 General safety equipment in tunnels (running tubes)

Italy [*] • Systems for keeping escape routes smoke-free [*]
• Fire main, dry-pipe Information
• Tunnel lighting during normal operations. derived from
• Lighting for escape routes the whole of
• Emergency lighting (5 lux at 100 cm from the walkway) available
• Refuges equipped with boxes containing: fire-fighting kits, fire hoses norms /
and nozzles, disposable masks, lamps with tripods, electrical wire. regulations.
• Luminescent and/or illuminated directional signals, indicating escape
routes
• Loudspeaker system
Telecommunications facility

Detailed comparison
Switzerland [*] • Lighting [*]

• Alarm buttons Information
• Emergency light switches derived from
• Tunnel lighting during normal operations. the whole of
• Emergency lighting in case of fire available
• Communication facilities norms /
• Handrails and/or touch-guide panels regulations.
• Reflecting directional signals, indicating escape routes
Emergency telephones
Germany [*] • Fire main [*]
• Emergency lighting (min. 0.5lux) Information
• Reflecting and illuminated directional signals, indicating escape derived from
routes the whole of
• Electrical power outlets (max. dist. betw. connections: 125m) available
Telecommunications facility and emergency telephones norms /
regulations.
France [*] • Fire main, dry or wet and protected against frost [*]
• Lighting Information
• Signs derived from
• Ventilation/smoke-exhaust (permanent ventilation in the tubes) the whole of
• Tunnel lighting during normal operations. available
• Emergency lighting (B-1H type, 2 lux on the walkways) norms /
• Emergency, fire resistant electrical power systems for safety regulations.
devices
• In double-tube configurations, devices to prevent smoke re-entry at
portals.
• Illuminated directional signals, indicating escape routes (every
100m)
• Telecommunication systems (minimum 2 radio lines)
Ventilation/smoke-exhaust systems
U.K. [*] • Lighting [*]
• Alarm buttons Information
• Switches for emergency lighting derived from
• Tunnel lighting during normal operations. the whole of
• Emergency lighting in case of fire available
• Communication facilities norms /
• Handrails and/or touch-guide panels regulations.
• Reflecting directional signals, indicating escape routes
Other [*] • Emergency lighting (1.0 lux) [*]
Austria • Switches for emergency lighting (max. distance between.: 50m ) Information
visible in the dark derived from
• Direction signs, indicating escape routes (every 25m) and first-aid the whole of
stations (every 150m) available
• Electrical power outlets both sides (max. distance between: 125m) norms /
• Hydraulic systems for fire-fighting with dry ducts or permanently regulations.
filled
• Emergency telephones
Radio transmitters

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Detailed comparison
• E92 Cross-connections, general safety equipment

Italy [*] • Positive pressure systems. [*]
• Telephones Information
• Illuminated signs derived from
• Emergency lighting the whole of
Fire and smoke-proof doors fitted with anti-panic handles. available
norms /
regulations.
Switzerland [*] • Systems for facilitating rescue operations: [*]
• Emergency lighting, Information
• Handrails, derived from
• Signs, the whole of
• Telephones, available
Positive pressure systems. norms /
regulations.
Germany [*] • Fire and smoke-proof doors, closing automatically. [*]
Emergency lighting Information
derived from
the whole of
available
norms /
regulations.
France [*] • Fire and smoke-proof doors (fire resistant up to 2 hrs) at each [*]
tunnel end Information
Devices for preventing smoke and fumes spreading into cross- derived from
connections and, thus, towards the tunnel not involved in the accident the whole of
and/or the safety shaft. available
norms /
regulations.
U.K. [*] In order to establish the equipment needed in cross connections, the [*]
following aspects must be considered: Information
• Passage of smoke and heat through cross-connections; derived from
• Opening and closing of doors; the whole of
• Risk to passengers from trains travelling in the other tube available
(including aerodynamic effects). norms /
The most common facilities are: regulations.
• Ventilation systems for providing fresh air and positive pressure.
• Fire and smoke-proof doors
Lighting system. The lighting is usually turned off, but it should be of
remote operation from adjoining stations and the control room, manual
operation from the tunnel and automatically on electrical failure.
Other [*] • Fire-proof panic doors, located at tunnel ends. [*]
Austria • Positive pressure systems. Information
Emergency telephones. derived from
the whole of
available
norms /
regulations.

Detailed comparison
4.4 Structural & equipment response to fire
4.4.1 R1 – Reaction to, and resistance to, fire
The tunnel structure and the equipment installed in it should be able to resist fire and
continue to perform safely during the time necessary for the evacuation of tunnel users. In
addition, the structure and equipment should assist fire-fighting, and should be designed with
the aim of minimising the economic consequences of a fire.
General specifications for the fire resistance of the tunnel structure and equipment are
available in all guidelines.
• R11 Reaction to fire

Italy [1] The materials used for construction or present in the tunnel must
have a fire resistance of over 120’. (REI 120) and flammability
category 0.
Emergency lighting must be designed with fire-resistant wiring (CEI
20-36).
Switzerland [!] Materials used in the tunnel must have a fire-resistance index of over [!] Information
REI 90. obtained
directly from
railway
network.
Germany [1,4] Pursuant to the EBA Directive, tunnels and emergency exits must be Fire duration
built of non-combustible materials. A time-temperature profile is given, [min]
to form the basis for the composition of the concrete and for the 0 5 60
reinforcement 170
Temperature
[°C]
0 1200
1200 0
France [1] (2.1) All materials must be classified M0 for performance against fire.
Category M1 is allowed for lateral linings and light, translucent cover
materials (lamps). Fire resistance of the structure and other
components should be demonstrated (by calculation or direct testing):
• against the normalised time-temperature curve (ISO 834 – EC1); •
against the hydrocarbon curve (EC1).
U.K. [1] (50.d) Materials should be chosen to: • resist the spread of flame; •
reduce the rate of heat release; • reduce hazardous products of
combustion. An assessment of the risk of fire, and the measures that
may be taken to minimize the risk, should be made at an early stage.
U.S.A. [1] - (3-2.1.3) Walk surfaces designated for evacuation of passengers
shall be constructed of non-combustible materials.

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Detailed comparison
- (3-2-5.2.3) Cover board / protective material shall have a flame

spread rate of not over 25 when tested in accordance with NFPA 255
(ASTM E 84).
- (3-2.5.2.4) …Insulating material for the cable, connecting power to
the rail shall meet the requirements of IEEE Standard 383, Standard
for Type Tests of Class l Electric Cables, Field Splices, and
Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, Section 2.5.
UNECE [10] See R12.
• R12 Fire protection requirements for structures

Italy [1] See R11. [!] Information
obtained
directly from
railway
network.
Switzerland [3] Reference made to materials in general.
See R11.
Germany [1,4] In the event of a fire nobody must be injured by spalling of the tunnel
lining. The depth of spalling must be estimated taking into account the
concrete mixture and reinforcement.
France [1] (2.2.1) – Tunnels, excavated but not lined: no special requirement for
fire resistance.
- Tunnels with non-load-bearing linings: design controls should
eliminate the risk of secondary collapse (chain reaction). Other
tunnels: ISO 834 - 2 hrs.
- Tunnels adjoining a structure in a built-up area, reinforced concrete:
2 hours.
- Tunnels authorised for the carriage of dangerous goods: • ISO 834
curve: 4 hours; • hydrocarbon curve: 2 hours
- Light linings: design controls should eliminate the risk of secondary
collapse (chain reaction).
- Suspended ceilings and walls that separate ventilation ducts: 2 hrs,
raised to 4 hrs if the carriage of dangerous goods is anticipated
U.K. [2,3] The potential hazard due to materials and equipment falling during a
fire should be addressed during the design of a new tunnel, i.e. its
lining materials and its reinforcing. Progressive failure modes
involving the spalling of small pieces of lining would be less hazardous
to fire fighters and others than failure modes which could result in
large pieces falling.
U.S.A. [1] (3.2.1.6) Structures such as remote vertical exit shafts and ventilation
structures shall be not less than Type I- (332) approved non-
combustible construction as defined in NFPA 220.
UNECE (C.2 02) ……structural fire protection …especially for those locations
involved in any safe haven or rescue. The risk study should consider
the likely fire size and its thermal impact on the type of structure
involved (heat transfer, smoke leakage, structural damage, spalling,
etc.) and the consequences of structural failure. Appropriate
temperature development curves should be chosen for the testing of
the materials involved.

Detailed comparison
• R13 Equipment, resistance to fire

Italy [1] Fire resistant and halogen-free electric cables (according to CEI 20-
32). Electrical supplies for emergency systems must use fire resistant
cables (CEI 20 -36).
Switzerland [3] (4.3) Electrical supplies to emergency lighting must be fed from both
portals, and be fire resistant for 30 min. For existing tunnels, and
evaluation of such measures is required, based on tunnel specific risk
assessment and cost-effectiveness criteria. Enclosures etc sealed to
IP64.
Germany [1] The structural installations for emergency lighting, communications,
power supply and release of the doors leading out of the emergency
exits to the open air, must be designed in such a manner that they can
withstand a fire for at least 90 minutes and continue to function (i.e.
meet category F 90 according to DIN 4102). Electrical supplies and
communication links should be laid in concrete ducts under the escape
route wherever possible. The cables required for operations
management, such as signalling or telecommunications cables (except
emergency telephones) do not require fire protection.
Locks: Doors from the lock to the main tunnel must be fire-retardant
and smoke-proof (minimum T 30). Doors to a rescue shaft or rescue
passage must be smoke-proof.
France [1] - (4.2) Fire resistance of ventilation fans must be at least 2 hours at See also
200°C (2.2.2)
- (3.2.1)… Electricity supply for emergency systems (lighting,
communication, electrical supply etc.) must be fire resistant for 60
minutes or there must be an independent supply between two sources,
fire resistant cable coverings, physical protection of cables
U.K. [1] See R11.
U.S.A. [1] - (3-2.3.2) …conduits, raceways, ducts, boxes, cabinets, equipment
enclosures, and their surface finish materials shall be capable of being
subjected to temperatures up to 932°F (500°C) for 1 hour and shall not
support combustion under the same temperature condition. Other
materials, where encased in concrete or suitably protected, shall be
acceptable.
- (4-3.2) Emergency ventilation fans, their motors, and all related
components shall resist at 250°C for a minimum of 1 hour. Fans rated
in accordance with the ANSI/AMCA 210-85.
• R14 Additional measures

Italy No reference.
U.K. No reference.

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Detailed comparison
4.5 Emergency management
4.5.1 4.5M1 – Organisational measures
To mitigate the consequences of an accident in a tunnel, plans are defined, published and
made available for appropriate contingency measures and assigned responsibilities for
managing emergency situations. The planning is lead by the tunnel’s manager, in
conjunction with all of those operating companies through the tunnel, managers of the
adjacent infrastructure, local authorities and the emergency services. These organisational
measures and emergency plans help to guarantee proper intervention and minimise time
delays, although no plan can cover the multitude of possible occurrences.
Analysis of the regulations reveal that the Italian, German, Swiss and Austrian regulations
make specific reference to emergency plans and the way they must be elaborated. Among
these regulations, those from Italy have a more limited field of application (only for tunnels
longer than 3.000m), whereas the other countries extend their plans to include all tunnels on
their respective networks. All of the regulations emphasise the necessity of periodic drills,
though frequency of these differs from country to country. The French and U.K. regulations
do not specifically refer to the development of emergency plans.
• M11 Safety plans

Italy [1,7] Starting from December 2001, emergency plans must be provided for
all tunnels longer than 3000m. These plans must: • be drawn up with
local competent authorities; • take into account possible risk
scenarios; • provide for periodic drills.
Switzerland [!,3] According to the “Ordinance on Protection Against Major Accidents” [!] Information
for every railway line and also for every tunnel, of whatever length, a obtained
contingency plan must be drawn up in conjunction with the emergency directly from
services and periodic exercises, on the basis of this plan, have to be railway
carried out. network.
Germany [1,4] The infrastructure manager is required to draw up, with the rescue
services, an operational alarm and hazard prevention plan, including
the fire brigade plans pursuant to DIN 14095, for every tunnel. The
plans are to be coordinated with the rural districts or urban
communities and made available to these. Exercises with the rescue
services must be carried out before a tunnel is put into service and at
intervals of no more three years thereafter.
U.K. No reference.
U.S.A. [1] - (7-8.1) (7-8-2) Emergency procedure plans are anticipated and shall
clearly delineate the authority or participating agency that is in
command and responsible for the overseeing, correction, or alleviation of
the emergency.
- (7-10.2) Exercises and drills …at least twice per year to prepare the
authority and participating agency personnel for emergencies.

Detailed comparison
UNECE [10] (C.4.13)….. regular maintenance of emergency and rescue plans is

recommended as a standard safety measure. …...It is recommended
that emergency service planning shall be developed during the
tunnel’s planning phase. …. it is recommended that the several
organizations not only prepare together and regularly review their
plans but also exercise jointly in various scenario situations.
Other A plan for warning and danger must be drawn up for all tunnels, in
Austria order to foster collaboration among local organisations. This plan
establishes: • the access ways for rescue teams on foot or by other
means of transport; • the forces (teams) to be mobilised and the
equipment they require; • the provisions for the infrastructure manager
to make transport by rail available; • the methods used to give a
shuttle service between the accident scene and tunnel entrances; •
training methods.

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Appendix 1 : Tables of Contents of National Guidelines Translated into English
5 APPENDIX 1: TABLES OF CONTENTS OF NATIONAL GUIDELINES TRANSLATED

INTO ENGLISH
5.1 Italy (I)
5.1.1 “Linee guida per il miglioramento della sicurezza nelle gallerie ferroviarie”
(25.07.1997)
Ministry of the Interior, FS S.p.A., National Fire Brigade Corp.
Contents:
Introduction
Risk in rail tunnels
Reference scenario
Guidelines
1. Chapter I: "Existing Tunnels"
1.1 External access
1.1.1 Access paths
1.1.2 External emergency area
1.2 Internal access
1.2.1 Rescue vehicles/equipment
1.2.2 Internal visibility
1.2.3 Emergency exits
1.2.4 Ordinary and emergency communications
1.2.5 Smoke control
1.2.6 Fire-fighting system
1.2.7 Equipment in "niches” and “refuges”
1.3 Emergency plan
2. Chapter II: "Tunnels in Construction"
Introduction
Reference scenario
2.1 External access
2.1.1 Access paths
2.1.2 External Emergency area
2.1.3 Rescue helideck
2.1.4 ‘Triage’ area
2.2 Internal access
2.2.3.1 Tunnels with intermediate accesses
2.2.3.2 Tunnels without intermediate accesses
2.2.5 Smoke control
2.2.7 Equipment in "niches” and “refuges”
2.3 Emergency plan
3. Chapter III: "Recently Built Tunnels"

Introduction
Reference scenario
Guide lines
3.1 Design criteria
3.1.1 Tunnel topologies
3.1.2 Structures and materials
3.1.3.1 Emergency paths
3.1.4 Emergency signals
3.1.5 Communications
3.1.6 Smoke Control
3.1.8 Power supply for emergency electric systems
3.1.9 Emergency lighting systems
3.1.10 "Refuges" and service rooms
3.2 External access
3.2.1 Introduction
3.2.2 Access paths
3.2.3 External Emergency area
3.2.4 Rescue helideck
3.2.5 ‘Triage’ area
3.3 Internal access
3.3.3 Signals
3.3.4 Emergency paths
3.3.4.1 Tunnels provided with windows
3.3.4.2 Tunnels provided with parallel service tunnel or double bores
3.3.6 Smoke control
3.4 Emergency plan
4. Chapter IV: "Definitions/Glossary"
5.1.2 “Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione di piazzali di emergenza, le strade di

accesso e le aree di atterraggio degli elicotteri ai fini della sicurezza delle
gallerie ferroviarie” (Aug. 1998)

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5.1.3 FS – RFI
Contents:
1. Preface
2. Access Paths
2.1 Preface
2.2 Regulation of reference
Features of access paths
3. Emergency parking area for rescue vehicles
3.1 Preface
3.2 Features of the emergency area
3.3 Design of the area
4. Rescue helideck
5. Reservoir/Basin for the collecting of water
5.1.4 “Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione degli impianti idrico antincendio,

elettrico e illuminazione, telecomunicazione, supervisione” (Apr. 2000)
5.1.5 FS – RFI
Contents:
1. General remarks
2. Design criteria for the installation of the water-based fire-fighting system
3. Design criteria for the installation of the electrical system and of the illumination
4. Design criteria for the installation of the telecommunication system
5. Design criteria for the installation of the control-system for the other systems
5.1.6 “Linee guida per la realizzazione del piano generale di emergenza per lunghe
gallerie ferroviarie” (Oct. 1998)
5.1.7 FS – RFI
Contents:
Preface
Introduction
Terms and definitions
Part I
Chapter. 1 Features of the railway line
Chapter. 2 Features of the tunnel of the railway
I.2.1. Tunnels
I.2.1.1 Name of the tunnel
I.2.1.2. Resources/installations/equipment of the tunnel
Chapter. 3 Involved companies
Part II
Chapter. 1 Signalling the event

II.1.1. Alarm degrees

II.1.2. Activating of the alarm degrees
Chapter 2 Organizing of the intervention (see under executive plan)
II.2.1 Proceeding at the beginning of the intervention
II.2.2. Executive Center Interforce (C.O.I.)
II.2.3. Technical Directions of intervention (D.T.I.)
II.2.4. Emergency rescue
II.2.5. First Aid rescue
II.2.6. Technical rescue
II.2.7. Connections with information media
Chapter 3 Proceeding of the intervention
Conclusions
Attachments:
A1 Form for the registration of the updates of the emergency plan
A2 List of the distribution of the emergency plan with his updates
A3 List of the most important telephone numbers of companies involved in the
emergency plan
A4 Summary of access paths to the tunnel, bridges and viaducts
A5 General map of the railway with tunnels put in evidence
A6 Map of details of the railway tunnel
A7 Shape of elevation of the tunnel
A8 General planimetry of the tunnel with equipment points put in evidence
A9 Planimetry of the emergency areas
A10 Planimetry of the security equipment of the tunnel
A11 Planimetry of the access paths
A12 Plan of the functions of the water-based fire-fighting system
A12 Diagram of how to activate the alarm
A13 Plans of internal intervention of the involved companies
5.1.8 “Linee guida per l’elaborazione del piano interno di emergenza” (Jun. 2000)

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5.1.9 FS-RFI
Contents:
1. Chapter 1 – General remarks
Instructions
Aim
Addressees of the plan
Internals of FS Railway
Transport companies
Externals of FS railway
Terms and definitions
List of abbreviations not in use at the FS
List of abbreviations in use at the FS
List of the most important rules of the FS and other FS publications
Features of the railway line
Features of the tunnel
Tunnel
Resources/installations/equipment of the tunnel
2. Signalling emergency
Scenario of a hypothetical accident in a tunnel
Common norms
Communications
Communications of the PdT
Communications from the DM/DCO to the DCM
Communications with external companies
First Aid
Help for a damaged train
Accident of a derailed freight train
Accident of a derailed passenger train
Case of fire in a freight train standing in a tunnel
Case of fire in a passenger train standing in a tunnel
Accident of a derailed freight train with dangerous freight
Accident of a derailed freight train with dangerous freight and a passenger train in
fire
Attachments:
Attachment 1: Features of the tunnel
Attachment 2: Position, length and equipment of the tunnel

5.1.10 “Linee guida per il tracciamento e la posa in opera di sistemi di supporto per
cavo radiante nelle gallerie ferroviarie” (Apr. 2001)
FS – RFI
Contents:
1. General remarks
2. Fields of application
3. Typology of tunnels to be supplied with equipment
4. Support systems for radiant cables
Fixing the cable with plastic supports and installation of the cable
Fixing the cable with a rope fixed on the vault of the tunnel and installation of the
cables
5. Fixation systems of the supply cables or fibreoptic cables
6. Papers to be supplied by the contractor
Attachments:
Attachment A: Principles of standard suspensions in railway tunnels
Attachment B: Minimum profile of obstacles for the pantograph L=1450 – chip 608.
5.1.11 RFI circular n° di/a1007/p/01/000562 del 04.06.2001: “Piano interno di

emergenza per gallerie di lunghezza compresa tra i 5.000 m e 3.000 m”
FS-RFI
Contents:
Circular Department Infrastructure RFI
Arrangement of the internal emergency plans also for the tunnels with a length between 3
and 5 km, extending them to all the tunnels with a length > 3 km.
5.1.12 RFI circular n° rfi/tdr/a1007/p/01/000512 del 17.12.2001: “Standard di

sicurezza per nuove gallerie ferroviarie”
FS-RFI
Contents:
Circular Department Investments RFI

Technical standard of new tunnels: with double track up to a length of 1000 m, tunnels with
two tubes from 2000 m up, the designer has the possibility to choose the best solution for
middle lengths.

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5.2 Switzerland
5.2.1 “Raccomandazione comune delle autorità di vigilanza sulle ferrovie della

Germania, dell’Austria e della Svizzera in merito alla sicurezza dei viaggiatori
in gallerie ferroviarie molto lunghe” (24.09.1992)
Swiss Federal Office of Transport
Contents:
1. Motivation and aim
2. Definition and principles
Field of application
Preliminary remark
Principles of security
Definition
3. Advice
Preventing the stopping of a train in a tunnel
Saving oneself in a tunnel on his own
Extinguishing a fire and technical help
Organization
Means of transport
Power supply
Fire fighting water supply
Means of communication
5.2.2 Prescrizioni svizzere sulla circolazione dei treni PCT
5.2.3 (R 300.1-.15, 14.12.2003)
UFT Federal Department of Transport
Contents:
The PCT contain the important security rules for the whole railway traffic, divided in the
following parts:
General remarks R 300.1
Signals R 300.2
Instructions and transmissions R 300.3
Traffic manoeuvring R 300.4
Preparation of the trains R 300.5
Railway traffic R 300.6
Signals in the cab (to be continued) R 300.7
Security at the working place R 300.8
Perturbations R 300.9
List of the set phrases R 300.10
List of the items R 300.11
Works in the track area R 300.12
Engine-drivers R 300.13
Sections without block R 300.15
.

5.2.4 Weisung I-AM-EB-31/00: "Sichereit in bestehenden Tunnels,

Infrastrukturmassnhamen zur Erleichterung der Selbstrettung" (06.12.2000)
Swiss Federal Railways
Contents:
1. Introduction
2. Aim
3. Field of application
4. Structural elements for the possibility of saving oneself
Emergency exit
Handrail
Fire emergency lighting system
Signs for the emergency exit
5. Elements for the saving by others
6. Documentation and control of the ability to operate
Security plan and plan of use
Plan of controlling and maintaining
Appendix
Arrangement and design of the structural elements in the tunnel
Sheet 1: Arrangement along the tunnel wall, fig. 1,20
Sheet 2: Arrangement in the cross section of the tunnel, cross section 1:20
Sheet 3: Arrangement in the cross section of the tunnel with a very narrow profile
Standards for the structural elements
Sheet 1: Handrail and guide rail, cross section 1:2
Sheet 2: Emergency exit sign, view 1:5
Sheet 3; Fire emergency lighting system (SBB 340-14-02), picture
Sheet 4: Distribution box E 30 (SBB 340-14-029), sheet of data
Sheet 5: Security cable FE 180 (SBB 312-66-34), sheet of data
Sheet 6: Map of principles
5.2.5 "Ausfuhrungsbestimmungen zur Eisenbahnverordnung von 16 Oktober 2002"

(AB-EBV SR 742.141.11)
Contents:
Not available
5.2.6 "Verordnung vom 27 Februar 1991 über den Schutz vor Störfällen"

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5.2.7 (Störfallverordnung, StFV SR 814.012)
Contents:
Section 1 General Remarks
Art.1 Aim and field of application
Art. 2 Definitions
Section 2 Principles for prevention
Art. 3 General security measures
Art. 4 Special security measures for companies
Art. 5 Report of the holder
Art. 6 Evaluation of the report, Risk analysis
Art. 7 Evaluation of the risk analysis
Art. 8 Extra security measures
Art. 9 Information about control results
Art. 10 Remarks about the transports of dangerous goods
Section 3 Behaviour in case of serious accident
Art. 11
Section 4 Tasks of the Swiss cantons
Art. 12 Space for announcements
Art. 13 Information and alarm
Art. 14 Coordination of organization in case of disaster
Art. 15 Coordination of control of the company
Art. 16 Federal Department Information
Section 5 Tasks of the Federation
Art. 17 Gathering of dates of the Federal Department
Art. 18 Remarks on the import, export and transit of dangerous goods on roads
Art. 19 Elaboration of the remarks for the transport of dangerous goods on roads
Art. 20 Information
Art. 21 Experts committees
Art. 22 Instructions
Section 6 Final instructions
Art. 23 Execution
Art. 24 Amending of the law in force
Art. 25 Temporary instructions
Art. 26 Coming into force
Attachment 1 Fields of application and report
Attachment 1.1 Upper limits for special substances, special goods and hazardous special
waste
Attachment 2 Principles for taking the general security measures
Attachment 2.1 Companies with special substances, special goods or hazardous special
waste
Attachment 2.2 Companies using micro organisms
Attachment 2.3 Communication media
Attachment 3 Special security measures
waste
Attachment 4 Risk analysis
waste
Attachment 4.3 Communcation media

5.2.8 " Verordnung vom 23 November 1983 über Bau und Betrieb der Eisenbahnen“
(Eisenbahnverordnung EBV SR 742.141.1)
Contents:
Art. 1 Subject, aim and field of application
Art. 2 Technical Rules and care
Art. 3 Other remarks
Art. 4 Complementary instructions
Art. 5 Exceptions of the instructions
Art. 6 Approval of the constructions plans and installation
Art. 7 Registering of the types
Art. 8 Authorization of use
Art. 8a Security certificate
Art. 9 Surveillance
Art. 10 Responsibility of the railway companies
Art. 11 Organization of the use
Art. 11a Instructions regarding the circulation of the trains
Art. 12 Instructions of the use
Art. 12 Technical business instructions
Art. 13 Maintenance
Art. 14 Maintenance staff
Art. 15 Information about use and maintenance
Chapter 2: Immovable installations
Section 1: Geometric characteristics of the track
Art. 16 Gauge
Art. 17 Track elements
Section 2: Safe distances
Art. 18 Outline of free space
Art. 19 Parallel tracks in open parts
Art. 20 Parallel tracks in the railway stations
Art. 21 Distances on platforms 32
Art. 22 Security signs
Art. 23 Street distances
Art. 24 Clearing of the railway track
Section 3: Platform and works of art
Art. 25 Platform
Art. 26 Railway bridges
Art. 27 Constructions near, above and under the railway track
Art. 28 Tunnels and safety tunnels
Art. 29 Safety measures against the current
Art. 30 Level crossing
Section 4: Superstructure/permanent way
Art. 31 Constructions of the track and the material to use
Art. 32 Points
Art. 33 Racks
Section 5: Railway stations
Art. 34 General remarks
Art. 35 Bumpers
Art. 36 Railway station buildings

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Section 6
Art. 37
Section 7: Safety installations
Art. 39 Technical safety requirements; constructive and technical measures of the tracks
Art. 40 Safety devices for the points
Art. 41 Devices for the control of the occupation of the tracks
Art. 42 Signals, automatic stopping device of the trains and transmission systems
Art. 43 Dependences, bolting, line-blockage
Art. 44 Power supply
Art. 45 Transmission of information
Chapter 3:Vehicles
Section 1:Constructive principles
Art. 46 Hypothesis of load
Art. 47 Outline limit of vehicles and loads
Art. 48 Constructive principles
Art. 49 Brakes
Art. 50 Equipment and signs
Section 2: Engines and trains of adhesion railways
Art. 52 Brakes
Art. 53 Cab
Art. 54 Speedometer
Art. 55 Safety devices and automatic stopping of the trains
Art. 56 Transmission of informations between the immovable installations and the vehicles
Art. 57 Thermic engines
Section 3: Rack railway engines and rack railway trains
Art. 59 Special equipment of the engines
Art. 60 Brakes
Art. 61 Multiple traction
Art. 62 Trailed rolling stock
Art. 63 Safety device for trains
Art. 64 Cab – mountain side
Section 4: Wagons of the adhesion railways
Art. 66 Doors
Art. 67 Special vehicles
Section 5: Rack railway wagons
Art. 69 Brakes
Section 6: Installations under pressure of the vehicles
Art. 70
Chapter 4: Railway activity
Section 1: Preambles regarding the railway activity
Art. 71 Telecommunication installations
Art. 72 Staff of the railway activity at the stations
Art. 73 Designation of the trains and of the railway installations
Art. 74 “Only staff” signs
Section 2: Formation and driving of the trains
Art. 75 Formation of the trains
Art. 76 Speed and schedule
Art. 77 Norms for the brakes
Art. 78 The driving of the engines
Art. 78a Examination of the engine driver

Art. 78b Obligation to carry the certificate on one´s person

Art. 79 Train stock
Art. 80 Measures in favour of the passengers
Chapter 5: Final instructions
Art. 81 Instructions of execution
Art. 82 Law in force: abolitions
Art. 83 Temporary instructions
Art. 83a Tasks by virtue of the sovereignty
Art. 84 The coming into force
5.3 GERMANY
5.3.1 Richtlinie “Anforderung des Brand- und Katastrophenschutzes an den Bau und
Betrieb von Eisenbahntunneln“ (01.07.1997).
Eisebahn-Bundesamt (EBA)
Contents:
1. General Information
1.1 Scope and Extent
1.2 Definition of Terms
1.3 Safety Measures, Rescue Concept
2. Structure Design
2.1 Principles
2.2 Safe Areas, Escape Routes
2.3 Emergency Exits
2.4 Emergency Lighting
2.5 Marking of Escape Route
2.6 Rescue Points and Access Roads
2.7 Overhead Power Lines
2.8 Power Supply
2.9 Fire Fighting Water Supply
2.10 Transport Facilities
2.11 Emergency Telephones
2.12 BOS-Radio Sets
2.13 Telephone communication system
3. Operational Requirements
3.1 Separation of Traffic Types
3.2 Vehicle Requirements
3.3 Organisational Measures
4. Other Measures

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5.3.2 "Leitfaden für den Brandschutz in Personenverkehrsanlagen der Eisenbahnen

des Bundes und der Magnetschnellbahn" (Jan. 2001)
Contents:
1. General Remarks
1.1 Field of application
1.2 General standards
1.3 Deviations from the established technical rules
1.4 The dealing of fire prevention in accordance with § 18 AEG
1.5 Further general remarks
2. Definition of terms
2.1 Installations for passenger traffic (Pva)
2.2 Safe Areas
2.3 The external space
2.4 Rescue Deadline
2.5 Traffic path
2.6 Escape Route and Rescue Route
2.7 Unity of use
2.8 Time for evacuation
2.9 Fire prevention plan (BSK)
3. Examinating the to be protected goals and risk analysis
3.1 Goals to be protected
3.2 Risk analysis
4. Showing the proofs
4.1 Danger levels
4.2 Number of persons
4.3 Special events in installations for passenger traffic (Pva)
4.4 Access paths
4.5 How long is the fire resistance of the structural elements
4.6 Peculiar dangers of the railway traffic for installations for passenger traffic (Pva)
4.7 Standards of the fire prevention plan (BSK)
4.8 Control during the construction and inspections
4.9 Examinations
5. Organizational Fire Prevention
5.1 Examination and controlling
5.2 Organizational standards/Measures
5.3 Documentation of Fire Prevention
5.4 Responsible of Fire Prevention

5.3.3 "Anforderungen der DB station&service AG an den Brandschutz in

Personenverkehrsanlagen" - Draft Version 15.03.2001
Contents:
1. Fundamental Principles and area of competence
1.1 Fire prevention plans
1.2 Binding nature of the regulations
2. Reaction to fire of building materials and structural elements
2.1 Building materials
2.2 Structural elements
2.3 The principle of separating with a bulkhead
3. Parameter for the definition of the proportions of the fire
4. Fire prevention in accordance with the technical features of the installation
4.1 Fire alarm installations
4.2 Alarm installations
4.3 Smoke extraction installations
4.4 Emergency power supply
4.5 Radio contact supply
4.6 Fire Fighting Installations
4.6.1 Means for First Fire Fighting
4.6.2 Fire Fighting Water Supply
5. Video-Monitoring
6. Loudspeaker-system
7. Emergency call installations
8. Power installations for supplying the train
9. Installations, Platform equipment
10. Escape routes and rescue paths
11. Evacuation
12. Operation Area for the Fire brigade
13. Organizational Fire prevention
13.1 Fire prevention during building work

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5.3.4 " FIRE AND DISASTER PROTECTION IN RAILWAY TUNNELS" –

(Mar. 2004)
Contents
1 INTRODUCTION
2 FIRE AND DISASTER PROTECTION IN RAILWAY TUNNELS
2.1 Legal basis
2.2 Safety concepts in railway tunnels
2.2.1 Preventive measures
2.2.2 Measure to mitigate the impact of an accident
2.2.3 Rescue concept
2.2.3.1 Measures for self-rescue
2.2.3.2 Measures for rescue
2.2.4 Incident probability, Accident scenarios
2.3 Comparison with road tunnels
3 CURRENT IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRE AND DISASTER PROTECTION
PURSUANT
TO THE DIRECTIVE OF THE FEDERAL RAILWAY OFFICE (EBA)
3.1.1 Scope of validity
3.1.1.1 Legal status of the Directive
3.1.1.2 Contents of the Directive
3.1.1.3 Scope of application
3.1.1.4 New tunnels, Existing tunnels
3.1.1.5 Exceptions
3.1.2 Definitions
3.1.3 Safety measures, Rescue concept
3.2 Structural design
3.2.1 Principles
3.2.1.1 Stability and construction materials
3.2.1.2 Maintenance of functional ability
3.2.1.3 Double-bore single-track tunnel
3.2.1.4 Longitudinal inclination
3.2.1.5 Track system
3.2.1.6 Security of access routes
3.2.2 Safe places, Escape routes
3.2.2.1 Distance
3.2.2.2 Structure, height and width of the escape route
3.2.2.3 Installed equipment
3.2.2.4 Tensioning weights
3.2.2.5 Handrails
3.2.3.1 General
3.2.3.2 Rescue shafts
3.2.3.3 Rescue passages
3.2.3.4 Locks
3.2.3.5 Tailback area
3.2.3.6 Access control (security)
3.2.4 Emergency lighting
3.2.4.1 Principles
3.2.4.2 Luminosity

3.2.4.3 Possibility of switching on from a remote location

3.2.5 Marking of escape routes
3.2.5.1 Direction arrows
3.2.5.2 Rescue signs
3.2.6 Rescue areas and access routes
3.2.6.1 Principles
3.2.6.2 Rescue areas
3.2.6.3 Access routes
3.2.7 Overhead line
3.2.7.1 Sectioning
3.2.7.2 Disconnection of the overhead line
3.2.7.3 Overhead line voltage tester (OHLVT) [not mentioned in the EBA Directive]
3.2.8 Power supply
3.2.8.1 Location
3.2.8.2 Power demand
3.2.9 Fire water supply
3.2.9.1 Reserve, Supply
3.2.9.2 Feeding of firewater
3.2.10 Transport aids
3.2.10.1 Rolling pallets
3.2.11 Emergency telephones
3.2.11.1 Location
3.2.11.2 Marking
3.2.11.3 General requirements
3.2.11.4 User guidance
3.2.11.5 Safety against failure
3.2.11.6 Monitoring of the emergency call system
3.2.12 "BOS radio" installations
3.2.13 Wire-bound communications
3.2.13.1 Telephone connections
3.3 Operational requirements
3.3.1 Segregation of types of traffic
3.3.1.1 Dangerous goods
3.3.2 Requirements for rolling stock
3.3.2.1 Emergency brakes
3.3.2.2 Loudspeaker announcements
3.3.2.3 Fire extinguishing equipment
3.3.2.4 Escape and first-aid equipment
3.3.3 Organisational measures
3.3.3.1 Railway undertaking
3.3.3.2 Obligations of the infrastructure manager
3.4 Other measures
3.4.1.1 Operational alarm and hazard prevention plan
3.4.1.2 Site maps
3.4.1.3 Agreements for necessary supplementary requirement
3.4.1.4 Instruction of the rescue services
3.4.1.5 Exercises
4 IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRE AND DISASTER PROTECTION PRIOR TO ENTRY
INTO FORCE OF THE EBA DIRECTIVE
4.1 Tunnels on the existing high-speed lines (HSLs) Hannover-Würzburg and
Mannheim-Stuttgart
4.1.1 Origination of the safety concept
4.1.2 Individual measures prepared by the Working Party

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4.1.2.1 Measures to reduce the probability of occurrence (preventive measures and

measures to mitigate the impact of an accident)
4.1.2.2 Emergency brake override system
4.1.2.3 On-board fire extinguishing equipment
4.1.3 Measures for self-rescue
4.1.3.1 Escape routes
4.1.3.2 Staff training
4.1.3.3 Emergency telephones
4.1.3.4 Marking of escape routes
4.1.3.5 Tunnel lighting
4.1.3.6 Airflow detectors
4.1.4 Measures for rescue
4.1.4.1 Deployment concept of a tunnel emergency train
4.1.4.2 Means of communication
4.1.4.3 Power supply
4.1.4.4 Access routes to the tunnel portals and emergency exits
4.1.4.5 Alarm and deployment plans, Exercises
4.1.4.6 Fire water supply
4.1.5 Rescue trains
4.1.5.1 Deployment concept
4.1.6 Extension of the rescue concept
4.1.7 Rescue train vs EBA Directive
4.2 Other tunnels on the conventional network
4.2.1 Road/rail fire-fighting vehicle
4.2.1.1 Carrier vehicle
4.2.1.2 On-track running device
4.2.1.3 Fire-fighting equipment
4.2.1.4 Other equipment
4.2.1.5 Deployment procedure
5 MEASURES FOR UPGRADING INDIVIDUAL TUNNELS
5.1 Criteria for determining the tunnels to be upgraded
5.2 Criteria for determining the structural measures
5.3 Implementation of the measures
5.4 Current status
6 MEASURES NOT REGARDED AS BEING EFFECTIVE
6.1 Fire detectors
6.2 Automatic fire-extinguishing systems
6.3 Industrial (works) fire brigades
7 FINAL REMARKS

List of illustrations:
Illustration 1: Handrail, Securing of OHL bracing

Illustration 2: Sketch of a rescue shaft
Illustration 3: Equipment lift
Illustration 4: Emergency exit door
Illustration 5: Key repository
Illustration 6: Marking of escape routes under emergency lighting
Illustration 7: Light switch
Illustration 8: Rescue sign E 12
Illustration 9: Rescue sign E
Illustration 10: Marking of emergency exit
Illustration 11: Rescue area at the Idsteiner Tunnel (cf. Illustration 29)
Illustration 12: On-mast switch for the OHLVTIllustration 13: Indicator and control panel for
the OHLVT
Illustration 14: Working-limit plate for the OHLVT
Illustration 15: Operating instructions for the OHLVT
Illustration 16: Mobile earthing devices
Illustration 17: Shore supply point
Illustration 18: Feeding into the firewater pipe
Illustration 19: Hose connection installation
Illustration 20: Rolling pallet
Illustration 21: Rescue sign E 07
Illustration 22: Emergency telephone post
Illustration 23: Connection socket for telephone
Illustration 24: Hectometre board with EBOS marking
Illustration 25: Rescue sign F 05
Illustration 26: Escape equipment box
Illustration 27: Map of DB Netz Branch Offices
Illustration 28: Map of fire brigade access
Illustration 29: Fire brigade plan, example: Idsteiner Tunnel (cf. Illustration 11)
Illustration 30: Emergency telephones on existing HSLs
Illustration 31: Marking of escape routes in HSL tunnels
Illustration 32: Light switches in HSL tunnels
Illustration 33: Rescue-train traction unit
Illustration 34: Emergency doctor's workplace
Illustration 35: Schematic diagram: Transport and ambulance cars
Illustration 36: Schematic diagram: Extinguishing agents car
Illustration 37: Schematic diagram: Equipment car
Illustration 38: Driving cab of the transport car
Illustration 39: Schematic diagram: Rescue train
Illustration 40: Road/rail fire-fighting vehicle
Illustration 41: Deployment of the HLF on rail (sketch)
Illustration 42: Deployment of the HLF on road (sketch)
Illustration 43: On-track running device
Illustration 44: On-track rolling container

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5.4 FRANCE
5.4.1 "Instruction téchnique interministérielle rélative à la sécurité dans les tunnels

ferroviaires" (08.07.1998)
Ministere de l’Equipement, des Transportes et du Logement
Contents :
Preamble
1. Field of application – definitions
1.1 Field of applications
1.2 Specification of the tunnels
1.3 Classification of the tunnels
1.4 Other specifications
1.4.1 Urban lines
1.4.2 Mixed traffic lines
1.4.3 Passenger lines
1.4.4 Rolling Stock
1.4.5 Dangerous goods
2. Reaction and resistance to fire
2.1 Reaction to fires
2.2 Fire resistance
2.2.1 Fire resistance of principle structures
2.2.1.1 Dug or submerged tunnels and covered trenches
2.2.1.2 Tunnels integrated with an inhabited or occupied concrete structure
2.2.1.3 Tunnels licensed for the passage of dangerous goods
2.2.1.4 Light covers
2.2.2 Fire resistance of secondary structures
2.2.2.1 False ceilings and partitions separating ventilation passages
2.2.2.2 Technical premises and ventilation locations
3. Communal arrangements
3.1 Civil engineering
3.1.1 Emergency vehicle access and parking at tunnel portals
3.1.2 Progress
3.1.3 Safety of maintenance workers
3.2 General security equipment
3.2.1 Electricity supply
3.2.2 Lighting
3.2.3 Identifying issues and their distance/removal
3.2.4 Fire fighting water supply
3.2.4.1 Tunnels in central city centre or suburban area
3.2.5 Emergency services communications
3.2.6 Resurfacing
3.2.7 Call circuit
3.3 Railroad security facilities
3.3.1 Ground-train relationship
3.3.2 Speed control system
3.3.3 Lorries

4. Particular arrangements
4.1 Civil engineering
4.1.1 System of approval
4.1.2 Emergency access in urban tunnels
4.1.2.1 Equipment
4.1.3 Evacuation of passengers
4.1.4 Helicopter landing areas
4.1.5 Anti-recycling system of fumes at tunnel portals
4.2 Ventilation, smoke extraction
4.3 Limitation/separation of passengers and freight
4.3.1 Rolling stock
4.3.2 Equipment or arrangements of railroad security
4.3.3 Hot axle box detection
5.4.2 "Décret relatif a la sécurité du reseau ferre national (30.05.2000)
Contents:
Title I: About the construction of systems incorporated in the national railway network
or possibilities of their use
Chapter I: General instructions
Chapter II: About the file of definitions
Chapter III: About the preliminary security file
Chapter IV: About the exploitation and the security file
Title II: About the exploitation
Chapter I: About the security regulations of the exploitation of the national railway network
Chapter II: nstructions regarding the exploitation, the maintaining and the control
Title III: ther instructions
5.5 NORWAY
5.5.1 "Substructure, regulations for new lines, tunnels – safety requirements"

(01.01.2000)
Jernbaneverket
Contents :
Substructure
Regulations for new lines
Tunnels - safety requirements
Introduction
1. Tunnel Design
2. Tunnel Classification
3. Safety Measures
4.1. Specific minimum requirements - type, amount and location
4.1.1 Derailment indicators
4.1.2 Escape routes via cross-cuts

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4.1.3 Access to tunnel mouths

4.1.4 Fire extinguishers in equipment rooms
4.1.5 Handrail
4.1.6 Walkway
4.1.7 Emergency lighting
4.1.8 Signs
4.1.9 Emergency telephones
4.1.10 Communications
4.1.11 Overhead line earthing rods for tunnel mouths
4.1.12 Power outlets
4.1.13 Fire protection for flammable insulation materials
4.1.14 Ban on storage of highly flammable materials
4.1.15 Emergency plans
4.2 Appropriate supplementary measures - type, amount and location
4.2.1 Ventilation system
4.2.2 Extension of cross-cut to allow room for motorised vehicles
4.2.3 Helicopter landing pad
4.2.4 Guard rails
4.2.5 Rail vehicles for evacuation
5. Design
6. Maintenance of Equipment
5.6 AUSTRIA
5.6.1 Richtlinie "Bau und Betrieb von Neuen Eisenbahntunneln bei Haupt- und
Nebenbahnen, Anforderungen des Brand- und Katastrophenschutzes" (1.
Ausgabe 2000)
Österreichischer Bundesfeuerwehrverband
Contents
1 General remarks
Area of validity
Definition of terms
Security measures, tunnel security plan
Facts of the case
2 Structural design
Principles
Safe areas, Escape routes
Emergency exits, Emergency staircases, Rescue tunnels
Illumination of the escape route
Marking of Escape Route
Rescue areas and access paths
Traffic direction
Power supply
Fire fighting water supply
Smoke extraction
Transport support

Radio contact installations
3 Operational Standard
3.1 Vehicle Requirements
3.2 Installations for the locating of overheating and of blocked brakes
3.3 Organizatorial Measures
4 Rescue Plan, other measures for the intervention
4.1 Rescue Plan
4.2 Entry to the tunnel
4.3 Alarm plans
4.4 Equipment, training, exercises
4.5 ÖBFV-RLA-12 -05-2000
5.6.2 Eisbav: "Eisenbahn-Arbeitnehmerinnershutzverordnung" (Jun. 2001)
Verkehrs- Arbeitsinspektorat
Contents:
1. Section: General regulations
l. Area of validity
2. Danger zone
2. Section: Transport roads and workplaces near to the rails
3. Transport roads
4. Transport roads for track vehicles
5. Safe area
6. Lateral Safe distance
7, Operation space
8. Special regulations for tunnels
9. End of the rails
10. Loading ramp
11. Lighting installations
12. Crossroads with other transport vehicles on rails
3. Section: Work processes
13. Operating Instructions
14. General instructions regarding the behaviour in the danger zone of rails
15. Moving track vehicles
16. Operating the clutch
17. Behaviour on track vehicles in motion
18. Installing and securing track vehicles
19. Loading and unloading of track vehicles.
20. The use of turntable and of traverser
21. The guarding of level crossings that are similar to rails
22. Personal prevention equipment and working clothes
23. Equipment with working means
24. Employment of employees
4. Section: Supplementary provision for building work
26. Operational instructions for building work
27. Safety measures, employment of

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28. Safety control, tasks of

29. Safety control, employment of
30. Security guard, tasks of
31. Security guard, equipment of
32. Security guard, preparation of the building work
33. Behaviour in case of building work
34. Storing of work means and work materials
35. Working near points
36. Working near the danger zone of rails
5. Sections: Final regulations
37. Temporary regulations
38. Coming into force
5.6.3 "Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept Für Mittlere Tunnel" (Dec.1995).
5.6.4 OBB - Austrian Federal Ministry Of Transport - Eisenbahn –

Hochleistungsstrecken AG
Contents:
1. Introduction
2. Estimating the risk for the initial condition
2.1 Procedure
2.2 Definition of the initial condition
2.3 Initial risk
3. Examination of measures
3.1 Examined measures
3.2 Cost-efficiency of the measures.
4. Judging of the safety measures
4.1 Making the right combinations
4.2 Judging with the risk-costs-diagram
4.3 Risk-reduction with the best combination of measures.
5. Conclusions
Bibliography
Appendix:
A1 Risk analysis
A2 Examined measures
5.6.5 "Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept Für Mittlere Bestandestunnel" (Aug 1996)


Contents
1 Introduction
1.1 Initial condition
1.2 Terms
2 Methods
3 Estimating the risk for the initial condition
3.1 Procedure
3.2 Definition of the initial condition
3.3 Collective initial risk
3.4 Perceived initial risk
3.5 Division of the tunnels in risk groups
4 Planning of measures
4.1 catalogue of measures
4.2 Combination of measures for the different risk groups
5 Conclusions and outlook
Bibliography
A1 Analysis of the situation
A2 Estimating and judging of the risk
A3 Planning of measures
5.6.7 "Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept Für lange Tunnel" (Dec 1995)

Contents:
1. Introduction
1.1 Starting point
1.2 Formulation of the problem
1.3 Target
1.4 Definition
1.5 Principles
2. Methodology
4.1 Approaches to a safety planning
2.1.1 Preliminary remark
2.1.2 Empirical approach
2.1.3 Approaches orientated towards measures
2.1.4 Approaches orientated towards risks
4.2 The risk concept
2.2.1 Elements of the risk concept
2.2.2 Risk analysis

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2.2.3 Risk valuation

2.2.4 Valuation with the risk-cost-diagram
5. Risk analysis for a long tunnel
4.1. Proceeding
4.1. Risk of the existing ÖBB-Tunnels
3.2.1 The characteristics of the existing tunnels
3.2.2. Statistical basis for the risk valuation
3.2.3. Risk of the existing ÖBB-Tunnels
4.1. Risk analysis for a long tunnel
3.3.1 The characteristics of a long tunnel
3.3.2 Factors with influence on the risk
3.3.3 The risk of a long tunnel
6. Examination of the measures
4.1. Structuring of the measures
4.3. Examined measures
4.3. Valuation of the measures
4.3.1 Estimation of the costs and of the efficiency
4.3.2 Costs-efficiency of the measures
7. Valuation of the safety-measures
5.1 Creation of suitable combinations
5.2 Valuation with the risk-cost-diagram
5.2.1. Representation of the combinations in the risk-cost-diagram
5.2.2 Optimal package of measures
5.2.3 Risk reduction with the optimal package of measures
5.2.4 Measures defined useless
8. Concluding remark
6.1 Specific safety concept for tunnels
6.2 Strategic decisions regarding the railway technology for the rolling stock
6.3 Delimitation from the very long tunnels
Bibliography
Appendix
AI Risk analysis
A2 Examples for the risk valuation
A3 Examination of the measures
A4 Specific aspects of tunnel safety
5.6.9 „Richtilinien Für das Entwerfen von Bahnanlagen - Hochleistungsstrecken

(HL- Richtilinien)“
Contents
1. General remarks
1.2 Planning speed
1.3 Running speed
1.4 Electric traction
1.5 Current regulations
1.6 Accidents

1.7 Exceptional cases

2. General principles of track constructing
2.1. Principles
2.2 Speeds for tracks
2.3 Danger zone
2.4 Track constructing according to height
2.5 Points
2.6 Fields of application of a solid road
3. Acceptance of load
3.1 Permanent way/Superstructure
3.2 Construction of bridges
4. Delimitation of the internal space
4.1 Enlarged regular internal space
4.2 Sign of limit
4.3 Crossings
4.4 Maximum permissible internal space
5. Internal heights/headroom's and internal widths of the constructions
5.1 Minimum internal heights/headrooms of the construction
5.2 Reduction of the minimum internal heights/headrooms of the construction
5.3 Heightening of the minimum internal heights/headrooms
5.4 Internal width of bridge/overpass constructions
5.5 Consideration of changes of the superelevation
6. Planning of the track
6.1 General regulations
6.2 Measuring stick for the bow-half
6.3 Superelevation
6.4 Superelevation ramps
6.5 Turning bows
6.6 Change of the distance between the rails
6.7 Change of the curvature
6.8 Gradient of the rails and change of gradient
6.9 Marking
7. Section design of the free part of the track
7.1 Section design on earth constructions
7.2 Section design inside the tunnel
7.3 Section design on bridges
8. Other design principles
8.1 Use of points
8.2 Installations for electric traction
8.3 Safety installations
8.4 Telephone installations
8.5 Energy-producing technique installations
8.6 Cable routes
8.7 Soundproof measures
8.8 Operating paths
8.9 Spaces for points installation
8.10 Railway crossings
8.11 Crossings for internal use

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8.12 Planting
9. Distance between rails inside the stations
9.1 Rail distance
9.2 Distance between the track-middle and immovable objects
9.3 Elements of the sections
Attachments:
1. Railway bridges
2. Substructure
3. Regular sections for tunnels and tubs
4. Structural fire prevention in underground traffic installations
5. Track map
6. Regelquerschnitte für Tunnel und Wannen
7. Baulicher Brandschutz in unterirdischen Verkehrsbauten
8. St recken karte
5.6.10 Handbuch " Feuerwehreinsatz im Gleisbereich“
5.6.11 ÖBB - ÖBFV
Contents
Not available
5.7 UNITED KINGDOM
5.7.1 "Railway Safety Principles And Guidance, Part 2, Section A, Guidance On The
Infrastructure - Chapter 5: Tunnels" (Mar. 2002)
UK Health And Safety Executive
Contents:
Chapter 5: Tunnels
Access Points
Cross Passages
Track Surface and Side Walk-ways
Electric Traction and Power Supplies
Fire Fighting Facilities
Ventilation
Lighting
Communications
5.7.2 "System Safety Requirements for New and Re-opened Tunnels"

Railway Group Standard – Railway Safety GC/RT 5114 Draft 3f December 2002
Contents:
Part A
A1 Issue record
A2 Implementation of this document
A3 Scope of Railway Group Standards
A4 Responsibilities
A5 Health and safety responsibilities
A6 Technical content
A7 Supply
Part B
B1 Purpose
B2 Application of this document
B3 Definitions
B4 Principles
Part C
C1 Tunnel configuration for new tunnels
C2 Evacuation route to a place of relative safety
C3 Place of relative safety within or adjacent to tunnels
C4 Access and egress routes
C5 Ventilation
C6 Lighting
C7 Communications
C8 Train control
C9 Equipment control systems and control centre
C10 Requirements for derailment and/or collision protection
C11 Detection systems in tunnels
C12 Fire fighting systems in tunnels
C13 Use and storage of equipment by emergency services
C14 Materials and equipment used in tunnels
C15 Trains stranded in tunnels
C16 Tunnel structure
C17 Tunnel cross section
C18 Water management in tunnels
C19 Aerodynamic effects
C20 Noise and vibration levels
C21 Electrical hazards
C22 Measures to deter unauthorised entry
C23 Maintenance activities
C24 Provision of records
References
5.7.3 "Guidance on System Safety Requirements in New and Re-opened

Tunnels"Railway Group Guidance Note – Railway Safety GC/GN 5614 Draft 2f
December 2002

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Contents:
Part A
A1 Issue record
A2 Implementation of this document
A3 Responsibilities
A4 Health and safety responsibilities
A5 Technical content
A6 Supply
Part B
B1 Purpose
B2 Application of this document
B3 Definitions
B4 Principles
B5 Risks of incidents in tunnels
B6 Recent tunnel incidents
B7 Particular recommendations for long tunnels
B8 UIC draft leaflet
Part C
C1 Tunnel configuration for new tunnels
C2 Evacuation route to a place of relative safety
C3 Place of relative safety within or adjacent to tunnels
C4 Access and egress routes
C5 Ventilation
C6 Lighting
C7 Communications
C8 Train control
C9 Equipment control systems and control centre
C10 Requirements for derailment and/or collision protection
C11 Detection systems in tunnels
C12 Fire fighting systems in tunnels
C13 Use and storage of equipment by emergency services
C14 Materials and equipment used in tunnels
C15 Trains stranded in tunnels
C16 Tunnel structure
C17 Tunnel cross section
C18 Water management in tunnels
C19 Aerodynamic effects
C20 Noise and vibration levels
C21 Electrical hazards
C22 Measures to deter unauthorised entry
C23 Maintenance activities
C24 Provision of records
References
5.8 Spain
5.8.1 "Instrucción obras subterráneas" (01.12.1998)

Renfe – Ministirio De Fomento

Contents :
Annexe
Title I General Considerations
I.1 Objective
I.2 Essential Requirements And Field Of Application
a) Structural And Mechanical Strength And Stability
b) Safety In Case Of Fire Or Release Of Toxic Of Flammable Materials
c) Safety Of Use
I.3 Classification Of Underground Works
a) Function
b) Geometry
c) Terrain
d) Construction Method
Title II Functional Obligations
II.1 The Owner
II.2 Obligations Of The Owner
II.3 Emergencies
II.4 Approval Of Projects And Inspection Of Underground Works
Title III Project Phase Criteria
III.1 General Conditions Of Safety And Stability
III.2 Route And Layout
III.3 Geological And Geo-Technical Studies
III.4 Cross Section
III.5 Constructive Methods
III.6 Support And Tunnel Lining
III.7 Monitoring And Testing During Construction
III.8 Completed Installations
III.9 Tunnel Waste
III.10 Prevention Of Risks To Workers
III.11 Environmental Impact
III.12 Project Documents
Title IV Basic Criteria In The Construction Phase
IV.1 Ground Conditions And Construction Materials
IV.2 Construction Project Documentation
IV.3 Construction Installations
IV.4 Instrumentation
IV.5 Machinery
IV.6 Explosives
IV.7 Construction Process
IV.8 Prevention Of Worker Risks
Title V Basic Criteria For The Completed Installations And Operational Phase
V.1 General Considerations
V.2 Road Tunnels
V.3 Rail Tunnels

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5.8.2 "Medidas De Seguridad En Nuevos Tuneles Ferroviarios" (Apr. 2000)

Renfe
Contents:
1. General remarks
1.1. Contents and scope
1.2. Definition of the concepts
1.3. Classification
1.4. Safety measures
2. Civil defence
2.1. Principles
2.2. Safe areas. Escape routes
2.3. Emergency exits
2.4. Emergency lighting
2.5. Marking of escape routes
2.6. First Aid areas and access paths
2.7. Catenary
2.8. Power Supply
2.9. Fire Fighting water supply
2.10. Technical rooms and ventilation stations
2.11. Communications
2.12. Emergency telephones
2.13. Ventilation
2.14. Drainage system
2.15. Fire alarm
2.16. Gas alarm
2.17. Stations
3. Complementary explanations
3.1. Installations of fault alarm on the train
3.2. Technical restriction at the entry of the trains in the tunnel
3.3. Technical specifications of the vehicles
3.4. Measures of organization
4. Other measures
5.9 The Netherlands
5.9.1 "The Dutch Vision On Safety In Road And Rail Tunnels (Draft)" (2003)
Ministries of Transports And Of Inland Affairs.
Contents:
1. Decision planning of the safety process
2. Safety file
3. New responsibilities
4. New roles
5. Probabilistic and deterministic standards
6. Functional and performance requirements
7. Decision to open the tunnel for use
8. Safety assurance system

9. Contingency planning
10. PR, education and training
5.10 SWEDEN
5.10.1 "Säkerhet I Järnvägstunnlar, Ambitionsnivå Och Värderingsmetodik, Handbok

BVH 585.30" (01.09.1997) - Zusammenfassung Auf Englisch
Banverket
Contents:
The handbook offers a basis for objective-guided design by providing procedure for risk
evaluations, establishing criteria on the tolerable level of safety and suggesting additional
safety measures.

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5.11 Finland
5.11.1 "Technical Regulation And Guidelines For Railways: Railway Tunnels” (Oct.
2002)
RAMO – Finnish Rail Administration Board
Contents:
18 Railway Tunnels
18.1 Definitions
18.11 Tunnels
18.12 Structural parts of a tunnel
18.121 Load-bearing structures
18.122 Interior structures
18.123 Equipment installations
18.13 Tunnel's cross-sectional area
18.14 Technical systems
18.15 Tunnel description
18.2 Classifications
18.21 Classification by length
18.22 Classification by speed
18.3 General Principles Of Tunnel Planning And Design
18.31 General requirements
18.32 Planning and design stages
18.321 Stage 1 - Establishment of requirements
18.322 Stage 2 - General planning and design
18.323 Stage 3 - Constructional planning and design
18.33 Surveys
18.331 Soil surveys
18.332 Bedrock surveys
18.333 Perched -water and groundwater surveys
18.334 Environmental reports
18.34 Contents of the plan
18.341 General drawings
18.342 Dimensional, working and detail drawings and signs
18.343 Foundation engineering plan
18.344 Rock construction plan
18.345 Structural plans
18.346 Plans for technical systems
18.347 Technical rail track plans
18.348 Work phase plans
18.349 Description of the plan
18.35 Aerodynamic planning and design
18.351 Initial situation
18.352 Basis of planning
18.353 Dimensional parameters
18.354 Dimensional criteria
18.355 Dimensions of cross-sectional areas and pressure equalizing shafts
18.356 Pressure load dimensions and design of structures and equipment

18.357 Air flow velocity

18.358 Aerodynamic design of structures, damping structures
18.36 Tunnel cross-section
18.361 Normal cross-section
18.362 Cross-section and rail track geometry
18.363 Cross-section and speed category
18.37 Basis of structural design
18.371 Planning and design guidelines and regulations
18.372 Structural strength design and dimensions
18.374 Thermic design and dimensions
18.375 Fire resistance design and dimensions
18.376 Noise protection
18.377 Vibration isolation
18.38 Fittings and equipment
18.381 Rail track related equipment
18.382 Technical systems
18.383 Other equipment
18.39 Approval of plans and designs
18.4 Technical Track Related Requirements
18.41 Rail track geometry
18.42 Electrification
18.421 Electrification equipment
18.422 Requirements of rail tunnels by electrification
18.423 Requirements relating to electrification
18.431 Signals
18.432 Rail track free indicators
18.433 Traffic monitoring equipment
18.44 Rail track
18.5 Planning And Design Of Tunnel Systems
18.51 Tunnel systems
18.52 Functional/operational analysis of rail traffic
18.53 Risk analysis of rail traffic
18.54 Functional/operational requirements /31 to 39/regarding safety as well as
exceptional
and accident situations
18.55 Requirements for area layout arrangements /31 to 39/
18.56 Requirements for structures, equipment and fittings /31 to 39/
18.6 Structural Planning And Design
18.61 Rock tunnels
18.611 Surveys
18.612 Mechanical rock analyses
18.613 Planning of rock construction work
18.614 Structures
18.615 Drainage system and substructure
18.62 Concrete and steel tunnels
18.621 Extent of coverage
18.622 Guidelines for planning and design

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18.7 Technical Systems

18.71 Extensiveness of the systems
18.72 Electrical systems
18.721 Transmission and distribution of electric energy
18.722 Main and group distribution centres
18.723 Back-up power supply
18.724 Cable routes
18.73 HVAC (heating, plumbing and air-conditioning) systems
18.731 Ventilation
18.732 Sewerage
18.73 3 HVAC monitoring system
18.74 Lighting
18.741 Normal lighting
18.742 Back-up lighting
18.75 Safety and monitoring systems
18.751 Fire annunciator systems
18.752 Fire extinguishing systems
18.753 Smoke removal systems
18.754 Aerial systems
18.755 Emergency telephone systems
18.756 Video monitoring systems
18.757 Crime reporting systems
18.758 Safety lighting and sign illumination systems
18.759 Sound reproduction systems
18.76 Monitoring centres
18.8 Construction of Tunnels
18.81 Scheduling of construction
18.82 Taking electrified railway track into account
18.821 Responsibility
18.822 General documentation
18.823 Electrification and safe distances
18.824 Railway -work zone (reach)
18.825 Rail track reservations and voltage interruptions
18.826 Earthing
18.827 Effects of electrification on measuring instruments
18.828 Safety training
18.83 Structural engineering work
18.84 HVAC work
18.85 Rail track engineering work
18.86 Overhaul work on existing tunnels
18.861 Need for overhaul
18.862 Inspections and surveys
18.863 Planning of overhaul work
18.864 Overhaul work
18.87 Quality assurance
18.871 Quality systems
18.872 Responsibility, plans and measures
18.873 Verification of compliance
18.88 Taking into account environmental requirements

18.9 Maintenance of tunnels

18.91 Basic maintenance
18.911 Objectives of and responsibility for maintenance
18.912 Inspections
18.913 Structural inspection measures
18.914 Equipment and fitment inspection measures
18.915 Basic maintenance measures
18.92 Repairs
18.921 Special inspections
18.922 Measures to be taken
18.10 Documentation
18.101 Documentation of surveys and ADP instructions
18.102 Documentation of plans/designs and as-built drawings and ADP instructions
18.103 Documentation of documents and ADP instructions
5.12 USA
5.12.1 "NFPA 130 Standards For Fixed Guideway Transit And Passenger Rail
Systems 2003 Edition" (May 2003) - National Fire Association
Contents:
Chapter 1 Administration
Chapter 2 Referenced Publications
Chapter 3 Definitions
Chapter 4 General
Chapter 5 Stations
Chapter 6 Trainways
Chapter 7 Emergency Ventilation System
Chapter 8 Vehicles
Chapter 9 Vehicle Storage and Maintenance Areas
Chapter 10 Emergency Procedures
Chapter 11 Communications
Annex A Explanatory Material
Annex B Ventilation
Annex C Emergency Egress
Annex D Suggested Test Procedures for Fire Hazard Assessment
Annex E Hazard Analysis Process for Vehicles
Annex F Creepage Distance
Annex G I Informational References
Index

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Appendix 2 : Tables of Contents of Other Reference Documents
6 APPENDIX 2: TABLES OF CONTENTS OF OTHER REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

(TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH).
6.1 UIC
6.1.1 UIC Codex 779-9 “Safety In Railway Tunnels – Recommendations for safety
measures final report” (24/09/2002)
Contents:
1. Scope
2. Conclusions
2.1 General aspects of safety in tunnels
2.2 Recommended set of safety measures for new tunnels
2.2.1 Prevention of incidents
2.2.2 Mitigation of impact
2.2.3 Facilitation of escape
2.2.4 Facilitation of rescue
2.3 Implementation in existing/reopened tunnels
3. Overview of safety measures
Definitions
Annexes
A. Preliminary remarks
B. Infrastructure
C. Rolling Stock
D. Operations
E. Additional measures for very long tunnels
6.1.2. "MEASURES TO LIMIT AND REDUCE THE RISK OF ACCIDENTS IN

UNDERGROUND RAILWAY INSTALLATIONS WITH PARTICULAR
REFERENCE TO THE RISK OF FIRE AND THE TRANSPORT OF
DANGEROUS GOODS" (JUNE 1991)
Contents:
1. General
2. Definitions And Technical Terms
3.2 Rescue
3.3 Intermittent train control system
3.4 Continuous automatic train control system
3.5 RIC
3.6 RID
3.7 RIV
3.8 Intervention by train crew
3.9 Tunnel
3.10 Tunnel risk
3.11 UIC cable
3.12 Central power supply

3.13 Train busbar

3. Measures To Prevent Incidents
3.1 Operational measures
3.1.1 Restrictions on the passing of passenger and freight trains in tunnels
3.2 Vehicle design
3.2.1 Adjustment of the pressure reducing valves and other venting devices of tank
wagons
3.3 Infrastructure
3.3.1 Systematic inspection of the tunnel condition
3.3.2 Systematic inspection of the track
3.3.3 Track detection equipment
3.3.4 Power supply to separate sections of the overhead line
3.3.5 Protection against flooding
3.3.6 Speed monitoring
3.3.7 Hot running detectors
3.3.8 Wheel flat detectors
3.3.9 Lineside checking of the conformity of the load to the gauge
3.3.10 Wheel load measurement
4. Measures To Reduce The Effects Of Incidents
4.2 Vehicle design
4.2.1 Reduction of fire load; fireproofing should be taken into account in the design of
vehicles in which passengers are carried
4.2.2 Avoiding the use of materials the combustion of which produces toxic substances
and emits large amounts of smoke
4.2.3 Maintaining the movement capability of vehicles in the event of fire
4.2.4 Maintaining train control in the event of fire
4.2.5 Neutralising emergency braking in tunnels in the event of fire
4.2.6 Central facility for switching off air-conditioning in an emergency
4.3 Infrastructure
4.3.1 Fire, gas and smoke detectors in tunnels
4.3.2 Sprinkler installations in tunnels
4.3.3 Smoke extraction systems
4.3.4 Protection of wiring and cables in tunnels
5. Measures To Facilitate Escape
5.1.1 Formulation of an escape plan
5.2 Vehicle design
5.2.1 Equipping vehicles with First Aid boxes
5.2.2 Fire detectors on traction units and in coaches
5.2.3 Equipping traction units and coaches with portable fire extinguishers
5.2.4 Fire extinguishing equipment of traction units
5.2.5 Automatic fire extinguishing equipment in coaches
5.2.6 Central door locking
5.3 Infrastructure
5.3.1 Fire extinguishers in tunnels
5.3.2 Marking of escape and emergency exits (stairs)
5.3.3 Walking routes, escape routes

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5.3.4 Tunnel lighting

5.3.5 Train radio
5.3.6 Emergency exits (stairs) and escape and rescue tunnels parallel to the tunnel
6. Measures To Facilitate Rescue
6.1.1 Preparation of emergency and rescue plans
6.1.2 Advance information to public emergency services on the transport of dangerous
goods
6.1.3 Identification of loads after an accident
6.1.4 Provision of breathing apparatus for rescue teams
6.2 Vehicle design
6.2.1 Provision of tunnel rescue trains
6.3 Infrastructure
6.3.1 Helicopter landing area at tunnel entrance
6.3.2 Access roads in the vicinity of tunnel entrances and emergency exits
6.3.3 Water main (water for fire-fighting) in the tunnel
6.3.4 TV monitoring
6.2 U.N.
6.2.1 Report Of The Ad Hoc Multidisciplinary Group Of Experts On Safety In

Tunnels (Rail). (Jul. 2003)
Contents:
A. Introduction And Mandate
A.1 Introduction
A.2 Mandate Of The Ad Hoc Multidisciplinary Group Of Experts On Safety In
Tunnels (Rail)
B. General Principles Of Safety In Railway Tunnels
C. Standard And Recommended Safety Measures For New Tunnels
C.1 Prevention Of Accidents
C.2 Mitigation Of The Consequence Of Accidents
C.3 Facilitation Of Escape
C.4 Facilitation Of Rescue
D. Standard And Recommended Safety Measures For Existing Tunnels
E. Conclusions
E.1 Risks And Accidents
E.2 General Principles
E.3 Standard And Recommended Safety Measures For New Tunnels
E.4 Recommendations For Existing Tunnels
E.5 Recommendations For Interoperability Rules

6.2.2 “Questionnaire on safety in railway tunnels – Replays by different Countries”
UN Informal Documents No. 14-15-16 (Nov. 2002)
Contents:
This summary contains the tabular presentation of the replies to the questionnaire on Safety
in Railway Tunnels received by the secretariat from member Governments.
6.2.3 “A Summary of Accidents in Railway Tunnels”
UN Informal Document No. 8 (Nov. 2002)
Contents:
The document contains a summary of accident reports. Accidents have been recorded in
chronological order and each page identified by both page number and the country in which
the accident occurred together with a sequential identification number for that country
6.2.4 “Railway tunnels in Europe and North America”
UN Secretariat – Informal Document No. 7 (May 2002)
Contents:
The document contains the list of railway tunnels (longer than 1.000m), compiled by UN
Secretariat from various national and international sources. The list is intended to serve as a
reference inventory a long railway tunnels in Europe and North America.
6.2.5 “Vehicles Fire And Fire Safety In Tunnels”
UN Secretariat – Informal Document No. 9 (Sept. 2002)

Centre For Fire Safety In Transport, UK
Contents:
This paper is a copy of the article “Vehicle fires and fire safety in tunnels” by Martin Shipp,
Centre for Fire Safety in Transport, Building Research Establishment Ltd. United Kingdom,
published in the “Tunnel Management International”, Vol. 5, No.3, 2002.
• Abstract
• Introduction
• Statistics
• Fire Severity
• Railway Standards and Codes
• Road Vehicle Standards and Codes
• Ignition Scenarios

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• Fire Growth, Fire Development and Reaction to Fire

• Fire Resistance and Compartmentation
• Detection Systems
• Alarm and Warning Systems
• Smoke Control Systems
• Means of Escape, Egress Provisions (Doors, Windows or Hatches), Places of Relative
Safety and Places of Safety
• Fire Suppression and Availability of Fire Fighting Media, Fire Fighting and Fire Service
Response
• Interaction with the Infrastructure
• Possible Risk Reduction Measures
• Conclusions
• References
• Acknowledgements
6.2.6 Peut-On Garantir La Securite Des Voyageurs Dans Les Longs Tunnels
Ferroviaires ? UN Secretariat – Informal Document No. 1 (Jun 2003)
Alptransit Gothard Sa
Contents:
The aim of the document is to give an answer according to the safety measures planned for
the base tunnel of Saint Gotthard that will be the longest railway tunnel in the world with 57
km.
6.2.7 “The Safety of the Swiss railway tunnels – Analysis of the federal office of
transport” UN Informal Document N° 2 (Jun 2003)
UN – SECRETARIAT
Content:
New breakdown of Swiss rail tunnels
Railways – a safe mode of transport
Measures to promote autonomous rescue
Rapid assistance is decisive
Poor access for road vehicles
Quality of rolling stock: a safety factor
Raising the safety standard to the safety level of new tunnels

6.2.8 A "Protection against fire and other catastrophic events in railway tunnels"
UN Informal Document N° 13 (Jun 2003)

Contents :
1. Introduction
2. Fire prevention and disaster prevention in railway tunnels
2.1 Legal basis
2.2 Safety concept for railway tunnels
2.2.1 Preventive measures
2.2.2 Mitigating measures
2.2.3 Rescue concept
2.2.3.1 Self-rescue measures
2.2.3.2 Measures to be saved by another
2.2.4 Incident probability
2.3 Comparison with road tunnels
3. Guideline of the Federal Railway Office (EBA)
3.1 Tunnels according to the EBA-Guideline
3.2 Requirement of the EBA-Guideline
3.2.1 Structural Design
3.2.1.1 Principles
3.2.1.2 Maintaining fitness for function
3.2.1.3 Tunnels with only one track
3.2.1.4 Gradient
3.2.1.5 Carriageway
3.2.2 Structural installations
3.2.2.1 Safe areas, escape routes
3.2.2.2 Emergency exits
3.2.2.3 Emergency lighting
3.2.2.4 Escape-route signage
3.2.2.5 Refuge sites and access roads
3.2.2.6 Overhead lifeline
3.2.2.8 Fire fighting water supply
3.2.2.9 Auxiliary means of transport
3.2.2.11 „BOS“ radio equipment
3.2.2.12 Line communication facilities
3.2.3 Operational requirements
3.2.3.1 Division of traffic types
3.2.3.2 Requirements for rolling stock
3.2.4 Organizational measures
3.2.4.1 Train Operating Companies (TOCs)
3.2.4.2 Railway Infrastructure Companies
3.2.5 Other Measures
3.2.5.1 Operational alert and hazard prevention plan
3.2.5.2 Layout maps

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3.2.5.3 Agreements on additional requirements

3.2.5.4 Familiarising rescue staff
3.2.5.5. Exercises
4. Practising the rescue concepts
4.1 New tunnels
4.1.1 Structural design
4.1.1.1 Maintaining fitness for function
4.1.1.2 Gradient
4.1.1.3 Carriageway
4.1.2.1.1 Handrails
4.1.2.8 Fire fighting water supply
4.1.2.11 „BOS“ radio equipment
4.1.3 Operational requirements 4.1.4 Requirements for rolling stock
4.1.5 Organizational Measures
4.1.5.2 Railway Infrastructure Companies
4.1.6 Other measures
4.1.6.1 Operational alert and hazard-prevention plan
4.1.6.2 Layout maps
4.1.6.5 Exercises
4.2 Tunnels of existing high-speed-lines (SFS)
4.2.2 Rescue trains
4.2.2.1 Intervention concept
4.3 Tunnel in the old network
4.3.1 Two-way Fire-engine
4.3.1.1 Carrier vehicle
4.3.1.2 Installations for driving on the track
4.3.1.3 Fire fighting technology
4.3.1.4 Further equipment
4.3.1.5 Intervention procedure
4.4 Aimless measures
4.4.1 Fire alarm installations
4.4.2 Automatical Fire Fighting installations
4.4.3 Company Fire Brigades
5. Tunnel adaptation

5.1 Modernizing programme of the DB AG

5.1.1 Measures in tunnels of the old network
5.1.2 Measures for SFS-Tunnels
6. Conclusion
6.2.9 A "Fire Protection in transport tunnels" (Germany)

Contents:
1. Introduction
2. Aims of the examination
3. Description of selected fire incidences
4. Interpretation of the examined fire incidents
5. Results of the workshop „Tunnel safety“
6. Suggestions for increasing the passenger protection in case of fire in traffic
tunnels
7. Suggestions for revising handbooks of regulation
8. Summary
9. Bibliography
10. Appendix
6.3 AEIF – European Association for Railway Interoperability
6.3.1 Mandate for CR second priority TSIs (version04)
Contents:
1. Object
2. Terms of reference
2.1 Scope of the TSIs
2.2 Principles to be applied when developing the TSIs
3 Cost/benefit analysis
4 Safety
5 Execution of the mandate
6.4 SBB-CFF-FFS
6.4.1 "Nutzungsanforderungen an neue Eisenbahntunne“ (Mar 2001)

Use requirements for new railway tunnels“ (March 2001)
Contents:
Table of contents
1 Definition of purpose
2 Area of validity
3 Indications of valid regulations

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4 Conditions, dependencies
5 Situation, longitudinal section, Tunnel geometry
6 Tunnel extension, principles and reflections
6.1 Tunnel covering
6.2 Tunnel drainage
7. Elements of equipment
7.1 Refuges for persons
7.2 Chimneys for the building office
7.3 Additional technical spaces
7.4 Carriageway (Fb)
7.5 Train power supply, power line (EA-FI)
7.6 Cable installations (EA-K)
7.7 Low tension, electromechanical equipment (6VN)
7.8 Safety installations (SA-S)
7.9 Telecommunications installations (TG)
8 Design of the tunnel cross section
8.1 Carriageway (Fb)
8.2 Side-walks
8.3 Train power supply, power line (EA-FI)
8.4 Cable installations (EA-K)
8.5 Safety installations (SA-S)
8.6 Telecommunications installations (TC)
8.7 Drainage installations
8.8 Tunnel profile
8.9 Space for technical use
8.10 Free cross section area for aerodynamic requirements
9. Building materials and materials
9.1 Tunnel covering
9.2 Support Board for the track in case of superstructure/permanent way without
ballast
10. Protection against corrosion
11. Earthings
12. Appendix
1 Geometric requirements for the tunnel cross section:
Sheet 1: Reference systems for the measurement of the tunnel cross section
Sheet 2: Tunnel profile EBV 4 for new railway tunnels
Sheet 3: Double track tunnel with bow vault (including circle profile), EBV 4
Sheet 4: Diagram regarding the double track tunnel EBV 4
Sheet 5: One track tunnel with bow vault (including circle profile), EBV 4, v ^ 160 km/h
Sheet 6: Diagram regarding the one track tunnel EBV 4, v s 160 km/h
Sheet 7: One track tunnel with bow vault (including circle profile), EBV 4, v > 160 km/h
Sheet 8: Diagram regarding the one track tunnel EBV 4, v > 160 km/h
Sheet 9: Cross section requirements for rectangular tunnel profiles
Sheet 10: Calculation of the space for technical use
2 Procedure plan, collaboration railway technology <> Planning
3 Common advices of the supervisory authorities of Germany, Austria and
Switzerland about „Passengers security in very long railway tunnels” of the 7th
july 1992
4 Put in front box-like niches (Example)

5 Definition of the categories according to STUVA (Society for underground traffic-

installations)
6 Regulations to which will be made reference
[ ] Reference to the register of regulations in appendix 6
6.5 Alpetunnel GEIGE
6.5.1 Safety Criteria For Operation, Lyon-Turin, Base Tunnel

Contents:
1. Introduction
2. Contents of the documents
3.1. Regulations and norms
3.2. Studies on safety
3.2.1. A General remarks
3.2.2. On the basis tunnel
3.3. Conferences / Meetings
4. Big tendencies of the international context
4.1.1. Works of art
4.1.2. Traffic
4.2. A Level of the safety measures
4.2.1. Safety measures quoted in the report UICIF 4/91
4.2.2. Specific safety measures
5. General presentation of the base tunnel
5.1. The building
5.2. Traffic
6. Incidents and accidents, Used instructions, residual risk for passenger trains
6.1. Presuming feared events
6.2. Safety measures
6.3. Planned safety levels
7. Organization of self-rescue and of rescue for passenger trains
7.1. General aspects
7.2. Passenger evacuation in the case of fire and smoke inside the tunnel
7.3. Rescue scenarios
7.3.1. Context
7.3.2. Scenario n°l : Interruption/detachment of the air line
7.3.3. Scenario n°2 : Train stops in the tunnel with a burning engine (at the end of the train)
7.3.4. Scenario n°3 : Derailment with injured persons
7.3.5. Synthesis
7.4. Examining adequate and inadequate behaviours of the passengers
8. Non-passenger trains
8.1. Normal freight trains and combined freight trains without dangerous goods.
8.1.1. Presuming feared events
8.1.2. Management of feared events
8.2. Railway motorway shuttles
8.2.1. Repetition of the concept

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8.2.2. Specific risks of the railway motorway

8.2.3. Procedures of guardianship of presumed safety
8.3. Dangerous goods
8.3.1. Specific risks of dangerous goods
8.3.2. Presumed orientations
9. Conclusions
9.1. Comparison with the big tendencies
9.1.1. A Consistency level of the projects
9.1.2. A Level of safety measures
9.2. General comments
10. Future studies
Index of the plates Index of the
tables
Attachments
Attachment 1: The international context
Attachment 2 : Safety measures in the base tunnel / summary tables
Attachment 3 : Valuation of the probability that the feared events could happen
Attachment 4 : Suggestion of a plan for safety instructions of the base tunnel
6.6 RFF
6.6.1 Safety Principles for New Long Tunnels for Freight and the Rail Motorway
Contents:
1. All safety answers to 4 generic principles
2. Fundamental principles for long tunnels
3. Means of satisfying these principles
4. Examples of concrete application
Conclusion
6.6.2 Official Policy for Making Existing Tunnels Safer During Renovation and/or
Widening Work on the National Railway Network
Contents:
1. Purpose
2. Scope
3. Objectives to be satisfied
4. A general/generic requirement
4.1 Improving passenger routing
4.2 Improving work conditions for rescue operations
5. Nature of the work
6. Estimate of costs induced during regeneration operations
Conclusion

6.7 DB
6.7.1 "Fire Disaster Control On The Cologne-Frankfurt New Build Line"

Contents:
1 Introduction
2 Averting Hazards on the Cologne-Fankfurt new-build line
2.1 Open line
2.2 Railway tunnels
2.2.1 Legal basis
2.2.2 The safety concept for tunnels
2.2.2.1 Preventive measures
2.2.2.2 Mitigating measures
2.2.2.3 Rescue concept
2.2.3 Incident probability
2.2.4 Comparison with road tunnels
3. Putting the rescue concept into practice
3.1 Structural design
3.1.1 Principles
3.1.2 Maintaining fitness for function
3.1.3 Gradient
3.1.4.1.1 Handrails
3.1.4.8 Water supply for fire-fighting
3.1.4.11 "BOS" radio equipment
3.2 Operational requirements
3.2.1 Requirements for rolling stock
3.2.2 Organisational measures
3.2.2.1.1 DBAG's special self-rescue concept
3.2.2.2 Railway Infrastructure Managers
3.2.3 Other Measures
3.2.3.1 Operational alert and hazard-prevention plan
3.2.3.2 Layout maps
3.2.3.5 Exercises

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3.2.3.5.1 Exercise scenarios

3.2.3.5.2 Conclusions from exercises
4 Managing emergencies
4.1 Operative emergency management
4.2 Reporting and alerting procedures; Emergency Control Centres
5 Concluding remarks
6.8 BBT
6.8.1 "Sicurezza Nelle Grandi Gallerie Di Base Alpine: Brenner Basis Tunnel"
(Oct. 2001)
Contents:
1. Synthesis
Structural interventions
Ventilation
Exercise criteria and emergency intervention criteria
Homogeneity of emergency intervention criteria
First priority of the rescue operations – mutual help of the trains
Standardization of the rolling stock for an inter-operating
2. Aims and contents of the report
3. General features of the projects
3.1 The projects in brief
3.1.1 Saint Gotthard Tunnel
3.1.2 Lòtschberg Tunnel
3.1.3 Mtd'Ambin Tunnel
3.1.4 Brenner Tunnel
4. Security principles
4.1 Danger and risk
4.2 Protection aims
4.2.1 SaintGotthard Tunnel
4.2.3 Mt d'Ambin Tunnel
5. Security measures
5.1 Simplicity and toughness
5.2 Preventive interventions
5.3 Minimizing interventions
5.4 Ventilation/cooling

5.4.3 Mtd'Ambin Tunnel

5.4.5 Comparison
5.5 Rolling stock
5.6 Organizational interventions and exercise interventions
5.6.1 Maintaining
5.6.2 Rescue
Attachment 1 Alarm plans and rescue
Attachment 2 Norms and e regulations
6.9 Denmark
6.9.1 The Great Belt Link

BaneDanmark – Danish National Railway Agency
Contents:
Safety equipments, engineering solutions and emergency escape procedure applied in the
tunnel.
6.10 The Netherlands
6.10.1 Integraal Veiligheidsplan Hsl-Zuid

Hsl-Zuid
Contents:
Not available
6.10.2 Memo Brandcurve Hsl-Zuid

Hsl-Zuid
Contents:
Not available
6.10.3 Beveiligingsconcept Hsl-Zuid, Teile A, B1, B2, B3

Hsl-Zuid
Contents:
Not available

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6.10.4 "High Speed Line South: Safety Concept- Green Heart Tunnel"
Government of Netherlands
Contents:
• Introduction
• Safety above all
• Safety in tunnels
• Fire prevention
• Fire detection and fire control
• Emergency stop in a safe place
• The emergency brake
• Essential running conditions
• Catenary
• Traffic operations
• From prevention and operation measures
• Self evacuation facilities
• Safe and fast get off
• A safe escape route
• A safe Location
• Control of atmosphere
• Training and instruction
• Emergency assistance and follow-up care
• Conclusion
6.11 UFT (SWISS FEDERAL OFFICE OF TRANSPORT)
6.11.1 Rapport Final Sur La Securite Dan Le Tunnels Ferroviaires Suisses

Final Report about the Security of the Swiss Railway Tunnels
Contents :
Table of contents
A Summary
B Bases
1. Introduction
1.1 Mandate
1.2 Aims of the study
2 General remarks regarding the tunnel safety
2.1 Railway tunnels safety
2.2 Incident analysis, comparison between tunnels and open roads
2.3 Comparison between road traffic and railway traffic
2.4 Alpine Railway Transit tunnels
3 Practice
3.1 The examined tunnels
3.2 Development

3.3 Tunnel classification

3.4 Data
C The Swiss railway tunnels (evaluation)
1 Horizon tour / appreciation
1.1 Horizon tour
1.2 Division in categories
2 General evaluation
2.1 Tunnel systems and road width
2.2 Length
2.3 Age and state of the construction
2.4 Traffic (proportions / composition)
3 Evaluation of the self-rescue possibilities
3.1 Length of the rescue routes
3.2 Rescue route equipment
4 Evaluation of the support in case of rescue by others
4.1 Tunnel accessibility
4.2 Intervention services
4.3 Communication infrastructure
4.4 Intervention Planning (current state)
5 Rolling stock (current state)
7.1 General remarks
7.2 Example: new rolling stock for the Vereina tunnel
6 Passenger information (current state)
7 Car transport (current state)
7.3 Specific safety measures
7.4 Special safety problems
7.5 Car transport between Kandersteg and Iselle
D Measures
1 Introduction
1.1 General remarks
1.2 Already planned measures for concrete works
1.3 Legal bases
2 Measure catalogue
2.1 Measures for avoiding incidents
2.2 Measures for reducing the incidents proportions
2.3 Measures for making easier self-rescue
2.4 Measures for making easier the rescue by others
2.5 Measures regarding the rolling stock
2.6 Measures regarding the passengers information
2.7 Special immediate measure deriving from the regulation according to very big
incidents
(planning and intervention plans)
2.8 Specific measures for car transport
2.9 Special measures for tunnels of two countries
E Proposed procedure and conclusions
1 Enrichment of the database of tunnels
2 Application of measures
2.1 General remarks

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2.2 Measures regarding the infrastructure, exploitation and organization

2.3 Measures regarding the rolling stock
2.4 Measures regarding passengers information
2.5 Special immediate measure deriving from the OPAM (planning and intervention
plans)
2.6 Specific measures for car transport
2.7 Special measures for tunnels of two countries
2.8 Costs and financing of the measures
3 Conclusions
Attachments
A1 Tunnel list
A2 List of the abbreviations of the railway companies
A3 Questionnaire
A4 “Not recommended” measures
A5 Example of an information file, given to the train passengers (Danish railways,
DSB)

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Technical Report – Part 2

Fire Safe Design – rail

2 Comprehensive list of safety measures 179

3 Matrix of guidelines contents 181

4 Detailed comparison 184

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’

4.3 Safety equipment 200

5 Appendix 1: Tables of contents of national guidelines

6 Appendix 2: Tables of contents of other reference documents

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’

1 LIST OF COLLECTED GUIDELINES

The first level of reporting is a list of the documents including:

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

1.1 Table of references (national# Guidelines)

“Linee guida per la realizzazione del piano generale di Oct. Guideline

“Linee guida per l’elaborazione del piano interno di Jun. Guideline

Linee guida per il tracciamento e la posa in opera di sistemi di Apr. Guideline

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 157/329

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 158/329

Germany [1] Richtlinie Jul. Guideline

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 159/329

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 160/329

[5] Richtilinien für das Entwerfen von Bahnanlagen Guideline

[6] Handbuch „Feuerwehreinsatz im Gleisbereich“ Manual

**** Specific methodology for

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 161/329

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 162/329

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 163/329

1.2 Table of references (other reference documents)

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 164/329

Organisation Title Reference Date Administrative status Comments

AEIF Mandate for CR second priority TSIs (version Jun.

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels 165/329

Organisation Title Reference Date Administrative status Comments

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 166/329

1.3 Analytical summaries (national# guidelines)

Ministry of the Interior, FS S.p.A., National Fire Brigade Corp.

1.3.1.2 Criteri progettuali per la realizzazione di piazzali di emergenza, le strade di accesso e

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 168/329

1.3.1.8 RFI circular n° rfi/tdr/a1007/p/01/000512 del 17.12.2001: “Standard di sicurezza per

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

Swiss Federal Office of Transport

1.3.2.2 Railway regulation: application rules, 01.01.1994

(Swiss Federal Railways).

1.3.2.3 Weisung I-AM-EB-31/00: Sichereit in bestehenden tunnels,

(Swiss Federal Railways).

1.3.2.4 Ausfuhrungsbestimmungen zur Eisenbahnverordnung, 01.2001

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 170/329

1.3.3.1 Leitfaden für den Brandschutz in Personenverkehrsanlagen der Eisenbahnen des

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

1.3.3.2 Anforderungen der DB Station&Service AG an den Brandschutz in

Deutsche Bahn AG (DB)

1.3.4.1 Instruction technique interministérielle relative à la sécurité dans les tunnels

Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transportes et du Logement

1.3.4.2 Décret relatif a la sécurité' du réseau ferre national (30.05.2000)

Ministère de l’Equipement, des Transportes et du Logement

Technical report Part 2 ‘Fire Safe Design – railway tunnels’ 172/329

1.3.5.1 Substructure, regulations for new lines, tunnels –

Thematic Network Fire in Tunnels

1.3.6.2 Eisbav: Eisenbahn-ArbeitnehmerInnershutzverordnung

1.3.6.3 Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für mittlere Tunnel

OBB- Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport - Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG

1.3.6.4 Allgemeines Sicherheitskonzept für mittlere Bestandestunnel

OBB- Austrian Federal Minstry of Transport - Eisenbahn – Hochleistungsstrecken AG