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Boracay Foundation, Inc. v.

Province of Aklan
G.R. No. 196870, June 26, 2012
FACTS:
Claiming that tourist arrivals to Boracay would reach 1 million in the future, respondent Province of
Aklan planned to expand the port facilities at Barangay Caticlan, Municipality of Malay. Thus, on May 7, 2009,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aklan Province issued a resolution, authorizing Governor Carlito Marquez to
file an application with respondent Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) to reclaim the 2.64 hectares of
foreshore area in Caticlan. In the same year, the Province deliberated on the possible expansion from its
original proposed reclamation area of 2.64 hectares to forty (40) hectares in order to maximize the utilization
of its resources.
After PRAs approval, on April 27, 2010, respondent Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Environmental Management Bureau-Region VI (DENR-EMB RVI) issued to the Province
Environmental Compliance Certificate-R6-1003-096-7100 (the questioned ECC) for Phase 1 of the
Reclamation Project to the extent of 2.64 hectares to be done along the Caticlan side beside the existing jetty
port.
On May 17, 2010, the Province finally entered into a MOA with PRA which stated that the land use
development of the reclamation project shall be for commercial, recreational and institutional and other
applicable uses. It was at this point that the Province deemed it necessary to conduct a series of public
consultation meetings.
On the other hand, the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan, the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Malay and petitioner Boracay Foundation, Inc. (BFI), an organization composed of some 160
businessmen and residents in Boracay, expressed their strong opposition to the reclamation project on
environmental, socio-economic and legal grounds.
Despite the opposition, the Province merely noted their objections and issued a notice to the contractor
on December 1, 2010 to commence with the construction of the project. Thus, on June 1, 2011, BFI filed with
the Supreme Court the instant Petition for Environmental Protection Order/Issuance of the Writ of
Continuing Mandamus. Thereafter, the Court issued a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
and ordered the respondents to file their respective comments to the petition.
The Petition was premised on the following grounds, among others:
a) the Province failed to obtain the favorable endorsement of the LGU concerned;
b) the Province failed to conduct the required consultation procedures as required by the Local
Government Code (LGC).
The Province responded by claiming that its compliance with the requirements of DENR-EMB RVI and
PRA that led to the approval of the reclamation project by the said government agencies, as well as the recent
enactments of the Barangay Council of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Malay
favorably endorsing the said project, had categorically addressed all the issues raised by the BFI in its
Petition. It also considered the Petition to be premature for lack of cause of action due to the failure of BFI to
fully exhaust the available administrative remedies even before seeking judicial relief.
ISSUES:
WON the petition is premature because petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
filing this case?
WON there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project?
RULING:
On the issue of prematurity due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies
The Court held that the petition is not premature for failing to exhaust administrative remedies and to
observe the hierarchy of courts as claimed by the respondents.
The Court reiterated their ruling in Pagara v. Court of Appeals where they clarified that the rule
regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable where, among
others, there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention such as in the instant case. The

rule may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy or where the
protestant has no other recourse.
Meanwhile, the new Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, provides a relief
for petitioner under the writ of continuing mandamus, which is a special civil action that may be availed of to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law and which provides for the issuance of a TEPO
as an auxiliary remedy prior to the issuance of the writ itself.
The writ of continuing mandamus allows an aggrieved party to file a verified petition in the proper
court when any government agency or instrumentality or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty xxx in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, xxx and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Such proper court may be the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territory where the actionable neglect or omission occurred, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court.
Here, the Court found that BFI had no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law to determine the questions of unique national and local importance raised that pertain to laws and rules
for environmental protection.
Moreover, the writ of continuing mandamus permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in
order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the courts decision and, in order
to do this, the court may compel the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government
agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its decision.
On the issue of whether or not there was proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for
the project
The Court found that there was no proper, timely, and sufficient public consultation for the project.
The Local Government Code (LGC) establishes the duties of national government agencies in the
maintenance of ecological balance and requires them to secure prior public consultations and approval of local
government units. In Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary, the Court emphasized that, under the Local
Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and
ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. The absence of either of
such mandatory requirements will render the projects implementation as illegal.
Here, the Court classified the reclamation project as a national project since it affects the environmental
and ecological balance of local communities. In one ruling, the Court noted that such national projects
mentioned in Section 27 of the LGC include those that may cause pollution and bring about climate change,
among others, such as the reclamation project in this case.
Also, DENR DAO 2003-30 provides that project proponents should initiate public consultations early
in order to ensure that environmentally relevant concerns of stakeholders are taken into consideration in the
EIA study and the formulation of the management plan.
Thus, the law requires the Province, being the delegate of the PRAs power to reclaim land in this case,
to conduct prior consultations and prior approval. However, the information dissemination conducted months
after the ECC had already been issued was insufficient to comply with the requirements under the LGC.
Furthermore, the lack of prior public consultation and approval is not corrected by the subsequent
endorsement of the reclamation project by the Sangguniang Barangay of Caticlan and the Sangguniang Bayan
in 2012, which were both undoubtedly achieved at the urging and insistence of the Province.

G.R. No. 207257

February 3, 2015

HON. RAMON JESUS PAJE, in his capacity as DENR Secretary v. Hon. Teodoro Casino, et al.
Facts
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate for a
proposed coal-fired power plant at Subic, Zambales to be implemented by RP Energy.
Hon. Teodoro Casino and a number of legislators filed a Petition for Writ of Kalikasan against RP energy,
SBMA, and Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR secretary on the ground that actual environmental damage will
occur if the power plant project is implemented and that the respondents failed to comply with certain laws and
rules governing or relating to the issuance of an ECC and amendments thereto.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition for the Writ of Kalikasan and invalidated the ECC. Both the DENR
and Casino filed an appeal, the former imputing error in invalidating the ECC and its amendments, arguing
that the determination of the validity of the ECC as well as its amendments is beyond the scope of a Petition for
a Writ of kalikasan; while the latter claim that it is entitled to a Writ of Kalikasan.
Issues
1.

Whether the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan; and

2.

Whether the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan


Ruling

1.

Yes, the parties may raise questions of fact on appeal on the issuance of a writ of Kalikasan because the
Rules on the Writ of kalikasan (Rule 7, Section 16 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)allow the
parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of a writ
of kalikasan.

2.

Yes, the validity of an ECC can be challenged via a writ of Kalikasan because such writ is principally
predicated on an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,
which involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial boundaries.
A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC
must not only allege and prove such defects or irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a
reasonable connection between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the action re-filed
before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
In the case at bar, no such causal link or reasonable connection was shown or even attempted relative to the
aforesaid second set of allegations. It is a mere listing of the perceived defects or irregularities in the issuance of
the ECC.

Cruz vs Secretary of DENR


Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers,
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law
that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership
over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA
to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are
private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed
irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs
of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

Former Justice Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the Republic Act No. 8371 or the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA Law) on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein,
in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law
basically enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources.
In addition, Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and
ancestral lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law also violate the rights of private landowners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Supreme Court deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote.
They deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the constitutionality of the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include
public domain somehow against the regalian doctrine.

Lina v. Pao
G.R. No. 129093, August 30, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
Facts:
Private respondent Tony Calvento, was appointed agent by PCSO to install a terminal for the operation
of lotto, applied for a mayors permit to operate a lotto outlet in San Pedro, Laguna. It was denied on the
ground that an ordinance entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna prohibited gambling in the province, including the operation of lotto. With the denial of his
application, private respondent filed an action for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent enjoining
petitioners from implementing or enforcing the subject resolution.
Issue:
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a
mayors permit based thereon are valid
Held:
No. The questioned ordinance merely states the objection of the council to the said game. It is but a
mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid
ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policy statement expressing
the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments
autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to
exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against
laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not
be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
Moreover, ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of
the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been
conferred on them by Congress. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. The question of whether gambling should be permitted is for
Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO
to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the
province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something
already allowed by Congress.

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