FIRST DIVISION

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO

P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B.
OCON,
Petitioners,

- versus -

G.R. No. 158763

Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:

VIRGILIO M. TULIAO,
March 31, 2006
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE,
and it is hereby ordered:

1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated
September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint
Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two
(2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent
Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 363524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and
REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated
July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding
Judge WilfredoTumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered
REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to
ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private
respondents Jose Pempe Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3
Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.[2]

The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan,

Ramon, Isabela,

which

were

later

identified

as

the

dead

bodies

of

Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is
now under the witness protection program.

Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1
Ferdinand Marzan,

SPO1

Ruben

B.

Agustin,

SPO2

Alexander Micu,

SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Santiago City.

The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of
Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts
of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that
time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review
where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April

2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz
and Amado Doe,

as

the

persons

responsible

for

the

deaths

of

Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.

Respondent Tuliao filed

criminal

complaint

for

murder

against

petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession
of

SPO2 Maderal.

On 25

June

2001,

Acting

Presiding

Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and

SPO2 Maderal.

On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary

investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.

In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted
the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on
the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the
motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners
appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of
Justice.

On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took

over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of
Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of
arrest issued against petitioner Miranda.He likewise applied this Order to
petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State
Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of
the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion
for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the
prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.

On

25

October

2001,

respondent Tuliao filed

petition

for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of
Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and
22 October 2001.

On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the

prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution,
Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court
took note of respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15
November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the
petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.

Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent
in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghaddeliberately and willfully committed
contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder. On 21 November 2001,
we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to
it of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.

On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision

granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the
RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against
petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this
Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.

Hence, this petition.

The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court
the following assignments of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing
and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghaddated August 17,
2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in
criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming
and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any
judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of
Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of
arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in
the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of
Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants
of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having
become final and executory.

Adjudication of a motion to quash a

warrant of arrest requires neither
jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body
of the accused.

The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of
Appeals ruling that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to
the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be
acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through
his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the
court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person
that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.
Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must
first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his
petition for judicial reliefs.[3]

Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners
Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not
yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their Urgent
Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or
quash warrants of arrest.[4]
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction
over the person of the accused is required only in applications for
bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their
person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for
their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court
by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.

In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of
applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar
Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other
relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case
was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the
accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA
307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance
pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs. Executive
Secretary (301 SCRA 102[5]), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for
lack of probable cause.[6]

In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already
acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion,petitioners invoke our
pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez[7]:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the
merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the
exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is
intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same
cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the
judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the

law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the
court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication

of other reliefssought by the defendant where the mere application therefor

constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.[8] Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender,[9] while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his
arrest or voluntary appearance.[10] One can be under the custody of the law but not
yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the
warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over
his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an
accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.[11] Being in the custody of
the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will
and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.[12] Custody of
the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not
limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,[13] cited by the Court of Appeals
should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application
for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire
paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that
court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of
the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused
before considering the application for bail.[14]

While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we

clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. [15] As we held in the aforecited case

of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal

proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special
requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano
v. Pasicolan,[16] we held that [t]he purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it
would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law. The
rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to
the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.[17]
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking
affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission
of ones person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings
whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which
only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included; [18] (2) in criminal cases,
motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person
of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are
consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the
fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the
person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of
arrest.

To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over

the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special
jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore,
in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the
processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the
person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody
of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule
applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no
requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best
illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in
the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the
jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for
bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the
person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno,[19] on the prayer of the accused in a petition for
certiorari on the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest
and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case
and, instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[20] upon the accuseds Motion to
Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and

desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the
issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,[21] on the prayer of the accused in a
petition for certiorari on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the
criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest.

We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in

applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we
allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable
that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude
being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven
guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons
not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely
entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who
issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the
Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the
records of the case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the
warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be
enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night. [22] Furthermore, the
continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of
probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.

In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise

incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human
rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,
[23]

demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its

taking and not after.

Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a
subsequently filed petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice and based on
doubts engendered by the political
climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of
Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal
cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued
by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of
Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the
political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutors resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this
Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding
with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner
Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of
Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest

on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, x x x prudence dictates

(that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper.[24]
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to
charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he
issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might,
in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the Secretary of
Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the
warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of
the prosecutors resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,[25] we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as
premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that
they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice.Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners
herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of
arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked
and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the
above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of
Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited
decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the
arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in
the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose PempeMiranda.[26]

Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as

having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.[27]

However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the
supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of
probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the
petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that
the determination of probable cause was based on the certification, under oath, of
the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally made by the Judge. No
presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly and
clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification.[28]

Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such

indication that he relied solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order
even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court
proceeded to determine the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating
the records x x x.[29]

The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was
accompanied by supporting documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v.
Felix[30] and People v. Inting.[31] The supporting documents are the following:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;

Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and
Reynaldo de la Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
41 in Criminal Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.

Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part
of Judge Tumaliuan of Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad,
however, focused on the substantive part of said section, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad ruled that the
confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was
given after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation;
(2) it was given by someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a
fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in exchange for an obvious reward of
discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the election period
amidst a politically charged scenario where Santiago City voters were pitted
against each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City
Mayor Amelita S.

Navarro,

and

allegedly

that

of

DENR

Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other.[32]

We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to
disturb the findings of probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.

It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a

witness is not within the province of the determination of probable cause. As we
held in Webb[33]:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the
suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put
in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than bare
suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify x x x conviction. A
finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a
pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined
in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.

Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of

a decision of this Court in another case
with different accused constitutes grave
abuse of discretion.

Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other
things, that there was a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution
before the Secretary of Justice. However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the
prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad summarily dismissed the two criminal cases
against the petitioners on the basis of the following explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et
al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila, and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed
to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him and the other police officers as the
direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court absolving
the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a narration of
falsehood and lies and that because of the decision acquitting said officers who
were likewise falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001
statements, it is now beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable

value. This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use
is Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions
evidence presented and adduced in Criminal Case No. 97160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these two (2) cases but
with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his
statements is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated
October 18, 2001, praying for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder
charges in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in People of the
Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the accused
therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in
that case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose
Miranda are ordered dismissed.[34]

This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our
decision and interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large
when the evidence of the prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision,
even of this Court, acquitting the accused therein of a crime cannot be the basis of
the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for the same crime. The
blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our decision
in Leao was based on reasonable doubt.We never ruled in Leao that the crime did
not happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused therein, since the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial
evidence, which interestingly is not even the situation in the criminal cases of the
petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness: Rodel Maderal. The
accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son, whereas
petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.

It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable

doubt in Leao, it is now beyond doubt that RodelMaderal made untruthful,
fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is without probable
value.[35] On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in Leao, an
acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the
prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets
the criteria of probable cause.

We

cannot

let

unnoticed,

too,

Judge Anghads dismissal

of

the informations two days after we resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a
temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further proceeding with the
case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While the
dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary
restraining order, such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts
resolve to issue a TRO against Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the
motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily
carries with it the reinstatement of the
orders set aside by the nullified
proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did
not recall or reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead
directed Judge Anghad to issue apparently new warrants of arrest.[36] According to
the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of Appeals to have done so, without a
personal determination of probable cause.

We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants
of arrest or merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by
Judge Tumaliuan is merely a matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy
whereof should not be allowed to affect the dispositions on the merits, especially in
this case where the other dispositions of the Court of Appeals point to the other
direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001 Order of
Judge Tumaliuan,[37] which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of
Appeals

likewise

declared

the

proceedings

conducted

by

Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of nullity of proceedings should be

deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by the nullified
proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been
nullified; therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants
of arrest based on a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally
permissible for them to do so. The records of the preliminary investigation had
been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also available to this Court,
allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the
records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we
have ruled in Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination
of probable cause does not rest on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in
those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause of the judges therein on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also overrule the
decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion.

There is no double jeopardy in the

reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed
before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No.
36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the order of dismissal issued therein had
become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of
Judge Anghad dated November 14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which
were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus
and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals. As
carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following
Orders issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.)
2.)
3.)
4.)

Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

Order dated September 21, 2001;
Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.

Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad,
which ultimately dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT
included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint Orders. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint Order
of November 14, 2001.[38]

Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this
Court. The Court of Appeals decided the case because we referred the same to
them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition was filed on 25 October
2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order.Upon receipt of the
14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with
this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that
Judge Anghad deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he

issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing

the informations for murder. On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the
Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in
Contempt places the 14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case
decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming that Judge Anghad committed
contempt

of

this

Court

in

issuing

the 14

November

2001 Order,

respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than
grave abuse of discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order
on 15 November 2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November
2001 Resolution. In said 12 November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a
temporary restraining order enjoining Judge Anghad from further proceeding with
the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond in the amount
of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing
as disobedience to lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases
of indirect contempt which require the granting of opportunity to be heard on the
part of respondent,[39]the prayer to cite public respondent in contempt and for
other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be construed to include a
prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.

In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does
not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the
accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case
was dismissed.[40]
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well
as in his motion to cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further
proceeding with the case, we hold that the number of instances of abuse of
discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent bias on the part of
Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1 Leao,[41] by
transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City
of Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December
2002 and the Resolution dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 363524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC
of the City of Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of
the cases within ten (10) days after receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is
likewise directed to report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10)
days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the
criminal cases within ten (10) days from the transfer;

4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report

to this Court compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days
from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act
on said cases with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith
warrants of arrest for the apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda,
Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and accused Rodel T. Maderal,
conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Sergio L. Pestao with Acting Presiding Justice (now Supreme Court Associate
Justice) Cancio C. Garcia and Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 109-110.
[3]
Id., p. 103.
[4]
Id.
[5]
This should have been 301 SCRA 298.
[6]
Oscar Herrera, REMEDIAL LAW, Vol. IV, pp. 38-39 (2001 ed.).
[7]
G.R. Nos. 99289-90, 27 January 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 643.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115407, 28 August 1995, 247 SCRA 741,
750; Dinapol v. Baldado, A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, 5 August 1993, 225 SCRA 110, 116-117. In some
jurisprudence, voluntary surrender is termed as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrender to the proper authorities.
[10]
Layosa v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-46080, 10 November 1978, 86 SCRA 300, 303; People v. Umbrero, G.R. No.
93021, 8 May 1991, 196 SCRA 821, 829.
[11]
This is because of the rule that jurisdiction, once acquired, attaches until the final disposition of the case. In such
a situation, the escapees right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses are deemed waived by

his failure to appear during the trial of which he has notice (Gimenez v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-37933, 15
April 1988, 160 SCRA 1, 5).
[12]
See Larranaga v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 75, 88-89 (1998).
[13]
A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, 6 November 1992, 215 SCRA 421.
[14]
Id., at 424.
[15]
Sapugay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86792, 21 March 1990, 183 SCRA 464, 471.
[16]
Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 112 Phil. 781, 783 (1961).
[17]
Paderanga v. Court of Appeals, supra note 9, p. 749. This is what the Court of Appeals erroneously rephrased just
before quoting Pico. Cf. note 1.
[18]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 15, Section 20.
[19]
G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192, 198.
[20]
324 Phil. 568, 590 (1996).
[21]
361 Phil. 251, 284 (1999).
[22]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Section 6.
[23]
Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Orga. v. Phil. Blooming Mills Inc., 151-A Phil. 656, 676 (1973).
[24]
Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, rollo, p. 204.
[25]
317 Phil. 758, 796 (1995).
[26]
Joint Order dated 17 October 2001, rollo, p. 196.
[27]
CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 2.
[28]
Petitioners Memorandum, rollo, pp. 477-478.
[29]
Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order dated 6 July 2001, rollo, p. 193.
[30]
G.R. Nos. 94054-57, 19 February 1991, 194 SCRA 292, 300.
[31]
G.R. No. 88919, 25 July 1990, 187 SCRA 788, 792.
[32]
Joint Order dated 17 August 2001, rollo pp. 197-201.
[33]
Webb v. De Leon, supra note 25, pp. 675-676.
[34]
Joint Order dated 14 November 2001, rollo, pp. 271-272.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Petitioners Memorandum, rollo, p. 493.
[37]
Rollo, pp. 150-151.
[38]
Id., pp. 498-499.
[39]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Section 3 (b) and (c).
[40]
People v. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454, 21 December 1990, 192 SCRA 548, 553.
[41]
419 Phil. 241 (2001).

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.

The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding

Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable
FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice),
JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON,
RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P.
LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities as
members of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than
Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an
unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already been rendered by
many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry
sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is under our
Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been
proved. Like any other person accused of an offense, he is entitled to the
full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent
judge denying his motion to quash the informations for rape with homicide
filed against him and six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any
other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment
from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the
filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner

Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty.
Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to
the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente
Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of
August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by
Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and
the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and
taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his
arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant
was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to
Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L.
Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion,
Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued
a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in
connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his
apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of
justice because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of
the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one
of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of
the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to
respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.

On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include

the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations
substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13,
1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion.
Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should
be quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the
preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to
conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court
has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with
seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza
and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the
offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we
required a Reply from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of five
days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court may consider his non-compliance an implied
admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a
ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss
his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.

The Preliminary Investigation.

The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the
petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present
counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the
presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut
or countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez
is concerned, We are not going to submit any counter-affidavit.

ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:

xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any
counter-affidavit because we believe there is
nothing to rebut or countermand with all these
statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counteraffidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses
who will come up soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito
Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August
27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the
petitioner's counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the
sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could
submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The following
exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn
statement of witness Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and
the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio Malabanan y
Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again
waiving the submission of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.

ACSP Zuo:
So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio
Sanchez is concerned, this case is submitted for
resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent
manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest
held on August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavits
sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with
their supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the abovequoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on
August 13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty.
Panelo as his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet
and let this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy
Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his
representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if
the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the
evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary
investigation 5, so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his
defense.

At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does

not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same
defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the
case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court
may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation
and hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar,
however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her
factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.

Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings
conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His
claim is that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the investigation of
all cases involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.

The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of

R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any
public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the case
of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged."

Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended

information filed in this case needed the approval of the
Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and
amended information here did not have the approval of the
Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval
was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545
(1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to
investigate charges of illegal or omissions on the part of any
public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must,
however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to
investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official"
(191 SCRA at 550) is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense here
charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement
of the office of the Ombudsman in the present case does not
have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the
panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or
amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the
Department of Justice, in connection with the charge of sedition, 10 and the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases, 11 may conduct the
investigation,

The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the
taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest

is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his

voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint
or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be
an intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent
onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by
virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting
him to appear at the said camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board

13

this Court declared:

Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an

invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions,
which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain
circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume
a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from
a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military
officers issued at a time when the country has just emerged
from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the
designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can
be easily taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it
purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one can
only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official
and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp.
Although in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order
of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact,
apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in
informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch
him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a
"custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally
arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.

It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was
placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and
Malabanan as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state
witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escapes from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the
petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rapeslay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal
knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of
the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover,
as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June
29, 1993, or forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said
that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was
arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on

August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the
rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the
trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If,
as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash,
he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his
person to the jurisdiction of that court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully
arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L.
Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637
for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest for the rape-slay
cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.

The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and
the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person
invalidly detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him
the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule
102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it

appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality
or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything
in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of
a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by
virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a new warrant specifically
naming her had been issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the
respondents, the Court said:

The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch

as the new warrant of arrest complies with the requirements of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding the particular
description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant
was unquestionably void, being a general warrant, release of
the petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will be
followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and
valid warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just have
left. This Court will not participate in such a meaningless
charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court,

17

more

recently in the Umil case. 18

The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate
homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not
have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape,
the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each
rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many
crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape,
thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus,
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape,
loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a
new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an
constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with
homicide with a specific penalty which is in the highest degree,
i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of
the application of the death penalty by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must

charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A.
4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven
accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation
of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the
seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other
six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus
silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually
raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the
petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed
against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the
killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were
committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying
of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a
suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own
petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the noninclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must
also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in
his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to
include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient
evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the

part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave
abuse of such discretion. 20

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the

Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the
Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and
absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a

grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts
of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such
exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. 22 Moreover,
before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the
same case must first avail itself of other adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such
inclusion. 23

At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have

been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner
and his co-accused should also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were
incumbent public officials or employees at the time of the alleged
commission of the crimes, the cases against them should come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This
contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same
for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861,
provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code:

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public

officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a
fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged
obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and
corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an
offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as
follows:

[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by

the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To
fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such
that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the
office. In other words, the office must be a constituent element
of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the
crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title
Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of
human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a
private citizen or public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took
advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as
an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its
materiality arises not from the allegations but on the proof, not
from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the
manner of the commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape
with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public

office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can
stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately
connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make
it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder
for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held
at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was
questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the
Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an
offense committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that
even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there
was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the
offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of
an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office
is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as
committed by the main respondents herein, according to the
amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately
connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal
motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed
it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of
respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because
he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.
(Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation
therein that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was
connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that
there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It
follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the
regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion

As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not
supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They
must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge,
who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his
co-accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on
the merits of the criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be
decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is
still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only
uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant public
speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not
officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is
DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141,
101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them
with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,
Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., took no part.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Resolution dated October 5, 1993.
2 The petitioner claims in his Reply to have received the
resolution on October 15, 1993. The reply was filed only on
October 25, 1993.
3 TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 10-11.
4 TSN, August 13, 1993, pp. 7-10.

5 Guzman v. People, 119 SCRA 337; Cruz v. Salva, 105 Phil.

1151.
6 Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138; Rodis v.
Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618; Sanciangco, Jr. v. People, 149
SCRA 1; People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 72; People v. Yutila, 102
SCRA 264; Solis v. People, 84 SCRA 377; People v. Figueroa,
27 SCRA 1239; People v. Casiano, 111 Phil 73.
7 Go v. Court of Appeals, supra; Velaquez v. Tuquero, 182
SCRA 388; Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462; People v. La
Caste, 37 SCRA 767.
8 191 SCRA 545.
9 G.R. No. 98452, September 26, 1991.
10 Aguinaldo v. Domagas, supra.
11 Panlilio v. Sandiganbayan, 210 SCRA 421; Virata v.
Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680; Cojuangco v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, 190 SCRA 226.
12 5 Am Jur 2d, p. 696
13 132 SCRA 318.
14 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium Book 2, 1989 Ed., p.
318 citing 22 C.J.S. 1961 Ed., p. 418.
15 Annex 1, Comment.
* The writer of this opinion has objected to this ruling but without
success. While maintaining his dissent in this case, he
nevertheless must acknowledge the binding character of the
doctrine.
16 Dugay, et al v. Ramos, G.R. No. 75221, January 15, 1987.
17 Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840; Domingo v.
Minister of National Defense, et al., 124 SCRA 529; Beltran v.

Garcia, 89 SCRA 717; Dela Plata v. Escarcha, 78 SCRA 208;

Cruz v. Montoya, 62 SCRA 543.
18 187 SCRA 312 and 202 SCRA 215.
19 Alberto v. de la Cruz, 98 SCRA 406; People v. Santos, 30
SCRA 100; People v. Agasang, 60 Phil 182; People v. Ong, 53
Phil. 544.
20 Maddela v. Aquino, 104 Phil. 433; People v. Morton, 23
SCRA 1024; Guiao v. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018.
21 Section 1, par. (d) P.D. No. 911; Section 4, Rule 112, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure; Department Circular No. 7,
January 25, 1990; Memorandum Circular No. 1266; Vda. de
Jacob v. Puno, 131 SCRA 144; Crespo v. Mogul, supra.
22 Section 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Baylosis v. Chavez, 202
SCRA 405; De Castro, et al., v. Castaeda, et al., 1 SCRA
1131; Guiao v. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018.
23 Aquino v. Mariano, 129 SCRA 532.
24 90 Phil. 49.
25 108 Phil. 613.