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2nd batch
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.

plaintiff-appellee,

MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime of murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00,
to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the
Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with a double-bladed dagger, with
evident premeditation and treachery, and with
intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, attack and stab PC
Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon
him stab wounds on the different parts of his
body which directly caused his death.

appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so.

Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana
rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the
matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt.
Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a
double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several
times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours
thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12,
t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three
companions of Lt. Masana PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Coast
Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica who were all
seated at a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters
away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood up
to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang,
Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the same
restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the
combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from
behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accusedappellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the
accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n.,
Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n.,
Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the
latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired
several hours later as a result of the stab wounds inflicted by the
accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del
Rosario, Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana
and made the following findings, which are embodied in his
Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-89, rec.), and which reads
as follows:

Contrary to law
Postmortem findings.
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the
following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the
deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa
and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch
inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n.,
Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan.
20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through the glass
panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing
his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant
was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by
PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached
appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC
officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license.
Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved
one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's
waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the
appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table
about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt.
Masana's three companions Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10,
t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt.
Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana
pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote
thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked

General:
Fairly developed and nourished male subject in
rigor mortis with postmortem lividity over the
dependent portions of the body. Pupils are
dilated. Finger and toe tips are pale. There is
an exploratory laparotomy incision at the
abdomen, measuring 21 cm. long, 3 cm. left of
the anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches
applied. There are surgical incisions at the left
and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9
cm. from the anterior midline and 2 cm. long,
6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2)
stitches applied and a rubber drain sticking out
of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by
0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline, 128
cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed
posterior wards and slightly upwards, passing
superficially between muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by
0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline, 121

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cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed
posterior wards, downwards and to the left,
lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal
space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by
0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline, 96 cm.
above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior
wards, upwards and to the left, perforating the
greater curvature of the stomach and the
gastric vessels, grazing the liver, perforating the
diaphragm and infero-medial border of the
lower lobe of the right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region,
measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal
third of the left arm, measuring 3 by 0.5 cm.,
just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the
proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its
posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots
accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a
lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the
stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected
organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due
to severe shock and intrathoracic hemorrhage
as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body,
perforating the stomach, gastric vessels, liver,
diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.

After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the

accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the
invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table where the
deceased offered beer to the accused who, however, refused
saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt.
Masana told the accused not to report any matter about smuggling
to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not
reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then
asked the accused for his identification card as a member of the
Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card,
Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an
officer of the Anti-Communist League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68,
t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was
fake, and after the accused insisted that it was genuine, Lt.
Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was
about to put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his
Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of
voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still
the accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon,
the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the
head with its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from
his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused
for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer,
pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times
and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant
(pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of
Indang, Cavite, where he intended to surrender to the authorities.
But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of
Indang, Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and
face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana
on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the
Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the
municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of
Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose
clinic was just across the street where the municipal building is
located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was
given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang
policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for
two days before he was picked up by the Philippine Constabulary
operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in
Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10,
1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the
accused as heretofore stated.

Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains

and relies on the following facts:

At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the

accused and his wife were in a restaurant near the market place of
Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come
from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec.
10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to
his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later
learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the
accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt.
Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro
Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit.

Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by

clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence (People vs.
Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17;
People vs. Solaa, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA
473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59
Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to
prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution,
for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA

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48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25
SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaa, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs.
Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7 2). The rationale for this
jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the
victim, the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime
unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of
legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased,
Lt. Guillermo Masana who committed unlawful aggression when
the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he
refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the
deceased because the same was his and he also spent money for
it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE
cannot perceive how this refusal of the accused could have
provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the
aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its
butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed after the
latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an
agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to
use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or
subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to comply with
his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender.
Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect
that the deceased was unarmed when the incident happened, he
being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian
clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore,
inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to
be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased
refused to heed his plea that his gun be returned him; because he
might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms. Accordingly,
We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was
the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the aggression which
ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased
before he parried the third blow. This claim is belied by the record.
During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the
scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he
refused to give his ID thus
Court
Q Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right
side of the head to the
Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused
corroborated the foregoing testimony in his medical findings,
Exhibit "3", which reads:

Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p.
116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person
(pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows that before the
stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were
facing each other. If that was the case, and considering that the
deceased was, according to the accused, holding the gun with his
right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head
and and on his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of
the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him twice with
the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow and then
stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the
scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted.
Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing
that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the
blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would perforce land
on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the recipient of
the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable,
the same being contrary to the natural course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC
soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim parried with both hands the
thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his
head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the
resulting injury on his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang,
Cavite, on his way to the municipal building from the scene of the
stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he
claims that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on
his head with the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from
the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was
detained in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days
before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters.
During all this time, he did not give any written statement, much
less inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt.
Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse
of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed selfdefense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the
municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If
the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have
so informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only
allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked him why his
head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He
did not tell the Police Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing
the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made
before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971
aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement made so long after
the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not
deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought,
which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of
prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard
serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased
witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of

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any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the
truth, must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.

A Yes, sir.
Q Who bumped the head of
Rodil on the table?

The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same
day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa, confirms the testimony of
the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident
between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief
embraced appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant, whom
he thereafter brought to the municipal building.

A When Masana parried his

stab with his hands he
accidentally bumped his
head on the table.

II

Q Is it not a fact that Floro

Rodil is much bigger than Lt.
Masana

Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or

homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of authority?

A Yes, sir.
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was
murder because "it was established by the prosecution that during
the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the
victim a chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times
with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest and
stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack
with a deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim,
which made it impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself
before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14,
Appellee's brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases
of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No.
10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery
is belied by the following testimony of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for
the prosecution:
COURT
Q What is the truth?
A The truth is that when I
saw that Floro Rodil stabbed
Lt.
Guillermo
Masana,
Masana parried him and his
head (Rodil's head) bumped
on the edge of a table; that
is why he sustained an
injury and blood oozed from
his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan.
20,
1972;
emphasis
supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUOZ
Q You said that Floro Rodil's
head was bumped on the
edge of a table and you saw
blood oozing from his head,
is that correct?

Q You mean, by simple

parrying, Floro Rodil was
pushed to the extent that he
bumped his head on the
table?
A The force of Lt. Masana
might have been strong in
parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil
bumped on the table, was
Lt.
Masana
already
stabbed?
A It could be that he was
already stabbed or he was
not yet stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis
supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the
testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the prosecution witnesses, WE
can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed
face to face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was
not treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the same
with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off
the attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a
table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical
treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur
of the moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself
suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al.,
43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show that the
accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the
commission of the crime, making it at the same time possible or
hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez,
1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil.
738). Neither does it show that the accused employed means
directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to
himself. On the contrary, it shows that the accused was easily
within striking distance of his three companions, two of whom were

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police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation between the
accused and the victim about the confiscation by the latter of the
gun belonging to the former, and at the moment when the victim
was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket
and with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the
impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the
latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This
kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery
in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed,
but must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies
(People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in the
explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery
exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make [Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew
because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he
was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of
the complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does
not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the
time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in
authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did attack
and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be
an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a
conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the
imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the
graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge
must be expressly and specifically averred in the information;
otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required
knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would
only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to
the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as
aggravating, being "in contempt or with insult to the public
authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an
"insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority or his agent in the
exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person
in authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseor
35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US
vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it
was held that failure to expressly alleged in the information that the
accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority does not render the information defective so long as
there are facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that the
accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority.
Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority
reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal
accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of Assault

upon a Person in Authority, committed as

follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960,
in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian, Province
of Batangas, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault Miss
Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the
school bonding of Lian, duly qualified and
appointed as such and while in the
performance of her official duties or on the
occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his
dagger, embraced and kissed. and repeatedly
trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher,
Miss Ester Gonzales. That the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances
of having committed it inside the school building
and during school classes.
Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, ... shall
attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his
agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such
performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal
Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578,
now part of Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978),
"teachers, professors, and persons charged
with the supervision of public or duly
recognized private schools, colleges and
universities shall be deemed persons in
authority, in applying the provisions of article
148." This special classification is obviously
intended to give teachers protection, dignity,
and respect while in the performance of their
official duties. The lower court, however,
dismissed the information on the ground that
there is no express allegation in the information
that the accused had knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority. This
is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information
sufficiently alleges that the accused knew that
fact, since she was in her classroom and
engaged in the performance of her duties. He
therefore knew that she was a person in
authority, as she was so by specific provision of
law. It matters not that such knowledge on his
part is not expressly alleged, complainant's
status as a person in authority being a matter of

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law and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not
excuse non- compliance on his part (Article 3,
Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of
domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna
vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether
substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1
Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and
necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA
305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information for Direct Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974,
at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of Potillo,
Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde,
Dony Grande and Jose Astjada each of whom
was armed with a piece of wood, except Paulo
Coraide conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, box and strike with said pieces of wood
one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio
Languyin of said municipality, duly elected and
qualified as such while said councilman was
engaged in the actual performance of his
duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of
allegation in the complaint or in the information
that the offended party was an agent of a
person in authority and that such fact was
known to the accused. The absence of such
allegation is fatal in this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a
petition for review on certiorari but the refiling of a valid information
against the accused, for the following considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of
November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the accused herein
is not on the merits. There is want of factual
finding upon which their conviction or acquittal
could have been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to the
fiscal's contention, the information was
deficient in that it did not allege an essential
element of the crime of direct assault that the
accused had knowledge of or knew the position
of authority held by the person attacked, viz.
that of a barrio councilman (and hence the
agent of a person in authority under Article 152
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by

Republic Act No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35

Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol.
11, Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p.
225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA,
119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it is sufficient
that the information alleged that the accused
knew the position of authority, held by the
offended party, in that case a public school
teacher, then engaged in the performance of
her official duties, and that it is not necessary to
allege further that the accused also knew that
such position was that of a person in authority,
since 'this is a matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher.
The information sufficiently
alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she
was in her classroom and
engaged in the performance
of her duties. He therefore
knew that she was a person
in authority, as she was so
by specific provision of law.
It matters not that such
knowledge on `his part is
not
expressly
alleged,
complainant's status as a
person in authority being a
matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance whereof could not
excuse non-compliance on
his part (Article 3, Civil
Code). This article applies to
all kinds of domestic laws,
whether civil or penal (De
Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil.
15) and whether substantive
or remedial (Zulueta vs.
Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for
reasons
of
expediency,
policy and necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a
mere dismissal of the information for failure to
charge an offense and was not a decision on
the merits with factual findings as per the trial
judge's own disavowal it is patent that the
fiscal's proper course is not the present petition
but the refiling of a valid information against
respondents-accused, as herein indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed
without prejudice to the refiling of a valid
information against respondents-accused as
hereinabove indicated (emphasis supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of
Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case; because the
information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in

Reyes
7 Report
the latter and does not allege facts from which inference can be
deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a
person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be
appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana
Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a
member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in
rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and
as such, refers to a high social position or standing as a grade in
the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official
standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to the order
or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy in
relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition,
Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the
designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order
to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in matters of
privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to
determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army staff
officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a
grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in
any scale of comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status
or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal
(People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of
the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service
Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351,
357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S.
vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil.
706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de
Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief of police by
the chief of the secret service division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil.
167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First
Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52
OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his subordinate a
mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and
the killing of an army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642,
May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of
Appeals, those "generally considered of high station in life, on
account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be
respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social
condition between the offender and the offended party, this
aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A.
The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant
and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of
murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and
not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard
of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be
appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is
inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an

agent of a person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant

is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating
circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder
or frustrated murder, the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra the appellant, a clerk in the Civil
Service Commission, was charged with and convicted of the
murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the
said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra the appellants were charged
with and convicted of murder for the death of Army Col. Valentin
Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army
Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. appellants were accused and
convicted of robbery with homicide for the killing of District Judge
Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15,
34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra where the accused chief of the
Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police Department was
convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public
authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of
Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he was taking
his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who
embraced or grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the
dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal
building of Indang. And appellant admittedly knew him even then
as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he went to
the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was
not allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19
Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and
People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term
public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC
lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but
merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of reexamining such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment
of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14
instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in
Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid
three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should
comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have
easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed
the said phrase in Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have

Reyes
8 Report
intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which
may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio
lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority or a public
authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person
in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town
municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as
well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May
26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public
authority or a person in authority; for he is vested with jurisdiction
or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty
bound to prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and
municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who
cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest
malefactors although specifically mentioned as persons in
authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town
chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the
municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire
territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than and
includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which
small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or
barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating
circumstance, the appellant should therefore be condemned to
suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty
prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR
DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY
ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS
HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM
OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF
RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS
HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
3rd batch
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN E. ILAOA and ROGELIO E. ILAOA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- appellee.
Buen Zamar for accused- appellants.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5

November 1987 to Tinio St., Sta. Maria Phase I, Balibago, Angeles
City, where the decapitated body of a man, later identified through
his voters identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a
grassy portion thereof. Apart from the decapitation, the deceased
bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest as well as slight
burns all over the body. The head was found some two (2) feet
away from the corpse.
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa,
Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang, were charged for the gruesome
murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only the brothers Ruben
and Rogelio stood trial since the other accused escaped and were
never apprehended.
On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found
Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder with the attendant
circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and cruelty, and imposed upon them the penalty of "life
imprisonment." 1 The conviction was based on the following
circumstantial evidence:
One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven
oclock in the evening of 4 November 1987, in a drinking session
with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio, Edwin
Tapang and a certain "Nang Kwang" outside Rubens apartment. 2
Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an
apparent argument were later on heard. 3 Nestor was then seen
being kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius
Eliginio and Edwin Tapang. 4 Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare,
aray, aray!" Afterwards, Nestor, who appeared drunk, was seen
being "dragged" 5 into Ruben Ilaoas apartment. Nestor was heard
saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako!" 6
Three. Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamils
tricycle at about two oclock the following morning allegedly for the
purpose of bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was about to
give birth. Ruben was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack
which looked as though it contained a human body, placed in the
sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex who
noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter thought that they were
those of the pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Rubens shirt when he was asked to lift
it during the investigation by the police. 7 Moreover, Rubens hair
near his right forehead was found partly burned and his shoes
were splattered with blood. 8 Susan Ocampo, Rubens live-in
partner, was likewise seen in the early morning of 5 November
1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their
apartment. 9
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their
acquittal. They contend that the circumstantial evidence relied
upon by the trial court for their conviction failed to establish their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, they assail the finding
of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty as
totally unwarranted.

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9 Report
We affirm Ruben Ilaoas guilt having been satisfactorily established
by the evidence on hand, albeit circumstantial. However, we
reverse the conviction of Rogelio as we find it patently baseless.
In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied solely on
the testimony that he helped his brother Ruben drag Nestor de
Loyola inside Rubens apartment where the deceased was last
seen alive. Apart from such testimony, however, there is nothing
else to link Rogelio to the killing.
To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
three requisites must concur: (a) there must be more than one
circumstance; (b) the circumstances from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and, (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. 10 In the case at bench, it does not require much
analysis to conclude that the circumstance relied upon to establish
Rogelio Ilaoas guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the deceased to
his brothers apartment, is totally inadequate for a conviction,
having miserably failed to meet the criteria. This is especially so
where the veracity of such circumstance is even open to question.
While Antonio Ramos and Abdulia Logan testified that Rogelio
Ilaoa helped his brother drag the deceased to his apartment,
Eustancia Bie who claimed to have witnessed the same incident
positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio who
did so. 11 Rogelio Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not having been
adequately established, in addition to being uncorroborated, such
circumstance alone cannot be the basis of Rogelios conviction.
Rubens case, however, is a totally different matter. Unlike that of
his brother, Ruben Ilaoas fate was most definitely assured by the
unbroken chain of circumstances which culminated in the
discovery of Nestor de Loyolas decapitated body in the early
morning of 5 November 1987.
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4 November 1987,
appellant Ruben Ilaoa was engaged in a drinking session with the
deceased Nestor de Loyola together with several others. Ruben
was heard arguing with Nestor. A few moments later, Ruben
mauled and kicked the deceased with the help of their drinking
companions just outside Rubens apartment. As the deceased
cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit nyo ako ginaganito? Hirap na
hirap na ako!" appellant dragged the deceased with the help of
Julius Eliginio to the apartment from where a mans cries were
continued to be heard later. To further seal the case against him,
Ruben borrowed Alex Villamils tricycle at two oclock in the
morning of 5 November 1987 on the pretext that a neighbor was
about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However,
he was seen driving the tricycle alone with a sack placed in the
sidecar. The sack looked as if it contained a human body. 12 Then,
an hour later, or at three oclock in the morning, the tricycle was
returned with bloodstains on the floor.
For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute the
testimony of an eyewitness that he was driving the tricycle at past
two oclock in the morning with the sack in the sidecar. However,
he claims that the sack contained buntot ng pusa, a local term for
marijuana, not a human body, which he delivered to a designated
place in Fields Avenue as a favor to his compadre Nestor de
Loyola whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it was the vomit
discharged by his drinking companions that was being swept clean
by his girlfriend at the entrance of their apartment in the early

morning of 5 November 1987, not blood as the witnesses

asseverated.
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the
defense. The fact that appellant quarreled with the deceased, then
mauled and pulled him to the apartment where the latter was last
seen alive, in addition to borrowing a tricycle which was found with
bloodstains when returned, sufficiently point to Ruben as the
culprit responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased was
his compadre, hence, presumably would have no motive to kill the
latter, is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is a matter of judicial
knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no
apparent reason at all, 13 and that friendship or even relationship is
no deterrent to the commission of a crime. 14
If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able to account
for the blood found on the floor of the tricycle after it was brought
back to the owner. Ruben himself could not explain away such
testimony for he belied the excuse that the tricycle was needed to
rush a pregnant woman to the hospital, which was the explanation
he gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed it. We cannot even
consider that the story about the blood on the tricycle was simply
concocted by Alex Villamil to incriminate Ruben because the latter
was his friend, as Ruben himself has admitted. 15 In fact he could
think of no reason for Alex Villamil to testify falsely against him. 16
Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for
homicide, not murder, on the ground that the qualifying
circumstances alleged in the information, namely, abuse of
superior strength, cruelty and evident premeditation, were not
sufficiently proved to be appreciated against appellant.
Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there
was no evidence whatsoever that appellant was physically
superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of
such superior physical strength to overcome the latters resistance
to consummate the offense. 17 The fact that Nestor de Loyolas
decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab wounds, twenty-four
(24) of which were fatal, 18 was found dumped in the street is not
sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that
appellant Ruben Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused
Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on him
unnecessary physical and moral pain. 19 Number of wounds alone
is not the criterion for the appreciation of cruelty as an aggravating
circumstance. 20 Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that
the victims dead body was dismembered. 21 Evident premeditation
cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the records to
show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill
Nestor de Loyola, nor is there proof to show that such killing was
the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On
the contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of
circumstances which culminated in the killing constitutes an
unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them
for calculation and meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance,
Ruben Ilaoa should only be held liable for homicide.
The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the maximum shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)

Reyes
10 Report
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision mayor, in any of its periods, the
range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years.
In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed by the
court a quo for the death of Nestor de Loyola is increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt is AFFIRMED but only for
homicide, instead of murder. Consequently, he is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years, ten (10) months and
twenty (20) days of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years, four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal
medium as maximum. In addition, accused-appellant RUBEN E.
ILAOA is ordered to pay the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and, as fixed by the court a quo, P46,765.00 as
actual damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged for obvious insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
4th batch
PADUA V PEOPLE
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review assails the Decision 1[1] dated April 19,
2005 and Resolution2[2] dated June 14, 2005, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 86977 which had respectively dismissed Michael
Paduas petition for certiorari and denied his motion for reconsideration.
Paduas petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailed the
Orders dated May 11, 20043[3] and July 28, 20044[4] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 168, Pasig City, which had denied his petition
for probation.
The facts, culled from the records, are as follows:
On June 16, 2003, petitioner Michael Padua and Edgar Allan
Ubalde were charged before the RTC, Branch 168, Pasig City of violating
Section 5,5[5] Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,6[6] otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for selling
dangerous drugs.7[7] The Information reads:
The Prosecution, through the undersigned
Public Prosecutor, charges Edgar Allan Ubalde y
Velchez a.k.a. Allan and Michael Padua y Tordel
a.k.a. Mike, with the crime of violation of Sec. 5,

Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165 in relation to R.A.

[No.] 8369, Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i), committed as
follows:
On or about June 6, 2003, in Pasig City,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, Edgar
Allan Ubalde y Velchez and Michael
Padua y Tordel, a minor, seventeen (17)
years old, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, not being
lawfully authorized to sell any dangerous
drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver
and give away to PO1 Roland A. Panis, a
police poseur-buyer, one (1) folded
newsprint containing 4.86 grams of dried
marijuana fruiting tops, which was found
positive to the tests for marijuana, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said
law.
Contrary to law.8[8]
When arraigned on October 13, 2003, Padua, assisted by his
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.9[9]
During the pre-trial conference on February 2, 2004, however,
Paduas counsel manifested that his client was willing to withdraw his plea
of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to avail of the benefits granted to
first-time offenders under Section 7010[10] of Rep. Act No. 9165. The
prosecutor interposed no objection.11[11] Thus, the RTC on the same date
issued an Order12[12] stating that the former plea of Padua of not guilty was
considered withdrawn. Padua was re-arraigned and pleaded guilty. Hence,
in a Decision13[13] dated February 6, 2004, the RTC found Padua guilty of
the crime charged:
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds
accused Michael Padua y Tordel guilty of [v]iolation
of Sec. 5 Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to R.A.
No. 8369 Sec. 5 par. (a) and (i) thereof, and
therefore, sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum and a
fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
No subsidiary imprisonment, however,

6
7
8

10

11

12

13

Reyes
11 Report
shall be imposed should [the] accused fail to pay the
fine pursuant to Art. 39 par. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code.
SO ORDERED.14[14]
Padua subsequently filed a Petition for Probation 15[15] dated
February 10, 2004 alleging that he is a minor and a first-time offender
who desires to avail of the benefits of probation under Presidential
Decree No. 96816[16] (P.D. No. 968), otherwise known as The Probation
Law of 1976 and Section 70 of Rep. Act No. 9165. He further alleged that
he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications under
the said laws.
The RTC in an Order17[17] dated February 10, 2004 directed
the Probation Officer of Pasig City to conduct a Post-Sentence
Investigation and submit a report and recommendation within 60 days
from receipt of the order. The City Prosecutor was also directed to submit
his comment on the said petition within five days from receipt of the
order.
On April 6, 2004, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Josefina
J. Pasana submitted a Post-Sentence Investigation Report to the RTC
recommending that Padua be placed on probation.18[18]
However, on May 11, 2004, public respondent Pairing Judge
Agnes Reyes-Carpio issued an Order denying the Petition for Probation
on the ground that under Section 2419[19] of Rep. Act No. 9165, any
person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege granted
by the Probation Law. The court ruled thus:
Before this Court now is the PostSentence Investigation Report (PSIR) on minor
Michael Padua y Tordel prepared by Senior Parole
and Probation Officer Teodoro Villaverde and
submitted by the Chief of the Pasig City Parole and
Probation Office, Josefina J. Pasana.
In the aforesaid PSIR, Senior PPO
Teodoro Villaverde recommended that minor
Michael Padua y Tordel be placed on probation,
anchoring his recommendation on Articles 189 and
192 of P.D. 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Welfare Code, as amended, which deal with the
suspension of sentence and commitment of youthful
offender. Such articles, therefore, do not find
application in this case, the matter before the Court
being an application for probation by minor Michael
Padua y Tordel and not the suspension of his
sentence.
On the other hand, Section 70 is under
Article VIII of R.A. 9165 which deals with the
Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug
Dependents. Sections 54 to 76, all under Article VIII
of R.A. 9165 specifically refer to violations of either
Section 15 or Section 11. Nowhere in Article VIII
was [v]iolation of Section 5 ever mentioned.
More importantly, while the provisions of

14
15

R.A. 9165, particularly Section 70 thereof deals with

Probation or Community Service for First- Time
Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment, the Court
is of the view and so holds that minor Michael
Padua y Tordel who was charged and convicted of
violating Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165, cannot
avail of probation under said section in view of the
provision of Section 24 which is hereunder quoted:
Sec.
24.
NonApplicability of the Probation
Law for Drug Traffickers and
Pushers. Any person convicted
for drug trafficking or pushing
under this Act, regardless of
the penalty imposed by the
Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the
Probation Law or Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended.
(underlining supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Petition for Probation filed by Michael Padua y
Tord[e]l should be, as it is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20[20]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the
same was denied on July 28, 2004. He filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals assailing the order, but the Court of
Appeals, in a Decision dated April 19, 2005, dismissed his petition. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit and ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.21[21]
Padua filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition where he raises
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF THE
PETITION
FOR
PROBATION
WHICH
DEPRIVED PETITIONERS RIGHT AS A MINOR
UNDER ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. [02-118-SC] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] RULE
ON JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] ACCUSED[S] RIGHT
[TO BE RELEASED UNDER RECOGNIZANCE]
HAS BEEN VIOLATED OR DEPRIVED IN THE
LIGHT OF R.A. 9344 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE COUNCIL UNDER DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE
APPROPRIATING
FUNDS
THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES.22[22]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing public
respondent, opted to adopt its Comment 23[23] as its Memorandum. In its
Comment, the OSG countered that

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I.
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAVE LEGAL BASIS IN APPLYING
SECTION 24, ARTICLE II OF R.A. 9165
INSTEAD OF SECTION 70, ARTICLE VIII OF
THE SAME LAW.
II.
SECTION 32 OF A.M. NO. 02-1-18-SC
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE RULE ON
JUVENILES IN CONFLICT WITH THE LAW HAS
NO APPLICATION TO THE INSTANT CASE. 24
[24]
Simply, the issues are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in
dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari assailing the trial courts order
denying his petition for probation? (2) Was Paduas right under Rep. Act
No. 9344,25[25] the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, violated?
and (3) Does Section 3226[26] of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC otherwise known
as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law have application in this
case?
As to the first issue, we rule that the Court of Appeals did not
err in dismissing Paduas petition for certiorari.
For certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.27[27]
Without jurisdiction means that the court acted with absolute
lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court
transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse
of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice, or personal hostility, and such exercise is so patent or so gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.28[28]
A review of the orders of the RTC denying Paduas petition for
probation shows that the RTC neither acted without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion because it merely applied the law and adhered to
principles of statutory construction in denying Paduas petition for
probation.
Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5,
Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear
under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 that any person convicted of drug
trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation, to wit:
SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the
Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers.
Any person convicted for drug trafficking or
pushing under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 29[29] If a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plainmeaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi
sermo, or speech is the index of intention.30[30] Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute

there should be no departure.31[31]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
intention of the legislators in Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165 is to
provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous
hand in Section 70 to drug dependents who are found guilty of violation of
Sections 1132[32] and 1533[33] of the Act. The law considers the users and
possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers
as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are
categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug
dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their
ways.34[34] The Court of Appeals also correctly stated that had it been the
intention of the legislators to exempt from the application of Section 24 the
drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the
law could have easily declared so.35[35]
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug
pushers while protective of drug users. To illustrate, a person arrested for
using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only a penalty of six months
rehabilitation in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense
under Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 9165, while a person charged and
convicted of selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) under Section 5,
Rep. Act No. 9165.
As for the second and third issues, Padua cannot argue that his
right under Rep. Act No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 was violated. Nor can he argue that Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-118-SC otherwise known as the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law has application in this case. Section 68 36[36] of Rep. Act No. 9344
and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC both pertain to suspension of
sentence and not probation.

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Furthermore, suspension of sentence under Section 38 37[37] of
Rep. Act No. 9344 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioners
benefit. Section 38 of Rep. Act No. 9344 provides that once a child under
18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 38[38] of Rep.
Act No. 9344, however, provides that once the child reaches 18 years of
age, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order
execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21
years. Petitioner has already reached 21 years of age or over and thus,
could no longer be considered a child 39[39] for purposes of applying Rep.
Act 9344. Thus, the application of Sections 38 and 40 appears moot and
academic as far as his case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated April 19, 2005 and the Resolution dated June 14, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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