Table of Contents

Table of Cases
1. Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1886
2. Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1952 SC 59
3. Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd, AIR 1995 SC 2200
4. Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006)
8SCC 433

ABSTRACT
Article 19 of the Indian Constitution says;
19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech etc
(1) All citizens shall have the right
(a) to freedom of speech and expression;
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms;
(c) to form associations or unions;
(d) to move freely throughout the territory of India;
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India; and
(g) to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business
(2) Nothing in sub clause (a) of clause ( 1 ) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or
prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause in the interests of the sovereignty
and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public
order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an
offence
(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of
the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise
of the right conferred by the said sub clause
(4) Nothing in sub clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of
the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on
the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause
(5) Nothing in sub clauses (d) and (e) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing,
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub clauses
either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any
Scheduled Tribe
(6) Nothing in sub clause (g) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law
in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of
the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said

sub clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub clause shall affect the operation of any
existing law in so far as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law relating to,
(i) the professional or technical qualifications necessary for practising any profession or
carrying on any occupation, trade or business, or
(ii) the carrying on by the State, or by a corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any
trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens
or otherwise .

INTRODUCTION
Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 19(1) guarantee to the citizens of India six freedoms, viz.,

speech and expression

peaceful assembly
association
free movement
residence
practising any profession and carrying on any business

Subject to some restrictions imposed on under clauses (2) to (6) of the said article. Article 19
guarantees some of the basic, valued and natural rights inherent in a person. According to the
Supreme Court, it is possible that a right does not find mention in any clause of Article 19(1)
and yet it may be covered by some clause therein. This gives an additional dimension to
Article 19(1) in the sense that even though a right may not be explicit, it may yet be implicit,
in the various clauses of Article 19.
Originally, Article 19 guaranteed seven freedoms. The freedom to hold and acquire property
was deleted in 1978.
Each of these rights is to be controlled and regulated to some extent by laws made by
Parliament or the state legislatures. Accordingly, clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19 lay down the
grounds and the purposes for which a legislature can impose reasonable restrictions on the
rights guaranteed by Article 19(10(a) to (g).
Article 19 confers the several freedoms on the citizens. Therefore, a municipal committee or
a foreigner or any other organisation cannot invoke Article 19. A foreigner enjoys no right
under Article 19. A foreigner can thus claim no right to reside and settle in India, as
mentioned in Article 19(1)(e). A foreigner who came to India in 1937 on a Belgium passport
engaged himself in Christian missionary work. He had been staying continuously in India
since 1937. By an order dated 08/07/1987, his request for further stay in India was rejected

and he was ordered to leave the country. He challenged the order through a writ petition
under Article 32 which was rejected.
The court ruled that he had not become a citizen of India under Article 5 of the Constitution
as he had not acquired his domicile in India. For that, he must prove that he had formed an
intention of making his permanent home in the country of residence and of continuing there
permanently.1
Part II of the Constitution deals with the various provisions and instances of Indian
citizenship. Indian Citizenship can be acquired by;

Birth ( Section 3)
Descent( Section 4)
Registration(Section 5)
Naturalisation(Section 6)

Article 19 protects the six freedoms of an Indian citizen from state action and violation of
these freedoms by private conduct of an individual is not within its purview.2
In spite of there being a general presumption in favour of constitutionality of a legislation, in
a challenge laid to the validity of a legislation allegedly violating any right to freedom
guaranteed by clause (1) of Article 19, on a prima facie case of such violation having been
made out, the onus would shift upon the respondent State to show that the legislation comes
within the permissible limits of restrictions set out in clauses (2) to (6) of the said article, and
that the particular restriction is reasonable.

REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS: Art 19(2) to 19(6)

Limitation imposed by Article 19(2) to 19(6) on the freedoms guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a)
to (g) serve a twofold purpose, viz., on the one hand, they specify that these freedoms are not
absolute and on the other hand, they put a limitation on the power of the legislature to restrict
these freedoms.
These restrictions have few characteristics, which are;
1) The restrictions under them can be imposed only by or under the authority of a law;
no restriction can be imposed by executive action alone without there being a law to
back it up.
1 Louis De Raedt v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1886
2 Shamdasani v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1952 SC 59

2) Each restriction must be reasonable.

3) A restriction must be related to the purposes mentioned in clauses 19(2) to 19(6).
Thus there is double test to adjudge the validity of a restriction, viz., whether it is reasonable
and whether it is for the purpose mentioned in the clause under which restriction is
being imposed?
(a) Test for Reasonableness.
It is difficult to give an exact definition reasonable. There is no definite test to adjudge
reasonableness of a restriction. Each case is to be judged on its own merits, and no
abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness is applicable uniformly on all
cases. However, the courts have laid down a few broad propositions in this respect.
The concept of reasonableness must change with time and absorb the current socioeconomic values as exemplified in Telecasting case involving the State owned
Doordarshan. The complaint of violation of the Fundamental Right under Art. 19(1) (a)
of the constitution was made against Doordarshan when it decided not to telecast a
documentary film titled Father, Son and Holy War. The film was the third part of a
trilogy of documentary film against communal violence. In this film the respondent film
maker looked at the question of gender along with the issue of religious violence. The
filmmaker challenged the refusal of Doordarshan to telecast the film which was disposed
of by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by directing Doordarshan to take a
decision on the application of the film maker. A selection committee was constituted by
Doordarshan to preview the film and according to the committee the violence depicted in
the film would have adverse effect on the minds of the viewers. When the matter came
up for consideration before the Supreme Court, the court held that the film maker had a
right to convey his perception on the oppression of women, flawed understanding of
manhood and evils of communal violence throughout the film.3
The Burden to show that the restriction is reasonable lies on the State. Legislation which
arbitrarily invades the fundamental Right, cannot be said to contain the quality of
reasonableness unless it strikes a proper balance between the Fundamental Right
guaranteed and the restriction imposed thereon. Further, a restriction to be valid must
have a direct and proximate nexus, or a relation with the object which the legislature
3 Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006)
8SCC 433

seeks to achieve and must not be in excess of the object. It is the direct, inevitable and
the real, not the remote, effect of the legislation on the fundamental right which is to be
considered.
In Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd.4, the supreme court has stated that the
following principles and guidelines should be kept in mind while considering the
constitutionality of a statutory provision imposing restriction on a Fundamental Right
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) to (g) when challenged on the ground of unreasonableness
of the restriction imposed by it:
i.
The restriction must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond
ii.

the requirement of felt need of the society and object sought to be achieved.
There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between

iii.

the restriction imposed and the object sought to be achieved.

No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may have universal

iv.

application in all cases.

In interpreting constitutional provisions, the court should be alive to the felt need
of the society and complex issues facing the people which the legislature intends
to solve through effective legislation. In appreciating such problems and felt need
of the society the judicial approach must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic and

v.

elastic.
The rights guaranteed to a citizen by Article 19 do not confer any absolute or
unconditional right. Each right is subject to reasonable restriction which the

vi.

legislature may impose in public interest.

The substantiveness needs to be tested both from the procedural and substantive

vii.

aspects.
A restriction imposed on a Fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19 must not be
arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive and also unreasonably
discriminatory.

The terms procedural and substantive aspects mentioned in clause (vi) have been
explained hereunder:

Substantive aspect.- In determining the substantive reasonableness, the court has to

take into consideration various factors, such as the nature of the right alleged to have
been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and

4 AIR 1995 SC 2200

urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition,

the prevailing conditions at the time.

Procedural aspect.- The method of imposing a restriction and the procedure provided
for putting it into operation constitute its procedural aspect. Even though a restriction
may be reasonable in substance, the court has to see whether the method of imposing
it is also reasonable. 5

(b)

Effect v. Subject-Matter test

A significant point which arises from a study of the above cases deserves to be
mentioned here. What is the test to be applied to ascertain whether a law violates Art.
19(1)(a), or any other Fundamental right? Should the court look into its subject-matter or
the effect of the legislation for this purpose?
In Bennett Coleman & Co. vs. Union of India 6, the Central Government argued in
support of the newsprint policy that its subject-matter

was rationing of imported

commodity and not freedom of speech, and the test to adjudge the validity of a regulatory
provision should be its subject-matter, its pith and substance, and not its effect or result.
The court rejected this approach and enunciated the test: What is the direct or
inevitable consequence or effect of the impugned state action on the Fundamental Right
of the petitioner? The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take
away or abridge Fundamental Rights.
A legislation or government action may have a direct effect on a Fundamental right
although its subject-matter may be different. The object of the law or executive action is
irrelevant when it infringes a Fundamental Right although its subject-matter may be
different. Even a law dealing directly with a purpose mentioned in Art. 19(2) would be
invalid if it is not reasonable. The court stated that no law or action would state in words
that rights of freedom of speech and expression are abridged or taken away. That is why
Courts have to protect and guard fundamental rights by considering the scope and
provisions of the act and its effect upon the Fundamental rights.
The court held that, in the instant case, the object of the restrictions imposed on
newspapers has nothing to do with the availability of newsprint or foreign exchange
5 Dr. Durga Das Basu, Constitutional Law of India, Eighth Edition, 2008, p.88
6 AIR 1973 SC 106

because these were post-quota restrictions which fell outside the purview of Art. 19(2).
Thus, in the instant case, the court applied the test of direct effect of law on a
Fundamental right.

Freedom of Speech: Articles 19(1)(A) and 19(2)

"I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it" - Voltaire.
This one line sums up for me, the whole essence of democratic behaviour. Speech is God's
gift to mankind. Through speech a human being conveys his thoughts, sentiments and
feelings to others. Freedom of speech and expression is thus a natural right, which a human
being acquires on birth. It is, therefore, a basic right. "Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; the right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and
to seek and receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers" proclaims the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The people of India
declared in the Preamble of the Constitution, which they gave unto themselves their resolve
to secure to all the citizens liberty of thought and expression. This resolve is reflected in
Article 19(1)(a) which is one of the Articles found in Part III of the Constitution, which
enumerates the Fundamental Rights. Similar laws exist in other democracies.
The freedom of speech is regarded as the first condition of liberty. It occupies a preferred and
important position in the hierarchy of the liberty, it is truly said about the freedom of speech
that it is the mother of all other liberties. Freedom of Speech and expression means the right
to express one's own convictions and opinions freely by words of mouth, writing, printing,
pictures or any other mode. In modern time it is widely accepted that the right to freedom of
speech is the essence of free society and it must be safeguarded at all time. The first principle
of a free society is an untrammeled flow of words in an open forum. Liberty to express
opinions and ideas without hindrance, and especially without fear of punishment plays
significant role in the development of that particular society and ultimately for that state. It is
one of the most important fundamental liberties guaranteed against state suppression or
regulation.
Freedom of speech is guaranteed not only by the constitution or statutes of various states but
also by various international conventions like Universal Declaration of Human Rights ,

European convention on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms, International Covenant

on Civil and Political Rights etc. These declarations expressly talk about protection of
freedom of speech and expression.
Man as rational being desires to do many things, but in a civil society his desires have to be
controlled, regulated and reconciled with the exercise of similar desires by other individuals.
The guarantee of each of the above right is, therefore, restricted by the Constitution in the
larger interest of the community. The right to freedom of speech and expression is therefore
subject to limitations imposed under Article 19(2) by the First Amendment to the Constitution
in 1951 which attempted to strengthen state regulation over the freedom of speech and
expression by expanding the scope of Article 19(2).
In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India7, Bhagwati, J., has emphasized on the significance of the
freedom of speech and expression in these words:
Democracy is based essentially on free debate and open discussion, for that is the
only corrective of government action in a democratic set up. If democracy means
government of the people by the people, it is obvious that every citizen must be
entitled to participate in the democratic process and in order to enable him to
intelligently exercise his right of making a choice, free and general discussion of
public matters is absolutely essential.
In Printers (Mysore) Ltd. v. Asst. Commercial Tax Officer,8 it has been observed:
Every free citizen has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public. Freedom to air ones views is the lifeline of any democratic institution and
any attempt to stifle, suffocate or gag this right would sound a deathknell to
democracy and would help usher in autocracy or dictatorship.
Scope and Content of the freedom: - This freedom is very vast but for the sake of better
understanding, its better to deal it under the following heads:1. Right to Information

7 AIR 1978 SC 597

8 1994 2 SCC 434

The expression freedom of speech and expression in Art. 19(1)(a) has been held to
include the right to acquire information and disseminate the same. It includes the right to
communicate it through any available media whether print or electronic or audio-visual,
such as advertisement, movie, article or speech, etc. It has been said in a government of
responsibility like ours, it is elementary that citizens ought to know what their
government is doing. They have the right to know every public act, everything that is
done in a public way, by their public functionaries. No democratic government can
survive without accountability and the basic postulate of accountability is that the people
should have information about the functioning of the government.
1.1 Right to information act, 2002
With a view to provide for freedom to every citizen to secure access to official
information , in order to promote openness, transparency and accountability in
administration and in relation to matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, the
Right to Information Act, 2005 was enacted. The freedom of speech and expression
includes the right to educate, to inform and to entertain and also the right to be
educated, informed and entertained. It also includes the right of the consumer to be
apprised of the ingredients of food products, cosmetics and drugs, so that he may
make a right to choice as per his beliefs and opinions. The right to information, like
other rights, is held subject to several exemptions/exceptions indicated in broad terms.
Since the R.T.I has turned out to be a great check on the executive, this is said to be a
strong case for extending the Act to sectors like the judiciary that remained insulated
from it. In this setting of the things, a Division bench of Delhi High Court in the case
of Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal9 had
given a landmark ruling that, the information of assets declared by the S.C judges, in
possession of the CJI, would come within the ambit of the RTI Act. The ruling will
promote transparency and accountability in the Judiciary. 10
1.2 Right of the Examinee to have access to evaluated scripts
In Secretary, West Bengal Council of Higher Secondary Education v. Ayan Das11, the
Apex Court ruled that the Courts should not normally direct the production of answer
9 AIR 2010 Del. 159
10 Prof. Narender Kumar, Constitutional law of India Allahabad law Agency, 2014, p. 236
11 AIR 2007 SC 3098

scripts, to be inspected by the examinees, unless a case was made out to show that
either some questions had not been evaluated or that the evaluation had been done
contrary to the norms fixed by the examining body.
Recently, in H.P.P.S.C v. Mukesh Thakur12, the Apex Court ruled that in the absence of
any provision for re-valuation of answer books in the relevant Rules, no candidate in
the examination could have got any right whatsoever to claim or ask for re-valuation
of his marks. It being a task of statutory authorities could not be performed by the
courts.
1.3 Right of the citizens/voters to know the Antecedents of the Candidates at election &
Right to vote.
Article 19(1)(a) which guarantees the right to speak and express oneself has been held
to include the voters speech or expression, in case of elections, in a democracy. It has
been said that the voter speaks out or expresses by casting vote. The foundation of a
healthy democracy is to have well-informed citizens-voters. The reason to have right
of information with regard to the antecedents of the candidate is that voter can judge
and decide in whose favour he should cast his vote. It is voters discretion whether to
vote in favour of an illiterate or literate candidate. It is his choice whether to elect a
candidate against whom criminal cases, for serious or non-serious charges were filed
but is acquitted or discharged. For the first time the right to know about the candidate
standing for election has been brought within the sweep of article 19(1) (a). There is
no doubt that by doing so a new a new dimension has been given dictated by the need
to improve and refine the political process of election.
The Supreme Court in Association for Democratic Reforms Case13 has held that
article 19(1) (a) which provides for freedom of speech and expression would cover in
its fold right of the voter to know specified antecedents of a candidate , who is
contesting elections.
Also in K. Krishnamurthi Vs Union of India 14 the nature of Right to vote and contest
elections was held that it does not have the status of fundamental rights. They are in
the nature of legal rights which can be controlled through legislative means.
12 AIR 2010 SC 2620
13 AIR 2002 SC 2112
14 AIR 2010,VOL 7, SCC 202

Constitution empowers the Election Commission to prepare electoral rolls for

identifying the eligible voters in elections for Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha. Right to
vote is not an inherent right and cannot be claimed in an abstract sense. The
Representation of the People Act, 1951 includes grounds that render persons ineligible
from contesting elections. Thus, there is no inherent right to contest elections since
there are explicit legislative controls over the same. Thus it is a statutory right.
2. Freedom of Silence
In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerela15, the Supreme Court held that no person could be
compelled to sing the National Anthem if he has genuine conscientious objections based
on his religious belief. In this case, three children belonging to Jehovahs Witnesses,
were expelled from the school for refusing to sing the National Anthem during school
prayers. They used to stand up respectfully when the National Anthem was being sung,
but did not join in singing it. The Kerela High Court upheld their expulsion from the
school on the ground that it was their fundamental duty to sing the National anthem and
that they committed an offence under the Prevention of Insults to National Honours Act,
1971.
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the High Court and observed that
they did not commit any offence. It was held that the expulsion of the children from that
school was a violation of their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) which also
included freedom of silence. It may, thus, be stated that freedom of expression includes the
right not to express.
3. Freedom of Press
In the U.S.A, the First Amendment, specifically protects a free press. The prime purpose
of the free press guarantee is regarded as creating a fourth institution outside the
government as an additional check on the three branches- executive, legislative and the
judiciary. It is the primary function of the press to provide comprehensive and objective
information on all aspects of the countrys social, economic and political life. The various
aspects of freedom of the press are discussed below: 3.1 No pre-censorship on press
The freedom of the press, thus, means the right to print and publish what one pleases,
without any previous permission. Imposition of pre-censorship on publication is,
therefore, violative of the freedom of the press, unless justified under clause (2) of
article 19.
15 AIR 1987 SC 748

In Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi 16in pursuance of Section 7(1)(c) of the East Punjab
Public Safety Act, 1949 as extended to the Province of Delhi, the Chief Commissioner
of Delhi issued an order against the petitioner, the printer, publisher and editor of an
English weekly the Organiser published from Delhi, directing them to submit, for
scrutiny in duplicate, before publication till further orders, all communal matters and
news and views about Pakistan including photographs and cartoons other than those
derived from official sources or supplied by the news agencies. The majority of the
Supreme Court struck down the order as violative of Article 19(1)(a).
3.2 No Pre-stoppage of publication in Newspapers or Articles or matter of public
Importance
In Virendra v. State of Punjab,17 the Supreme Court held that banning of publication in
the newspapers of its own views or the views of correspondents about burning topic
of the day was a serious encroachment on the valuable and cherished right to
freedom of speech and expression.
3.3 Right of Access to the source of Information.
In M. Hasan v. Government of Andhra Pradesh,18 the Andhra Pradesh High Court held
that refusal to Journalist and Videographer seeking interview with condemned
prisoners amounted to deprivation of citizens fundamental right to freedom of speech
and expression under Article 19(1)(a). As far the exercise of fundamental rights is
concerned, the Court said, position of a condemned prisoner was on par with a free
citizen. He had a right, the Court held, to give his ideas and was entitled to be
interviewed or to be televised.
3.4 Freedom in the volume of News or Views
In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 19 the Supreme Court held that the right to
propagate his ideas guaranteed in Article 19(1)(a) extended not merely to the matter
which he was entitled to circulate but also to the volume of circulation.
In this case, in pursuance of the provision of the Newspapers (price and page) Act,
1956, the Central Government issued the Daily Newspapers (Price and Page) Order,
1960 which fixed the maximum number of pages that might be published by the
16 AIR1950 SC 129
17 AIR 1957 SC 896
18 AIR 1998 A.P 35
19 AIR 1962 SC 305

newspaper according to the price charged. The order fixed a minimum price and
number of pages which a newspaper was entitled to publish. The petitioners were
required to increase the price of their newspaper if they were increasing the pages. On
the other hand, if the petitioners were to reduce the price, they were required to
decrease the number of pages. That would have the effect of reducing the column,
space for news, views or ideas.
The order was challenged as violative of the freedom of the press, since its adoption
meant either the reduction in the existing number of pages or raising the price. In
either case, there would be reduction of the volume of circulation of the newspapers
and, therefore, a direct infringement of the liberty of the press. The Order thus, acted
as a double edged knife. It cut the circulation by a price rise or publication or
dissemination of news, ideas and knowledge by restricting column space consequent
to decrease in the number of pages. The Supreme Court struck down the order and
held it to be inoperative since the impugned Act and the order placed restraints on the
volume of circulation.
Again, in Bennett Coleman and Co. v. Union of India,20 the Supreme Court laid down
that freedom of speech and expression was not only in the volume of circulation but
also in the volume of news and views.
India faces a shortage of indigenous newsprint. Therefore, newsprint has to be
imported from foreign countries. Because of the shortage of foreign exchange,
quantity of newsprint imported was not adequate to meet all requirements. Some
restrictions, therefore, became necessary on the consumption of newsprint.
Accordingly, a system of newsprint quota for newspapers was evolved. It fixed the
maximum number of pages, i.e., 10 pages, which a newspaper could publish with an
allowance of 20 percent page increase only to newspapers below ten pages.
The Supreme Court struck down the Newsprint Policy as being violative of Article
19(1)(a). The Court held that the newspapers should be left free to determine their
pages, their circulation and their new edition within their quota of newsprint which
had been fairly fixed.
3.5 No excessive taxes on Press

20 AIR 1973 SC 106

In Indian Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 21 the Supreme Court
emphasized that the Government should be more cautious while levying taxes on
matters concerning newspaper industry than while levying taxes on other matters.
In this case, the petitioners, who were editors, printers and publishers of newspapers,
periodicals, magazines, etc. challenged the validity of the imposition of import duty,
on newsprint under the Customs Act, 1962 read with the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and
the levy of auxiliary duty under the Finance Act, 1981, on newsprint.
The Supreme Court held that the newspaper industry had not been granted exemption
from taxation. However, the exercise of power to tax should be subject to scrutiny by
the courts. The imposition of a tax like the customs duty on newsprint, the Court said,
was an imposition of tax on knowledge and would virtually amount to a burden
imposed on a man for being literate and for being conscious of his duty as a citizen to
inform himself of the world around him.22
4. Right to exhibit films on Doordarshan
In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manubhai D. Shah, 23 the Supreme Court held
that a film-maker had a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) to exhibit his film on
Doordarshan.
In this case, the respondent, Cinemart Foundation produced a documentary film on the
Bhopal Gas disaster titled Beyond Genocide. The film had won the Golden Lotus
Award as the best non-feature film of 1987. At the time of the presentation of awards, the
Union Minister for Information and Broadcasting., had declared that that the award
winning films would be telecasted on Doordarshan. It was granted a U certificate by the
Central Board of Films Certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.
The Doordarshan refused to telecast the film on certain grounds. The Supreme Court held
that the respondents had the right to convey his perception of the gas disaster in Bhopal
through the documentary film. Merely because, it was critical of the State Government
was no reason to deny selection and publication of the film. In fact, the community was
keen to know what actually had happened, what was happening, what remedial measures,
the State authorities were taking and what were the likely consequences of the gas leak.24
In respect to right to exhibit films, the following aspects may be noticed21 AIR 1986 SC 515
22 Supra 10, p.245
23 AIR 1993 SC 171

4.1 Article 19(1)(a) forbids State Monopoly either in print or Electronic Media
The Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket
Association of Bengal,25 made an important innovation and held that the government
had no monopoly on electronic media and that a citizen had under Article 19(1)(a), a
right to telecast and broadcast to the viewers/listeners through electronic media,
television and radio, any important event. It has been held that a monopoly over
broadcasting whether by government or anybody else, was inconsistent with free
speech right. The Honourable Court brought broadcasting and telecasting within the
ambit of this article, thus, interpreted the article in broader terms.
4.2 Pre-censorship of films
In K.A Abbas v. Union of India,26 the constitutionality of films as a media of
expression and its pre-censorship came up before the Supreme Court. Under the
Cinematograph Act, 1952, films are categorised as U films and A films. While U
films are meant for unrestricted exhibition, A films can be shown to adults only. The
petitioner, unable to get U certificate for his film Tale of Four Cities, questioned
the validity of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 along with rules made thereunder.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the impugned Act and said that precensorship of films was justified under Article 19(2) as imposing a reasonable
restriction.
5. Commercial advertisements
In Hamdard Dawakhana Vs Union of India27, it was held that commercial
advertisements were not included within the concept of freedom of speech and
expression. In the instant case, the Drugs and Magic Remedies objectionable
advertisements) Act, 1954 was passed with a view to the prevention of self-medication
and self-treatment by prohibiting the publication of advertisements of drugs having magic
qualities for curing diseases. The Supreme court held the act valid and ruled that the
scope and object of the impugned act was not interference with the freedom of speech and
expression but it dealt with the trade and business which might be restricted in the
interests of general public under Article 19(6).
24 Supra 10, p.250
25 AIR 1995 SC 1236
26 AIR 1971 SC 481
27 AIR 1960 SC 554

In Indian express newspaper Vs UOI

28

the court held that all commercial advertisements

could not denied the protection of art 19(1)(a), merely because they were issued by a
businessmen.
Thus explaining the effect of the combined reading of both the above cases the Supreme
Court in TATA Press ltd Vs MTNL29 held that commercial speech could not be denied the
protection of art 19(1)(a), merely because they were issued by businessmen. In a
democratic society it was observed that free flow of commercial information was
indispensible.
6. Right to fly National flag
The right to fly the National flag freely with respect and dignity, being an expression and
manifestation of ones allegiance and feelings and sentiments of pride for the Nation, has
been held in Union of India v. Naveen Jindal,30 to be a fundamental right within the
meaning of Article 19(1)(a), but so long as the expression is confined to nationalism,
patriotism and love for motherland.

Reasonable Restrictions on Freedom of Speech and Expression- Article 19(2)

The freedom of speech and expression does not confer an absolute right to speak and publish,
without responsibility, whatever one may choose or an unrestricted or unbridled licence that
gives immunity for every possible use of language and does not prevent punishments for
those who abuse this freedom.31 Clause (2) of Article 19 specifies the grounds on which the
freedom of speech and expression may be restricted. It enables the legislature to impose
reasonable restrictions on the right to free speech in the interests of or in relation to the
following:

28 AIR 1986 SC 515

29 AIR 1995 SC 2438
30 AIR 2004 SC 1559
31 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124

1. Security of State: Under Article 19(2) reasonable restrictions can be imposed on

fredom of speech and expression in the interest of security of State. The term
"security of state" refers only to serious and aggravated forms of public order e.g.
rebellion, waging war against the State, insurrection and not ordinary breaches of
public order and public safety, e.g. unlawful assembly, riot, affray. Thus speeches or
expression on the part of an individual, which incite to or encourage the commission
of violent crimes, such as, murder are matters, which would undermine the security of
State.
2. Friendly relations with foreign states: This ground was added by the constitution
(First Amendment) Act, 1951. The object behind the provision is to prohibit
unrestrained malicious propaganda against a foreign friendly state, which may
jeopardise the maintenance of good relations between India, and that state. No similar
provision is present in any other Constitution of the world. In India, the Foreign
Relations Act, (XII of 1932) provides punishment for libel by Indian citizens against
foreign dignitaries.
3. Public Order The preservation of public order is one of the grounds for imposing
restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression. This ground did not occur in the
Constitution as framed in 1950 but was added later by the First (Amendment) Act,
1951. The expression public order is synonymous with public peace, safety and
tranquillity.32 It signifies the absence of disorder involving breaches of local
significance in contradistinction to national upheavals such as revolution, civil strife
or war, affecting the security of the state.
It may be noticed that clause (2) uses the words in the interests of public order and
not for the maintenance of public order. A law may not be designed to directly
maintain law and order yet it may be enacted in the interests of public order. Also,
not only such utterances as are directly intended to incite disorder, but also those that
have the tendency to lead to disorder fall within the expression.33 Thus, a law
punishing utterances made with deliberate intention to hurt the religious feelings of
any class is valid, because it imposes a restriction on the right to free speech in the

32 Supdt., Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.

33 Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620; Virendra v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957
SC 896.

interest of public order, since such speech or writing has the tendency to create public
disorder even if in some cases such activities may not lead to the breach of peace.34
4. Decency and morality Decency and morality is another ground on which freedom
of speech and expression may be reasonably restricted. Decency is same as lack of
obscenity. Obscenity becomes a subject of constitutional interest since it illustrates
well the clash between the right of individuals to freely express their opinion and the
duty of the state to safeguard their morals. It is obvious that the right to freedom of
speech and expression cannot be used to deprave and corrupt the community.
In Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra35the Supreme Court for the first time was
called upon to lay down the test to determine obscenity. The facts were that the
appellants, a Bombay bookseller, was prosecuted under Section 292of the Indian
Penal Code for selling and for keeping for sale the well known book, Lady Chatterlys
Lover written by D.H. Lawrence. The Magistrate held that the book was obscene and
sentenced the appellant. The court held that it had the right to restrict the freedom on
the grounds of decency and morality.
5. Contempt of Court The constitutional right to freedom of speech does not prevent
the courts from punishing for their contempt spoken or printed words or any other
expression calculated to have that effect.36 The expression contempt of court is now
defined in Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as under:
a) contempt of court means civil contempt or criminal contempt;
b) civil contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgement, decree, direction,
order, writ or any other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given
to a court;
c) criminal contempt means the publication (whether by words spoken or written,
or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing
of any other act whatsoever which
i)
Scandalizes or tends to scandalize or lowers or tends to lower the authority
ii)

of any court
Prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any

iii)

judicial proceedings
Interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner.

34 Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620.

35 AIR 1976 SC 881.
36 L.R. Frey v. R. Prasad, AIR 1958 Punj 377.

6. Defamation- The freedom of speech and expression cannot be used to transgress the
law relating to defamation. The word defamation covers both the crime and the tort
and in Article 19(2) it means the entire law of defamation, civil and criminal. Every
person possesses a right to his reputation and therefore no body can so

Freedom of Assembly: Articles 19(1)(b) and 19(3)

Art 19(1) (b) guarantees to the citizens of India the right to assemble peaceably and without
arms. Under art.19(1)(3), however, the state can make any law imposing reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of this right in the interest of public order, and sovereignty and
integrity of India.
To some extent, there is common ground between art 19(1) (a) and art19 (1) (b). For example
demonstrations, processions and meetings considered under art 19(1) (a) also fall under art
19(1) (b) for a demonstration also amounts to an assembly and, therefore, the same principles
apply under both articles. The right to strike is not available under either of these articles.
Restrictions on freedom of assembly
1) Assembly should not be violent but peaceful.
2) It should be without arms
3) The public order has to be maintained.
In Railway Board Vs Niranjan Singh37 the question arose that whether anyone could hold
meetings in government premises or not even though the person is government employ?
The court held that it is true that the freedoms guaranteed under our Constitution are very
valuable freedoms and this Court would resist abridging the ambit of those freedoms except
to the extent permitted by the Constitution. The fact that the citizens of this country have
freedom of speech, freedom to assemble peaceably and freedom to form - associations or
unions does not mean that they can exercise those freedoms in whatever place they please.
The exercise of those freedoms will come to an end as soon as the 'right of some-one else to
37 AIR 1969 SC 966

hold his property intervenes. Such a limitation is inherent in the exercise of those 'rights.
The validity of that limitation is not to be judged by the tests prescribed by Sub-Arts.
(2) And (3) of Art. 19.

In other words the contents of the freedoms guaranteed under

clauses (a), (b) and (c), the only freedoms with which we are concerned in this appeal, do
not include the right to exercise them in the properties belonging to others a citizen of this
country in the exercise of his right under clauses (d) and (e) of Art. 19(1) could move about
freely in a public-office or even reside there unless there exists some law imposing
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights.
Likewise, processions, demonstrations and agitations on busy roads cause obstruction to free
flow of traffic, apart from creating huge loss to public. Therefore, a ban imposed on such
activity would only be a reasonable restriction.
In India citizens have a right to hold meetings in public streets before the constitution, subject
to the control of appropriate authority regarding the time and place of the meeting and
considerations of public order. In Himat lal vs Police commission case 38, section 33(1)(o) of
the Bombay Police Act, 1951, empowered the Police Commissioner to make rules to regulate
assemblies and processions. Under Rule 7, the commissioner could put a total ban on all
meetings or processions. The supreme court struck down Rule 7 as violative of the right
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(b). The court held that the State cannot by law abridge or take
away the right of assembly by prohibiting assembly on every Public Street or public place.
The State can only make regulations in aid of the right of assembly of each citizen and can
only impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order. If the right to hold public
meetings flows from Art.19 (1) (b) and Art. 19(1) (d) it is obvious that the State cannot
impose unreasonable restrictions. It must be, kept in mind that Art.19 (1) (b), read with
Art.13, and protects citizens against State action.

Freedom to form Associations or Unions: Article 19(1)(c) and (4)

An association means a collection of persons who have joined together for a certain object,
which may be for the benefit of the members or the improvement, welfare or advantage of the
members or the improvement, welfare or advantage of the public or some scientific,
38 AIR 1973 SC 87

charitable or similar purpose. Article 19(1)(c) includes the right to form companies,
societies, partnership firms, trade unions, clubs, political parties and the like body of persons.
This freedom implies that several individuals can get together and form voluntary admit in
the association with common aims, legitimate purpose and a community of interests. The
person who form the association have the associational right to continue with the member
with those other whom they voluntarily admit an association. Any state action directed to
highjack association by taking it over, introducing officials in the management body of
association, trading out the member or restricting the committees and bodies constitution in
accordance with the constitution of the association. Association of which citizens may be
members may be social, academic creational, religious, cultural, or professional, vocational
or political. These may include associations for of cultural activities.
The right to form associations means the right voluntarily to be a member of an association. It
includes the right not to be a member or the right to continue to be or not to continue to be a
member of the association.
In Damyanti v. Union of India39, the petitioner was a member of the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan,
a Society, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 formed to promote and
propagate Hindi language. Subsequently, Parliament enacted the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan
Act, 1962 for regulating the affairs of the society. The act changed the composition of the
society and introduced new members. The Act further provided that the original members
would continue to be the members of the newly constituted Society. As a result, the members
who voluntarily formed the association were now compelled to act in the association with
other members, in whose admission, they had no say.
The Supreme Court held that the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) could be effective only
if it was held to include within it the right to continue the Association with its composition as
voluntarily agreed upon by the persons forming the association. The court thus held that the
act violated the right of the original members of the society to form an association guaranteed
under article 19(1)(c).40

39 AIR 1971 SC 966

40 Prof. Narender Kumar, Constitutional law of India Allahabad law Agency, 2014, p. 262

In Sitaramacharya v. Senior Dy. Director,

41

a circular was issued requiring the teachers to

join an association sponsored and recognised by the Government at the pains of disciplinary
action. The Andhra Pradesh High court struck down the circular as violative of Article 19(1)
(c) and laid down that the right to form an association included the right not to be a member
of an association.
The right to form association implies the right not to form an association.
In P.Balakothiah v. Union of India,42 the Supreme Court distinguished between the right to be
a member of an association and the right to continue in the government service.
In the instant case, the Railway service rules, 1949, enabled the government to terminate the
services of government servants at their pleasure, the services of the appellant were
terminated under the Rules for his being a member of the Communist party and a trade
unionist. The appellant contended that the termination of his service amounted to a denial to
him to the right to form an association.
The supreme court held that the order terminating his services was not in contravention of his
right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c). The court said that the appellant, no doubt, had the
fundamental right to form association, but he had no fundamental right to be continued in the
government service. The order terminating his service, the Court held, did not prevent him
from continuing to be a member of the communist party and a trade unionist.
The Fundamental Right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) can be claimed by government
servants as well. A government servant may not lose his right under Article 19(1)(c) by
joining government service. But the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) to form association
does not involve a guaranteed right to recognition thereof as well.
In Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmchari Sangh v. Union of India,43 the Supreme Court has
upheld the validity of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966, which imposes
certain restrictions on the enjoyment of Fundamental Rights on members of the police force.
The Act has been enacted under Article 33 but it is also valid under Art. 19(4).
41 AIR 1958 A.P 78
42 AIR 1958 SC 232
43 AIR 1987 SC 379

A Rule compelling a member of the police force to withdraw his membership of an

association as soon as recognition accorded to it is withdrawn, or if, no recognition is granted
to it, would be protected by Article 33. It is also protected by Article 19(4), as it is a
reasonable restriction on the right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) in the interest of discipline
and public order.

Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19(4)

The right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) is not absolute. Article 19(4) specifically
empowers the State to make any law to fetter, abridge or abrogate the right by imposing
reasonable restrictions.
In Peoples Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, 44 the Prevention of terrorism Act, 2002
was enacted, inter alia, to protect sovereignty and integrity of India from the menace of
terrorism. Declaring any organisation as a terrorist organisation, under the Act, was
permissible under Article 19(4).
In Haji Mohd. V. District Board Malda,45 teachers were required to take prior permissions to
engage themselves in politics or to participate in political activities. The Calcutta high court
upheld the restriction as reasonable one. It was held that a teacher was not merely a citizen
but he had to be under certain terms and discipline of employment. The restriction was aimed
at preventing teachers from getting mixed up with political institutions.

Freedom of Movement and Residence: Article 19(1)(d), 19(1)(e) and 19(5)

Inhered in his status of citizenship, the citizens right to move freely throughout the territory
of India is an important aspect of his freedom. The freedom of locomotion guarantees him in
general right of free movement which is an aspect of his personal liberty, although a specific
and limited part of it. It secures to hi, the right and privilege to go to any place within the
country across all states and inter- state barriers. A citizen needs no passport and no visa
while travelling inside the country.
44 AIR 2004 SC 456
45 AIR 1958 Cal. 401

Sub-clause (d) of Clause (1) of Article 19 guarantees to every citizen of India the right to
move freely throughout the territory of India.
The right to move freely throughout the territory of India means the right to locomotion
which connotes the right to move wherever one likes, whenever one likes, and however one
likes.
Article 19(1)(d) guarantees the right to move freely not merely from one state to another
state, but also from one place to another, within the same State. The right is not absolute in
the sense that clause 5 of Article 19 enables the state to impose reasonable restrictions on the
freedom on the following grounds(i)
(ii)

In the interest of general public;

For the protection of the interests of any scheduled tribe.

Broadly speaking the two rights contained in articles 19(1) (d) and 19(1) (e) are parts of the
same right and are complementary and often go together. Most of the cases considered under
article 19(d) are relevant to article 19(e) also. The two rights are therefore discussed together.
Foreigners
Art 19(1) (d) applies only to the citizens and not to foreigners. Accordingly the fundamental
right of a foreigner is confined to art 21 guaranteeing his life and liberty. He cannot claim the
right to reside and settle in the country as guaranteed by art 19(1) (e). The government of
India thus has the power to expel foreigners from India.
Road Blockades
The right to move freely secured under Article 19(1)(d) includes the right to use roads or
highways. Therefore, road blockades, which obstruct free flow of traffic on roads amount to
infringement of the fundamental right to move freely.
In Chambara Soy v. State of Orissa46, the petitioner was not allowed to take his ailing son to
the hospital by the unscrupulous elements, hooligans (rioters) blocking the road. As a result,
the son of the petitioner, who somehow escaped the mob, arrived at the hospital, but was
declared dead on arrival. Holding the State government negligent in removing the blockage,
the Orissa High Court granted compensation to the petitioner for this loss.
46 AIR 2008 Ori. 148

Wearing Helmets
A rule was made under the Motor Vehicles Act requiring compulsory wearing of helmet by a
person driving a scooter or a motor cycle. The rule was challenged as infringing the free
movement of the driver of a two wheeler guaranteed under Article 19(1)(d), but the Court
refused to accept the argument. The Court maintained that the rule has been framed for the
benefit and welfare of, and safe journey by, a person driving a two wheeler vehicle. The rule
is made to prevent accidents not to curtail freedom of movement. It is justifiable under Article
19(5) as a reasonable restriction in the interest of general public.47
Reasonable Restrictions

Deportation: - In N.B Khare v. State of Delhi,48 the East Punjab Public Safety Act,
1949 empowered the District Magistrate or the State Government to pass orders of
externment against any person, on being satisfied that such an order was necessary to
prevent him from acting in any way prejudicial to public safety and maintenance. The
Act was enacted with a view to meet the situation resulting from the partition of the
country and was to have a limited duration.
The petitioner, the Secretary of All India Hindu Mahasabha, propagating against
Muslims and Pakistan, was served with an order of externemnt by the District
magistrate, Delhi, to remove himself immediately from Delhi District and not to
return there for a period of three months. The petitioner contended that the Act was
violative of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(d).
The Supreme court held that the Act was not invalid because the discretion to make an
exterrnment order was given to the executive, such power could reasonably be
conferred in an emergency. Again, since the act was to have limited duration, the court
said, there was no possibility of an order of externemrnt being made for an indefinite

period.
Police Surveillance: - Since the pre-independence days, there have been in operation
in some of the States, some police regulations providing for police surveillance of
activities of persons suspected as criminal habits or tendencies. This includes secret
picketing of the house, domiciliary visits at nights, and shadowing the movements of
the suspect.

47 Ajay Canu v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 2027

48 AIR 1950 SC 211

The validity of such regulations with reference to Art.19(1)(d) was first considered by
the Supreme Court in Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh.49. The Court ruled by a
majority that no aspect of police surveillance fell within the scope of Art. 19(1)(d).
The purpose of secret picketing was only to identify the visitors to the suspect so that
police might have some idea of his activities and this did not affect his right of
movement in any material form.
On the same view, domiciliary visits were also held to fall outside the scope of Art.
19(1)(d) as a knock at the door, or rousing a man from his sleep, does not impede or
prejudice his locomotion in any manner.50
Surely, there was a flaw in this view that if there was no physical restraint on a
persons movements, then the reasonableness of police surveillance could not be
scrutinised vis-a-vis Art. 19(1)(d).
This flaw now has been removed by the Supreme Court by its pronouncement in
Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh.51The court has now held that police surveillance
will have to be restricted to such persons only against whom reasonable material exist
to induce the opinion that they show a determination to lead a life of crime Similarly
domiciliary visits and secret picketing by the police should be restricted to clearest
cases of danger to community security and should not be resorted to as routine followup at the end of a conviction or release from prison or at the whim of a police officer.

Freedom to Carry on Trade and Commerce: Arts. 19(1)(g) and 19(6)

The term occupation means some activity by which a person is occupied or engaged. It
would be an activity of a person undertaken as a means of livelihood or a mission of life. The
49 AIR 1963 SC 1295
50 Prof. MP Jain, Indian Constitutional Law, Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa,2010 p.
1126
51 AIR 1975 SC 1378

guarantee in Art.19(1)(g) extends to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation,

trade or business. Art. 19(1)(g) uses four different expressions so as to make the guarantee in
Art.19(1)(g) as comprehensive as possible and to include all avenues and modes through
which a person earns his livelihood.
The extent and scope of this freedom can be discussed in the following heads.1. Right to Start or to close Down a Business
The right to carry on a business includes the right not to start any business or if he
chooses, he has the right to close it down at any time he likes. Thus, the state cannot
compel a citizen to carry on business against his will. Also, a citizen cannot insist
upon the government or any other individual for doing business with him.
In ExcelWear v. Union of India,52the validity of section 25-O and 25-R of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was challenged. Section 25-O required an employer to
take prior permission from the government for closure of his industrial undertaking.
The government could refuse the permission to close down the business if it was
satisfied that the reasons given by the employer were not adequate and sufficient or
that such closure was prejudicial to the public interest.
The Supreme Court held section 25-O as a whole and section 25-R in so far as it
related to the awarding of punishment for violation of the provisions of section 25-O
as unconstitutional and invalid for violation of Article 19(1)(g). The court said that no
person had a right to carry on the business if he could not pay even the minimum
wages to the workers.
2. No Right to carry on Business or Trade in Liquor
Whether an activity or business comes within the purview of Article 19(1)(g), should
not be determined by applying the standards of morality obtaining at a particular time
in the country. The standards of morality can afford a guidance to impose restrictions,
but cannot limit the scope of the right.
In Har Shankar v. Deputy Excise and taxation commissioner,53 the Supreme Court
held that there is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants-its
manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations,
52 AIR 1979 SC 25
53 AIR 1975 SC 1121

these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting, there can be no
effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants.
3. Right to Impart Education and establish Educational Institutions.
The Supreme court in Unni Krishna vs state of A.P54 commonly known as capitation
fee case observed that activity of establishing an educational institutional institution
could neither a trade or business nor could it be a profession within the meaning of art
19(1)(g).
The above decision of Supreme Court was overruled by T.M.A Pai Foundation Vs
State of Karnataka55 where the court held that:Education used to be charity or philanthropy in good old times. Gradually it became
an 'occupation'. Some of the judicial dicta go on to hold it as an 'industry'. Whether, to
receive education, is a fundamental right or not has been debated for quite some time.
But it is settled that establishing and administering of an educational institution for
imparting knowledge to the students is an occupation, protected by Article 19(1)(g)
and additionally by Article 26(a), if there is no element of profit generation. As of
now, imparting education has come to be a means of livelihood for some professionals
and a mission in life for some altruists.
It is submitted that taking over the right to regulate admission and fee structure of
unaided professional institutions is not a 'reasonable restriction' within the meaning of
Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

54 AIR 1993 SC 2178

55 AIR 2003 SC 355