Cases For Public Corporation PDF

Public Corporation 1
Cases for Public Corporation

Contents
LIMBONA VS. MANGELIN ........................................................... 2
MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. . 7
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO ....................... 13
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
OF TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA VS. BOADO ........................... 24
LONZANIDA VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTION .................................................................................. 28
MONTEBON VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION ....................... 32
TAN VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS .......................... 39
PADILLA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS .......................... 46
CENIZA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ............................ 48
ORDILLO VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ................. 51
Page | 1
SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, PETITIONER, VS. CONTE MANGELIN,

SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS,
GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO
there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee

hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in
batasang pampook x x x."
PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, AND BIMBO SINSUAT,

RESPONDENTS.
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting

Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following
DECISION
telegram:
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM
SARMIENTO, J.:
RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY

MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS
The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this
REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF
petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:
THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WIRE

ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER
1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was
AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF
appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous
CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN
Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.
BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional
advice, with the following assemblymen present:
Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for
1. Sali, Salic
brevity).
2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Dagalangit, Rakil
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March
5. Mangelen, Conte
23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of
6. Ortiz, Jesus
candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao
7. Palomares, Diego
del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter
8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly.
9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the
After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr.
authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the
Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence,
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter
the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.
which reads:
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake Consultations and dialogues
8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the
with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional
following Assemblymen present:
leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues
affecting Regions IX and XII.
1. Mangelen Conte -- Presiding Officer

2. Ali Salic
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart
3. Ali Salindatu
the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod
4. Aratuc, Malik
the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission
5. Cajelo, Rene
as mandated by the Commission.
6. Conding Pilipinas (sic)
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your
7. Dagalangit, Rakal
respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987; with venue at the Congress of

the Philippines.
8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

9. Ortiz, Jesus
Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.
10. Palamares, Diego
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting
11. Quijano, Jesus
Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that
12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
Page | 2
[4]
13. Tomawis, Acmad
made ... and that "such action of Mr. Limbona in paying Abdula his salaries
14. Tomawis, Jerry
and emoluments without authority from the Assembly ... constituted a

usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"[5] that the petitioner "had recently
An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to

the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly (sic) ,"[6]
HON. DALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the
and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members
presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move
of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the
to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the
confines of the Assembly,"[7] for which the respondents now submit that the
previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing
petition had become "moot and academic".[8]
so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker ProTempore as the
Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelista as Acting Secretary in the session
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner
last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.
(pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.
HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by
reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's
PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions
expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to
presented? The Chair hears none and the said motions are approved. x x x.
preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the
[1]
Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against.
expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no

showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation and whether or
Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:
not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an
investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand,
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that -
what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the
respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has
not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook."[9] To be sure, the private
(a) This Petition be given due course;
respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him

(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be
to come to Cotabato City,"[10] but that was "so that their differences could be
issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on
threshed out and settled."[11] Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh
November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter;
out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be, cannot be a substitute for
the notice and hearing contemplated by law.
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by

respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void;
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative
law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or
opportunity to be heard,[12] it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to
Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting; and
begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and
corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was
(e) Making the injunction permanent.
accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the

charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant
[2]
Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.
expulsion.
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta
resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPELLING ALIMBUSAR P.
by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former
LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK,
perceive to be obduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution)
AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"[3] on the grounds, among other things, that the
speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme
petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the
Court ... on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the
salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after
Assembly -- an act which some members claimed unnecesarily and unduly
filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of
assails their integrity and character as representative of the people," [13] an act
Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections ... and nothing in the record of the
that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed
Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever
by the Constitution,[14] and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
Page | 3
prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the

base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more
We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of
responsive and accountable",[23] and "ensure their fullest development as self-
the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the
national development and social progress."[24] At the same time, it relieves the
most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the
central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues,
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general
their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the
supervision"[25] over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
according to law."[26] He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.[27]
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are
"autonomous", the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-
power in favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that
called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Regions constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation",
IX and XII?
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to

the central authorities but to its constituency.[28]
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and

XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618[15] promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao
other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" [16] in the two regions
under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather
"[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is
Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,"
[17]
"with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities"
[18]
specified
therein.
involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of

the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy
now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case.
It required the autonomous regional governments to undertake all internal

administrative matters for the respective regions,[19] except to "act on matters
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these
which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
two senses, thus:
Government,
[20]
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the
(2) Foreign relations;
Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall
(3) Foreign trade;
be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking,
provided.[29]
and external borrowing;

(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.[30]
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;

(8) Customs and quarantine;
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
(9) Immigration and deportation;
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
[21]
(12) General auditing."
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have
Republic of the Philippines.[31]
the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions
xxx."[22]
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category

[CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy". On
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted,
Page | 4
under the supervision of the national government acting through the President
(and the Department of Local Government).
[32]
legislation, policies, plans and programs.
If the Sangguniang Pampook (of
Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably,
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts,
Pambansa.[34]
say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of
jurisdiction.
the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's
removal as Speaker.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous

governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise
Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds
autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits
that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole
an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the
mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and
Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess;
control over Autonomous Regions."
[33]
In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative
and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for
lack of quorum.
services, thus:
Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. - The Sangguniang Pampook
were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian
shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework
Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of
of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas:
the Sangguniang Pampook,"[35] but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may,
on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of short intervals."[36] Of course, there is
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called

by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short
(2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist
that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous
used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so
Region;
that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate
dissenssion [sic] and disunity."[37] The Court agrees with the respondents on this
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals". Secondly, the Court
likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the
(5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session opens under the
same Rules.[38] Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree; interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents'
own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the
petitioner called the "recess", it was not a settled matter whether or not he could
Autonomous Region;
do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other
intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
social services, programs and facilities;
does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What
appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back
(9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his
indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and
side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith.
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law, including the enactment
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the
of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare
aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his
of the people in the Autonomous Region.
ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced
that the invitation was what precipitated it.
The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that
enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national
establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared
Page | 5
without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein,
we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation
of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof.
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from

reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at
the proper time. In the event that the petitioner should initiate obstructive
moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to
thwart them.[39]
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The

Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the
petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE
him as Speaker thereof. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 6
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO,

PETITIONERS, VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. &
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1)

year, for the third and subsequent offenses.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
SECTION 4. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication
thereof.
DECISION
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375CRUZ, J.:
93 reading as follows:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the

project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND

PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
legislators. The media trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against
to the welfare of the city.
CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution
cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To
No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO;
this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353,
Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private respondents, renovated and
prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business
equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the
Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises
Christmas season.
or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local
and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as
Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4),
follows:
Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local Government Code, the City
Council as the Legislative Body shall enact measure to suppress any activity
inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and/or regulate or
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT protect social and moral welfare of the community;
AND
CANCELLING
EXISTING
BUSINESS
PERMIT
TO
ANY NOW THEREFORE,
ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS

PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de
Oro, in session assembled that:
SECTION 1. - That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of
casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any
person, partnership or corporation for the operation of casino within the city
limits.
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

SECTION 1. - The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de
Oro is hereby prohibited.
SECTION 2. - Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following
penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed

against the proprietor, partnership or corporation
SECTION 2. - That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any
undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of
persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or portion
gambling CASINO in the City and closure thereof;
thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation and other
gambling activities.
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more
SECTION 3. - PENALTIES. - Any violation of such existing business permit as
than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of
defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:
P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court

against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and
a fine of P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense,
and a fine of P3,000.00/day
Page | 7
responsible in the establishment, conduct and

maintenance of gambling CASINO.
SECTION 3. - This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
in a local newspaper of general circulation.
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,

enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge
convenience of their inhabitants.
succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. [1]
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, 1993. [2]

Sec. 458. - Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a) The
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review
Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[3] They aver that the respondent Court of
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of
Appeals erred in holding that:
the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de this Code, and shall:
Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and
operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec.
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and
effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx
458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) - (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress
invalid on that point.
and impose appropriate penalties for habitual

drunkenness in public places, vagrancy,
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to
mendicancy, prostitution, establishment and
cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.
maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the
and other prohibited games of chance,
general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent
fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money
with the laws or policy of the State.
or property, drug addiction, maintenance of
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the
delinquency, the printing, distribution or
issues presented in this present case.
exhibition of obscene or pornographic

materials or publications, and such other
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and
activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the
the inhabitants of the city;
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and

Gaming Corporation,[4] this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties
and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third
and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general
highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau
welfare.[5]
of Customs.
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to
Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games
enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by
expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General
general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred
Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and
not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if
SEC. 16. - General Welfare. - Every local government unit shall exercise the the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the
powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its
powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment autonomy as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution,
of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a as well as various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character
Page | 8
of the nation. In giving the local government units the power to prevent or
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite
suppress gambling and other social problems, the Local Government Code has
various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court
recognized the competence of such communities to determine and adopt the
expressive of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the
measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in
State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might
line with the policies of the State.
be expected, call attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, [7] which
sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local
petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of
government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games
P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating
of chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of
PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the
gambling without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."
[6]
debemos. Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it
This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local
government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
territories, including the operation of casinos.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is

nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or,
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of
for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment
activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may
than P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between
prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted
follows:
its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse.
Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, theories.[8] That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not
inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and
modified accordingly.
executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of

government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will
Local Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of
ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
the petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of
specifically provides:
Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. - In the interpretation of the provisions of this the criteria laid down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of
Code, the following rules shall apply:
gambling.
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally

[9]
interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
requirements:
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
xxx
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to
give more powers to local government units in accelerating economic
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community; x 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
x x (Emphasis supplied.)
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.
Page | 9
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code,
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing
local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified)
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire
law. The petitioners are less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have
repealing clause, which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
excluded such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the
section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or
SEC. 534. Repealing Clause. - (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known
phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words
as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and
with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other
instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay
prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
are hereby repealed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite
conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of
the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy,
deserve more than short shrift from this Court.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding
hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the
Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D.
1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR
558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136
are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs
Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny
locally-funded projects.
that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance
admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change has
been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by
the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that
PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the local
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972,
as amended, and
government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local

Government Code is permissible because one law can change or repeal
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
another law.
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are

inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the modified accordingly.
decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is
already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in
Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos.
the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco
Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local
& Co. v. Apostol,[10]this Court explained:
government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated
by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is to be given its
accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to prevent
and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and
illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of
chance to regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local
government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the
Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a
toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of
the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given
effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it
has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to
repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that
the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear
to each other the relation of general to special.
powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation of

casinos.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the

contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the
source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309,
creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of
Page | 10
victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648,
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the
providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a
are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR charter
folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal
has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been
corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of
improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of
no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned.
the government.
They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.[11]
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against

another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort
to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as
the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of
a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold
one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if
possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution of the
problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of
gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D.
1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to
detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under
our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True,
there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, [12] which cannot
now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy
its will or modify or violate it.
both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to
wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern
concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The
petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of
gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling
without a clear indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly,
following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized
by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as
authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
welfare of their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of

Cagayan de Oro City will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We
share the view that "the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without special
effort, turns the head of the workman"[13] and that "habitual gambling is a cause
of laziness and ruin."[14] In People v. Gorostiza,[15] we declared: "The social
scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be
enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice,
the brother of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must
recognize the power of the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize
certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in
the Local Government Code. That decision can be revoked by this Court only if
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the

conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are
it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do not

find such contravention here.
valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the
decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of
gambling in general.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of
chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local
Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a
suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national

government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the
latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was
not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to
enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all
their praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the
public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which
they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it destroy, it may abridge
Page | 11
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the

respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It
is so ordered.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,

Puno,
Vitug,
Padilla
and
Page | 12
Kapunan,
Davide,
and
Jr.,
JJ.,
Mendoza,
see
JJ.,
concur.
separate
opinion.
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, REPRESENTED BY ITS GOVERNOR,

HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALBERTO G.
The LGSEF in the GAA of 1999
ROMULO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND CHAIRMAN OF THE OVERSIGHT

COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION; HON. EMILIA BONCODIN, SECRETARY,
In Republic Act No. 8745, otherwise known as the GAA of 1999, the program
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT; HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., was renamed as the LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
RESPONDENTS.
(LGSEF). Under said appropriations law, the amount of P96,780,000,000 was

allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue taxes. Item No. 1,
Special Provisions, Title XXXVI A. Internal Revenue Allotment of Rep. Act No.
DECISION
8745 contained the following proviso:

... PROVIDED, That the amount of FIVE BILLION PESOS (P5,000,000,000)
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
shall be earmarked for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund for the
funding requirements of projects and activities arising from the full and efficient
The Province of Batangas, represented by its Governor, Hermilando I.
implementation of devolved functions and services of local government units
Mandanas, filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
pursuant to R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional
1991: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such amount shall be released to the local
and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of
government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations, including
1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each
such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and distribution of
corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the
said fund among local government units subject to the guidelines that may be
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service
prescribed by the Oversight Committee on Devolution as constituted pursuant to
Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.
Book IV, Title III, Section 533(b) of R.A. No. 7160. The Internal Revenue
Allotment shall be released directly by the Department of Budget and
Named as respondents are Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo, in his
Management to the Local Government Units concerned.
capacity as Chairman of the Oversight Committee on Devolution, Secretary
On July 28, 1999, the Oversight Committee (with then Executive Secretary
Emilia Boncodin of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) and
Ronaldo B. Zamora as Chairman) passed Resolution Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-
Secretary Jose Lina of the Department of Interior and Local Government
99-005 and OCD-99-006 entitled as follows:
(DILG).
OCD-99-005
Background
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP5

BILLION CY 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND
On December 7, 1998, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive
(LGSEF) AND REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH
Order (E.O.) No. 48 entitled ESTABLISHING A PROGRAM FOR
EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE SAID ALLOCATION SCHEME.
DEVOLUTION ADJUSTMENT AND EQUALIZATION. The program was

established to facilitate the process of enhancing the capacities of local
OCD-99-006
government units (LGUs) in the discharge of the functions and services

devolved to them by the National Government Agencies concerned pursuant to
RESOLUTION ADOPTING THE ALLOCATION SCHEME FOR THE PhP4.0
the Local Government Code.[1] The Oversight Committee (referred to as the
BILLION OF THE 1999 LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION
Devolution Committee in E.O. No. 48) constituted under Section 533(b) of
FUND AND ITS CONCOMITANT GENERAL FRAMEWORK, IMPLEMENTING
Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) has been tasked
GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND
to formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for its
RELEASE, AS PROMULGATED BY THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON
effective implementation.[2] Further, to address the funding shortfalls of functions
DEVOLUTION.
and services devolved to the LGUs and other funding requirements of the
program, the Devolution Adjustment and Equalization Fund was created. [3] For
OCD-99-003
1998, the DBM was directed to set aside an amount to be determined by the
Oversight Committee based on the devolution status appraisal surveys
RESOLUTION REQUESTING HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT JOSEPH
undertaken by the DILG.[4] The initial fund was to be sourced from the available
EJERCITO ESTRADA TO APPROVE THE REQUEST OF THE OVERSIGHT
savings of the national government for CY 1998.
[5]
For 1999 and the
succeeding years, the corresponding amount required to sustain the program
COMMITTEE ON DEVOLUTION TO SET ASIDE TWENTY PERCENT (20%)

OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE EQUALIZATION FUND (LGSEF)
was to be incorporated in the annual GAA.[6] The Oversight Committee has been FOR LOCAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PROJECTS AND OTHER PRIORITY
authorized to issue the implementing rules and regulations governing the
equitable allocation and distribution of said fund to the LGUs.
Page | 13
[7]
INITIATIVES FOR LGUs INSTITUTIONAL AND CAPABILITY BUILDING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES AND MECHANICS
under the one-billion-peso portion of the LGSEF, the OCD promulgated the
AS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMITTEE.
following:
These OCD resolutions were approved by then President Estrada on October 6,
III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY:
1999.
1.
LGUs (province, city, municipality, or barangay),
Under the allocation scheme adopted pursuant to Resolution No. OCD-99-005,
individually or by group or multi-LGUs or leagues of LGUs,
the five billion pesos LGSEF was to be allocated as follows:
especially those belonging to the 5th and 6th class, may

access the fund to support any projects or activities that
1.
The PhP4 Billion of the LGSEF shall be allocated in
satisfy any of the aforecited purposes. A barangay may
accordance with the allocation scheme and implementing
also access this fund directly or through their respective
guidelines and mechanics promulgated and adopted by the
municipality or city.
OCD. To wit:
2.
a.
The proposed project/activity should be need-based, a
The first PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be
local priority, with high development impact and are
allocated in accordance with the codal formula
congruent with the socio-cultural, economic and
sharing scheme as prescribed under the 1991
development agenda of the Estrada Administration, such
Local Government Code;
as food security, poverty alleviation, electrification, and

peace and order, among others.
b.
The second PhP2 Billion of the LGSEF shall be

allocated in accordance with a modified 1992
cost of devolution fund (CODEF) sharing
3.
Eligible for funding under this fund are projects arising

from, but not limited to, the following areas of concern:
scheme, as recommended by the respective

leagues of provinces, cities and municipalities to
a.
the OCD. The modified CODEF sharing formula

is as follows:
delivery of local health and sanitation services,

hospital services and other tertiary services;
b.
delivery of social welfare services;
c.
provision of socio-cultural services and facilities

for youth and community development;
d.
Province
40%
Cities
20%
Municipalities:
40%
provision of agricultural and on-site related

research;
e.
improvement of community-based forestry

projects and other local projects on environment
and natural resources protection and
conservation;
This is applied to the P2 Billion after the approved amounts
f.
granted to individual provinces, cities and municipalities as
improvement of tourism facilities and promotion

of tourism;
assistance to cover decrease in 1999 IRA share due to
g.
peace and order and public safety;
reduction in land area have been taken out.
h.
construction, repair and maintenance of public

works and infrastructure, including public
2.
The remaining PhP1 Billion of the LGSEF shall be
buildings and facilities for public use, especially
earmarked to support local affirmative action projects and
those destroyed or damaged by man-made or
other priority initiatives submitted by LGUs to the Oversight
natural calamities and disaster as well as
Committee on Devolution for approval in accordance with
facilities for water supply, flood control and river
its prescribed guidelines as promulgated and adopted by

the OCD.
dikes;
i.
provision of local electrification facilities;
j.
livelihood and food production services, facilities
In Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the Oversight Committee set aside the one
billion pesos or 20% of the LGSEF to support Local Affirmative Action Projects
(LAAPs) of LGUs. This remaining amount was intended to respond to the
urgent need for additional funds assistance, otherwise not available within the
parameters of other existing fund sources. For LGUs to be eligible for funding
Page | 14
and equipment;
k.
other projects that may be authorized by the

OCD consistent with the aforementioned
objectives and guidelines;
Further, under the guidelines formulated by the Oversight Committee as

contained in Attachment - Resolution No. OCD-99-003, the LGUs were required
4.
Except on extremely meritorious cases, as may be
to identify the projects eligible for funding under the one-billion- peso portion of
determined by the Oversight Committee on Devolution, this
the LGSEF and submit the project proposals thereof and other documentary
portion of the LGSEF shall not be used in expenditures for
requirements to the DILG for appraisal. The project proposals that passed the
personal costs or benefits under existing laws applicable to
DILGs appraisal would then be submitted to the Oversight Committee for
governments. Generally, this fund shall cover the following
review, evaluation and approval. Upon its approval, the Oversight Committee
objects of expenditures for programs, projects and activities would then serve notice to the DBM for the preparation of the Special Allotment
arising from the implementation of devolved and regular
Release Order (SARO) and Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) to effect the
functions and services:
release of funds to the said LGUs.
a.
acquisition/procurement of supplies and
materials critical to the full and effective

implementation of devolved programs, projects
Under Rep. Act No. 8760, otherwise known as the GAA of 2000, the amount of
and activities;
P111,778,000,000 was allotted as the share of the LGUs in the internal revenue
b.
repair and/or improvement of facilities;
taxes. As in the GAA of 1999, the GAA of 2000 contained a proviso earmarking
c.
repair and/or upgrading of equipment;
five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF. This proviso, found in Item No. 1,
d.
acquisition of basic equipment;
Special Provisions, Title XXXVII A. Internal Revenue Allotment, was similarly
e.
construction of additional or new facilities;
worded as that contained in the GAA of 1999.
f.
counterpart contribution to joint arrangements or

collective projects among groups of
The Oversight Committee, in its Resolution No. OCD-2000-023 dated June 22,
municipalities, cities and/or provinces related to
2000, adopted the following allocation scheme governing the five billion pesos
devolution and delivery of basic services.
LGSEF for 2000:
1.
The PhP3.5 Billion of the CY 2000 LGSEF shall be

allocated to and shared by the four levels of LGUs, i.e.,
5.
To be eligible for funding, an LGU or group of LGU shall
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays, using the
submit to the Oversight Committee on Devolution through
following percentage-sharing formula agreed upon and
the Department of Interior and Local Governments, within
jointly endorsed by the various Leagues of LGUs:
the prescribed schedule and timeframe, a Letter Request

for Funding Support from the Affirmative Action Program
under the LGSEF, duly signed by the concerned LGU(s)
and endorsed by cooperators and/or beneficiaries, as well
For Provinces
26% or P 910,000,000
as the duly signed Resolution of Endorsement by the
For Cities
23% or 805,000,000
respective Sanggunian(s) of the LGUs concerned. The
For Municipalities
35% or 1,225,000,000
LGU-proponent shall also be required to submit the Project
For Barangays
16% or 560,000,000
Request (PR), using OCD Project Request Form No. 9902, that details the following:
2.
Provided that the respective Leagues representing the
(a) general description or brief of the project;

(b) objectives and justifications for undertaking the project, which should
highlight the benefits to the locality and the expected impact to the local
program/project arising from the full and efficient implementation of
social services and facilities, at the local levels;
(c) target outputs or key result areas;
(d) schedule of activities and details of requirements;
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall draw

up and adopt the horizontal distribution/sharing schemes
among the member LGUs whereby the Leagues concerned
may opt to adopt direct financial assistance or projectbased arrangement, such that the LGSEF allocation for
individual LGU shall be released directly to the LGU
concerned;
(e) total cost requirement of the project;

(f) proponents counterpart funding share, if any, and identified source(s) of
counterpart funds for the full implementation of the project;
(g) requested amount of project cost to be covered by the LGSEF.
Page | 15
Provided further that the individual LGSEF shares to LGUs

are used in accordance with the general purposes and
guidelines promulgated by the OCD for the implementation
of the LGSEF at the local levels pursuant to Res. No. OCD-
Modified Codal Formula
P 3.000 billion
99-006 dated October 7, 1999 and pursuant to the
Priority Projects
1.900 billion
Leagues guidelines and mechanism as approved by the
Capability Building Fund
.100 billion
OCD;
Provided further that each of the Leagues shall submit to
P 5.000 billion
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P3.0 B of the CY 2001 LGSEF which is to be
the OCD for its approval their respective allocation scheme, allocated according to the modified codal formula shall be released to the four
the list of LGUs with the corresponding LGSEF shares and
levels of LGUs, i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, as follows:
the corresponding project categories if project-based;

Amount
LGUs
Percentage
Provinces
25
P 0.750 billion
Cities
25
0.750
Municipalities
35
1.050
Barangays
15
0.450
100
P 3.000 billion
Provided further that upon approval by the OCD, the lists of

LGUs shall be endorsed to the DBM as the basis for the
preparation of the corresponding NCAs, SAROs, and
related budget/release documents.
3.
The remaining P1,500,000,000 of the CY 2000 LGSEF

shall be earmarked to support the following initiatives and
local affirmative action projects, to be endorsed to and
approved by the Oversight Committee on Devolution in
accordance with the OCD agreements, guidelines,
procedures and documentary requirements:
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the P1.9 B earmarked for priority projects shall be
distributed according to the following criteria:
1.0 For projects of the 4th, 5th and 6th class LGUs; or
2.0 Projects in consonance with the Presidents State of the Nation Address
(SONA)/summit commitments.
On July 5, 2000, then President Estrada issued a Memorandum authorizing

then Executive Secretary Zamora and the DBM to implement and release the
2.5 billion pesos LGSEF for 2000 in accordance with Resolution No. OCD-2000023.
RESOLVED FURTHER, that the remaining P100 million LGSEF capability

building fund shall be distributed in accordance with the recommendation of the
Leagues of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barangays, and approved by
the OCD.
Thereafter, the Oversight Committee, now under the administration of President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, promulgated Resolution No. OCD-2001-29 entitled
ADOPTING RESOLUTION NO. OCD-2000-023 IN THE ALLOCATION,
IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEASE OF THE REMAINING P2.5 BILLION
LGSEF FOR CY 2000. Under this resolution, the amount of one billion pesos of
Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution, Gov. Mandanas wrote to the
individual members of the Oversight Committee seeking the reconsideration of
Resolution No. OCD-2002-001. He also wrote to Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo urging
her to disapprove said resolution as it violates the Constitution and the Local
Government Code of 1991.
the LGSEF was to be released in accordance with paragraph 1 of Resolution

No. OCD-2000-23, to complete the 3.5 billion pesos allocated to the LGUs,
while the amount of 1.5 billion pesos was allocated for the LAAP. However, out
On January 25, 2002, Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo approved Resolution No. OCD2002-001.
of the latter amount, P400,000,000 was to be allocated and released as follows:

P50,000,000 as financial assistance to the LAAPs of LGUs; P275,360,227 as
The Petitioners Case
financial assistance to cover the decrease in the IRA of LGUs concerned due to
reduction in land area; and P74,639,773 for the LGSEF Capability-Building
Fund.
The petitioner now comes to this Court assailing as unconstitutional and void
the provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, relating to the LGSEF.
Similarly assailed are the Oversight Committees Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-
003, OCD-99-005, OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD2002-001 issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner submits that the assailed
In view of the failure of Congress to enact the general appropriations law for
2001, the GAA of 2000 was deemed re-enacted, together with the IRA of the
LGUs therein and the proviso earmarking five billion pesos thereof for the
LGSEF.
On January 9, 2002, the Oversight Committee adopted Resolution No. OCD2002-001 allocating the five billion pesos LGSEF for 2001 as follows:
Page | 16
provisos in the GAAs and the OCD resolutions, insofar as they earmarked the
amount of five billion pesos of the IRA of the LGUs for 1999, 2000 and 2001 for
the LGSEF and imposed conditions for the release thereof, violate the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is invoked as it mandates that the just

share of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. Sections 18 and
286 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which enjoin that the just share of
Government Code of 1991. Finally, the petitioner urges the Court to declare that
the LGUs shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of
the entire IRA should be released automatically without further action by the
further action are, likewise, cited.
LGUs as required by the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The petitioner posits that to subject the distribution and release of the five-
The Respondents Arguments
billion-peso portion of the IRA, classified as the LGSEF, to compliance by the

LGUs with the implementing rules and regulations, including the mechanisms
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to
and guidelines prescribed by the Oversight Committee, contravenes the explicit
dismiss the petition on procedural and substantive grounds. On the latter, the
directive of the Constitution that the LGUs share in the national taxes shall be
respondents contend that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
automatically released to them. The petitioner maintains that the use of the
2001 and the assailed resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee are not
word shall must be given a compulsory meaning.
constitutionally infirm. The respondents advance the view that Section 6, Article
X of the Constitution does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall be
To further buttress this argument, the petitioner contends that to vest the
determined solely by the Local Government Code of 1991. Moreover, the
Oversight Committee with the authority to determine the distribution and release
phrase as determined by law in the same constitutional provision means that
of the LGSEF, which is a part of the IRA of the LGUs, is an anathema to the
there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the just
principle of local autonomy as embodied in the Constitution and the Local
share of the LGUs in the national taxes. In other words, Congress is the arbiter
Government Code of 1991. The petitioner cites as an example the experience in of what should be the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes.
2001 when the release of the LGSEF was long delayed because the Oversight
Committee was not able to convene that year and no guidelines were issued
The respondents further theorize that Section 285 of the Local Government
therefor. Further, the possible disapproval by the Oversight Committee of the
Code of 1991, which provides for the percentage sharing of the IRA among the
project proposals of the LGUs would result in the diminution of the latters share
LGUs, was not intended to be a fixed determination of their just share in the
in the IRA.
national taxes. Congress may enact other laws, including appropriations laws
such as the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, providing for a different sharing
Another infringement alleged to be occasioned by the assailed OCD resolutions
formula. Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991 was merely
is the improper amendment to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of
intended to be the default share of the LGUs to do away with the need to
1991 on the percentage sharing of the IRA among the LGUs. Said provision
determine annually by law their just share. However, the LGUs have no vested
allocates the IRA as follows: Provinces 23%; Cities 23%; Municipalities
right in a permanent or fixed percentage as Congress may increase or decrease
[8]
34%; and Barangays 20%. This formula has been improperly amended or
the just share of the LGUs in accordance with what it believes is appropriate
modified, with respect to the five-billion-peso portion of the IRA allotted for the
for their operation. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits Congress
LGSEF, by the assailed OCD resolutions as they invariably provided for a
from making such determination through the appropriations laws. If the
different sharing scheme.
provisions of a particular statute, the GAA in this case, are within the
constitutional power of the legislature to enact, they should be sustained
The modifications allegedly constitute an illegal amendment by the executive
whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of their enactment.
branch of a substantive law. Moreover, the petitioner mentions that in the Letter
dated December 5, 2001 of respondent Executive Secretary Romulo addressed
On procedural grounds, the respondents urge the Court to dismiss the petition
to respondent Secretary Boncodin, the former endorsed to the latter the release
outright as the same is defective. The petition allegedly raises factual issues
of funds to certain LGUs from the LGSEF in accordance with the handwritten
which should be properly threshed out in the lower courts, not this Court, not
instructions of President Arroyo. Thus, the LGUs are at a loss as to how a
being a trier of facts. Specifically, the petitioners allegation that there are
portion of the LGSEF is actually allocated. Further, there are still portions of the
portions of the LGSEF that it has not, to date, received, thereby causing it (the
LGSEF that, to date, have not been received by the petitioner; hence, resulting
petitioner) injury and damage, is subject to proof and must be substantiated in
in damage and injury to the petitioner.
the proper venue, i.e., the lower courts.
The petitioner prays that the Court declare as unconstitutional and void the
Further, according to the respondents, the petition has already been rendered
assailed provisos relating to the LGSEF in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001
moot and academic as it no longer presents a justiciable controversy. The IRAs
and the assailed OCD resolutions (Resolutions Nos. OCD-99-003, OCD-99-005, for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001, have already been released and the
OCD-99-006, OCD-2000-023, OCD-2001-029 and OCD-2002-001) issued by
government is now operating under the 2003 budget. In support of this, the
the Oversight Committee pursuant thereto. The petitioner, likewise, prays that
respondents submitted certifications issued by officers of the DBM attesting to
the Court direct the respondents to rectify the unlawful and illegal distribution
the release of the allocation or shares of the petitioner in the LGSEF for 1999,
and releases of the LGSEF for the aforementioned years and release the same
2000 and 2001. There is, therefore, nothing more to prohibit.
in accordance with the sharing formula under Section 285 of the Local
Page | 17
Finally, the petitioner allegedly has no legal standing to bring the suit because it
adequate interest in the manner and distribution of the IRA among the LGUs.
has not suffered any injury. In fact, the petitioners just share has even
increased. Pursuant to Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the
The petition involves a significant
share of the provinces is 23%. OCD Nos. 99-005, 99-006 and 99-003 gave the
legal issue
provinces 40% of P2 billion of the LGSEF. OCD Nos. 2000-023 and 2001-029
apportioned 26% of P3.5 billion to the provinces. On the other hand, OCD No.
The crux of the instant controversy is whether the assailed provisos contained in
2001-001 allocated 25% of P3 billion to the provinces. Thus, the petitioner has
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the
not suffered any injury in the implementation of the assailed provisos in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991. This is undoubtedly a
GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions.
legal question. On the other hand, the following facts are not disputed:
1.
The Ruling of the Court
The earmarking of five billion pesos of the IRA for the

LGSEF in the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
and re-enacted budget for 2001;
Procedural Issues
Before resolving the petition on its merits, the Court shall first rule on the
2.
The promulgation of the assailed OCD resolutions
following procedural issues raised by the respondents: (1) whether the petitioner
providing for the allocation schemes covering the said five
has legal standing or locus standi to file the present suit; (2) whether the petition
billion pesos and the implementing rules and regulations
involves factual questions that are properly cognizable by the lower courts; and
therefor; and
(3) whether the issue had been rendered moot and academic.
3.
The release of the LGSEF to the LGUs only upon their
The petitioner has locus standi
compliance with the implementing rules and regulations,
to maintain the present suit
including the guidelines and mechanisms, prescribed by

the Oversight Committee.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
Considering that these facts, which are necessary to resolve the legal question
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
now before this Court, are no longer in issue, the same need not be determined
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[9]
by a trial court.[11] In any case, the rule on hierarchy of courts will not prevent this
Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a party assailing the
Court from assuming jurisdiction over the petition. The said rule may be relaxed
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. Such party must be
when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
he has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction. [12]
result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about
The crucial legal issue submitted for resolution of this Court entails the proper
to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is
legal interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions. Moreover, the
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
transcendental importance of the case, as it necessarily involves the
act complained of.[10]
application of the constitutional principle on local autonomy, cannot be gainsaid.

The nature of the present controversy, therefore, warrants the relaxation by this
The Court holds that the petitioner possesses the requisite standing to maintain
Court of procedural rules in order to resolve the case forthwith.
the present suit. The petitioner, a local government unit, seeks relief in order to
protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other LGUs. This interest
The substantive issue needs to be resolved
pertains to the LGUs share in the national taxes or the IRA. The petitioners
notwithstanding the supervening events
constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed provisos in the GAAs of
1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD resolutions contravene Section 6, Article X
Granting arguendo that, as contended by the respondents, the resolution of the
of the Constitution, mandating the automatic release to the LGUs of their share case had already been overtaken by supervening events as the IRA, including
in the national taxes. Further, the injury that the petitioner claims to suffer is the
the LGSEF, for 1999, 2000 and 2001, had already been released and the
diminution of its share in the IRA, as provided under Section 285 of the Local
government is now operating under a new appropriations law, still, there is
Government Code of 1991, occasioned by the implementation of the assailed
compelling reason for this Court to resolve the substantive issue raised by the
measures. These allegations are sufficient to grant the petitioner standing to
instant petition. Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot
question the validity of the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the
2001, and the OCD resolutions as the petitioner clearly has a plain, direct and
Constitution.[13] Even in cases where supervening events had made the cases
Page | 18
moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and public.
corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos of the IRA for the LGSEF
[14]
and the OCD resolutions promulgated pursuant thereto, transgress the

Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
Another reason justifying the resolution by this Court of the substantive issue
now before it is the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.
[15]
For the GAAs in
the coming years may contain provisos similar to those now being sought to be
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000

and 2001 and the OCD resolutions violate the
constitutional precept on local autonomy
invalidated, and yet, the question may not be decided before another GAA is
enacted. It, thus, behooves this Court to make a categorical ruling on the
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution reads:
substantive issue now.
Sec. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law,
in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
Substantive Issue
When parsed, it would be readily seen that this provision mandates that (1) the
LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes; (2) the just share shall be
As earlier intimated, the resolution of the substantive legal issue in this case
determined by law; and (3) the just share shall be automatically released to the
calls for the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle,
LGUs.
that of local autonomy.
[16]
In Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly
adopted as a policy that:
The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions, underscores
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
the automatic release of the LGUs just share in this wise:
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government units shall
and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. Section 2 thereof reiterates the State
have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall be
policy in this wise:
responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their development
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
plans, program objectives and priorities; to create their own sources of revenue
Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue exclusively for their use
Presidents power over the LGUs to one of general supervision.
[17]
This
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The distinction
[18]
between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim:
and disposition and which shall be retained by them; to have a just share in
national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without
need of further action;
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
...
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover

such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
Sec. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may
quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall
not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

The Local Government Code of 1991
[20]
[19]
government for whatever purpose.
was enacted to flesh out the mandate of
the Constitution.[21] The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in Section 2
(b) Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood to diminish the share of local
thereof:
government units under existing laws.
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State
Websters Third New International Dictionary defines automatic as involuntary
that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
either wholly or to a major extent so that any activity of the will is largely
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as
negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition; mechanical; like or suggestive of
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
an automaton. Further, the word automatically is defined as in an automatic
attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more
manner: without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus,
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such, the
system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more
LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to
powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of
them from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government Code
decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
of 1991, the just share of the LGUs shall be released to them without need of
government units.
further action. Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in Pimentel, Jr. v.
Guided by these precepts, the Court shall now determine whether the assailed
Aguirre,[22] viz:
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, earmarking for each
Page | 19
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal
P1.9 billion priority projects
autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal P100 million capability building fund.[26]
revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the
Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the
Oversight Committees prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion of the
LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and shall not
LGSEF allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999; P1.5
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
billion for 2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the Oversight Committee, through the
government for whatever purpose. As a rule, the term SHALL is a word of
assailed OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and mechanisms that the LGUs
command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The provision is,
had to comply with before they could avail of funds from this portion of the
therefore, IMPERATIVE.
LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs to identify the projects eligible for
funding based on the criteria laid down by the Oversight Committee; (b) the
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1,
LGUs to submit their project proposals to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project
1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA pending the assessment and evaluation
proposals that passed the appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the
by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal
Oversight Committee for review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon
situation in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution
approval thereof that the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release
and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means
the funds for the projects.
something held back or withheld, often temporarily. Hence, the temporary

nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any
To the Courts mind, the entire process involving the distribution and release of
retention is prohibited.
the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or

just share of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in
release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and regulations, including the
times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter
guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally prescribed by the Oversight Committee
provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999,
Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold
2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a
the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the just share
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily,
of the LGUs shall be automatically released to them. The LGUs are, thus,
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods.
[23]
placed at the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
The just share of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the appropriations law
or GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the assailed provisos in the GAAs Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it must
of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA in the amount of five billion pesos
be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it
was earmarked for the LGSEF, and these provisos imposed the condition that
that the mandate is obeyed.[27] Moreover, as correctly posited by the petitioner,
such amount shall be released to the local government units subject to the
the use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute
implementing rules and regulations, including such mechanisms and guidelines
denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
for the equitable allocations and distribution of said fund among local
discretion.[28]
government units subject to the guidelines that may be prescribed by the

Oversight Committee on Devolution. Pursuant thereto, the Oversight
Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over the
Committee, through the assailed OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion
distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an anathema to
pesos LGSEF such that:
and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as embodied in the
For 1999
Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as the Oversight
P2 billion -allocated according to Sec. 285 LGC
Committee was created merely to formulate the rules and regulations for the
P2 billion - Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 40%;
efficient and effective implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991 to
Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%)
ensure compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the
P1 billion projects (LAAP) approved by OCD.
[24]
Constitution.[29] In fact, its creation was placed under the title of Transitory
For 2000
Provisions, signifying its ad hoc character. According to Senator Aquilino Q.
P3.5 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 26%;
Pimentel, the principal author and sponsor of the bill that eventually became
Cities 23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 16%);
Rep. Act No. 7160, the Committees work was supposed to be done a year from
[25]
the approval of the Code, or on October 10, 1992.[30] The Oversight Committees
P1.5 billion projects (LAAP) approved by the OCD.

For 2001
authority is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local Government
P3 billion Modified Sharing Formula (Provinces 25%;
Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither can it exercise
Cities 25%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 15%)
control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
Page | 20
That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee and
governments and as put by political adherents, to liberate the local
promote local autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion below between
governments from the imperialism of Manila. Autonomy, however, is not meant
Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then members of the
to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of
MR. MAAMBONG. Unfortunately, under Section 198 of the Local Government
federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments,
Code, the existence of subprovinces is still acknowledged by the law, but the
under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no
statement of the Gentleman on this point will have to be taken up probably by
other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government.
the Committee on Legislation. A second point, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that

under Article 2, Section 10 of the 1973 Constitution, we have a provision which
As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national
states:
administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to insure their fullest development as self-reliant
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of
communities.
power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government
This provision no longer appears in the present configuration; does this mean
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the
that the concept of giving local autonomy to local governments is no longer
base of government power and in the process to make local governments more
adopted as far as this Article is concerned?
responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant

communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
MR. NOLLEDO. No. In the report of the Committee on Preamble, National
development and social progress. At the same time, it relieves the central
Territory, and Declaration of Principles, that concept is included and widened
government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
upon the initiative of Commissioner Bennagen.
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises general supervision

over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you for that.
judgments with his own.

With regard to Section 6, sources of revenue, the creation of sources as
provided by previous law was subject to limitations as may be provided by law,
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political
but now, we are using the term subject to such guidelines as may be fixed by
power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be
law. In Section 7, mention is made about the unique, distinct and exclusive
autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
charges and contributions, and in Section 8, we talk about exclusivity of local
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
taxes and the share in the national wealth. Incidentally, I was one of the
According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to self-
authors of this provision, and I am very thankful. Does this indicate local
immolation, since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
autonomy, or was the wording of the law changed to give more autonomy to the
accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
local government units?[31]
Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The fairly
[34]
recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre[35] is particularly instructive. The Court

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes. In effect, those words indicate also decentralization
declared therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of the LGUs to,
because local political units can collect taxes, fees and charges subject merely
inter alia, allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities:
to guidelines, as recommended by the league of governors and city mayors,
Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative
with whom I had a dialogue for almost two hours. They told me that limitations
autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal
may be questionable in the sense that Congress may limit and in effect deny the autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own
right later on.
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes

released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their
MR. MAAMBONG. Also, this provision on automatic release of national tax
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of
share points to more local autonomy. Is this the intention?
their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints
thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, the Commissioner is perfectly right.
[32]
governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not
The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals [33]
...[36]
in this wise:
Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally mandated
As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means a more responsive
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. [37]
and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of

decentralization. The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to
Following this ratiocination, the Court in Pimentel struck down as
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
unconstitutional Section 4 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which ordered
Page | 21
the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of ten percent of the LGUs IRA
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget
Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs:
Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.
Sec. 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. The share of local

government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the
In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and
following manner:
the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a portion of the IRA. They put
(a) Provinces Twenty-three (23%
on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos LGSEF and subject
(b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%);
the same to the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines
(c) Municipalities Thirty-four (34%); and
and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time. Like
(d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%).
Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five billion
2001 and the OCD resolutions effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy
pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the assailed
enjoyed by the LGUs and must be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a different sharing
upheld.
scheme. For example, for 1999, P2 billion of the LGSEF was allocated as
follows: Provinces 40%; Cities 20%; Municipalities 40%.[39] For 2000, P3.5
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000
billion of the LGSEF was allocated in this manner: Provinces 26%; Cities
and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot amend
23%; Municipalities 35%; Barangays 26%.[40] For 2001, P3 billion of the
Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
LGSEF was allocated, thus: Provinces 25%; Cities 25%; Municipalities

35%; Barangays 15%.[41]
Section 284[38] of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning the third
year of its effectivity, the LGUs share in the national internal revenue taxes shall The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the Constitution
be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be reduced except in the event
does not specify that the just share of the LGUs shall only be determined by
the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit" and only
the Local Government Code of 1991. That it is within the power of Congress to
upon compliance with stringent requirements set forth in the same section:
enact other laws, including the GAAs, to increase or decrease the just share of
Sec. 284.
the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The Local Government Code of 1991 is
...
a substantive law. And while it is conceded that Congress may amend any of
the provisions therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs.
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an
Any amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a
unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby
separate law, not in the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in
authorized, upon recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior
a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject
separate legislation.[42]
to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is
revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment
limited to specified sums of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate
be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of the national internal
fiscal unit.[43] Any provision therein which is intended to amend another law is
revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year; Provided,
considered an inappropriate provision. The category of inappropriate
further That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government
provisions includes unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no
which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services,
place in an appropriations bill.[44]
be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved personnel

services.
Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage
Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the mandatory
sharing therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are
automatic release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue collections
matters of general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake these
for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the
amendments through the GAAs, as the respondents contend, would be to give
preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released
Congress the unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the
shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The
LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year. This, the Court cannot
adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual
sanction.
collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal
year. In the instant case, however, there is no allegation that the national
It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike those of 1999, 2000 and
internal revenue tax collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have
2001, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 do not contain provisos similar to the herein
fallen compared to the preceding three fiscal years.
assailed provisos. In other words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 have not
Page | 22
earmarked any amount of the IRA for the LGSEF. Congress had perhaps seen
fit to discontinue the practice as it recognizes its infirmity. Nonetheless, as
earlier mentioned, this Court has deemed it necessary to make a definitive
ruling on the matter in order to prevent its recurrence in future appropriations
laws and that the principles enunciated herein would serve to guide the bench,
bar and public.
Conclusion
In closing, it is well to note that the principle of local autonomy, while concededly
expounded in greater detail in the present Constitution, dates back to the turn of
the century when President William McKinley, in his Instructions to the Second
Philippine Commission dated April 7, 1900, ordered the new Government to
devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal
governments in which the natives of the Islands, both in the cities and in the
rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own affairs
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of
supervision and control in which a careful study of their capacities and
observation of the workings of native control show to be consistent with the
maintenance of law, order and loyalty.[45] While the 1935 Constitution had no
specific article on local autonomy, nonetheless, it limited the executive power
over local governments to general supervision ... as may be provided by law.
[46]
Subsequently, the 1973 Constitution explicitly stated that [t]he State shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the
barangay to ensure their fullest development as self- reliant communities.[47] An
entire article on Local Government was incorporated therein. The present
Constitution, as earlier opined, has broadened the principle of local autonomy.
The 14 sections in Article X thereof markedly increased the powers of the local
governments in order to accomplish the goal of a more meaningful local
autonomy.
Indeed, the value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured

by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.[48] As eloquently put by M. De
Tocqueville, a distinguished French political writer, [l]ocal assemblies of citizens
constitute the strength of free nations. Township meetings are to liberty what
primary schools are to science; they bring it within the peoples reach; they
teach men how to use and enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free
governments but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have the
spirit of liberty.[49]
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which
these provisions are based.[50]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed provisos in the General

Appropriations Acts of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the assailed OCD
Resolutions, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 23
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF TESS

DUMPIT-MICHELENA, TESS DUMPIT-MICHELENA, PETITIONER, VS.
Julian West when she purchased from her father, Congressman Dumpit, a
residential lot on 19 April 2003. She even designated one Gardo Fontanilla as a
CARLOS BOADO, FERNANDO CALONGE, SALVADOR CARRERA, BENITO caretaker of her residential house. Dumpit-Michelena presented the affidavits
CARRERA, DOMINGO CARRERA, AND ROGELIO DE VERA,
RESPONDENTS.
and certifications of her neighbors in San Julian West to prove that she actually
resides in the area.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR TO
The Ruling of the COMELEC
CANCEL CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY FOR MAYOR, TESS DUMPITMICHELENA, PETITIONER, VS. CARLOS BOADO, FERNANDO CALONGE,
SALVADOR CARRERA, BENITO CARRERA, DOMINGO CARRERA, AND
ROGELIO DE VERA, RESPONDENTS.
In a Resolution issued on 9 March 2004, the COMELEC Second Division ruled,

as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions are hereby
GRANTED. Respondent is hereby adjudged to be a non-resident of Brgy. San
DECISION
Julian West, Agoo, La Union for purposes of the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. Accordingly, her Certificate of Candidacy is hereby
CARPIO, J.:
CANCELLED on the ground of material misrepresentation under Sections 78

and 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, in relation to Comelec
The Cases
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari[1] assailing the 9 March 2004
[2]
Resolution No. 6452.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Resolution of the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Second Division
The COMELEC Second Division held that Boado, et al. established by
and the 7 May 2004 Resolution[3] of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA 04-015[4]
convincing evidence that Dumpit-Michelena is not a bona fide resident of San
[5]
and SPA 04-016.
Julian West, Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division found that
among the neighbors of Dumpit-Michelena who executed affidavits in her favor,
The COMELEC Second Division cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Tess
only one is a resident of San Julian West. The others are from other barangays
Dumpit-Michelena ("Dumpit-Michelena") on the ground of material
of Agoo, La Union. The COMELEC Second Division noted that several affiants
misrepresentation. The COMELEC En Banc denied Dumpit-Michelena's motion
who declared that Dumpit-Michelena resides in San Julian West later retracted
for reconsideration for late filing.
their statements on the ground that they did not read the contents of the
documents when they signed the affidavits.
The Antecedent Facts

Dumpit-Michelena moved for the reconsideration of the Resolution of the
Dumpit-Michelena was a candidate for the position of mayor in the municipality
COMELEC Second Division.
of Agoo, La Union during the 10 May 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections. Engineer Carlos Boado, Rogelio L. De Vera, Fernando Calonge,
In a Resolution issued on 7 May 2004, the COMELEC En Banc denied Dumpit-
Benito Carrera, Salvador Carrera and Domingo Carrera ("Boado, et al.") sought
Michelena's motion for reconsideration. The COMELEC En Banc ruled that the
Dumpit-Michelena's disqualification and the denial or cancellation of her
motion for reconsideration was filed three days after the last day of the
certificate of candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation under
prescribed period for filing the motion.
Sections 74[6] and 78[7] of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 ("Omnibus Election Code").
Hence, the present recourse by Dumpit-Michelena.
Boado, et al. alleged that Dumpit-Michelena, the daughter of Congressman
Tomas Dumpit, Sr. ("Congressman Dumpit") of the Second District of La Union,
The Issues
is not a resident of Agoo, La Union. Boado, et al. claimed that DumpitMichelena is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian, La Union and
The issues raised in the petition are the following:
that Dumpit-Michelena only transferred her registration as voter to San Julian

West, Agoo, La Union on 24 October 2003. Her presence in San Julian West,
1.
Agoo, La Union was noticed only after she filed her certificate of candidacy.
Whether Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration

was filed on time;
Boado, et al. presented, among other things, a joint affidavit of all barangay
officials of San Julian West to prove that Dumpit-Michelena is not a resident of
the barangay.
Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in San

Page | 24
2.
Whether Dumpit-Michelena was denied due process of law;

and
3.
Whether Dumpit-Michelena satisfied the residency
COMELEC summarily resolved the disqualification case against her without
requirement under the Local Government Code of 1991.
giving her a fair opportunity to submit additional evidence to support her case.
The Ruling of the Court
Resolution No. 6452 delegates the reception of evidence in disqualification

cases to field officials designated by the COMELEC.[11] The summary nature of
The petition is partly meritorious.
disqualification proceedings is provided under Section 5(A)(6) of Resolution No.

6452 which states:
On Timeliness of the Motion for Reconsideration

6.
The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the
We rule that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
testimonies, the parties shall submit their affidavits or
denying Dumpit-Michelena's motion for reconsideration for late filing.
counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence

including their position paper or memorandum within a
[9]
Resolution No. 6452 provides:
period of three (3) inextendible days;
SECTION 8. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a decision,

resolution, order or ruling of a division shall be filed within three (3) days from
The position paper or memorandum of each party shall
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the
contain the following:
execution for implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.

a.
A "Statement of the Case", which is a clear and
Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the
concise statement of the nature of the action, a
Commission shall notify the Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall, within
summary of the documentary evidence and other
two (2) days thereafter, certify the case to the Commission en banc.
matters necessary to an understanding of the

nature of the controversy;
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for
the resolution of the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the
b.
certification thereof.
A "Statement of the Issues", which is a clear and

concise statement of the issues;
In this case, the Resolution cancelling Dumpit-Michelena's Certificate of

Candidacy was promulgated in open court on 9 March 2004. Dumpit-
c.
The "Argument" which is a clear and concise
Michelena's counsel was present during the promulgation. Following Section 8
presentation of the argument in support of each
of Resolution No. 6452, Dumpit-Michelena had until 12 March 2004 within which
issue; and
to file her motion for reconsideration. However, while Dumpit-Michelena claims

to be familiar with Resolution No. 6452, she filed her motion for reconsideration
on 15 March 2004. This is because during the promulgation of the cases on 9
March 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order
[10]
which states:
d.
The "Relief" which is a specification of the

judgment which the party seeks to obtain. The
issues raised in his/its pleadings but not included
On call of these cases today for promulgation, counsels for the respondent
in the Memorandum shall be deemed waived or
appeared. There was no appearance for the petitioners. Counsel manifested
abandoned. Being a summation of the parties'
that they filed a manifestation and motion and an urgent motion holding in
pleadings and documentary evidence, the
abeyance the promulgation of the resolution of these cases. The motions to
Commission may consider the memorandum
hold in abeyance the promulgation is hereby denied. However, the respondent
alone in deciding or resolving the petition.
may file a motion for reconsideration within five (5) days from receipt of
the decision if the decision is adverse to their client. (Emphasis supplied)
In these cases, Dumpit-Michelena filed a motion for the inhibition of Atty. Marino
Apparently, the COMELEC committed an oversight in declaring that Dumpit-
V. Salas ("Atty. Salas"), the Provincial Election Supervisor and hearing officer
Michelena had five days within which to file her motion for reconsideration. The
designated to receive the evidence of the parties. She alleged that Boado, et
COMELEC overlooked Resolution No. 6452. For her part, Dumpit-Michelena
al.'s counsel was the former Regional Director of the COMELEC Regional Office
only followed the period provided in the Order. She filed her motion for
and undue influence might be exerted over Atty. Salas. In the meanwhile, she
reconsideration on 15 March 2004 since 14 March 2004 fell on a Sunday. This
submitted a "semblance of a memorandum if only to insure x x x that she would
Court can hardly fault her for following the COMELEC Order.
be able to convey her opposition to the petitions filed against her."[12] DumpitMichelena alleged that she wanted to submit her evidence to a hearing officer
On Denial of Due Process
Dumpit-Michelena asserts that she was denied due process when the
Page | 25
who would not be biased and would not be inclined to side with Boado, et al.
Without resolving the Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Salas forwarded the records of the
case to COMELEC Manila. However, to obviate suspicion of partiality, Atty.
panglungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected;
Salas did not make any recommendation as required under Resolution No.
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
6452.
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
We rule that there was no denial of due process in the cases before the Court.
The concept of residence in determining a candidate's qualification is already a

settled matter. For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with
Section 5(A) of Resolution No. 6452 provides:
domicile.[15] In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,[16]

this Court declared:
7.
The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from
x x x The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile
the date of the filing of the answer. The Hearing Officer
not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
concerned shall personally or through his authorized

representative submit to the Clerk of the Commission his
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
Hearing/Case report(s) indicating his findings and
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for congress continues to
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion
remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:
of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
complete records of the case;
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the

place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So
8.
Upon receipt of the records of the case [indicating] the
my question is: What is the committee's concept of residence of a candidate for
findings and recommendations of the Hearing Officer
the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
concerned, the Clerk of the Commission shall immediately
constructive residence?
docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for

raffle to a division;
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others,
9.
The division to whom the case is raffled shall, after
'and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one
evaluation and consultation, assign immediately the same
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973
to a member who shall pen the decision within five (5) days
Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile." (Records of the 1987
from the date of consultation.
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87)
Resolution No. 6452 is clear. The hearing officer is only designated to hear and
xxx
receive evidence. His conclusions are merely recommendatory upon the

COMELEC. Dumpit-Michelena knew fully well that the entire records of the
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think
case would be forwarded to COMELEC Manila for the resolution of the cases.
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that 'resident' has been
She had all the opportunity to present her evidence to support her stand.
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Instead, she chose to file a Memorandum which she described as one "done in
'half-hearted' compliance with the rules."[13] She may not claim now that she
Mr. Delos Reyes: Domicile.
was denied due process because she was unable to present all her evidence
before the hearing officer.
M[r]s. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time
to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
On Residency Requirement
Mr. Delos Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering
Dumpit-Michelena failed to prove that she has complied with the residency
that a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos
requirement.
living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence."
Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the qualifications for
(Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
elective provincial, city, municipal and barangay officials shall be those provided
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the
for in the Local Government Code. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code
word "residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
of 1991[14] states:
Prior to her transfer, Dumpit-Michelena was a resident and registered voter of
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Ambaracao North, Naguilian, La Union. She claims that she has already
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or,
acquired a new domicile in San Julian West and is thus qualified to run for the
in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
position of mayor. She transferred her registration as a voter of San Julian West
Page | 26
on 24 October 2003.
is not a resident of their barangay.
Dumpit-Michelena presented a Deed of Sale dated 19 April 2003 showing her
Hence, the COMELEC Second Division did not commit grave abuse of
acquisition of a parcel of land in San Julian West where she eventually built a
discretion in cancelling Dumpit-Michelena's Certificate of Candidacy.
house. However, property ownership is not indicia of the right to vote or to be

voted for an office.[17] Further, domicile of origin is not easily lost.[18] To
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution dated 9
successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the
March 2004 of the COMELEC Second Division and the Resolution dated 7 May
following requirements:
2004 of the COMELEC En Banc with MODIFICATION that Tess DumpitMichelena's motion for reconsideration was not filed late.
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

SO ORDERED.
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose.[19]
Without clear and positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements,
the domicile of origin continues.[20] To effect change, there must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.[21] The intent to remain in the new
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time, the change of
residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.[22]
The Court agrees with the COMELEC Second Division that Dumpit-Michelena
failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Among the
documents submitted by Dumpit-Michelena is a Special Power of Attorney[23]
authorizing Clyde Crispino ("Crispino") to "apply, facilitate and follow up the
issuance of a building permit of the beach house" she intended to put up in her
lot. She also authorized Crispino to help her caretaker oversee the lot and the
construction of the beach house. As correctly pointed out by the COMELEC
Second Division, a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It
can hardly be considered a place of residence.
In addition, the designation of caretaker with monthly compensation of P2,500 [24]

only shows that Dumpit-Michelena does not regularly reside in the place. The
Deed of Absolute Sale states that Dumpit-Michelena is a resident of Naguilian,
La Union[25] while the Special Power of Attorney states that she is a resident of
San Julian West, Agoo, La Union and No. 6 Butterfly St. Valle Verde 6, Pasig,
Metro Manila. Dumpit-Michelena obviously has a number of residences and the
acquisition of another one does not automatically make the most recently
acquired residence her new domicile.
We considered the affidavits submitted by Dumpit-Michelena where the affiants

retracted their previous affidavits stating that Dumpit-Michelena was not a
resident of San Julian West. The affiants alleged that they signed the first
affidavits without knowing their contents. However, the COMELEC Second
Division pointed out that Boado, et al. also submitted affidavits with the affiants
repudiating their previous affidavits that Dumpit-Michelena was a resident of
San Julian West. The Court is inclined to give more weight to the joint affidavit
of all the barangay officials of San Julian West attesting that Dumpit-Michelena
Page | 27
ROMEO LONZANIDA, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION

ON ELECTION AND EUFEMIO MULI, REPONDENTS.
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration
of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the
three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The
DECISION
finding of the COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc
in a resolution dated August 11, 1998.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside
him disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections.
the resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and
He maintains that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms
by the COMELEC En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In
and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term
the matter of the Petition to Disqualify Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida
for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials,
of San Antonio, Zambales. Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs. Romeo Lonzanida,
because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995
respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo
elections as evidenced by the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in
Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio,
EAC no. 6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida,
Zambales in the May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not
Protestee-Appellant, wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly
be counted and if he has been proclaimed winner the said proclamation is
elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner also argues that the
declared null and void.
COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after
he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper remedy
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive
is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule
terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995
36 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court
the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then
to sustain the questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its
opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the Regional Trial
jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification. The private respondent states
Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure
that the petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May
of elections. The court ruled:
1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25 of the
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the
results of the election for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last
COMELEC before the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be
May 8, 1995 as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
disqualified may still be herd and decided by the COMELEC after the election
and proclamation of the said party without distinction as to the alleged ground
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio,
for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election offense or for
Zambales is hereby declared vacant."
ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the
merits of the petition for disqualification were issued within the commission's
COMELEC resolved the election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and
jurisdiction. As regards the merits of the case, the private respondent maintains
re-appreciation of the contested ballots declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of that the petitioner's assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as
San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes
service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost
as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC
three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral
issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed,
elections.
and Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.

The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy
COMELEC praying for the dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General
for mayor of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely
stressed that section 8, Art. X of the Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter I of
filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in
the Local Government Code which bar a local government official from serving
the 1998 elections on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in
more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks of "service of a
the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.
term " and so the rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent
On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued the questioned
contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor
resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida
from 1995 to 1998 which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he
had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he
was later unseated, because he served as mayor for the greater part of the
is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The
term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as a de jure or de facto
COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of his
mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the three
Page | 28
term limit because the prohibition speaks of "service of a term" which was
The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local
intended by the framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to monopolize
government officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to
political power. It is likewise argued by the respondent that a petition for quo
perpetually bar them from running for the same office after serving nine
warranto with the regional trial court is proper when the petition for
consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified candidates to choose
disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for
from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local government
disqualification which was filed before the elections may be resolved by the
official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive
COMELEC thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.
terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.[2]
The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner
The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the
could not have served a valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed
exception of barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms
office as mayor for that period because he was no t lawfully elected to the said
was discussed at length in the case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC and
office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated before the expiration of the term
Jose Capco, Jr.[3] where the issue raised was whether a vice-mayor who
and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one full term. As
succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the death of the
regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the
incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to
COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the
have served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term
petitioner's proclamation.
limit. This court pointed out that from the discussions of the Constitutional
The petition has merit.
Convention it is evident that the delegates proceeded from the premise that the
official's assumption of office is by reason of election. This Court stated:[4]
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:
"Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional

Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The
which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall
second is the idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected."
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving
rule:
by reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the
"Sec. 43. Term of Office.
Constitutional Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI

sections 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
run again?
term for which the elective official concerned was elected."

The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanida's assumption of office as
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before-if the Gentlemen will
limit for elective local government officials.
remember-was: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election
which is three years or one term which is six years?
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term
limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo
proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local government official from
expressed the view that during the election following the expiration of the first 12
running for the same position after serving three consecutive terms. The said
years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year
disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the accumulation of massive
thereafter, his particular member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a
political power by an elective local government official in a given locality in order
period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees' stand.
to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to
broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office,
xxxx xxxx xxxx
and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from
running for the same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
by some delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief
ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local
executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political dynasty.
Page | 29
[1]
officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence
speaks of "the term of office of elective local officials" and bars "such officials"
served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion
from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in
of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for
explaining when an elective official may be deemed to have served his full term
the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three
of office, states that "voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
consecutive terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
scrutiny states, "Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not
full term for which he was elected." The term served must therefore be one "for
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the the official concerned was elected." The purpose of the provision is to
which he was elected. "The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective
any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
official may serve."
office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of
must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
served three consecutive terms. It stated:
of the full term porvided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
"To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position.
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply."
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold
mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor of San
office for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March
Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office and
1998 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term
discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated
run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.
November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which declared
his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between
the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
petitioner and his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years
and resultantly extended the petitioner's incumbency in an office to which he
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the
was not lawfully elected. We note that such delay cannot be imputed to the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the
petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any
May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover,
mayoral term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. After a re-
protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution
appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared
of the election protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to
by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
file a motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void.
position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office while the
His assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of
appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not here shown to
a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly
have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office
held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local
[5]
proclamation at all and while a proclaimed candidate may assume office on
government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a

presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the
[6]
The petitioner's contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over
election protest. Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San
the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit.
Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly
The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the
elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioner's
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC and Trinidad[7]
that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate against whom
a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998
the COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on
term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the
the merits.
term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have
Page | 30
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:
mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the
"Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared
hearing and eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
this Court held-
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
`Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was
the winning number of votes in such election, the court or commission shall
illegally made. The fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
have said, is no bar to the exercise of such power. It of course may not be
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof
availed of where there has been a valid proclamation. Since private
order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
respondent's petition before the COMELEC is precisely directed at the
evidence of his guilt is strong."
annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this
This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC xxx
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e.,
Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the
until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for
validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder,
disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved after the
baneful effects may easily supervene.'
proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward the
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to
said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the prevent the candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute
resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
him for violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has
been proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed
The court stated:
condoned and may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation."
"Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is
COMELEC declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the
rendered thereon. The word "shall" signified that this requirement of the law is
1998 mayoral elections are hereby set aside.
mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced.

Theimplication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed
with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the
election, Silvestre vs. Duavit in effect disallows what R. A. No. 6646 imperatively
requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which
cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued beyond the scope
of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative
agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes and should be for the
sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such
interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the law itself
cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for
that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic
law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to forsee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead
of punished, by the dismissal of thedisqualification case against him simply
because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to
determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the
candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do
is to employ delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the
commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election. This
scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and
purpose of the law.
Page | 31
SO ORDERED.
FEDERICO T. MONTEBON AND ELEANOR M. ONDOY, PETITIONERS, VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTION AND SESINANDO F. POTENCIOSO, JR.,
term having been involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be

disqualified to seek reelection as municipal councilor.[5]
RESPONDENTS.
On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division, as
DECISION
follows:
Respondent's assumption to the office of the vice-mayor of Tuburan in January
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
2004 during his second term as councilor is not a voluntary renunciation of the
latter office. The same therefore operated as an effective disruption in the full
This petition[1] for certiorari assails the June 2, 2007 Resolution[2] of the First
service of his second term as councilor. Thus, in running for councilor again in
Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 07-421,
the May 14, 2007 Elections, respondent is deemed to be running only for a
denying the petition for disqualification filed by petitioners Federico T. Montebon
second consecutive term as councilor of Tuburan, the first consecutive term fully
and Eleanor M. Ondoy against respondent Sesinando F. Potencioso, Jr., as well
served being his 2004-2007 term.
as the September 28, 2007 Resolution[3] of the COMELEC En Banc denying the
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Montebon's and Ondoy's June 9, 2007 manifestation and omnibus

motion are hereby declared moot and academic with the instant disposition of
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were
their motion for reconsideration.
candidates for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the
May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April 30, 2007,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners' motion for reconsideration is
petitioners and other candidates[4] for municipal councilor filed a petition for
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that respondent

had been elected and served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in
SO ORDERED.[6]
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is proscribed from running for
Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on the ground that the
the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth consecutive
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
term.
jurisdiction in ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in

January 2004 interrupted his 2001-2004 term as municipal councilor.
In his answer, respondent admitted that he had been elected for three
consecutive terms as municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the service
The petition lacks merit.
of his second term in 2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he
succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor
The 1987 Constitution bars and disqualifies local elective officials from serving
Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not disqualified from vying for the
more than three consecutive terms in the same post. Section 8, Article X
position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.
thereof states:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
In the hearing of May 10, 2007, the parties were directed to file their respective
which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall
memoranda.
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
In petitioners' memorandum, they maintained that respondent's assumption of
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be considered an interruption in Section 43 of the Local Government Code also provides:
the service of his second term since it was a voluntary renunciation of his office
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
as municipal councilor. They argued that, according to the law, voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
concerned was elected.
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that a local elective official is not
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections,[7] the Court held that the two
disqualified from running for the fourth consecutive time to the same office if
conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that the
there was an interruption in one of the previous three terms.
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
local government post; and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
On June 2, 2007, the COMELEC First Division denied the petition for
terms.[8] In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[9] the Court emphasized that
disqualification ruling that respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor
the term limit for elective officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
should be considered an interruption in the continuity of his service. His second
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Thus, for the
Page | 32
disqualification to apply, it is not enough that the official has been elected three
succeed to the post does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no
consecutive times; he must also have served three consecutive terms in the
circumstances can simple refusal of the official concerned be considered as
[10]
same position.
permanent inability within the contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the

successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he is mandated to occupy by
While it is undisputed that respondent was elected municipal councilor for three
virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason he is permanently
consecutive terms, the issue lies on whether he is deemed to have fully served
unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.
his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of Tuburan on

January 12, 2004.
xxxx
Succession in local government offices is by operation of law.[11] Section 44[12]
Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government
provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the
official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible
highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor. Thus:
administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor,
performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
Mayor, and Vice Mayor. - (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
rather than voluntary.[14]
governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The June 2, 2007
governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division denying the petition for
governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
disqualification and the September 28, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC en
member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
banc denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice
mayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be
filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking
as defined herein. x x x
In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due
to the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the highest
ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. It is clear
therefore that his assumption of office as vice-mayor can in no way be
considered a voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the concept of

voluntary renunciation as follows:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
`Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected.' The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the
same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service.[13] (Emphasis added)
Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an
involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an
interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law.
We quote with approval the ruling of the COMELEC that The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept
the vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no
exception. Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to
Page | 33
SO ORDERED.
GOVERNOR ZOSIMO J. PAREDES and MAYOR MARIO W.

CHILAGAN, Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF THE MUNICIPALITY
OF MAYOYAO, IFUGAO, Respondents.
DECISION
Melquiades Paredes, for Petitioners.
The constitutional question raised in a declaratory relief proceeding treated as a

special civil action for prohibition, one of first impression, arose from the
issuance of a proclamation by the President, 1 directing that a plebiscite be
conducted in certain barangays 2 all within the municipality of Mayoyao,
Province of Ifugao, segregated under a Batas Pambansa, 3 "to determine
whether the said Barangays shall become a new municipality to be known as
the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao." In such proclamation,
Respondent Commission on Elections 4 was charged with the duty of
supervising the conduct of such plebiscite and empowered to promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to implement the proclamation. It is alleged that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI,
Section 3 of the Constitution. 5 The basis for such contention is that the statute
excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the poblacion and other barangays
of the Municipality of Mayoyao except those mentioned in the Act.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AUTONOMY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS;

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 86; LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN A PLEBISCITE
TO PEOPLE IN THE AFFECTED BARRIOS; CONSTRUCTION AVOIDING A
FINDING OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY TO BE PREFERRED. There is
indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression "units or units
affected." It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain barangays
are separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all voters therein
are affected. It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents
do that the acceptable construction is for those voters, who are not from the
barangays to be separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite. It is in
accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions,
one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result,
the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy,
commands itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years
is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking
to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that
there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where
the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no
finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This is the issue specifically posed: "Who are to be included in such plebiscite?
As contended by petitioners Zosimo J. Paredes and Mario W. Chilagan, the
former being the incumbent Governor of the Province of Ifugao and the latter,
Mayor of the Municipality of Mayoyao, Ifugao, all the inhabitants of such
municipality should participate in such plebiscite as they are included in the "unit
or units affected."cralaw virtua1aw library
Such interpretation is disputed by respondents. 6 It is their submission that in

the interpretation of the above phrase, the Court "should not lose sight of the
fact that this provision is intended to promote autonomy of our local government
units. Thus, in a case where barrios are being separated from an existing
municipality to form a new municipality, as in the case at bar, the units affected
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO INFRINGEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION IN CASE AT are the barrios whose transfer is being sought. It is the people in these barrios
BAR. It is clear that in granting autonomy, priority is to be accorded the
who will really be affected by the new grant of autonomy. They will be under a
smallest unit, the barangay. That enables its residents the fullest development
new set of officials, a new government, anew set of powers and responsibilities.
as a self-reliant community, with a distinct personality of its own. Adherence to
They should thus be consulted on whether they are willing to shoulder the
such a philosophy compels the conclusion that when there are indications that
responsibilities attendant to autonomy. Barrios which will remain with the
the inhabitants of several barangays are inclined to separate from a parent
original municipality are not affected since their autonomy vis-a-vis the national
municipality they should be allowed to so. What is more logical than to ascertain government is not in any way diminished. They will be under the same local
their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who
government, without any diminution whatsoever of their rights. There is
shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens therefore no infringement of the Constitution if people in these barrios do not
will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth
vote in the plebiscite. On the contrary, an anomalous situation may arise if they
will be a matter of choice their choice. They should be left alone then to
are allowed to vote and if their voters are numerically superior to frustrate any
decide for themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true
attempt of some barrios to break away from the original municipality. In such an
expression of their will. They may even frustrate it. That certainly will be so if
eventuality, one very populous barrio may for selfish reason prevent the desired
they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they constitute the majority.
autonomy of other barrios." 7
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC WITH THE
PLEBISCITE DULY HELD. The petition to enjoin respondents, particularly
respondent Commission from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 86,
specifically "from conducting, holding and undertaking the plebiscite provided for
in said Act." The petition was filed on December 5, 1980. There was a plea for a
restraining order, but Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for such plebiscite
on December 6, 1980 had been issued as far back as November 11, 1980. Due
to this delay in filing this suit, attributable solely to petitioners, there was no time
even to consider such a plea. The plebiscite was duly held. The certificate of
canvass and proclamation of the result disclosed that out of 2,409 total votes
cast in such plebiscite, 2,368 votes were cast in favor of the creation of the new
municipality, which, according to the statute, will be named municipality of
Aguinaldo. There were only 40 votes cast against. As a result, such municipality
was created. There is no turning back the clock. The moot and academic
character of this petition is thus apparent.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 86,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; REASONS. Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 creating the
Municipality of Aguinaldo out of eight barangays within the Municipality of
Mayoyao, Ifugao, is of doubtful constitutionality for two reasons: (1) It was
enacted even before there was a local government code and, therefore, the
creation of the Municipality of Aguinaldo or the division of the Municipality of
Mayoyao was done without reference to any established criteria; and (2) When
the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of the people
of the Municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar
or all of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. In the
case of the creation of the municipality of Aguinaldo, it is obvious that the people
in all of the barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao have an interest in the
matter for it will mean the dismemberment of their town.
Page | 34
The Court sustains the stand of respondents. The petition must be

dismissed.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
1. Admittedly, this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the
use of the expression "unit or units affected." It is plausible to assert as
petitioners do that when certain barangays are separated from a parent
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much
more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable
construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be
separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two
possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the
other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save,
not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic
presumption all these years is one of validity. 8 The onerous task of proving
otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional
provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face.
Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt,
even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcols aphorism is apropos: "To
doubt is to sustain." 9
3. Such a doubt moreover is dispelled by a reference to this fundamental
principle declared in the Constitution: "The State shall guarantee and promote
the autonomy of local government units, especially the [barangays], to ensure
their fullest development as self-reliant communities." 10 It is clear that in
granting autonomy, priority is to be accorded the smallest unit, the barangay.
That enables its residents the fullest development as a self-reliant community,
with a distinct personality of its own. Adherence to such a philosophy compels
the conclusion that when there are indications that the inhabitants of several
barangays are inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be
allowed to so. What is more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite
called for that purpose. It is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new
unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new
municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice
their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To
allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They
may even frustrate it. That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish
reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the
fundamental principle of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the
preference being for smaller units. To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an
accepted principle of constitutional construction, that in ascertaining the
meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the
framers and of the people may be gleaned from provisions in pari materia.
4. One last consideration. What is sought in this suit is to enjoin respondents
particularly respondent Commission from implementing Batas Pambansa Blg.
86, specifically "from conducting, holding and undertaking the plebiscite
provided for in said Act." The petition was filed on December 5, 1980. There
was a plea for a restraining order, but Proclamation No. 2034 fixing the date for
such plebiscite on December 6, 1980 had been issued as far back as November
11, 1980. Due to this delay in filing this suit, attributable solely to petitioners,
there was no time even to consider such a plea. The plebiscite was duly held.
The certificate of canvass and proclamation of the result disclosed that out of
2,409 total votes cast in such plebiscite, 2,368 votes were cast in favor of the
creation of the new municipality, which, according to the statute, will be named
municipality of Aguinaldo. there were only 40 votes cast against. As a result,
such municipality was created. There is no turning back the clock. The moot and
academic character of this petition is thus
apparent.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.
Page | 35
G.R. No. L-56022 May 31, 1985

GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR., for himself and all other interested parties
similarly situated in Metropolitan Manila, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-56124 May 31, 1985
GEMILIANO C. LOPEZ, JR. and REYNALDO B. ARALAR, for themselves
and all other interested parties similarly situated as themselves in
Metropolitan Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE METROPOLITAN MANILA COMMISSION, respondent.
Reynaldo B. Aralar for and in his own behalf.
Jacinto D. Jimenez for petitioner G. Lopez, Jr.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
Presidential Decree No. 824 1 was a response to a felt need for a "central
government to establish and administer program and provide services common
to" the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen
municipalities 2 in the surrounding area. It is worth noting that such a problem
was by no means unique and confined to the Philippines. Recent decades have
witnessed a growing erosion in public confidence in the ability of local
government units as traditionally organized to fulfill their responsibilities and
discharge their functions effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily.3 The growth in
population in Manila, the three other cities, and the adjacent municipalities has
been unchecked since the end of World War II. There was of course the bright
promise of a better fife especially so with the proliferation of commercial firms
and the establishment of industries. The lure has thus proved irresistible. The
result has been the ever increasing inability of the separate local governments
to cope with the ensuing serious problems. A public corporation was thus
created "to be known as the Metropolitan Manila, vested with powers and
attributes of a corporation including the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, acquire, purchase, expropriate, hold, transfer and dispose of property and
such other powers as are necessary to carry out its purposes." 4 It is
administered by a Commission. 5
Petitioners 6 in the second of the above cases 7 assail the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 824. They rely on this provision: "No province, city,
municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." 8 The Local
Government Code was not enacted until 1983. 9
For reasons to be set forth, it will be made apparent that such a challenge is far
from formidable. It does not suffice to call for a declaration of unconstitutionality.
Moreover, the last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present
constitutional provision adopted in the plebiscite on January 27, 1984. Thus in
the Article on Batasang Pambansa it is expressly provided: "The Batasang
Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than 200 Members unless
otherwise provided by law, shall include representatives elected from the
different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities as may be
declared by or pursuant to law, and districts in Metropolitan Manila, those
elected or selected from the various sectors as may be provided by law, and
those chosen by the President from Members of the Cabinet. Each district in
Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact
and adjacent territory. The elective representatives shall be apportioned by law
among the provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and
the districts of Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, but
the provinces with component cities and highly urbanized cities shall have at
least one representative each. The provinces and cities shall have at least the
same total number of representatives as under the 1935 Constitution." 10
The recognition of the existence to Metropolitan Manila cannot be expressed
any clearer. There can be no legal justification then for a declaration of
unconstitutionality. Presidential Decree No. 824 is not tainted with constitutional
infirmity.
Page | 36
1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held

on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the residents of the Greater Manila Area
authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the four cities
and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or
commission form of government," with the terms and conditions being left to the
discretion of the President. 11 It was then pointed out that "the rapid growth of
population and the corresponding increase of social and economic requirements
in the contiguous communities referred to above has brought into being a large
area that calls for [development both] simultaneous and unified." 12 For "many
public services [then] rendered by local governments separately for themselves
[ought to] be ad. ministered more efficiently and more economically, to the
common benefit of the cities and municipalities in the area, if they are integrated
and harmonized, under a system of central planning [treating as a common
problem the] separate municipal needs." 13 It "is Vital to the survival and growth
of the aforementioned Greater Manila Area that a workable and effective system
be established for the coordination, integration and unified management of such
local government services or functions" 14therein, There is necessity for "the
unified metropolitan services or functions [to] be planned, administered, and
operated [based on] the highest professional technical standards." 15 The
foregoing constitutes the justification for and the objective of such Presidential
Decree.
2. There is relevance to this opening paragraph in the recent case of Paredes v.
Executive Secretary: 16 "The constitutional question raised in this declaratory
relief proceeding treated as a special civil action for prohibition, one of first
impression, arose from the issuance of a proclamation by the President,
directing that a plebiscite be conducted in certain barangays, all within the
municipality of Mayoyao, Province of Ifugao, segregated under a Batas
Pambansa, "to determine whether the said barangays shall become a new
municipality be known as the Municipality of Aguinaldo, Province of Ifugao." In
such proclamation, respondent Commission on Elections was charged with the
duty of supervising the conduct of such plebiscite and empowered to
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the proclamation.
It is alleged that Batas Pambansa Blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative
of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. The basis for such contention is that
the statute excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the poblacion and other
barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao except those mentioned in the
Act." 17 The proclamation was issued on November 11, 1980, at least three
years before the enactment of the local government code. The petition based on
Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, the very same provision relied upon in
this case, was dismissed. There were twelve (12) votes in favor of such
dismissal, two of the Justices 18 voting to dismiss the petition on the ground that
it had become moot and academic, the plebiscite having been duly held and the
certificate of canvass and proclamation disclosing that out of the 2,409 total
votes being cast in the plebiscite, 2,368 were cast in favor of the creation of the
new municipality. 19 Justice Abad Santos dissented on the ground that the
people in the barangay of the municipality of Aguinaldo should likewise have
voted in the plebiscite, not only those of the barangays that constituted the new
municipality. The Court did take note of the plausibility of such an approach but
came to the conclusion that the constitutional provision on the need for a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected would be
satisfied even if "those voters who are not from the barangay to be separated
[were] excluded in the plebiscite." 20 It cannot be argued therefore that the
plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila, having
manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has
been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in
February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.
3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential
Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time
no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was then entrusted
with such responsibility. So it was held in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, 21 decided in January of 1975. The ponencia of Justice Makasiar
dispelled "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the
President during the period of Martial Law, * * *." 22 As the opinion went on to
state: "The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to
legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the
incumbent President during the period of Martial Law." 23
4. The sole petitioner in the other case 24 is likewise now Assemblyman
Gemiliano C Lopez, Jr, of Metropolitan Manila. It is a mandamus petition to
require respondent Commission on Elections to order the elections for members
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and
thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila. As was ,stated in the Memorandum of the
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, the fact that it is a suit for mandamus is
an admission of the validity of Presidential Decree No. 824. 25 Nor would
mandamus lie, it being provided therein that "the Sangguniang Bayan shall be
composed of as many barangay captains as may be determined and chosen by
the Commission, and such number of representatives from other sectors of the
society as may be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the
Commission." 26 The Solicitor General can, therefore plausibly assert: "This

demonstrates that the petition's charge, that there is no duly constituted
Sangguniang Bayan, in Metro Manila Area is untrue, and that the citizenry
therein do have a voice in decision-making, through the respective Sangguniang
Bayans of each of the political units therein." 27 The Decree itself thus supplies
the refutation to the contention of petitioner.
5. The point has been raised, however, that unless Presidential Decree No. 824
be construed in such a way that along with the rest of the other cities and
municipalities, there should be elections for the Sangguniang Bayan, then there
is a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution. The point is not
well-taken. In a recent decision, 28 this Court reiterated the concept of equal
protection in these words: "The applicable standard to avoid the charge that
there is a denial of this constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the
exercise of the police power or the power of eminent domain is to demonstrate
"that the government act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of
the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that
all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being
different, both in the priveleges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism
and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal
protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances,
which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden
or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest."
That same formulation applies as well to taxation measures. The equal
protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of approximating
the Ideal of the law's benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being
by the serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea
of law. There is, however, wisdom, as well as realism, in these words of Justice
Frankfurther: "The equality at which the "equal protection" clause aims is not a
disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins "the equal protection
of the laws, and the laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to
abstract units A, B and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific
difficulties, addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific
remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same."29 It is clear that
under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. As was so well
put by Justice Laurel asponente in the leading case People v. Vera: 30 "Class
legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But
classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is
permitted. * * * The classification, however, to be reasonable must be based on
substantial distinction which make real differences; it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must
apply equally to each member of the class." 31 All such elements are present.
There is no need to set forth anew the compelling reasons that called for the
creation of Metropolitan Manila. It is quite obvious that under the conditions then
existing still present and, with the continued growth of population, attended
with more complexity what was done a response to a great public need. The
government was called upon to act. Presidential Decree No. 824 was the result.
It is not a condition for the validity of the Sangguniang Bayans provided for in
the four cities and the thirteen municipalities that the membership be Identical
with those of other cities or municipalities. There is ample justification for such a
distinction. It does not by any means come under the category of what
Professor Gunther calls suspect classification. 32 There is thus no warrant for the
view that the equal protection guarantee was violated.
6 Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where
there is express recognition of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila.
Such express constutional affirmation of its existence in the fundamental law
calls, as earlier noted, for the dismissal of these petitions, there being no legal
justification for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
824. Nor was it the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of the
creation of Manila. Thus according to the Election Code of 1978, "there shall be
160 regional representatives to the interim Batasang Pambansa apportioned
among the thirteen regions of the nation in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" with
Region IV. with 19 representatives comprising "Metro Manila as follows: Cities
of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, and Pasay; and the municipalities of Valenzuela,
Malabon, Navotas, Makati, Paranaque, Las Pinas, Mandaluyong, San Juan,
Pasig, Muntinlupa, Marikina, Pateros, and Taguig." 33 Then there is this
provision found in Presidential Decree No. 1396 creating the Ministry of Human
Settlements" "SEC. 3. Establishment of the National Capital Region In view
of the critical importance of the Metropolitan Manila Region in human settlement
development. it is hereby declared and established as the National Capital
Region of the Republic of the Philippines, and its administration as such is
hereby vested in the Secretary of Human Settlements. The pertinent provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 824, creating the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
are hereby accordingly amended." 34 The fact of such regional representation
was once again made clear in the April 7, 1981 amendments to the Constitution.
Page | 37
Thus: "SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa which shall be composed of not more
than 200 members unless provided by law, shall include representatives elected
from the regions of the Philippines, those elected or selected from various
sectors as may be provided by law, and those chosen by the President from the
members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among
the regions in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ration." 35 Lastly, in addition to Article
VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution as approved on January 27, 1984, its
accompanying ordinance reads as follows: "SECTION 1. For purposes of the
election of Members of the regular Batasang Pambansa on the second Monday
of May 1984 and subsequent elections and until otherwise provided by law, the
Members of the Batasang Pambansa, other than the sectoral representatives
and those chosen by the President from the Cabinet, shall be apportioned to the
different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities and the
representatives districts of Metropolitan Manila as follows: "National Capital
Region: Manila six (6) Quezon City, four (4); Caloocan, two (2); Pasay, one (1);
Makati, one (1); Malabon, one (1); Navotas and Valenzuela, two (2); San Juan
and Mandaluyong, one (1); Taguig, Pateros and Muntinlupa, one (1)." 36 It would
be, therefore, as contended by respondent Commission to show lack of the
fidelity to the Constitution if the prayer for the abolition of the Metropolitan
Manila, which is expressly authorized and recognized by the fundamental law,
be granted.
7 One last point. It is undeniable, therefore, that the creation of the Metropolitan
Manila Commission is free from any constitutional objection. There is, however,
a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President over
the Commission. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission,
the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the
direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in
this Decree, the President shall the power to revoke, amend or modify any
ordinance, resolution or act of the Commission, the General and the
Commissioners." 37 It may give rise to doubts as to its validity insofar as it
confers the power of control on the President. That control he certainly
exercises under the present Constitution over the ministries. 38 His power over
local governments does not go that far. It extends no further than general
supervision. 39 These doubts, however, do not suffice to nullify such a provision.
They can be set at rest. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad 40 shows the way. After
reiterating the classic doctrine of the presumption being always in favor of
constitutionality, Justice Malcolm, as ponente, categorically declared: "To doubt
is to sustain." 41 In this case, the validity of Republic Act No. 2972 of the
Philippine Legislature, popularly known as the Chinese Bookkeeping Law, was
questioned. According to the opinion of Justice Malcolm: "A literal application of
the law would make it unlawful for any Chinese merchant to keep his account
books in any language other than English, Spanish, or oral dialect. The
petitioner say the law is susceptible of that interpretation might, and probably
would, cause us to hold the law unconstitutional." 42 The construction adopted to
which the Court considered permissible is "that the law only intended to require
the keeping of such books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental
inspection for tax purposes" 43 Such a conclusion was reached by the invocation
of "an elementary, a fundamental, and a universal rule of construction, applied
when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two
constructions one of which will maintain and the other constructions one of
which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the
former." 44 Succinctly put, that construction that would save is to be preferred as
against one that will destroy. As phrased by Chief Justices Hughes in Crowell v.
Bengson, 45 "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal
principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is
fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." 46 N r does it argue
against the authoritative character of Justice Malcom's ponencia in Yu Cong
Eng that it was reversed in appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. 47 During the period of American sovereignty, such jurisdiction validly be
exercised. Its decision then nullifying the Chinese Bookkeeping Law is the law
of the case. it does not follow, however, that the reasoning on which the
Philippine decisions was based is bereft of any legal significance. It does not
admit of doubt that Justice Malcolm and his brethren considered fully the
precise problem presented and the need for such a measure to assure that the
taxes to which the Philippine government was entitled would be fully paid. It
cannot be said that the American Supreme Court in this as in other cases of
Philippine origin was as well-informed. It did not possess it could not
possess full awareness of the conditions then existing in this country. After
July 4, 1946, when the Philippine declared its independence, therefore, it is not
only understandable but also proper that there be less reliance on American
Supreme Court decisions. What is undeniable as shown by the foregoing
citations of case both Philippine and American is that approach followed
by Justice Malcom in the interpretation of statutes to avoid any doubt as to its
validity remains a fundamental canon.
8 To show fidelity to his basic principle of construction is to lend substance to
the equally basic doctrine that the constitution enters into and forms part of
every statute. 48 Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the
Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be considered national in
character. There can be no valid objection to such exercise of authority. It is

undisputed that by virtue of the 1981 amendments to the Constitution, once
again, "there is one purpose which is crystal-clear and is the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive." 49 So it was affirmed in Free Telephone Workers
Union v. Minister of Labor. 50 There is significance to the fact that the Local
Government Code 51 does not include the Metro Manila Commission. That is
clear recognition that some of its attributes are those of a national character.
Where, however, the acts of the Metro Manila Commission may be considered
as properly appertaining to local government functions, the power of the
President is confined to general supervision. As thus construed, Section 13
clearly appears to be free from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56022 entitled Gemiliano C. Lopez, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, and the petition in G.R. No. 56124 entitled Gemiliano
C. Lopez, Jr. and Reynaldo B. Aralar v. Metropolitan Manila Commission, are
dismissed. No costs.
Page | 38
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO,

VIRGILIO GASTON, CONCHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO
"SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,

merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LACSON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, PETITIONERS, VS.
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER
Section 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions which
OF NEGROS OCCIDEDENTAL, RESPONDENTS.
must exist to provide the legal basis for the creation of a provincial unit and
these requisites are:
DECISION
"SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. - A province may be created if it has a

territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population
ALAMPAY, J.:
of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual

income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos
Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 - An Act Creating a
for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the
New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said
Norte, which took effect on December 3, 1985, Petitioners herein, who are
creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory
residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and
need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.
municipalities therein, on December 23, 1985, filed with this Court a case for
Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents Commission on Elections
"The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both
from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the
the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and
aforesaid law, was scheduled for January 3, 1986.
nonrecurring income." (Rollo, p. 6)

Due to the constraints brought about by the supervening Christmas holidays
Said law provides:
during which the Court was in recess and unable to timely consider the petition,
"SECTION 1. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities
a supplemental pleading was filed by petitioners on January 4, 1986, averring
of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona;
therein that the plebiscite sought to be restrained by them was held on January
and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are
3, 1986 as scheduled but that there are still serious issues raised in the instant
hereby separated from the province to be known as the Province of Negros del
case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise which
Norte.
should properly be passed upon and resolved by this Court.
"SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the
The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del
City of Silay, the Municipality of Salvador Benedicto and the City of San Carlos
Norte, namely: the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities
on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion to the Island of
of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and
Negros on the west, north and east, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square
Don Salvador Benedicto. Because of the exclusions of the voters from the rest
kilometers more or less.
of the province of Negros Occidental, petitioners found need to change the

prayer of their petition "to the end that the constitutional issues which they have
"SEC. 3. The seat of government of the new province shall be the City of Cadiz. raised in the action will be ventilated and given final resolution." At the same
time, they asked that the effects of the plebiscite which they sought to stop be
"SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the proposed new province which
suspended until the Supreme Court shall have rendered its decision on the very
are the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the
fundamental and far-reaching questions that petitioners have brought out.
approval of this Act. After the ratification of the creation of the Province of
Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite, the President
Acknowledging in their supplemental petition that supervening events rendered
of the Philippines shall appoint the first officials of the province.
moot the prayer in their initial petition that the plebiscite scheduled for January
3, 1986, be enjoined, petitioners plead, nevertheless, that -
"SEC. 5. The Commission on Elections shall conduct and supervise the
"xxx a writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to Respondent Commission on
plebiscite herein provided, the expenses for which shall be charged to local
Elections to desist from issuing official proclamation of the results of the
funds.
plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.
"SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval." (Rollo, pp. 23-24)
"Finding that the exclusion and non-participation of the voters of the Province of
Petitioners contend that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is unconstitutional and it is
Negros Occidental other than those living within the territory of the new Province
not in complete accord with the Local Government Code as in Article XI, Section of Negros del Norte to be not in accordance with the Constitution, that a writ of
3 of our Constitution, it is expressly mandated that ?
Mandamus be issued, directed to the respondent Commission on Elections, to

schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which all the qualified voters of the
Page | 39
entire Province of Negros Occidental as now existing shall participate, at the
"2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two
same time making pronouncement that the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986
possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the
has no legal effect, being a patent legal nullity;
other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save,
not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic
"And that a similar writ of Prohibition be issued, directed to the respondent
presumption all these years is one of validity. xxx
Provincial Treasurer, to desist from ordering the release of any local funds to
answer for expenses incurred in the holding of such plebiscite until ordered by
"3. xxx. Adherence to such philosophy compels the conclusion that when there
the Court." (Rollo, pp. 19-10).
are indications that the inhabitants of several baranggays are inclined to
Petitioners further prayed that the respondent COMELEC hold in abeyance the
separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is
issuance of any official proclamation of the results of the aforestated plebiscite.
more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. It
is they, and they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities
During the pendency of this case, a motion that he be allowed to appear as
will be assumed. New burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation
amicus curiae in this case (dated December 27, 1985 and filed with the Court on will come into existence. Its birth will be a matter of choice - their choice. They
January 2, 1986) was submitted by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla. Said
should be left alone then to decide for themselves. To allow other voters to
motion was granted in Our resolution of January 2, 1986.
participate will not yield a true expression of their will. They may even frustrate
it. That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish reasons, and they
Acting on the petition, as well as on the supplemental petition for prohibition with
constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle of the
preliminary injunction with prayer for restraining order, the Court, on January 7,
Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units.
1986 resolved, without giving due course to the same, to require respondents to
To rule as this Tribunal does is to follow an accepted principle of constitutional
comment, not to file a motion to dismiss. Complying with said resolution, public
construction, that in ascertaining the meaning of a particular provision that may
respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on January 14,
give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people may be gleaned
1986, filed their Comment, arguing therein that the challenged statute - Batas
from provisions in pari materia."
Pambansa 885, should be accorded the presumption of legality. They submit
Respondents submit that said ruling in the aforecited case applies equally with
that the said law is not void on its face and that the petition does not show a
force in the case at bar. Respondents also maintain that the requisites under
clear, categorical and undeniable demonstration of the supposed infringement
the Local Government Code (P.D. 337) for the creation of the new province of
of the Constitution. Respondents state that the powers of the Batasang
Negros del Norte have all been duly complied with. Respondents discredit
Pambansa to enact the assailed law is beyond question. They claim that Batas
petitioners' allegations that the requisite area of 3,500 square kilometers as so
Pambansa Blg. 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of
prescribed in the Local Government Code for a new province to be created has
the Local Government Code have been complied with. Furthermore, they
not been satisfied. Petitioners insist that the area which would comprise the
submit that this case has now become moot and academic with the
new province of Negros del Norte, would only be about 2,856.56 square
proclamation of the new Province of Negros del Norte.
kilometers and which evidently would be lesser than the minimum area
prescribed by the governing statute. Respondents, in this regard, point out and
Respondents argue that the remaining cities and municipalities of the Province
stress that Section 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 creating said new province
of Negros Occidental not included in the area of the new Province of Negros del
plainly declares that the territorial boundaries of Negros del Norte comprise an
Norte, do not fall within the meaning and scope of the term "unit or units
area of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less.
affected", as referred to in Section 3 of Art. XI of our Constitution. On this

reasoning, respondents maintain that Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 does not
As a final argument, respondents insist that instant petition has been rendered
violate the Constitution, invoking and citing the case of Governor Zosimo
moot and academic considering that a plebiscite has been already conducted
Paredes versus the Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al. (G.R.
on January 3, 1986; that as a result thereof, the corresponding certificate of
No. 55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 61), particularly the pronouncements
canvass indicated that out of 195,134 total votes cast in said plebiscite, 164,734
therein, hereunder quoted:
were in favor of the creation of Negros del Norte and 30,400 were against it,;
"1. Admittedly, this is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
and because "the affirmative votes cast represented a majority of the total votes
allowed considerable leeway. There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the
cast in said plebiscite, the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers proclaimed the
use of the expression 'unit or units affected'. It is plausible to assert as
new province which shall be known as "Negros del Norte". Thus, respondents
petitioners do that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent
stress the fact that following the proclamation of Negros del Norte province, the
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected. It is much
appointments of the officials of said province created were announced. On
more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable
these considerations, respondents urge that this case should be dismissed for
construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be
having been rendered moot and academic as the creation of the new province is
separated, should be excluded in the plebiscite.
now a "fait accompli".
Page | 40
In resolving this case, it will be useful to note and emphasize the facts which
3. Victorias
133.9
4. Manapla
112.9
5. Cadiz City
516.5
6. Sagay
389.6
funds in connection with the plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as so disclosed
7. Escalante
124.0
in the Comment to the Petition filed by the respondent Provincial Treasurer of
8. Toboso
123.4
9. Calatrava
504.5
10. San Carlos City
451.3
11. Don Salvador Benedicto.
(not available)
appear to be agreed to by the parties herein or stand unchallenged.
Firstly, there is no disagreement that the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of

Negros Occidental has not disbursed, nor was required to disburse any public
Negros Occidental dated January 20, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 36-37). Thus, the prayer
of the petitioners that said Provincial Treasurer be directed by this Court to
desist from ordering the release of any public funds on account of such
plebiscite should no longer deserve further consideration.
Secondly, in Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which led to the enactment of Batas
"This certification is issued upon the request of Dr. Patricio Y. Tan for whatever
Pambansa Blg. 885 and the creation of the new Province of Negros del Norte, it
purpose it may serve him.
expressly declared in Sec. 2 of the aforementioned Parliamentary Bill, the

"SGD.) JULIAN L. RAMIREZ
following:
Provincial TReasurer"
"SEC. 2. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern Limits of the
(Exh. "C" of Petition, Rollo, p. 90).
on the South and the natural boundaries of the northern portion of the Island of
Although in the above certification it is stated that the land area of the relatively
Negros on the West, North and East, containing an area of 285,656 hectares
new municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto is not available, it is an
more or less." (Underscoring supplied).
uncontradicted fact that the area comprising Don Salvador municipality, one of
However, when said Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was very quickly enacted into
the component units of the new province, was derived from the City of San
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, the boundaries of the new Province of Negros del
Carlos and from the Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and added
Norte were defined therein and its boundaries then stated to be as follows:
thereto was a portion of about one-fourth the land area of the town of Murcia,
"SECTION 1. - The Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos and the municipalities
Negros Occidental. It is significant to note the uncontroverted submission of
of Calatrava, Toboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona;
petitioners that the total land area of the entire municipality of Murcia, Negros
and Salvador Benedicto, all in the northern portion of the Island of Negros, are
Occidental is only 322.9 square kilometers (Exh. "D", Rollo, p. 91). One-fourth
hereby separated from the Province of Negros Occidental and constituted into a
of this total land area of Murcia that was added to the portions derived from the
new province to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte.
land area of Calatrava, Negros Occidental and San Carlos City (Negros
Occidental) wound constitute, therefore, only 80.2 square kilometers. This area
"SEC. 1. The boundaries of the new province shall be the southern limits of the
of 80.2 square kilometers if then added to 2,685.2 square kilometers,
representing the total land area of the Cities of Silay, San Carlos and Cadiz and
on the south and the territorial limits of the northern portion of the Island of
the Municipalities of E.R. Magalona, Victorias, Manapla, Sagay, Escalante,
Negros on the West, North and East, comprising a territory of 4,019.95 square
Taboso and Calatrava, will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4
kilometers more or less."
square kilometers using as basis the Special Report, Philippines 1980,
Equally accepted by the parties is the fact that under the certification issued by
Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 of the National
Provincial Treasurer Julian L. Ramirez of the Province of Negros Occidental,
Census and Statistics Office, Manila (see Exhibit "C", Rollo, p. 90).
dated July 16, 1985, it was therein certified as follows:

"xxx
xxx
xxx
No controversion has been made by respondent with respect to the allegations

of petitioners that the original provision in the draft legislation, Parliamentary Bill
"This is to certify that the following cities and municipalities of Negros Occidental No. 3644, reads:
have the land area as indicated hereunder based on the Special Report No. 3,
"SEC. 4. A plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of
Philippines 1980, Population, Land Area and Density: 1970, 1975 and 1980 by
one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act. After the ratification
the National Census andStatistics Office, Manila.
of the creation of the Province of Negros del Norte by a majority of the votes
cast in such plebiscite, the President shall appoint the first officials of the new
Land Area
province."
(Sq. Km.)
However, when Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 was enacted, there was a significant
Page | 41
"1. Silay City
214.8
2. E.B. Magalona
113.3
change in the above provision. The statute, as modified, provides that the
requisite plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are
revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article
the areas affected."
XI, Section 3 of the Constitution, which being brief and for convenience, We
It is this legislative determination limiting the plebiscite exclusively to the cities
again quote:
and towns which would comprise the new province that is assailed by the
"SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided,
petitioners as violative of the provisions of our Constitution. Petitioners submit
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance
that Sec. 3, ART XI thereof, contemplates a plebiscite that would be held in the
with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the
unit or units affected by the creation of the new province as a result of the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."
consequent division of and substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision makes it
existing province. In this instance, the voters in the remaining areas of the
imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the
province of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to participate in the
plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or
questioned plebiscite.
merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus

inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its
compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new
held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before
province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that
Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the
two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
existence of this newly proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The
have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if
other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from
indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not
the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
provide the very excuse for perpetuation of such wrong. For this Court to yield
to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court
We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to
should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an
said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these
unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so
two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify
propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents' submission will
exclusion of the parent province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on
create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its
the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out
duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might
what is claimed to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local
tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and
government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the
with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
cardinal precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will
imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with.
abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring
No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy
about a fait accompli.
intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at

the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution
In the light of the facts and circumstances alluded to by petitioners as attending
commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different
to the unusually rapid creation of the instant province of Negros del Norte after a from one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the idol therein.
swiftly scheduled plebiscite, this Tribunal has the duty to repudiate and
discourage the commission of acts which run counter to the mandate of our
We find no merit in the submission of the respondents that the petition should
fundamental law, done by whatever branch of our government. This Court gives be dismissed because the motive and wisdown in enacting the law may not be
notice that it will not look with favor upon those who may be hereafter inclined to
challenged by petitioners. The principal point raised by the petitioners is not the
ram through all sorts of legislative measures and then implement the same with
wisdom and motive in enacting the law but the infringement of the Constitution
indecent haste, even if such acts would violate the Constitution and the
which is a proper subject of judicial inquiry.
prevailing statutes of our land. It is illogical to ask that this Tribunal be blind and
deaf to protests on the ground that what is already done is done. To such
Petitioners discussion regarding the motives behind the enactment of B.P. Blg.
untenable argument the reply would be that, be this so, the Court, nevertheless,
885 to say the least, are most enlightening and provoking but are factual issues
still has the duty and right to correct and rectify the wrong brought to its
the Court cannot properly pass upon in this case. Mention by petitioners of the
attention.
unexplained changes or differences in the proposed Parliamentary Bill No.

3644 and the enacted Batas Pambansa Blg. 885; the swift and surreptitious
On the merits of the case.
manner of passage and approval of said law; the abrupt scheduling of the
plebiscite; the reference to news articles regarding the questionable conduct of
Aside from the simpler factual issue relative to the land area of the new province
the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986; all serve as interesting reading but
of Negros del Norte, the more significant and pivotal issue in the present case
are not the decisive matters which should be reckoned in the resolution of this
Page | 42
case.
The environmental facts in the case before Us readily disclose that the subject
What the Court considers the only significant submissions lending a little
matter under consideration is of greater magnitude with concomitant multifarious
support to respondents' case is their reliance on the rulings and
complicated problems. In the earlier case, what was involved was a division of
pronouncements made by this Court in the case of Governor Zosimo Paredes
a barangay which is the smallest political unit in the Local Government Code.
versus The Honorable Executive Secretary to the President, et al., G.R. No.
Understandably, few and lesser problems are involved. In the case at bar, crea-
55628, March 2, 1984 (128 SCRA 6). In said case relating to a plebiscite held
tion of a new province relates to the largest political unit comtemplated in
to ratify the creation of a new municipality from existing barangays, this Court
Section 3, Art. XI of the Constitution. To form the new province of Negros del
upheld the legality of the plebiscite which was participated in exclusively by the
Norte no less than three cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from
people of the barangay that would constitute the new municipality.
the parent province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an existing
This Court is not unmindful of this solitary case alluded to by respondents.
province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially altered. It
What is, however, highly significant are the prefatory statements therein stating
becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of the division of the parent
that said case is "one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is
province necessarily will affect all the people living in the separate areas of
allowed considerable leeway" and that "there is indeed an element of ambiguity
Negros Occidental and the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The
in the use of the expression "unit or units affected." The ruling rendered in said
economy of the parent province as well as that of the new province will be
case was based on a claimed prerogative of the Court then to exercise its
inevitably affected, either for the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case,
discretion on the matter. It did not resolve the question of how the pertinent
either or both of these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore,
provision of the Constitution should be correctly interpreted.
the unit or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which

must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
The ruling in the aforestated case of Paredes vs. The Honorable Executive
Secretary, et al. (supra) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
It is a well accepted rule that "in ascertaining the meaning of a particular
precedent when it is acknowledged therein that "it is plausible to assert, as
provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the
petitioners do, that when certain Barangays are separated from a parent
people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari materia." Parliamentary Bill
municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected."
No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte
recites in Sec. 4 thereof that "the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas
It is relevant and most proper to mention that in the aforecited case of Paredes
affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of
vs. Executive Secretary, invoked by respondents, We find very lucidly
this Act." As this draft legislation speaks of "areas", what was contemplated
expressed the strong dissenting view of Justice Vicente Abad Santos, a
evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to
distinguished member of this Court, as he therein voiced his opinion, which We
be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the
hereunder quote:
proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assump-
"2. xxx when the Constitution speaks of "the unit or units affected" it means all of tion will be consistent with the requirements set forth in the Constitution.
the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the
case at bar or all of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when
merger. I see no ambiguity in the Constitutional provision."
Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that
This dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos is the forerunner of the
it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in
ruling which We now consider applicable to the case at bar. In the analogous
the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed
case of Emilio C. Lopez, Jr., versus the Honorable Commission on Elections, L-
to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the
56012, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA, this dissent was reiterated by Justice Abad
fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to
Santos as he therein assailed as suffering from a constitutional infirmity a
cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the
referendum which did not include all the people of Bulacan and Rizal, when
evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected.
such referendum was intended to ascertain if the people of said provinces were
willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila. His dissenting
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those responsible for the
opinion served as a useful guideline in the instant case.
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 betrays their own misgivings. They
must have entertained apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the
Opportunity to re-examine the views formerly held in said cases is now afforded
areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be tainted with illegality. In
the present Court. The reasons in the mentioned cases invoked by respondents anticipation of a possible strong challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite
herein were formerly considered acceptable because of the views then taken
there was, therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a self-serving
that local autonomy would be better promoted. However, even this
phrase that the new province constitutes the area affected. Such additional
consideration no longer retains persuasive value.
statement serves no useful purpose for the same is misleading, erroneous and
Page | 43
far from truth. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area
The Court is prepared to declare the said plebiscite held on January 3, 1986 as
affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not null and void and violative of the provisions of Sec. 3, Article XI of the
to mention the other adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue
Constitution. The Court is not, however, disposed to direct the conduct of a new
the points raised by the petitioners.
plebiscite, because We find no legal basis to do so. With constitutional infirmity

attaching to the subject Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 and also because the
Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros
creation of the new province of Negros del Norte is not in accordance with the
del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long
criteria established in the Local Government Code, the factual and legal basis
established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of
for the creation of such new province which should justify the holding of another
Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that
plebiscite does not exist.
the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about

285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute Whatever claim it has to validity and whatever recognition has been gained by
to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create
the new province of Negros del Norte because of the appointment of the officials
Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as
thereof, must now be erased. That Negros del Norte is but a legal fiction should
Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved
be announced. Its existence should be put to an end as quickly as possible if
was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of
only to settle the complications currently attending to its creation. As has been
Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as
manifested, the parent province of Negros del Norte has been impleaded as the
Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of
defendant in a suit filed by the new Province of Negros del Norte, before the
boundary.
Regional Trial Court of Negros (del Norte), docketed as Civil Case No. 169-C,
for the immediate allocation, distribution and transfer of funds by the parent
As contended by petitioners, -
province to the new province, in an amount claimed to to be at least
"Indeed, the terms 'created', 'divided', 'merged', abolished' as used in the
P10,000,000.00.
constitutional provision do not contemplate distinct situation isolated from the

mutually exclusive to each other. A province maybe created where an existing
The final nail that puts to rest whatever pretension there is to the legality of the
province is divided or two provinces merged. Such cases necessarily will
province of Negros del Norte is the significant fact that this created province
involve existing unit or units abolished and definitely the boundary being
does not even satisfy the area requirement prescribed in Section 197 of the
substantially altered.
Local Government Code, as earlier discussed.
"It would thus be inaccurate to state that where an existing political unit is
It is of course claimed by the respondents in their Comment to the exhibits
divided or its boundary substantially altered, as the Constitution provides, only
submitted by them petitioners (Exhs. C and D, Rollo, pp. 19 and 91), that the
some and not all the voters in the whole unit which suffers dismemberment or
new province has a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers, more or less. This
substantial alteration of its boundary are affected. Rather, the contrary is true."
assertion is made to negate the proofs submitted, disclosing that the land area
It is also Our considered view that even hypothetically assuming that the merits
of the new province cannot be more than 3,500 square kilometers because its
of this case can depend on the mere discretion that this Court may exercise,
land area would, at most, be only about 2,856 square kilometers taking into
nevertheless, it is the petitioners' case that deserve to be favored.
account government statistics relative to the total area of the cities and
municipalities constituting Negros del Norte. Respondents insist that when
It is now time for this Court to set aside the equivocations and the indecisive
Section 197 of the Local Government Code speaks of the territory of the
pronouncements in the adverted case of Paredes vs. the Honorable Executive
province to be created and requires that such territory be at least 3,500 square
Secretary, et al. (supra). For the reasons already here expressed, We now
kilometers, what is contemplated is not only the land area but also the land and
state that the ruling in the two mentioned cases sanctioning the exclusion of the
water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. It is even the
voters belonging to an existing political unit from which the new political unit will
submission of the respondents that in this regard the marginal sea within the
be derived, from participating in the plebiscite conducted for the purpose of
three mile limit should be considered in determining the extent of the territory of
determining the formation of another new political unit, is hereby abandoned.
the new province. Such an interpretation is strained, incorrect, and fallacious.
In their supplemental petition, dated January 4, 1986, it is prayed for by
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As so
petitioners that a writ of mandamus be issued, directing the respondent
stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
Commission on Elections, to schedule the holding of another plebiscite at which
islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local
all the qualified voters of the entire province of Negros Occidental as now
Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly reflects that
existing shall participate and that this Court make a pronouncement that the ple-
"territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and
biscite held on January 3, 1986 has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Page | 44
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous". Contiguous
Province of Negros Occidental and even by our Nation. Commendable is the
means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c)
patriotism displayed by them in daring to institute this case in order to preserve
near, next, or adjacent (Webster's New World Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307).
the continued existence of their historic province. They were inspired
"Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only
undoubtedly by their faithful commitment to our Constitution which they wish to
used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid
be respected and obeyed. Despite the setbacks and the hardships which
masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be
petitioners aver confronted them, they valiantly and unfalteringly pursued a
ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the
worthy cause. A happy destiny for our Nation is assured as long as among our
statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore,
people there would be exemplary citizens such as the petitioners herein.
in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the
"territory" - - the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the
WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional.
legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "ter-
The proclamation of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the
ritory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely
appointment of the officials thereof are also declared null and void.
concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant
to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a
statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature (82 C.J.S., p.
636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction
(In re Winton Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is
an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words
of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to
bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain
meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing
the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words
and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored (Helvering vs.
Hutchings, 85 L. Ed., p. 909).
It would be rather preposterous to maintain that a province with a small land

area but which has a long, narrow, extended coast line, (such as La Union
province) can be said to have a larger territory than a land-locked province
(such as Ifugao or Benguet) whose land area manifestly exceeds the province
first mentioned.
Allegations have been made that the enactment of the questioned state was
marred by "dirty tricks", in the introduction and passing of Parliamentary Bill No.
3644 "in secret haste" pursuant to sinister designs to achieve "pure and simple
gerrymandering"; "that recent happenings more than amply demonstrate that far
from guaranteeing its autonomy it (Negros del Norte) has become the fiefdom of
a local strongman" (Rollo, p. 43; parenthesis supplied).
It is not for this Court to affirm or reject such matters not only because the merits
of this case can be resolved without need of ascertaining the real motives and
wisdom in the making of the questioned law. No proper challenge on those
grounds can also be made by petitioners in this proceeding. Neither may this
Court venture to guess the motives or wisdom in the exercise of legislative
powers. Repudiation of improper or unwise actions taken by tools of a political
machinery rests ultimately, as recent events have shown, on the electorate and
the power of a vigilant people.
Petitioners herein deserve and should receive the gratitude of the people of the
Page | 45
SO ORDERED.
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RESPONDENT.
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of

Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15,
1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be
undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the
RESOLUTION
plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and
illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312
ROMERO, J.:
should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12
barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-
Pursuant to Republic Act 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang,
November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:
Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not
have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo,
WHEREAS,
Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991
Camarines Norte.[4]
creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to

be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of
Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in
the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in
the Municipality of Labo, same province.
Tan v. COMELEC[5] relied upon by respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus
WHEREAS, under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution[1] the creation
reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary[6] which held that where a
of a municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a
local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be
plebiscite in the political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of
segrated should be included in the plebiscite.[7]
the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337)[2] said plebiscite shall
be conducted by the Commission on Elections;
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC

committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and,
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses
in holding the plebiscite shall be taken out of the Contingent Fund under the
current fiscal year appropriations;
consequently, whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising

the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the
mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves,

to promulgated (sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in
plebiscite:
promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the
creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is valid.
1.
The plebiscite shall be held on December 15,

1991, in the areas or units affected, namely
Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been superseded
the barangays comprising the proposed
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the
Paredes v. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan v.
remaining areas of the mother Municipality of
COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution[8] our
Labo, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC,
ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the
G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
1987 Constitution, especially since the latter provision deleted the words unit
or.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase unit or in Section 10, Article X of
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of
the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973
Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the
Constitution has not affected our ruling in Tan v. COMELEC as explained by
creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the
then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate
political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of
votes.[3]
Page | 46
Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional

Commission, to wit:
Mr. Maambong. While we have already approved the deletion of unit or, I
would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present
Local Government Code, the words used are actually political unit or units.
However, I do not know the implication of the use of these words. Maybe there
will be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform the Committee about
this.
Mr. Nolledo. Can we not adhere to the original unit or units? will there be no
objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide. I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words unit
or because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units
affected. If it is the creation of a barangay, the municipality itself must participate
in the plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.[9]
(Underscoring supplied)
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be
conducted in the political units directly affected, it means that residents of the
political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phrase political units directly affected, is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite.[10] Logically, those to be
included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the
proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent
COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution
No. 2312.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 47
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL AND
may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the province of which
ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON
that city is a component, if its charter provides", but that "voters registered in a
ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, AND NATIONAL TREASURER,
highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located";
"WHEREAS, inasmuch as the charters of the different cities vary with respect to
the right of their registered voters to vote for the provincial officials of the
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
provinces where they are located, there is need to study the various charters of
the cities and determine what cities shall, and shall not vote for provincial
Petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
officials pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 51;
injunction.
"WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be accordingly informed if they are
On December 22, 1979, the Interim Batasan Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51
going to vote for provincial officials or not, for their proper guidance;
providing for local elections on January 30, 1980. Section 3 of the statute
provides:
"NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers
"SEC. 3. Cities. - There shall be in each city such elective local officials as
conferred upon it by the Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and Batas
provided in their respective charters, including the city mayor, the city vice-
Pambansa Blg. 52 (51) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, that the qualified
mayor, and the elective members of the sangguniang panglungsod, all of whom
voters in each city shall or shall not be entitled to vote for the provincial officials
shall be elected by the qualified voters in the city. In addition thereto, there shall of the province where they are geographically located, to wit:
be appointive sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of the president of
the city association of barangay councils, the president of the city federation of
A. Cities not entitled to participate in the election of provincial officials
the kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the agricultural and
industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the President (Prime Minister)
1. Baguio
11.Mandaue
whenever, as determined by the sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of
2. Bais
12.Manila
sufficient number in the city to warrant representation.
3. Canlaon 13.Naga
4. Caloocan14.Ormoc
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component cities in
5. Cebu
accordance with the standards established in the Local Government Code as
6. Cotabato 16.Ozamis
provided for in Article XI, Section 4(1) of the Constitution, any city now existing
7. Dagupan 17.Pasay
with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general funds of
8. Davao
not less than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of
9. General 19.San Carlos
this Act shall be classified as a highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be
considered components of the provinces where they are geographically located.
Santos
10.Iloilo
15.Oroquieta
18.Quezon
(Pangasinan)
20.Zamboanga"
Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147.64, it is classified as a

The City of Baguio, because of its special functions as the summer capital of the highly urbanized city and the voters thereof cannot take part in the election of
the elective provincial officials of the province of Cebu, although the Charter of
Philippines, shall be classified as a highly urbanized city irrespective of its
income.
Cebu City[1] allows the qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of the
provincial officials of the Province of Cebu.
The registered voters of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election
of the officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter so
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than P40
provides. However, voters registered in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove
million, is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the city
defined, shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials of the
cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter[2] expressly
province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located."
provides that the registered voters of the city cannot participate in the election of
To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for short)
the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate
adopted Resolution No. 1421, which reads as follows:
therefor.
"WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 in calling for the election of the provincial
governor, provincial vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the
Panlalawigan in each province classified the chartered cities of the Philippines
Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan
into "highly urbanized" and "component" cities based on the annual regular
group known as D-O-E-R-S (an acronym for "DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION:
income of each city, and provided that "the registered voter of a component city
RESOLVED TO SUCCEED), which counts lawyers among its members, and
Page | 48
extends free legal assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located. This
status in meritorious cases involving violation of civil liberties and basic human
is as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly
rights. They vigorously assail Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses
urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity which
the annual income of a given city as the basis for classification of whether or not
require greater autonomy.
a particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the
election of provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
located; and Republic Act No. 5519, otherwise known as the Charter of
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective
Mandaue City, which went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the
provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any
residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum. They pray that upon filing
governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city. Thus, in the case of
of the instant petition, a restraining order be issued "temporarily prohibiting the
Teves vs. Commission on Election[7] this Court, in holding that the registered
holding of election for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials
voters of the City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the provincial officials of Negros
in the province where the 18 cities listed by the respondent COMELEC are
Oriental because the charter of the city does not expressly allow the voters in
located, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, and temporarily prohibiting
the city to do so, ruled:
the National Treasurer to release public funds and the COA to pass in audit said
"The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity separate from and
funds in connection with and for the purpose of holding local elections in said
independent of the province of Negros Oriental. The purpose of an election is to
provinces; and after hearing, to make the injunction permanent declaring
enable the electorate to choose the men that will run their government, whether
unconstitutional and therefore void Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 as well as
national, provincial, municipal or city. If so, no useful end will be served by
Section 96, Art. XVIII of the Charter of Mandaue, otherwise known as RA 5519,"
allowing - in the absence of express legislative preference - the voters of a city
and should the stopping of the provincial elections in the provinces concerned
to participate in the election of the officials of the province which has ceased to
be not possible, the respondent COMELEC be directed "to allow the qualified
have any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.
registered voters in the cities listed by said respondent, particularly Cebu City
and Mandaue City, to participate in the election of, and vote for, the Provincial
To confirm our view that the City of Dumaguete has been segregated from the
Governor and other elective provincial officials and preparing the corresponding
province of Oriental Negros for purposes of provincial elections, we should point
official ballots for this purpose which shall provide spaces therein for Provincial
to the penultimate section of the charter providing that "until otherwise provided
Governor and other elective provincial officials of the provinces concerned,
by law, the City of Dumaguete shall continue as part of the first representative
particularly the Province of Cebu."
district of the Province of Oriental Negros." This is an express exception to the

general effect of separation - an exception that serves to reiterate or even
[3]
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 insofar as it classifies establish the rule. In other words, the Congress meant that the inhabitants of
cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing
the city may not vote for provincial officials, but may vote for their representative
its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably
in Congress."
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and
the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction.
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable
The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
classification amounts to a denial of equal protection."
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It

would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as
We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards
to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the
and State Policies, it is stated that "The State shall guarantee and promote the
provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in
autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest
the election of provincial officials in some instances.
[4]
development as self-reliant communities." To this end, the Constitution directs

the National Assembly to "enact a local government code which may not
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a
protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to
more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective
vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
system of recall, allocating among the different local governments their powers,
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative
removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all
discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of
[5]
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units," and
suffrage. In the case of Teves vs. Commission on Elections[8] the Court said:
empowered local government units "to create its own sources of revenue and to
"Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is silent as to
levy taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law."[6] Art. XI, Section
the right of its qualified voters to participate in the election of provincial officials
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
of Negros Oriental, and as said voters are residents of the province, they are
Page | 49
clearly entitled to vote for said provincial officials.
officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally affected and
exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the matter. Thus,
in the cases of Bacolod, Cabanatuan, Legaspi, Naga, and Ormoc, their charters
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not
expressly prohibit the residents therein from voting for provincial officials of the
having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention
province to which said cities formerly belonged. Upon the other hand, the
is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,
charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan, Cavite, Iloilo, Calbayog, Lipa, San Pablo,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio
and Dagupan contain provisions extending to their residents the privilege to take should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
part in the election of the provincial officials of the provinces in which said cities
in the governmental unit or units affected[10] is a new requirement that came into
were previously included.
being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective[11] in character and

therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the omission in
existence on June 21, 1969.
the charter of Dumaguete City of an express provision on the right of its

residents to vote for provincial officials of Negros Oriental, in the light of the
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were
legislative practice that, when desired, the right is either recognized or
behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue
withdrawn expressly. We are inclined to overrule petitioners' position."
City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in
rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a
the province, 234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from Mandaue City,
denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or
so that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of
group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to
Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of
another individual or group of voters in the same city.
Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis. "Gerrymandering" is a "term
employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of
as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power."[12] The questioned statutes
suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the
in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The said
provincial officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited
representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an
to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the
unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the
questioned statutes neither withdraw nor restrict.
Solicitor General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters
are supporters of the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for
questioned statutes will work to their disadvantage.
elective provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the

exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs against
provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated the petitioners.
in the Constitution, however, has reference to such requirements, as the Virginia
poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board of Elections,[9] or the New York
requirement that to be eligible to vote in a school district, one must be a parent
of a child enrolled in a local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, which impose burdens on the right of suffrage
without achieving permissible state objectives. In this particular case, no such
burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They
are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, save that of being
registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is
maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of

republicanism as it would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the conduct
of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise of his right of suffrage.
It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government has no
governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities are
independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the
case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the provincial
Page | 50
SO ORDERED.
CORDILLERA REGIONAL ASSEMBLY MEMBER ALEXANDER P. ORDILLO, Regional Assembly, and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220
(BANAUE) PETITIONERS, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.
RESPONDENTS.
The petitioners maintain that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous
DECISION
Region in only one .province as the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766
require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent unit.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners, then, pray that the Court: (1) declare null and void COMELEC
The question raised in this petition is whether or not the province of Ifugao,
resolution No. 2259, the memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera
memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative Order No. 160, and
Autonomous Region can, alone legally and validly constitute such Region,
Republic Act No. 6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from
implementing the same and spending public funds, for the purpose and (2)
The antecedent facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows:
declare Executive Order No. 220 constituting the Cordillera Executive Board
and the Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices to be still in force and
On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain
effect until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been
Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga Apayao and the city of Bagnio cast their
enacted by Congress and the same is duly ratified by the voters in the
votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act
constituent units. We treat the Comments of the respondents as an answer and
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region."
decide the case.
The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite
This petition is meritorious.
showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889
votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676
The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned.
Region.
Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or
ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President
and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and
reiterating the COMELEC resolution and provided:
geographical areas, sharing common and. distinctive historical and cultural

heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
xxx[A]nd considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city,
within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" (Underlining Supplied)
only province which voted favorably - then, alone, legally and validly constitutes,
the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7)
The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote

that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
As. a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861
"region" used in it's ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
Monday of March 1991.
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.

(Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of
Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary
the land by P.D. No. 1; P.D. No. 742) Ifugao is a province by itself. To become
on February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the
part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and
affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly
geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive
created under Executive Order No. 220.
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social' structures and other
relevant characteristics. The Constitutional, requirements are not present in this
On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the
case.
non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted
said petition.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the

Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160
common use and that the words used in constitutional-provisions are to be
declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera
given their ordinary meaning except where technical term's are employed, must
Page | 51
then, be applied in this case. (See Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770,
Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos
[1988]; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413,
(P10,000,000,00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational
422-423 [1970])
requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province.
Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act
These sections of Republic Act No. 6766 show that a one province Cordillera
No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be
Autonomous Region was never contemplated by the law creating it.
constituted from only one province.

The province of Ifugao makes .up only 11% of the total population of the areas
Article III. Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera
enumerated in Article I, Section 2 (b) of Republic Act No. 6766 which include
Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government
Benguet, Mountain Province, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City. It has the
consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. It further
second smallest, number of inhabitants from among the provinces and city
provides that:
above mentioned. The Cordillera population is distributed in round figures as

follows: Abra, 185,000; Benguet, 486,000; Ifugao, 149,000; Kalinga - Apayao,
"SECTION 2. The Regional Government shall exercise powers and functions
214,000; Mountain Province, 116,000; and Baguio City, 183,000; Total
necessary for the proper governance and development of all provinces, cities,
population of these five provinces and one city; .1,332,000 according to the
municipalities, and barangay or ili within the Autonomous Region xxx."
1990 Census (Manila Standard, September 30, 1990. p. 14)
From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a
There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or
single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be
which cannot be complied, with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional
faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial
Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and six (6)
officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
members .coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the
legislative powers over exactly the same small-area.
respondents view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one
member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet
Article V. Sections 1 and 4 of Republic Act 6766 vest the legislative power in the
members, as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the
Cordillera Assembly whose members shall be elected from regional assembly
Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various
districts apportioned among provinces and the cities composing the
indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires
Autonomous Region.
the development of a common regional language based upon the various

languages and dialects in the region which regional language in turn is expected
If we follow the respondent's position, the members of such Cordillera Assembly
to enrich the national language.
shall then be elected only from the province of Ifugao creating an awkward
predicament of having two legislative bodies - the Cordillera Assembly and the
The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous
Sangguniang Panlalawigan - exercising their legislative powers over the
Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
province of Ifugao. And since Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the
constituting the Region.
Philippines, population-wise, it would have too many government, officials for so

few people.
To contemplate the situation .envisioned by the respondent would not only

violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but
Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development
would also be impractical and illogical.
Board composed of the .Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and
city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly,
Our decision in Abbas, et al. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 89651, November 10,
and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in
1989), is not applicable in the case at bar contrary to the view of the Secretary
the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development
of Justice.
Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par, 2, Republic Act
No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four,
The Abbas case laid down the rule on the meaning of majority in the phrase "by
Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Big. 337 - Local
majority of the vote's cast by the constituent units called for the purpose" found
Government Code), If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform
in the Constitution, Article X, Section 18. It stated:
such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform
almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area
xxx
must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the
"xxx [I]t is thus, clear that what is required by the Constitution is simple majority
Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail.
Page | 52
xxx
xxx
of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in
'the individual constituent units.
This was the pronouncement, applied by the Secretary of Justice, in arriving at

his conclusion stated in his Memorandum for the President that:
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx [i]t is believed that the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR)
as mandated by R.A. No. 6766 became effective upon its approval by the
majority of the votes cast in the province of Ifugao. And considering the proviso
in Section 13 (a) that only the provinces and city voting favorably shall be
included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted
favorably - can, alone, legally and validly constitute the CAR." (Rollo" p. 40)
The plebiscites mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act. No. 6766 for the
Cordillera and Republic Act No. 6734 for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao determine. (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in the
Cordillera and in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among
those enumerated in the two Republic Acts, shall comprise said Autonomous
Regions. (See III, Record of the Constitutional Commission, 487-492 [1986]).
The Abbas case established the rule to follow on which provinces and cities
shall comprise the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao which is,
consequently, the same rule to follow with regard to the autonomous region in
the Cordillera. However, there is nothing in the Abbas decision which deals
with the issue on whether an autonomous region, in either Muslim Mindanao or
Cordillera could exist despite the fact that only one province or one city is to
constitute it.
Stated in another way, the issue in this case is whether the sole province of
Ifugao can validly and legally constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. The
issue is not whether the province of Ifugao is to be included in the Cordillera
Autonomous Region. It is the first issue which the Court answers in the instant
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 2259 of the

Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the creation of an autonomous
region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, the
February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act. No. 6861 are declared null and void while
Executive Order No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly
repealed or amended.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 53

Cases For Public Corporation PDF

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Cases For Public Corporation PDF

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Public Corporation 1

Cases for Public Corporation

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, PETITIONER, VS. CONTE MANGELIN,

there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee

PALOMARES, JR., RAKIL DAGALANGIT, AND BIMBO SINSUAT,

6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting

RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY

REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF

petition. The antecedent facts are as follows:

THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WIRE

1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was

AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF

appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous

CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN

Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur.

BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS.

2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional

advice, with the following assemblymen present:

Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for

2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)

3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said

4. Dela Fuente, Antonio

members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March

23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of

resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly.

4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the

After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was

Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr.

authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the

Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence,

petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter

the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.

8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the

with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional

following Assemblymen present:

1. Mangelen Conte -- Presiding Officer

the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission

as mandated by the Commission.

6. Conding Pilipinas (sic)

respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987; with venue at the Congress of

8. Dela Fuente, Antonio

Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable.

10. Palamares, Diego

5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting

11. Quijano, Jesus

Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that

12. Sinsuat, Bimbo

13. Tomawis, Acmad

14. Tomawis, Jerry

and emoluments without authority from the Assembly ... constituted a

An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:

caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to

petition had become "moot and academic".[8]

last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session.

(pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic.

HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.

PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions

preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.

Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against.

expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no

Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that -

(a) This Petition be given due course;