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C O M P A R A T IAVNEA L Y S I S
A R A BA N D I S R A E L IC O M B APTE R F O R M A N C E
1967 AND 1973 I,|ARS

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A Report Preparedfor
Secretary of Defense
Assistant
0ffice,
June 1976
Undercontract No. DNA001-76-A-0089

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This work sponsoredby the DefenseNuclearAgencyunder:

RMSS
Codex337076469Q8sQAxYx91220
RDT&E

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ORGA}IIZATIO}I
ANDRTSTARCH
EYAIUATIOil
HISTORICAT

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ERRATA
Comparative Analysis
Arab and Israeli CombatPerformance
1957 and 1973 V'lars

d+

.J

.:.lcture

Chanqe
1/8 Div
L/24 Bde

Column 7 heading from L/I2 Dj.v

1/36 Bde

Eng. No, 67-2 should read Abu Ageila-i.l.mKatef

-0

.June 8, columns 3 and 4 should read 10.I(i00)

10.I(4) respectively

10

28, 79, (1)18,

\tune 5 line should read across:
1(46),(10), (32)r.., .., ..,

23

33

For engagements 22, 23, 24, change Anab CEV col-umn

to read down: I.70, 0.73, 0.26

23

33

For engagements 22, 23, 24, change Israeli

column to read down: 0.59, 1.36, 3.85

24

35

For 1967 - West Bank (far left column) change

Israeli CEV to 1.95 (far right colurnn)

26

last
para,

to read

and

CEV

Change first
line to read: In 1970, following an
equally dismal performance against Jordan, there
led this time by
had been one more coup dtetat,
the then Ministen of Vrlar, Aln Force General
Hafez aI Assad.

TABLEOF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
O b j e c t iv e
Data Sounces
P a r t i c i o a n ts

3
?

3
A
t

COMBAT
IN THE1967 I,'|AR
PERFORMANCES
The Data
D a t aA n a l y s i s
COMBAT
PERFORMANCE
IN THE 1973 WAR
TheData
D a t aA n a l y s i s
C a m p a ' igAnn a l yse s

5
5
15
15
15
15

EVALUATION
OVERALL
COMPARATIVE

(J

IONS
CONCLUS

28

List of Fjgures
F o rceS tre n g ths, Sjx- DayW ar , 1967
1 . A p p ro xi ma te
1967
Summ ar ies,
? . Es t ima te dIsra e l i A rma ment
1967
Summ ar ies,
3 . Es t ima te dE g yp ti a nA rma ment
1967
Summ ar ies,
4 . Es t ima te dJo rd a n i a nA rma ment
1967
Summ ar ies,
5 . Es t ima te dS yri a n A rma ment
6. EngagemenS
t si,x - D a yW a r , J u n e 1 9 6 7
, inai Front,
7 . E s t i m a t eA
d l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s S
J u n e5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
8 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f T a n kL o s s e s ,S i n a i F r o n t ,
J u n e5 - 8 , 1 . 9 6 7I,n c ] u s i v e
e ro r t i e s
9 . E s t j m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b S
S u e z - S i n aFi r o n t , J u n e5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c ] u s i v e
1 0 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f B a t t l e C a s u a l t ' i e sJ, o r d a nF r o n t ,
J u n e5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
1 1 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t i o n o f T a n kL o s s e s ,J o r d a nF r o n t
J u n e5 - 7 , L 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
e ro r t i e s ,
L 2 . E s t i m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b S
J o r d a n i a nF r o n t , J u n e5 - 7, L 9 6 7 , I n c ' l u s i v e
, o l a nF r o n t ,
1 3 . E s t j m a t eA
d l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t j e s G
J u n e9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c ] u s i v e
1 4 . E s t i m a t e dA l l o c a t ' i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,S y r j a n F r o n t ,
J u n e9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
Sro r t i e s ,
1 5 . E s t i m a t e dC l o s eA i r S u p p o r tF i g h t e r - B o m b e
G o l a nF r o n t , J u n e9 - 1 0 , L 9 6 7 ,I n c l u s i v e
1 6 . E n g a g e m eDnat t a C a l c u l a t i o nI n p u t S h e e t
1 7 . M o d e l( E n g a g e m e nCt a) l c u l a t i o nF o r m
1 8 . P r e l i m i n a r y1 9 6 7A r a b - I s r a e l i W a rA n a l y s i s
1 9 . 1 9 6 7A r a b - I s r a ei l W a rA n a l y s i s - R e f i n e d

7
7
7
8
B
9
10
10

t0
10
11
11
11
11
11
L2
13
t4
14

(continued)
0F C0NTENTS
TABLE

Page

L i s t o f F i g u r e s( c o n t i n u e d )
2 0 - A . E sti ma te dGro u n dS trengths,0ctober 1973
B . E sti ma te dL o sse s,October1973
z L - A . A i r F o rceS tre n g th s,October1973
B . E sti ma te dA i r L o sse s,0ctober 1973
1973
Summ ar ies,
2 2 . E sti ma te dIsra e l i A rma m ent
1.973
Surmaries,
23. EstimatedEgyptianArmament
1973
Summaries,
24. EstimatedSyrian Arrnament
October1973
2 5 . S i n a i F ro n t E n g a g e ments,
B
a t t l e C a s u a l t i e s ,S i n a i F r o n t n
o
f
26, Estimated
Allocation
0 c t o b e r6 - 2 4 , L 9 7 3 ,I n c l u s i v e
A l l o c a t i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,S i n a i F r o n t ,
27. Estimated
0ctoberr6-24, Incl usi ve
Sor ties,
2 8 . Esti ma te dC l o seA i r S u ppor tFighter - Bomber
S u e z-S i n a F
i ro n t, October6- 24, L973
0ctober 1973
, .
29. Golan Front Engagements,
30. Estimated
A l l o c a t i o no f B a t t l e C a s u a l t j e s ,G o l a nF r o n t ,
0 c t o b e r6 - 2 2 , 1 9 7 3 ,I n c l u s i v e
31. Estimated
A ] l o c a t i o no f T a n kL o s s e s ,G o l a nF r o n t ,
Octo b e r6 -2 2 , 1 .9 7 3
Sor ties,
3 2 . E sti ma te dC l o seA i r S u ppor tFighter Bomber
Go 'l a nF ro n t, 0 cto b er 6- 22, L973
3 3 . P r e l i m i n a r y1 9 7 3A r a b - I s r a e l iW a rA n a l y s i s
3 4 . 1 97 3A ra b -Isra e li l ,l a rAnalysis- Ref i ned
3 5 . C omp a ra ti ve
C a mp a 'i gAnnalyses,1967, 1973

16
16
t7
L7

18
18
19
19
20
20
21
2t
22
22
23
23
24
24

COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS,ARABANDISRAELI COMBAT
PERFORMANCE
1967AND1973WARS
A HER0Report

INTRODUCTION
OBJ
ECT
IVE
T h e p u r p o s eo f t h i s s t u d y b y t h e H i s t o r j c a l E v a l u a t i o na n d R e s e a r c 0h r g a n i z a , a s s t a t e d i n t h e T a s k0 r d e r t o b e a s f o l l o w s :
t i o n ( H E R 0 )w
U t i I i zi n g d a ta a 1re a d y a va i' ab]
l e to HERO,
with such additions and
r e f i n e m e ntsa s a re mu tu a l l y a g r eedby HERO
and OASD( I)to be necessar y
a n d f e a s i b l e w i t h i n b u d g e t a r yl i m i t s o f t h e s t u d' level
Oi l l a n a l y z e
y , H E Rw
a p p r o x i m a te 'lte
y n e n g a g e me n ts,
each, at br igade
or higher , for the
1 9 6 7Si x Da yWa r, a n d th e 1 9 7 3OctoberW ar , em ployingboth the Quantified
J u d g m e nMt e t h o do f A n a l y s i so f H i s t o r i c a l C o m b aDt a t a ( Q J M Aa) n d q u a l i t a t i v e h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y t i c a l t e c h n i q u e s ,i n o r d e r t o a s c e r t a i nt h e f o l l o w i n g :
a . Re l a ti ve co mb a e
t ffe cti v enessof the opposedfor ces in each
e ng a g e me n t;
b . P a t t e r n so r d i f f e r e n c e si n r e l a t i v e c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s so f
d j f f e r e n t A r a bu n i t s a n d a r m i e s ;
c . P a t t e r n so r d i f f e r e n c e sb e t w e e nr e l a t i v e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o m b a t
p e r f o r m a n cien 1 9 6 7a n d i n 1 9 7 3 ;
d . T h e e x t e n t t o w h i c hA r a b a n d I s r a e l i r e l a t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e
c ha n g e db e tw e e no ffe n sive and defensivepostur es;
e . T he e xte n t to w h i ch th e pr esenceor lack of air powerappear s
t o h a ve i n fl u e n ce dco mbatout om es;
t . T he e xte n t to w h i ch o u tcom es
wer e jnfluencedb.yany other
v a r i a b ] e so f c o m b a t .
Th e t a s k s t o b e p e rfo rme da n d th e pr ocedur esto be followed, accor dingto the T as k
0rder, were:
C o m p i l a t ' i oonf d a t a ; t o i n c l u d e s u c ha d d i t i o n so r r e f i n e m'el n t so f
e x is t i n g H E R O
d a ta a s ma ybe necessar y,assur ing compati
b' i i ty,
t o t h e e x t e n t p o s s i b l e nw i t h d a t a u s e di n o n g o i n ga n a l y s e so f t h e
M id d ]e E a s t B a la n c e ;
2 . Q u a n t i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f t h e 1 9 6 7W a rd a t a b y 0 J M ;
3 . Q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 6 7W a rd a t a ;
4 . Q u a n t i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 7 3W a rd a t a b y Q J M ;
5 . Q u a l i t a t i v ea n a l y s i so f 1 9 7 3W a rd a t a ;
6 . C o m p a r a t i veev a l u a t i o no f r e s u l t s o f s t e p s 2 - 5 , i n c l u s i v e ;
7 . P r e p a r a t i o no f R e p o r t .
1.

DATASOURCES
I n t h e p e r f o r m a n coef S t e p 1 , d a t a o n t h e 1 9 7 3w a r a l r e a d ya v a i l a b l e t o H E R w
0 as
re v i e w e da n d re fi n e d o n th e b a si s of infor mation collected for a r epor t on "The
M i d d l eE a s t W a ri n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e , "p r e p a r e df o r t h e D i r e c t o r o f N e t A s s e s s m e n t , D e p a r t m e notf D e f e n s e a, n d a d d j t ' i o n a li n f o r m a t i o nr e c e i v e di n c o n v e r s a t i o n s
w i t h M a j o rG e n e r a A
l vraham
A d a n ,I s r a e l ' i A r m y ,a n d C o l o n e lA v r a h a m
A y a ' l o n ,I s r a e l i
Army.

oper ationalnar rati v e

D a t ao n th e 1 9 6 7h l a r i s th a t com piledin an unpublished
of member s
Ret..,
with
assistance
USA,
p
re
p
a
re
d
T
.N"
Dupuy,
b
y
C
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l
of that war
by
offici al s
militar
y
on
comm
ented
b
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eviewed
and
w
h
i
ch
sta i f,
o f t h e H ER Q
has
for
ces.
ar
med
Jo
rd
anian
E
g
yp
ti
a
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d
I
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el
i
,
of the
A c u r s o ry ch e cko f so mei te ms of classified data on the 0ctoberl,{ arled t o a
0 n c l a s s i f i e dd a t a i s p r o b a b l yj u s t a s a c c u r a t e ;t h u s n o
c o n c l u s i o nt h l t t h e H E R u
c l a s s i f i e d d a t a w a su s e di n t h e s t u d y , a n d a c c o r d ' i n g ltyh i s r e p o r t i s n o t c l a s s i fied.
PARTI
CI PANTS
M o s to f th e w o rk o n th i s stu dy and this r epor t wasdoneby ColonelT.N. Dupuy ,
, e t . C o n t r i b u t i o n st o t h e s t u d y
U S A ,R e t . , a n d C o l o n e lJ o h nA . C . A n d r e w sU, S A FR
staff. The un der w e r e a l s o ma d eb y Gra ceP . H a ye sand Vivian Lyons,of the HERO
s i g n e dt a k e s f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t yf o r t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e s t u d ya n d t h i s r e p o r t .

D u n nL o r i n g , V i r g i n i a
1 5 J u n e1 9 7 6

T.N. Dupuy
ExecutiveDir ector

COMBAT
PERFORMANCES
IN THE1967 t^lAR
THEDATA
nsix DayW a r ,"
f i g u r e 1 i :_ a su rma ryo f ma j or statistical data of the 1967
in c l u d i n g o v era l l stre n g th s a n d i osses of per sonneland selectedm ajor iiem s ot
! 9 u l R m e nfto r a ' l l ^ m a i o rp a r t i c i p a n t s . F i g u r e s2 , 3 , 4 , a n d 5 p r e s e n tm o r ed e t a i l e d l i s t i n g s o f th e p ri n ci p a l var ietiei of weiponsind combbtequipmentes ti m a t e dt o b e o n h a n di n th e Isra e l i , Egyptian,Jor danianand Syr ian' ar m iesas of
f . J g n e L 9 6 7 , sh o w i n gp re su mead'l l ocationsto m ajor combatfor m ations, such as
divisions andbrigades.
F i g u r e6 i s a ' l i s t i n g o f a l l m a j o r e n g a g e m e notns a l l t h r e e f r o n t s , b e t w e e n
_
J u n e 5 a n d J u n e 1 0 . F i g u re 7 i s an estim atedbr eakdown
of the pr esum ed
total
I s r a e l i a n d F g y p t i a nc a i u a ' l t i e so n t h e S i n a i f r o n t , w i t h a l l o c a t i o n s t o d a y s a n d
e n g a g e m e nba
ts se du p o np ro fe ssi o nalhistor ical and m ilitar y judgm entin coir s i der at io n o f t h e Du p u yd e ta i l e d n a rra ti v e of oper ationscited uir aerr Data sour ces"i n
t h e I n t r o d u cti o n to th i s re p o rt. Figur e 8 is a com par able
br eakdown
of pr esu m ed
I s r a e ' l i ^ a n dEg yp ti a nta n k l o sse s on the Sinai fr ont, by day and by engagem ent.
Fig u r e 9 i s a co mp a ra b l be re a kd o wn
of estim ateddir ect air - suppor i alioiations by
t h e I s r a e l i an d E g yp ti a na i r fo rces, also r elated to engagem ehls
and dates.
F i g u r e s1 0 , 1 1 , a n d 1 2 p r o v i d ec o m p a r a b ldea t a e s t i m a t e sf o r t h e J o r d a n ,W e s t
B a n k ,F r o n t , J u n e5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 . F i g u r e s1 3 , 1 4 , a n d 1 5 p r o v i d ec o m p a r a b ldea t a e s t i ma t e sf o r t h e S yri a n , Go l a n , F ro n t, June 9- 10, 1967.
Av a i l a b l e re so u rce so f ti me and funds per mitted analysis of onl,ytwelve engagements
of the 1967War-four on each front. This was a total of two more 1967
wa r e n g a g e m e a
nn
t a 'l yse sth a n w a s pr ovidedfor in the Task 0r der .
DATAANALYSIS
F i g u r e 1 6 !s_ a sa mp l ee n g a g ement
data sheet for Engagem ent
67- L, the Bat tl e of
R a f a , J u n e6 , 1 9 6 7 . F i g u r e 1 7 i s a s a m p l ee n g a g e m ecnitl i u l a t i o n s h e e t f o r t h e
e n g a g e m e nst ,h o w i n g .th ea p p l i ca ti on of the data to the for m ulaeof the Quant i fi ed
J u d g m e nMt o de l(QJM). T h e e n tri e s for Figur e 18, "Pr eliminar y1967Ar ab- Isr ael i
W a rA n a l y s i s , " a r e d e r i v e df r o m t h e s e a n d - c o m p a r a bd' a
l et a a n d - c a l c u l a t i o ns h e e t s
f o r t h e o t h e r e 'l e ve ne n g a g e me n ts.That figur e pr ovidesa sur nm ation
of the QJ M
a n a l y s e so f t h e s e _ q l g a g e m e nat sn ,d i s t h e e s s e n c eo f t h i s s t u d y ' s q u a n t i t a t i v e
a n a l y s i so f t h e 1 9 6 7W a r .
T h e c o l u m n so f F i g u r e 1 8 a r e d e s c r i b e da s f o l l o w s :
1 . E n g a g e mennut mb e r(se e Figur e 6)
2 . N u me ri cama
l n p o w eco
r mpar ison( Ar abwith r espect to Isr aeli)
3 . F i re p o w e rco mp a ri so n
ratio
4 . R e l a t i v ec o m b aP
t o w e r ,b a s i c c a l c u l a t i o n , i n w h i c ha l r r e a d i l y i d e n t i f i a b l e c o m b avt a r i a b l e s h a v eb e e nc o n s i d e r e d i
5 . T h e e ffe cts o f su rp ri se, r eflecting effects of sur pr ise on r elativ e
m o b i l i t y a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f t h e o p p o n e n tas s c a l c u l a t e df o r
W o r l dW a rI I e n g a g e m e n t s . l
6 . M o d i fi e d co mb a tP o w e rRatio ( to r eflect effects of sur pr ise)
7 . Engagement
outcomes
8 . E ffe cti ve C o mb aPt o w erRatioi the r atio that would have been
r e q u i r e df o r a v e r a g er a t i o - r e s u l t r e l a t i o n s h i p i n w o r l d w a r I I
e n g a g e me d
na
t ta b a se ( ( n - n) /S + t )
9 . A r a b C o m b aEt f f e c t i v e n e s sV a l u e ( C f V 1 ;c a l c u ' l a t e db y d i v i d i n g e n t r y
i n c o l u m n8 b y t h a t i n c o l u m n6 .
1 0 . I sra e l i C E V(re cr'p ro calof Ar ab CEV)
l s e e , T . N . D u p u y,T h e Qu a n ti ,!ied
M ethodof Analysis of Histor ica l
llg4gment
Co m b aDt a t a . H E R 0 D
, un

D u p in gth e p ro ce sso f a n a l y sis of the data in F' igur eLB, and that of Fi gur e 34
( c o n t a i n in gs'i mi l a r a n a l yti ca l data fr om 1973W arengagement
analyses) ,thr e e anal y t i c a l h y po th e sehsa veb e e nfo rmulated:
in whichthey wer e fol l ow i n si tuations and ci' r cumstances
1 . A ra b p e rfo rma n ce
i n g c a r e f ul l y p re p a re dp re -w a rplans was substantially better than whencop i ngw i th
u n a n t i c i pa te dco mb asi
t tu a ti o n s ; this ability is est' imate{at abouta 30%im pr ov eoper ations.z
in pr e- planned
m e n to v e r sta n d a rdp e rfo rma n ce
2 . Th e e ffe cts o f su rp ri s e in 1967and 1973com batsituations wasclear l y m or e
and the W ester nAl l i es i n
the Ger m ans
s i g n i f i c a nt th a n i t h a d b e e ni n com batbetween
l the gr eater ave r agedi s 1 9 4 3a n d 19 4 4 ;th i s i n cre a sea p pear ed
to be pr opor tiona'to
p e r s i o no f tro o p s i n th e sew a rs ( about4,000 squar emeter sper m an)than in W or l d
W a rI I ( a b o u t3 , 0 0 0s q u a r em e t e r sp e r m a n ) . T h i s e n h a n c evda l u eo f s u r p r i s ei n a n
t ith Soviet
i n c r e a s i n g ' lsyc i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c a e
l n v i r o n m e ns te e m tso b e c o n s i s t e n w
a s s e s s m en ts,
a s re p re se n te d
b y the following quotationfr om ScientificlTeqln!!q]ProgressaqlIdt1eRbvo.|utionjirMiljtar.vAffijrsbyCo1onelGffis.
S c i e n t i f i c - t e c h n i c apl r o g r e s si s t h e m a t e r i a lb a s i s o f t h o s er e v o l u t i o n a r y
c h a n g ew
s h i chh a veo ccu rre din the Soviet Ar medFor cesin r ecent year s.
. . / T n i s Z r e v o l u t i o ni n m j ' l i t a r ya f f a i r s t o a s i g n i f i c a n td e q r e eh a s
r a i s - e dt-h ei mp o rta n ce
o f sur pr ise. High combatr eadinessof the Soviet
Ar m e dF o rce si s ca u se db y the m ost impor tantof all the tasks confr ont' i ng
t h e m -th a t i s, to th w a rt th e intentions and pr ovidea decisiveand comp l e t e d e fe a t to a n y a g g re ssor . The pr esentcapabilities of the Soviet
Ar m e dF o rce sma kei t p o ssi bleto solve th' is pr ob' lem .
3 . Th ed i sru p ti ve e ffe cts of sur pr ise evidently continuefor at least tw o day s
a f t e r t h e s u r p r i s ei s a c h i e v e d . F o r t h e f j r s t d a y i t i s a b o u tt w o - t h i r d st h e d i s r u p t i v e e ffe ct o f th e su rp ri se as calculatedfor the day it occur s, and abo utonet h i r d t h e ' i n i t i a l s u r p r i s ed i s r u p t i v ee f f e c t o n t h e s e c o n d a y a f t e r s u r p r i s ej s
a c he
i ved.
T h ea p p l i c a t j o no f t h e s eh y p o t h e s et so t h e a n a l y t i c a l r e s u l t s o f F i g u r e1 8 p r o v ' i d e ss o me w h a
ret fi n e d va l u e sfor com bateffectiveness,as shownin Figur e 19.
T h e re fi n e d a n a l ysi s re fl e cted by the values in Figur e 19 showsr emar kabl cy ons i s t e n t v a l u e s ' i n r e l a t i v e c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s so f t h e o p p o n e n tws i t h i n e a c ho f t h e
t h r e e s e t s o f fo u r e n g a g e me non
ts the thr ee separ atefr onts. It showsthat the
I s r a e ' l j c o mb aet ffe cti ve n e sssu per ior ity over the Egyptianswason the average96% ,
,r a
s a so n t h e a v e r a g e5 3 % o
o r a C E Vo f 1 . 9 6 ;t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e J o r d a n i a nw
a
CEV
o
r
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
w
a
s
o
n
t
h
e
S
y
r
i
a
n
s
3
1
3
%
,
C E V0 f 1 . 6 3 ; I s r a e l i s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e
4
.
1
3
.
of
pr ovidesthe fol l ow N o r ma l i zi n gth e se re l a t'i o nshipson the Syr ian per for m ance
i n g i n t e r e s t i n gc o m p a r i s o n :
(1.63) (1.96)
4.13
Israeljs
(1.20)
(i.00)
Jordanian 2.53
(1.00) (t.oo)
Esyptian 2.11
Syrian
1.00

2 t h i s p h e n o m e n ohna s a l s o b e e n n o t e d ' i n W o r l d W a r I I e n g a g e m e n tbse t w e e nR u s s i a n a n d G e r m a nf o r c e s , s u p p o r t j n g a m o r e g e n e r a l h y p o t h e s i s : w h e na f o r c e o f l o w e r

e ith
c o m b a te f f e c t i v e n e s s ' i s a b l e t o s e i z e t h e i n i t j a t i v e a n d o p e r a t e ' i n a c c o r d a n c w
c a r e f u l ' l y p r e p a r e d p ' l a n sf o r e i t h e r o f f e n s e o r d e f e n s e , t h e c o m b a te f f e c t i v e n e s s
d i f f e r e n t i a ' l i s r e d u c e db y o n e - t h i r d .

Figure 1.

APPR0XIMATE
F0RCESTRENGTHS,
SIX-0AY t{AR, 1967

I s rael

Mobilized Manpower
Tanks
APC
Arrtti l l e r y P i e c e s
SAM
AA Guns
Combat
C
ombaA
t ircraft

totraI
Arahs

EqvDt

Jordan

Svria

210,000 309,000 200,000 45,000 6 3 , 0 0 0

r nnna
t ?47
t ,3000
zeTt
750
1, 5 0 0 b
1, 8 4 5
t,050
2r0
585
?03
962
575
72
315
50
160
160
0
0
550
2,050+
950
?
1, 1 0 0
286c
682
431e
18
tzTr 106

4 2 0 0 M - 4 8 , 2 5 0 C e n t u r i o n s , 1 5 0 A M X - 1 3 ,4 0 0 S h e r m a n - S u p eSr h e m a n .
u H aI t t r a c k s .
clncludes 92 Mirage, 24 Superli|ystere, 72 Mystere, 55 ouragan, 24
light bombers.
d l n c l u d e s 4 0 0 T - 3 4 , 4 5 0 T - 5 4 l 5 5 , 1 O OS u - 1 0 0 . l O 0 J S - 3 .
e l n c l u d e s 5 5 5 u - 7 , 1 6 3 M i G - 2 1 ,4 0 M i G - 1 9 ,1 0 0 M i G - i 5 / 1 7 , 3 0 T u - 1 6 ,
4 J l t - l d : s n o r f ,0 t o l t o t s .
rlncludes 200 M-48. 80 Centurions.
9 I n c l u d e s4 0 s u p e r s o n l c ,6 8 M i c - 1 5 / 1 7 , 1 5 T u - 1 6 , 4 I t - 2 8 .

Figure 2.

Inf Bde
Personnel
P is t o l
Rifle
l ' 4 a c hnie G u n , I t
l ' l a c h i n eG u n , h v y
l4ortar, 81m
llortar, 4.2"
Bazooka
A T M i s s il e 5 5 - 1 0 / 1 1
RR, 106m
APC,Halftrack
A A ,, l t , 2 0 m
AA
A,, l t , 4 0 m
Hawk
How, 105m
How
w,, 1 5 5 m
G un, 155m
G uu nn,, 1 7 5 m
Tanks
AI1X113
M-48 (90)
Super Sherman
Centuri on
A
AP
PC
C,,H a l f t r a c k
TI rruucc k s
sP
S PM
ti o u n t s

4,300
430
3,870
120
80
20
I2
20
6
50
16

Fleczd
Bde

Armd
Bde

Armd
Rgt

Arty
Rst

4,300
430
3,870
80
60
10
I
10
4

3,600
360
3,240
40
40

2,000
200
I,800
30

I,000
100
900
10

200
T2

?0

30
10

l0

io t g otis o l

150
30

ziro
150
30

Personnel
Pisto l
Rif'le
M a c h i n eG u n , l t
M a c h i n eG u n , h v y
Mortar,2"
Mortar, Sarn
l',!ortar, 120m
RL, 40nn
GAT, B5mn
S c h m eA
l TMissile
RR, 107m
AMGZPU-2
AMG ZPU-4
AA,37mn
M, 57mn
AA, 85mm
Mortar, 240m
ilow, 122m
Gun How, 15 nn
uunr lJUm
AT Su-100SP
JS-3
PT-76
T-34
T-54155
A P CB T R - 5 0
A P C3
8TR-152
Truck
Motor
lilotorcycl e
SP l4o
l4ount

10,000
1,000
9,000
360
?40
2A
50
12
50
48
24
24
9
9
6
12

T2

;^
I'

io
tio
20
800
60
36

Tank
Dlv
10,000
1,000
9,000
270
160
10

'io

150
38

Tank
Bde

3,500
350
3,150
85
55
12

io

?4
T2
t2
9
9

. :

90
40
( 3 0 ) ( 4 0 )( 1 0 )

Figure 3.

Inf u1v

:o

l0

so

ESTIMATED
ISRAELIARI'lAlrtENT
SUI4MARIES,
1967

'tiol
' :"
75
19

'.'
3
2
4

Ll 12 Div
1/36 Bde
l'1isc Unlts

9
Arty
Rgts

2
Amd
Rgts

l4
2
I n f , / P a r a Meczd
Bde
Bde

25,000
2,500
22,500
250
420

9,000
900
8 ,1 0 0
270
270

4,000
400
3,600
60

6 0 , 2 0 0 I 600
6,020
860
5 4 , 1 8 0 7 740
1, 6 8 0
160
1, 1 2 0
1?0
280
20
168
16
280
20
168
8
84
8
700
400
224
24

45
78

.:tlo

140
76
50

: :

24

18
36

3
100

iol

' ) q

125
2,500
200

2 aan

?7
900
225

160 I
96 |
I
i

150
38

I40
i40

'i6o
2,100
420

:
oo

Totals
1? qf,n

?5,920 1122,040
320 | 2,740
320 | 2.310
loo
I
i84
I
3eo
|
254
|I
O?

't

: :

Bde

28,800 | 135,600

ti lgo

80
(80)(20)

'-

1,437
514

'::

t l ?

| 1 "

:: |
I

tzo |
(z+01
?0
1
|
io 720)(480)|
I
400
160|
300
1 , 2 0 0I
304i

,i

1,ooo
150
200
400
z5o
1,436
8,586
1,263

ESTIMATED
EGYPTIAN
ARMAMENT
SUMMARIES,
1967

Inf
boe

4,000
400
3 ,6 0 0
T?O
80
10
16
16
24
I
8
6

Arty
Rgt
I,000
100
900
75
75

10

1 / 1 0D i v
illsc Unit

:o
'roo

: :
.':'

100
t00
50
50

4
4

90

(5)120
(4) s6
(3) 72
(2) 48
(1)24

5
tnt
Divs

50,000
5,000
45,000
1,800
I,200
100
250
60
250
240
120
120
45
45
30
60
270
60
'oo
60

30

zio

roo
iz

20
10

15
Arty
Rgts

1 5, 0 0 0 I 5 , 0 0 0
I,500
1,500
1 3 , 5 0 0 13,500
200
I,ta)
i50
trLa)

so

10
30
50
10
?
200
?0

it

(31,72
(t)24
(i)12

: :

o
6

10
10
30
100
150
30
i0
600
50
30

1u

:'

8
l
Armd I

100
'ooo
45
500
30
50

r,soo
'reo

100
4,000
300
180

2
Tank
u 1v s

Inf
Bdes

20,000 20,000
2,000 2,000
18,000 18,000
540
600
320
400
20
50
80
20
20
80
48
r20
24
40
24
40
18
30
18
12

72
20
20
60
200
300
60
2A
I,800
100
60

20
20

t50
I,250
100
50

7
Tank
Bdes

Tota l s

2 4 , 5 0 0 1 4 4, 5 0 0
2,450 14,450
22,050 130,050
595
4,860
385
3,580
84
304
330
80
500
408
184
184
42
Jaa
163
92
122
120
96
414
108
24
100
100
70
130
?LO
510
350
650
70
925
14
134
I,400
10,450
140
670
520

F i g u T e4 .

E S T I M A T JEO
DR D A N I A R
N M A M ESNUTM M A R I E
1S
9 6. 7

Armd
Bde

INT

Bde

Personnel
P is t ol
Rifle
M a c h i n eG u n ,1 t
M a c h i n eG u n ,h v y
Mortar, 8lmm
M o r t a r4 . 2 "
B a z okoa
RR, 106mm
AA, 1t, 20nrm
AA,1t,40mm
G u n ,2 5 p d r
How,105mm
How,155mm
Gun,155mm
Tanks
M-48
C e n t u roi n
T r u c ks
S PM o u n t s
A r L , r v tI .Jr, ) a r a c e n

500
450
050
t20
BO
20

4,0oo
400
3,600
40
40
i0

L2
20
6
16

Fiqure 5.

P e r s o n nI e
P is t o l
Rifle
M a c h i nGe u n , 1 t
M a c h i n eG u n ,h v y
Mortar, B2mm
Mortar,120mm
RL, 40mm
GAT,85mm
RR, lo7mm
AAMG
ZPU-2
AAMG
ZPU-4
AA, 37mm
M, 57mm
AA, B5mm
Mortar,240nun
Katus hya
How, 1Z2rrun
G u nH o w ,1 5 2 n m
Gun, 130nrn
A T S u - 1 0 0S P
J S -3
PI 76
T-34
T- 54/55
A P CB T R - 5 0
A P CB T R - 1 5 2
Truck
Motorcycle
S PM o u n t

I2

10
6

90
30
150
20
20

4,000
400
3, 6 0 0
270
160
20
4

4,500
450
4, 0 5 0
300
180
?0
4
16
3?
I

3, 5 0 0
350
3,150
B5

LI

l2
B

50

Arty
Rgt
800
BO
720
75

r28

tafiz

250
20
10

1,200
160
400

10
tJ
?

1/11Bde
M i s cU n i t s

4 ,000
400
3, 6 0 0
50

10
:
b

25
: :
25
?5
20
20
(2)48

10
Arty
Bde

2,000
200
I,800
40
BO

io
24

(t)rz
180
60
300
40
40

20

Total s
48,000
4,900
43,200
1, 1 0 5
842
180
T12
2t0
56
188
t2
7?
36
24
8
240
180
60

r,770
220
540

6
Inf
Bde

(r)24
( 4) e 6
(3)72
(r)24

.':.0
II

1n

?n
60

..r..,
JO

roo
T2

30

720
10
12

I ,000

't)o

JO

24
30

240
60
I ,500
t20
60

180
180
30
825
60
60

T o t a ls

10,500 60,000
1, 0 5 0 6 , 0 0 0
9,450 54,000
2Eq

? q7q

i;; I r:;i;
|I

l
30 |

I
241
el
el
12l
1
1
1
l
|

180
10

tanK I
Hatp

72
48

72
24

20
5
250
20
10

3
Meczd
Bde

8,000 24,000 13,500

800 2 , 4 0 0
1,350
7 ,200 2 1 , 6 0 0 1 2 l ( n
750 r , 6 2 0
900
960
900
60
.':o
120
24
T2
100
96
48
96
T9?
: :
48
24
18
60
36
36
18
24
1.?

(1) R

60
60
10
275
20
20

4
Arty
Bns

(2)24
(l) I

72
L2
B
10

8,000
800
7,200
80
BO
20
16
?0
8
24

(2)24

.10

:u

30
40
i0
250
20
10

3 6, 0 0 0
3,600
32,400
960
640
160
96
160
48

Armd
Bdes

..:,

t+

;,.

B
Inf
Bdes

ESTIMATE
SD
YRIAN
A R M A M ESNUTM M A R I E1 S
96
,7

Tank
Bde

'

T2
1.2

(tzt.

Meczd
Bde

32
B
6
6

2,000
200
1, 8 0 0
25

:o

10

Inf
Bde

IO

500
50
450
10

1/10 Bde
M i s cU n i t s

1.2

150
20
50

Arty
Bn

36 |
72 |

teo
^.

o
299

288
e6
148
88
68
5 6
4 8
2 4
8
204
7

144
L44

3ol
60
e0 |
270
180 I
360
60 |
520
15 |
107
7 5 0| 4 , 1 9 5
60 I
250
30 I
282

F i g u re 6 .
EngNo

E n g a g e meD
ne
t sig n a ti o n
Ra fa h

5/6
5-7

Ab y A g e i l a -U mK a te f
Ga zaS tri p

2 Inf Div
P L AD i v

5/6

El Arish

7 Inf Div

5/6

Bi r L a h fa n

3 Inf Div

June

6 7- 2
67- 3
67- 4
67- 5

67- 6
67- 7
67- 8

67- 9

7/B
8

J er us ale m Wes tBank

67-LT
6 7- t 2
67-t3
67-t4
67-t5
G o l a nH t s
67-21
67-22
67-23
67-24
67-25
67-26

Arab Forces
Egyptian
PLA&TInfDiv

S'inai
6 7- I

6 7 -1 0
67-10.1

E N GAGEM ENTS,
t,lAR,JUNE1967
SIX- DAY

7
7

JebelLibni
3 Inf Div
B i r H a m a - B iG
3 I n f D i v & 2 1 T a n kD i v
r ifgafa
B i r H a s s n a - B iTr h a m a d a 3 I n f D i v & 4 T a n kD i v
Mitla Pass
Bir Gifgafa
Nakhl

3 Inf, 6 Inf Divs

4 T a n kD i v
6 M e c z dD i v

Isr aeli F or c es
T a l' s D i v
S h a r o n ' sD i v
T a l' s D iv
T a l' s D i v
Y o f f e ' s D iv
Yoffe'sDiv
T a l' s D i v
Y o f f e 's D iv
Yoffe'sDiv
Tal'sDiv
S h a r o n 'D
s iv

Jor danian
5-7

J e ru sael m

5/a J e n in
6/7
6/t
7

9
9
9
10
10
10

Kabat'iya
T i I fi t-Z a b a b i d a
N a bul s

Za o u ra -K a l
Tel Fahar
Rawiya
B a nai s - M a s a a d a
Ku n etra
i
Boutmi.ya

J e r u s a ' l eB
md e ( + )
25 Inf Bde
40 Ar m dBde, 25 Inf Bde
40 Ar m dBde, 25 Inf Bde
Br i gadeequ' iv
Syri an
11 Inf Bde
11 Inf Bde
8 Inf Bde
11 Inf Bde
Syri an MeczdBde
Syrian ArmdBde

Central Command
P e le d' s D iv
P ee
l d's D'iv
R a m ' sB d e
R a m ' sB d e , K o c h v a ' Bde
s

M e n delr ' s B d e
G o l a n iB d e
R a m ' sB d e
G o l a n iB d e
M e n delr ' s B d e
P e l e d ' sD i v

JU
' N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C I U S I V E
SS
I N, A IF R O N T
E S T I M A TAELDL O C A T 0
I 0FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I E

F i q u r e7 .
Date

E n g a g e m e n t s

Israel

Egypt

June

( 1 )3 , o o o ( l ) 5 o o

5
b

I
( 2 )l , o o o| ( z ) z o o

( 5 ) 5 0 0i ( 5 ) 5 0
(6).
(6).40
.5oo
( 1 0 ) 5 o o ( 1 0 )4 0

7
8

E qy p t

I srael

lSyLt

(7).

(t].ou
. 6 0 0i
(11) uroi (rr) ro

F i q u T e8 ,

Date

(3)

Israel

(3) soo

(3) 45
(3) 20

(8)

(8)

250

600

Eqypt
(4)

30

I sr a e l

(e)

(e)

600

60

(1)

(1) 15

lzj

.70
6
7

(sj

':o

(6)

'

(6) 10

li\

o).

,rt,t

( 1 1 )4

.30
I

( 1 o )l o o ( 1 0 ) 1 1

Israpl

(2) 19

t s ji r

(3) 60
(3) 30

/?\

,ui1 0

(8) 30

(4) 13

( 4 ) 80

( e ) 1 o o( 9 ) 1 6

LOSS

i
I
|
|
I

L 0 ss

70r 70
180 250
30 2Bo
30 310
so 4oo
100 500
200 700

JUf,

18
.

377
477

27
10

650
640

(1)51

,r]

()\

t:j is

t'i

(B) 40

245

( 1 0 )o

( 1 0 ) 1 2 3( 1 1 )o

(1r)12

1,105
r ,794

11

cum ouiry I r'r.i

Loss Returni loq

i5
5t
5 5

t q

i
a

uu

2J

i o q
o l 8 3

25 | e1
16
i07
|
15 | 722

i e e

s lros
44 I or

(4) 38

r sjio

E S T I M A T EADL L O C A T I O
ON
F BATTLE
C A S U A L T I E JSO
, R D AFNR O N TJ, U N E5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

E n g a g e m e n t s

;-f

J o r d a n ia n

CumuJordan

880

.. I e3o
ro i r,045

.lsrae

.rt (2) 0
(5) 76
(6) 52 (7) 0

(' 1
- -1').1. , 5- 0 0 (' 1
- '1-)-6l 0 0

.. i

E n q a q e m e n t s

(5) 20
(6) 0

oate
I

500
860

Israeli

r52
t5?

FiquTe10.

.. i
30 i

115
60 . .
64 15

I cum
D a li y
Net
Dai1yI
R e t u r n 'L o s s L o s s i
. 7 0
ls I
.
250
36
|
J
I I J
4 1

20
0

'I
ati ve

M is c

ESTII'IATE
CD
L 0 5 EA I R S U P P 0 RFTI G H T E R - B 0 l 1 S
B0
ER
RT I E S
S U E Z - S I N AFI R O N TJ, U N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

tl

ul

(3)

Israel

E q v pt

ffirir" *"*

une

500
300
20
50

Egyptian

Israel

Fovnt

Fisure 9.

D at e

M is c

Ua
Enq

ESTII4ATE
AD
LLOCATIO
ON
F T A N KL O S S E SS, I N A ] F R O N TJ, U N E5 - 8 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

D a i l y Cum
n+

s r a el

Israel i

LUnUI ati ve

3,000
3,000
4,500
1, 5 0 0
500
u:o 5 , 5 0 0
500 .
6,000
1 , 7 0 0 t:ulo 9 , 2 0 0
600
9,800
1,184 I ,900 t2,884

( 4 ) 85

250

E n g a g e m e n t

June

'

E g y p t ia n
UA
Enq

Israel

Jordan I

( 1 2 : 8) 0 0 ( 1 2 ) 4 o o
\ r'

(n)l,ooo (il)8ool

( r 1 ) 1 , o o o( 1 r ) 3 5| 0 ( t 5 ) 1 , o o ot ri luoo

..

(14) 500

10

Israel

I,500
800
( 1 4 ) 2 5 3 2 , 5 0 0I
.
r
2,000

Iati

Israel i
Daily
M is c

1 , 0 0 0 3 , 0 0 0 600
I , 2 0 0 4 , 5 0 0 400
I
1 , 0 0 0I B , 0 0 0 I , 6 0 3
1 , 0 0 01 9 , 0 0 0
l
z , o o oi 1 3 , 0 0 0

100
100

tu-mu'l
ati ve
700
I ,100

'lul'

FiguTe 11.

Date r

E S T I M A T EADL L O C A T I OONF T A N KL O S S E SJ, O R D A N

F R O N T J, U N E5 - 7 , 1 9 6 7 , I N C L U S I V E

E n g a g e m e n t

June

J o r d a ni a n

Dailyl
Loss I
50
40
100

rael

( 1 1 ) 5 0 ( 1 1) 2 0
( 1 1) 2 0 ( 1 11) o
( 1 1 ) 2 0 ( 1 11) 0

6
7

tril+o trzlie
(1s)18

( 1 5) 4 6

bb

Israeli

C u mi D a i l y N e t
LossI Return Los
50
50

eoi

190
256

Net

20
38
78
96
56

eo

6
12
t0

184
238
228

SORTIES
FIGHTER-BOMBER
F i g u r e1 2 , ESTIMATED
CLOSEAIR SUPPORT
FRONT,
JUNE5-7, 1967, INCLUSIVE
JORDANIAN

te

E n g a g e m e n t s

A v a iI a b e S o r t i e
Jordan I s r a e

f,

ln

'1

'l

11

trz

,.,

104

) o

srael

( 1 1 )J d
38
{ r 1 )40
1n
( 1 1 )A L

,J0rdan

Jordan

I s r a eI

( 12\

(12) 0

lsraeI

ir "
l
( 1 3 )2 1i ( 1 4 ) 0 i ( 1 4 )2 1

a1?\
f1q\

I J o r dl n

t
r

( 1 5 ) 52

l
l

F i g u r e 1 3 . E S T I M A TAELDL 0 C A T I00FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I G

0 ,L A F
NR 0 N TJ,U N E
9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I N C L U S I V E
ES
Date

E n q a q e m e n t s

S y r ia
Israel
June
Syria
S y r ia
i Israel
( 2 1) 1 , 0 0 0 ( 2 1 ) 1 o o ( 2 2 ) 1 , 5 0 0 ( 2 2 . ) 1 . 5 0
I
(22) 600
(24) 500 ( 2 4 )5 0 ( 2 5 ) 5 0 0 ( 2 5 ) 5 0 (26) 500
10

Syri an

I srael

S y n ia

Israel

Israeli

r Lumuu a rl y
Eno t Misc lative

I
I

D a 1l - y
L
i Tumu::E n o r M i s cI I t i v e

0 ,15 0 0 2 5 0 1
| 2,500i1,003
600 400 4.500 ur
|
l
| 1 . 5 0 0| 6 0 0 6 . 6 0 0 1 5 0|

(23)68
(26)50

tat)

3i8
468

F i g u r e1 4 . E S T I M A TAELDL o C A T I0oFNT A N K
t o S S E SS, Y R I AFNR o N TJ,U N E
9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 ,I N C L U S I V E
D a t e l

June
J

l0

E n g a g e m e n t

Syria I s n a e l
(21)15 (21\40
(24)15

Svri a

(?2\10

(22) s

I Srae |

r r o l r u ( 2 5 ) 2 0l 2 C \ ? q

\vr] a

Syrian

Israel

Israel

Syri a

(23)10 tzilio
r26\?n

Israel i

i uum
luur'l
Daily Cum Daily I Net
D a i 1 y C u m D a i 1 vI N e t
L 0 5S
L o s s R e t u r nI L o s s L o s s I L o s s R e t u r n il o s

(26)35

za

2 5

10

Jf,

of,

i 2 5
Jf,

tnn

i
I

07

$ , 9 2

F i g u r e1 5 . ESTIMATED
CLOSEAIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER.BOMBER
SORTIES
G O L AFNR O N TJ ,U N E
9-10, 1967.INCLUSIVE
Date

Available Sorties
5yrr a

10

E n g a q e m e n t s

lsrael

Svri a

Israel

238

(21\ 0

( 2 1 ) 1 1 e(22) 0

(22)1le

( 2 3 )o

tirj o

231

(24) 0

(24) 77

(25) 77 ( 2 6 )o

(26) 77

l1

Svrla

I s r a el

5rvt a

4 5 1 4 5
1 0 ' 5 5
'
105
160

1 4 5
i 5 5
o

I rf,c

74 i

80

INPUTSHEET
ENGAGEMENT
DATACALCULATION

Fiqure 16.

E n g a g e m e nDt a t e : 5 J u n e
Terrain:
Posture:
Weather:
Season:

17 May '76

Date of Calc:

E n g a g e m e nNt o : 6 7 - I

EngagementNo:

.l967

67-1

Dateof Calc:

17 Mav '76

E n g a g e m e nDt a t e : 5 J u n e 1 9 6 7

Flat l4ixed/Desert
F o r t / P r e p a r e dD e f e n s e
Hot, Dry
S p r in g

Terrain:
Posture:
Weather:
S e as o n:

Flat Mixed/Desert
Attack
Hot, Dry
S p r in g

7 t h D i v ( - ) & P L AD i v ( - ) , E g y p l
D e p t h : B .B
Q: -45

Unit:

P e r s o n nl e L o s s e s : 3 , 0 0 0
T a n kL o s s e s : 7 0

P e r s o n n e lL o s s e s : 5 0 0
T a n kL o s s e s : 1 5

MissionFactor: 2

MissionFactor: 9

Unit:

Tal Div, Israel

Depth: B.B

Q: 45

Total
Number OLI
N Personnel
l,ls Pistol, Beretta
Rifle, AK-47
t ^ l mM
g GL t . , S G M
7.62
M GH v y ., D K1 2 . 7
W6*Mortar, 50mm
Mortar, B2mm
Mortar, 120mm
A P C ,B T R - 5 0
A P C ,B T R - 1 5 2
Wgi RL, 40rnm
S c h m eAl T M i s s i l e
RR, 107rnm
GunAT, D-48, B5nrn
Gun, 100rnm
H o w ,M - 3 8 , 1 2 2 n r n
G u nH o w ,D - 2 0 , 1 5 2 m m
wgyMMG,ZPU-2
AAMG,
ZPU-4
AAG,37nn
GunAA 5-60, 57nm
Wi G u n , A T , S P , S U - 1 0 0( T D )
Tank Hvy, T-10/JS-3
Tank Lt, PT-76
Tank, T-34
Tank, Sherman
Tank, T-54 )
Tank, T-55 )

wy

MiG-17

Trucks
Motorcycle
He1i copters

Personnel
l,'ls Pistol, cal .45
R i f 1 e ,G a 1 i 1
W r nM a c h i n eg u n , c a l 7 . 6 2 n n
M a c h i n ge u n , c a l 1 , 2 . 7 n n
W 6 *M o r t a r , 8 l m m
Mortar,4.2" (107nrm)

0 . 0 3 I ,950
59
0 . 2 6 1 7 , 5 5 0 4, 5 6 3
0 .5 8
485
281
0 .8 9
323
287
1 )OA
?7
48
44
47
2,068
5B
696
L2
5B
a5

?o
34
101
192
229
159
231
27
5t

66
168
388
281
2t?
280
210
av.505

109
9
60
23
23

__2W
1,200
782

oa

11,904

T2

2 , 74 8
8, 2 6 8
924
972
592
528
I,680
4, 6 5 6

aa

4
Jb

16
B
10
tl

T2
13

10 qrn

0.02 1 0(2
0.22 17,568
0.82
283
1. 0 4
292
50
20
90
t2

Halftrack, ltl3
W g iB a z o o k a
A T MS S 1 0 / 1 1
R R - S P1, 0 6 r m
lr.lg HowSP, 105rm
H o wS P , 1 5 5 r m
G u nS P , 1 5 5 m m
W o ,G u nA A , S P , L t 2 0 m m
GunAA, SP, Lt 40nun
S A MH
. awk
lili T a n k ,M 4 ( l O S n r n 1
Tank, M4B(90rnm)

lt,ly

1 77t

T a n k ,C e n t u r i o n
T a n k ,A M X - 1 (39 0 m )
MystereIV
Super-Mystere

18
6
48
24
T2
67
20
4
45
45
45
105
23/2

1 2, 6 0 0
10,500

65

?2 A2q

Trucks
APCT
, r a c k ,H a fl t r a c k
He1
i copters

7
120,988
1, 2 0 9
155
BB
2?

t?

?q

3,865
232
304
I,000
I,080
3,375
574
ota

798
7,690
5,640
? 6?6

9,308
2 q2n

1, 2 0 0
2 1, 1 5 0
21,330
24,r20
3 3, 7 0 5
17,963

Total 0LI

50

Total OLI

A P C ,T a c k , H a l f t r a c k

19,500

175,677
I ,105
361
39

Figure
Engagement:
tEyptian

Engagenent

No,

MODEL (ENGAGEMENT) CALCUIATTON FORM

5 June 1967

Date:

Unit:

POStufe:

Mission Factor

17.

F^rf/DrAh

calculation
Israeli

naf

Mi-ssion Factor

(wq + wqy) (r*n x h"n x zwg x wyg)

( r f ? , / or a z 7 2 ) ( r x I ( , x , g )

30.3n

l ' t ,r ' l l

(390!t + 536 +6.1ti + t98't) /,1{

(wg + wgy) (r"n x hsg x z"n x wyg)
QA%6 t Ot tl n lt z,rtts.- to't t 9) /z) A ri K i x i. I

w i x r w i x \ i

6 G 7 0 1x . 1 5 / l
t o 5 7 J > - xI l x l x , &
sf
"

G;/St

(tota1)

63,373

d,263

ue)lL6

Fdctor

(Nf

l2J

+ Wi )

x tr\,,/N

bge-oo t r z(rzog i e rc t z zo)i Lc.tofii.qVcmo

nd=r
""=@-Zru =i[Ar-6,o
Pf = Sf x m x ]e

vF =
=

x o x b x u" x ru X h, x zu X vf
t.l? x I x I t,.7El2
lt3 ilto * I xt x ' xlx lxl,13(

o.E10b
1,q66'l
t,2890

31 loi Y-lx I x I x l, I

3 7 ,5 2 o

i 73,21)o

,1202

Factor

ma = Ma -

( 1 _- r .

x \)(Mu

le x t

x o xb

M-

r/res.zb

1)

185,qoo'

P"/P1=

0,?2
of

v,25 tb

i, 2 7.{t'

x us x ru x hu x zu x ve

t T g , z o o \l , 2 7 1 6 N l ( | x l r l x I x l r | * l x , 4 z o z -

202, t'2Y

t,O?

Surprise

s = 2.2326

(2 x .1094)= O.7AI2

ma = 2,1?ro

ve = 1 -

Pf = 153,063

(.6 x .0798) = .9521

Pe = 364'655
Pg/Pg = 6.4472

Ps/P" = 2.2363

Result
Q = 45, Df = 8.8,

(S. x us.)/pg

x u"g)

calculat

casg = 3,699. case = 5oo

Eesp = r'(Sf x u51)/(Ss

(4Q + De)/3Df

Yr,r3otr< r/t,it t ('l('1t +e.o/e ^ 8,9

tu-

(Nc + ,ZJ + w; ) x rq,6/N.

l , z E 9- ( l - . c t ( r ) ( , z e i )

Pe = S. x mx

lra = fiIZEG-r

Efcas =

a9,lc5

qr,29o

LrqtaO r | 2.(t I 06 + 722 +39o) l rooa6.,Ji,

Effects

Er.. --

Mobility

x t

Pf/Pe =

vf = 1 -

tt)?gt

lOo,3O5 x.9l x I
wY*tu{Yxh*x'*Y"*YY

V. = N. x 5,/ru ",EJ% x vy x vr
ie'zOx r/r x.60S3x.?xl
v"=I-Ve,/se = l-,O79t

x vy x vr

lgt00 * .g5r4.lq x t,23ll x l.lr,l

'f = I - vf/sf = l-.logLl
l4obi l r ty

wixrwix\i

wytt"y*h"y*""y*"yy

Nf x ur,/r,

Attack

S" = (W" + W*g + Wh, + wgi) * r,

(Lltozz + sbS + t Oltl + te zo1) ,<.l 5

!'f

Posture I

sf = (ws + W^9 + wh, + wgi) * rn

r7 MaY 1976

Date:

Unit:

Rf= F f+E fs p +E fc a s

Rf - Re =

lAQ + Df)/}De

v
E e c a s=

^ffi@-rydtu -J, isto.= 2-2.5t -3, t7

- 2,5534

u"",/S6) - Vloocasf/Nfl
lV(cu". x u"6,/S")/(Cast x

,qobsiffi

x u.")

= -3. /qO3

, f- "

^
l

T|
- V]00crc../'t1,,
lVtcast x use,/sf)/(casu x u"6/5.)
I

. ctoz 765

fi@t7;te __E4t_

R^ = MF- * E"so * Eecas

'15,93

Re-Rf =

1J

= I,b66

= 1 +2,1o7+,5A

+t5,13

i2,tL,_

o
Ct)

(IJ

'> lrl
c) -o

ro

(5
l-

l!
L

t-..

(r-)

C\l

l-

'

<f,F-lo@
@@Otd
.
.
.
ddd(\t,-

\O F.

q?

t\

dc\l

dd

>o

.o

loU
L O

F-Or@d
(o<f ord

(Orr)<t'Cf)
Lost-(f)ro

dd(\t<\

iid(\l

c!ct()(f)

()
(uo-

9-.\
q- o-

(O

l,.o F

qI

ca<f

(lJ..
Orsf (Ost
gt(U
(OC!F\@
.
.
.
. ( t ' O r
dddd
L.d
(l)L

>q.,

- ( d >

i+cO d(Or+tr)|J)rr)<l-e(F
.
. G t F
.
.

ad

Or dr.$(ts
|r)@l()lr)e(F
.
.
.
. ( o F

rd

oooo-c

1\

(I,..
gt(U
. G ' 0 ,
(o
c, l-

- . 6 >

)
s

.o

oooo-c

sf @@(O
Cr..
cnmC\llr)
C',q)
.
. . d g )
.
.
(r)Str)cr) L.rJ
(I)!

>(U

- ( >

O ctOl
CO rts
cOC\ldC!F(F
.
. 6 F
.
.

oooo-E

{J

+'

dc!

i(\t

f\(\F\CO
@orF.@

+,

(u>

d(\l

.+oto(t
(\l ct <\l c\J

rosfc!@
co (n sf cn

c l c l o r(\l
<f,
(\r
(\l
c!

oaoo

c)ooo

oooo

ao@Ortr)
Ortr)C\J@

OiO@
f\OrOlOr

r\(Osl@
@(OOt\

Ld

,d>
!uJ

<(-)
V)
U)
z,

cDc\I(.olr)
lJ) tr) (f) cO

OF\dF\
(O (.o 1r) r+

o
UJ
z.
mc!d$J
LL

cJ -i
rF ol+
u

C!NlOt<f
C! C\J C! c\J

a/,

'\c ooo

O- Vt

z.
cn@OrLO
crr rl) C\.1 @

O d O @
F\ Or Ol

lr)d+r.o

cOOr(ON
t
t
t
l

Ot

F\ (O <r- @
@ C D O N

d d d d

Et(gdo

d(\OO

ct@cttn

O O O O

O O O O

O O d O

1ilq

. F . P

91i\

\111

F-F\C!1r)

i F
.coFr

sl' l'\
.F-@

. o o

. o o

VI

o-a

'\
o-

oa
a./1

tr)@(!r}
.+ tr) f.- t.o

C)CDA1O
(ost@O

(olr)lr)lr)
rr,F.to@

t 0
l-.r

ci c;.-; d

tJ',

d.

c') Gt (f)

F- (n
(o (o

Osl@lf)
Clcf)+lo

C\J(ONO
Or!O(OCO

ro@rolr)
r..OrF\

-;G;Jd

c;cic;c;

c;c;+c;

co co cf)

(n co

(Y) (t

Or r.O (O Co
\o O Or rr)

C\t i+ F. r\
(+ (O (O ro

d) rJ) l'\ O
st rf, r.. (O

o d o o

o o o o

o o d o

O(O<i(.o
OOrr+Or

OrF*F-C!
+Ii)F*O

ChdO@
OdOF\

d C ) d O

o O O d

d d d c )

r'-+@

(\I
(f)

1..

OJ
l o
3- .r
u ) d

orcld
< c f ) l o .

stst
@ @ . .

cicic;

c>ci

c!
. . s t

.c;

o;

(u

c)
o-

UJ
a
o-

t l -

o(u

r\t\c\tlo

ooc'r(gt\
|

(n
(O<tC\l@
Cf) CD + CN

Tf Ot.ocO
NI CO (\I C!

at1

lodstr.O
d d d d

tr

Ol

&

L =
. r O

u-o

(uL

(\lOdtf,
Ot@<l(O

tdCDt3
F-lO@CO

r.Or()clrrn
rr)F\('o@

dJJci

cic;c;d

dd,";ci

Or(O\OCD
(o O Or rr)

Cvsf F\F\
st'(f) (o K)

(Y)lr)F\O
<l'6
N (o

d-icid

c;oc;d

c;c;Jd

O\o<t(O
OOr<Or

OrF\F\C\l
+rr)F\O

OrdOcO
C)dC)N

z.

-id,-; c;

ci ci d -i

-i--; J d

.O'F

.d o- +J
, - r o

LL

ca

< 4 J . d
OJ LI
tt,

I L
0Jo

r =
1 ! O -

r
z
rt'
z.

C
t

l{-

+)
E
(U
16
U

c)
0r

-C
G|

,.u
c,
rf = N L
rd.o r!.r
d<(.'CO

.iJ-;d

(I,

.o

'

E
.O.d

>iE

.O .6
=.F
l- q.o.o
(lJ (L, (o,o
F)F)szN

-C
d,oo

(d

.
=

+J
o
E
c,

rO
-B c
(o O (o tu
O.Fdco

J(.i-;<

-;(.;-;.+

d d r d

N ( ! c ! N

16
U

14

O
c')
.d
rlj
q - = N !
rE.o
r!.F
d<(5CO

-; c.; ..;;

C
.
r+_
r
ro

6
.

(U
G
(o

E
.6|!
>
r

=.F
l - E 5
(U
(l,
r)F)Sz

|!
fd
- O
l!
rd
F{

L
E

.O

.
=

roiuo

.o
F F - C
f6
O' |l'
CTFdCO

J c.; -; .+

J c.; ,.; i

dddd

Rj$j(\l(\l

l!

rd

IN THE1973 }{AR
COMBAT
PERFOMANCE
THEDATA
"October
Figure 20 is a sumnaryof the major statistical grounddata of the 1973
h lar , " i n c l u d i n g o ve ra l l stre n g th s a nd losses of per sonneland se' lecteditems of
air str ength
equi p m e nfto r a l l ma Jo rp a rti ci p a n ts.' Figur e 21 pr ovidescom par able
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
l
i
s
t
i
n
g
s
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
of the princimore
a n d l o s s d a t a . F i g u r e s2 2 , 2 3 , ' a n d 2 4
pal varieties of giound weaponsand combatequipmentestimated to be on hand in the
allo showingpr esum ed
I s ra e l i , Eg y p ti a n ,a n d S yri a n a rrn i esas of 6 October ' 1,973,
br
igades.
c at io n s t o m a j o r co mb a fo
t rma ti o n s, such as divisions and
on the Suez- Sinaiand Gola n
F i g u r e 2 5 i s a l i sti n g o f a l 'l m ajor engagem ents
of the preFronts from October6 through 25. Figure 26 is an estimatedbreakdown
s u m e dt o t a l o f Isra e l i a n d E g yp ti a ncasualties on that fr ont, with allocations to
day s a n d e n g a g e me nbtsa se du p o np ro fessionalhistor ical and m ilitar y judgm entin
nar r ative of oper ationscited under "Data Sour c es "
c o n s i d e r a t i o n -o fth e d e ta i l e d H E R O
of pr es um ed
br eakdown
in t h e I n t r o d u cti o n to th i s re p o rt. Figur e 27 is a compar able
I s ra e l i a n d Eg yp ti a nta n k l o sse s o n the Suez- Sinaifr ont, by day and by engage m ent.
Figu r e . 2 8i s a co mp a ra b l b
of estimateddir ect air suppor tallocations by
e re a kd o wn
and dates. Fi gur e
t he I s r a e l i a n d E g yp ti a na i r fo rce s, also r elated to engagements
2 9 i s a l i s t i n g o f e n g a g e m e notns t h e G o l a nF r o n t . F i g u r e s3 0 , 3 1 , a n d 3 2 g i v e c o m para b l e b r e a k d o w nosf e sti ma te dca sualties, tank losses and dir ect air suppor t s or t i e s o n t h e G o l a nF r o n t .
As i n t h e ca se o f a n a 'l ysi so f the 1967W ardata, available r esour cesper mi tted
on
analysesof only twe'lveengagements
on the Suez-SinaiFront and four engagements
than pr ovid ed
t h e G o l a nf r o n t. T h i s w a s a to ta l of six m or e1973W arengagements
over all than pr ovid ed
f or i n t h e T a sk 0 rd e r, o r a to ta l o f eight m or eengagements
f or i n t h e T a sk 0 rd e r.
DATAANALYSIS
F i g u r ^ e3 3 , " P re l i mi n a ry1 9 7 3A rab- Isr aeli W arAnalysis," pr ovidesthe samek i nd
of o v e r a l l s u m ma ry
o f th i s stu d y's quantitative analysis of the 1973war as is found
in F i g u r e 1 8 f or th e 1 9 6 7Wa ra n a l yses. Figur e 34 pr ovidesa fur ther r efinem entof
t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l ysi s a fte r a p p lication to the 1973ldardata of the samethr ee
h y p o t h e s e st h a t w e re re fl e cte d i n F i gur e 19 for the 1967W ar .
A s w i t h t h e 1 9 6 7Wa r, th e re fi n ed analysis shownin Figur e 26 showsr em ark abl y
c o n s i s t e n t v a l ue s i n re l a ti ve co mb ateffectivenessof the opponentsin eachof the
t wo s e t s o f d a ta : th a t fo r th e S u ez- Sinaifr ont, and that for the Golanfr ont. It
s how st h a t t h e Isra e l i co mb a te ffe ctivenesssuper ior ity over the Egyptianswas on
t he a v e r a g eL L 6 %,o r a C E Vo f 2 .1 6 ; Isr aeli super ior ity over the Syr ianswas 17 5%
o r a C E Vo f 2 . 7 5 .
A n o r m a l ize dco mp a ri so nsi
, mi l ar to that for the 1967W ar , is shownbelow:
(2.16)
2.75
I s r a e il s
(1.00)
Egyptians 1.27
1.00
Syrians
ANALYSES
CAMPAIGN
per for mance,and of air p ow er ,
I n o r d e r t o se e k p o ssi b l e e ffe cts of high comm and
on t h e o v e r a l l ca mp a i g n
re su l ts a n d on calculated CEVs- asopposedto the indiv i dual
results-QJM analyseswere performedon the overall campaigndata and
engagement
and the two 1973l^|arcampaigns.The res ul ts
re s u l t s f o r t h e th re e 1 9 6 7Wa rca mpaigns
i n Figur e 35.
of t h e s e a n a l y se sa re su mn a ri ze d

15

ED
ROUN
SD
TRENGTH
0C
ST
, 0 B E1R9 7 3
F i q u r e Z 0 - A . E S T I M A TG
Total
Arab
Potentia l

Arabs ll Total
Avajl able ArmyManpowerl
T a n k / A r m o r eDdi v i s i o n s
I n f a n t r y / M e c h a n i z eDd i v s
S e p a r a t eB r i g a d e s
M e d i u mT a n k s
APCs
Arti l I ery (over 100nm)
M u l t i p l e R o c k e tL a u n c h e r s
Mortars (over 100nm)
S S ML a u n c h e r s
SAMLaunchers
S t r e lI a
M Guns
A TM i s s i l e s
AT Rockets
AT Guns

3 1 0 , 0 0 0 505,000 3 1 5 , 0 0 0 140,oo0 20,000

2
I
7
5
2
1 1
'ie
8
?1
47
20_
z,oool 4, 9 4 1 2,2005 l , 8 2 0 : ,
300
4,000r
2,400
300
4,3?0
I ,300
54
570
2, 0 5 5
1,210
655
20
'ris
90
70
:
650+
350
300
30
')s
42
L2
8800
1,280
36010
zo
2,000_ 1 , 0 0 0.?
3,000
1.000
3,650+ 2 . 7 5 0 1 1,eooll
?
2804
8508
350rr
?
1,200
q ?on+
2,500
2,800
650
;
?,200+ 1,300
900

N o t e s : 1 0 n t y t i e t d a r m ya n d d i r e c t s u p p o r tm a n p o w e rf ;o r i n s t a n c e , t o t a l
I s r a e l i m o b i l i z e ds t r e n g t hw a so v e r 3 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,E g y p t i a no v e r 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
2 I n c l u d e s 1 5 0 c a p t u r e dI - 5 4 / 5 5 , m o d i f i e d .
3 I n c l u d e s3 , 5 0 0 +h a l f - t r a c k s , 5 0 0 M - 1 1 3 .
4 I n c l u d e sS S - 1 0a n d S S - 1 1 ,a p p a r e n t l yn o t u s e d .
5 I n c lu d e sT - 6 2 .
6 I n c l u d e s8 0 5 A - 6 .

5 , 0 0 0 2 5 , 0 0 0 9 5 , 0 0 07 5 , 0 0 0 6 5 0 , 0 0 0
I
2
I
4
18
?
46
1
5t L
540
6,131
150
1,200
550
1,500
5,870
?00
720
320
36
100
600
2,885
90
:
650+
I
4?
:
20
1, 2 8 0
?
;
3,000
7
?
3,650+
:
?
?

P e r s o n nl e
Killed
l^lounded
P r i s o n e r so r M i s s i n q
Tanks**
APCs
ArtiIIery Pieces
S A MB a t t e r i e s
Ai rcraft
H e 1i c o p t e r s
N a v a l V e s s esl

2 9?R*

B, 8 0 0 *
508
840
400

-10,

/ I n c ' l u d e s1 5 0 Z S U - 2 3 - 4 .
S M o s t l yS a g g e r ,s o m eS n a p p e r .
9 I n c lu d e s T - 6 2 .
l 0 I n c l u d e s6 0 s A - 6 .
l l l n c l u d e s 1 0 0Z S U - 2 3 - 4 .
l 2 M o s t l y S a g g e r ,s o m eS n a p p e r .

L 0DS S E S0' C T 0 B E1R9 7 3

Figure 20-B. ESTIMATE

I srae'l

Arab
Total
8,528
19,549
2,554
850+
550+
47
JOU

55
1

5,000 3,100
12,0006,000
8 , 0 3 1 500
1, 1 0 0 1 , 2 0 0
400
450
250
300
3
44
223
rt7
'l?
42
5
10

28
49

300
1,000
20
200
?
?
20
:.

* A b o u t 1 0 %h a s b e e na d d e dt o o f f i c i a l l y r e p o r t e d I s r a e l i c a s u a l t i e s t o r e p r e d h od i e d o f t h e i r i n i u r i e s , a n d t h e f a c t t h a t
s e n t a p p r o x i m a t e l yt h e w o u n d e w
o f f i c i a l I s r a e l i f i g u r e s a p p a r e n t l yd o n o t i n c l u d e t h o s ew o u n d endo t e v a u c a t e d
f r o m a i d s t a t i o n sa n d f i e l d h o s p i t a l s .
* * T a n k sd e s t r o y e do r p u t o u t o f a c t i o n f o r o n e o r m o r ed a y s . F o r i n s t a n c e ,
t h e I s r a e l i s s e e mt o h a v er e n a i r e da n d r e t u r n e dt o o p e r a t i o na b o u t 4 0 0 o f t h e t a n k
l o s s e s s h o w nh e r e . T h e ya l s o r e c o v e r e da b o u t 3 0 0 r e p a i r a b l e A r a b t a n k s .

16

1, 2 0 0
5, 3 0 0 +
2,200+

F i g u r e2 1 - A .

A I R F 0 R CS
E T R E N G T H0SC, T 0 B E1R9 7 3
I S R A E L I S

Fi qhters
-fiidzl

160
60
200

M ic - l 9
Mic- 17
Su-7
Hunter
Mirage
Total Fighters

t':

-n

t8
30
--Tg

Il -28
Total Bombers
Total Combat

'ri

30

Il-14
Il-18

H el i c o p t e r s
--Tr-:6l'1i-8

V a u t o u r ,l t b o m b e r

L2
70

6
30

c-130
c-47
c-97
N o r a tal s

---36

6Z

50

S u p e rF r e lo n

18
1

LN-f,J

AB 205

-130'

Total Helicopters
Total Non-combat

taL

Total Air Inventory

Losses
pply*
Resu

750
265
648

21,6

327
131

|,254
M7
288

321
9,000

nnn

6
12
10
30
66
I

12
30
f,U

52

LZa

,?

B
o

30

-16

150
140
50
12

360

.Z

.o:
-7d

Total Transports

A-4, Skyhawk
F-4 Phantom
M ir a g e
SuperMystere

18
30
48
1,038

598

Transports
-In-If-

Total At Endof War

14anpower

5L

3f,U

Bombers
-T[:16'

311
60
3s1
219
21
28
-9m.

ld

I lo

476
109
56+
423+

I,095
32,000+

17,000

* 0 c t o b e r9 - 2 3 . i n c l u s i v e .

F i g u r e 2 1 - 8 . E S T I M A TA
EIDR L 0 S S E S0,C T 0 8 E1R9 7 3

|
|
|
l o t n e r l A r a ib
i E q y p It S y r i aI l r a o I A r a b sI r o t u t i I s r a e t
A. By Type
Fi ghter
Bomber
Transport
H e li c o o t e r

222

Totals

265

rt7

I
'q)

2t

30

390
1

--q

IJ

1':

109

B. By Cause
Ai r"-to-Air
To SAl4
To AAA
Miscor Unknown
Friendly Forces

287
77
19
58

2l
40
31
15
2

447

109

bb

TotaI s
C.

Damage

Damaged
R e p a i r e di n O n eW e e k

r25
,2

17

(50

215

Figure 22.

Arty
Rgt

4 , 3 0 0 I 4, o o o 3 , 6 0 0

l ,700

3,870 i

1,000
100
900
10
20

t'leczd

' - - ' t " - "

430 |

1.20
80
20

Armd
Bde

360
3,600 3,240
BO
40
60
40
10

170

400

30
30

10
50
20

)o

200
10

10
20

SA-6
G u nA T - S u - 1 0 0 ,S P
Tank, lt, PT76
Tank, med,T54l55
Tank, hvy, T62
A P CB T R 6 O
A P CB T R s O
A P CB R D M 1
APC BRDI42
A P CB M P
B M PS/ ag g e r
T r u ck
It4otorcyc'le
SP l"lounts

16
I nf/ Para
Bde

3 0 , 0 0 0 a Enn
3,000
850
27,000
300
150
I f,U
600

')s

5
10

3
5

go

I5I

55

30

150

YO

t2

6o

172

11
|
f4eczd j
Bde i

10
Anmd
Bde

Total s

6 8 , 8 0 0 4 4 , 0 0 0 | 3 6 , 0 0 0 2 7 7, 3 0 0
6 ,880
4,400 i 3,600 27,730
I
67,920 3 9 , 6 0 0 3 2 , 4 0 0 1 9 5 , 5 7 0
i
1, 9 2 0
880 I
400
3,9s0
660
1, 2 8 0
400
3 ,590
320
11 0
430
192
88 I
280
64
44 I
204
'roo
1
(
220 I
100
505
800
2,200
200
3,471
320
11 0
635
96
256

lo

120

192
770
212
75
216

rio

tiz

I J

( e) 2 1 6
(e)21,6
(4) e6
(3) 72
\L I

20

360
240
50
T2
100
40
?0
l0
30

L J ' IV

9. 0 0 0
270
':o
20
16
24

lo

8
g
9
T2
T2
T2
54

zio

240

5
10
t a

19

I2
9
9
I2
I L

4
36

3
100
25

360
240
50
t2
100
40
20
10
30
16
8
9
9
T2
T2
!2
54

'rir

'so

3, 0 0 0
300

3, 0 0 0
750

160
800
2,400
608

sia

'zio
2,200
I,650
418

96
72
12
goo 2 , 0 4 8
100
600
600
400
200
148
505
100
200
3,491
1 , s oIo 11, 9 2 5
380|

NU
T M M A R I E1S9, 7 3
E S T I I 4 A T ETDG Y P T I AA
NR M A I 4 ES

1 / 1 0D i v
Army Spt
Units

l4eczd
Div

12,000
1. 2 0 0
9.000

ato

L'

48

10
20
I50
38

I n f D iv

s A2 / 3

5
Armd
Rgts

( 4 ) 96

: .

6
IO

Armd

f 4 G ,l t , s c r , r7 . 6 2
M G ,h v v , D K 1 2 . 7
Mortar,82mm
t4ortar,12Omm
R P G - 7 ,8 2 m m
S ag g e r
Inf RR, 82mm
Inf RR, 107mm
SPG-9
RR,73mm
G A TD - 4 8 , 8 5 m m
G A TM - 5 5 , 1 0 0 m m
AAI4G
ZPU.4
A A M GZ U - 2 3
AAMG
ZSU-23-4
A A M GS - 6 0 , 5 7 m m
l4RL,l22mm
How,122mm
G u nH o w , 1 2 2 r n m
GunHow, 152rnm
Gun, 180mm
S c u dF
/ rog
brat | )A-l

30,000
3,000
27,000
300
500

30
Arty
Rgts

L '

Fiqure 23.

P e r so n n eI
P i s t o l , g m mB e r e t t a
I A-47
Rifle )^,,.,

1/1.2Div
1 / 3 6B d e
Misc tJnits

Armd
R9t

P e r so n ne l
Pistol, Cal .45
( G a ] i 15 . 5 6
Krrre
]FN
l , l a c h i n eG u n , l t , C a l
r v i a c h i nG
e u n , h v y ,C a l
l'lortar, 81mm
Yortar, 4.2", 107nrn
t4ortan, 120mm
\4ortar, 160mm
A P CM - 1 1 3
H a lf t r a c k 1 4 3
B az o ok a/ L A W
R E C G8, 4 m m
RRSP,106nrn
AA,lt,20mm
AA, lt, 40mm
S A MH a w k
H o w ,S P , 1 0 S m m
H o w ,S P , 1 5 5 m m
G u n ,S P , 1 5 5 m m
G u n ,S P , 1 7 5 m m
H o w ,S P , 8 "
Tanks
T a n k s , | \ 4 4 8( 9 0 m m )
T a n k s , | \ 4 4 8( 1 0 5 n r m )
T a n k s, C e n t u r jo n
Tanks, 1,460
Tanks, T54l55 (105mm)
Tanks,M4 (105mm)
A P C ,M l 1 3
H a lf t r a c k s
Trucks
SP t'lts

E S T I M A T EID
NU
T M M A R I E1S9, 7 3
S R A E L IA R M A M E S

4, 0 0 0
400
3, 6 0 0
1.20
80

3, 5 0 0
350

6 4, 0 0 0
6,400
5 7, 6 0 0

lo

206
100
l5

4
30
L2
6
3
10

50

'zio
3
3
4

300
300
100
350
20
224
'sq

5
Inf
D iv s

Armd I
Divsl

5 0, 0 0 0 2 0, 0 0 0
5, 0 0 0 2, 0 0 0
45,000
540
1,800
32.0
1, 2 0 0
250
60
40
s00
200
100
50
qs
150
BO
40
)q
45
1B
45
18
60
24
24
60
I
60
t2
270

l'leczd I
Divsl

Inf
Bdes

36,000 4 8, 0 0 0
3, 6 0 0 4 , 8 0 0
3 2 , 4 0 0 4 3, 2 0 0
1,080 1,440
720
960
150
192
48
360
144
12
36

Jb

300
120
60
30
90
4B
24
27
27
36
36
JO

I
Armd
Bdes

T o t a ls

2 8 , 0 0 0 2 4 6, 0 0 0
2 , 8 0 0 2 4, 6 0 0
25,200 221,400
680
7,340

olo
.
'ie
32

4,840
592
350
1, 3 4 8
543
232
116
2(a

' ;-

'iq

JO

36
4B
4B

''riq

24
5a
J'

ro(

125
298
450
450
300
550
124
872

'rso

'io

, a
-Jb

20/10
100
800
80

so
T2
10
80
30
110
720
120

60

10
80
30
I'

7T
46
36

4
6
800
60
44

:'
'250

' r o o 60
520
'zis 140
'ie
'rso
tf,

10

lf,

zoo
20
10

l8

2, 0 0 0
100
200

4,000
300
220

r,zoo
100
68

36
30
240
90
330
360
360
18
72
18
2,400
180
LJ'

48

'tio
'
t44

'iz
12
' 7 2
3, 0 0 0
240
168

80
640
?40

:.

vb

48

r,ooo
160
80

36
20/10
920
800
80
r44
170
1, 6 2 0
470
820
550
720
45
44
45
14,200
1,080
868

Figure 24.

Inf Div
Personnel
Pistol, Markarov
Rifle, AK-47
M G ,I t , 7 . 6 2
M g ,h v y , 1 2 . 7
Mortar, S2mm
Mortar, l20mm
RPG-7,82rnm
Sagger
SPG-9,73mm
GATM-55, 100mm
AAMGZPU-4
AAMG
ZU-23
AAMG
ZSU.23-4
AAMG
5-60, 57mm
M R L ,1 2 2 m m
How, 122mm
Gun How, 152nrn
Gun, lBOrm
Frog
GraiI SA-7

Armd
Div

1 0, 0 0 0 l 0 , 0 0 0
1 , 0 0 0 1, 0 0 0
9 ,000 9, 0 0 0
300
200
200
160
50
t2
100
30
50
20
60
24
24
t2
J
9
J
9
L2
I2
t?
t2
12
JO
54

io

sA2/3
sA-6
GAT
SU-1OO

,,,

Tank,lt, PT76
T a n k , m e d ,T 5 4 l 5 5
T a n k , m e d ,T 6 2
T a n k ,h v y , J S 1 1 1 / 1 1 0
T a n k , m e d ,T - 3 4
APCBTR6O
APCBRDM1
APCBRDMz
APCBMP
Trucks
Motorcycles
SP Mounts

20
50
30
l q

20
800
50
44

Armd
Bde

Inf
Bde
4

36

000
400
600
90
60

500
?6n

150
80
50

lo

30
1?
20

l0
b

4
4

L2

t2

L2

t2

30
180
90
?0
10

ARMAMENT
SUMMARIES,
1973*
ESTIMATED
SYRIAN

10
60
30
10
10
E

10
5

20
600
40
34

5
ZJU

20
14

5
200
?0
10

1/10Div
Army Spt
Units

1
Meczd
Div

Inf
D iv s

2 5 , 0 0 0 1 3 , 0 0 02 0 , 0 0 0
2 ,500
I ,300 2 , 0 0 0
2 2 , 5 0 0 11, 7 0 0 1 B , 0 0 0
100
300
600
200
200
400
50
100
50
24
12
J5U
200
120
EN
100
30
60
120
?4
48
150
9
18
150
9
-td
40
tz
24
l.+
150
L2
10
1Z
24
54
50
110
24
12
24
t2
L2
100
72
300
:u
60
t2
tq
10
60
20
30
40
200
150
100
100
100
60 1
10
50
30
45
20
40
500
800 I , 6 0 0 I
20
100 I
50
100
44
8B

Armd
D iv s

1 1 1 1 0
S e pI n f l S e pA r m d
BdesI Bdes Totals

20,000 4 4 , 0 0 0| 3 5 , 0 0 0i s 7 , 0 0 0
2,000 4 , 4 0 0| 3 , 5 0 0 1 5 , 7 0 0
1 8 , 0 0 0 3 9 , 6 0 0| 3 1 , 5 0 0, 1 4 1 , 3 o o
400
990|
800 3,190
JLV
660 I
s00 2,280
1 7 6I
326
^^ |
rto

eo

. - l

24
24

3 3 0|
132 |
220 |
I
33 |
33 I
44 i
44 i

iz

t32

72

I
i
132 i
i

40
4B
24
i8
l6

oo

20j
10
40'
1 , 2 0 0,
80 1
68l

120

44
I
I
i
110
1 1 0r
55 ;
44 i
55
? , 7 5 0|
?201
154r

538
60
. .
1 2
l
z
r20
532
..
300
60
B0
100
170
5Bo 1,ooo
250
450
. .
3 0
70
220
100
700
50
385
40
184
50
250
2,000 B,Bso
2001 670
100'
554

* P l u s 1 M o r r o c a ni n f a n t r y b r i g a d e , I J o r d a n i a na r m o r e db r i q a d e , a n d 1 I r a q i a r m o r e dd i v i s i o n .

Figure 25.

n te s i g n a t i o n
Eng No D a t e I E n g a g e m eD
1a

73- 2

6
6

/J-

73- 4

t5-

73- 6
/J-

ti

73- 9

| S u e zC a n a lA s s a u l t ( N )
| S u e zC a n a lA s s a u l t ( S )
| SecondArmyBuildup

| T h i r d A r m yB u i l d u p
8 | Kantara-Firdan
1 4 I E g y p tO f f e n s i v e ( N )
1 4 | E g y p t0 f f e n s i v e ( S N )
l 5 l 1 6 I D e v e r s o i r ( C h i n e s eF a r m
1 6 / 1 7| C h i n e s eF a r m( I I )

SINAI FR0NTENGAGEMENTS,
OCT0BER
1973

Egyptian Forces
SecondArmy
Third Arrny
SecondArmy

I s r a e li F o r c e s
E l e m e n t s1 a r m d& 1 i n f b d e
ElementsI armd & I Inf bde

Third Army

M e n d l e rD i v ( - ) & e l m s A d a n& S h a r o n
M e n d l e rD i v ( - )

SecondArmy

A d a n& S h a r o nD i v s ( - )

SecondArmy

S a s s o o nA
, d a n& S h a r o nD i v s
(
+
Magen )

Third Army
1 / 7 7 6 D i v , 1 / 2 2 1 .D i v
1/2 16 Div. 1/2 ?1 Div(+)

Sharon
Adan( +)

7 3 -1 0
1 8 | D e v e r s o i rW e s t
73-11 l9-21 | Jebel Geneifa
73-t2 l9-22 | Ismailia
73-13

SecondArmy elms
Third Army elms

Adan(+)

SecondArmy elms

Sharon

Third Army elms

Magen

73-14

Third Army elms

Adan

Third Army elms

Adan

Third Army elms

Adan(-)

22 | ShallufaI

73-15
/J-IO

2 4 | S h a l l u f aI I

19

Adan & Magen

1,160
382
sSB
246
258
258
184
294
+o

360
180

'ioi

100
60
80
..
30
30
40
40

F i 9 U T C2 6 . E S T I M A TA
ELDL O C A T IO
OFNB A T T LC
E A S U A L T I ESSI N
, A IF R O N TO, C T O B 6E-R2 4 , T 9 7 3 ,I N C L U S I V E
Da

E n g a g e m e n t s

0ct
6

Egvpt

Israel

Eqypt

(1) 3oo / 1 \

I sr a e l
200 ( 2 \ t 3
a a u ( 4 ) 300

1rE (?\

(3)
B
9

350 (3) 400( 4 )

(5) 1,000 (5)1,000

I srael

E qv p t

500
I

600
|
r , 0 0 0j
I

10
11

|
/

L2

13

16
T7
18
19
20
2L
22
23
24

200
|
700
|
100 2,200 1,000
|
500 2 , 7 O O
|
:oo 3 , 0 0 0
|
:oo 3 , 3 0 0
I
300 3 , 6 0 0

?7q

e00
|
70e
I
708
I

708 |

400

100

1,200

200
200

2,400
2,600

100

2,700

r00 2,8oo

|
400I 150 3 , 5 0 0

I rso

3 0 0 .1 .

400 100
|
400 100
|

300 1oo
I

200 11, 7 0 0
let 12,600
rez 1 3, 5 0 0

2oo
I

200

2,900
I roo
100 3 , 0 0 0

eoo 2oo 1 0 , 6 0 0
|

( 1 2 )1 0 0 1 1 ) ? ? 4 ( 1 1 ) 1 o o
l 1t\
?7q
( 1 2 )1 0 0 1 1 ) 3 3 3 ( t t ) t o o
( 1 2 ) . 3 7 5 ( 1 2 )l o o 1 1 ) ? ? ? ( 1 1 ) 1 0 0
( 1 3 ) 2 o o( 1 3 ) 5 0
(tzl 37s ( 1 2 )t o o r q i r , s o (o1 4 )1 5 0
(15) 400 r 1 5 l l q n 16) 5oo (16) 50
(l5) 400 ( 1 5 )1 5 0 16) 500 (16) 50
( 12\

500
1, 1 0 0

3,800
1 0 0 7,500
200 7 , 7 0 0
8,400
200 g , 5 0 0

3,600
|
|
700
|
e00
|

( a j ' z o o(8) 3oo

(e) eoo(e) 400
(e) eoo(e) 400
(r o l e o o ( 1 0 ) 3 o o

uuiltuu a rl y
'|
E n q I M is c ati ve

200

( 6 ) 1 , 6 0 0 ( 6 ) 1 5 0 ( 7 ) 2 , 0 0 0 ( 7 ) 250

l4
l5

I s r a e li

Egyptian
u a rl y
uumu'I
Enq I Misc
ati ve

200 100
|
200 100
|
200| 100
501

192 1 4 , 4 0 0
14,600

3,600
3,900
4,400
4,900
5, 3 0 0
5,600
5, 9 0 0
6, 2 0 0
6,250

zso
roo 6 , 6 0 0
I
200 50 6 , 8 5 0

- ^ - - l

/ 1 5 L7,200
I
9 0 0 2 , 3 0 0 2 0, 4 0 0
e o o 2 , 3 0 02 3 , 6 0 0

I,6/5 |

|
200
|

s0

7, 1 0 0

F i q u T e2 7 . E S T I M A TA
ELDL O C A T IO
OFNT A N KL O S S E S
S,I N A IF R O N TO, C T O B 6E.R
24,1973, INcLUsIVE
E n q a g e m e n t s

0ct
7
9
10
11
72
13
l4
15
16
17

18
19
20
2l
22
IJ

24

Eqyot

D a il y
E q y D t I s r a e l Loss
5 0 i ( 2 ) 3 0 ( 2 ) 50
40
40j (4) 10 ( 4 ) 50
20

Israel

( 1 )r o
l(r)
(3)

1 0l ( 3 )
(5) ro (s)
i
25i
10I

10
25

10r
251 t o i
,UI tnl
251

(6)

25

(e) eo (e) : : l
|
( e )r 5 0 ( e ) l' o: ll
I
( 1 0 )7 0 ( 1 0 )1 5
|
1

( 1 2 )3 0| ( 1 2 )1 5 ( 1 1 ) 3 0 / 1 1 \ t u l
|
( r 2 ) 3 0 ( 1 2 ) 8 ( 1 1 ) 3 0 r ' 1 1) B l
|
|
( 1 2 )3 0 ( 1 2 ) 8 | ( 1 1 ) 3 0 ( t t 1 8 l
I

( r : 12 e

I IJ /

tol

l \ r v l

40
5B
f,

D a il y

Loss L o ss
100
90

Cum
L o ss
100
190

D a i l y Net
Return Loss
l0

100
180

ao3

LY

tJb

10

275

r02

10

285

26
28

220
202

64
B4

25

145

11

116

10

295

a6

184

25

170

133

t74

190
450

10

143
392

305
315

20

20
260

10
10
40

355

t2
5

172
207

10
50

460
510

LO

376
426

10
30

365
395

B
8

209

90

600

24

492

l6

411

l0

t5l

150

750

34

608

IO

427

11

?42

70
60
60
60
20
60

820
BBO
940

38
40
25
25

640
660
695
730
728
77r
814

442
472
4BB

11
11
9
10
B

246
268
273
280
280
292

307

( 1 2 )3 0 ( 1 2 )1 0 ( 1 4 ) 3 0 ( 1 4 ) t o l
|
|
( 1 5 )2 s ( 1 5 )1 2 l r 1 6 \ ? E ( 1 6) T ' I 6 0
|
( l s ) 2 5I ( l s ) r z | ( r o )s s ( 1 6 ) t 2 l 6 0
^ L

40
60
70
v5

Daily
Return

1.20

aa

2
- -0 ll
101
( 6 ) 1 1 0 ( 6 ) .- ,-.l r' ^- l' -, .-n"
|
1 01
( 8 ) 5 0 ( 8 ) 191
I

Cum
L o ss

Israel
LUm
Net

v v

2A

1, 0 0 0
r,020
1, 0 8 0
I ,140
I ,200

11

ta

17
t7
17

857
800

15
30
IO

16
10
20

504
514

24

558
582

24

B
5t

a3L

323
29r

FiguTe 28.

Date

ESTIMATED
AIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER-BOMBER
SORTIES
CLOSE
SUEZ.SINAIFRONT,OCTOBER
6-24, T973

A v a il a b l e T h i s
Front for CAS
Eqypt

6
7
8
o
10
11
t2
13
I4
l5
16
L7
1B
l9
20
2t
22
a5

24

208
20r
200
195
191
187
180
179
tto

175
167
160
I f,Y

148
l3l
L?3
113
IIz
115

E n g a g e m e n t s

I srael

EqvDt

141
135
t32
66**
65**
62**
60**
60**
289
116**
229
305
305
240
302
239
248
309
309

I srael

EqvDt

ISrae I

sra

Lovot

(1) 104 (1) 70 (2) 104 (2) 70

|
(s) too (3) 67 (4) loo (4) 67

( 5 ) 1 o o ( s ) 6 6I

(6)

44 ( 6 ) 7 2 ( 7 )

l7\

( e ) 1 6 7 (s) 22s . :
( e ) l 6 0 ( e ) 3 0 5 r. .
( 1 0 ) 1 5 e( 10)30s
( 1 2 ) 7 4 ( 1 2 ) r 2 o( 1 1 )7 4
(12)l1s(12\1q1 1rrl11c
( 1 2 )6 1 / 1 2 ) 1 1 0 l / 1 1 \ A 1
( 1 2 ) 3 8 ( 1 2 )8 3 ( 1 3 ) 3 7
( 1 5 ) s 6 ( 1 5 ) 1 5 4( 1 6 ) s 6
( 1 s ) 5 7 ( l s ) 1 5 4 (' 1 6 ) s 7
\ - ^ /

v r

72

(ll)120
/rr\1R1
1111110

r 1 ? \e 2

( t +1

( 1 4 )8 2

(l 6 )1 5 4
(16)154

*0ctober 6-13, inclusive, one-third Israe'li air effort allocated to this front,
two-thirds to Golan; thereafter two-thirds to this front, one-third to Golan.
* * 0 n d a t e s w h e r e n o e n g a g e m e n tasr e s h o w no n t h i s f r o n t , h a l f a v a i l a b l e I s r a e l i
C A Ss o r t i e s a r e a l l o c a t e d t o o t h e r f r o n t . a n d v i c e v e r s a .

Figure 29.

GOLAN
FRONT
ENGAGEMENTS,
0CTOBER
1973

Eng No Date E n g a g e m e nDte s ig n a t i o n

Arab Forces

Israel i Forces

ucf,

73-21
73-22
73-23
73-24
73-25

6/7
6/7
7-9
7/8
8
I5-tO
B/g
73-27 t0-12
1?
73-28
73-29 l 5

Ahmadiye
R a f id

7 I n f D i v ( + ), 1 / 2 9 I n f D i v
5 M e c z dD i v ( + ) , 1 / 2 9 I n f D i v

7 A r m dB d e , 1 / 2 G o l a n iB d e

Hushniya

1 B BA r m dB d e , 1 / 2 G o l a n i B d e
7 I n f D i v ( + ), t / Z 9 I n f D i v , 3 d T a n k D i v 7 A r m dB d e ( - ) , l / 3 c o l a n i B d e
5 M e c z dD i v , 1 , / 2 9 I n f D i v , 1 s t T a n k D i v L a n e r & P e l e d D i v s ( - )
M o r o c c a nB d e ( + )
G o l a n iB d e ( - )
5 M e c z d ,L / 2 9 l n f , l s t T a n k
Laner & Peled

Mt. Hermonit
Nafekh
Mt HermonI
S a a s s a0 f f e n s i v e

l,3,5,7,9

Tel el Hara

Iraqi 3d Tank Div

Kfar Sharms

I r a q i 3 d T a n kD i v ( + )

Laner

Naba

J o r d a n i a n4 0 B d e ( + )

L a n e r( - )

Divs(+)

Eytan& Laner
Laner

/J-JU

16

7 3 - 3I
73-32
7 3 -3 3

19

A r a b C o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e I r a q i 3 d , J o r d a n i a n4 0 ( + )

Peled

at

Mt HermonII

M o r r o c a nB d e ( + )

Golani Bde

lt

M t H e r m o nI I I

M o r r o c a nB d e ( + )

Golani Bde(+)

21

-22,7973' INCLUSIVE
F i s u r e 3 0 . E S T I M A TAELDL Q C A T I00FNB A T T LCEA S U A L T I E
F R 0 N T0,C T 0 B E6R
GS0,L A N

Date

I s r a e li

E n g a q e m e n t s

7
8
Y

10
11
12
13
i4
15
16
t7
18
19
20
21.
22

'|
at ive

Arab

0ct
6

(2t)2oo ( 2 1 ) 1 0 0(2?)4oo( 2 2 ) 3 o o
(22)400 ( 2 2 ) 3 0 0
( 2 1 ) 2 0 0( 2 1 ) 1 o o( 2 4 ) 3 o o( 2 4 ) 2 0 0
( 2 3 ) e o o( 2 3 ) 3 s o
( 2 4 ) 3 0 0(24)200 I r F \ 1 n n
( z : ) g o o t z i t i s o( 2 6 ) s o o( 2 6 ) 2 0 0
( 2 6 ) 5 o o( ? 6 ) 2 0 0
(27) 600 (27)3oo
( 2 7 ) 5 o o(27)2oo
( 2 7 ) 5 o o( 2 7 ) 1 o o
( 2 8 ) 6 0 0( 2 8 ) i 5 0

/2q\1nn

600
400
500
900
400
1, 4 0 0
500
600
500
500
600

( 2 e ) 6 0 0( 2 e ) 1 0 0
( 3 0 ) 4 0 0( 3 0 ) 1 o o

ooo

rslt6oo

ooo

400

( 3 2 ) 2 0 0t r z l i s o
( 3 3 ) 2 0 0( 3 3 ) 2 0 0

200
200

uive

Mi

400

: : I r,ooo 300
: :

,:400

2oo | 3,000
I 4,4oo
2oo I s,100
tnn

E Ann

200 | 6,500
200 | 7,200

300
350
300
550
200
300
200
100

400
700
1,000

: :

1 ?Rn

100

1,750
2,300
2,600
3,000
3, 3 0 0

100
100
100

100
100
50
50
50
100

3,500
3, 7 0 0
3,800
4,000
4,150
4,200
4,?50
4,550

50
50
50

4,600
4,800
5,050

100

2oo I B,0oo 1 5 0 1 0 0
200
200
200
200
200
200

|
I
|
I
|
|
200 |
150 |
100 |

8,200
9,000 1 0 0
9,600 100
9,800
10,000
10,800 ,oo
11,000
11,350 150
1 1 , 6 5 0 200

F i q u r e3 1 . E S T I T ' I A T
G,O L AFNR 0 N T , 0 C T 0 B6E- 2R2 , 1 9 7 3
AE
LL
D0 C A T I0 F
NT A N K
LOSSES

0ct
6
7
.J

Arab
I sr a e l
(21) 75 ( 2 1 ) B

(21) 75 ( 2 1 ) o
( 2 3 ) 1 o s( 2 3 ) 25

( z i l i o s( 2 3 )25

9
10
11
t2
13
L4
15
IO

l7
1B
l9
20
2l
22

Arab

E n g a q e m e n t

Date

()7\

( 2 4 ) 3 8 (241' 8
(26) 75 (26) l 5
( 2 6 ) 1 o o( 2 6 ) 1 4

qn

(27) 7
(27) 40 (?7\ 7
( ? 7 ) 4 0 ( 2 7) 7
(28)roo (28) 7
25
(2e) 60 ( 2A\ 7
" : ' . u u ,r:, 1 0

( 3 1 ) 1 0 0( 3 1 ) t 1
(7)\

Arab
Israel
( ? ? \ 50 ( 2 ? \ 35
J5
50
( 2 4 ) 3B ( 2 4 ) I

rs2l0
( 3 3 ) o | ??'l 0
n

t2
l2
L2
?0
1B
20
30
2o
18

3
3

4
4

Arab

()r,\

D a il y Cum D a i l y
I s r a e l L o s s Loss Return
t25
L2s
50
t75
B
288
t?
113
393
20
105
()q\ n
5d
431
25
6 1 1 30
180
711 31
100
37
50
761
801
30
40
29
40
841
a6
941
100
37
978
23
7? 1,050 16
19
7 B 1, 1 2 8
20 1 , 1 4 8 20
1B I , 1 6 6 20
15
r20 1 , 2 8 6
30 I , 3 1 6 2 I
19
2 0 1, 3 3 6
16
I
.
3
5
4
1B
34

22

I srael
LUm
Net

D a i l y Cum

I ncc

ln<c

167
ao6
J3J

366
516
585
598
608
619
693
700
749
802
802
820
925
934
935
937
903

43
35
16
25
8
40
14
7
7
7
7
3
7
1n

1t
4
4

I ncs

43
7B
94
119
t27
t67
181
188
195
202
209
212
219
229
232
235
?46
?50
254
258

Daily
Return
q

B
9
t?
t2
13
10
11
7
9
?

3
3

Net

73
tJI

97
93
721
r22
119
11s
115
113
113
L17
124
124
724
r32
IJJ

134
lJ5

LIJ

FiguTe32. ESTIMATEIJ
CLOSE
AIR SUPPORT
FIGHTER
SORTIES
BOMBER
GoLAN
FRoNT,oCToBER
6-22, L973

Date

A v a il a b l e T h i s
Front for CAS
Arab

6
1

B
9

10
l1
12
l3
14
l5
16
17
18
19
20
2l
22

E n g a g e m e n t s
Arab

ISrae I

143
139
132
tzB
t28
tL7
113
103
100
97
140
87
Rq

87
88
85
79

I srael

lsrael

Arab

(21\ 71

( 2 1 ) 1 4 0( ? ? \ 7 1
( 2 1 )6 e ( 2 1 ) 1 3 4(24) 6s
( 2 3 )6 6 (23)r32 (24) 66
( 2 3 )6 4 (23)174 ( 2 5 )6 4
(27)r28 (27)32s
(27)rr7 ( 2 7 ) 3 1 0
(27)rL3 ( 2 7 ) 3 o o

2Bl
269
264
349
3?5
310
300
299
5B**
232
lls
61**
61**
120
61**
119
t24

srae

I Arab

(22)140
(24)r34
(24)r32
(26)17
4

( 2 8 ) 1 0 3(28)zee
( 2q\

9 7 (2e)232

( 3 0 ) l40

":'l'u

, a rt ' 87 ( 3 1 ) 1 2 0
(v\
/l?\

85 r s z l i r s
7 9 ( 3 3 )1 2 4

*October6-13, inclusive, two-thirds of Israeli air

effort allocated to this
front, one-third to Suez-Sinai; thereafter one-third to this front, two-thirds
t o S u e z - Si n a i .
* * 0 n d a t e s w h e n n o e n g a g e m e n tasr e s h o w no n t h i s f r o n t ,
half available Israeli
C A Ss o r t i e s a r e a l l o c a t e d t o o t h e r f r o n t , a n d v i c e v e r s a .

F i g u r e3 3 . P R E L I M I N A1R
Y3A R A B - I S R A W
97
E LAI R
ANALYSTS

Engagement

N./N1

Fi repower

7.68
7.92
q.ZZ
3.90
Z.48
1.98
Z.l9
1.20
t.zs
O.gS
t. og
1.40

4.07
4.76
2.33
2.42
1.79
1.41
t.64
0 .9 3
0 .9 4
0.92
0.85
1.09

1.01
1.29
0 .9 4
0.99
?,OB
0.71

l,.tu
I g.c0
I S.qO
I t. te

t.74
3.03
1.01

0 .3 0
0.68
0.72
t.75

l.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
I2.

C a n aC
l r o s s i n gN
, |
CanaC
l r o s s i n gS, |
E g y p tB u i l d u p ,N
I
E g y p tB u i l d u p ,S
|
A d a nC o u n t e r a t t a c kI
E g y p tO f f e n s i v e ,N |
E g y p t0 f f e n s . i v e S
, I
0 p G a z e l l e( C a n a l )|
ChinesF
earm
I
D e v e r s o i r ,W e s t
I
G e n ef ai
I
I s m alii a
|

21.
22.
23.
24.

Ahmadiye
Rafid
Mt. Hermonit
Nafekh

1q

Surpri se

P/P

?.57
2.40

n a ?

1.31

0.86

1.49
l. 14
1.45

23

P/P

2.60
3 .1 0
0 .9 4
0.99
2.08
0.71
0 .' 9l ? 3
I

I .49
1.14
1.45
1.80
2.17

Effect
P/P

Arab

cEv

Israel i
CEV

- 0 .4 0

2.27
2.45
I .54
1.58
2.LL
0.35
0 .3 8
0. 4 6
0. 4 3
0 .6 0
0.39
0.93

0 .8 5
0.79
1. 5 4
1.59
1.01
0. 4 9
0.41
0. 4 5
0 .3 0
0 .4 0
0 .3 9
0 .5 4

1.18
1.27
0.61
0 .6 3
0.99
2.04
2.44
2.22
3.09
2.50
2.9?
1. 5 6

-o.5v

0.44

7. 5 7
-4.46
- 6 .t 4

a.ar

0.81
0 .5 9
1.36
3 .8 5

1.23
I .70
0.73
0.26

(s&D)R

0.54
I .48
0.72
r./5

- R

6.03
7. 2 7
2.68
2.92
5 .5 4
-9.34
-6.45
-J.64

- 6 .5 0
-3.35
- t . 1 3

R?

0.45

Figure 34.

1 9 7 3 A R A B - I S R A E lL, lI A RA N A L Y S I S - R E F I N E D

Arab
Engagement
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
B.
9.
10.
11 .
12.

C a n a lC r o s sni g , N |
C a n a lC r o s s n
i g, S |
E g y p tB u i l d u p , N
|
E g y p tB u i 1 d u o .S
|
AdanCounterattack |
E g y p t0 f f e n s i v e , N |
E q y o t0 f f e n s i v e , S |
0 p G a z e l l e( C a n a l )|
C h i n e s eF a r m
I
Deversoir,West
|
G e n efia
I
I s m a li i a
|

zL. Ahmadiye
22. Rafid
23. Mt. Hermonit
7-4. Nafekh

Na/Ni
7.68
7. 9 2
4.22
3.90
2.48
1.98
2.I9
1.20
l.?5
0.95
1. 0 9
1.40

I ,. ru
|
I
I

3.46
5.40
t.ta

Fi re- S e t - Pe
i ce
power F a c t o r
P/P

4.07
4.76

3
3

4.55

2. 4 2
1.79
1.41
\.64

3
:

Surp r is e

1.31
1 .6 8

D is r u p - P / P
(s&D)
tion

J. +J

3.20
2.61
2.47

r. aa

r.29
2.33
0. 7 1
0.93

n o?

0.94
0.92
0.86
1.09

1.49
1 .1 4
1. 4 5

i:'
o .i o

?1

0.80
0.90

1. JJ

1 .1 9
1.74

9
J

J. UJ

1.01

0.57
1.29
0.72
1.75

2.40
2.90

: :
1.15

4.49
5.38
3 .1 8
3 .1 9
4.22
0 .7 1
0.93
0.92
1. 0 6
1. 3 4
1 .1 4
1.45
1. 3 7
3 . 74
t.17
2.0t

R - R
O.UJ

7. 2 7
2.68
2.92
5.54
-v.J+

-8.23
- 5 .B 2
- 6 .5 0
-3.35
-7.75
-0.40

Effect
P/P

?.2r
2.45
- t. 3 +

1.58
2.11
0.35
0.38
0.46
0.43
0.60
0 .3 9
0.93

0 .4 4

-O.JL

7. 5 7
-+. JU

- 5 .1 4

L . 1 l

0 .5 3
0.49

CEVs
A r a b I I s r a e li

Average

0.4e |
0.45 |
0.4e |
0.s0 |
0.50|
o.4e I

2.03 |
2,20 I
2.06 |
2.02 i
2 . 0 0|
z.o+ |

o : 5 0|

z . o oI

o . z 4|

q.v I

n 4 1

? L L

0.40 |
2.47 |
0.45 |
2.23 I
0.34 I
2.92 |
0 . 6 4 t 1 . 5 6 t 2 . L 6
t half average: 2.06
h a 1f a v e r a g e : 2 . 2 7
0 . 3 2I
3.i1 |
0.67 |
1.4eI
0.45|
2.21I

t half average:
2 half average:

z.7s

2.30
3.19

F i g u r e 3 5 . C 0 M P A R A TCI V
AE
M P A IA
GN
NA L Y S E1S9,6 7 ,1 9 7 3

Nu/Ni
1 9 6 7- S i n a i
1967- WestBank
1 9 6 7- G o l a n
1 9 7 3- S i n a i
1 9 7 3- G o l a n

1.82
0.95
1. 4 8
2.37
2.86

Firepower*

Calc
P/P

1.37
0 .6 5

2.28
1 .1 4
2 .1 0
1.41
1. 9 3

1 ? ?

3 .0 3
2.23

Arab
Revised
S e t - P ei c e C a lc
S ur P/P
pri se** ( s & D ) R - R
F act o r
P/P
1.1
1.1
1.1
1.1
1

4.40

t.25
L . J T

1 .5 5
?.t2

0 .3 9
0.64
0 .8 3 * * *
I .04
1.04

0.96
0 .B 0
1.92
1.61
?.20

-t2.t4
- 7. 3 1
- 1 1. 4 6
-3.08
-4.65

* I n c l u d e s a c t u a l d a i ' l y a i r e f f o r t s o f o p p o s i n gs i d e s , n o t a i r s t r e n g t h s p r i o r
to war.
* * A s s u m e sf u l l e f f e c t f o r f i r s t t h r e e d a y s ; t h e r e a f t e r p r o r a t e d .
***Reflects Israeli surprise night attacks, June9-10.

Z4

Effect I
CEVs
P / P I A r a b t I s r a e li

0.2e
1 0 . 3 0I
0 . 4 1 1 0 . 3
0 . 3 0 0 .1 4
I
I
0.62
l0.3Bl
0 .s 2 | 0 .2 3 |

3.31
8 1 2 . 1 0
6.40
2.60
4.23

OVERALL
COMPARATIVE
EVALUATION
0 f a l l o f t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s , t h e m o s ts i g n i f i c a n t a r e
t h e r e l a t i v e I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a nC E V sf o r 1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3 . I n b o t h i n s t a n c e st h e
opponentw
s e re re p re se n ta ti veo f the best militar y for ce the r espectivenat i ons
c o u l d a t t h a t t i m e p u t i n t h e f i e l d , w i t h e x p e r i e n c eodf f i c e r c o r p s , a n d w i t h w e a p o n so f c o m p a r a b lqeu a l i t y a n d s o p h i s t i c a t ' i o n . I n t h e 1 9 6 7W a rt h e E g y p t i a n s
s u f f e r e dt h e d i s r u p t i o n r e s u l t i n g f r o m m o d e r a t e
o r s u b s t a n t i a ls u r p r i i L ; i n t h e
1 9 7 3W a rt h e I s r a e l i s s u f f e r e dd i s r u p t i o n f r o m p r a c t i c a l l y c o m p l e t es u r p r i s e .
A f t e r a l l o w i n g f o r t h e s u r p r i s e d i s r u p t i o n b y i d e n t i c a ' lp r o c e d u r e isn b o t h
c a s e s ,a n d c o n s i s t e n t l ya p p l y i n gt h e o t h e r v a r i a b l e so f c o m b atto t h e f o r c e s c o m mi t t e d i n a n u mb eor f b a ttl e s, the aver ageIsr aelj CEVwith r espect to the E' gy
F bpttians was1.96 (a'lthough
a p p a r e n t l yi n c r e a s i n qa s t i m e w e n t o n ; s e e b e l o w ) .
l o w i n g t h e ' i d e n t i c a l p r o c e d u r ef o r t h e 1 9 7 3W i r t h e a v e r a g eI s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c tt o t h e E g y p t i a n sf o r t h e w a r w a s 2 . 1 6 , a l t h o u g hi t w a sa p p a r e n t l yo n l y
2 . 0 6 a f t e r f o u r d a y so f c o m b a t . W h i c h e v evra l u e w e u a e ( 2 . t 6 f o r t h e w a i a s i
w h o l e , o r 2 . 0 6 f o r a c o m p a r a b 'pl ee r i o d o f f o u r d a y so f c o m b a t )t h e c o n c l u s ' i o ins
t h e s a m e . I n t h e o n e i n s t a n c et h e n u m b e r su g g e s t h a t t h e I s r a e l i c o m b aet f f e c t i v e n e s ss u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n sh a d i n i r e a s e db y a b o u t l 0 % i n t h e ' i n t e r v e n i n gs i x y e a r s , i n t h e o t h e r c a s et h a t t h e g a p h a d w i d e n e db y s % .
T h e s i g n i f i c a n t t h i n g i s t h a t , a l t h o u g ht h e d i f f e r e n t i a l w a s s t ' i l l c l o s e t o
t h e s a m e - ab o u ttw o -to -o n efa cto r in favor of the Isr aelis- the qap had not nar ro w e dl e t w e e n 1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 2 3 ; i f anythinq it had widened. Th@t r a d i c t o r y t o t h e c o n v e n t i o n arl e a s o n i n g , . w h i chha s s u g g e s t e tdh a t t h e A r a b sd i d
s o m u c hb e t t e r i n 1 9 7 3t h a n i n 1 9 6 7b e c a u s e
t h e y h a d l e a r n e df r o m t h e i r 1 9 6 7l e s s o n s , a n d h a d u t i l i z e d t h e t i m e t o i m p r o v et h e m s e l v e sw, h i l e t h e I s r a e l i s , a r r o g a n t
a n d o v e r c o n fi d e n t,h a d n o t ma d ecom par able
effor ts.
Se r i o u sstu d y o f th e ma tte r , however ,r .evealsnot o n l y t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l
r e a s o n i n gi s w r o n g ,i t a l s o r e v e a l sw h y i t i s w r o n g .
D e m o nstra t'i othn a t th e 1 9 7 3per for m ance
is not an i n d j c a t o r o f i m p r o v e d
Arab
p e r f o r m a n cies a s f o l l o w s :
1 . l n 1 9 6 7 ,t h e I s r a e l i s s t a r t e d w i t h s u r p r i s e ; t h e A r a b sn e v e rr e c o v e r e d ,
in f a c t n e v e r h a d a ch a n ceto re cover :
2 . I n 1 9 7 3t h e A r a b ss t a r t e d w i t h g r e a t e r s u r p r i s e t h a n t h e I s r a e l i s a c h i e v e d
i n 1 9 6 7 . Y e t w i t h i n t h r e e d a y st h e I s r a e l i s h a d r e c o v e r e d a
, n d w e r ef i g h t i n g o n
e q u a l t e r m s w i th th e A ra b s. T h i s i s o n e o f t h e m o s tr e m a r k a b lree c o v e r i e si n m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y.
3 . O n er e a s o nt h e i n i t i a l I s r a e l i f r o n t i e r v i c t o r i e s ' i n 1 9 6 7w e r ef o l l o w e ds o
q u i c k l y b y A r a bc o l l a p s ei s t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s h a d e l i m i n a t e dt h e A r a ba i r a r m , a n d
w e r e a b l e t o u s e t h e i r o w na i r i n u n c h a l l e n g e dm, a s s i v ea t t a c k s t h a t c o m D l e t etdh e
demoralization
o f t h e A r a b g r o u n df o r c e s . T h a n k st o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f S o v j e t a j r
d e f e n s ew e a p o n s ' i ng r e a t n u m b e rbs e t w e e n1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3 ,j n t h e l a t e s t w a r t h e A r a b s
w e r e a b l e t o p r e v e n tt h e I s r a e l i a i r f r o m h a v i n ga c o m p a r a b lfei e l d d a y .
4 . I n 1 9 6 7t h e o v e r a l l A r a b c o m m a n dienr c h i e f , a n d t h e m a nd ' i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e S i n a j f r o n t , w a sa p o l i t i c a l a p p o i n t e ea, d r u n ka n d a d r u gi d d i c t ,
w h o s e e m st o h a ve b e e nu n d e r b o th of the lattelinfluences shor tl.y aftei he l ear ned
o f t h e d e s t r u c t i o no f h i s a i r f o r c e . I n 1 9 7 3t h e E g y o t i a n s( a n d ' i t s o t h e S y r i a n s )
w e r e l.e d b y m e nw h o , i f n o t t h e e q u a l o f t h e i r I s r a e l i o p p o n e n t (sI s m a i t p r i l U a b l y
q q ! b e c o m p a r endo t u n f a v o r a b l yw i t h t h e m ) ,w e r ea t l e a s t c o m p e t e nsto l d i e r s w h o
d i d n o t l o s e t h e i r h e a d se i t h e r i n v i c t o r y o r i n a d v e r s i t y .
B e c a u so
e f t h e a s s u m p t i o ni sn v o l v e d , t h e o v e r a l l c a m p a i gann a l y s e ss h o w n ' i n
F i g u r e 3 5 a r e n o t s o r e l i a b l e a s t h o s e f o r t h e e n g a g e m e n t sH. o w e v e rt,h e y s u g g e s t
25

a n i n t e r e s t i n g q u a n t i t a t i v e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e q u a l i t a t ' i v e a r g u m e n t sp r e s e n t e d
above.
n e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s s u g g e s t sa n I s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
T h e i 9 6 7 J o r d a n i a nc a r n p a i g p
r e s p e c t t o t h e J o r d a nA r m yo f 2 . 1 , 0 ,w h i c h i s 2 9 %h ' i g h e rt h a n t h e a v e r a g eC E Vf o r
t h e f o u r b a t t l e s a n a l y z e d . S i n c e t h e J o r d a n i a nh i g h c o r n m a nddo e s n o t s e e mt o h a v e
m a d ea n . ys e r i o u s b l u n d e r s d u r i n g t h e c a m p a ' i g ni,t c a n b e h y p o t h e s i z e dt h a t m o s t o f
t h e 2 9 %d i f f e r e n c e i s d u e p r i m a r i l y t o t h e e f f e c t s o f a i r p o w e r o n t h e o v e r a l l o u t come.
T h e 1 9 6 7 E g y p t ' i a nc a m p a i g np e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s p r o v i d e s a n I s r a e l i / E g y p t i a n
C E Vo f 3 . 3 1 , w h i c h i s 6 9 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g eC E Vf o r t h e f o u r b a t t ' l e s a n a l y z e d .
I f w e a c c e p t t h e s a m eh y p o t h e s i sf o r t h e d e m o r a l j z i n ga n d c a s u a l t y - p r o d u c i n ge f f e c t
o f t h e v i g o r o u sa p p l i c a t i o n o f u n c h a l l e n g e a
d i r p o w e r , t h i s l e a v e s 4 0 %a t t r i b u t a b l e
t o t h e i n e p t l e a d e r s h i po f F i e l d M a r s h a lA m e r .
T h e 1 9 6 7S y r i a n c a m p a i g np e r f o r m a n c ea n a l y s i s i n d ' i c a t e s a n I s r a e l i C E Vw i t h
r e s p e c t t o t h e S y r i a n A r m yo f 6 . 4 0 , w h i c h i s 5 5 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g eI s r a e ' l i
C E Vf o r t h e f o u r b a t t l e s a n a l y z e d . A g a i n h y p o t h e s i z i n gt h a t 2 9 %o f t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a l j s d u e t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f I s r a e l i a i r p o w e r , t h ' i s l e a v e s 2 6 %a t t r i b u t a b l e t o
t h e e x t r e m ei n e p t i t u d e o f t h e S y r i a n h j g h c o m m a n dw, h i c h f a i l e d t o e m p l o yi t s
f o r c e s a d e q u a t e l y ,o r t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f t h o s e u n i t s t h a t w e r e e n g a g e d .
I n t h e S u e z - S i n a i1 9 7 3c a m p a i g a
n n a l y s i s , h o w e v e r ,t h e r e l a t i v e I s r a e l i E g y p t i a n C E Vf o r t h e c a m p a i g ni s 2 0 %h i g h e r t h a n t h e a v e r a g ec a l c u l a t e d f o r t h e
b a t t l e s a n a l y z e do n t h a t f r o n t . T h i s i s c o n s i s t e n tw i t h a q u a l i t a t i v e a s s e s s m e n t
t h a t I s r a e l i a i r p o w e rd i d n o t s i g n i f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e o v e r a l l o u t c o m eo f t h e s e l a n d
c a m p a i g n s a, n d t h a t t h e h i g h - 1 e v e l A r a b l e a d e r s h i p w a s s o m e w h al te s s c o m p e t e n ti n
p e r f o r m a n c et h a n w e r e t h e s u b o r d i n a t eu n i t s . T h e o v e r a l l a n a l y s i s f o r t h e S y r i a n
f r o n t s h o w sa n I s r a e l i - A r a b C E U5 4 %h i g h e r t h a n f o r t h e e n g a g e m e n a
t sn a l . y z e d . T h i s
s u g g e s t st h a t t h e E g y p t i a nh i g h c o m m a nwda s a b o u t 3 4 %m o r e c o m p e t e n t h a n t h a t o f
the Syrians.
A c o m p a n i s o on f t h e I s r a e l i v s . S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ei n t h e t w o w a r s m i g h t , a t
f i r s t g l a n c e , a p p e a rt o c o n t r a d i c t t h e a r g u m e n t sp r e s e n t e da b o v e . I n f a c t , h o w e v e r ,
t h e S y r i a n s i t u a t i o n w a s u n i q u e , a n d c a n n o t b e t h e b a s j s f o r a n y c o m p a r i s o on f t h i s
sort.
T h e S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ei n 1 9 6 7v l a s o n e o f t h e m o s t a b y s m a li n t h e h i s t o r y o f
c o n v e n t i o n a lw a r f a r e . l , J h i l et h e I s r a e ' l ' i p e r f o r m a n c eo n J u n e 9 - 1 0 , 1 9 6 7 , w a s c o n m e n d a b l e , t h e r e s u l t s a c h i e v e dw o u l d h a v e b e e n i m p o s s i b l ea g a i n s t e v e n a m o d e r a t e l y
c o m p e t e nm
t i l i t a r y p e r f o r m a n c e . I t i s a l m o s t j n c r e d i b l e t o a m i l i t a r y o b s e r v e rt h a t
a n y m i l i t a r y f o r c e c o u l d h a v e s c a l e d t h e e s c a r p m e nf tr o m t h e H u l e hV a l l e y t o t h e
G o l a n P l a t e a u i n a f e w h o u r s a g a i n s t a f o r c e w j t h t h e w e a l t h o f w e a p o n sa n d e q u i p m e n t a v a i ' l a b l et o t h e S y r i a n s . O n em u s t d r a w t h e c o n c l u s i o nt h a t , w i t h a f e w j n d j v i d u a l e x c e p t i o n s , t h e S y r i a n A r m yw a s h a r d l y b e t t e r t h a n a m o bi n u n i f o r m , c o m m a n d e d
b y i n d i v i d u a l s w h o c o u l d n o t c o o p e r a t ew i t h e a c h o t h e r , o r c o o r d i n a t es u b o r d i n a t e s .
T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s e v i d e n t j n t h e h i s t o r y o f S y r i a b e t w e e n1 9 4 9a n d 1 9 6 7 .
T h e r e h a d b e e n n i n e m i ' l i t a r y c o u p sd ' e t a t , a n d a f t e r e a c h c o u p t h e s u c c e s s f u l u p s t a r t
h a d c l e a r e d o u t a l l p o t e n t i a ' l r i v a l s o r e n e m i e si n t h e o f f i c e r c o r p s . T h e r e s u l t w a s
t u r m o i l i n t h e a r m e df o r c e s , w i t h ' i n e v i t a b l e i n c o m p e t e n coef t h e s o r t d e m o n s t r a t ejdn
t h e 1 9 6 7W a r .
D u r i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g w i n t e r , h o w e v e r ,t h e r e h a d b e e no n e m o r ec o u p d ' e t a t , l e d
this time by the then Mjnister of War, Air Force General Hafezal Assad. The new
P r e s i d e n t a g a i n s w e p t t h e s e n i o r c o n u n a n d ear sw a y ( t h e e v i d e n c eo f t h e r e c e n t w a r
s u g g e s t st h a t t h i s c o u l d n o t h a v e d o n e s e r j o u s h a r m ) , a n d p u t ' i n h ' i s o w nm e n ,w h o
h a v e r e m a i n e da s t h e m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e c o u n t r y e v e r s j n c e . T h u s a n i m p r o v e m e n t i n S y r i a n p e r f o r m a n c ea
, m a j o r i m p r o v e m e n tw, a s i n e v j t a b l e , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e
I s r a e l i s , t h e E g y p t i a n s ,o r a n y o n ee l s e h a d a l s o d o n e i n t h e m e a n t i m e . I t w o u l d
s e e ms u r p r i s i n g , i n f a c t , i f t h e i m p r o v e m e n w
t ,i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e I s r a e l i s , h a d n o t
b e e n a t l e a s t f r o m a C E Vo f 0 . 2 4 t o o n e o f 0 . 4 0 . T h e r e i s n o k n o w ni n f o r m a t i o n o r
t e c h n i q u ea v a i l a b l e w h i c h c a n t e l l u s w h e t h e r i t w o u l d h a v e b e e n g r e a t e r i f t h e
I s r a e l i s h a d n o t a l s o i m p r o v e d ,a s i s e v i d e n c e df r o m t h e a n a l y s i s o f o p e r a t ' i o n s
against the Egyptians.

26

The Israelis had not only not fallen behindin the years between1967and 1973
but in fact had continuedto widenthe combateffectivenessgap betweenthemselves
as follows:
a n d t h e E g yp ti a n sfo r ma n yre asons,whichcan be sur nmar ized
at all l ev el s
s e l i e ffor ts to im pr ovem ilitar y per for m ance
a . C o n ti n u o uIsra
p
r
a c t i c e s ,e t c . ;
p
l
a
n
s
a
n
d
m
o
b
i
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
c
h
o
o
'
l
i
n
g
,
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
s
:
a n di n a l l
a mor einten s i v eR &D
b . A su b sta n t'i a 1 lhyi g h er R&Dcapability, and appar ent' ly
effort;
l i l i t a r y a n a l y s i so f h j s t o r i c a l
c . S o u n do, b j e c t i v e , I s r a e l i p r o f e s s i o n am
t o t h e A r a bc u l t u r a l t e n e x p e r i e n caen d c u r i e n t c a p a b i l ' i t i e s ,i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n
, l a n n i n ga n d
d e i r c yt o a l l o w e m o t i o na n dw i s h f u l t h i n k i n g t o i n f l u e n c ee v a l u a t i o n p
o p e r a t i o n alle a d e r s h i p .
F i r s t - h a n do b s e r v a t i o on f M i d d l eE a s ta r m i e ss u g g e stth a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n h a s
n o t c h a n g esdi n c e 1 9 7 3 .
r ecognition,is the fac t
so consistentas to dem and
An i n te re sti n g p h e n o menonn
t h a t i n 1 9 7 3 ,a s i n i g O Z ,a s e r i e s o f A r a bd e f e a t si s j n v a r i a b l yf o l l o w e db y d e c l i n evidentas a r esult of the
i n g c o m b aet ffe cti ve n e ss. T her eis no suchphenom enon
f e w I s r a e l i d e fe a tsi n e a rl y 0ctober 1973,in fact quite the contr ar y. It i s bey ond
t h e s c op eo f th i s stu d y to i n i tiate any attem ptto quant' ifywhat' is almos tc er tai nl y
to the obiecti v esof the
It is quite ger m ane
a m o r a lba n d /o rd i sru p ti o n p h enomenon.
be given cons i der ati on
must
exists, and
s t u d y , h o w e ve r,to n o te th a t the phenom enon
of futur e confl i c t.
in
event
the
i n a n y effo rts to a sse ssA ra bcom bateffectiveness

27

CONCLUS
IONS
1 . C o mb apt e rfo rma n ce
o f the Isr aelis with r espect to the opposingAr a b
a r m i e si n 1 96 7 , a n d th e p e n fo rmance
of the Ar ab ar m ieswith r espect to eachother ,
c a n b e r e p r e se n te db y th e fo l l o w 'ingnumer icalCEVcompar isons:
Israelis
J o r d a nai n s
Egyptians
S y r ia n s
or, in percentages:

4.13
2.53
2.LI
1.00

(1.63)

(r.oo1

(1.e6)

(1.20)
(t'oo1 )1'oo)

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

I s r a e l i 6 3 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e J o r d a n i a n s ;
I s r a e l i 9 6 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
Isra e l i 3 1 ,3 %
su p e ri or ity over the Syr ians;
J o r d a n i a n2 0 %s u p e r i o r j t y o v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
J o r d a n i a n1 5 3 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s ;
E g yp tia n l .L 7 %su p e rior ityover the Syr ians.
2 . C o mb apt e rfo rma n ce
o f the Isr aelis with r espect to the opposingAr a b ar m i es
in 1 9 7 3 , a n d th e p e rfo rma n ce
o f the Ar ab ar mieswith r espect to eachother , c an be
re p r e s e n t e db y th e fo l l o w i n g n u m er icalCEVcom par isons:
Israeljs
Z.7S (2.16)
(t.OO1
Egyptians 1.27
Syrians
1.00
0r, in percentages:
a . I s r a e l i 1 1 6 %s u p e r i o r i t yo v e r t h e E g y p t i a n s ;
b . I s r a e l i 7 7 5 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s ;
c . E g y p t i a n2 7 %s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e S y r i a n s .
3 . S p e c i a ' cl i r c u m s t a n c erse l a t i n g t o t h e p o l i t i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i po f
S y r i a j n 1 9 6 7a n d i n 1 9 7 3d o n o t p e r m i t t h e d r a w i n go f a n y f i r m c o n c l u s i o n sf r o m
t h e c o m p a r a ti veIsra e 'l i vs. S yri an com par isons
in 1967and 1973.
4 . B e tw e e n1 9 6 7a n d 1 9 7 3th e gap in com bateffectivenessbetweenthe Is r ael i
a n d Eg y p t i ana rmi e sw i d e n e d .
5 . S a v ef o r t h e S y r i a n s , t h e r e i s n o r e a s o nt o b e l i e v e t h a t a n y o t h e r A r a b
a r m e df o r c e s i m p r o v e dt h e i r m i l i t a r y e f f e c t i v e n e s sr e l a t i v e t o t h e I s r a e l i s a n y m o r e
t h a n t h e E g y p t i a n s ;t h e S y r i a n i m p r o v e m e sn t i l l l e a v e st h e mc o n s i d e r a b l yb e h i n dt h e
Egyptians.
6 . T h e re i s n o re a so nto b elieve that the Ar abshave impr ovedtheir r el ati v e
e f f e c t i v e n e s sw i t h r e s p e c tt o t h e I s r a e l i s s j n c e 1 9 4 3 ;r a t h e r i t i s 1 i k e 1 yt h a t t h e
q u a l j t a t i v e g a p h a s w i d e n e df u r t h e r .

?8