G.R. No.

203041

June 5, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MOISES CAOILE, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused-appellant challenges in this appeal the March 21, 2012 Decision1 promulgated by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, which affirmed with modification the judgment 2 of
conviction for two counts of Rape rendered against him by Branch 32 of the Agoo, La Union
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and A-497.
Accused-appellant Moises Caoile (Caoile), in two separate Amended Informations filed before the
RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-496
That on or about April 6, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the
victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one
AAA,3 a demented person with a mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her
damage and prejudice.4
FAMILY COURT CASE No. A-497
That on or about May 12, 2005, in the Municipality of Rosario, La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing the mental disability of the
victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one [AAA],
a demented person with a mental age of seven (7) years old against her will and, to her damage and
prejudice.5
Caoile pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment6 for both cases on March 1, 2006.
After the completion of the pre-trial conference on March 8, 2006,7 joint trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, which were succinctly summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
Evidence for the Prosecution
[AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La
Union when her mother left to work abroad when she was still young. One of their neighbors was the
accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the playmate of [AAA].
One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place. Upon reaching thereat,
the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the instruction of the accused

whom she called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused removed [AAA]s short pants and panty and
inserted his penis into her vagina. [AAA] felt pain but she did not do anything. After two minutes or
so, the accused removed his penis inside [AAA]s vagina. [AAA] stood up and wore again her short
pants and panty. Before the accused allowed [AAA] to go home, the former gave the latter a
medicine, which she described as a red capsule with white casing, with the instruction of taking the
same immediately upon reaching home. As instructed by her uncle Moises, [AAA] took the medicine
as soon as she got home.
Four (4) days thereafter, and while [AAA] was at the pumping well near their house, the accused
invited her to gather guavas at the mountain. [AAA] accepted her uncle Moisess invitation. At the
mountain, the accused led [AAA] to lie down, and then he removed her short pant[s] and panty.
Thereafter, the accused inserted his penis inside the vagina of [AAA]. After the sexual intercourse,
the accused and [AAA] gathered guavas, and went home.
One day, while [AAA] was sleeping in their house, Marivic woke her up and invited her to play at
their house. At the accuseds house, and while [AAA] and Marivic were playing, the accused invited
[AAA] to gather santol fruits. [AAA] went with the accused, and once again the accused had carnal
knowledge of her.
Sometime in April 2005, [AAA] heard her friend, [BBB], complaining to Lucio Bafalar, a Barangay
Tanod, that the accused mashed her breast. Upon hearing the story of [BBB], [AAA] blurted out that
she, too, was abused by the accused.
[CCC], [AAA]s aunt, immediately went home to Rosario when she learned that her niece was raped
by the accused, and together with [AAA] and Barangay Captain Roming Bartolome they went to the
Rosario Police Station to report the incident. After executing their respective affidavits, [AAA] was
examined by Dr. Claire Maramat at San Fernando, La Union.
After examining [AAA] on June 21, 2005, Dr. Claire Maramat found out that [AAA]s genitalia suffered
a multiple hymenal laceration which, at the time of the examination, was already healed, thus,
possibly, it was inflicted a week or months prior to the examination. According to Dr. Maramat, a
multiple hymenal laceration may be caused by several factors, such as trauma to the perineal area
or penetration of a penis.
Dr. Maramat also took seminal fluid from the vagina, the cervix and the cervical canal of [AAA], and
forwarded the same to Dr. Brenda Rosuman, a pathologist at the Ilocos Training and Regional
Medical Center (ITRMC), for examination.
Dr. Rosuman testified that after examining the seminal fluids taken from [AAA], she found the
presence of spermatozoa, which means that [AAA] had sexual intercourse, and the predominance of
coccobacilli, meaning that [AAA] could be suffering from infection caused by hygiene or acquired
through sexual intercourse. She further testified that, according to some books, spermatozoa can
live in the vaginal tract within 17 days from sexual intercourse. She clarified, however, that in her
medical experience, she rarely finds spermatozoa in a specimen beyond three (3) days.
Claire Baliaga, a psychologist of the Philippine Mental Health Association, Baguio-Benguet Chapter,
testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] on August 10, 2007; that [AAA]
obtained an overall score performance of 55, which is classified within the mental retardation range;

and that [AAA] has the mental age of a seven-year, nine-month old child who is inadequate of
sustaining mental processes and in solving novel problems employing adoptive strategies.
Dr. Roderico V. Ramos, a psychiatrist of the ITRMC, testified that he evaluated the mental condition
of [AAA], that after psychiatric evaluation, [AAA] was given a diagnosis of moderate mental
retardation; that a person who is mentally retardate do not function the way his age required him to
be; that [AAA] was eighteen (18) years old at the time he examined her, but the mental functioning of
her brain is around five (5) to six (6) years old; and that [AAA] can only do what a five or six-year old
child could do.
Dr. Ramos further testified that generally a mentally retardate cannot finish primary education. He,
however, explained that parents of mentally retardates begged the teachers to give passing marks to
their sons/daughters, and out of pity, they would be able to finish primary education. 8
Evidence for the Defense
Accused Moises Caoile knew [AAA] because they were neighbors. [AAA] was, in fact, a playmate of
his children and a frequent visitor in their house. When accused and [AAA] became familiar with one
another, the latter would go to the formers house even when the children were not there, and they
would talk and tease each other.
In the year 2005, the wife of the accused worked at the town proper of Rosario, La Union. The wife
would leave early in the morning, and returned home late at night. More often than not, the accused
was left alone in the house since all his children were attending school. It was during his so called
alone moments that the accused courted [AAA]. He gave her money, chocolates or candies. Time
came when [AAA] would stay at the accuseds house, from Monday to Sunday, with or without the
children. Soon thereafter, accused and [AAA] found themselves falling in love with one other. As
lovers, they had their intimate moments, and their first sexual intercourse happened on April 6, 2005
on the mountain. From then on, the accused and [AAA] repeatedly had sexual intercourse, and most
of which were initiated by [AAA], especially their sexual intimacies in Agri Motel, Pangasinan.
During their relationship, [AAA] suggested that they [live] together as husband and wife. The
accused refused because he cannot leave his family.
The accused did not know that [AAA] was a demented person since she acted like a normal
individual. In fact, she went to a regular school and she finished her elementary education.
The accused did not force himself on [AAA]. [AAA] knew that he is a married man, but she,
nonetheless, loved him without reservation.
The defense moved that it be allowed to have [AAA] be evaluated by a psychiatrist of its own choice.
As prayed for the defense, [AAA] was evaluated by Dr. Lowell A. Rebucal of the Department of
Psychiatry, Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. In his Psychiatric Evaluation Report, Dr.
Rebucal concluded that [AAA] is suffering from Mild Mental Retardation.9
Ruling of the RTC

On May 6, 2009, after weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the RTC rendered its Joint
Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1. In FC Case No. A-496, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and
Article 266-B of Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
2. In FC Case No. A-497, accused Moises Caoile is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) and
Article 266-B of Republic Act No. 8353, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
3. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the amounts
of P50,000.00 for each count of rape as compensatory damages and P50,000.00 for each
count of rape as moral damages.10
Caoile elevated the RTC ruling to the Court of Appeals, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt by attacking the credibility of AAA and the methods used to determine her mental
state.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated March 21, 2012, in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03957, the Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the RTC decision. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Joint Decision dated May 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court ("RTC"), First Judicial Region, Branch 32, Agoo, La Union, in Family Court Case Nos. A-496
and A-497, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Moises Caoile, Accused," finding
appellant Moises Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with
modification in that aside from civil indemnity and moral damages, appellant Moises Caoile is
ORDERED to indemnify [AAA] exemplary damages amounting toP30,000.00 for each count of
rape.11 (Citation omitted.)
Issue
Caoile is now before this Court, on appeal,12 with the same lone assignment of error he posited
before the Court of Appeals,13 to wit:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE.14
In essence, Caoile is attacking the credibility of AAA, and claims that she might not be a mental
retardate at all, having been able to give categorical and straightforward answers during her
testimony. Moreover, Caoile avers that it has not been shown that AAA underwent the proper clinical,
laboratory, and psychometric tests to arrive at the conclusion that she fell within the range of mental

retardation. Caoile argues that while it is true that his denial and sweetheart defenses are generally
deemed weak and unavailing, his conviction should nevertheless be founded on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence and not on the flaws of his defenses.15
This Courts Ruling
Caoile was tried and convicted of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) in relation to Article 266B, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Said provisions
read:
Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
xxxx
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
xxxx
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua.
Validity of the Amended Informations
Taking a cue from the Court of Appeals, this Court would like, at the outset, to address the validity of
the Amended Informations vis--vis the crime Caoile was actually convicted of.
Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two circumstances
when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered rape:
1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and
2. Paragraph 1(d): when the offended party is x x x demented. 16
Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations with rape of a demented person under paragraph
1(d). The term demented17 refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated
mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individuals former intellectual level and often by
emotional apathy, madness, or insanity.18 On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under
paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency,
or retardation.19 Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly
classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."

The mistake, however, will not exonerate Caoile. In the first place, he did not even raise this as an
objection. More importantly, none of his rights, particularly that of to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him,20 was violated. Although the Amended Informations stated that
he was being charged with the crime of rape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d), it also
stated that his victim was "a person with a mental age of seven (7) years old." Elucidating on the
foregoing, this Court, in People v. Valdez,21 held:
1wphi1

For a complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials
of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
Thus, the erroneous reference to paragraph 1(d) in the Amended Informations, did not cause
material and substantial harm to Caoile. Firstly, he simply ignored the error. Secondly, particular facts
stated in the Amended Informations were averments sufficient to inform Caoile of the nature of the
charges against him.
Mental Condition of AAA
Caoiles insistence, to escape liability, that AAA is not a mental retardate, cannot be accepted by this
Court.
The fact that AAA was able to answer in a straightforward manner during her testimony cannot be
used against her. The capacity of a mental retardate to stand as a witness in court has already been
settled by this Court. In People v. Castillo,22 we said:
It bears emphasis that the competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses
have been upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably
and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainants accusations, it even lends
greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so
tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the
hands of the accused. Moreover, it is settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says
in effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if
it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. (Citations omitted.)
More importantly, AAAs medical condition was verified not only by one expert, but three witnesses
a psychologist and two psychiatrists, one of whom was even chosen by the defense and testified for

the defense. All three experts confirmed that AAA suffered from mental retardation. Caoile cannot, at
this point, properly impeach his own witness without violating established rules of evidence.
This Court further disagrees with Caoiles claim that the experts "merely impressed that they
conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] in which she obtained a performance classified
within the mental retardation range."23 The experts findings on AAAs mental condition were based
on several tests and examinations, including the Stanford-Binet Test, 24 which Caoile, relying on this
Courts ruling in People v. Cartuano, Jr., considered as one of the more reliable standardized
tests.26 Besides, this Court has already qualified the applicability of Cartuano in cases involving
mentally deficient rape victims, to wit:
People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a
finding of mental retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos, declaring
that the records in People v. Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support
to sustain a finding that the victim had been suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in
People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the victim had been mentally retarded by
an examining psychiatrist who had been able to identify the tests administered to the victim and to
sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial court.27 (Citations omitted.)
Borrowing our words in People v. Butiong,28 "in direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did
not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim." Here, the psychiatric evaluation report of
Caoiles own expert witness is the final nail on the coffin of Caoiles argument.
In addition, this Court will not contradict the RTCs findings, which were affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, absent any valid reason. The trial courts assessment of the witnesses credibility is given
great weight and is even conclusive and binding upon this Court.29 In People v. Sapigao, Jr.,30 we
explained in detail the rationale for this practice:
It is well settled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. These are
important in determining the truthfulness of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the
face of conflicting testimonies. For, indeed, the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice are
potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial court has the opportunity and can take
advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the appellate
court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in transcript of testimonies with the risk
that some of what the witness actually said may have been lost in the process of transcribing. As
correctly stated by an American court, "There is an inherent impossibility of determining with any
degree of accuracy what credit is justly due to a witness from merely reading the words spoken by
him, even if there were no doubt as to the identity of the words. However artful a corrupt witness
may be, there is generally, under the pressure of a skillful cross-examination, something in his
manner or bearing on the stand that betrays him, and thereby destroys the force of his testimony.
Many of the real tests of truth by which the artful witness is exposed in the very nature of things
cannot be transcribed upon the record, and hence they can never be considered by the appellate
court."
Carnal Knowledge of a
Mental retardate amounts to Rape

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person is
automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be proven
are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the victims mental
retardation.31
Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental retardate. Anent the fact
of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecutions own testimonial and
documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with AAA. In fact, he has
confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being sweethearts.
Sweetheart Defense
Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a female, even
when done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without her consent. To
expound on such concept, this Court, in People v. Butiong, 32 said:
In rape committed by means of duress, the victims will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity
of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was
committed against her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or
unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such
lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also
when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not
necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse.
Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes
rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse
with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was incapable
of giving any rational consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman
was considered rape. But a deafmute is not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances
must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the
absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the rape under par. 2 may be committed
when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any cause such as when she is asleep, or
due to lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her by the accused. x x x.
Consequently, the mere fact that Caoile had sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, makes
him liable for rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Defense of Lack of knowledge of
AAAs mental condition
Similarly, Caoiles allegation that he did not know that AAA was mentally retarded will not suffice to
overturn his conviction.
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person regardless
of the perpetrators awareness of his victims mental condition. However, the perpetrators

knowledge of the victims mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime and
makes it punishable by death33 under Article 266-B, paragraph 10, to wit:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
xxxx
10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of
the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
There is no sufficient evidence to establish the qualifying circumstance of knowledge by Caoile of
AAAs mental disability. The trial court and the Court of Appeals which did not make any finding on
the said qualifying circumstance correctly convicted said accused of simple rape only.
This Court finds the award of damages as modified by the Court of Appeals in order. Pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence,34 however, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be
imposed on all damages awarded from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03957 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant MOISES CAOILE is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape in Family Court Case Nos. A-496 and
A-497 under subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. The award of civil indemnity and moral
damages, both in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and exemplary damages in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), all for each count of rape, are maintained, subject
to interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197291

April 3, 2013

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner,

vs.
SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as
Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF
THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct the
manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the
Secretary of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to
include a person in the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a
certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request or motion.

The Case
This direct appeal by petition for review on certiorari has been taken from the final order issued on
June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-1247771 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, in Manila,
dismissing petitioners petition for mandamus.2
Antecedents
History will never forget the atrocities perpetrated on November 23, 2009, when 57 innocent civilians
were massacred in Sitio Masalay, Municipality of Ampatuan, Maguindanao Province. Among the
principal suspects was petitioner, then the Mayor of the Municipality of Datu Unsay, Maguindanao
Province. Inquest proceedings were conducted against petitioner on November 26, 2009 at the
General Santos (Tambler) Airport Lounge, before he was flown to Manila and detained at the main
office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI and the Philippine National Police
(PNP) charged other suspects, numbering more than a hundred, for what became aptly known as
the Maguindanao massacre.3
Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a
Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation.
On November 27, 2009, the Department of Justice (DOJ) resolved to file the corresponding
informations for murder against petitioner, and to issue subpoenae to several persons. 4 On
December 1, 2009, 25 informations for murder were also filed against petitioner in the Regional Trial
Court, 12th Judicial Region, in Cotabato City.5
On December 3, 2009, Secretary of Justice Devanadera transmitted her letter to Chief Justice Puno
requesting the transfer of the venue of the trial of the Maguindanao massacre from Cotabato City to
Metro Manila, either in Quezon City or in Manila, to prevent a miscarriage of justice. 6 On December
8, 2009, the Court granted the request for the transfer of venue. 7 However, on December 9, 2009,
but prior to the transfer of the venue of the trial to Metro Manila, the Prosecution filed a manifestation
regarding the filing of 15 additional informations for murder against petitioner in Branch 15 of the
Cotabato City RTC.8 Later on, additional informations for murder were filed against petitioner in the
RTC in Quezon City, Branch 211, the new venue of the trial pursuant to the resolution of the Court. 9
The records show that petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder when
he was arraigned on January 5, 2010,10 February 3, 2010,11 and July 28, 2010.12
In the joint resolution issued on February 5, 2010, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals
with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre.13 It appears that in issuing the joint
resolution of February 5, 2010 the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one
Kenny Dalandag, both dated December 7, 2009.14
On August 13, 2010, Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. 15 On
September 7, 2010, the QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order,16 wherein Dalandag was listed
as one of the Prosecution witnesses.17
On October 14, 2010, petitioner, through counsel, wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De
Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in
the informations for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the

massacre through his two sworn declarations.18 Petitioner reiterated the request twice more on
October 22, 201019 and November 2, 2010.20
By her letter dated November 2, 2010,21 however, Secretary De Lima denied petitioners request.
Accordingly, on December 7, 2010, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila
(Civil Case No. 10-124777),22 seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another
accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC.
On January 19, 2011,23 the RTC in Manila set a pre-trial conference on January 24, 2011 in Civil
Case No. 10-124777. At the close of the pre-trial, the RTC in Manila issued a pre-trial order.
In their manifestation and motion dated February 15, 201124 and February 18, 2011,25 respondents
questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner opposed.
On February 15, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, 26 which the RTC in
Manila granted on March 21, 2011 after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition.
Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order of March 21, 2011.
On March 21, 2011,27 the RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness
Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify on April 4, 2011 in Civil Case No.
10-124777.
On April 4, 2011, respondents moved to quash the subpoena. 28 Petitioner opposed the motion to
quash the subpoena on April 15, 2011.29 The parties filed other papers, specifically, respondents their
reply dated April 26, 2011;30 petitioner an opposition on May 12, 2011;31 and respondents another
reply dated May 20, 2011.32
On June 27, 2011,33 the RTC of Manila issued the assailed order in Civil Case No. 10-124777
dismissing the petition for mandamus.34
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE KENNY DALANDAG AS AN ACCUSED IN THE INFORMATIONS
FOR MULTIPLE MURDER IN THE MAGUINADANAO MASSACRE CASES IN LIGHT OF HIS
ADMITTED PARTICIPATION THEREAT IN AFFIDAVITS AND OFFICIAL RECORDS FILED WITH
THE PROSECUTOR AND THE QC RTC; and,
2. WHETHER THE SUBSEQUENT INCLUSION OF KENNY DALANDAG IN THE WITNESS
PROTECTION PROGRAM JUSTIFIES EXCLUSION AS AN ACCUSED AND HIS NONINDICTMENT FOR HIS COMPLICITY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE NOTWITHSTANDING
ADMISSIONS MADE THAT HE TOOK PART IN ITS PLANNING AND EXECUTION.35

The crucial issue is whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge
Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre despite his
admission to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ.
Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal
power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component
of the power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests
the public prosecutors with a wide range of discretion the discretion of what and whom to charge,
the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors that are best appreciated by the public
prosecutors.36
The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a
respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases
should be filed in court.37
Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems
it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the
Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of
exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his discretion "in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent
and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law."38
The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse
of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. It is
notable in this regard that petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number
of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also
investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn
declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the informations did not at all amount to
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding
Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint or information shall be xxx against all
persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved," albeit a mandatory provision, may
be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime
becomes a state witness.
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness
are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules
of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security
and Benefit Act).39 These modes are intended to encourage a person who has witnessed a crime or
who has knowledge of its commission to come forward and testify in court or quasi-judicial body, or

before an investigating authority, by protecting him from reprisals, and shielding him from economic
dislocation.
These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other.
Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of
several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion
by the Prosecution before resting its case. The trial court shall require the Prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statements of the proposed witnesses at a hearing in support of the
discharge. The trial court must ascertain if the following conditions fixed by Section 17 of Rule 119
are complied with, namely: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said accused can
be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to be most
guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.
On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides:
Section 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and
desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the
Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:
a. the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised
Penal Code or its equivalent under special laws;
b. there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
c. there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;
d. his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
e. he does not appear to be most guilty; and
f. he has not at any time been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may
be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may
upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act.
Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State
Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, supra, the requisites under both
rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information
by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection
Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981.

A participant in the commission of the crime, to be discharged to become a state witness pursuant to
Rule 119, must be one charged as an accused in the criminal case. The discharge operates as an
acquittal of the discharged accused and shall be a bar to his future prosecution for the same offense,
unless he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for his discharge.40The discharge is expressly left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, which has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the conditions prescribed by the
rules for that purpose exist.41
While it is true that, as a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of a co-accused from the
information in order that he may be utilized as a Prosecution witness rests upon the sound discretion
of the trial court,42 such discretion is not absolute and may not be exercised arbitrarily, but with due
regard to the proper administration of justice.43 Anent the requisite that there must be an absolute
necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is sought, the trial court has to rely on
the suggestions of and the information provided by the public prosecutor. The reason is obvious
the public prosecutor should know better than the trial court, and the Defense for that matter, which
of the several accused would best qualify to be discharged in order to become a state witness. The
public prosecutor is also supposed to know the evidence in his possession and whomever he needs
to establish his case,44 as well as the availability or non-availability of other direct or corroborative
evidence, which of the accused is the most guilty one, and the like.45
On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first
charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission into the
Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also
operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal
information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted
by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an
accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the
Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. 46 The Court
shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information. 47
The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state
witness since August 13, 2010 was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the
successful prosecution of the criminal charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic
Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the
Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as
a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he
could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his
admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with
the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the
crimes.
Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the
tribunal or officer. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only
be resorted to in order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take
action, but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be
exercised,48or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of
judgment or discretion.49

As such, respondent Secretary of Justice may be compelled to act on the letter-request of petitioner,
but may not be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such letter-request.
Considering that respondent Secretary of Justice already denied the letter-request, mandamus was
no longer available as petitioner's recourse.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the final order
issued on June 27, 2011 in Civil Case No. 10-124777 by the Regional Trial Court in Manila; and
ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164538

August 9, 2010

METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the government on
its own motion, even though complete reparation [has] been made of the damage suffered by the
private offended party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is committed against the State, the private
offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the
commission of the crime."1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the
Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 and its further
Resolution3 dated July 12, 2004 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. 4
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged respondents before
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code. In the affidavit5 of petitioners audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was
alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch
uncovered anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client
Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only voting members of
the branchs credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to clients up
to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal, which has a paidup capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining balance of P5,000.00, was able to make
withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.006 against uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at
petitioners Port Area branch; that, consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioners funds even
before the seven-day clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universals withdrawals
against uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioners head office; that

the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed";
and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with Universal and
claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and increase its deposit accounts
and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in the total amount
of P50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same in bi-monthly
amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered by postdated checks,
"plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest and other charges, if any, on
December 31, 2001."9
Findings of the Prosecutor
Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M. Edad
(Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution10 dated July 10, 1997 found petitioners evidence insufficient to
hold respondents liable for estafa. According to Prosecutor Edad:
The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel to argue that
the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing of this case, the
relations between the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and prevented the incipience of
any criminal liability on the part of respondents.11
Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:
WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the case be
dismissed.12
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the Department of
Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review.13
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only against its
employees and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the one who benefited from
this transaction and instead, agreed that it should be paid on installment basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which
will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa
was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this
transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with
Universal.

Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited
with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive
Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which
they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with]
Universal.14
A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on March 1, 2000 by
then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero.16
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Citing jurisprudence19 wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it
may prevent the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the filing of the criminal information
in court.20 Hence, according to the CA, "[j]ust as Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills
purchase transactions on account of novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the
former, cannot be made liable [for] the same transactions."21 The CA added that "[s]ince the
dismissal of the complaint is founded on legal ground, public respondents may not be compelled by
mandamus to file an information in court."22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) where
the latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ, agreed with petitioner that
the DOJ erred in dismissing the complaint. It alleged that where novation does not extinguish
criminal liability for estafa neither does restitution negate the offense already committed. 24
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to implead other
responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal, suggesting that the proper
remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information.25 This notwithstanding, however, the CA
disposed of the petition as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED. Consequently, the
resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, this instant petition before the Court.
On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to dismiss, on the
petition within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of
Comment28 while respondent Jose C. Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted his Comment29 on the petition.
The Secretary of Justice failed to file the required comment on the OSGs Manifestation and Motion
in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio Reynado (Reynado) did not submit any. For which
reason, we issued a show cause order30 on July 19, 2006. Their persistent non-compliance with our
directives constrained us to resolve that they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine
of P1,000.00 on Reynado. Upon submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and
Adraneda, the instant petition was submitted for resolution.

Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable
for the offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did
not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the
settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but did not extinguish the criminal liability of
the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding
of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law
on novation. By petitioners claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the
"negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution
for the offense already committed."32
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the
sole responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent
documents being the head of petitioners Port Area branch. Nonetheless, he contends that because
of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they cannot be held liable for estafa.
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed before the CA
to give due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in dismissing the complaint for
estafa.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the execution of
the Debt Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding respondents liable to stand trial for
estafa under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.33
Our Ruling
We find the petition highly meritorious.
Novation not a mode of extinguishing
criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation of
contract.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability."34
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or
novation of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this Court ruled that in a crime
of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the
accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno 37 and
in People v. Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of

contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its
own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the
offended party." Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda39 cited by
petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and
not his criminal liability.
Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered
into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accuseds liability for estafa. Neither will
the same bar the prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the
complaint for estafa against respondents should not be dismissed just because petitioner entered
into a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:
Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into
between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the
latters liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually
committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank. x x x40
Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed over in the body
of the assailed Decision of the CA.
Execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement did not prevent the incipience of criminal liability.
Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the disposition
absolving the respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still erroneous.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." The civil law principle of
relativity of contracts provides that "contracts can only bind the parties who entered into it, and it
cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is aware of such contract and has acted with
knowledge thereof."41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement. The intention
of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or in the beneficent
provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of the parties. Not being parties
to the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom to bar their anticipated trial for the
crime they committed. It may do well for respondents to remember that the criminal action
commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of
confidence perpetrated by them in relation to their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not
arise from a contractual dispute or matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so,
respondents cannot rely on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense
already committed to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any
liability that may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the
agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of the
respondents.

Determination of the probable cause, a function belonging to the public prosecutor; judicial review
allowed where it has been clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. 42 The Secretary of Justice,
however, may review or modify the resolution of the prosecutor.
"Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial."43 Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is,
when he has exercised his discretion "in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law." 44 Tested against these guidelines,
we find that this case falls under the exception rather than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edads Resolution dated July 10, 1997 readily
reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed probable cause to
indict respondents for the crime charged. From her own assessment of the Complaint-Affidavit of
petitioners auditor, her preliminary finding is that "Ordinarily, the offense of estafa has been
sufficiently established."45 Interestingly, she suddenly changed tack and declared that the agreement
altered the relation of the parties and that novation had set in preventing the incipience of any
criminal liability on respondents. In light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor
should not have gone that far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error,
the DOJ in dismissing petitioners petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of the prosecutor.
Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how respondents
misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after its checks deposited
with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present considering that the Executive
Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were duly notified of these transactions which
they approved. Further, no damage was caused to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with]
Universal.46
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are matters of
defense best left to the trial courts deliberation and contemplation after conducting the trial of the
criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence
of probable cause is "not a part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties evidence
is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof."47 A "finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it
is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged." 48 So we held
in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:49
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for affirming the
dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafa and/or qualified estafa are determinative of whether or
not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring

"hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl
and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of
probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, wellfounded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The
term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it
requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." Herein, the DOJ reasoned as if no
evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in fact the records of the case were
teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation when in fact the evidence presented was
adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene
committed the crime/s complained of. In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised
its discretion, amounting to grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to
correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case of estafa exists against
respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are
reasonable enough to excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the crime complained of.
In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that the "presence or absence of
the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed
upon after a full-blown trial on the merits."51
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the sufficiency of
evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have previously ruled that grave
abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates and contravenes the
Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioners appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor gave another
ground failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under the law which
will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client agreed that no estafa
was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the principal player and beneficiary of this
transaction[,] more so with herein respondents whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with
Universal.52
1avvphi1

The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against respondents
rests upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal) based on the
latters conspiratorial participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in the charge should benefit
the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.

Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must be
charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private complainant, are the
ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions must be commenced
either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines against all persons
who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to
file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense. The
proper remedy under the circumstances where persons who ought to be charged were not included
in the complaint of the private complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include
them in the information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the
inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with
respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that because the
officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not likewise be charged.
Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by the public prosecutor from
prosecution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof were
charged.
Mandamus a proper remedy when resolution of public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when "any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station."54 The writ of mandamus is not
available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is
a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible
for the commission of a crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his
inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the
rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite
the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding information
against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely
abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence for the crime of estafa as
acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latters finding and
proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard
of the concept of probable cause as pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary
of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made with grave abuse. 55 The
present case calls for the application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner has
clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and
March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice, and its Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying
reconsideration thereon are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered
to file the necessary information for estafa against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191567

March 20, 2013

MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is exclusively
within the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts
cannot interfere in such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of Justice
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Case
Under review is the decision promulgated on November 20, 2009, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) upheld the resolution dated April 16, 2009 issued by the Secretary of Justice dismissing for lack
of probable cause the complaint for murder filed against the respondents. 2
Antecedents
The petitioner is the mother of the late Cheasare Armani "Chase" Callo Claridad, whose lifeless but
bloodied body was discovered in the evening of February 27, 2007 between vehicles parked at the
carport of a residential house located at No.10 Cedar Place, Ferndale Homes, Quezon City.
Allegedly, Chase had been last seen alive with respondent Philip Ronald P. Esteban (Philip) less
than an hour before the discovery of his lifeless body.
Based on the petition, the following are the background facts.
Around 5:30 p.m. of February 27, 2007, Chase returned home from visiting his girlfriend, Ramonna
Liza "Monnel" Hernandez. Around 7:00 p.m., Chases sister Ariane was sitting at the porch of their
house when she noticed a white Honda Civic car parked along the street. Recognizing the driver to
be Philip, Ariane waved her hand at him. Philip appeared nonchalant and did not acknowledge her
gesture. Ariane decided to stay behind and leave with their house helpers, Marivic Guray and
Michelle Corpus, only after Chase had left on board the white Honda Civic car.
In the meanwhile, Chase exchanged text messages with his girlfriend Monnel starting at 7:09 p.m.
and culminating at 7:31 p.m. Among the messages was: Ppnta n kunin gulongyam iniisip k prn n d
tyo magksma. sbrang lungkot k ngun (On the way to get the tires I still think about us not being
together Im very sad right now)
Security Guard (SG) Rodolph Delos Reyes and SG Henry Solis, who were stationed at the main
gate of Ferndale Homes, logged the arrival at 7:26 p.m. on February 27, 2007 of Philip on board a
white Honda Civic bearing plate CRD 999 with a male companion in the passenger seat. It was
determined later on that the white Honda Civic bearing plate CRD 999 was owned by one Richard
Joshua Ulit, who had entrusted the car to Philip who had claimed to have found a buyer of the car.

Ulit, Pamela Ann Que, and car shop owner Edbert Ylo later attested that Philip and Chase were
friends, and that they were unaware of any rift between the two prior to the incident.
Marivic Rodriguez, a house helper of Shellane Yukoko, the resident of No. 9 Cedar Place, Ferndale
Homes, was with her co-employee nanny Jennylyn Buri and the latters ward, Joei Yukoko, when
they heard somebody crying coming from the crime scene: Help! Help! This was at about 7:30 p.m.
Even so, neither of them bothered to check who had been crying for help. It was noted, however,
that No. 10 Cedar Place, which was owned by one Mrs. Howard, was uninhabited at the time. Based
on the initial investigation report of the Megaforce Security and Allied Services, Inc., 3 the Estebans
were illegally parking their cars at Mrs. Howards carport. The initial investigation report stated that
the SGs would regularly remind the Estebans to use their own parking garage, which reminders had
resulted in heated discussions and altercations. The SGs kept records of all the illegal parking
incidents, and maintained that only the Estebans used the carport of No. 10 Cedar Place.
Around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban (Teodora) arrived at Ferndale Homes on board
a vehicle bearing plate XPN 733, as recorded in the subdivision SGs logbook. At that time, three
cars were parked at the carport of No. 10 Cedar place, to wit: a Honda CRV with plate ZAE 135
parked parallel to the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999, and another Honda Civic with plate JTG 333,
the car frequently used by Philip, then parked diagonally behind the two cars. Some witnesses
alleged that prior to the discovery of the Chases body, they had noticed a male and female inside
the car bearing plate JTG 333 engaged in a discussion.
At around 7:50 p.m., SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village, noticed that the
side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to move towards
the parked cars. He inspected the then empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on.
He checked the cars and discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999
were smeared with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was
then that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. The body
was naked from the waist up, with a crumpled bloodied shirt on the chest, and with only the socks
on. SG Sarmiento called for back-up. SG Rene Fabe immediately barricaded the crime scene.
Around 7:55 p.m., SG Solis received a phone call from an unidentified person who reported that a
"kid" had met an accident at Cedar Place. SG Solis later identified and confirmed the caller to be
"Mr. Esteban Larry" when the latter entered the village gate and inquired whether the "kid" who had
met an accident had been attended to. Moreover, when SG Fabe and SG Sarmiento were securing
the scene of the crime, they overheard from the radio that somebody had reported about a "kid" who
had been involved in an accident at Cedar Place. SG Fabe thereafter searched the village premises
but did not find any such accident. When SG Fabe got back, there were already several onlookers at
the crime scene.
The Scene-of-the-Crime Operations (SOCO) team arrived. Its members prepared a sketch and took
photographs of the crime scene. They recovered and processed the cadaver of Chase, a
bloodstained t-shirt, blood smears, green nylon cord, fingerprints, wristwatch, and a bloodied Nokia
N90 mobile phone.
According to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Report No N-07-163 signed by
Dr. Valentin Bernales, Acting Medico-Legal Division Chief, and Dr. Cesar B. Bisquera, Medico-Legal
Officer, the victim sustained two stab wounds, to wit: one on the left side of the lower chest wall with
a depth of 9 cm., which fractured the 4th rib and pierced the heart, and the other on the middle third

of the forearm. The findings corroborated the findings contained in Medico-Legal Report No. 131-07
of Police Chief Insp. Filemon C. Porciuncula Jr.
Resolution of the
Office of the City Prosecutor
The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint in its resolution
dated December 18, 2007.4
The OCP observed that there was lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to
charge Philip with homicide, much less murder; that the circumstantial evidence could not link Philip
to the crime; that several possibilities would discount Philips presence at the time of the crime,
including the possibility that there were more than one suspect in the fatal stabbing of Chase; that
Philip was not shown to have any motive to kill Chase; that their common friends attested that the
two had no ill-feelings towards each other; that no sufficient evidence existed to charge Teodora with
the crime, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory; and that the allegation that Teodora could
have been the female person engaged in a discussion with a male person inside the car with plate
JTG 333 was unreliable being mere hearsay.
The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal, but the OCP denied the motion on
December 15, 2008.5
Resolution by the Secretary of Justice
On petition for review,6 the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on April 16,
2009.7
The Secretary of Justice stated that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive,
insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the
witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged.
The Secretary of Justice held that the only circumstantial evidence connecting Philip to the crime
was the allegation that at between 7:00 to 7:30 oclock of the evening in question, Chase had
boarded the white Honda Civic car driven by Philip; that the witnesses positive identification of Philip
as the driver of the car was doubtful, however, considering that Philip did not alight from the car, the
windows of which were tinted; and that the rest of the circumstances were pure suspicions, and did
not indicate that Philip had been with Chase at the time of the commission of the crime.
After her motion for reconsideration was denied by the Secretary of Justice on May 21, 2009, 8 the
petitioner elevated the matter to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court.
Ruling of the CA
In her petition for review in the CA, the petitioner assigned to the Secretary of Justice the following
errors, to wit:
I. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DENYING THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THEREOF FILED BY

PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS AGAINST

RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER UNDER ARTICLE 248 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE.
II. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE
NUMEROUS PIECES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST
RESPONDENTS TO HOLD THEM LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER AS EXTANT IN
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
III. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ALL THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THE INSTANT CASE.9
On November 20, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,10 dismissing the petition for
review.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion for its lack of merit.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner prays that Philip and Teodora be charged with murder on the strength of the several
pieces of circumstantial evidence; that the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery be appreciated in the slaying of her son, given the time, manner, and
weapon used in the commission of the crime and the location and degree of the wounds inflicted on
the victim.
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in upholding the decision of the Secretary of Justice
finding that there was no probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for the killing of
Chase.
Ruling
We deny the petition for review, and sustain the decision of the CA.
We note, to start with, that the petitioner assailed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing in
the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a grave mistake that
immediately called for the outright dismissal of the petition. The filing of a petition for review under
Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justices resolution on the determination of probable cause was
an improper remedy.11 Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis--vis the Secretary of Justice.
A petition for review under Rule 43 is a mode of appeal to be taken only to review the decisions,
resolutions or awards by the quasi-judicial officers, agencies or bodies, particularly those specified in
Section 1 of Rule 43.12 In the matter before us, however, the Secretary of Justice was not an officer
performing a quasi-judicial function. In reviewing the findings of the OCP of Quezon City on the
matter of probable cause, the Secretary of Justice performed an essentially executive function to
determine whether the crime alleged against the respondents was committed, and whether there
was probable cause to believe that the respondents were guilty thereof. 13

On the other hand, the courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of probable
cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of Justice
acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department exercising powers akin
to those of a court of law.14 But the requirement for such intervention was still for the petitioner to
demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear demonstration is made, the intervention is
disallowed in deference to the doctrine of separation of powers. As the Court has postulated in
Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III: 15
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or
to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the
Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in
contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility. x x x
Secondly, even an examination of the CAs decision indicates that the CA correctly concluded that
the Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming the finding of
probable cause by the OCP.
A preliminary investigation, according to Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, is "an inquiry or
proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial." The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, because it is yet to be followed by the trial
proper in a court of law. The occasion is not for the full and exhaustive display of the parties
evidence but for the presentation only of such evidence as may engender a well-founded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty of the offense. 16 The role and
object of preliminary investigation were "to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and
expensive prosecutions."17
In Arula vs. Espino,18 the Court rendered the three purposes of a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1)
to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of the accused with it, in order
that he may be informed of the nature and character of the crime charged against him, and, if there
is probable cause for believing him guilty, that the State may take the necessary steps to bring him
to trial; (2) to preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the State; and (3) to
determine the amount of bail, if the offense is bailable. The officer conducting the examination
investigates or inquires into facts concerning the commission of a crime with the end in view of
determining whether an information may be prepared against the accused.
The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended
party.19 Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence

showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the
accused. Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction, demands
more than bare suspicion.20
A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that establishes the probable cause
justifying the filing of a criminal information against the respondent because the determination of
existence of a probable cause is the function of the public prosecutor.21 Generally, the public
prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
Consequently, it is a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to just leave to the Department of Justice the ample latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution
of supposed offenders. Consistent with this policy, courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justices
findings and conclusions on the matter of probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion.22 By way of exception, however, judicial review is permitted where the respondent in the
preliminary investigation clearly establishes that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of
discretion, that is, when the public prosecutor has exercised his discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.23 Moreover, the trial court may ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable
cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.24 Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to
the public prosecutors findings, the courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the
circumstances warrant, to determine whether the public prosecutors findings are supported by the
facts, and by the law.25
Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct the CAs determination that no prima
facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents involvement in the commission of
the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness of the actual killing of Chase; or that there was no
evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been
the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing. There was also nothing that directly incriminated the
respondents in the commission of either homicide or murder.
Admittedly, the petitioner relies solely on circumstantial evidence, which she insists to be enough to
warrant the indictment of respondents for murder.
We disagree.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty
thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were
probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were
innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 26Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such
as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.27
The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from
the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the

househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about seeing Chase board
the white Honda Civic at around 7:00 p.m. of February 27, 2007, and about Philip being the driver of
the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the
other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. To be sure,
some of the affidavits were unsworn.28 The statements subscribed and sworn to before the officers of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) having the authority to administer oaths upon matters
connected with the performance of their official duties undeniably lacked the requisite certifications
to the effect that such administering officers had personally examined the affiants, and that such
administering officers were satisfied that the affiants had voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.29
The lack of the requisite certifications from the affidavits of most of the other witnesses was in
violation of Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides thusly:
Section 3. Procedure. The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the address of the respondent and shall be accompanied by the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents to establish
probable cause. They shall be in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2)
copies for the official file. The affidavits shall be subscribed and sworn to before any prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public, each of who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
xxxx
The CA explained that the requirement for the certifications under the aforecited rule was designed
to avoid self-serving and unreliable evidence from being considered for purposes of the preliminary
investigation, the present rules for which do not require a confrontation between the parties and their
witnesses; hence, the certifications were mandatory, to wit:
In Oporto, Jr. vs. Monserate, it was held that the requirement set forth under Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is mandatory. This is so because the rules on preliminary
investigation does not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is
ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through submission
of affidavits and supporting documents, through the exchange of pleadings. Thus, it can be inferred
that the rationale for requiring the affidavits of witnesses to be sworn to before a competent officer so
as to ensure that the affidavits supporting the factual allegations in the Complaint have been sworn
before a competent officer and that the affiant has signed the same in the formers presence
declaring on oath the truth of the statement made considering that this becomes part of the bases in
finding probable guilt against the respondent. Well-settled is the rule that persons, such as an
employee, whose unsworn declarations in behalf of a party, or the employees employer in this case,
are not admissible in favor of the latter. Further, it has been held that unsworn statements or
declarations are self-serving and self-serving declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of
the facts asserted, whether they arose by implication from acts and conduct or were made orally or
reduced in writing. The vital objection to the admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay
character.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits accompanying the complaint shows that out
of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses, only nine (9)
thereof were sworn to before a competent officer. These were the affidavits of the following: (1) SG
Sarmiento; (2) SG Solis; (3) SG Fabe; (4) SG Marivic Rodriguez; (5) Jennylyn Buri; (6) Richard
Joshua Sulit; (7) Marites Navarro; (8) Pamela-Ann Que; and (9) Edbert Ylo, which were sworn to or
subscribed before a competent officer.
Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen in the company of
respondent Philip must be established by competent evidence required by the rules in preliminary
investigation. Here, it was allegedly Chases sister, Ariane, and their two household helpers, Marivic
Guray and Michelle Corpus, who saw respondent Philip pick up Chase at around 7:00 oclock in the
evening of February 27, 2007. Yet, such fact from which the inference is derived was not duly
proven. The statements of Marivic and Michelle both executed on February 28, 2007 were not sworn
to before the proper officer. Neither was the affidavit dated July 3, 2009 of Ariane Claridad duly
notarized nor is there any explanation why the same was belatedly executed.
It cannot thus be used to prove the circumstance that it was respondent Philip who drove the white
car parked in front of their house at around 7:00 oclock in the evening of February 27, 2007 and that
the factual allegation that the car used bore the Plate no. CRD-999. Further, since their affidavits
were not in the nature of a public document, it is incumbent upon the complainant to prove its due
execution and authenticity before the same is admitted in evidence. It is a well-settled rule that
private documents must be proved as to their due execution and authenticity before they may be
received in evidence.
Likewise, the circumstance that the victim sent a text message to his girlfriend Monet that he was on
his way to get the tires at around 7:09 oclock in the evening of February 27, 2007 is likewise
inadmissible in evidence because Monets affidavit was not sworn to before a competent officer.
There was also no evidence of the alleged text message pursuant to the law on admissibility of
electronic evidence. Besides, it cannot be inferred therefrom who the victim was with at that time and
where he was going to get the tires.
Neither can the handwritten unsworn statement dated February 28, 2007 of SG Rodolph delos
Reyes and handwritten sworn statement dated March 8, 2008 of SG Henry Solis be of any help in
claiming that the victim was in the company of respondent Philip when the latter entered the village
at around 7:26 oclock in the evening of February 27, 2007. Suffice it to state that their statements
only identified respondent Philip driving the white Honda Civic bearing Plate No. CRD-999. However,
both were unsure if they saw respondent Philip with a passenger because it was already dark and
the car was tinted.30
Also, the CA cited in its decision the further consequences of not complying with the aforequoted
rule, to wit:
It also follows that the succeeding pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by complainant are
not admissible for either being incompetent or hearsay evidence, to wit:
(a) that at around 7:45 p.m., respondent Teodora Alyn Esteban, on board a vehicle bearing
plate no. XPN-733 entered Ferndale Homes is inadmissible because it is not supported by
any sworn affidavit of a witness

(b) that at around the same time, two unidentified persons, a male and female were heard
talking inside Honda Civic bearing plate no. JTG-333 allegedly belonging to respondent
Philip, which was one of the vehicles parked at the carport of #10 Cedar Place, inside
Ferndale Homes is inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a
witness;
(c) that the Esteban family was temporarily using the carport of #10 Cedar Place as a
carpark for their vehicles at that time is inadmissible because it is not supported by any
sworn affidavit of a witness;
(d) that when the guards went to the house of the Esteban family, the same was unusually
dark and dim is inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(e) that while the crime scene was being processed, Mr. Esteban sought assistance from the
police and requested that they escort his son, respondent Philip Esteban, to St. Lukes
Medical Center, as the latter also allegedly suffered injuries is inadmissible because it is not
supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness;
(f) that during the investigation, Philip, Mrs. Teodora Alyn Esteban and their family refused to
talk and cooperate with the authorities and that they neither disclosed the extent of Philips
alleged injuries nor disclosed as to how or why he sustained them is inadmissible because it
is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness; and
(g) Mrs. Edith Flores, speaking for respondents family, reportedly communicated with the
family of the deceased on numerous occasions and offered to pay for the funeral expenses
is inadmissible because it is not supported by any sworn affidavit of a witness.
This now leaves this Court with the remaining pieces of circumstantial evidence supported by the
sworn statement dated March 6, 2007 of Marivic Rodriguez, handwritten sworn statement dated
March 8, 2007 of SG Abelardo Sarmiento, Jr. and handwritten sworn statement dated March 8, 2007
of SG Rene Fabe as follows:
(a) at around 7:30 p.m., Marivic Guray and Jennylyn Buri heard a commotion (loud cries
saying "Help! Help!) at No. 10, Cedar Place inside Ferndale Homes;
(b) at around 7:50 p.m., the body of the deceased was discovered lying in a pool of blood in
the carport of #10 Cedar Place;
(c) there was blood inside and outside the white Honda Civic bearing plate no. CRD-999;
(d) that at around 7:55 p.m., respondent Philip Estebans father, Lauro Esteban, who was
then outside the village, called the security guard at the entrance gate of the village to report
the incident through his mobile phone;
(e) that at around 9:09 p.m., Mr. Esteban entered the village and admitted that he was the
one who called for assistance regarding an incident that transpired at Cedar Place; and

(f) as per Autopsy Report, the cause of Chases death was a stab wound in the chest and
that the said wound was 9 centimeters deep, or around 3.6 inches and cut the descending
aorta of his heart.
The above pieces of circumstantial evidence, though duly supported by sworn statements of
witnesses, when taken as a whole, do not, however, lead to a finding of probable cause that
respondents committed the crime charged.
The factual allegations of the complaint merely show that at around 7:30 oclock in the evening of
February 27, 2007, Marivic Rodriguez heard a male voice, coming from the front of their employers
house, shouting "Help! Help!"; that at around 7:50 p.m., the body of the deceased was discovered
lying in a pool of blood in the carport of #10 Cedar Place; that there was blood inside and outside the
white Honda Civic bearing plate no. CRD-999; and, that as per Autopsy Report, the cause of
Chases death was a stab wound in the chest and that the said wound was 9 centimeters deep, or
around 3.6 inches and cut the descending aorta of his heart. However, all of these do not prove the
presence of respondents at the scene of the crime nor their participation therein.
We likewise agree with the DOJ Secretary that there was no motive on the part of the respondents to
kill the victim. This was supported by the sworn statement dated March 1, 2007 of Richard Joshua
Ulit; the sworn statement dated March 10, 2007 of Pamela-Ann Que; and, the sworn statement
dated March 10, 2007 of Egbert Ylo, who all knew the victim and respondent Philip and claimed that
the two were good friends and that they were not aware of any misunderstanding that occurred
between the concerned parties. Jurisprudence is replete that motive becomes of vital importance
when there is doubt as to the identity of the perpetrator.
1wphi1

In Preferred Home Specialties, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the Supreme Court held that
while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the
evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty,
the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or
groundless charges.31
It is clear from the foregoing disquisitions of the CA that the Secretary of Justice reasonably reached
the conclusion that the dismissal by the OCP of Quezon City of the complaint for murder had been
based on the lack of competent evidence to support a finding of probable cause against the
respondents. Accordingly, such finding of probable cause by the Executive Department, through the
Secretary of Justice, could not be undone by the CA, in the absence of a clear showing that the
Secretary of Justice had gravely abused his discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means that the
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.32 That showing was not made herein.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari, and AFFIRMS the decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 20, 2009.
The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178607

December 5, 2012

DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as President and representative of UNLAD SHIPPING &
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDWIN SORONGON (in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL, MARCELl
GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari[ 1] filed by Dante La. Jimenez (petitioner) to challenge
the twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals ( CA) dated November 23, 20062 and June 28, 20073 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 96584, which dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari and denied his motion
for reconsideration, respectively.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning
agency, while Socrates Antzoulatos, Carmen Alamil, Marceli Gaza, and Markos Avgoustis
(respondents) are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another
local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit4 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. 5 The
petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSIs articles of
incorporation6 to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA).
On October 9, 2003, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their joint counter-affidavit denying the
complaint-affidavits allegations.7 Respondents Avgoustis and Alamil did not submit any counteraffidavit.
In a May 4, 2004 resolution,8 the 3rd Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment against the respondents. The City
Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal information with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City (docketed as Criminal Case No. MC04-8514 and
raffled to Branch 212) presided by Judge Rizalina T. Capco-Umali.
Subsequently, in a December 14, 2004 resolution, the City Prosecutor reconsidered the May 4, 2004
resolution and filed a motion with the RTC to withdraw the information. 9 The petitioner and
respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed their opposition10 and comment to the opposition,
respectively.

In an August 1, 2005 resolution,11 the RTC denied the motion to withdraw information as it found the
existence of probable cause to hold the respondents for trial.12 Thus, the RTC ordered the issuance
of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On August 26, 2005, respondents Antzoulatos and Gaza filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration
and for deferred enforcement of the warrants of arrest.13 In a September 2, 2005 order,14 the RTC
denied the omnibus motion, reiterating that the trial court is the sole judge on whether a criminal
case should be dismissed or not.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable
cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.15
On September 29, 2005, the petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that
respondent Alamil, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any relief and that the RTC,
in the August 1, 2005 resolution, already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial. 16
In a September 30, 2005 order,17 the RTC denied respondent Alamils motion for being moot and
academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the August 1,
2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of Judge
Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.18 On October 25, 2005, the petitioner filed an opposition
with a motion to expunge, reiterating that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek relief from the
RTC.19
In a January 4, 2006 order,20 Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and did
not resolve respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration and the petitioners motion to expunge.
The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,21 the RTC granted respondent Alamils motion for reconsideration. It
treated respondent Alamils motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of
probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false
information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings
seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued
warrants of arrest.
On April 3, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration, stressing the existence of probable cause
to prosecute the respondents and that respondent Alamil had no standing to seek any relief from the
RTC.22
On April 26, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the motion for being a prohibited pleading
since the motion did not have the public prosecutors conformity.23
In its May 10, 2006 order,24 the RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration, finding that
the petitioner merely reiterated arguments in issues that had been finally decided. The RTC ordered

the motion expunged from the records since the motion did not have the public prosecutors
conformity.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal. 25
On May 30, 2006, respondent Alamil moved to expunge the petitioners notice of appeal since the
public prosecutor did not authorize the appeal and the petitioner had no civil interest in the case. 26
On June 27, 2006, the petitioner filed his comment to the motion to expunge, claiming that, as the
offended party, he has the right to appeal the RTC order dismissing the case; the respondents
fraudulent acts in forming TMSI greatly prejudiced him.27
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,28 the RTC denied the petitioners notice of appeal since the
petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent the
People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered the notice of
appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari assailing the RTCs March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,29 the CA dismissed outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for
lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. It noted that
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal personality to represent the People,
under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. It also held that
the petitioner was not the real party in interest to institute the case, him not being a victim of the
crime charged to the respondents, but a mere competitor in their recruitment business. The CA
denied30 the motion for reconsideration31 that followed.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that he has a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since
he is the private complainant and a real party in interest who had been directly damaged and
prejudiced by the respondents illegal acts; respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any
relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice.
The Case for the Respondents
The respondents32 submit that the petitioner lacks a legal standing to assail the dismissal of the
criminal case since the power to prosecute lies solely with the State, acting through a public
prosecutor; the petitioner acted independently and without the authority of a public prosecutor in the
prosecution and appeal of the case.
The Issue

The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing
outright the petitioners Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on
behalf of the People of the Philippines.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled
to the avails of the suit."33 Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the
decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. 34 By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. 35 When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a
real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.36
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." 37 In appeals
of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code.
This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the
following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People
in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed
in several cases38 and continues to be the controlling doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal
action on his own behalf39 (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance
does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since
the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of
probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an
offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the
respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as
represented by the OSG.40

Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTCs jurisdiction

As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. 41
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not
required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. 42
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated
November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175602

January 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The sufficiency of the allegations of the facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the
crime charged is crucial in every criminal prosecution because of the ever-present obligation of the
State to duly inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.
The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder on January 20, 2005 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. They were penalized with reclusion
perpetua for each count, and ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, andP50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification
that each accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus
costs of suit.1
The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused Edwin Valdez
filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming
Edwins appeal closed and terminated.2 Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez.
Antecedents

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with three
counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson,
alleging:
Criminal Case No. 00-90718
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
FERDINAND SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his
head, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said FERDINAND SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Criminal Case No. 00-90719
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him several times with a gun,
hitting him on his face and chest, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was
the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said
MOISES SAYSON, JR. Y DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 00-90720
That on or about the 1st day of March, 2000, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, qualified
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and employ personal violence upon the person of one
JOSELITO SAYSON Y DABOCOL by then and there shooting him with a gun, hitting him on his
back, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wound which was the direct and immediate
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO SAYSON Y
DABOCOL.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the States evidence of guilt as follows:
On March 1, 2000, at around 8:00 oclock in the evening, Estrella Sayson, (Estrella) was at the
canteen (which also includes a jai alai betting station) located at 77 Corregidor Street, Bago Bantay,
Quezon City. Estrella was preparing for the celebration of the birthday of her second husband,

Wilfredo Lladones, which was held later in the evening. Estrellas son, the deceased Moises Sayson,
a former policeman, and his wife, Susan Sayson (Susan) owned the said canteen and managed the
betting station. At about 9:00 oclock in the evening, Estrellas other sons Joselito Sayson (Joselito)
and Ferdinand Sayson (Ferdinand) arrived at the canteen to greet their stepfather. Estrellas family
and other visitors ate and enjoyed themselves at the party (pp. 3-5, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 36, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 31, 2001).
At about 10:00 oclock in the evening, the celebration was interrupted with the arrival of Eduardo and
Edwin, who alighted from a motorcycle in front of the jai alai fronton. Eduardo and Edwin asked
the jai alai teller, Jonathan Rubio (Jonathan), to come out. Jonathan was then attending to
customers who were buying jai alai tickets. Moises approached Eduardo and Edwin and tried to
reason with them. Estrella saw Eduardo and Edwin armed with guns. She tried to prevent Moises
from going near Edwin and Eduardo. Moises did not heed his mothers warning. He went out and
advised Eduardo and Edwin not to force Jonathan to go out of the fronton. Estrella then heard one of
the accused-appellants threaten Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin na kita?" Moises replied
"huwag." Successive shots were thereafter heard. Moises fell and was continuously fired upon even
after he was sprawled on the ground. Ferdinand immediately approached the scene to help his
brother Moises. Ferdinand, however was shot on the left temporal portion of his head and fell.
Somebody told Joselito to run away, but he was hit at the back while running. Joselito fell on a
burger machine (pp. 7-11, TSN, November 29, 2000; pp. 6-10, TSN, February 6, 2001; pp. 5-10,
TSN, July 31, 2001; pp. 2-6, September 5, 2001).
After shooting the Sayson brothers, Eduardo and Edwin escaped from the scene of the crime (p. 10,
TSN, February 6, 2001).6
In turn, the appellants brief filed by the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) rendered the version of the
accused, to wit:
xxx [A]t about 10:00 oclock in the evening, Heidi dela Cruz (a barbecue vendor) and Noel Valad-on
(a tricycle driver) saw accused Edwin Valdez alight from a bus. The latter bought P100.00 worth of
barbecue from Heidi then proceeded towards home. He was walking along Corregidor Street when
Heidi saw Jun Sayson (Moises), then holding a gun, block his (Edwins) way. Jun Sayson poked a
gun at accused Edwin, shouting, Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita. The latter raised both his hands
and said Wag kuya Jun, maawa ka.
Accused Eduardo Valdez (a policeman), then carrying his 6-year old child, was walking when his
way was likewise blocked but this time, by the siblings Joselito and Ferdinand as well as their
stepfather. Joselito twisted one of his (Eduardos) hands at his back while his (Joseltios) stepfather
held the other. Ferdinand fired a gun but accused Eduardo was able to evade. Joselito, who was
positioned behind Eduardo, was hit. He slumped and bled. He asked Heidi to inform his family that
he was hit. Heidi ran away. She saw Jun (Moises) and accused Edwin grappling. Thereafter, she
heard gunshots.
Accused Eduardo ducked during the firing. He pretended to be dead. Ferdinand stopped firing.
Accused Eduardos son approached him crying. Accused thereafter, brought his son home, took his
service firearm and on his way back to the scene of the incident when he met General Jesus
Almadin, his commanding officer (CO). He reported the incident and sought for advice. He was told
to take a rest and go back on (sic) the following day. He accompanied his CO to Camp Crame. He
surrendered his firearm to Sr./Insp. Rodolfo Araza of the CIU. Accused Edwin Valdez likewise

surrendered (TSN dated 05 February 2003; pp. 3-9; 12 March 2003, pp. 2-16; 11 August 2003, pp.
2-18, 1 September 2003, pp. 3-10; 15 October 2003, pp. 2-8; 03 December 2003, pp. 2-4; 18
February 2004, pp. 2-9; 24 March 2004, pp. 3-9; 10 April 2004, pp. 2-7; 07 June 2004, pp. 2-25). 7
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to
suffer reclusion perpetuafor each count of murder.8
On appeal, the CA affirmed the convictions.9
Issues
In this appeal, PO2 Valdez assails the credibility of the States witnesses by pointing to
inconsistencies and weaknesses in their testimonies; challenges the finding of conspiracy between
the accused; and contends that the State did not establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery.10
Ruling
The Court affirms the convictions, but holds PO2 Valdez guilty only of three counts of homicide due
to the failure of the informations to allege the facts and circumstances constituting treachery.
First of all, PO2 Valdez insists that the States witnesses (Susan Sayson, Marites Sayson and
Estrella Sayson) did not really see the events as they transpired; and that they wrongly identified the
two accused as the persons who had shot and killed the victims; and that the victims were
themselves the aggressors.
The CA rejected PO2 Valdezs insistence, holding thus:
In their Brief, the accused-appellants desperately attempted to discredit the testimonies of witnesses
Susan, Marites and Estrella. They claimed that a perusal of Estrellas testimony would cast doubt on
her statement that she actually witnessed the shooting incident. The accused-appellants claimed
that Estrella Sayson did not actually see who allegedly threatened her son Moises with the words
"Gusto mo unahin na kita?" The accused-appellants also claimed that Estrella also failed to see who
shot Moises. They likewise assailed the testimonies of Susan and Marites as being incredible. They
said that Susan testified that she was in a state of shock after the incident and that she could not
speak; yet she was still able to give her statement on the same day the incident allegedly happened.
The accused-appellants also said that Marites testified that she was only about five (5) meters away
from them (accused-appellants) when they alighted from their motorcycle; but that, "interestingly,"
she only learned from her husband Joselito that the accused-appellants were looking for a certain
Jonathan.
We are not persuaded. In her testimony, Estrella satisfactorily explained her purported failure to see
who between the accused-appellants threatened Moises with the words "Gusto mo unahin kita?"
and who shot her son Moises, by pointing out that she was then facing Moises because she was
preventing him from approaching the accused-appellants, who were armed with short firearms.
Estrella categorically stated that she saw the accused-appellants alight from their motorcycle on
March 1, 2000. She could not have been mistaken about the identity of the accused-appellants for
the simple reason that they are her neighbors and that their (the accused-appellants) father is her
"cumpadre." When the incident happened, the accused-appellants were about eight (8) to ten (10)
meters away from where she and her son Moises were standing. She also saw with her own

eyes how her son Moises fell after she heard successive bursts of gunshots (approximately [9]
shots) coming from where the accused-appellants were standing.11
Considering that the CA thereby affirmed the trial courts findings of fact, its calibration of the
testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight, as well as its conclusions, the
Court accords high respect, if not conclusive effect, to the CAs findings.12 The justification for this is
that trial court was in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses by virtue of its firsthand
observation of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses under grilling examination. The
only time when a reviewing court was not bound by the trial courts assessment of credibility arises
upon a showing of a fact or circumstance of weight and influence that was overlooked and, if
considered, could affect the outcome of the case.13 No such fact or circumstance has been brought
to the Courts attention.
It is not trite to remind that a truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free
testimony because of the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory; and that inaccuracies
noted in testimony may even suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been
rehearsed.14 To properly appreciate the worth of testimony, therefore, the courts do not resort to the
individual words or phrases alone but seek out the whole impression or effect of what has been said
and done.15
Secondly, PO2 Valdez argues that the three victims were themselves the aggressors who had
attacked to kill him and his brother. He narrated during the trial that he dodged the bullet fired from
the gun of Ferdinand (one of the victims), causing the bullet to fatally hit Joselito (another victim);
that he played dead to avoid being shot at again, and walked away with his terrified son only after
the way was clear for them to leave; and that he heard gunshots while Edwin and Jun (the third
victim) grappled for control of a gun, and assumed that the gunshots had hit and killed Jun and
Ferdinand.16
The argument of PO2 Valdez is bereft of factual merit.
It is fundamental that the question as to who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful
aggressor is a question of fact addressed to the trial court for determination based on the evidence
on record.17 The records show that the version of PO2 Valdez was contrary to the established facts
and circumstances showing that he and Edwin, then armed with short firearms, had gone to the jai
alai betting station of Moises to confront Jonathan Rubio, the teller of the betting booth then busily
attending to bettors inside the booth; that because the accused were calling to Rubio to come out of
the booth, Moises approached to pacify them, but one of them threatened Moises: Gusto mo unahin
na kita?; that immediately after Moises replied: Huwag!, PO2 Valdez fired several shots at Moises,
causing him to fall to the ground; that PO2 Valdez continued firing at the fallen Moises; that
Ferdinand (another victim) rushed to aid Moises, his brother, but Edwin shot Ferdinand in the head,
spilling his brains; that somebody shouted to Joselito (the third victim) to run; that Edwin also shot
Joselito twice in the back; and that Joselito fell on a burger machine. The shots fired at the three
victims were apparently fired from short distances.
The testimonial accounts of the States witnesses entirely jibed with the physical evidence.
Specifically, the medico-legal evidence showed that Ferdinand had a gunshot wound in the
head;18 that two gunshot wounds entered Joselitos back and the right side of his neck; 19 and that
Moises suffered a gunshot wound in the head and four gunshot wounds in the chest. 20 Also, Dr.
Wilfredo Tierra of the NBI Medico-Legal Office opined that the presence of marginal abrasions at the

points of entry indicated that the gunshot wounds were inflicted at close range. 21 Given that physical
evidence was of the highest order and spoke the truth more eloquently than all witnesses put
together,22 the congruence between the testimonial recollections and the physical evidence rendered
the findings adverse to PO2 Valdez and Edwin conclusive.
1avvphi1

Thirdly, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit the felony.23 Proof of the actual agreement to commit
the crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their acts. 24 Herein,
both lower courts deduced the conspiracy between the accused from the mode and manner in which
they perpetrated the killings. We are satisfied that their deduction was warranted.
Based on the foregoing, PO2 Valdez cannot now avoid criminal responsibility for the fatal shooting
by Edwin of Ferdinand and Joselito. Both accused were convincingly shown to have acted in concert
to achieve a common purpose of assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in
concert was manifest not only from their going together to the betting station on board a single
motorcycle, but also from their joint attack that PO2 Valdez commenced by firing successive shots at
Moises and immediately followed by Edwins shooting of Ferdinand and Joselito one after the other.
It was also significant that they fled together on board the same motorcycle as soon as they had
achieved their common purpose.
To be a conspirator, one did not have to participate in every detail of the execution; neither did he
have to know the exact part performed by his co-conspirator in the execution of the criminal
acts.25 Accordingly, the existence of the conspiracy between PO2 Valdez and Edwin was properly
inferred and proved through their acts that were indicative of their common purpose and community
of interest.26
And, fourthly, it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of
treachery.
Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any of the crimes
against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its execution, without risk to the offending
party arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 27 It encompasses a wide variety
of actions and attendant circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.
Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or qualifying is
also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety generates the actual need for
the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances or particular acts that constitute the criminal
conduct or that qualify or aggravate the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused
sufficient notice to defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the
complaint or information.28 In People v. Dimaano,29 the Court elaborated:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the

designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and
the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will
be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. [emphasis supplied]
The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with intent to kill, qualified with
treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault, attack and employ
personal violence upon" the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]" on
various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person by shooting him
with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially
ensured without risk to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of
the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could
serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment,
for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short,
the particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder
were missing from the informations.
To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must specify in the information the
details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement
of sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge
against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of
innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime of which he stands charged and for which he must be tried
thoroughly accords with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court
fittingly said in United States v. Lim San: 30
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. xxx. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things
else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit
a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive right, how the law
denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in
the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a
conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a
real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense he need not know the
name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial

rights. The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the
manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named murder." If he performed the acts
alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the
penalty therefor. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named. xxx. (emphasis supplied)
A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability is to prohibit the
introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that tends to establish that detail. The
allegations in the information are controlling in the ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance
between the offense charged in the information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense proved. 31 In
that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the information, constitute the latter; an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.32
We now fix the penalty for each count of homicide.
Pursuant to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal.33 There being no circumstances modifying criminal liability, the penalty is applied in its
medium period (i.e., 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Under
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from prision
mayor, and the maximum from the medium period of reclusion temporal. Hence, the Court imposes
the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum for each count of homicide.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 18, 2006 is MODIFIED by
finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE, and
sentencing him to suffer for each count the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and to pay to the respective heirs of the
late Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
The accused shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136916 December 14, 1999
FLEURDELIZ B. ORGANO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and the JAIL WARDEN OF MANILA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under Republic Act (RA) No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over accused public officials
only when they occupy positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher. Thus, RA 7080, insofar
as it provided that all prosecutions for plunder fell within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, was
impliedly repealed.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Habeas Corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, praying that this
Court direct the jail warden of Manila to produce the body of petitioner's mother, Lilia B. Organo, and
to set her at liberty without delay. Earlier, the accused had been detained, pursuant to a Warrant of
Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan 1 in connection with an Information 2 for plunder dated August 14,
1997 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 24100. Petitioner maintains that the Warrant was invalid,
because that court had no jurisdiction over her mother.
The Facts
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, are as follows:
In an Information filed before the Sandiganbayan on August 15, 1997, Dominga S.
Manalili, Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose DP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, Gil R. Erencio,
Reynaldo S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr. were charged with the violation of RA No.
7080 (Plunder) committed as follows:
That on or about 05 November 1996, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dominga S. Manalili,
Teofisto A. Sapitula, Joel DP. Marcelo, Lilia B. Organo, being then
public officers and taking advantage of their official positions as
employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Region 7, Quezon
City, and Gil R. Erencio, Reynaldo S. Enriquez and Luis S. Se, Jr.,
conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass and acquire
funds belonging to the National Government by opening an
unauthorized bank account with the Landbank of the Philippines,
West Triangle Branch, Diliman, Quezon City, for and in behalf of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and deposit therein money belonging to
the government of the Philippines, consisting of revenue tax
payments then withdraw therefrom the sum of Pesos: One Hundred
Ninety Three Million Five Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Seventy Nine
& 64/100 (P193,565,079.64) Philippine Currency, between
November, 1996 to February, 1997, without proper authority, through
checks made payable to themselves and/or the sole proprietorship
firms of the above-named private persons, thereby succeeding in
misappropriating, converting, misusing and/or malversing said public
funds tantamount to a raid on the public treasury, to their own
personal gains, advantages and benefits, to the damage and
prejudice of the government in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 24100, was raffled to the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
On August 20, 1997, Lilia B. Organo filed a Motion to Quash Information for lack of
jurisdiction and to defer the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Thereafter, with the creation of [the] 4th and 5th Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the
case was unloaded to the respondent court, 4th Division.
On September 29, 1997, respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the
accused in Criminal Case No. 24100.
On October 1, 1997, Organo filed an Urgent Motion to Recall and /or Quash Warrant
of Arrest Pending Resolution on the Issue of Lack of Jurisdiction and Other Incidents.
The motion was opposed by the prosecution.
In a Resolution dated November 20, 1997, respondent court denied Organo's
motion.
On December 9, 1997, Organo filed with the respondent court a Motion for
Reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution.
On April 28, 1998, respondent court denied Organo's Motion for Reconsideration
ruling as follows:
The Motion for Reconsideration dated December 9, 1997 filed by
accused Lilia Organo, through counsel, is hereby denied, there being
no valid and compelling reason to set aside our Resolution dated
November 28, 1997 denying her Motion to Quash Information for
Lack of Jurisdiction. Besides, accused movant is still a fugitive from
justice and continues to evade arrest so that jurisdiction over her
person has not yet been acquired by this Court.
Hence, movant Organo has no right to file with this Court her said
Motion to Quash which was denied, and subsequently her subject
Motion for Reconsideration.
Movant Organo should first surrender and place her person under the
jurisdiction of this Court before she may file any further pleading with
this Court.
With the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Organo filed before the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
against herein respondents People of the Philippines and the 4th Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner alleges in the main that respondent court has no
jurisdiction over a case of plunder if the officials or employees fall below salary grade
27 and that respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of

jurisdiction in failing to act on her motion to Quash before issuing a warrant of

arrest. . . . .
With the warrant of arrest issued by the respondent court, Organo was arrested and
detained by the National Bureau of Investigation in its detention cell. Thereafter, she
was transferred to the Manila City Jail. 3
The Issue
Petitioner submits this sole issue for the consideration of the Court:
Does the Respondent Court, the Honorable Sandiganbayan, have jurisdiction over a
case of plunder when none of the accused occupy Salary Grade "27" or higher as
provided under Republic Act No. 6758 . . . 4
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Sole Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 24100 and
to issue a warrant of arrest therein. True, Section 3 of Republic Act 7080, the law penalizing plunder,
states that "[u]ntil otherwise provided by law, all prosecutions under this Act shall be within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan." When the crime charged was allegedly committed,
however, already in effect were RA 7975 5and RA 8249, 6 which confined the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction to public officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Since not one of the accused occupies such
position, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 24100.
We agree. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over petitioner's mother and the other accused in
Criminal Case No. 24100 has been resolved by the Supreme Court in Lilia B. Organo v.
Sandiganbayan. 7 In that case, we ruled that "the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of
plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade
"27" or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in
relation to their office." The Court explained that "the crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080,
as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan "until otherwise provided by law." Republic Act No. 8249, enacted on February 5, 1997, is
the special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that prescribed in
Republic Act No. 7080." (Emphasis supplied)
The Office of the Solicitor General argues, however, that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
cases of plunder, regardless of the public official's salary grade. Arguing that a special law will prevail
over a statute or law of general application, it maintains that RA 8249 provides for the general
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, while RA 7080 is a special law which deals with the crime of
plunder.

Furthermore, it avers that a "close perusal of RA 8249 would show that the legislature did not intend
to repeal or alter the provisions of RA 7080 as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
cases of plunder. In fact, Section 4 (a) shows the instances wherein the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is limited to those where the accused public official occupies a Salary Grade of "27"
or above only involves "Violations of RA 3019", as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code. Subsection (a) does not mention cases involving violations of RA 7080.
Necessarily, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases relating to plunder is not subject to the
limitations under Section 4 of RA 8249. Had the legislature intended to modify the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving plunder, it would not have left out "cases involving violations of
RA 7080" from the enumeration in Subsection (a) Section 4, RA 8249." 8
The argument is incorrect. Section 4 of RA 8249 is reproduced in full as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
It is true that a violation of RA 7080 penalizing plunder is not mentioned in Section 4 (a) of RA 8249.
However, the crime falls squarely under Section 4 (b), which we again quote below:
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.
Plunder is clearly a crime committed by public officials in relation to their office. Hence, there is no
doubt that this crime is covered by Section 4 (b). Clearly, RA 7080 was impliedly repealed by RA
8249, such that prosecutions for plunder are cognizable by the Sandiganbayan only when the
accused is a public official with Salary Grade 27 or higher.
Explaining the effect of RA 8249, the Court in People v. Magallanes 9 has categorically ruled that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over public officials only if their positions fall under Salary Grade 27 or
higher.
As a consequence of these amendments, the Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive
original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended; R.A.
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. It retains
only cases where the accused are those enumerated in subsection a, Section 4
above and, generally, national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6758).
Moreover, its jurisdiction over other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office is no longer determined by the prescribed

penalty, viz., that which is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
years or a fine of P6,000.00; it is enough that they are committed by those public
officials and employees enumerated in subsection a, Section 4 above. However, it
retains its exclusive original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to
or in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A.
Moreover, the Court in Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan 10 has explained that the intent of Congress in RA
8249 was to make Salary Grade 27 the demarcation line determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and other courts.
The apparent intendment of these amendments is to ease the dockets of the
Sandiganbayan and to allow the Anti-Graft Court to focus its efforts on the trial of
those occupying higher positions in government, the proverbial "big fish." Section 4,
as amended, freed the Sandiganbayan from the task of trying cases involving lowerraking government officials, imposing such duty upon the regular courts instead. The
present structure is also intended to benefit these officials of lower rank, especially
those residing outside Metro Manila, charged with crimes related to their office, who
can ill-afford the expenses of a trial in Metro Manila. As the Explanatory Note of
House Bill No. 9825 states:
One is given the impression that only lowly government workers or
the so-called "small fry" are expediently tried and convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. The reason for this is that at present, the
Sandiganbayan has the exclusive and original jurisdiction over graft
cases committed by all officials and employees of the government,
irrespective of rank and position, from the lowest-paid janitor to the
highly-placed government official. This jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan must be modified in such a way that only those
occupying high positions in the government and the military (the big
fishes) may fall under its exclusive and original jurisdiction. In this
way, the Sandiganbayan can devote its time to big time cases
involving the "big fishes" in the government. The regular courts will be
vested with the jurisdiction of cases involving less-ranking officials
(those occupying positions corresponding to salary grade twentyseven (27) and below and PNP members with a rank lower than
Senior Superintendent. This set-up will prove more convenient to
people in the provinces. They will no longer have to travel to Manila
to file their complaint or to defend themselves. They can already file
their complaint or their defense before the Regional Trial Court or the
Municipal Trial Court in their respective localities, as the case may be.
To distinguish the "big fish" from the "small fry," Congress deemed the 27th Grade as
the demarcation between those who should come under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and those within the regular courts.
Epilogue
Desperate people sometimes resort to desperate methods. In the present case, desperation may
have impelled this original action because petitioner was frantic to free her mother from detention.

While we understand her plight, we must call attention to the folly of her act. Inasmuch as a Petition
for Certiorari (GR No. 133535) raising the same issue had already been submitted by her mother
before the Court at the time, the present Petition forHabeas Corpus should not have been filed at all.
A motion in GR No. 133535 asking for Mrs. Organo's release would have accomplished the same
result even more expeditiously and would have avoided the double vexation on this Court's time and
attention. While the elements of forum shopping may not be present because the herein petitioner
was not a party in GR No. 133535, still we must express our displeasure at the attempt to vex this
Court twice for the same relief. Hence, though granted relief, petitioner is assessed costs.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the Manila jail warden is ORDERED to immediately
release Lilia B. Organo from custody, unless a valid information has been filed in the proper court
and a warrant for her arrest properly issued. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 147706-07

February 16, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and EFREN L. ALAS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation
Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act? The petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), takes the
affirmative position in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Respondent
Efren L. Alas contends otherwise, together with the respondent court.
Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman, two separate
informations1for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999 against Efren L. Alas. The
charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts entered into by Alas, in his
capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB),
with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the
government.
On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction, which
motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments of both
parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its officers,
particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. According to the
Sandiganbayan:
After a careful consideration of the arguments of the accused-movant as well as of that of the
prosecution, we are of the considered opinion that the instant motion of the accused is well taken.

Indeed, it is the basic thrust of Republic Act as well as (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1606 as
amended by President Decree No. 1486 and Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No. 8249 that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private persons are charged with
them in the commission of the offenses.
The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the Philippine
Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by a special
law. It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code which is Batas Pambansa Blg.
68. It was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC No. AS094-005593
on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of fifty (50) years. Under its Articles of Incorporation the purpose for
which said entity is formed was primarily for business, xxx
Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposes of the corporation points to the conclusion
that it exists for business. Obviously, it is not involved in the performance of a particular function in
the exercise of government power. Thus, its officers and employees are not covered by the GSIS
and are under the SSS law, and actions for reinstatement and backwages are not within the
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but by the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC).
l^vvphi1.net

The Supreme Court, in the case of Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. National
Housing Corp., 173 SCRA 33, held that the Civil Service now covers only government owned or
controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, those created by an act of Congress or by
special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general legislation. The Highest
Court categorically ruled that the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled
corporation which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporation
under the general corporation law.
In Philippine National Oil Company Energy Development Corporation vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA 26,
the Supreme Court emphasized that:
The test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the Civil
Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporation created by special
charter are subject to its provision while those incorporated under the general corporation law are
not within its coverage.
Likewise in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission, 201 SCRA 601 it was held that
"by government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter we mean government-owned
or controlled corporation created by a special law and not under the Corporation Code of the
Philippines" while in Llenes vs. Dicdican, et al., 260 SCRA 207, a public officer has been ruled, as a
person whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the performance of the function of
government.
Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the accused herein
cannot be considered a public officer. Thus, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over his act. 2
Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this
petition3 arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or controlled corporation as
the term was defined under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987. 4 Likewise, in further
defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to the manner

of creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers to fall under its
jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating Officer of the PPSB at the time of
commission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
1awphi1.nt

Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001, respondent Alas, on the
other hand, practically reiterated the pronouncements made by the respondent court in support of
his conclusion that the PPSB was not created by special law, hence, its officers did not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.5
We find merit in the petition.
Section 2(13) of EO 2926 defines government-owned or controlled corporations as follows:
Sec. 2. General Terms Defined Unless the specific words of the text or the context as a whole or a
particular statute, shall require a different meaning:
xxx xxx xxx
(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or nonstock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary
in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly or through its instrumentalities either
wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the extent of at least 51% of its
capital stock: provided, that government owned or controlled corporations maybe further categorized
by the department of the budget, the civil service commission and the commission on audit for the
purpose of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and responsibilities with
respect to such corporations.
From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled corporation, and
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal
Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the
government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves officers of
PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354, otherwise
known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, "to encourage and promote
the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public, especially the youth and the
marginalized sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal service by "receiving collections
and making payments, including postal money orders."7
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters whenever charges
of graft and corruption are involved. However, a question arises whether the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the same officers in government-owned or controlled corporations organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code in view of the delimitation provided for in Article IX-B
Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of
the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and distinct
from the Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by Article XI, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution which provides that "the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law." This
provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as defined under Article XIII,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation, thus:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which
shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offense committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. (Italics ours)
On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987 Constitution, enacted
RA 79758maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations without any distinction whatsoever.
Thereafter, on February 5, 1997, Congress enacted RA 82499 which preserved the subject provision:
Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense,
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director, and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics ours)
The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations" within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has
consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of their creation.
The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include the
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it been otherwise, it
could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Corollarily, Article XI Section 12 of
the 1987 Constitution, on the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the governments prosecutory arm
against persons charged with graft and corruption), includes officers and employees of governmentowned or controlled corporations, likewise without any distinction.
1awphi1.nt

In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,10 this Court, already mindful of the pertinent provisions of the 1987
Constitution, ruled that the concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether created by special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of Government, which is to eradicate, or at the
very least minimize, the graft and corruption that has permeated the fabric of the public service like a
malignant social cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section 1 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act embodies this policy of the government, that is, to repress certain acts not only
of public officers but also of private persons constituting graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.
The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its usefulness. On the contrary, it has become even
more relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and corruption that erode the peoples faith in
government. For indeed, a government-owned or controlled corporation can conceivably create as
many subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code as it might wish, use public funds,
disclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities and responsibilities provided by law. By
including the concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations organized and
incorporated under the Corporation Code within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislature
evidently seeks to avoid just that.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed resolution
dated February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 124391

July 5, 2000

PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELMER YPARRAGUIRE y SEPE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
After his indictment1 and trial, accused-appellant appeals from his conviction for the crime of rape of
a mental retardate. 2 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, rape is a crime
against person which may be prosecuted de oficio. However, considering that the alleged rape was
committed in 1994, which was prior to the effectivity of R.A. 8353, we apply the old law and treat
rape as a private crime.
The facts as narrated by the trial court are:
"On March 24, 1994, at about 11:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant Charmelita D. Ruina,
an invalid and mentally retarded, was on her bed at the store of her mother at the Public Market at
Carrascal, Surigao del Sur, where she and her mother lived, accused Elmer Yparraguirre alias "Lalo"
entered her room, the door of which was not locked because her mother went to the store of her
elder sister. Upon getting inside, he undressed himself and approached the Complainant who was

apparently awake. He caressed her and sucked her breasts. She shouted for help but nobody came
to rescue her, perhaps because it was late already in the evening and her voice was not loud
enough to be heard at the distance as, in fact, it could be heard at only about three to five meters
away x x x. Accused told her to keep quiet and when she put up some limpy resistance, he boxed
her. He then removed her panty went on top of her and inserted his manhood into her most private
part. She felt pain. After raping her, he left her room. Soon her mother, Sanselas Leongas Ruina,
arrived. She reported to her the incident. The following morning, accused went back to the store and
apologized for what he did and promised not to do it again. But his plea would not mollify Sanselas.
She took the complainant to the Madrid (Surigao del Sur) District Hospital for physical examination.
Dr. Carlo P. Altrecha recorded the following findings in the Medical Certificate that he issued on
March 26, 1994:
POLIO MYELITIS-MENTALLY RETARDED
PPE:
n ABRASION, AT THE LEVEL OF THE MID-CLAVICULAR AREA, BOTH, LEFT AND
RIGHT.
n CONTUSION, BOTH BREAST, LEFT AND RIGHT.
n CONTUSION, AT THE LEVEL OF THE 8TH THORACIC RIB, ME-AXILLARY LINE,
RIGHT.
GENITALIA:
n LABIA MAJORA: NO CONGESTION, NO HEMATOMA.
n LABIA MINORA: CONGESTED, SLIGHT SWOLLEN.
n VAGINAL ORIPICE: CONGESTED, SLIGHT SWOLLEN HYMEN NOT INTACT.
n VAGINAL SMEAR FOR THE PRESENCE OF SPERMATOZOA: NO
SPERMATOZOA SEEN."3
Appellant did not testify in court but instead relied on the lone testimony of his father, who alleged
that the complaint for rape was filed as a result of a "misunderstanding" between appellant and the
mother of the victim.
In this appeal, the basic issue raised by appellant is that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction
over the case because the complaint was signed and filed by the chief of police and not by the
complainant.
Appellants contention has no merit. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides in part:
"The offense of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may
be. In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and
has no known parents, grandparents or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her
behalf.

The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the above
offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or
incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a
minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents, or guardian may file the same. The right
to file the action granted to the parents, grandparents or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in the
immediately preceding paragraph."
Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, the offended party can initiate a prosecution for rape even if
she is a minor, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her
minority. Although the victim in this case is no longer a minor, it is undisputed that she is a mental
retardate and suffering from physical deformity. No woman would come out in the open, inform the
authorities of the injustice done to her, make a statement of what had happened unless her purpose
is to redress the wrong done against her honor. Once the violation of the law becomes known
through a direct original participation initiated by the victim, the requirements of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), to the effect that the offense of rape "shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents," are satisfied. Said provision is not
determinative of the jurisdiction of courts over the private offenses because the same is governed by
the Judiciary law, not the Revised Penal Code which deals with the definition of felonies and their
punishment. Stated differently, the complaint required in Article 344 is but a condition precedent to
the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. Such condition
was imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. 4 The complaint simply
starts the prosecutory proceeding but does not confer jurisdiction on the court to try the
case5 because the overriding consideration in determining whether the condition precedent in Article
344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront
committed.6
Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefitting the accused. When it is said that
the requirement in Article 344 (that there should be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives)
is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is
not the complaint which confers jurisdiction in the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law.7
Going now to the merits of the case, the gravamen of the crime of rape is the sexual congress of a
woman by force and without consent.8 These elements have been proven beyond reasonable doubt
to concur in this case. The evidence shows that appellant boxed the victim in the neck and slapped
her on the face while she was alone and lying in bed on that fateful night. When she shouted for
help, appellant told her to keep quiet. Appellant then began sucking her breasts and her vagina.
Then he removed her panty and forcibly had sexual intercourse with the mentally retarded victim
causing pain in her private part. Her testimony in the oral deposition confirms the statements she
made in the vernacular in her affidavit earlier executed. Thus,
P Unsa may imong guibuhat paghikita nimo niadtong tawo nga miduol kanimo.
T Misinggit ako.
P Unsay guibuhat niadtong tawo sa imong pagsinggit?

T Iyang guitampa ang akong baba, dayon mipatong siya kanako.

P Unsay sunod nga guibuhat niadtong tawo sa dihang mipatong na siya kanimo?
T Iyang guidun-an ang akong tiyan, apan kay mikisikisi man ako iyang guisumbag ang
akong kilid dayon guihubo ang akong baro ug guisunod usab dayon ang akong pante.
P Unsay sunod nga guibuhat niadtong tawo kanimo sa tapos niya paghubo sa imong baro
ug imong pante?
T Iya akong gui-iyot senyor.
P Unsay imong guibuhat sa dihang guiiyot sa tawo?
T Misinggit ako senyor apan guipagngan ang akong baba busa mikisikisi ako apan
guisumbag na usab ug maoy nakapalipong kanako.9 (Italics supplied).
The victims narrations are corroborated by the medical findings of the physician who examined her
and found that her labia minora was "congested, slight swollen", and her hymen no longer intact.
She also suffered abrasions and contusions on both breasts and near her right armpit, which may
have been caused by the blows.
In rape, it is not essential that the force employed in accomplishing the crime be so great or of such
character or could not be resisted.10 Force in rape is relative, depending on the age, size and
strength of the parties. In the same manner, intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victims
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast
rule.11 The victim was a mental retardate and suffering from physical disability when appellant
employed force by boxing and slapping her. And when she shouted for help he intimidated her to
keep her quiet. The fact that the victim did not offer a tenacious resistance is immaterial considering
her physical nature she is an invalid and unable to rise from the bed unassisted. Physical
resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the
latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists advances because of fear for her life and
personal safety.12 Although the victim shouted for help, her voice could be heard only as far as three
to five meters away.13 This negates the contention of the father of appellant that the rape could not
have been committed because the locus criminis of the crime was only about fifteen meters away
from the passengers terminal where there were people passing. In any case, it has been
consistently ruled that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks
along the roadsides, in a house where there are other occupants, 14 in the same room where other
members of the family are sleeping,15 and even in places which to many would appear unlikely and
high risk venues for its commission.16 For rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the place to
be ideal, or the weather to be fine for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they carry out
their evil deed.17
1wphi1

On the alleged misunderstanding that appellant had with the victims mother which allegedly
prompted the mother to file the rape case against him, suffice it to say that no mother would expose
her own daughter to embarrassment and humiliation as well as to the trouble, inconvenience,
ridicule and scandal concomitant with a public trial if such was not the truth and had not her intention
been to bring the culprit to the folds of justice. No mother, virtuous or not, will voluntarily and without
compelling reasons put her own daughter to shame and humiliation18 if she were not motivated by an

honest desire to have her daughters transgressor punished accordingly.19 Besides, it is unnatural for
a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to
embarrassment.20
In an apparent attempt to free himself from liability, appellant on the very same night after the
assault, asked forgiveness from the victims mother and promised that the same will never be
repeated. Yet, no mother can just let pass an indignity committed against one of her own blood. It is
easy to forgive, but justice for her would be no less than punishment. Moreover, a plea for
forgiveness may be considered analogous to an attempt to compromise, which offer of compromise
by the appellant may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt pursuant to Section
27, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.21
With respect to the monetary awards, the P50,000.00 "damages" granted by the trial court should be
properly denominated as moral damages, which is allowed even if there was no proof during the trial
as basis therefor.22The mental and physical suffering of the victims injury is inherently concomitant
with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime which per se warrants the award of moral
damages.23 In addition thereto, the complainant is also entitled to a civil indemnity of
P50,000.0024 which is outrightly awarded to rape victims being in the category of actual or
compensatory damages25 and because the rape herein is not effectively qualified by any
circumstance under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law.26
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape is AFFIRMED. Further, appellant is ORDERED TO PAY the complainant
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity in ADDITION to the fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) moral damages.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila;
and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to
be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to
lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started

auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only
child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had
been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still
pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of
the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally
and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage
was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and
with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los
Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a
resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William
Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the
respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",
docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the
same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of
Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned
and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both
cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner
moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal
Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which

motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also
directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a
plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being
considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of
not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the
criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez
acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a
resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the
petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is
a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the
court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is
just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who
can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of
the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended
party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate
the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such
amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the
offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in
fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as
of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, through
the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.
However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the
present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his
power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by
petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity
to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the commencement
thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to
do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as
to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the
complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by
the former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with
ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the
right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent
spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to
entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this

provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must
be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such
nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse,
and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United
States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a
trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered
to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his
pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of
divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.
When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no
longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one
of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be
no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the
other.

The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of a
married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled to
have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage
is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the
beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg
to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision
in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination of
the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would
necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid
foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer
the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein
had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency
but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to
the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:

It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American
law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of
the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities
would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what
he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law,
it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August
3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.

Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce as
valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of his
obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party in case
his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he already
implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less
than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same
privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the absolute
divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in the Philippines
on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law, namely, American
law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of
the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities
would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of theNational law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in what

he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man who is no
longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the opposite
expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be
valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to
comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband would be
injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid under her national law,
it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family Code (which took effect on August
3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both with respect to the American husband and the
Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that the
husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the divorce
insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
G.R. No. L-47437 September 29, 1983
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAMELO MARIANO y OBUSAN, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pedro A. Venida for accused-appellant.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, finding Gamelo Mariano
y Obusan guilty of the crime of rape committed upon a woman of unsound and feeble mind, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to indemnify the offended party in the
amount of P 12.000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.
Socorro Soria, a demented woman of 24 years, had been confined as a mental patient at the
National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong, Manila, since February 26, 1971 up to May 3, 1974 when
she was transferred to the Don Susano J. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital in Pili, Camarines Sur for
further treatment. On May 26, 1975, her parents brought her home to Burabod Daet, Camarines
Norte, to be treated by the appellant, known in the locality as a faith healer or "spiritista"
In the afternoon of September 25, 1976, appellant went to the residence of the Sorias to treat
Socorro. After securing some "salompas" from Mrs. Maria Soria, mother of Socorro, he entered the
room of his patient, and locked the door.
Shortly after, Mrs. Soria, who was attending to her customers at the rice mill adjacent to her house,
was informed by her daughter-in-law Elizabeth Albino Soria, that the door of Socorro's room was
locked. Mrs. Soria proceeded to the room and when she noted that the door was indeed locked from
inside, she and Elizabeth peeped through a small aperture and saw the appellant on top of Socorro

in the act of sexual intercourse. Appellant had his pants off, while Socorro was naked from the waist
down. Mrs. Soria immediately clambered to the top shelf of the cabinet which served as the dividing
wall between Socorro's room and the sala, and stretching herself across the top of the cabinet, she
reached out and grabbed the appellant's hair. [This was demonstrated by Mrs. Soria during the
ocular inspection conducted at the scene of the incident]. Jolted by the sudden intrusion appellant
stood up, with his penis still erect. He hastily put on his clothes, opened the door of the room, and
attempted to run, but his path was blocked by Elizabeth. When Mrs. Soria confronted him, appellant
expressed his willingness to be Socorro's husband and promise to construct an annex to his house
where he would keep Socorro as his wife.
Socorro was forthwith brought to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital, where she was examined
by Dra. Amelia Paguirigan. The latter's findings are as follows:
Abrasions, over both lower part of mucosa of labia majora.
Hymenal tear, 6 o'clock, 2 o'clock and 9 o'clock position.
Vaginal intritus admits 1 finger loosely.
Vaginal smear and emusion for sperm cells negative
In his defense, appellant denied having had any sexual intercourse with Socorro at any time since
he began treating her sometime in July 1976. He declared that one week before September 25,
1976, he informed Mrs. Soria that her daughter's mental illness was beyond his capacity to cure; that
he recommended that Socorro be referred to another faith healer from San Pablo; that despite his
recommendation, Mrs. Soria on September 25, 1976 had him fetched by her nephew to continue
with the treatment of Socorro; that because of Mrs. Soria's call, he went to the Soria's residence, but
he entered Socorro's room only after he had asked the permission of her mother; and that after
performing the necessary treatment, he immediately proceeded home.
On September 27, 1976, a verified complaint for rape, signed by Mrs. Maria Soria, was filed against
appellant before the Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte. On the basis thereof, an information
was filed before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte.
We sustain the trial court's conclusion that "the evidence regarding the commission of the offense by
the appellant is overwhelming." No less than the victim's mother testified that she had caught
appellant having carnal intercourse with Socorro. Indeed, Mrs. Soria could not have given false
testimony and thus expose her daughter to public ridicule and disgrace, if she was not motivated by
her maternal desire to vindicate her daughter's honor.
The positive declaration of Mrs. Soria that her daughter was sexually abused by appellant finds
corroboration in the testimony, of the examining physician, Dr. Paguirigan, who found "hymenal tears
at 6 o'clock, 2 o'clock and 9 o'clock positions." These lacerations of the hymen constitute indubitable
proof of penetration of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum 1
That Socorro was a demented woman is not disputed by appellant, as the latter even admitted that
Socorro's mental illness was beyond his capability to cure. Moreover, Dra. Amelia Paguirigan
described the victim as a "known psychotic, violent type and resisting examination, talking nonsense,

while Dr. Edgardo Bengzon of the National Mental Hospital diagnosed her ailment as "schizophrenia
chronic." [Exhibit B
It is settled in this jurisdiction that an accused who has carnal knowledge with a mentally retarded or
demented woman is guilty of rape 2 the reason being that she is incapable of giving rational consent to
the sexual intercourse. 3
Appellant further argues that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because the
victim's mother had no right or authority to file a complaint for rape inasmuch as the father was still
living. He invokes the following provisions of Rule 1 10 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions.
xxx xxx xxx
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasPiviousness shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint Med by the offended party, or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the abovenamed persons, as the case may be.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to institute the
prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other
than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint,
her parents, grandparents or guardians, may file the same. The right to file the action
granted to the parents, grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order herein provided." [See third
paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code].
While we agree with the appellant's contention that the trial court does not acquire jurisdiction if the
complaint charging an accused with any of the aforesaid private crimes is not filed by one of the
persons indicated in said section there is nothing in the context thereof to support the view that the
mother cannot present the complaint if the father is still living In People vs. Dela Cruz 4, this Court
resolved the same legal question in this wise:
Appellant's contention is . . . based on a dubious technicality. If sustained, it might
defeat the ends of justice. It is not sanctioned by section 4 of Rule 110 nor by article
344 of the Revised Penal Code whose provisions do not categorically specify that the
father has the preferential right to file the complaint for seduction, abduction, rape or
abusos deshonestos It is noteworthy that 'the father and mother jointly exercise
parental authority over their legitimate children who are not emancipated'. It is their
duty to represent their emancipated children 'in all actions which may redound to
their benefit' [Arts. 311 and 316, Civil Code]. "
xxx xxx xxx
Under the circumstances the complaint filed by ther was a sufficient complhmee with
article 344 and section 4 of Rule 110. It conferred jiwiction on the court to try the Mae
[People vs. Pastores, L-29800, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 498, 508; People vs.

Bangalao 94 Phil. 354; U.S. vs. Gariboso 25 Phil. 171]. The father's passivity should
not preclude the mother from securing redress for the outrage committed against her
daughter.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed, with costs against appellant Gamelo Obusan.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148965

February 26, 2002

JOSE "JINGGOY" E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN,respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
A law may not be constitutionally infirm but its application to a particular party may be
unconstitutional. This is the submission of the petitioner who invokes the equal protection clause of
the Constitution in his bid to be excluded from the charge of plunder filed against him by the
respondent Ombudsman.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former
President and members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution 1 finding probable cause
warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former
President and the other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder
under Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy"
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558,
the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the
accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed.
On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash or Suspend" the Amended Information on the
ground that the Anti-Plunder Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than
one offense. Respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and his co-accused.
On its basis, petitioner and his co-accused were placed in custody of the law.

On April 30, 2001, petitioner filed a "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion" 2 alleging that: (1) no probable
cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was only
allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a "series or combination of overt or criminal acts" as
required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. Petitioner prayed that he
be excluded from the Amended Information and be discharged from custody. In the alternative,
petitioner also prayed that he be allowed to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court. 3
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas Motion To Fix
Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the
Facts Charged In The Information Do Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him."4
On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a "Motion to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To Direct
Ombudsman To Explain Why He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending
Incidents."5
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners "Motion to
Quash and Suspend" and "Very Urgent Omnibus Motion." 6 Petitioners alternative prayer to post bail
was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The court held:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES for lack of merit the following: (1)
MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND dated April 24, 2001 filed by accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada;
(2) MOTION TO QUASH dated June 7, 2001 filed by accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada; and (3)
MOTION TO QUASH (Re: Amended Information dated 18 April 2001) dated June 26, 2001 filed by
accused Edward S. Serapio.
Considering the denial of the MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND of accused Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, his VERY URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION, praying that he be: (1) dropped from the
information for plunder for want of probable cause and (2) discharged from custody immediately
which is based on the same grounds mentioned in this MOTION TO QUASH AND SUSPEND is
hereby DENIED. Let his alternative prayer in said OMNIBUS MOTION that he be allowed to post bail
be SET for hearing together with the petition for bail of accused Edward S. Serapio scheduled for
July 10, 2001, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon after the arraignment of all the accused." 7
The following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Resolution. Respondent
court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea
prompting respondent court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him. 8
Hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:
"1) not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to
petitioner, and denying him the equal protection of the laws;
2) not holding that the Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards;
3) sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses, and with alleged
conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely connected - contrary to the
dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due
process;

4) not fixing bail for petitioner for alleged involvement in jueteng in one count of the
information which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment totally in defiance of the
principle of proportionality."9
We shall resolve the arguments of petitioner in seriatim.
I.
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him and
denies him the equal protection of the laws.10
The contention deserves our scant attention. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080, the Anti-Plunder
Law, has been settled in the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.11 We take off from the Amended
Information which charged petitioner, together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio, Charlie "Atong" Ang, Yolanda T. Ricaforte and others, with the crime of plunder as follows:
"AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB Office of the Ombudsman,
hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada a.k.a.
"ASIONG SALONGA" AND a.k.a "JOSE VELARDE", together with Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE
a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080,
as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PUBLIC
OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACYwith his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS
OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount OR TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more
or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND
TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR
SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY
IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS
(P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accusedCHARLIE ATONG ANG, Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AN (sic)JOHN DOES AND

JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL

GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS [P130,000,000.00], more or less,
representing a portion of theTWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000] tobacco
excise tax share allocated for the Province of Ilocor Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie Atong Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane
Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT,
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000
SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System
(SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED
TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00], RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY
EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS [P1,847,578,057.50];
AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P189,700,000.00], MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE
ACCOUNT NAME "JOSE VELARDE";
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR
LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME "JOSE VELARDE" AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila for Quezon City, Philippines, 18 April 2001"12
Petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7080 is unconstitutional as applied to him is principally perched
on the premise that the Amended Information charged him with only one act or one offense which
cannot constitute plunder. He then assails the denial of his right to bail.
Petitioners premise is patently false. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show
that it is divided into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E.

Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong"
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the second paragraph spells out in general
terms how the accused conspired in committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four subparagraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder
pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused who committed
each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Informationwhich is of "receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in
the aggregate amount ofP545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x." In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy
with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving or collecting money from illegal
gambling amounting to P545 million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he
received or collected money from illegal gambling "on several instances." The phrase "on several
instances" means the petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that the
Amended Information charged the petitioner with the commission of only one act or offense despite
the phrase "several instances" is to indulge in a twisted, nay, "pretzel" interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words "combination" or "series" as they
appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,13 we held that where these two terms
are to be taken in their popular, not technical, meaning, the word "series" is synonymous with the
clause "on several instances." "Series" refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the
items in Section 1 (d) of the law. The word "combination" contemplates the commission of at least
any two different predicate acts in any of said items.Plainly, sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information charges petitioner with plunder committed by a series of the same predicate act
under Section 1 (d) (2) of the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of April 4, 2001 finding
probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the other accused, he was alleged to have
received only the sum of P2 million, which amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required
under R.A. No. 7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the
Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-accused, which in
pertinent part reads:
"x x x

xxx

xxx

Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila, appears to have
also surreptitious collection of protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned
from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor Estrada, on at least two
occasions, turned over to a certain Emma Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng
haul totalling P2 million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in February, 2000.
An alleged "listahan" of jueteng recipients listed him as one "Jingle Bell," as affirmed by Singson
[TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17 Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI]." 14
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made the finding that P2
million was delivered to petitioner as "jueteng haul" on "at least two occasions." The P2 million is,
therefore, not the entire sum with which petitioner is specifically charged. This is further confirmed
by the conclusion of the Ombudsman that:

"x x x

xxx

xxx

It is clear that Joseph Ejercito Estrada, in confabulation with Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Atty. Edward
Serapio and Yolanda Ricaforte, demanded and received, as bribe money, the aggregate sum of
P545 million from jueteng collections of the operators thereof, channeled thru Gov. Luis Chavit
Singson, in exchange for protection from arrest or interference by law enforcers; x x x." 15
To be sure, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to argue that the Ombudsman failed to establish
any probable cause against him for plunder. The respondent Sandiganbayan itself has found
probable cause against the petitioner for which reason it issued a warrant of arrest against him.
Petitioner then underwent arraignment and is now on trial. The time to assail the finding of probable
cause by the Ombudsman has long passed. The issue cannot be resurrected in this petition.
II.
Next, petitioner contends that "the plunder law does not provide sufficient and complete standards to
guide the courts in dealing with accused alleged to have contributed to the offense." 16 Thus, he
posits the following questions:
"For example, in an Information for plunder which cites at least ten criminal acts, what penalty do we
impose on one who is clearly involved in only one such criminal act? Is it reclusion perpetua? Or
should it be a lesser penalty? What if another accused is shown to have participated in three of the
ten specifications, what would be the penalty imposable, compared to one who may have been
involved in five or seven of the specifications? The law does not provide the standard or specify the
penalties and the courts are left to guess. In other words, the courts are called to say what the law is
rather than to apply what the lawmaker is supposed to have intended."17
Petitioner raises these hypothetical questions for he labors hard under the impression that: (1) he is
charged with only one act or offense and (2) he has not conspired with the other accused named in
sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of the Amended Information, ergo, the penalty imposable on him ought to
be different from reclusion perpetua to death. R.A. No. 7080, he bewails, is cloudy on the imposable
penalty on an accused similarly situated as he is. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second
paragraph of the Amended Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada
in committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the commission of the
predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information. If these allegations are
proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be unclear. It will be no different from that of the former
President for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided
in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
"Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as
described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court."

III.
Petitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for "sustaining the charge against petitioner for
alleged offenses and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not even remotely
connected contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is personal, not vicarious results in the
denial of substantive due process."18
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that petitioner is charged not only with the predicate
act in sub-paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) & (d)
because he is indicted as a principal and as co-conspirator of the former President. This is
purportedly clear from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended Information. 19
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the allegations of the Amended Information vis-vis the provisions of R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his other co-accused
with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the accused, while the second paragraph
describes in general how plunder was committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime
itself. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute the crime
and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate act.
The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-paragraphs correspond to the items
enumerated in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of
receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with
former President Estrada in committing the offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense
described in item [2] of the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged
the predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense described in item [1] in the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead
names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts that of ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and collecting or receiving commissions
from such purchase from the Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the "Jose
Velarde" account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in
the enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that
the former President unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance
with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the same under his account name "Jose Velarde" at
the Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the enumeration of
Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the accused named in
sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual acts, conspired with former President Estrada to
enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain whether the
accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each other to enable the former President to
amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for
the conspiracy entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the second
paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to (d). We hold that

petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in
sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the
former President whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including
the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended Information in one,
and not in four, separate Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the
law was crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-Plunder Law
was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were filed
against former President Marcos and his alleged cronies.Government prosecutors found no
appropriate law to deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by
the former President to acquire illegal wealth.20 They also found that under the then existing laws
such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal Code and other special laws,
the acts involved different transactions, different time and different personalities. Every transaction
constituted a separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to
be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation of multiple Informations
was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the Sandiganbayan.21 R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder
Law22 was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid in the Explanatory
Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
"Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like kleptocracy and economic treason,
punishes the use of high office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in
the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may involve so many persons,
here and abroad, and which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions
sought to be penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public funds, bribery,
extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation resulting in material
damage to the national economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a safeguard against the possible
recurrence of the depravities of the previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar
inclination to succumb to the corrupting influence of power."
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation resulting in material damage to the
national economy" is made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of
plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar,
the different accused and their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended
Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the conspiracy. The gravamen of
the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money
from illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each
accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and
kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused in multiple conspiracies commonly
involves two structures: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single
person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the

"spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other
contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as
with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer.23
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar appears similar to a "wheel" conspiracy.
The hub is former President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the rim that encloses
the spokes is the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
IV.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the charge against the petitioner on the ground
that the allegation of conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is even
expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired
by American law and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with conspiracy in American criminal law and
in common law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. As a
general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when
the law fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion
and sedition. In contrast, under American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is
the gravamen of the offense.24 The essence of conspiracy is the combination of two or more
persons, by concerted action, to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not in
itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. 25 Its elements are: agreement to
accomplish an illegal objective, coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal
purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. 26
A study of the United States Code ought to be instructive. It principally punishes two (2)
crimes of conspiracy27 conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud the United
States, and conspiracy to impede or injure officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the
United States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,28 as follows:
"Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States. If two or more persons
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or
any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor
only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for
such misdemeanor."
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
"Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or more persons in any State, Territory,
Possession, or District conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person from
accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence under the United States, or from
discharging any duties thereof, or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave

the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be performed, or to injure him in his person
or property on account of his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in the
lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in
the discharge of his official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than six years, or both."
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy to commit any offense against the
United States; and (2) conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency thereof. The
conspiracy to "commit any offense against the United States" refers to an act made a crime by
federal laws.29 It refers to an act punished by statute.30Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs the whole
gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or regulatory.31These laws cover criminal offenses
such as perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder, theft, bank robbery, etc.
and also include customs violations, counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud,
lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate commerce and other areas of
federal regulation.32 Section 371 penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive
offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and distinct from the substantive
offense,33 hence, the court rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose
prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy.34
The conspiracy to "defraud the government" refers primarily to cheating the United States out of
property or money. It also covers interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental functions
by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are dishonest.35 It comprehends defrauding the
United States in any manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not. 36
The basic difference in the concept of conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case
law on howconspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not necessary for the indictment to
include particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and
means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such specificity of detail falls within the scope of
a bill of particulars.37 An indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the
agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement was directed; and (3) the overt acts
performed in furtherance of the agreement.38 To allege that the defendants conspired is, at least, to
state that they agreed to do the matters which are set forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To
allege a conspiracy is to allege an agreement.39 The gist of the crime of conspiracy is unlawful
agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is not necessary to set out the criminal
object with as great a certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged as a
substantive offense.40
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference on how Philippine courts and
American courts deal with cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the ground
that they lack particularities of time, place, circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as
aforestated, conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or
it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in
itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed
by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the
information for this crime must contain the following averments:
"Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information."
The complaint or information to be sufficient must state the name of the accused, designate the
offense given by statute, state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the
offended party, the approximate date of the commission of the offense and the place where the
offense was committed.
Our rulings have long settled the issue on how the acts or omissions constituting the offense should
be made in order to meet the standard of sufficiency. Thus, the offense must be designated by its
name given by statute or by reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. 41 The
information must also state the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances.42 The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form
as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. 43 No information for a crime will be
sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. 44 Every
element of the offense must be stated in the information. 45 What facts and circumstances are
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials
of the specified crimes.46 The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.47
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the
crime of "conspiracy to commit treason" is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons
come to an agreement to levy war against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give
them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it.48 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender
owes allegiance to the Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the Philippines
is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war
against the government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and comfort; and (4) that the
offender and other person or persons decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be
alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when conspiracy is not charged
as a crime in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar. There
is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged.The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. 49 The liability of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, 50 for the act of one is
the act of all.51 In People v. Quitlong,52 we ruled on how conspiracy as the mode of committing
the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:
"x x x. In embodying the essential elements of the crime charged, the information must set forth the
facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the accused so that the

accused can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. One such fact or circumstance in a
complaint against two or more accused persons is that of conspiracy. Quite unlike the omission of an
ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to during trial, may be corrected or
supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy, or one that would impute
criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to
hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty
with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where conspiracy exists and can rightly
be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance,
the act of one being imputable to all the others (People v. Ilano, 313 SCRA 442). Verily, an accused
must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but
also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege
all the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the
evidence proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one
another in the web of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the
same degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that
the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in
ordinary and concise language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in
a manner that can enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and
with such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent
indictment based on the same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient
"if it follows the words of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the
offense he is charged with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a
sufficient statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the
conspiracy and the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A
C.J.S. 842-844).
xxx

xxx

xxx

x x x. Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it. Verily,
the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that
there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the
felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the
words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear
in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement
to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused
must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and
synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be
alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his
plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may
be required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it
need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may beinferred from shown acts and conduct of
the accused.
xxx

xxx

x x x."

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a
mode in the commission of an offense in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word
"conspire," or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; 53 or (2) by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common
understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused
to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. 54
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with the adequacy of
evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of actual
cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted action or
concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. 55 A statement of this evidence
is not necessary in the information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged in general terms
how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the words "in connivance/conspiracy
with his co-accused." Following the ruling in Quitlong, these words are sufficient to allege the
conspiracy of the accused with the former President in committing the crime of plunder.
V.
We now come to petitioners plea for bail. On August 14, 2002, during the pendency of the instant
petition before this Court, petitioner filed with respondent Sandiganbayan an "Urgent Second Motion
for Bail for Medical Reasons." Petitioner prayed that he be allowed to post bail due to his serious
medical condition which is life-threatening to him if he goes back to his place of detention. The
motion was opposed by respondent Ombudsman to which petitioner replied.
1wphi1

For three days, i.e., on September 4, 20 and 27, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan conducted
hearings on the motion for bail. Dr. Roberto V. Anastacio, a cardiologist of the Makati Medical Center,
testified as sole witness for petitioner.
On December 18, 2001, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for
Early/Immediate Resolution of Jose Jinggoy Estradas Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations." Petitioner reiterated the motion for bail he earlier filed with respondent
Sandiganbayan.56
On the same day, we issued a Resolution referring the motion to respondent Sandiganbayan for
resolution and requiring said court to make a report, not later than 8:30 in the morning of December
21, 2001.
On December 21, 2001, respondent court submitted its Report. Attached to the Report was its
Resolution dated December 20, 2001 denying petitioners motion for bail for "lack of factual
basis."57 Basing its finding on the earlier testimony of Dr. Anastacio, the Sandiganbayan found that
petitioner "failed to submit sufficient evidence to convince the court that the medical condition of the
accused requires that he be confined at home and for that purpose that he be allowed to post bail." 58
The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 7659,
with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our Rules, offenses punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong,
to wit:

"Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless
of the stage of the criminal prosecution."59
Section 7, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on Section 13, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:
"Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses hinge on the issue
of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires that the trial court
conduct bail hearings wherein both the prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient
opportunity to present their respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to
show strong evidence of guilt.60
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires evidentiary hearing
that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The hearings on which respondent court based its
Resolution of December 20, 2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which
evidence was given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that evidence on
petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court.
Upon proper motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting of bail to petitioner.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show that the respondent
Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139297

February 23, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee

vs.
RENATO @ BONG TORRECAMPO y LEYTE and RENE TORRECAMPO y LEYTE, appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
JOVITO CASPILLO1 was found stabbed and decapitated in his rented room. For his death, brothers
RENATO alias "Bong" and RENE TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias2 with murder in an Information3 alleging:

That on or about the 11th day of November 1994, in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating with one, NORA TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE whose present
whereabouts still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill,
taking advantage of superior strength and/or with evident premeditation did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab in the different part(s) of his body and even cut off his
head with a bladed weapon, one JOVITO GASPILLO, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, which directly caused the death of said JOVITO GASPILLO.
The evidence adduced in the trial shows that Jovito was a tenant of the Escosio family at No. 66
Laong Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Pias, Metro Manila. He shared a room with his brother
Randy and first cousins Nora and Karen Torrecampo. The Escosios occupied the other room of the
house.
Prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio testified that on November 11, 1994 at about 10:30 in the
morning, she was seated at the door of their room removing lice from the hair of her daughter when
she saw Nora and appellant Renato pass by. They were followed shortly after by another man later
identified as appellant Rene Torrecampo. All three (3) went to the room of Jovito. A while later,
Erlinda heard a weepy Nora pleading to get into Jovitos room where the loud noise of the radio
could be heard. Some minutes after, she saw Nora and appellant Renato come out of the room.
Appellant Renato dragged Nora to the direction of Sampaguita Compound. Appellant Rene left the
room after them. He was carrying a bag.
Erlinda continued that after the departure of appellants and Nora, she walked to the toilet and
noticed blood at the door of Jovito. Curious, she peeped inside and was shocked by the sight of a
body drenched in blood with its head severed from the neck. It was Jovito. Terrified, she called for
her neighbors and the barangay tanods. People milled to the crime scene until the authorities
arrived. She felt that appellants were the culprits. She explained that the main door is the only way in
and out of the house. Either way, one would have to pass by their room to get to Jovitos. On subject
date and time, she only saw appellants and Nora go in and come out of the scene of the crime. At
the police station, she identified both appellants.
Cherry Francisco, a neighbor who lives in front of the house of the Escosios and approximately ten
(10) meters from the room of Jovito, also gave her testimony. According to her, at about 10:00 A.M.
on November 11, 1994, she was eating breakfast with her family when she heard noises coming
from the room of Jovito. She went out to investigate and noticed Nora beating at the door crying out,
"Bakit ninyo siya pinatay?" The door was suddenly opened and someone grabbed Nora by the hair
and pulled her inside the room. She later identified the person as appellant Rene. Moments
thereafter, appellant Renato came out of the room dragging Nora with him. Trailing them was
appellant Rene, whose hands and clothes were drenched with blood. However, as appellant Renato
and Nora walked to the direction of Sampaguita Compound, appellant Rene went off to Laong
Almanza carrying a long bag. Without delay, Cherry rushed to the house of neighbor Buena to
recount what she had just witnessed. Buena called for the authorities. Cherry returned to her house.
From there, she saw Erlinda emotionally telling people that crowded the crime scene about finding
her tenant Jovito dead with his head cut off. Eventually, the authorities arrived and investigated the
incident.

Melvin Tupaz identified the body of his cousin Jovito. Ravell Ronald R. Baluyut, a medico-legal
expert of the National Bureau of Investigation, conducted the autopsy and disclosed the cause of
death as "multiple stab and hack (sic) wounds."4
Randy Caspillo, the younger brother of Jovito, testified on the expenses incurred by the family as a
result of his brothers death. He claimed a total of P35,014.00 in expenses but was only able to
account for P13,250.00 in receipts. As a result of the sudden demise of his brother, he said he
suffered moral shock, mental anguish and wounded feelings.
Appellant Rene Torrecampo testified in his defense. He averred that on November 11, 1994 at 7:00
A.M., he left for work and arrived at LFS Engineering an hour later as indicated in the office logbook.
He claimed that he found out about Jovitos death only at 10:00 A.M. during his coffee break when
his brothers (appellant Renato) wife telephoned them about it. According to him, they left for Laong
immediately after getting permission from their employer Lamberto Samonte. They arrived there at
11:00 that same morning after taking a tricycle to Casimiro, then a passenger jeep to Pillar Village.
Right away, he looked for his sister Karen, who was then living with Jovito. He found her
unconscious at her friend Lolita Montinels place so he brought her to Paraaque Community
Hospital on board a white police service Fiera. When Karen regained consciousness and asked
about the incident, she merely cried. The doctor advised the police that she was just scared and
needed some rest. On their way home, appellant Rene and Karen stopped by the latters place
primarily to find out what happened to Jovito and incidentally to get some of her things. The room
was a mess and Jovito was nowhere to be found. While there they overheard Roger Escosio saying,
"Ang tigas-tigas ng ulo nila, matagal ko nang pinapaalis ayaw nilang umalis."
Appellant Rene added that at work the next day he read in Abante that his brother Renato was being
tagged as the principal suspect in the killing. Hence, he and his brother immediately requested their
employer Lamberto Samonte to accompany them to the Las Pias Police Station to surrender. The
police took them to the Office of then Municipal Mayor Ben Casimiro where they were presented to
the media. An investigation ensued. Appellants were detained and ultimately charged for the murder
of Jovito.
Appellant Renato Torrecampo basically related a similar story. His account only differed on what he
did upon arrival at Laong on the date of the incident. He claimed that he went straight home to take
care of his sick child and stayed there with his wife the rest of the day. He was about to leave for
work the next morning when he read in the newspaper that he was the prime suspect in the killing of
Jovito. Together with his brother, he asked their employer to escort him to the police station to clear
his name. However, they were detained instead and threatened into admitting the commission of the
crime. They insisted that they had no knowledge thereof and explained that they were at their place
of work when it happened. The police did not believe them. Forthwith, they were charged with
murder.
The defense likewise offered in evidence the testimonies of SPO1 Benjamin Javier, Edgardo Gremio
and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena. SPO1 Javier of the Las Pias Police Criminal Investigation Division
was assigned to investigate the death of Jovito. He said that he found the dead body of Jovito in his
small rented room, which was adjacent to the room of the owner of the two (2)-bedroom house. The
rooms were separated by a plywood wall. He said that Jovitos room was facing the house of one
Cherry Francisco. He placed the time of death at 10:30 A.M. based on his interview of Erlinda
Escosio. He took down the statement of Erlinda on November 12, 1994. He believed her story and
submitted a report on his findings.

Edgardo Gremio and SPO4 Esmeraldo Lucena gave corroborative testimonies. Gremio testified that
he is a member of the Barangay Police Force in Laong Street, Barangay Almanza Uno, Las Pias.
He claimed that at about 10:30 A.M. on November 11, 1994, he was informed of a killing in his area.
He passed for his neighbor SPO4 Lucena, then still asleep, before going to the crime scene. SPO4
Lucena said that people crowded the place of the incident when they got there. He went inside the
house, which he insisted had three (3) rooms. He maintained that the first room was occupied by the
owner of the house, the second by a driver he did not know and the third by the victim Jovito. He
saw the dead body and told everyone not to touch anything until the police investigator arrived. He
then called for fellow policemen whom he accompanied to the scene.
On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the court a quo found Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentenced them to death. It likewise ordered them to
solidarily pay the heirs of the victim Jovito Caspillo P100,000.00 as indemnity for the loss of
life; P35,014.00 in actual damages for the wake, funeral and burial expenses; and, the costs of the
suit.5 Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659.6
In convicting appellants, the trial court relied on the following circumstances: (a) at about 9:00 A.M.
on November 11, 1994, Erlinda saw Jovito very much alive; (b) after an hour, Erlinda saw appellant
Renato and his sister Nora pass by, followed shortly by appellant Rene; (c) Erlinda heard a
commotion inside the room of Jovito and after a few minutes saw appellants emerging from the room
with Nora in tow; (d) Cherry heard a loud banging from the room of Jovito so she went outside and
saw Nora frantically pounding at the door, then Nora was pulled inside the room; (e) after thirty (30)
minutes, Cherry witnessed a seemingly weak Nora being assisted by appellant Renato coming out
of the room; and, (f) Cherry likewise observed appellant Rene leaving the room with his hands and
clothes covered with blood.
Circumstantial evidence to be sufficient for purposes of conviction must have the following elements:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proved; and, (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.7 The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain, which leads to
one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person.
In the instant case, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court establish an unbroken chain of
events showing the complicity of appellants and no other in the killing of victim Jovito Caspillo.
Indeed, the case of the prosecution is woven principally around the testimonies of witnesses Erlinda
Escosio and Cherry Francisco whose testimonies were sufficiently tested and found credible on the
crucible of cross-examination. Notably, as correctly observed by the court a quo, appellants failed to
demonstrate ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to testify against them. Absent any
evidence showing any reason or motive for the witnesses to prevaricate, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 8
In their Brief, appellants contend that the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to
the evidence adduced during trial.9 We reject this contention.
First. Appellants submit that the trial court should have completely rejected both oral and written
accounts of prosecution witness Erlinda Escosio considering that her in-court testimony is contrary
to her sworn statement. Specifically, they call attention to Erlindas narration in court that she saw

appellant Rene stabbing the victim while appellant Renato was slicing off his head. We are not
impressed. The records show that on cross-examination, Erlinda was able to explain the alleged
inconsistency:10
Q : Do you affirm the truth and veracity of the statement you have issued before SPO1
Benjamin Javier as stated in your salaysay?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : You stated previously that you saw the actual incident while peeping through the hole in
the wall, did you not?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : How come in your statement you never mentioned that you peeped through the hole?
You stayed outside while taking out the lice from the head of your daughter?
A : I was scared and confused that I failed to narrate the details.
Clearly, reference is made on what Erlinda did not mention in her sworn statement. This is not an
inconsistency but merely an incompleteness of narration. Sworn statements, being taken ex parte,
are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial
suggestion or for want of suggestion and inquiries.11 There is no rule of evidence to the effect that
omission of certain particulars in a sworn statement would estop an affiant from making an
elaboration thereof or from correcting inaccuracies during the trial.12
The trial court did not err in giving credence to Erlindas testimony in court as it is consistent with her
sworn statement on all other matters and is corroborated on material points by the testimony of
Cherry Francisco. Repeatedly, this Court has ruled that the testimony of a witness may be believed
in part and disbelieved in other parts, depending on the corroborative evidence and the probabilities
and improbabilities of the case.13 Moreover, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarants demeanor, conduct and attitude at
the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and
falsehood.14
Second. Appellants assail the testimonies of Erlinda and Cherry on the commission of the crime at
10:00 A.M. on November 11, 1994. They insist that they had just left their place of work and only
arrived at the crime scene an hour later.
We are not convinced. To merit belief, alibi and denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of nonculpability. The records reveal that appellants employer only substantiated their claim that they left
LFS Engineering at 10:00 A.M. on that ill-fated day. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced
to establish that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. Indeed, they admitted leaving LFS Engineering to go to the locus criminis though they
claimed to have arrived there only at 11:00 A.M. Their testimony cannot prevail over the positive
identification of Erlinda and Cherry, who are disinterested witnesses.

Also dubious is their asseveration on what they did upon arrival at the crime scene. Appellant Rene
professed that he looked for his sister Karen whereas appellant Renato averred that he went home
to attend to a sick child. They obviously deviated from their purpose to find out what really
happened to their cousin Jovito.15 We note that they did not present anyone to corroborate their
stories.
Third. Appellants likewise impugn the testimony of prosecution witness Cherry Francisco. They claim
that SPO1 Benjamin Javier merely supplied the name of appellant Rene Torrecampo as the person
who pulled Nora into Jovitos room during the incident in view of the admission of Cherry during trial
that she did not know appellant Rene.
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, this attempt to discredit the testimony of Cherry is
misleading. Admittedly, she testified that she only saw appellant Rene for the first time on November
11, 1994. But she was certain that it was appellant Rene who pulled Nora inside Jovitos room when
she was made to identify him in court on March 23, 1995.16
Appellants likewise try to discredit the testimony of Cherry that she heard the commotion in the room
of Jovito given the blaring sound of the radio, and that she witnessed the circumstances of the crime
at a distance of ten (10) meters. The contention is misleading. The records show that Cherry heard
some disturbance from the room of Jovito, which made her go out of her house. She never claimed
that it was the blare of the radio that caused her to investigate outside. 17 It was Erlinda who testified
about the sound of the radio.
As to the distance of her house from the room of Jovito, the Court finds reliable the testimony of
Cherry on cross-examination that her house was directly in line with the room of Jovito and that
there was nothing to obstruct her view thereof except the not so tall trees. 18 It is settled that when
conditions of visibility are favorable, and when the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their
assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. 19
Appellants further denigrate Cherrys assertion that one of them left the crime scene with blood
spattered all over his clothes and body. They aver that whoever committed the killing could have
washed away the bloodstains before leaving the victims room as suggested by the pail of bloodtainted water found in Jovitos room.
It may be in keeping with human experience for anyone including appellants to wash the blood away
from their clothes and body after committing a crime. However, it is also natural for them to act with
haste so they could immediately leave the crime scene and avoid suspicion. It is thus not incredible
that the hurried and haphazard attempt to remove the bloodstains left the herein appellants with
some traces of blood still visible to the naked eyes of witnesses Erlinda and Cherry.
Fourth. In a further effort to impair the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants impute
on SPO1 Benjamin Javier the "orchestration" of the written statements and oral testimonies of
Erlinda and Cherry to get recognition for arresting appellants and solving the crime. This is mere
conjecture that deserves scant consideration. Needless to state, the court in criminal prosecution is
always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human
experience and not by mere surmises.20
Fifth. Appellants also assail the denial by the trial court of their motion for an ocular inspection of the
crime scene. They suggest that had it been granted, the accuracy or inexactitude of the description

by SPO1 Javier could have been established. We agree with the Solicitor General that the ocular
inspection would have been an exercise in futility for the reason that the house had then long been
renovated. On March 2, 1995, when Erlinda Escosio testified, there were already three (3) rooms in
the house. The renovation was made on February 1995, a month prior to her testimony; 21 thus,
explaining the testimony of SPO1 Javier that the house of the Escosios consisted of two (2) rooms
on November 11, 1994.
We now come to the crime committed by the appellants. The Information alleged the circumstances
of "taking advantage of superior strength and/or evident premeditation," and charged the crime of
murder. The circumstances that qualify the killing to murder must be proved indubitably as the killing
itself. The prosecution failed to prove these circumstances.
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the
aggressor and selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence
does not show that appellants took advantage of their number in order to overpower the victim. The
evidence against appellants is merely circumstantial.
Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when
appellants determined to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to
their determination to commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of sufficient period of time between the
determination and the execution of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the consequences
of their act. Hence, this circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated.
The Solicitor General submits that treachery should be appreciated against the appellants as Jovito
was asleep when killed. He contends that while treachery was not alleged in the Information, it could
be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. We do not agree. Erlinda testified that Jovito
was asleep prior to the arrival of appellants but she did not say that he was still sleeping when the
attack commenced. Even assuming that treachery was proved, it could not be considered a generic
aggravating circumstance. Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the Offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall
be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
Clearly, under the aforesaid provisions, aggravating circumstances, whether qualifying or generic,
must be alleged in the information before they can be considered by the court. These new provisions
apply even if the crime was committed prior to their effectivity since they are favorable to the
accused, as in this case.
Appellants cannot invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender
to be considered, it must be shown that: (1) the offender was not actually arrested; (2) he

surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of that person; and, (3) his surrender was
voluntary.22 The records disclose that appellants voluntarily presented themselves to the Las Pias
Police Department "to clear their name."23 We have ruled time and again that the act of a suspect in
going to the police station only "to clear his name" does not show intent to surrender unconditionally
to the authorities.24
Prescinding from these premises, appellants can only be convicted of the crime of homicide. The
penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Corollarily,
Article 64 (1) provides that when there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the
penalty prescribed by law shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed on appellants should be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty
next lower in degree which is prision mayor, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. The civil indemnity ex delicto given in the
amount ofP100,000.00 must be reduced to P50,000.00 in line with recent jurisprudence. In addition,
moral damages must be awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the testimony of Randy
Caspillo about his "surprise" and "hurt" as a result of the sudden death of his brother.25
The actual damages awarded in the amount of P35,014.00 representing wake, funeral and burial
expenses cannot be sustained. The receipts submitted by witness Randy Caspillo only prove
expenses in the amount ofP13,250.00. Nonetheless, temperate damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 can be awarded. This is in keeping with recent jurisprudence to the effect that when
actual damages established by receipts during trial amount to less than P25,000.00, which in this
case is only P13,250.00, an award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified. 26
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the trial court finding appellants RENATO and RENE
TORRECAMPO guilty of murder and imposing upon them the penalty of death is MODIFIED; they
are instead found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and each
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jovito Caspillo P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202124
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
IRENEO JUGUETA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 30, 2012 in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252. The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in
Criminal Case No. 7702-G.
1

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad
Ilaya, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill,
qualified by treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old, who
suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound Point of Entry lower abdomen, right, 2 cm. from the midline and 6 cm. from the level of the
umbilicus, directed upward toward the left upper abdomen."
and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 years of age, who suffered the following:
"Gunshot wound Point of Entry - 9th ICS along the mid-axillary line, right, 1 cm. diameter
Point of Exit - 7th ICS mid-axillary line, left;"
which directly caused their instant death.
That the crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the
attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.
Contrary to law.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was
charged with Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified
by treachery, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by
the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly
by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of
some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is, the
occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann
Divina, both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Roger San Miguel, however, moved for reinvestigation of the case against them. At said
proceedings, one Danilo Fajarillo submitted his sworn statement stating that on June 6, 2002, he
saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only
appellant who was carrying a firearm while the other two had no participation in the shooting
incident. Fajarillo further stated that Roger San Miguel was not present at the crime scene. Based on
the sworn statement of Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel. Thus, upon motion of the prosecution, the case for Attempted
Murder against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel was dismissed, and trial proceeded only as to
appellant.
4

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes
Taguinod who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto,
namely, Mary Grace and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory
of the bullet wounds showed that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she
could not tell what kind of ammunitions were used.
6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6,
2002, as his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling
of their hut was suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the
covering of the wall gone, the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto
clearly saw their faces which were illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut.
Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant, Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.
The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then
uttered, "Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying,
"Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?"
Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his
children and wife in an attempt to protect them from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive
gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled together in their hut.
7

When the volley of shots ceased and the three (3) men left, Norberto saw that his two (2) young
daughters were wounded. His wife went out of their house to ask for help from neighbors, while he
and his older daughter carried the two (2) wounded children out to the street. His daughter Mary
Grace died on the way to the hospital, while Claudine expired at the hospital despite the doctors'
attempts to revive her.
8

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied
that he had a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed
a case against appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter.
9

On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's
testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel, Isidro San Miguel and Ruben
Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San Miguel, where he
had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and the
other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.

10

Finding appellants defense to be weak, and ascribing more credence to the testimony of Norberto,
the trial court ruled that the evidence clearly established that appellant, together with two other
assailants, conspired to shoot and kill the family of Norberto. Appellant was then convicted of Double
Murder in Criminal Case No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts judgment in Criminal Case No. 7698-G reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Double Murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and
to indemnify her heirs in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer Reclusion Perpetua for
the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine
Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims
actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.
SO ORDERED.

11

On the other hand, the dispositive portion of the trial courts judgment in Criminal Case No. 7702-G,
reads:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Ireneo Jugueta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Multiple Attempted Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation
to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of FOUR (4)
YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS ofPrision Correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of Prision Mayor as maximum for each of the offended parties; Norberto Divina, Maricel
Divina, Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina. Further, accused is ordered to pay for the costs of the
suit.
SO ORDERED.

12

Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. On January 30, 2012, the CA
rendered a Decision affirming appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.
13

Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to this Court. On July 30, 2012, the
Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that they may submit their respective Supplemental
Briefs. Both parties manifested that they will no longer submit supplemental briefs since they had
exhaustively discussed their positions before the CA.
14

15

The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's
testimony, such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to
categorically identify appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norbertos children.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions based on
these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. Thus, generally, the Court will not
recalibrate and re-examine evidence that had been analyzed and ruled upon by the trial court and
affirmed by the CA.
16

The evidence on record fully supports the trial court's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, that
appellant acted in concert with two other individuals, all three of them carrying firearms and
simultaneously firing at Norberto and his family, killing his two young daughters. Norberto clearly saw
all of the three assailants with their firearms as there is illumination coming from a lamp inside their
house that had been laid bare after its walling was stripped off, to wit:

Q: When the wall of your house was stripped off by these three persons at the same time, do you
have light in your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of light was there?
A: A gas lamp.
Q: Where was the gas lamp placed at that time?
A: In the middle of our house.
xxxx
Q: when did they fire a shot?
A: On the same night, when they had stripped off the wallings.
Q: How many gunshots did you hear?
A: Only one.
Q: Do you know the sound of a gunshot? A firearm?
A: Yes, sir, it is loud? (sic)
xxxx
Q: After the first shot, was there any second shot?
A: After that, successive fire shot (sic) followed and my youngest and eldest daughters were hit.
xxxx
Q: How many of the three were holding guns at that time?
A: All of them.
Q: You mean to tell the honorable court that these three persons were
having one firearm each?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And they fired shots at the same time?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: To what direction these three persons fired (sic) their firearms during that night?
A: To the place where we were.
Q: When those three persons were firing their respective firearms, what was your position then?
A: I ordered my children to lie down.
Q: How about you, what was your position when you were ordering your children to lie down?
A: (witness demonstrated his position as if covering his children with his body and ordering them to
line (sic) down face down)
Q: Mr. Witness, for how long did these three persons fire shots at your house?
A: Less than five minutes, sir.
Q: After they fired their shots, they left your house?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when these persons left your house, you inspected your children to see what happened to
them?
A: Yes, sir, they were hit.
xxx

17

Appellant and the two other malefactors are equally responsible for the death of Norberto's
daughters because, as ruled by the trial court, they clearly conspired to kill Norberto's family.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of a
crime and decide to commit it. Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the
commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted acts reveal a common design
and unity of purpose. In such case, the act of one is the act of all.18 Here, the three men
undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of Norberto together, each with his own
firearm. It is, therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the bullet particularly fired
from appellant's firearm that killed the children.
Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person,
which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident
premeditation. The presence of any one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the
Code is sufficient to qualify a killing as murder. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is liable
for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norbertos two children, thus:
19

20

x x x Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina, were all lying down side by side
about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made
of sack was stripped off by [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto Alegre (sic)
[Gilbert Estores]. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for
mercy, they fired at them having hit and killed his two (2) daughters. The family of Norberto Divina
were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were
shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 years old respectively. In this case, the victims were

defenseless and manifestly overpowered by armed assailants when they were gunned down. There
was clear showing that the attack was made suddenly and unexpectedly as to render the victims
helpless and unable to defend themselves. Norberto and his wife and his children could have
already been asleep at that time of the night. x x x
21

Verily, the presence of treachery qualified the killing of the hapless children to murder. As held
in People v. Fallorina, the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an
unsuspecting victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a
child, treachery exists.
22

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal
Code states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In Esqueda v.
People, the Court held:
23

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either
consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or
attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.
Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in
the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the
manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries
are inflicted by him on the victim.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as
shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission of
the crime. The Court thus quotes with approval the trial courts finding that appellant is liable for
attempted murder, viz.:
24

In the case at bar, the perpetrators who acted in concert commenced the felony of murder first by
suddenly stripping off the wall of their house, followed by successive firing at the intended victims
when Norberto Divina refused to go out of the house as ordered by them. If only there were good in
aiming their target, not only Mary Grace and Claudine had been killed but surely all the rest of the
family would surely have died. Hence, perpetrators were liable for Murder of Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine Divina but for Multiple Attempted Murder for Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
Divina and Judy Ann Divina. But as [appellant] Ireneo Jugueta was the only one charged in this
case, he alone is liable for the crime committed.
25

Meanwhile, the supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the
very beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from
appellants firearm that killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said
witness's credibility. An examination of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real
inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v. Cabtalan, "[m]inor inconsistencies and
discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as well as their
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." Both the trial court and the
CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this Court sees
no reason why it should not conform to the principle reiterated in Medina, Jr. v. People that:
26

27

28

Time and again, this Court has deferred to the trial court's factual findings and evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the CA, in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that

would justify altering or revising such findings and evaluation. This is because the trial court's
determination proceeds from its first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing the trial
court in unique position to assess the witnesses' credibility and to appreciate their
truthfulness, honesty and candor x x x.
29

The records of this case, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, reveal no outstanding or
exceptional circumstance to justify a deviation from such long-standing principle. There is no cogent
reason to overturn the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence, particularly the testimony of
Norberto Divina identifying appellant as one of the assailants, is worthy of belief. Thus, the
prosecution evidence established beyond any reasonable doubt that appellant is one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
However, the Court must make a clarification as to the nomenclature used by the trial court to
identify the crimes for which appellant was penalized. There is some confusion caused by the trial
court's use of the terms "Double Murder" and "Multiple Attempted Murder" in convicting appellant,
and yet imposing penalties which nevertheless show that the trial court meant to penalize appellant
for two (2) separate counts of Murder and four (4) counts of Attempted Murder.
The facts, as alleged in the Information in Criminal Case No. 7698-G, and as proven during trial,
show that appellant is guilty of 2 counts of the crime of Murder and not Double Murder, as the killing
of the victims was not the result of a single act but of several acts of appellant and his cohorts. In the
same vein, appellant is also guilty of 4 counts of the crime of Attempted Murder and not Multiple
Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G. It bears stressing that the Informations in this case
failed to comply with the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an
information must charge only one offense.
As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is
defective. The reason for the rule is stated in People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appeals,
21st Division, Mindanao Station, et al., thus:
30

The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the
accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare
for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might
confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may
raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed
waived.
However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during arraignment and failed to move for the
quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the same. Section 9
of Rule 117 provides that "[t]he failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash
before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule."
It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information
but the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are
charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper penalty for each offense.
31

Appellant can therefore be held liable for all the crimes alleged in the Informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G, i.e., 2 counts of murder and 4 counts of attempted murder, respectively,
and proven during trial.
Meanwhile, in People v. Nelmida, the Court explained the concept of a complex crime as defined in
Article 4833 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
32

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and
in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one penalty is imposed.
There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a compound crime, or when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The classic example of
the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more persons. A different rule
governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that
when various victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.
34

Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in
firing successive and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms,
intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case,
indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several
individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his cohorts
committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held inPeople v. Nelmida, "each act
by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at
different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime."
35

36

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling
as an ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 7698-G and 7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect, to wit:
Criminal Case No. 7698-G for Double Murder:
That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation
for the attack and the accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the
offense.
37

Criminal Case No. 7702-G for Multiple Attempted Murder:

x x x the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another, armed with short firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery,
with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with the said firearms the house occupied by the family of
Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts,
but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason of some cause
or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused x x x
38

In People v. Agcanas, the Court stressed that "[i]t has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling
is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to human abode. He who
goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him
elsewhere." Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. The testimony of Norberto
established the fact that the group of appellant violated the victims' home by destroying the same
39

40

and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter. Hence, the trial
court should have appreciated dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties
imposed on appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of
murder. However, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2)
counts of murder without eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder,
the penalty prescribed for each count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance,
the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years ofprision
mayor, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision
correccional,in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
This Court finds it apt to impose on appellant the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder.
41

Anent the award of damages, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards
criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types
of criminal cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity,
moral, and exemplary damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages
in some instances.
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party,
in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual
damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. This award
stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable."
42

It is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased
by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
43

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased,
and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every
case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article
291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of
testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused,
which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a
person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also
ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the
law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is 3,000.00. The law did
not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be changed,
increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it.
44

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in
nature. Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals expounded on the nature and purpose of moral
damages, viz.:
45

Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such
as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although
incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral damages
may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have
sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. x x x.
46

47

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages

awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." They may also be
considered and allowed "for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation, indignity, and vexation
suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her assailant's conduct, as well as the factors of
provocation, the reasonableness of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex
of the victim, [and] mental distress."
48

49

The rationale for awarding moral damages has been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon:
"[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted."
50

Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish
or the suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
51

52

Finally, the Civil Code of the Philippines provides, in respect to exemplary damages, thus:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
ART. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are
separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the

use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of
indignity and humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the
highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant associated with such circumstances as willfulness,
wantonness, malice, gross negligence or recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud
that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the wrongdoer and
others like him from similar conduct in the future.
53

54

55

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise,
is to be understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged
effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier
punishment for the accused and by an award of additional damages to the victim. The increase of
the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in its commission. Unlike
the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if
not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying
nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case,
an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an
award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
56

The reason is fairly obvious as to why the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires
aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, to be stated in the complaint or
information. It is in order not to trample on the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature of the alleged offense that he or she has committed. A criminal complaint or information
should basically contain the elements of the crime, as well as its qualifying and ordinary aggravating
circumstances, for the court to effectively determine the proper penalty it should impose. This,
however, is not similar in the recovery of civil liability. In the civil aspect, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, even if not alleged in the information but proven during trial would entitle
the victim to an award of exemplary damages.
57

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the
presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230
prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision,
lays down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary
damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually
abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on
account of the moral corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a
pregnant married woman. In People v. Caada, People v. Neverio and People v. Layco, Sr., the
Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve as deterrent to elders who
abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
58

59

60

61

62

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at 30,000.00, despite the lack of
any aggravating circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to 50,000.00 in
order to deter similar conduct.
63

If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the
provisions of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
64

Before awarding any of the above mentioned damages, the Court, however, must first consider the
penalty imposed by law. Under RA 7659 or An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, certain crimes
under the RPC and special penal laws were amended to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances. Under the same law, the following crimes are punishable by reclusion perpetua:
piracy in general, mutiny on the high seas, and simple rape. For the following crimes, RA 7659
has imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: qualified piracy; qualified bribery under
certain circumstances; parricide; murder; infanticide, except when committed by the mother of the
child for the purpose of concealing her dishonor or either of the maternal grandparents for the same
purpose; kidnapping and serious illegal detention under certain circumstances; robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons under certain circumstances; destructive arson, except
when death results as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under the
article; attempted or frustrated rape, when a homicide is committed by reason or on occasion
thereof; plunder; and carnapping, when the driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Finally,
RA 7659 imposes the death penalty on the following crimes:
65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

(a) In qualified bribery, when it is the public officer who asks or demands the gift or present.
(b) In kidnapping and serious illegal detention: (i) when the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person; (ii) when
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention; (iii) when the victim is raped,
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts.
(c) In destructive arson, when as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts
penalized under Article 320, death results.
(d) In rape: (i) when by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim becomes insane or
homicide is committed; (ii) when committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances: (1) when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim; (2) when the victim is
under the custody of the police or military authorities; (3) when the rape is committed in full
view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity; (4) when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old; (5) when
the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease; (6) when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency; and (7) when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
From these heinous crimes, where the imposable penalties consist of two (2) indivisible penalties or
single indivisible penalty, all of them must be taken in relation to Article 63 of the RPC, which
provides:
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. - In all cases in which the law prescribes
a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following
rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
1. when in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance,
the greater penalty shall be applied.
2. when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is
no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act,
the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number
and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding
rules, according to the result of such compensation. (Revised Penal Code, Art. 63)
Thus, in order to impose the proper penalty, especially in cases of indivisible penalties, the court has
the duty to ascertain the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, in
crimes where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, the court can impose
either reclusion perpetua or death, depending on the mitigating or aggravating circumstances
present.
But with the enactment of RA 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited. It provides that in lieu of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC.
79

As a result, the death penalty can no longer be imposed. Instead, they have to impose reclusion
perpetua. Despite this, the principal consideration for the award of damages, following the ruling
in People v. Salome andPeople v. Quiachon, is "the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender."
80

81

82

When the circumstances surrounding the crime would justify the imposition of the death penalty
were it not for RA 9346, the Court has ruled, as early as July 9, 1998 in People v. Victor, that the
award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape when punishable by death should be 75,000.00 We
reasoned that "[t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and
the financial fluctuations over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity." Such reasoning also applies to all heinous crimes
found in RA 7659. The amount was later increased to 100,000.00.
83

84

85

In addition to this, the Court likewise awards moral damages. In People v. Arizapa, 50,000.00 was
awarded as moral damages without need of pleading or proving them, for in rape cases, it is
recognized that the victim's injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odious crime
of rape to warrant per se the award of moral damages. Subsequently, the amount was increased to
75,000.00 in People v. Soriano and P100,000.00 inPeople v. Gambao.
86

87

88

89

Essentially, despite the fact that the death penalty cannot be imposed because of RA 9346, the
imposable penalty as provided by the law for the crime, such as those found in RA 7569, must be
used as the basis for awarding damages and not the actual penalty imposed.
1avvphi1

Again, for crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of an ordinary
aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of 100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and 100,0000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or
the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of 100,000.00 is awarded as
exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages. Regardless of the attendance of
qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be fixed at 100,000.00. "[T]his
is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of
heinous crimes x x x."
90

91

When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only,
there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should
be 75,000.00 as civil indemnity, 75,000.00 as moral damages and 75,000.00 exemplary
damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the single act done by the offender
caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single design, the amount of civil
indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of victims. For each of the
victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder without any ordinary
aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed
is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed, then, for
every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with 100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
100,000.00 as moral damages and 100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
92

In case of a special complex crime, which is different from a complex crime under Article 48 of the
RPC, the following doctrines are noteworthy:
In People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog, this Court ruled that special complex crime, or more
properly, a composite crime, has its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. Justice Regalado, in his Separate Opinion in the case of People v. Barros, explained
that composite crimes are "neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on complex
crimes in Article 48 [of the Revised Penal Code], since they do not consist of a single act giving rise
to two or more grave or less grave felonies [compound crimes] nor do they involve an offense being
a necessary means to commit another [complex crime proper]. However, just like the regular
complex crimes and the present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a single
penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes although composed of two or more offenses."
93

94

In People v. De Leon, we expounded on the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, as
follows:
96

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery
must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or
simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be
consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the

95

homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the

occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder,
parricide, and infanticide.
97

In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is to be understood in its
generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries committed by reason or on occasion
of the rape. Hence, even if any or all of the circumstances (treachery, abuse of superior strength
and evident premeditation) alleged in the information have been duly established by the prosecution,
the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime committed by appellant is still rape
with homicide. As in the case of robbery with homicide, the aggravating circumstance of treachery is
to be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance only. Thus we ruled in People v.
Macabales:
98

99

Finally, appellants contend that the trial court erred in concluding that the aggravating circumstance
of treachery is present. They aver that treachery applies to crimes against persons and not to crimes
against property. However, we find that the trial court in this case correctly characterized treachery
as a generic aggravating, rather than qualifying, circumstance. Miguel was rendered helpless by
appellants in defending himself when his arms were held by two of the attackers before he was
stabbed with a knife by appellant Macabales, as their other companions surrounded them. In People
v. Salvatierra, we ruled that when alevosia (treachery) obtains in the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, such treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Robbery with homicide is a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the
Revised Penal Code. There is no special complex crime of robbery with murder under the Revised
Penal Code. Here, treachery forms part of the circumstances proven concerning the actual
commission of the complex crime. Logically it could not qualify the homicide to murder but, as
generic aggravating circumstance, it helps determine the penalty to be imposed.
100

Applying the above discussion on special complex crimes, if the penalty is death but it cannot be
imposed due to RA 9346 and what is actually imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil
indemnity and moral damages will be 100,000.00 each, and another 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to set an example. If there is another
composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty imposed is death, an additional
100,000.00 as civil indemnity, 100,000.00 moral damages and 100,000.00 exemplary damages
shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
For example, in case of Robbery with Homicide wherein three (3) people died as a consequence of
the crime, the heirs of the victims shall be entitled to the award of damages as discussed earlier.
This is true, however, only if those who were killed were the victims of the robbery or mere
bystanders and not when those who died were the perpetrators or robbers themselves because the
crime of robbery with homicide may still be committed even if one of the robbers dies. This is also
applicable in robbery with rape where there is more than one victim of rape.
101

102

In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which
the crime was committed and proven during the trial. Article 6 of the RPC provides:
Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. - Consummated felonies, as well as those
which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are
present; and it is frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the penalty imposed is death but
reduced toreclusion perpetua because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that
should be awarded will each be 100,000.00 and another 100,000.00 for exemplary damages or
when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the civil
indemnity and moral damages should be 75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary damages in the
amount of 75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil indemnity and
moral damages that should be awarded will each be 50,000.00, and an award of 25,000.00 civil
indemnity and 25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted stage. The
difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the
crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of the crime. The
said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or
attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime under
Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is 100,000.00 each, while in the attempted
murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is 25,000.00 each.
In a special complex crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims
(except the robbers) sustained injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered
that in a special complex crime, unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted
or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is
to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if
on the occasion of a robbery with homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the
severity, the crime committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime,
"Homicide", in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense
and now forms part of the essential element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of
force upon anything. Hence, the nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still
be determined for the purpose of awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal
wounds and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded
civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a
frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages should likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded
in an attempted stage.
103

In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties,
like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be 50,000.00 and 50,000.00 moral damages
without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an award of 50,000.00 exemplary damages
in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating circumstance present that has been
proven but not alleged in the information.
Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases. The
award of 25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the
104

Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the
victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. In this case, the Court
now increases the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to 50,000.00.
105

In the case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further
made atrocious by the fact that the victims are innocent, defenseless minors one is a mere 3year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the amount of awards for damages
is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of
lives.
In summary:
I. For those crimes like, Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional
Mutilation, Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
106

109

107

108

110

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity 100,000.00
b. Moral damages 100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 100,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
ii. Moral damages 75,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity 50,000.00
ii. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the abovementioned:
a. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
b. Moral damages 75,000.00

c. Exemplary damages 75,000.00

2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity 50,000.00
ii. Moral damages 50,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity 25,000.00
ii. Moral damages 25,000.00
iii. Exemplary damages 25,000.00
II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity 100,000.00
b. Moral damages 100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 100,000.00
111

1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:

112

a. Civil indemnity 50,000.00

b. Moral damages 50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the abovementioned:
a. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
b. Moral damages 75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
2.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:

a. Civil indemnity 25,000.00

b. Moral damages 25,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 25,000.00
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where death, injuries, or
sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages will
depend on the penalty, extent of violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity 100,000.00
b. Moral damages 100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 100,000.00
1.2 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the abovementioned:
a. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
b. Moral damages 75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed.
In other complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with
Rape, the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed
penalty and the penalty imposed, as the case may be.
IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide, Robbery with Rape, Robbery
with Intentional Mutilation, Robbery with
113

114

115

Arson, Rape with Homicide, Kidnapping with Murder, Carnapping with Homicide or
Carnapping with Rape, Highway Robbery with Homicide, Qualified Piracy, Arson with
Homicide, Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation and other crimes with death,
injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes, where the penalty consists of indivisible
penalties:
116

117

120

123

118

119

121

122

124

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because
of RA 9346:
a. Civil indemnity 100,000.00
b. Moral damages 100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages 100,000.00

In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the
above if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although
death did not occur.
1.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
125

a. Civil indemnity 75,000.00

b. Moral damages 75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
1.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity 50,000.00
b. Moral damages 50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
2.1 Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the abovementioned:
a. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
b. Moral damages 75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the
above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
2.2 For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not for a
timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
a. Civil indemnity 50,000.00
b. Moral damages 50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
2.3 For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity 25,000.00
b. Moral damages 25,000.00

c. Exemplary damages 25,000.00

In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise be
dependent on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
126

The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s
or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.
1wphi1

Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that
for every additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other
victims, the victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of
rape are treated as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple
rape/qualified rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible
penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous Affray, Infanticide to conceal the
dishonour of the offender, Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional
Abortion and Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
127

1.1 Where the crime was consummated:

a. Civil indemnity 50,000.00
b. Moral damages 50,000.00
1.2 Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where
there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous affray:
a. Frustrated:
i. Civil indemnity 30,000.00
ii. Moral damages 30,000.00
b. Attempted:
i. Civil indemnity 20,000.00
ii. Moral damages 20,000.00
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not
alleged in the Information, in addition to the above mentioned amounts as
civil indemnity and moral damages, the amount of 50,000.00 exemplary
damages for consummated; 30,000.00 for frustrated; and 20,000.00 for
attempted, shall be awarded.
128

VI. A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua and death
occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are entitled to the
following:
129

a. Civil indemnity 100,000.00

b. Moral damages 100,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 100,000.00

130

B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the rebellion and
could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be
awarded:
a. Civil indemnity 75,000.00
b. Moral damages 75,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 75,000.00
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
a. Civil indemnity 50,000.00
b. Moral damages 50,000.00
c. Exemplary damages 50,000.00
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral
expenses is presented in court, the amount of 50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be
awarded.
To reiterate, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the minimum amount for awards of civil
indemnity is P3,000.00, but does not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount
cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and
increased when the present circumstance warrants it.
131

Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary
aggravating circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the
following damages: (1) 100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2)
100,000.00 as moral damages for each of the two victims; (3) another 100,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of the two victims; and (4) temperate damages in the amount of 50,000.00 for
each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of Attempted Murder, appellant should pay
50,000.00 as civil indemnity, 50,000.00 as moral damages and 50,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary
damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.
132

Lastly, this Court echoes the concern of the trial court regarding the dismissal of the charges against
Gilberto Estores and Roger San Miguel who had been identified by Norberto Divina as the
companions of appellant on the night the shooting occurred. Norberto had been very straightforward
and unwavering in his identification of Estores and San Miguel as the two other people who fired the
gunshots at his family. More significantly, as noted by the prosecutor, the testimonies of Estores and
San Miguel, who insisted they were not at the crime scene, tended to conflict with the sworn
statement of Danilo Fajarillo, which was the basis for the Provincial Prosecutor's ruling that he finds

no probable cause against the two. Danilo Fajarillo's sworn statement said that on June 6, 2002, he
saw appellant with a certain "Hapon" and Gilbert Estores at the crime scene, but it was only
appellant who was carrying a firearm and the two other people with him had no participation in the
shooting incident. Said circumstances bolster the credibility of Norberto Divina's testimony that
Estores and San Miguel may have been involved in the killing of his two young daughters.
After all, such reinvestigation would not subject Estores and San Miguel to double jeopardy because
the same only attaches if the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached before
the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first. In turn, a first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b)
before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. In this case, the case against Estores and San Miguel was dismissed
before they were arraigned. Thus, there can be no double jeopardy to speak of. Let true justice be
served by reinvestigating the real participation, if any, of Estores and San Miguel in the killing of
Mary Grace and Claudine Divina.
133

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 30, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03252 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of murder defined
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, and hereby sentences him to suffer two (2) terms of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole under R.A. 9346. He is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Mary Grace Divina
and Claudine Divina the following amounts for each of the two victims: (a) 100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) 100,000.00 as moral damages; (c) 100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
and (d) 50,000.00 as temperate damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, the Court finds accused-appellant Ireneo
Jugueta GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of attempted
murder defined and penalized under Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of the Revised Penal
Code, attended by the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, and sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
for each of the four (4) counts of attempted murder. He is ORDERED to PAY moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of
PS0,000.00 to each of the four victims, namely, Norberto Divina, Maricel Divina, Elizabeth
Divina and Judy Ann Divina.
(3) Accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta is also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid, to be
imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages and temperate
damages.
(4) Let the Office of the Prosecutor General, through the Department of Justice,
be FURNISHED a copy of this Decision. The Prosecutor General is DIRECTED to
immediately conduct a REINVESTIGATION on the possible criminal liability of Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel regarding this case. Likewise, let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Secretary of Justice for his information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165751. April 12, 2005

DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure assailing
the resolutions1of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26381, admitting the Amended
Information2 and denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, 3 dated 12 January 2004 and 03
November 2004, respectively.
An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga and Naimah Unte with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, for their alleged illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A.
Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:
That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotabato City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary, DAR, DATU GUIMID
MATALAM, a high ranking public official, HABIB A. BAJUNAID, ANSARI M. LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA
and NAIMAH UNTE, all low-ranking public officials, committing the offense while in the performance
of their official duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue
injury to several employees of the Department of Agrarian Reform, cotabato City, thru evident bad
faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to pay the
monetary claims of the complaining DAR employees namely: KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E.
ZAILON, ESMAEL A. EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE ZAILON, PENDATUN MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA
MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the period of January 1998 to June 1999 amounting to
P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service Resolutions Nos. 982027 and 990415 in the nature of
unpaid salaries during the period when they have been illegally terminated, including salary
differentials and other benefits.4
On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.
Per order of the court, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted where petitioner filed his
Counter-Affidavit.5
After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid Matalam" 6 to which petitioner
filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to Admit the Alleged Amended Information
Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam.7 Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed his Reply8 to which
petitioner filed a Rejoinder.

The Amended Information reads:

That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in cotabato City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused a public officer being then
the ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary DAR, committing the offense while in the
performance of his official duties and thru evident bad faith and manifest partiality did there and then,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, cause undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service
complaining DAR-Maguindanao employees, cotabato City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E.
Zailon, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatum Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil, to their
damage and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the period
when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other benefits. 9
In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an entirely new
cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer his alleged refusal to pay
the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal
dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses. He insists that the amended information
charging a separate and entirely different offense cannot be admitted because there would be a
serious violation of due process of law. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since
he was not informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses
and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.
On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P. Matalam. It admitted the
Amended Information charging solely petitioner for Violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019.
The court a quo ruled:
What seems to be more crucial here is, whether the amendments made are not prejudicial to the
rights of the accused and are considered as a matter of form only, so that, if the Amended
Information is admitted, there would be no need to require the Public Prosecutor to conduct another
preliminary investigation in the observance of the rights of the accused to due process. On the other
hand, if the amendment would be substantial, necessarily, another preliminary investigation should
be accorded to the accused. Distinction of the two is thus imperative.
...
The Amended Information charges essentially the same offense as that charged in the original
Information which is a Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Theoretically, therefore, the amendment is
a matter of form only.
Interestingly, however, the change in the recital of cause of action in the Amended Information is
very much noticeable. As correctly pointed out by accused Matalam, the corpus delicti in the original
Information was the alleged willful and confederated refusal of the accused to pay the backwages of
the complaining witnesses. Thecorpus delicti in the Amended Information is now altered into the
alleged illegal dismissal of the complainants from their service by accused Matalam. Certainly, the
two causes of action differ differently from each other.
Following the aforementioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the amendments seem to
be substantial considering that the main defense of all the accused in the original information the
lack of a corresponding appropriation for the payment of the monetary claims of the complaining

witnesses would not, in itself alone, stands [sic] as a defense for accused Matalam in the Amended
Information anymore. In the same manner, the evidence that accused Matalam would have to
present in the original Information, had it not been found to be without prima facie evidence, will not
be equally available to bail him out in the Amended Information anymore. And further, although the
nature of the offense charged has not changed, the theory of the case as against accused Matalam
is now deemed to have been changed because the cause of action now varies and therefore, he
would have to formulate another defense again.
However, after making a meticulous and independent assessment on the evidence obtaining on
record, this Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the Public Prosecutor that the
real and exact issue in this case is actually the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining
witnesses. The issue of non-payment of their backwages is merely incidental because had it not
been for the alleged illegal dismissal, their demand for monetary claims should have not arisen. Put
in another perspective, the surrounding circumstances that brought about the issue of the alleged
illegal dismissal were actually the ones that spewed the issue of unpaid backwages.
Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Public Prosecutor, the change in the recital of the cause
of action does not conceivably come as a surprise to the accused. In fact, in his counter-affidavit
submitted before the Public Prosecutor, accused Matalam already took the occasion to elaborate his
version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about the alleged illegal dismissal of the
complaining witnesses. And these chain of circumstances, actually, were the very preceding
circumstances as to why the complaining witnesses had suffered their alleged injury. The need for
another preliminary investigation is therefore not necessary.
Given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused Matalam are not, after all, in any way
prejudiced because an inquiry to the allegations in the original cause of action would certainly and
necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the new cause of
action contained in the Amended Information.
To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of time considering
that accused, in his counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively his defense on the new
allegations contained in the Amended Information sought to be admitted. And definitely, his projected
defense would be the same assuming that another preliminary investigation be conducted and that
he would be required to submit another counter-affidavit again. 10
On 11 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 which the prosecution
opposed.12 On 03 November 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion. 13 It explained:
While it is true that accused-movants defense in the original information could not by itself stand
alone as his defense to the amended one, however, the same would still be available for the latter
because although the two questioned causes of action literally varied, they are nonetheless
interrelated with each other. The essential ingredients of the amended information are actually
identical with those constituting the original, such that, the inquiry into one would elicit substantially
the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal. And since these two causes of action had
emanated from the same set of factual settings, the evidence that accused-movant might have
under the original information would still be available and applicable to the amended one.
Be it noted that the private complainants lodged their complaint due to the alleged injury they
suffered as a consequence of the alleged refusal of the accused-movant to pay them of their

backwages. And notably, based on the affidavit that the accused-movant had submitted, his defense
to this was due to the lack of funds appropriated for the said purpose. But why was there no
appropriation? Because, allegedly, the private complainants were illegally dismissed from their
service and as a result thereof, their names were subsequently stricken off from the roster of
employees in the government agency where they were connected.
Culled from these factual settings, the root cause of the alleged injury suffered by the private
complainants would therefore be their alleged illegal dismissal from the service. Otherwise, their
names would not have been stricken off from the roster of employees in the agency which they were
connected with and the appropriation for the payment of their salaries would have been continuously
made.
Thus, from the foregoing, although there was a change in the recital of the cause of action (from
non-payment of backwages into illegal dismissal), the amendment of the information did not however
affect or alter the nature of the offense that was originally charged. Neither did it change the basic
theory of the prosecution since this remained to be a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 on account
of the alleged injury caused to the private complainants. And even if the prosecutions theory would
now be premised on the new cause of action (illegal dismissal), this would not however cause
surprise to the accused-movant nor would require him to undergo a material change or modification
in his defense because in presenting his defense, he still has to commence from the very same set
of factual settings that preceded the original cause of action. And evidently, this is the reason why in
the affidavit he submitted during the reinvestigation, his discussions therein consisted not only of his
defense to the original information but also included an extensive discussion regarding his defense
to the amended one.
This being so, the outright admission of the amended information even without affording the
accused-movant a new preliminary investigation did not amount to a violation of his rights. To afford
him another process of preliminary investigation would no longer serve him and this court any better
considering that he had already explained in the said affidavit his defense to the amended
information. Otherwise, if he is allowed to submit another one, he is likely to elaborate again the very
same arguments that he had already invoked in his previous affidavit.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03
November 2004 admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without conducting a
preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of jurisdiction
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the arguments raised by petitioner, the issue boils down to whether or not petitioner was
deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Information without
conducting another or new preliminary investigation. Firstly, petitioner maintains that a new
preliminary investigation should have been ordered because the corpus delicti in the Amended
Information is the termination of services of the complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti in the
Original Information is the alleged refusal to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. In
other words, there being a new and distinct offense, he should be entitled to a new preliminary
investigation. Secondly, he contends he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ruled
that if "he were allowed to submit another counter-affidavit, he is likely to elaborate again the very
same argument that he had invoked in his previous affidavit" considering that he would have pointed

out certain facts not contained in his counter-affidavit. He added that despite the finding of the
Sandiganbayan that "the theory of the case against him changed because the cause of action
varies, and that he would have to formulate another defense," the Sandiganbayan did not remand
the case to the public prosecutor for preliminary investigation because it was a waste of time since
he had already explained extensively in his counter-affidavit his defense on the new allegations
contained in the Amended Information. Thirdly, he asserts he was not given the opportunity to show
that he did not act with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the seven
employees inasmuch as there are other factors and circumstances that would support his posture.
In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor,
stated that the admission of the Amended Information without another preliminary investigation
would not violate petitioners right to due process on the ground that the amendment is merely
formal, and to require another preliminary investigation would not be in obedience to, but in
disregard of, the prime purpose for which a preliminary investigation is ordained by law and
jurisprudence. It maintains that petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in
illegally terminating the complainants from service.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner filed his Reply.14
The initial question to be resolved is what kind of amendment was made in the Information?
Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.
Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment
may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. 15
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 16
The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate
only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the
original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to
cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an
amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; 17(5) an amendment
that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new

and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained
in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. 18
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be whether a
defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in
the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of
the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance.19
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting the
offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly
committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the
private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of
the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable
refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the
service of the private complainants.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken, the
information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court; but if amended in
substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation, unless the amended charge
is related to or is included in the original charge. 20
Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information entitles an
accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended information contains a charge
related to or is included in the original information, a new preliminary investigation is not required.
The Sandiganbayan and the public prosecutor maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a new
preliminary investigation because the charges in the original information and amended information
are related and the latter has already presented his defense on the amended charge. Further,
remanding the case to the Public Prosecutor for another preliminary investigation would be a waste
of time considering that petitioner had already explained extensively his defense on the new
allegations contained in the Amended Information, that is, the accused already elaborated his
version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about the alleged dismissal of the
complaining witnesses. It added that the change in the recital of the cause of action will not come as
a surprise to the accused because the causes of action, though different, are nonetheless
interrelated, and that the rights of the accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the
allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts
to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information.
On the other hand, petitioner insists he should be given a new preliminary investigation because he
was not, among other things, given the opportunity to show that he did not act with manifest partiality
and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the private complainants.
While it is true that the charges in the original and amended informations are related, i.e., an inquiry
into one would have elicited substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that an inquiry into the
other would have brought into light,21 this fact should not necessarily deprive an accused to his right
to a new preliminary investigation. As above-stated, the rule is that a new preliminary investigation is

needed if there is a substantial amendment. The exception, i.e., charge is related or included in the
original information, should not be applied automatically. The circumstances in every case must be
taken into consideration before the accused is deprived of another preliminary investigation.
The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or private persons
charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official duty in
relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence;
and
4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.22
The third element of the offense states that the public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in committing the prohibited act. Admittedly, the alleged
illegal dismissal contained in the amended charge gave rise to the original charge of failure to pay
the monetary claims of private complainants. It cannot be disputed that petitioner already discussed
circumstances surrounding the termination of services of the private complainants in his counteraffidavit. However, we find nothing therein that would show that he had already touched the issue of
evident bad faith or manifest partiality. As can be gathered from the counter-affidavit, there were
arguments tending to counter the presence of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross
inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure to pay the monetary claims
and not to the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegation stemmed from the other, the court a
quo and the public prosecutor cannot say the element of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence is the same in both. This being an element of the offense charged,
petitioner should be given the opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.
If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will
definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut
evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal.
He will be denied due process.
A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and
substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process. 23
Our rulings in the cases of People v. Magpale24 and Lava v. Gonzales25 where no new preliminary
investigation was given because the charges in the amended informations were related to, or
included in, the original charges cannot apply in the case at bar. The factual milieu in those cases is
different from the case before us.
In Magpale, the accused was charged with violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code for
illegal possession of iron brand, and making or ordering the making thereof. In the notices sent to

the accused in connection with the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the accused was
informed not of one but of both. He was given the chance, and was placed on guard, to defend
himself for both charges. Moreover, the right of the accused to have another preliminary
investigation was waived when he went forward with the trial.
In Lava, the accused was charged with Complex Rebellion but the charge was later amended to
Simple Rebellion. This court held that a new preliminary investigation was not necessary there being
no change in the nature of the crime charged, and that accused failed to ask for a reinvestigation
upon learning of the amended information.
In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the same (Violation of Section 3(e),
Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended), the prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to
pay monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to submit his
evidence on the absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal
dismissal. Petitioner has not waived his right to a new preliminary investigation and, instead, is
asking for one.
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is
reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution. 26
Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under the Rules.
This Court is not determining if petitioner should or should not be brought to trial. What we are
looking into is whether or not petitioner was given all the opportunity to present countervailing
evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding that petitioner was not given the chance to
fully present his evidence on the amended information which contained a substantial amendment, a
new preliminary investigation is in order.
As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation would be
merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof will hold back the
progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused may be afforded his right to a
preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation should never be
compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
Finally, as to petitioners prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed, the same
cannot be ordered. The absence27 or incompleteness28 of a preliminary investigation does not
warrant the quashal or dismissal of the information. Neither does it affect the courts jurisdiction over
the case or impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The court shall hold
in abeyance the proceedings on such information and order the remand of the case for preliminary
investigation or completion thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent courts resolutions dated
12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381 are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. Respondent court is directed to order the Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a
preliminary investigation of the charge embodied in the Amended Information filed against petitioner.
It is further directed to suspend the proceedings in the said case pending termination of the
preliminary investigation, and thereafter to take such action on petitioners case as may be
warranted by the results of said preliminary investigation.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171271 August 31, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA, Appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua was charged with the crime of murder in an amended
Information 1 that reads:
That on or about the 12th of February, 2001, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with intent
to kill and with evident premeditation, treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Evelyn Kho y Sua on the different
parts of her body with the use of a deadly weapon, thereby inflicting upon said Evelyn Kho y Sua
stab wounds, which directly caused her death; that the act was committed inside the dwelling of
Evelyn Kho y Sua and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account
of his (sic) rank, age or sex.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Accused was employed as a family driver by Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho since 1998. The latter worked as
the managing partner of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, a law firm operated as a sole proprietorship,
and located at 2302 Atlanta Center, 31 Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Juan, M.M. Accused was
initially paid P6,000.00 a month as wages, aside from boarding, food, overtime and extra pay, which
he received when he did extra driving and other work for Atty. Sua-Khos family.
On February 12, 2001, at around 6:00 oclock in the evening, the accused drove Atty. Sua Kho to her
condominium unit at 1702 Platinum 2000, Anapolis St., Greenhills, San Jun M.M. After handing his
employers bag to Marissa Hiso, the housemaid, accused proceeded to the kitchen where he drank
a glass of water. Also in the condominium unit were Atty. Sua-Khos three year old daughter Issa and
her nanny, Nelie Maglasang. After talking and playing with her daughter for a few minutes, Atty. SuaKho emerged from the bedroom to talk with the accused. Shortly thereafter, Marrisa heard her
employer screaming, and she saw the accused stabbing her with their kitchen knife. She tried to
stop the accused, shouting "Kuya Bert!", but the latter continued to stab Atty. Sua-Kho. Meanwhile,
Nelie also heard her employers screams, and locked herself with Issa in the masters bathroom.
When she peeped-out from her hiding place, she saw Marissa, whom she signaled to go downstairs
for help. The latter did so, and sought help from the security guard. Nellie, meanwhile called Atty.
Sua-Khos father, Marcelino Sua, and husband, Daniel Kho, on the bedroom phone.

When Marcelino Sua arrived, he saw Marissa and a security guard in front of the condominium unit.
When they entered, they saw the bloodied and unmoving body of Atty. Sua-Kho sprawled on the
floor. Marcelino then brought his daughter to the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital, where doctors
tried to revive her, but failed. The accused, meanwhile, fled, using the victims car. He was arrested
soon afterwards in Calapan, Mindoro, while on his way to his home province.
Upon examination of the victims body, Dr. Edgardo Rodriguez Vida found that she suffered eighteen
(18) stab wounds and three (3) incise wounds aside from other minor injuries. The stab wounds on
her chest were considered fatal as they affected both lungs, the main blood vessel of the heart and
the heart itself. There were four stab wounds on the heart, one on the right lung and four on the left
lung. According to the doctor, the wounds could have been caused by a sharp single-bladed object
and that the incise wounds found on the left forearm, right wrist and left leg could have been inflicted
while Atty. Sua-Kho tried to parry the blows.
Marian Aquino, legal secretary of the Lawyers Advocate Circle, where the victim worked, related that
prior to the killing of Atty. Sua-Kho, the accused had confided to her about his grudges against the
victim, such as being given spoiled food, that his meals were being measured, that he worked long
hours of the day and served many bosses. On February 11, 2001, accused spent the day at her
boarding house where he told her he could no longer take the way Atty. Sua-Kho treated him. Later
he said "nadedemonyo na ako" and that he would finish Atty. Sua-Kho. He would hit her at the back,
very deep, and he would make sure that she would die. Then he would go to the province, his
territory, where he could not be followed.
Atty. Joel Baguio, an associate at the Lawyers Advocate Circle, also testified that before the killing,
the accused told him of his grudges against Atty. Sua-Kho, like his being scolded for being late, and
being called a thief, a killer, and ex-convict and other bad names. On February 12, 2001, the
accused also told him not to get too close, as he might get involved in what was going to happen.
The accused, on the other hand, raised the defense of self-defense. Atty. Sua-Kho, he testified,
didnt want her husband to know that she had been taking trips with a company guest, a certain
Phillip Robinson, to Puerto Azul and Daranak Falls in Tanay. She warned the accused that
something bad would happen to him if her husband would learn about it. In the evening of February
12, 2001, Atty. Sua-Kho urged accused to go to her fathers house, because her husband Daniel
Kho would be arriving. As she and the accused argued about Phillip Robinson, the former got a knife
and stabbed him with it, catching him on the wrist. Accused managed to wrest control of the knife,
and with it, stabbed Atty. Sua-Kho three or four times. After he stabbed her he was shocked and left
the place using the victims car. He fled to Mindoro where he allegedly surrendered to the police. 2
On March 26, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused, Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is sentenced to suffer
the severe penalty of death by lethal injection with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to
pay the costs.
On the civil liability of the accused, he is ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual, moral,
nominal, exemplary and temperate damages in the respective sums of P298,202.25, P50,000.00,
P200,000.00, P200,000.00 and P50,000.00. He is also ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00

for the loss of the victims life, all with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6 percent per annum from
this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED. 3
The case was elevated to this Court because the penalty imposed was death. However, pursuant to
our ruling in People v. Mateo, 4 the case was transferred and referred to the Court of Appeals. 5
On October 21, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellant, having been found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder, is hereby sentenced to Death. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
following:
(1) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P298,202.25 as actual damages; and
(4) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
The awards of temperate and nominal damages are hereby DELETED.
Since the imposition of the death penalty in this case was affirmed, this Decision and the complete
records of this case are hereby ordered TRANSMITTED to the Supreme Court on automatic review,
immediately upon the promulgation of this Decision.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals disregarded appellants claim of self defense for lack of evidence and for being
incredible considering the number and location of wounds sustained by the victim and his flight from
the crime scene. It also noted that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime as there
were no particulars as to how the killing began or executed.
However, the appellate court found that evident premeditation was adequately established which
qualified the killing to murder. Likewise, it appreciated abuse of superior strength as an aggravating
circumstance.
As regards the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to the rank, sex and age of the
victim, the Court of Appeals noted that these circumstances were included as amendments to the
information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence. As such, the same should not
be allowed because it will prejudice the rights of the appellant.

In a Resolution dated March 7, 2006, we required both parties to file supplemental briefs. The Office
of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer be filing a supplemental brief. On the other
hand, appellant insisted on his theory of self defense and prayed for his acquittal.
We agree with the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants claim of selfdefense is self-serving hence should not be given credence. In Cabuslay v. People, 7 we ruled that:
One who invokes self defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof
shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and
convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger.
With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self defense must be established:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self
defense.
Appellants version of the stabbing incident does not inspire belief. His testimony that it was Atty.
Sua-Kho who attacked him is uncorroborated and improbable. Appellants alleged use of reasonable
means to repel the aggression is also untenable considering the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim which demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend
oneself. 8 We note that the victim suffered 18 stab wounds which were all directed to her chest, heart
and lungs. She also had incised wounds which were inflicted while she was parrying the blows
coming from the appellant. In fact, appellant testified that Atty. Sua-Kho was running away from him
but he still pursued her and inflicted the fatal wounds:
Q: According to you, Atty. launched at you and you covered and cut on your left hand and that was
the time you got the knife and what happened after that?
A: What I remember is that she went inside.
Q: So, she run (sic) away from you, is that what you are saying?
A: When I was hit and I was able to stab her, she ran towards the room.
Q: So she was trying to avoid [you] after she stabbed you the first time?
A: I do not know, what I know is that when I stabbed her, she went inside the room.
Q: What part of the body did you hit her the first time?
A: At the abdominal area, sir.
Q: After that initial wound, Atty. Kho run (sic) towards the room, is that correct?
A: What I remember, she run (sic), sir. 9
Moreover, appellants act of fleeing from the crime scene instead of reporting the incident to the
police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence but highly indicative of guilt and negate his
claim of self defense. 10

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present.
Treachery under paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined as the deliberate
employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the intended victim might raise. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a)
the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender from defensive
and retaliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself; and (b) the
means, method and manner of the execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the
offender. 11 Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conclusively as the killing itself. 12
In the instant case, there is no proof on how the attack was commenced. Where no particulars are
known as to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which resulted in the
death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions
that the killing was perpetrated by treachery.13
We find however that evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength attended the
killing.
Like any other circumstance that qualifies a killing as murder, evident premeditation must be
established by clear and positive evidence; 14 that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 15 The
essence of premeditation is that the execution of the act was preceded by cool thought and
reflections upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to
arrive at a calm judgment. To be considered, the following elements must be proven: (1) the time
when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating that he has
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the execution, to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 16
Prosecution witnesses Marian Aquino and Atty. Joel Baguio testified as to appellants state of mind
and predisposition to avenge the alleged maltreatment by the victim. Both witnesses testified on
appellants ill-plans against his employer the day prior to the crime. Absent evidence showing any
reason or motive for the witnesses to falsely testify against the appellant, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists and their testimonies should be accorded full faith and credit.
Thus, the lower courts correctly concluded that evident premeditation attended the commission of
the crime.
Appellant likewise took advantage of his superior strength to perpetuate the criminal act. He killed
Atty. Sua-Kho by overpowering her and driving the murder weapon into her body several times,
despite her attempts to parry the blows. He could not have executed the dastardly act without
employing physical superiority over the victim. InPeople v. Espina, 17 we have ruled that an attack by
a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the
circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him,
and from which the woman was unable to defend herself.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the amendments in the information
regarding the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to
rank, age or sex. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 18 provides that an amendment after the
plea of the accused is permitted only as to matters of form, provided leave of court is obtained and

such amendment is not prejudicial to the rights of the accused. A substantial amendment is not
permitted after the accused had already been arraigned. 19
In Teehankee, Jr. v. Madayag, 20 we had the occasion to distinguish between substantial and formal
amendments:
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following
have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations which relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which
does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3)
additional allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise
to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right to invoke
prescription.
The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally
available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might
have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. 21
Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult
or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial,
amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or
distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the
range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not
adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. 22 Besides, appellant never objected to the
presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in
disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex. 23 Without any
objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived. 24
There is no dispute that Atty. Sua-Kho was killed in her home. Appellant could have killed her
elsewhere but he decided to commit the crime at her home; thus we appreciate the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. However, it was not convincingly shown that appellant deliberately
intended to offend or disregard the respect due to rank, age, or sex of Atty. Sua-Kho. The motive for
the murder was his grudge against the victim and not because she was a lawyer and his employer.
Neither did appellant took into consideration the age of Atty. Sua-Kho and the fact that she is a
woman when he killed her.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, 25 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, 26 prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Considering the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, and taking advantage of
superior strength without any mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty would have
been death. 27
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty on June 24, 2006 28, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion perpetua, thus:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act
No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the
penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of
the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.
Pursuant to the same law, appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Regarding damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and (6) interest, in
proper cases. 29
We affirm the monetary awards granted by the Court of Appeals but modify the amount of actual
damages and exemplary damages.
The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Hence, based on recent jurisprudence, the award of
civil indemnity ex delicto of P75,000.00 for the heirs Atty. Sua-Kho is in order.
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or
loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at repairing the wrong
done. 30 To be recoverable, actual and compensatory damages must be duly proved with reasonable
degree of certainty. 31 In the present case, the award of actual damages of P298,210.25 32 is correct,
considering that the said amount has been duly proven.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 in view of the
violent death of the victim and the resultant grief of her family.
Article 2230 of the Civil Code specifically states that exemplary damages may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in this case. Moreover, as an
example and deterrent to future similar transgressions, the Court finds that an award of P25,000.00
for exemplary damages is proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01366,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Elberto Tubongbanua y Pahilanga
isfound GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt ofMURDER as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, qualified by evident premeditation and with the

attendant aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength and dwelling, with no
mitigating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty would have been death. However, pursuant
to Republic Act No. 9346, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua without
possibility of parole. The appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho, the
amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; P298,210.25 as actual damages; 50,000.00 as moral
damages; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; all with interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160451

February 9, 2007

EDUARDO G. RICARZE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC.,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK), Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 68492, and its Resolution2 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration and the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation,
a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to the main office of
Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to
Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltexs customers. 3
On November 6, 1997, Caltex, through its Banking and Insurance Department Manager Ramon
Romano, filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on
October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was
discovered that unknown to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13,
1997 in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB
on October 15, 1997. An investigation also revealed that two other checks (Check Nos. 73999 and
74000) were also missing and that in Check No. 74001, his signature and that of another signatory,
Victor S. Goquinco, were forgeries. Another check, Check No. 72922 dated September 15, 1997 in
the amount ofP1,790,757.25 likewise payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, was also cleared through the
same bank on September 24, 1997; this check was likewise not issued by Caltex, and the signatures
appearing thereon had also been forged. Upon verification, it was uncovered that Check Nos. 74001
and 72922 were deposited at the Banco de Oros SM Makati Branch under Savings Account No. S/A
2004-0047245-7, in the name of a regular customer of Caltex, Dante R. Gutierrez.

Gutierrez, however, disowned the savings account as well as his signatures on the dorsal portions
thereof. He also denied having withdrawn any amount from said savings account. Further
investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged
checks were deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. A bank teller from the Banco
de Oro, Winnie P. Donable Dela Cruz, positively identified petitioner as the person who opened the
savings account using Gutierrezs name.4
In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998.
However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requisite
preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification
of commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, Branch 63. The Informations are worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 98-1611
That on or about the 24th day of September 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual,
with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines,
Inc. through its duly authorized officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial
document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the
following manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 72922
dated September 15, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50 with
intent to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously affixed or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and
Victor Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it
to appear that Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank
check no. 72922 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said
accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from Payables
Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed
by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner above
set forth, the said accused purporting himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the
check with Banco De Oro under Account No. 2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds
of the falsified but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by
Ramon Romano, in the amount of Php1,790,757.50.
Criminal Case No. 98-1612
That on or about the 15th day of October 1997 in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a private individual,
with intent to defraud and intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of Caltex Philippines,
Inc. through its duly authorized officers/representatives, and by means of falsification of commercial
document, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Caltex Phils., Inc., in the
following manner, to wit: said accused, having obtained possession of PCIBank check no. 74001
dated October 13, 1997 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25 with intent
to defraud or cause damage to complainant Caltex Phils., Inc., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
affixed or caused to be affixed signatures purporting to be those of Ramon Romano and Victor
Goquingco, Caltex authorized officers/signatories, and of payee Dante R. Gutierrez, causing it to
appear that Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco have participated in the issuance of PCIBank
check no. 74001 and that Dante R. Gutierrez had endorsed it, when in truth and in fact, as said

accused well knew, such was not the case, since said check previously stolen from Payables
Section of CALTEX, was neither duly signed by Ramon Romano and Victor Goquingco nor endorsed
by Dante R. Gutierrez, after the check, a commercial document, was falsified in the manner above
set forth, the said accused purporting himself to be the payee, Dante R. Gutierrez, deposited the
check with Banco De Oro under Account No. 2004-0047245-7, thereby appropriating the proceeds
of the falsified but cleared check, to the damage and prejudice of complainant herein represented by
Ramon Romano, in the amount of Php5,790,570.25.5
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. 6 Pre-trial
ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the
Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal
Offer of Evidence.7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was
represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was
only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private
prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not
withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the
Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence
filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private
complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the
Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original
Informations.8 He insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the
offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount
to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and
interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil
indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount
was brought out on cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB
pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank
dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex.9
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO.10 In his Rejoinder, he averred that the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion; the Information
must be amended to allege that the private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the
preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is
a mere formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the
Information. To support its claim, PCIB cited the ruling of this Court in Sayson v. People. 11
On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the
substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioners motion to have
the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record. 12 Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied on November 14, 2001. 13

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for
Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for the annulment of the RTCs
Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. The petitioner averred that:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRIEVEOUSLY (SIC) ERRED IN RENDERING ITS ORDER ISSUED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION BY ALLOWING THE SUBSTITUTION OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, AFTER THE
ACUSED WAS ALREADY ARRAIGNED AND PROSECUTION HAS ALREADY TERMINATED
PRESENTING ITS EVIDENCE THEREBY PATENTLY VIOLATING THE STRICT CONDITION
IMPOSED UPON BY RULE 110 SEC. 14 RULES ON CRIMINAL ROCEDURE.
II
AND AS A COROLLARY GROUND RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RENDERING AN ORDER RECOGNIZING THE
APPEARANCE OF A NEW PROSECUTOR WITHOUT WRITTEN OR EVEN ORAL WITHDRAWAL
OF THE COUNSEL ON RECORD.14
According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. The
amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party would
prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which
would be unavailable if the Informations are amended. Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the
Sayson case did not apply to this case.
On November 5, 2002, the appellate court rendered judgment dismissing the petition. The fallo
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition to annul the orders dated July 18, 2001 and
November 14, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 981611 and 98-1612 is hereby DENIED and consequently DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex, it was
subrogated to the latters right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses against property,
the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the
criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. The appellate court
cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Ho16 and People v. Reyes.17
On October 17, 2003, the CA issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition which is anchored on the following grounds:
I. THE PEOPLE V. YU CHAI HO 53 PHILIPPINES 874 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT
BAR CONSIDERING THE PACTS ARE SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.

II. LIKEWISE, THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS. REYES CA, 50 (2) OG 665, NOVEMBER 11,
1953 HAS NO MATERIAL BEARING TO THE PRESENT CASE.
III. THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS
OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
IV. THERE IS NO VALID SUBROGATION BETWEEN CALTEX AND PCIBANK. ASSUMING
THERE IS, THE CIVIL CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED TO PROSECUTE.
V. THE TWIN INFORMATIONS UPON WHICH PETITIONER WAS INDICTED, ARRAIGNED,
PRE-TRIAL HELD AND PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TERMINATED THE PRESENTATION OF
ITS EVIDENCE IN CHIEF ARE DEFECTIVE AND VOID, HENCE THE DISMISSAL IS IN
ORDER.
VI. PETITIONER TIMELY OBJECTED TO THE APPEARANCE OF PRIVATE
PROSECUTOR FOR PCIBANK.
VII. THE FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACTS ARE NOT SUPORTED BY THE RECORD NOR
EVIDENCE AND BASED ON MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS.
VIII. PETITIONERS SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT
VIOLATE THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE UNDER SEC. 8, RULE 15 OF THE 1997 RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.19
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner argues that the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complainant at this late stage of
the trial is prejudicial to his defense. He argues that the substitution is tantamount to a substantial
amendment of the Informations which is prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 5, Rule 11020 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to
another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly
instituted, and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it
separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action
(including the civil) remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor. The
prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will
act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and
inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be
costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the
case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.21

On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.22 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102
and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment
may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After
arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused. 23
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 24 The following
have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of
the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds
specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts,
and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged. 25
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged

therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. 26
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial
amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it
result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks
remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he
cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Petitioner next argues that in no way was PCIB subrogated to the rights of Caltex, considering that
he has no knowledge of the subrogation much less gave his consent to it. Alternatively, he posits
that if subrogation was proper, then the charges against him should be dismissed, the two
Informations being "defective and void due to false allegations."
Petitioner was charged of the crime of estafa complex with falsification document. In estafa one of
the essential elements "to prejudice of another" as mandated by article 315 of the Revise Penal
Code.
The element of "to the prejudice of another" being as essential element of the felony should be
clearly indicated and charged in the information with TRUTH AND LEGAL PRECISION.
This is not so in the case of petitioner, the twin information filed against him alleged the felony
committed " to the damage and prejudice of Caltex." This allegation is UNTRUE and FALSE for there
is no question that as early as March 24, 1998 or THREE (3) LONG MONTHS before the twin
information were filed on June 29, 1998, the prejudice party is already PCIBank since the latter ReCredit the value of the checks to Caltex as early as March 24, 1998. In effect, assuming there is valid
subrogation as the subject decision concluded, the subrogation took place an occurred on March 24,
1998 THREE (3) MONTHS before the twin information were filed.
The phrase "to the prejudice to another" as element of the felony is limited to the person
DEFRAUDED in the very act of embezzlement. It should not be expanded to other persons which
the loss may ultimately fall as a result of a contract which contract herein petitioner is total stranger.
In this case, there is no question that the very act of commission of the offense of September 24,
1997 and October 15, 1997 respectively, Caltex was the one defrauded by the act of the felony.
In the light of these facts, petitioner submits that the twin information are DEFECTIVE AND VOID
due to the FALSE ALLEGATIONS that the offense was committed to the prejudice of Caltex when it
truth and in fact the one prejudiced here was PCIBank.
The twin information being DEFECTIVE AND VOID, the same should be dismissed without prejudice
to the filing of another information which should state the offense was committed to the prejudice of
PCIBank if it still legally possible without prejudicing substantial and statutory rights of the
petitioner.27
Petitioners argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIBs
comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional subrogation.
Subrogation is the transfer of all the rights of the creditor to a third person, who substitutes him in all
his rights.28 It may either be legal or conventional. Legal subrogation is that which takes place without

agreement but by operation of law because of certain acts.29 Instances of legal subrogation are those
provided in Article 130230 of the Civil Code. Conventional subrogation, on the other hand, is that
which takes place by agreement of the parties.31 Thus, petitioners acquiescence is not necessary for
subrogation to take place because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by
operation of law, and without need of the debtors knowledge.
Contrary to petitioners asseverations, the case of People v. Yu Chai Ho32 relied upon by the
appellate court is in point. The Court declared
We do not however, think that the fiscal erred in alleging that the commission of the crime resulted to
the prejudice of Wm. H. Anderson & Co. It is true that originally the International Banking
Corporation was the prejudiced party, but Wm. H. Anderson & Co. compensated it for its loss and
thus became subrogated to all its rights against the defendant (article 1839, Civil Code). Wm. H.
Anderson & Co., therefore, stood exactly in the shoes of the International Banking Corporation in
relation to the defendant's acts, and the commission of the crime resulted to the prejudice of the firm
previously to the filing of the information in the case. The loss suffered by the firm was the ultimate
result of the defendant's unlawful acts, and we see no valid reason why this fact should not be stated
in the information; it stands to reason that, in the crime of estafa, the damage resulting therefrom
need not necessarily occur simultaneously with the acts constituting the other essential elements of
the crime.
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to intervene in
the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its properties or funds,
reparation, or indemnification.
Petitioners gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both
Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of
the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. The complaint or information must state the name and
surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any
appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of
identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property
must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.

(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was
committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be
inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or
designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring
that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law. (12a)
In Sayson v. People,33 the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the
name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in
the complaint or information can be properly identified:
The rules on criminal procedure require the complaint or information to state the name and surname
of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed or any appellation
or nickname by which such person has been or is known and if there is no better way of Identifying
him, he must be described under a fictitious name (Rule 110, Section 11, Revised Rules of Court;
now Rule 110, Section 12 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] In case of offenses against
property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as
long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. Thus,
Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 11. Name of the offended party
(a) In cases of offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the
property, subject matter of the offense, must be described with such particularity as to
properly Identify the particular offense charged.
(b) If in the course of the trial, the true name of the person against whom or against whose
property the offense was committed is disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause the
true name to be inserted in the complaint or information or record.

In U.S. v. Kepner [1 Phil. 519 (1902)], this Court laid down the rule that when an offense shall have
been described in the complaint with sufficient certainty as to Identify the act, an erroneous
allegation as to the person injured shall be deemed immaterial as the same is a mere formal defect
which did not tend to prejudice any substantial right of the defendant. Accordingly, in the
aforementioned case, which had a factual backdrop similar to the instant case, where the defendant
was charged with estafa for the misappropriation of the proceeds of a warrant which he had cashed
without authority, the erroneous allegation in the complaint to the effect that the unlawful act was to
the prejudice of the owner of the cheque, when in reality the bank which cashed it was the one which
suffered a loss, was held to be immaterial on the ground that the subject matter of the estafa, the
warrant, was described in the complaint with such particularity as to properly Identify the particular
offense charged. In the instant suit for estafa which is a crime against property under the Revised
Penal Code, since the check, which was the subject-matter of the offense, was described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, it becomes immaterial, for purposes of

convicting the accused, that it was established during the trial that the offended party was actually
Mever Films and not Ernesto Rufino, Sr. nor Bank of America as alleged in the information.
Lastly, on petitioners claim that he timely objected to the appearance of SRMO 34 as private
prosecutor for PCIB, the Court agrees with the observation of the CA that contrary to his claim,
petitioner did not question the said entry of appearance even as the RTC acknowledged the same
on October 8, 1999.35 Thus, petitioner cannot feign ignorance or surprise of the incident, which are
"all water under the bridge for [his] failure to make a timely objection thereto." 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154629 October 5, 2005
SPO4 MARINO SOBERANO, SPO3 MAURO TORRES and SPO3 JOSE
ESCALANTE, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In November 2000, the prominent public relations practitioner, Salvador "Bubby" Dacer, together with
his driver, Emmanuel Corbito, was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. in the City of Manila. Their
charred remains, consisting of burnt bones, metal dental plates and a ring, were later found in
Barangay Buna Lejos, Indang, Cavite. They were positively identified by their dentists and by
forensic pathologists from the University of the Philippines.1 Both victims were killed by
strangulation.2
A preliminary investigation was conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) through a panel of
prosecutors made up of State Prosecutor II Ruben B. Carretas, State Prosecutor Geronimo L. Sy
and Prosecution Attorney Juan Pedro C. Navera.
On 11 May 2001, an Information3 was filed by the panel of prosecutors with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), City of Manila.4 The following were charged with double murder:
Jimmy L. Lopez
Alex B. Diloy
William L. Lopez
(all detained)

SPO4 Marino Soberano

SPO3 Mauro Torres
SPO3 Jose Escalante
Crisostomo M. Purificacion
Digo De Pedro
Renato Malabanan
Jovencio Malabanan
Margarito Cueno
Rommel Rollan
(all under the custody of PNP-CIDG Camp Crame, Quezon City)
P/Supt. Glen Dumlao
P/C. Insp. Vicente Arnado
P/Insp. Roberto Langcauon
SPO4 Benjamin Taladua
SPO1 Rolando Lacasandile
P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva
SPO1 Mario Sarmiento
SPO1 William Reed
PO2 Thomas J. Sarmiento
SPO1 Ruperto A. Nemeno
John Does and James Does
(all at large)
The Information reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom are public officers, being then members

of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt.
Dumlao, P/C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento,
SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno), with evident premeditation,
treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and remoteness of the place and with deliberate
intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the accused police
officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kill SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO by strangulation, which was
the immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their body (sic) by incineration, to the
damage and prejudice of the latters respective heirs.
The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 41, Manila, presided by Judge Rodolfo A. Ponferrada.
On 23 May 2001, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information5 which was granted
and the Amended Information was admitted by the trial court.
The Amended Information6 reads:
That on or about November 24, 2000 in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, some of whom are public officers, being then members
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force assigned at Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task
Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City, (SPO4 Soberano, SPO3 Torres, SPO3 Escalante, P/Supt.
Dumlao, P/ C. Insp. Arnado, P/Insp. Langcauon, SPO4 Taladua, SPO3 Villanueva, SPO1 Sarmiento,
SPO1 Reed, PO3 Lacasandile, PO1 Sarmiento and SPO1 Nemeno),abduct SALVADOR (Bubby)
DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmea Highway (formerly South Super
Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite, and with
evident premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, nighttime and remoteness of the place
and with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring, confabulating and confederating with one another, the
accused police officers using their offices in committing the offense, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kill said SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO by
strangulation, which was the immediate cause of their death, and thereafter dispose of their body by
incineration, to the damage and prejudice of the latters respective heirs.
On 24 May 2001, Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio
Malabanan and Rollan moved to quash the Information.
Accused P/Supt. Glen Dumlao was subsequently arrested. He later executed a sworn statement
implicating other police officers to the Dacer-Corbito double murder, specifically P/Supt. Michael Ray
B. Aquino, P/Supt. Cesar Mancao, PO3 Larry Ambre and a certain Rigor,7 all former members of the
defunct Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
On 18 June 2001, one of the accused, P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva, filed a Motion for Reinvestigation
asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. He stressed that it
was not him but a certain "SPO3 Allan Cadenilla Villanueva" who was previously identified by
several witnesses as one of the culprits.8 This was granted by the trial court.
On 26 June 2001, in view of the sworn statement executed by Dumlao, the prosecution filed a
Motion for Reinvestigation9 which was granted by the trial court in its Order 10 dated 04 July 2001. The

prosecution was ordered to terminate the reinvestigation and submit its findings within twenty (20)
days. The arraignment was set on 30 July 2001.
On 28 June 2001, the trial court denied the joint Motion to Quash the Information earlier filed by
Soberano, Escalante, Torres, Purificacion, Renato Malabanan, Jovencio Malabanan and Rollan.
On 02 August 2001, the National Bureau of Investigation filed a new complaint with the DOJ against
a new suspect in the same case, by the name of P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Via, who was also a member of
the PAOCTF.
After the reinvestigation, the prosecution filed a Motion to Discharge dated 13 August 2001, praying
that P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva11 be discharged from the Information, and that he be immediately
released from detention. In its Order12 dated 16 August 2001, the trial court granted the motion.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information13 dated 17 September 2001 was filed by
the prosecution. The Amended Information --(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they
are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr.
Supt. Teofilo Via.
Accused Soberano, Torres, Escalante, Purificacion, Renato and Jovencio Malabanan opposed the
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information in an Opposition14 dated 28 September
2001. They prayed that the Motion to Admit Amended Information and the discharge of accused
Dumlao, Diloy and the brothers Lopez be denied.
In its Order dated 01 October 2001, the trial court denied the Motion to Admit Amended Information.
The prosecution filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in an Order 15 dated 24 October
2001.
On 16 November 2001, the prosecution moved in open court to inhibit Judge Ponferrada from
hearing the case. Acting on this motion, Judge Ponferrada, on 22 November 2001, ordered that the
case be re-raffled. The case was re-raffled to Branch 18, RTC, Manila, presided by Judge Perfecto
A.S. Laguio.
On 04 January 2002, the prosecution filed a special civil action for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order before the Supreme Court praying that the Orders of then Judge
Ponferrada dated 01 and 24 October 2001 be annulled and set aside and that Judge Perfecto A.S.
Laguio of Branch 18 be restrained, in the meantime, from proceeding with the case in accordance
with said orders. In a Resolution16dated 21 January 2002, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action.
On 04 April 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, 17 the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE
COURSE and the writ prayed for, accordingly GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated October 01,
2001 and October 24, 2001 which were issued by JUDGE RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in Criminal
Case No. 01-191969, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jimmy Lopez, et al." are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent JUDGE PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. or any person or
persons acting in his stead, is/are hereby ORDERED to ADMIT the Amended Information dated
September 17, 2001 substituting SPO3 ALLAN CADENILLA VILLANUEVA for P/Insp. DANILO
VILLANUEVA as accused, and charging P/Senior Supt. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, P/Senior Supt.
CEZAR MANCAO II and P/Senior Supt. TEOFILO VIA as additional accused, and discharging or
excluding only the accused JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM L. LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY and to
CONTINUE with the proceedings therefrom with utmost deliberate dispatch. Needless to state, the
original information filed on May 11, 2001 stands insofar as P/Senior Supt. GLEN(N) G. DUMLAO is
concerned.18
Accused Soberano, Escalante and Torres moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
Decision. In a Resolution19 dated 12 August 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order 20 dated 28 August
2002 filed by Soberano, Torres and Escalante where they assign as errors the following:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE PONFERRADA
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE ADMISSION OF THE AMENDED
INFORMATION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPLYING SECTION 14 OF RULE 110 OF THE REVISED RULES
ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (RRCP) IN ALLOWING THE DISCHARGE OF ACCUSED DILOY
AND THE LOPEZ BROTHERS.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION WAS
TANTAMOUNT TO A PRIOR LEAVE OF COURT AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 14 OF
RULE 110 OF THE RRCP.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPLYING SECTION 17 OF RULE 119 OF THE RRCP IN
THE DISCHARGE OF THE ACCUSED.
V
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 17 OF RULE
119 OF THE RRCP TO A SITUATION WHERE THE ACCUSED HAS ALREADY BEEN ARAIGNED
AND UNDERGOING TRIAL.

Gathered from the above assignment of errors, the fundamental issue that must be resolved
concerns the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information
excluding some of the accused named in the original information for utilization as witnesses for the
State. The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and Section 17 of
Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or
excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons
in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended
party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case,
the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they
may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the
sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is
satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court
denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The trial court, in denying the prosecutions motion to admit amended information discharging some
accused, ratiocinated that to admit said amended information would be violative of Section 17, Rule
119, thus:

After study, it appearing that the Amended Information not only includes new accused, namely,
SPO3 Allen Villanueva, P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao and P/Supt. Teofilo Via
but excludes or discharges certain accused, namely, Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Diloy
and Glenn Dumlao from the original Information to be used as state witnesses, the Court is not
inclined to grant the motion as it believes and so holds that in the discharge of the accused to be
state witnesses the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
should be observed and/or complied with. Stated otherwise, to grant the motion and admit the
Amended Information outright would violate said section which is quoted as follows. . . . 21
The Court of Appeals held the contrary view. It reasoned that Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable in
the instant case and not Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:
To begin with, it is undeniable, and it is necessary to point out, that Criminal Case No. 01-191969
has already been filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on May 11, 2001. The Motion to Admit
was filed later or on September 18, 2001.
While it is true that once the information is filed in court, the court acquires complete jurisdiction over
it, We are not unmindful of the well-settled ruling of the Supreme Court that the determination of who
should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one.
Section 14, Rule 110 (Prosecution of Offenses) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, reads
"Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
"However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in
or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the
offended party.
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not
be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial."
Applying the import of the afore-quoted Section 14, Rule 110, it appears that the Amended
Information sought to be admitted by the petitioner finds sufficient support therein, considering,
firstly, that there has been no arraignment yet. Secondly, when respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADA granted the motion for reinvestigation in the Order dated July 04, 2001, there was in
effect a prior leave of court given to the State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice to conduct
the same, substantially complying with such requirement under the second paragraph of Section
14, Rule 110. After all, a leave of court is defined a "permission obtained from a court to take some
action which, without such permission, would not be allowable: as, to sue a receiver, to file an
amended pleading, to plead several pleas."

In the case of People v. Montesa, Jr., the Supreme Courts pertinent ruling, which We now reiterate,
finds application in the case at bench, i.e., where a judge grants a motion for reinvestigation [as in
this case], he is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the
Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and to determine
whether the information it has filed should stand, and that the final disposition on the reinvestigation
should be the sole and only valid basis for the judges final action with respect to the reinvestigation.
Thus, in accord with the aforesaid Montesa, Jr. ruling, respondent JUDGE RODOLFO A.
PONFERRADAs "sole and only basis" for the inclusion (or exclusion, for that matter) of the
additional accused should be the final disposition on the reinvestigation conducted by the State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justices.
Consistent with the foregoing disquisition, We hold the opinion that Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), . . .
is not applicable under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bench, although in the case
of Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, We are mindful of the Supreme Courts clarification that only
when an information, charging two (2) or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed
in court will Section 9, Rule 119 (Trial) of the Rules of Court [now 100% restated under Section 17,
Rule 119 (Trial) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure] "come into play."
Section 17, Rule 119 (Trial), contemplates a situation wherein the Information is already filed, the
accused is already arraigned, undergoing trial and the prosecution has not rested its case.
Here, although the original Information has already been filed, the four (4) accused sought to be
discharged or excluded from the Amended Information have not been arraigned and no trial has
been commenced. Thus, the discharge or exclusion being sought by the petitioner may come under
the purview of Republic Act No. 6981, a special law which the Department of Justice is called upon
to enforce and implement. Considering that the State Prosecutors disposition on the investigation in
Criminal Case No. 01-191969 should be the sole and only valid basis of respondent JUDGE
RODOLFO A. PONFERRADA in considering whether the Amended Information sought to be
admitted should stand or not, it follows that the discharge/exclusion of the four (4) accused
underRepublic Act No. 6981 must be directed by the Department of Justice, not by the court a quo.
Needless to say, Section 9, Rule 119 [of the Rules of Court] does not support the proposition that
the power to choose who shall be state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. It is not
constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enactRepublic Act No. 6981 vesting in the
Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who
shall be granted immunity from prosecution.22 (Emphasis in original)
The petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Section 14 of Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on amendment of complaints. Instead, what should have been
applied was Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as witness for the state. The
petitioners further aver that even if it is only a simple discharge under Section 14 of Rule 110, it is
still necessary to seek prior leave of court. The prosecution simply filed an Amended Information
excluding Jimmy and William Lopez, Alex Diloy and Glen Dumlao, without prior leave of court, and
moved for its admission.23
The petitioners also argue that while the determination of who should be criminally charged is
essentially an executive function, the discharge of an accused when an Information had already
been filed lies with the court.24Further, the petitioners assert that the Motion For Reinvestigation

which was approved by the trial court is not tantamount to a Motion For Leave to File an Amended
Information as required under Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 25
In answer to all these, the prosecution contends that the admission of the Amended Information was
not violative of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, contrary to the
opinion of the trial court.26
The prosecution insists that Judge Ponferrada should have just required it to present evidence in
support of the discharge for had this procedure been followed, the fact of admission of the accused
sought to be discharged into the Witness Protection Program (WPP) would have come to light. 27
The prosecution likewise professes that Section 14, Rule 110 should be applied, and not Section 17,
Rule 119 for the following reasons: first, while the case was already filed in court, the accused
therein have not yet been arraigned; second, the trial court ordered the reinvestigation of the case;
and third, new evidence dictate the necessity to amend the Information to include new accused and
to exclude other accused who will be utilized as state witnesses.28
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an
information to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least,
Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to
complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of
discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the requirements
for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as
additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one
provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or
Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused
must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave
of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds
for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is
sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as
state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive
function, not a judicial one.29 The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether,
what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
best appreciated by prosecutors.30 By virtue of the trial court having granted the prosecutions motion
for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of
the Government.31 Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus
equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof.

The foregoing discussion is qualified by our decision in the seminal case of Crespo v.
Mogul,32 wherein we declared that:
. . . Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the
permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is
true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case
should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition
the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration
of the Court. The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial
rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecutions discretion is not boundless or infinite. The prosecution
must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of utilizing him as
state witness is qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information but his discharge
as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests its case, in which event, the
procedural (in addition to the substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise
stated, when no amendment to the information is involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and trial
proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of
Section 17, Rule 119. It is fitting then to re-state the rule inGuingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals33 that
. . . [T]he decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. Only when
an information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court
will Rule 119, Section 934 of the Rules of Court, come into play. . . .
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the accused to be discharged is included in
the information that the prosecution must present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon
whom discretion rests, as to the propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.
Having thus ruled, it now behooves upon this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals was
correct in admitting the amended information insofar as the discharge of JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM
LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY is concerned.
It is undisputed that the motion to admit amended information seeking the exclusion of the abovenamed accused (together with P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO) was with notice to the offended party
and was set for hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial courts grant of the prosecutions
motion for reinvestigation operates as leave of court to amend the information, if the situation so
warrants.
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals considering that we
do not perceive here any impairment of the substantial rights of all the accused or the right of the
people to due process.
As we have discussed earlier in this decision, the trial court is with discretion to grant or deny the
amendment of the information. In general, its discretion is hemmed in by the proscription against
impairment of the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.

In this case, in denying the motion to admit amended information, the trial court simply said that the
same was violative of Section 17, Rule 119 without stating the reasons therefor. And for this lapse,
the trial court has indeed erred.
One final point. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, it held that the discharge or exclusion of
P/Sr. Supt. Glen Dumlao from the Amended Information finds no legal basis under Republic Act No.
698135 for he is a law enforcement officer. The original information, according to the Court of
Appeals, should stand insofar as Dumlao is concerned.
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 6981 provides:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or
information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before
any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the
Program:
Provided, That:
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised
Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is
subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced,
intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively,
because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other law enforcement
officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the
protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the
requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shall
admit said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper
certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as
the Witness.
It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981 enumerates the requirements before a
person may be admitted to the WPP. It does not state that if an accused cannot be admitted to the
WPP, he cannot be discharged as a witness for the state. Admission to the WPP and being
discharged as an accused are two different things. Dumlaos being a law enforcement officer and,
thus, disqualified to be under the WPP, do not in any way prohibit him to be discharged from the
information.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 04 April 2002 and 12 August 2002, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION to include P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO as one of the accused excluded from the
Amended Information dated 17 September 2001. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157472

September 28, 2007

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and OLYMPIO L.
ESCUETA, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by SSGT. Jose M.
Pacoy1(petitioner) seeking to annul and set aside the Orders dated October 25, 2002 2 and December
18, 20023 issued by Presiding Judge Afable E. Cajigal (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac in Criminal Case No. 02-42.
On July 4, 2002, an Information for Homicide was filed in the RTC against petitioner committed as
follows:
That on or about the 18th day of March 2002, in the Municipality of Mayantoc, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused with intent to kill, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita
with his armalite rifle hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on
his body which caused his instantaneous death.
With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank. 4
On September 12, 2002, upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded
not guilty to the charge of Homicide. Respondent Judge set the pre-trial conference and trial on
October 8, 2002.5
However, on the same day and after the arraignment, the respondent judge issued another
Order,6 likewise dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank alleged in the
Information which public respondent registered as having qualified the crime to Murder.
Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word "Homicide"
and instead wrote the word "Murder" in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the Information.
The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for Homicide,
with the correction of the spelling of the victims name from "Escuita" to "Escueta." 7
On October 8, 2002, the date scheduled for pre-trial conference and trial, petitioner was to be rearraigned for the crime of Murder. Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would

be placed in double jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his
express consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on the
amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not guilty.8
On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend Proceedings
Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion9 on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner alleged
that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and arraigned before a competent court,
and the case was terminated without his express consent; that when the case for Homicide was
terminated without his express consent, the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of
Homicide placed him in double jeopardy.
In an Order10 dated October 25, 2002,11 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Quash. He ruled
that a claim of former acquittal or conviction does not constitute double jeopardy and cannot be
sustained unless judgment was rendered acquitting or convicting the defendant in the former
prosecution; that petitioner was never acquitted or convicted of Homicide, since the Information for
Homicide was merely corrected/or amended before trial commenced and did not terminate the
same; that the Information for Homicide was patently insufficient in substance, so no valid
proceedings could be taken thereon; and that with the allegation of aggravating circumstance of
"disregard of rank," the crime of Homicide is qualified to Murder.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Inhibit with attached Motion for Reconsideration. In his Motion to Inhibit,
he alleged that the respondent judge exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary, capricious and partial
manner in mandating the amendment of the charge from Homicide to Murder in disregard of the
provisions of the law and existing jurisprudence.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner reiterated that the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent, which constitutes a ground to quash the
information for murder; and that to try him again for the same offense constitutes double jeopardy.
Petitioner stated that contrary to respondent judge's conclusion that disregard of rank qualifies the
killing to Murder, it is a generic aggravating circumstance which only serves to affect the imposition
of the period of the penalty. Petitioner also argued that the amendment and/or correction ordered by
the respondent judge was substantial; and under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, this cannot be done, since petitioner had already been arraigned and he would
be placed in double jeopardy.
In his Order dated December 18, 2002,12 the respondent judge denied the Motion to Inhibit and
granted the Motion for Reconsideration, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion to Inhibit is hereby DENIED while the Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED.
Unless ordered otherwise by the Highest Court, the presiding judge shall continue hearing this case.
Further, the Order dated October 25, 2002 is reconsidered and the original information charging the
crime of homicide stands.13
In granting the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent judge found that a close scrutiny of Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code shows that "disregard of rank" is merely a generic
mitigating14 circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to
murder.

On April 30, 2003, petitioner filed herein petition for certiorari on the following grounds:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE INFORMATION FROM
HOMICIDE TO MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND VIOLATED THE
LAW IN DENYING THE MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION FOR MURDER.
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED HIS
JURISDICTION AND VIOLATED THE LAW IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE
INFORMATION FOR HOMICIDE WHICH WAS ALREADY TERMINATED.15
Petitioner alleges that despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the
public respondent ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder because of
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of "disregard of rank," which is in violation of Section
14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; that the public respondents ruling that
"disregard of rank" is a qualifying aggravating circumstance which qualified the killing of 2Lt. Escueta
to murder is erroneous since, under paragraph 3, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, disregard of
rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to affect the penalty to be imposed
upon the accused and does not qualify the offense into a more serious crime; that even assuming
that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating circumstance, such is a substantial amendment
which is not allowed after petitioner has entered his plea.
Petitioner next contends that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he denied the
Motion to Quash the Information for Murder, considering that the original Information for Homicide
filed against him was terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same
offense would place him in double jeopardy.
Petitioner further argues that although the respondent judge granted his Motion for Reconsideration,
he did not in fact grant the motion, since petitioner's prayer was for the respondent judge to grant the
Motion to Quash the Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy; that his Motion for
Reconsideration did not seek the reinstatement of the Information for Homicide upon the dismissal of
the Information for Murder, as he would again be placed in double jeopardy; thus, the respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the Homicide case.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that the respondent judge's Order reinstating the
Information to Homicide after initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein
petition moot and academic; that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy,
i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his consent; that petitioner confuses amendment with substitution of Information;
that the respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an amendment of the
Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure; and
that amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.
Private respondent Col. Olimpio Escueta, father of the victim, filed his Comment alleging that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the respondent judge when he denied petitioner's
Motion to Quash the Amended Information, as petitioner was not placed in double jeopardy; that the

proceedings under the first Information for homicide has not yet commenced, and the case was not
dismissed or terminated when the Information was amended.
In his Reply, petitioner reiterates his contention that the amendment of the charge of Homicide to
Murder after his arraignment would place him in double jeopardy, considering that said amendment
was without his express consent; and that such amendment was tantamount to a termination of the
charge of Homicide.
The parties filed their respective Memoranda.
Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition for certiorari is highly improper, for it violates the
established policy of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. However, the judicial
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.16 A strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal
questions.17
In the present case, petitioner submits pure questions of law involving the proper legal interpretation
of the provisions on amendment and substitution of information under the Rules of Court. It also
involves the issue of double jeopardy, one of the fundamental rights of the citizens under the
Constitution which protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against
being tried for the same offense. These important legal questions and in order to prevent further
delay in the trial of the case warrant our relaxation of the policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
We find no merit in petitioner's contention that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in amending the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge in
the Information for Homicide. The argument of petitioner -Considering the fact that the case for Homicide against him was already terminated without his
express consent, he cannot anymore be charged and arraigned for Murder which involve the same
offense. The petitioner argued that the termination of the information for Homicide without his
express consent is equivalent to his acquittal. Thus, to charge him again, this time for Murder, is
tantamount to placing the petitioner in Double Jeopardy.18
is not plausible. Petitioner confuses the procedure and effects of amendment or substitution under
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to wit -SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in
substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and
during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done
without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would
not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
with Section 19, Rule 119 of which provides:
SEC. 19. When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense. - When it becomes manifest
at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such
case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original
case upon the filing of the proper information.
First, a distinction shall be made between amendment and substitution under Section 14, Rule 110.
For this purpose, Teehankee v. Madayag19 is instructive, viz:
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the
second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and substitution of the information may be made
before or after the defendant pleads, but they differ in the following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or substantial changes, while substitution
necessarily involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be effected without leave of court, but
substitution of information must be with leave of court as the original information has to be
dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is no need for another preliminary
investigation and the retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of information,
another preliminary investigation is entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same offense charged in the original information or
to an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the original charge,
hence substantial amendments to the information after the plea has been taken cannot be
made over the objection of the accused, for if the original information would be withdrawn,
the accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other hand, substitution requires or
presupposes that the new information involves a different offense which does not include or
is not necessarily included in the original charge, hence the accused cannot claim double
jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of
Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is
that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information, an amendment of the information is

sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different
from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the
same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this
connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential
elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.20
In the present case, the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution as defined in Teehankee.
While the amended Information was for Murder, a reading of the Information shows that the only
change made was in the caption of the case; and in the opening paragraph or preamble of the
Information, with the crossing out of word "Homicide" and its replacement by the word "Murder."
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the determination
of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended Information for Murder are exactly the
same as those already alleged in the original Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any
change in the act imputed to petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying
circumstance. Thus, we find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from "Homicide"
to "Murder" as purely formal.21
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which the
accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice the rights of the
accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a
complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally
stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made; and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information. 22 Since the facts alleged
in the accusatory portion of the amended Information are identical with those of the original
Information for Homicide, there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case;
neither would there be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that "disrespect on account of rank" qualified the
crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance, 23 we do not find that he
committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the amendment of the Information after
petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was
only formal and did not adversely affect any substantial right of petitioner.
Next, we determine whether petitioner was placed in double jeopardy by the change of the charge
from Homicide to Murder; and subsequently, from Murder back to Homicide. Petitioner's claim that
the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the
Amended Information for Murder on the ground of double jeopardy is not meritorious.
Petitioner's Motion to Quash was anchored on Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Section 7 of the same Rule lays down the requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy
may prosper, to wit:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, there is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy
attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second
jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first.24
As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the
accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent.25
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case that bars
further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or the frustration
thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information. 26
Petitioner's insistence that the respondent judge dismissed or terminated his case for homicide
without his express consent, which is tantamount to an acquittal, is misplaced.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by Section 7 presupposes a definite or unconditional
dismissal which terminates the case.27 And for the dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause, it
must have the effect of acquittal.
1wphi1

The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to correct and
amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a new Information charging the
proper offense as contemplated under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court -- which, for convenience, we quote again -If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one

charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused shall not
be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance
at the trial.
and Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes manifest
at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense and the
accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense necessarily included
therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears good cause to detain him. In such
case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for the proper offense and dismiss the original
case upon the filing of the proper information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense charged is
wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted of a crime with which
he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which case, there must be a dismissal
of the charge and a substitution of a new information charging the proper offense. Section 14 does
not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In this connection, the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form a part of those constituting the latter.28
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge merely ordered
the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original Information. To repeat, it was
the same original information that was amended by merely crossing out the word "Homicide" and
writing the word "Murder," instead, which showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
Anent the last issue, petitioner contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
ordering that the original Information for Homicide stands after realizing that disregard of rank does
not qualify the killing to Murder. That ruling was again a violation of his right against double jeopardy,
as he will be prosecuted anew for a charge of Homicide, which has already been terminated earlier.
We are not convinced. Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002 showed that the respondent judge granted
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy exists, but on his
realization that "disregard of rank" is a generic aggravating circumstance which does not qualify the
killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly corrected himself by reinstating the original
Information for Homicide. The requisite of double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second is not present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor
was the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. 29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, there being no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Judge.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA
CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR
GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case
filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was
elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the
merits.
On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed
an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77. 1 When the case was set for arraigment the accused
filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the
resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor,

A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of

August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to
elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3
Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion.

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the
accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August
17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the
accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he
recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the
Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to
compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally
resolved the petition for review. 7
On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition
for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trial
court, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2, 1978
the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the
motion and set the arraigniment stating:

ORDER
For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised
on insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident
from Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to
move for dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the

payment of a pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and
not criminal.
The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the
accused on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of
Justice, a matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also
erodes the Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without
merit and therefore hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at
9:00 o'clock in the moming.
SO ORDERED. 11
The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the
issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals
that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued by the Court of
Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979
the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said
decision filed by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that
said decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing
his threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the
information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the
said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16
In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the
petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within
ten (10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the
petition be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply
to the comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the
resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the
Court En Banc. In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due
course to the petition.
Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be
reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.
It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends
upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not fonow that presented by the
offended party, according to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. 18 The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded

Prosecuting officers under the power vested

in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the
evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. 21 They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation
they become convinced that the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22
prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.

20

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a
puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the
fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a Court
to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that
the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24Neither has the Court any power to order
the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with
the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of
the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same commit no
error.26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the dismissal should the reinvestigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt may not be established beyond
reasonable doubt. 27 In a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did,
or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally
prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be
issued by the courts to restrain a criminal prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary
for the Courts to do so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an op pressive and vindictive manner. 30
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is
subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe
and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or
reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the rase be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires
jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case. 32 When after the
filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and
the accused either voluntarily submited himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the
information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion
the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such
reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for
appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether
or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court
whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be addressed for
the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused. 36or the right of the People to due process of law. 36a
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the
fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the
Court, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the
trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon
the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state
prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does

not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the
prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk
from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances
much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private
prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is
to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to
the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial
court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination
of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by
the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed
after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.
In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who
reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice
should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action
of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be
left entirely for the determination of the Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151785

December 10, 2007

SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision1 dated August 29, 2001 and Resolution dated
January 15, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58270.

The facts are:

Sometime in 1989, the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Bangued, same province, four separate Informations for illegal recruitment against Susan FrondaBaggao, petitioner, and Lawrence Lee, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 744, 745, 746 and 749.
Petitioner eluded arrest for more than a decade; hence, the cases against her were archived. On
July 25, 1999, petitioner was finally arrested.2
On July 26, 1999, the prosecutor filed with the trial court a motion to amend the Informations. He
prayed that the four separate Informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there would
only be one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale. On the same day, the trial court denied
the motion for lack of merit.
On August 6, 1999, the prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order dated January 26,
2000, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale, thus:
Accordingly, the Order dated July 26, 1999 denying the motion to amend Information is
hereby set aside and the Information for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale is hereby
admitted in substitution of the other four Informations.
Moreover, considering that illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in a large
scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage, let this case be
forwarded to RTC, Branch 2, a Special Criminal Court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
March 21, 2000.
On April 11, 2000, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 58270.
In its Decision dated August 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. Likewise, in its
Resolution dated January 15, 2002, petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue for our resolution is whether the four Informations for illegal recruitment could be amended
and lumped into one Information for illegal recruitment in large scale.
Petitioner contends that (a) Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure refers
to an amendment of one Information only, not four, which cannot be joined in only one Information;
and that (b) the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into a single Information
for a graver offense violates her substantial rights.

Respondent, on the other hand, prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in
form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of
court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged
in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon
motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all
parties, especially the offended party.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of
a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the
accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to
give bail for their appearance at the trial. (Emphasis ours)
Simply stated, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the
complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the
accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial
to the accused.3
Following the above provisions and considering that petitioner has not yet entered her plea, the
four Informations could still be amended.
Petitioner also contends that the above Rule refers to an amendment of one Information only, not
four or multiple Informations which cannot be joined into only one Information.
We disagree.
A careful scrutiny of the above Rule shows that although it uses the singular
word complaint or information, it does not mean that two or more complaints or Informations
cannot be amended into only one Information. Surely, such could not have been intended by this
Court. Otherwise, there can be an absurd situation whereby two or more complaints or Informations
could no longer be amended into one or more Informations. On this point, Section 6, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court is relevant, thus:
SEC. 6. Construction. - These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

In fact, in Galvez v. Court of Appeals,4 before the accused were arraigned, this Court allowed the
amendment of three original Informations for homicide and frustrated homicide into four Informations
for murder, frustrated murder and illegal possession of firearms.
Petitioner contends that the amendment of the four Informations for illegal recruitment into a single
Information for illegal recruitment in large scale violates her substantial rights as this would deprive
her of the right to bail which she already availed of. Such contention is misplaced. Obviously,
petitioner relies on Section 14 of the same Rule 110 which provides that "after the plea and during
the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused." As stated earlier, petitioner has not yet been
arraigned. Hence, she cannot invoke the said provision.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58270 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.