Although one doesn't hear about it in the news, the US nuclear arsenal still exists and is

still important. It is generally accepted

(http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2006JD008235/full), and has been re-affirmed by US
presidents from Reagan to Obama, that the use of the US's nuclear arsenal in war could spell
total destruction. In Ronald Reagan's words, "A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be
fought." (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40205) Those words are no less
true today than they were when Reagan uttered them more than 30 years ago.
With that in mind, I thought I would investigate into the direction the US arsenal has
taken recently. In particular, I will examine the contradiction between what both the US
executive branch and the military say with regards to the future of the US arsenal, and what is
the actual US plan for the next 10-20 years.
US presidents have repeatedly stressed the dangers of a worldwide nuclear buildup, and
have reavowed the US' commitment to reduce its weapons to zero at some future date, in
accordance with our obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
(https://web.archive.org/web/20070807060917/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infc
ircs/Others/infcirc140.pdf). In his Prague speech, April 2009 (https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered), President Obama said, "Today,
I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons." He went on to outline a plan for global nuclear arms
reductions and anti-proliferation efforts. His belief in a nuclear-free world was granted increased
urgency one year later by the 2010 Nuclear Policy Report (NPR) from the Department of
Defense
(http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Revie
w_Report.pdf), which states that:
Concerns have grown that we are approaching a nuclear tipping point - that unless today's
dangerous trends are arrested and reversed, before very long we will be in a world with a
steadily growing number of nuclear-armed states and an increasing likelihood of terrorists
getting their hands on nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, in the same report, the DoD claims that the international security
environment has changed such that the threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the
risk of nuclear attack has increased. Since the US no longer feels threatened by one large

adversary but by many smaller ones, it can fulfill its security objectives with significantly lower
force levels, beginning with a 30% reduction of the arsenal from the previous arms limitations
agreement (under the 2002 SORT agreement, also called the Moscow Treaty).
As such, the NPR recommends a strategy of stockpile management according to which
no new warhead designs will be produced; existing warheads will be maintained using preexisting technology without introducing new capabilities; and finally, when maintenance must be
performed, refurbishment and reuse will be preferred over replacement of parts unless
replacement is the only viable option. Essentially, the US nuclear arsenal will retain its current
structure but at a diminished scale.
Despite the president's overtures, and despite the DoD's stated plans to cut back on
weapons, a glance at the budget tells a different story. Although the size of the arsenal has been
reduced by about 50% since 2000, yearly spending on the nuclear arsenal has doubled in that
time (http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_nuclear_weapons_cost_study.pdf). Not only that, but
the 2017 budget outlines a plan which would significantly increase spending on nukes over the
next 10-20 years. A Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report
(https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/12-19-2013NuclearForces.pdf) on nuclear spending from the years 2014-2023 pegs the ticket at around
$300b for that decade, though the report indicates that some of the R&D programs driving that
cost increase would barely be getting off the ground in that time (for example, the designs for the
next generation of nuclear submarines will be completed, but no new subs will yet have been
purchased).
The size of the budget casts suspicion on the rhetoric surrounding nuclear arms
reductions, and an investigation of the programs allocated in that budget does not reassure.
Though the military claimed that it would avoid new capabilities and adhere as closely as
possible to existing designs, all three legs of the US nuclear triad submarine-launched
missiles, or SLBMs; intercontinental missiles launched from US-based silos, or ICBMs; and
nuclear-capable bombing aircraft are receiving updates beyond mere maintenance.
For example, the W78 and W88 warheads used on ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively,
would be combined into one "Interoperable Warhead", the planned IW-1. This warhead is a mix
of designs from three different warheads. In contradiction to its plan to diverge from existing
designs as little as possible, the DoD's new warheads combine different designs in novel ways

which have not been tested to the extent that the existing W78/88's have. Because the new
designs have not been tested, they cannot be considered as reliable as the old ones, and this
deficit of reliability is a problem given that the US has signed (though not ratified) the
Comprehensive Nucear Test Ban Treaty. Either the US must accept that its newer weapons will
be less reliable than its old ones, or the US must resume nuclear testing, neither of which options
are acceptable.
The US' new aircraft-launched nuclear missile, the Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
weapon, is another example of a dangerous change in the design of the most catastrophically
dangerous weapons in the world. The plan is to replace the current Air-Launched Cruise
Missiles (ALCM) with a new missile with both nuclear and conventional warhead capabilities.
The new missile could be used either for nuclear or non-nuclear missions, with no way for our
adversaries to determine which payload was being used. The destabilizing influence of such
weapons is obvious; the mere presence of a nuclear weapon is threatening, and the devastation
that would result from a nuclear strike is so extreme that every weapon which might hold a
nuclear payload must be treated as a nuclear threat. Given the attention they must receive from
other nations, it is difficult to see the development of nuclear/conventional-capable weapons as a
reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in US strategy. Former Secretary of Defense William
Perry has denounced the LRSO program and called for a worldwide ban on the LRSO and any
similar design. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mr-president-kill-the-new-cruisemissile/2015/10/15/e3e2807c-6ecd-11e5-9bfe-e59f5e244f92_story.html)
Finally, in contradiction to our stated commitment to reducing our nuclear arsenal, the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) plans to ramp up the
US's nuclear production capabilities. First, it is designing a new Uranium Processing Plant
(UPP) to be located at the Oak Ridge nuclear test lab in Tennessee. This plant would expand the
US' uranium enrichment capabilities, allowing the US to produce more weapons-grade uranium.
Though the NNSA alleges that this plant will enable us to meet our weapons dismantlement
goals, it may have misrepresented our dismantlement progress in the past
(http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662840.pd), and its word is not to be taken at face value.
Second, the NNSA proposes a fourfold increase in plutonium-pit production capacity at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (plutonium pits are an essential component of nuclear weapons).
From a domestic perspective, this is a colossal waste of money, as the US a) has no immediate

need of new plutonium pits, which have an estimated lifespan of 60 years or longer, b) is not
currently producing any pits, and c) has more than 10,000 pits banked up at the Pantex weapons
assembly plant. Meanwhile, from an international perspective, these two construction projects
taken together can only signal an intent to revitalize the US' nuclear weapons production industry
in defiance of our NPT obligations. If, as the NPR claims, Russia and China find our
conventional arms buildup and missile defense destabilizing, how much more destabilizing
would they find a reborn US nuclear weapons program? This is not the path to global zero.
The US' actions speak louder than its words, and where the two come into contradiction,
our actions will be seen as the true signals of our intent. If the US wants to be seen as a peaceful
nation and not a warlike one, then we must act in a way consistent with nuclear disarmament, not
arms buildup.
More information on the costs (in terms of money, security, and public health) of the US
current nuclear trajectorycan be found in the Alliance for Nuclear Accountabilities April 2016
report entitled Trillion Dollar Trainwreck
(http://static1.squarespace.com/static/52311edfe4b0830625de8366/t/570ff2bed210b8a7d566f530
/1460662985134/trillion_trainwreck.pdf).