You are on page 1of 11

1. People vs Sendaydiego, et. al.

G.R. No. L-33254 and 33253


January 20, 1978
Facts:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P.
Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a
lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice,
used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE"
the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial
engineer's office and by the governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs.
Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses
"were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is
not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses
are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer. Paragraph 3 contains these
words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is signed by
the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated
February 28, 1969, certifying that the voucher has been pre-audited and signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a
certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification
"was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. " It may
be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Issue:
Whether or not appellants are liable for the crimes of falsicification of public documents and six crimes of
malversation?
Held:
Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation. In lieu of the
penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties: For each of the six falsification of the
vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison
correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a
fine of three thousand pesos. For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh.
K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and
to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252). For the
malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60
covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion
temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by
voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision

mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold
limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677),
meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12)
years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years
(see People vs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years
(Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and
69 Phil. 58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of
P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are solitarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code).
Samson should pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED.
2. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ROGELIO BAYOTAS Y CORDOVA
236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant, was charged with rape before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City (Criminal
Case No. C-3217). He was convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February
4, 1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal in a resolution dated May 20, 1992.
Issue:
Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability?
Held:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources
of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator
or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
The appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is dismissed with costs de oficio.

3. Sarmiento v Court of Appeals


G.R. No. 122502. December 27, 2002
Breach of obligation is separate and distinct from any criminal liability for misuse and/or misappropriation of
goods or proceeds realized from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts,
punishable under Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115)
Facts: Gregorio Limpin, Jr. and Antonio Apostol, doing business under the name and style of Davao Libra
Industrial Sales, filed an application for an Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit with the plaintiff Bank for the
amount of P495,000.00 in favor of LS Parts Hardware and Machine Shop (herein after referred to as LS Parts) for
the purchase of assorted scrap irons. Said application was signed by defendant Limpin and Apostol. The aforesaid
application was approved, and plaintiff Bank issued Domestic Letter of Credit No. DLC No. DVO-78-006 in favor
of LS Parts for P495,000.00. Thereafter, a Trust Receipt dated September 6, 1978, was executed by defendant
Limpin and Antonio Apostol (Exh. C). In said Trust Receipt, the following stipulation, signed by defendant
Lorenzo Sarmiento, Jr. The defendants failed to comply with their undertaking under the Trust Receipt. The
defendants claim that they cannot be held liable as the 825 tons of assorted scrap iron, subject of the trust receipt
agreement, were lost when the vessel transporting them sunk, and that said scrap iron were delivered to Davao
Libra Industrial Sales, a business concern over which they had no interest whatsoever.
Issue: Whether or not Sarmiento is liable no withstanding the loss of the scrap iron
Held: Yes In the present case, private respondents complaint against petitioners was based on the failure of the latter
to comply with their obligation as spelled out in the Trust Receipt executed by them. This breach of obligation is
separate and distinct from any criminal liability for misuse and/or misappropriation of goods or proceeds realized
from the sale of goods, documents or instruments released under trust receipts, punishable under Section 13 of the
Trust Receipts Law (P.D. 115) in relation to Article 315(1), (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Being based on an
obligation ex contractu and not ex delicto, the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
instituted against petitioners regardless of the result of the latter
4. ACE Haulers Corp vs CA

5. Maccay vs Spouses Nobela- (PS)

6. Donato vs. Hon. Luna


G.R. No. L-54598; April 15, 1988
FACTS: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado Cantor, filed
information for bigamy against Leonila Donato with the Court of First Instance. The private respondent filed a civil
action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner. Respondent had no previous knowledge of
petitioners existing marriage to Rosalinda Maluping.Donato interposed in her answer the defense that his second
marriage was void and since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence were employed by respondent. Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal
case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of the second marriage raise a prejudicial question which
must be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
ISSUES: Whether or not the issue raised in the civil case is a prejudicial question which must be determined before
the criminal case can proceed; and whether or not the petitioner lacked the legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.
RULING: Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial question because a case for annulment of marriage can only
be considered as a prejudicial question on the condition that it must be proven that the petitioners consent to the
marriage was obtained through intimidation, violence and undue influence in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was done involuntarily. In the petitioners argument that the second marriage should have been
declared null and void on the ground of force, intimidation and violence allegedly employed against him by
respondent only sometime later cannot be considered relevant.

7. BELTRAN VS PEOPLE CASE DIGEST


CIVIL LAW
Article 40
In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24 years of
marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs PI. Felix countered
that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed a case of concubinage
against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and Milagros. In order to forestall the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that the civil case he filed is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts hearing the cases may issue conflicting
rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans
petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal. Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in the case at
bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two
essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The
pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage
case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending
the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.
In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he
can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring
his marriage void.

With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.
8. Te v. Choa (Te v. CA)
G.R. 126746

November 29, 2000

Facts:
1

Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on 1988 (Sept. 14). They did not live together after
marriage although they would meet each other regularly.

1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter, Arthur stopped visiting her.

1990 (May 20) Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was subsisting.

Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case (revocation of
engineering license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2 nd wife of Arthur)

Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana.

RTC and Board rendered decision while the petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.

Issue: Marriage annulment case had to be resolved first before criminal and administrative case be rendered
judgment?

Held: NO.
1

P. v. Mendoza and P. v. Aragon ruling (no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
marriage which is ab initio) was overturned.

Family Code Art. 40 is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be invoked
for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

RD: Absence of Impediment.


FC. Art. 5: any male or female of the age of 18yrs or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned under
art. 37 & 38, may contract marriage.
Case: Since it was deemed that the marriage of Arthur and Liliana was valid, bigamous marriage between Arthur and
Julieta is void. (see. NCC Art. 80)

9. De Leon vs Mabanag

10. Tenebron vs CA
Tenebro v. CA, G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004
FACTS: Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro
showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage,
petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed
married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her
husband. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Villegas countered that his marriage
with Villareyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his second marriage,
with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for
bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD: Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
SEPARATE OPINION

VITUG, J.
Would the absolute nullity of either first or second marriage prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute
a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? Yes. Except for a void marriage on account of psychological
incapacityvoid marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish
their nullity. The complete nullity of a previously contracted marriage being void ab initio and legally inexistent can
outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy. Strong reservation on the ruling that bigamy is still committed
though marriage is ab initio null and void (if marriage is contracted before th judicial declaration of its nullity).
Canon law-reconcile grounds for nullity of marriage. Reasons why except those due to psychological incapacity:
a) Breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of marriage
b) Other grounds are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity however, being a mental
state may not be so readily evident
c) It remains valid and binding until declared judicially as void
11. Sabandal vs Hon Tongco

12. Sps. Yuliengco vs CA

13. Judge Tamin vs CA

14. Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II


23 February 2006
FACTS:
Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment for the
P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter. When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were
dishonoured by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt. Thereafter,
the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the administrative case for the respondents disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule
on non-forum shopping; and
Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
No. The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping. Forum shopping is
only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Furthermore, the main object of the
seven criminal cases of the respondents violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from the administrative case at hand.
The former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in
the payment of his debts.
Yes. Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His refusal
to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable cause, despite
acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to comply with the expectation of lawyers to be

honest in their dealings be it in their professional or private affairs. What is more, his failure to file his answer and
verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities. For his
acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.
15. Spouses Yu vs. PCIB
CITATION: GR No. 147902, March 17, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria Lee-Yu mortgaged their title, interest, and participation over several parcels of
land located in Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial International Bank,
respondent and highest bidder, as security for the payment of a loan.
As petitioners failed to pay the loan and the interest and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage on the Dagupan City properties on July 21, 1998. City Sheriff issued
notice of extra-judicial sale on August 3, 1998 scheduling the auction sale on September 10, 1998.
Certificate of Sale was issued on September 14, 1998 in favor of respondent, the highest bidder. The sale was
registered with the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the expiration
of the redemption period, respondent filed an ex-parte petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan.
Petitioners complaint on annulment of certificate of sale and motion to dismiss and to strike out testimony of
Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC. Motion for reconsideration was then filed on February 14, 2000 arguing
that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial issue to the filed ex-parte petition for writ of
possession, the resolution of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of Possession.
ISSUE: Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the existence of a civil case for annulment of a
certificate of sale and a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession in a special proceeding since the two cases
are both civil in nature which can proceed separately and take their own direction independently of each other.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because issue raised in civil action would be
determinative de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.
16. Wong Jan Realty vs Espanol

17. Omictin vs CA (PS)

18. Magestrado vs People

FRANCISCO MAGESTRADO, Petitioner,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ELENA M. LIBROJO Respondents.
1

Francisco Magestrado loaned a sum of money from Elena M. Librojo. As security for the said load,
Magestrado executed a mortgage in favor Librojo. The said title to the property was surrendered to Librojo.

Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint 3 for perjury against petitioner with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City
Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City
Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City.
-

Magestrado executed an Affidavit of Loss before Notary Public falsely alleging that he lost Owners
Duplicate Certificate of TCT No. N-173163, which document was used in support of a Petition For
Issuance of New Owners Duplicate Copy of Certificate of Title and filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, to which said Magestrado signed and swore on its verification,

The said accused knowing fully well that the allegations in the said affidavit and petition are false, the
truth of the matter being that the property subject of Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173163 was
mortgaged to complainant Elena M. Librojo as collateral for a loan in the amount of P 758,134.42 and
as a consequence of which said title to the property was surrendered by him to the said complainant by
virtue of said loan,

The case was raffled to the MeTC of Quezon City, Branch 43 entitled, "People of the Philippines v.
Francisco Magestrado."

Magestrado filed a motion5 for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question. Petitioner
alleged that Civil Case No. Q-98-34349, a case for recovery of a sum of money pending before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84, and Civil Case No. Q-98- 34308, a case for
Cancellation of Mortgage, Delivery of Title and Damages, pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
77, must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil
cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action.
MeTC-Branch 43 issued an Order 6 denying petitioners motion for suspension of proceedings. Hence, the
trial of this case shall proceed as previously scheduled on July 19 and August 2, 1993 at 8:30 in the
morning.

A motion7 for reconsideration was filed by Magestrado but was denied by the MeTC.

Aggrieved, Magestrado filed a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with a
prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 83, on the
ground that MeTC Judge Billy J. Apalit committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying his motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case.

RTC-Branch 83 dismissed the petition and denied the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, reasoning that there is no prejudicial question involved as to warrant the suspension of the
criminal action to await the outcome of the civil cases.

10

Again, Magestrado filed a motion for reconsideration11 but this was denied by RTC- Branch 83.

11 Dissatisfied, Magestrado filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari 13 under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, Petitioner alleged that RTC Judge Estrella T. Estrada committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the Petition for Certiorari
12 The Court of Appeals dismissed14 the Petition on the ground that petitioners remedy should have been an
appeal from the dismissal by RTC-Branch 83 of his Petition for Certiorari in Q-99-39358. The Court of
Appeals ruled that:

Issue: Whether or not this instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the correct and appropriate remedy?
We rule negatively.
The resolution or dismissal in special civil actions, as in the instant petition, may be appealed x x x under Section
10, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and not by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same rules.

13 The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration16 in a Resolution17 dated 3 May 2001.
14 Magestrado comes before the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court raising the following issues:

19. Ocampo vs Buenaventura

20. De Jesus vs Syquia


FACTS:
Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the defendants
brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a
prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on
June 17, 1931.
In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even wrote a
letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was
out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on time for her and juniors sake.
The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in
Manila.
After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they lived
together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he
was married with another woman at this time.
It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the arrangement of the
ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia during her
pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.
2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a
natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case
should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters are sufficient to
connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be
indubitable.
The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child;
and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco for
supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof
upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.

Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in
the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to
modify the order as to the amount of pension.

21. Geluz vs CA
Geluz vs CA
CITATION: 2 SCRA 801
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician,
through her aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and Oscar were legally
married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it from her parents, she decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She
had her pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it inconvenient as she was employed at
COMELEC. After two years, on February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time
was in the province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board. He doesnt have any idea nor
given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the
physician who caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the death of a person does not cover cases
of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality which trial court and Court of Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasnt able to find any basis for an award of moral damages evidently because Oscars
indifference to the previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental affections. Instead of filing an administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of which not only he but, including his wife would
be the beneficiaries. It shows that hes after obtaining a large money payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly
exaggerated.
22. Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public convenience to install
and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed
service. The Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a
dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his
properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service
Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it
is so adjudged and decreed.

23. SAN LUIS V. SAN LUISFebruary 6, 2007


(Under Property Regimes of Unions without Marriage)
Two consolidated cases:
Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis, Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis Background: The case involves the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis. During his lifetime Felicisimo contracted three marriages. From the
first marriage contracted in 1942 he had six children, twoof whom are the petitioners in this case. His first wife died
in 1963 and his second marriage to an American citizen ended in the wife getting a divorce in 1971. In 1974
Felicismo married Felicidad, therespondent in this case, in the USA. They had no children but lived together for 18
years until Felicis modied in 1992.After Felicisimos death, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and filed a petition for letters of administration. The children of Felicisimo from his first marriage
opposed this on the grounds that Felicidad is only a mistress, the second marriage to the American wife subsisting.
The petitioners claimed that Article 26, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
the bigamous marriage because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children (Article 256 of
the Family Code).
Issue:
Does the respondent Felicidad have legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration?
Held/Ratio:
YES. Even if the Court does not apply Article 26, Par. 2 of the Family Code, there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
in the case of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
where it was held that a Filipino spouse should no longer be considered married if the alien spouse validly obtains a
divorce outside of the Philippines. [Remember that in Van Dorn the Court applied the nationality principle in Article
15 of the Civil Code] Indeed, in cases like Quita v. Dandan and Republicv. Orbecido III it was pointed out that Par.
2, Article 26 of the Family Code traces its origins to the ruling in Van Dorn.
However,
Since Felicidad failed to present the necessary evidence to prove the divorce decree (recall Garcia v. Recio: copy of
the law, final decree of absolute divorce) as well as her marriage solemnized in California, the case is remanded to
the trial court for further reception of evidence.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad , Felicidad still has legal personality to file the
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. Sec. 2, Rule 79 provides (in part) that a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. Felicidad qualifies as an interested person with direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their 18-year cohabitation. If she proves the validity of the divorce but fails to
prove her marriage, she may be considered a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. If she fails to prove the
validity of both the divorce and the marriage, Article 148 of the Family Code would apply. Article 148 states that
couples who are incapacitated to marry but still live together as husband and wife have co-ownership over properties
acquired during their cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Petitioners claimed it should have
been filed in Laguna, where the deceased was governor, interpreting residence as domicile. The SC did not uphold
this, interpreting resides in Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court to mean actual or physical habitation of a person,
not legal residence or domicile.