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A PROJECT IN ECON11

Land Reforms in the Philippines; the Positive and Negative


Externalities of Dutertes Anti-Drug Campaign

Submitted by:
Agulan, Shiela Mae
Castro, Mary Joyce
Patague, Divine Grace

Land Reforms in the Philippines


Land reform has been the main policy response of government to correct the sharp
inequalities in the distribution of land ownership in the Philippines. Historical records
show that the process of disposal of State lands has heavily favored households
with economic and political power. These households had undue advantage over the
common populace in acquiring property rights through the Spanish system of royal
grants and the American system of land cadaster. The result has been the
ownership of big landholdings by few families and the rise of haciendas or family
estates comprising several hundreds and thousands of hectares.
A series of land reform programs have been legislated and, to a lesser extent,
implemented by successive administrations during the last several decades in the
Philippines. We will review a few distinct episodes in the evolution of land reform
legislation, mainly in terms of its stated goals and its design. Here are a few
examples:
1. Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963
One of the major turning points in the recent history of land reform
legislation appears to be the 1963 Agricultural Land Reform Code. The stated
goal of the 1963 Code was to establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-sized farm to make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant
A distinct feature of the Code was that, unlike in the earlier land reform
initiatives, land reform was considered as a means to increase agricultural
productivity, which, in turn, was based on the need for supply of cheap food for
urban consumers as well as the Marshallian view of inefficient share tenancy
which was widespread among young economist-technoclats of the day. (Hayami,
et al. 1990)
The so called Marshallian inefficiency view rests on the argument that
share tenancy is inefficient due to the agency problem. Agency problem
arises when agricultural workers or tenant farmers face weak incentives to work
diligently (or face incentives to shirk) on the farm under the contractual
arrangement with their farm operators/landowners. Under share tenancy a
portion of the tenants marginal products is taken away as share rent and thus
the tenants labor effort would be less than the optimal level which should occur
if he receives full marginal products (i. e., under owner-cultivation or fixed-rent
leasehold). If it is possible to monitor the labor effort of the tenant and such
monitoring is not highly costly, however, then such inefficiency can be avoided
by specifying the optimal labor effort level by the tenant in the contract. Thus, if
landowners are able to observe the labor effort with relatively low cost (as likely
to be the case if, for example, the landowner and her/his tenants live in the
same community) and if sanction can be enforced onto the tenant when the
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contract is violated (through, for example, tenant eviction and/or loss of


reputation which could preclude the tenants future employment prospect within
the community), then serious Marshallian inefficiency is not likely to arise. It
appears that such conditions tended to apply in the rice growing areas in the
Philippines where the tenancy reform was mainly targeted. Theoretical
arguments suggest that under these circumstances of perfect enforceability of
optimal labor input of the tenant/laborer, the optimal level of per hectare yield
would be the same under share tenancy, fixed-rent lease or owner cultivation
In its attempt to increase agricultural productivity by creating ownercultivatorship, the Code stipulated a two-step procedure for land redistribution:
(1) Operation Leasehold, which was to convert share tenancy to
leasehold with the fixed rent at 25 percent of the average harvest in the
three normal years preceding the Operation, and
(2) Operation Land Transfer, where the government was to expropriate
land in excess of the retention limit of 75 hectares, with compensation to
landowners of 10 percent of the land value in cash and the rest in interestfree Land Bank bonds, and then was to resell to tenants for annual
amortization payments within twenty five years. Such reforms were to
apply only to land planted with rice or corn.
While the Code can be seen as a major advance in land reform legislation,
there were serious limits in design as well. For example, the reform Code
covered only rice and corn land, thereby excluding land planted with sugar,
coconut, fruits and other crops. This also meant that landowners could avoid
land reform implementation simply by shifting their crop away from rice or corn.
Another fault in design was that there was no sanctions against evasion through
transforming land use or transferring ownership to family members, which were
common means of sabotaging land reform implementation. Furthermore, the
initial version of the Code included progressive land tax, which was subsequently
deleted in the final version. Indeed, these limits generally persisted through the
subsequent land reform codes (1971 and 1972) until the enactment of CARP in
1988.

2. Land Reform under Marcos Presidency


While President Ferdinand Marcos took office in 1966, it was not until the
early 1970s that land reform program made any major advance. First, in
responding to the pressures from farmers protests supported by a highly
politicized student and workers movement in 1971, Congress passed the Code
of

Agrarian

Reform

(Republic

Act
2

No.

6389).

It

established

the

Department of Agrarian Reform, declared the entire Philippines a land


reform area (the 1963 Code, on the other hand, required that the National Land
Reform Council should first declare a given region to be covered by the program
before actual implementation could proceed in a given region), provided for the
automatic conversion of tenancy to leasehold tenancy in all areas and declared
share tenancy illegal, included regulations on interest rates, on the sale of farm
animals and implements and on the conversion of agricultural land into other
uses, and finally, reduced the landlord retention limit from 75 hectares to 24
hectares.
Just about a year later in September 1972, President Marcos imposed
Martial law. In the early years of the Martial Law period land reform was high on
policy agenda. A month after the Martial law regime started, President Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 27 (PD 27) aimed at emancipation of the
tiller from the bondage of the soil. (Hayami, et al. 1990) Under PD 27, all rice
and corn fields over the lowered retention limit of 7 hectares were to be
transferred to the tenants who tilled them at a price 2.5 times the value of
average annual production, payable to the Land Bank at 6 percent interest
within fifteen years. When the tenant completed amortization she/he would be
issued a land title, called Emancipation Patent (EP), transferable only to
her/his heirs; during the period of amortization the tenant would receive a
Certificate of Land Transfer identifying her/his cultivated area and
promising her/him the right to purchase it. On the other hand, land owners were
to be paid 10 percent in cash and 90 percent in Land Bank bonds, as was
stipulated in the 1963 Code. Furthermore, under the Operation Leasehold
(OLH) Program, tenanted rice and corn fields under the 7 hectare retention
limit were to be tilled under fixed rent lease contract with the official rental
ceiling of 25 percent of average output (net of costs for seeds, harvesting,
threshing, loading, hauling, and processing) for three normal years prior to the
reform implementation.
While PD 27 can be seen as an improvement in expanding the potential
coverage of land reform compared to earlier legislation, it still included some
notable limitations in its design, which were also shared by the earlier laws.
Among others, PD 27 stipulated;
(1) That the land must already have been in agricultural production by
1972, thereby excluding new agricultural land which subsequently
amounted to 1.24 million hectares between 1971 and 1980,
(2) That land reform was limited to rice and corn fields which amounted to
about 4 million hectare as of 1972 while excluding its application to 2.5
million hectares of coconut and sugar lands (as of 1972), and

(3) That the decree applied only to tenanted areas, which represented
about 24 percent of all rice and corn areas, excluding landless laborers
and subtenants amounting to 3.5 million in 1975. As so designed, PD 27
would cover about 12 percent of the total Philippine farm area as of 1972.
(Hayami, et. al. 1990, Mangahas 1985, Balisacan 1990) In addition, such
design provided landowners covered by the decree with opportunities to
avoid its implementation by shifting to crops other than rice or corn (or to
non-agricultural use), or by evicting tenants, replacing them with hired
labor and undertaking direct management of the farm operation.

3.

Comprehensive

Agrarian

Reform

Program

(CARP)

under

Aquino

Presidency
President

Corazon

Aquino

assumed

her

presidency

amid

heightened

expectations toward a more comprehensive land reform program than any previous
land reform initiatives. As a start, the 1986 Philippine Constitution was drafted (and
later supported by plebiscite in February 1987) by a 48 member Constitutional
Commission appointed by the President.
While it was a substantially watered down version of the initial draft
adopted by the Committee on Social Justice under the Commission, the Constitution
was nevertheless a major improvement vis--vis the previous Constitution. Above
all, it mandated a comprehensive land reform covering all agricultural lands and
natural resources (thus going beyond rice and corn lands under PD27) and both
tenants and regular farm workers (who had been excluded as beneficiaries in the
previous reform Codes). At the same time, however, many of the crucial aspects of
the defining characteristics of the reform were left with the Congress to determine,
including: the retention limits, to be set according to ecological, developmental,
and equity considerations; types of exempted lands; and phasing and time table of
the program. Constitution also included various alternative measures to land
redistribution, such as voluntary land sharing, and it allowed private corporations to
lease up to 1000 hectares (while local citizens 500 hectares) of public lands.
The second step that the Aquino administration took before the newly elected
Congress convened was to issue Executive Order 229 (EO229) in June 1987. It
was a response to the mounting pressures from pro-reform social forces following
the Mendiola Bridge massacre (where thirteen members and supporters of
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (Peasant Movement of the Philippines) rallying
near Malacaan Palace for a genuine land reform were killed) on January 22, 1987.
During

this

period,

however,

President

Aquino

rejected

(acting

upon

the

recommendations from her key economic ministers, such as Finance Secretary


Jaime Ongpin) the Accelerated Land Reform Program (ALRP) proposal put
4

together by key government officials immediately following the Mendiola incident,


which included a uniform 7 hectare ceiling for all croplands and the sequencing of
reform program starting with large privately owned farms. Instead, EO229, drafted
by her conservative cabinet members including Secretary Ongpin and then signed
by President Aquino, mostly focused on procedural matters and, once again, left
many of the critical aspects of land reform, including retention limits and priority
setting/phasing, to the Congress. EO229 was issued five days before the new
Congress was to meet for the first time in fifteen years. Many observers have
concluded that, by leaving the most critical aspects of her land reform program to
the Congressional process, President Aquino was not able to take full advantage of
the historically rare opportunity to initiate a massive transformation of Philippine
rural economies, due to her strong popular support, especially among the middle
class, and to the fact that the opposing landlord block had not been consolidated,
during the initial days of her presidency.
The newly elected Senate and the Lower House of the Congress proposed,
debated and passed their respective versions of land reform bills during the period
between June 1987 and June 1988. The House bill (HB400) was originally based
on a draft proposed by the Congress for a Peoples Agrarian Reform (CPAR), a
coalition of major peasant organizations, and initially included a uniform land
retention limit of 7 hectares, sliding scale of compensation for landowners based on
size, and full peasant involvement in the implementation process. Such features of
the bill, however, disappeared in the process of passing through the House
Committee on agrarian reform and to the House floor, where more than half of its
members were considered landowners or having them as patrons. Indeed, the bill
was so substantially watered down that its initial sponsors withdrew their support
from the bill. (Hayami, et al. 1990; Balisacan 1990; Putzel 1992, Reidinger 1995)
The bill that eventually passed the House floor, HB400, stipulated retention limits of
7 hectares, with 3 hectares for each heir, for landowners, 24 hectares for
homesteaders, and 3 hectares for reform beneficiaries. HB400 also included as
exempted lands farms under corporate stock sharing or voluntary land sharing as
well as the exemptions included in EO 229. In terms of the timing of reform
implementation, HB400 placed priority on alienable and disposable public lands and
lands under management of multinational firms over (domestically owned) private
lands. The bill that passed the Senate, on the other hand, had a 5 hectare retention
limit for landowners (except for the rice and corn lands under PD 27 where 7
hectare limit applied) with the 3 hectare limit for the reform beneficiaries, and
included additional exemptions such as lands with 18 percent slope, lands for the
underprivileged, vegetable farms, commercial sites, residential sites, industrial
sites, parks, forest reserves, mangroves, wildlife grounds, watersheds, and other
lands of specified uses. In terms of the time table, the Senate bill placed its first
priority on private farms of over 50 hectares and corporate farms with lease
5

contracts for public lands over 1000 hectares (for the contract with 1000 hectares
or below contracts were to be honored for five years), with second priority on
alienable and disposable public lands and private farms between 24 and 50
hectares, then followed by private farms below 24 hectares, plantations (including
fishponds, prawn ponds, livestock/poultry lands), and corporate farms under local
management (for lands under the management of multinational firms contracts
were to be honored until the contracts expired). Based on these bills, a compromise
was reached between the both chambers and the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL, or Republic Act 6657) was passed in June, 1988.
The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL: RA6657) stipulated the
following:

Retention limit: CARL set the retention limit at 5 hectares but also allowed
additional 3 hectares for each hair (of at least age 15 and actually tilling the

land or directly managing it).


Land valuation and owner compensation : The law stipulated: that the land
owner compensation be based on the fair market value including various
valuation considerations (such as the cost of acquiring the land, the current
value of like properties, owners sworn valuation, the assessment made by
the government); that landowners with 50 hectares or more, 24 or more, or
below 24 hectares receive, respectively, 25%, 30% and 35% of payments in
cash; and that landowners be allowed to contest decisions made by the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the judiciary system.


Beneficiary repayments: The law stipulated that beneficiaries pay the

amortization over 30 years with 6 % annual interest.


Alternatives to land re-distribution: As an alternative to land re-distribution,
the law allowed corporate landowners to satisfy their reform obligations by
giving their farmworkers the right to purchase such proportion of the capital
stock of the corporation that the agricultural land, actually devoted to
agricultural activities, bears in relation to the companys total assets.

(Sec.31 as quoted in Reidinger 1995)


Exemptions: As exception to the reform coverage, a 10 year deferment was
allowed on lands for: commercial livestock, poultry and swaine raising,
aquaculture, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms, cacao,
coffee and rubber plantations. Also lands leased to agribusiness corporations

were excepted for 10 years or until the lease expired.


Program phasing and priority: The reform program was to be implemented in
three phases: (Phase 1) Year one to four: rice and corn lands covered under
PD27, idle and abandoned lands, lands foreclosed by government financial
institutions, lands acquired by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, and Private lands voluntarily offered; (Phase 2) Year one to
four: Public agricultural lands and private lands in holdings greater than 50
hectares; (Phase 3) Year four to seven: Private lands in holdings between 24
6

and 50 hectares; and in year six to ten: Private lands in holdings less than 24
hectares.

References:
Ballesteros, Marife and dela Cruz, Alma (2006). Land Reform and Changes in Land
Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Rice-Growing Villages in the Philippines.
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 2006-21. 1 Research Fellow, Philippine Institute for
Development Studies (PIDS) and Professor, Central Luzon State University (CLSU)

Adriano, Lourdes S. (1994). DAR, Land Reform-Related Agencies and the CARP: A
Study of Government and Alternative Approaches to Land Acquisition and
Distribution. Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies Discussion Paper
Series No. 94- 13.
Hayami, Yujiro, Ma. Agnes R. Quisumbing, and Lourdes S. Adreano (1990). Toward
An Alternative Land Reform Paradigm: A Philippine Perspective. Ateneo de Manila
University Press.
Mangahas, Mahar (1985). Rural Poverty and Operation Land Transfer in the
Philippines. In Strategies for Alleviating Poverty in Rural Asia. (eds.) Rizwanul Islam.
Dhaka and Bangkok: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies and International
Labor Organization Asian Employment Program
Balisacan, Arsenio M. and Rhoda Theresa Bacawag (1995). Inequality, Poverty, and
Urban-Rural Growth Linkagets. In Arsenio M. Balisacan and Ernost Pernia (eds.)
Spatial Development, Land Use, and Urban-Rural Growth Linkages in the Philippines.
Pasig: National Economic and Development Authority.
Putzel, James (1992). A Captive Land: the politics of agrarian reform in the
Philippines. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Riedinger, Jeffrey M (1995). Agrarian Reforms in the Philippines: Democratic
Transitions and Redistributive Reform. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

There is something about President Rodrigo R. Duterte that sets him intensely apart
from all other Philippine presidents we have had. He seems to have the ability to
move people to support his causes and go out of their way to back him. Perhaps it is
8

because people see that he came to his job prepared, with a clear understanding of
the countrys major problems and a vision of how to get things done.
Positive Externalities
1. Setting up economic boom
Less than two months in office, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte is getting high
marks from the business community for policies that could engineer an economic
surge and companies say they are making new investments as a result.
While Duterte may be getting headlines for a bloody war against drug dealers and
users, less attention has been paid to one of Asias few economic success stories.
The groundwork was laid by Duterte's predecessor, President Benigno Aquino, who
took growth above 6 percent over his six-year term , but executives are also
cheering the new administrations focus on building new infrastructure and say it
could spell the start of a long-term boom. Some even see Duterte's violent and
highly controversial anti-drugs campaign as potentially positive.
Jollibee Foods Corp (JFC.PS), the biggest fastfood chain in the country, plans to open
200 more domestic stores this year. So does Robinsons Retail (RRHI.PS), taking its
total to over 1,500. BDO Unibank Inc (BDO.PS), the country's biggest lender, plans
to open 50-100 new branches this year.
"Business will be good under this administration," BDO Unibank executive vicepresident Luis Reyes said of Duterte. "Concerns center more on the extra-judicial
killings."
Supporters of Duterte say even as the long-term mayor of the southern city of
Davao, where he earned his reputation for busting crime, he created the conditions
for business to flourish.
Government data show that the Davao region's economy grew by 6.6 percent on
average in 2010-14 compared with 6.3 percent for the whole country. According to
one estimate, there were more than 20,000 people in outsourcing jobs in the city in
2013, and this sector was growing at more than 20 percent a year.
Duterte's reputation of carrying out his promises has given businesses plenty to
look forward to - for instance his vow to make spending on infrastructure a priority.
"I believe infrastructure is going to grow very fast and it will have a double or triple
effect," said Henry Schumacher of the European Chamber of Commerce in the
Philippines. "Money will be available. An iron fist is going to be behind it."

2. A Boost on Tourism
While some sectors are giving the current administrations fight against illegal drugs
a thumbs down, tourism stakeholders on the other hand, are keeping their hopes up
that this particular campaign would have a favorable impact in the long run.
"The fact that crime rate is down by at least 40 percent should be reassuring
enough that the Philippines today is becoming safer and safer to visit," said tourism
capitalist Jay P. Aldeguer.
Aldeguer believes that peace and order will be more evident under this
administration in the next few months and will surely be a big boost to tourism.
Cebu Association of Travel Agencies (CATO) president Edilberto Mendoza Jr., likewise
foresees good impact of the agressive stance of the government for restoring peace
and order, specifically illegal drug related concerns, to have good effect on the
tourism trade of the Philippines.
According to Mendoza, Duterte's firm resolve on putting a stop to drugs and
criminality sends positive signal that the Philippines is shaping up in terms of
improving the country's peace and order and safety environment for both residents
and tourists.
"This will give confidence to our tourists," Mendoza added.
But for his part, Efren Belarmino, general manager of Plantation Bay Resort and Spa,
said that Duterte's fearless stance against illegal drug related issues, which will
eventually led to improved crime rate and safetiness of the country provides good
impression to both domestic and international travelers. (FREEMAN)
3. People Have Become More Compliant to the Law and Mass Surrender
What will you do to an addict who cannot be rehabilitated or jailed? President-elect
Rodrigo Duterte believes these addicts are better off dead because they would
eventually commit crimes to sustain their addiction.
In a 42-minute speech laced with profanities, Duterte told a crowd of about 10,000
that he wanted to be honest about how he would address the problem of illegal
drugs.
Karon makita nako nga mga bata one year old, 12 years old gipangrape ug
ipanglabay. Unsa mang klaseng kinabuhi ang ibilin nako sa inyo? Ang ako ba may
apo ko, masiguro ba pud nako nga dili na ma-adik? (Now, I see children as young as
one year old, 12 years old getting raped and dumped. I have a grandchild. Can I be
assured that my grandchild will not become an addict? Can I really prevent things
from happening if I am no longer around to prevent it?), he said.
10

Duterte said that the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) placed the
number of drug addicts in the country at three million.
The President-elect said that most addicts, who had been in rehabilitation for six
months to a year, could no longer be helped since their brains had shrunk from
illegal drug use.
The loss of reasoning has led many drug addicts to commit crimes like rape, robbery
and murder, according to Duterte. He said not all drug addicts could be put in jail or
rehabilitation at the same time. With them out on the streets and likely to commit
crimes any time, he said it would be better to kill them.
Duterte also warned police officials who were protecting illegal drugs to stop or they
could go to hell, go to heaven or go somewhere else. He advised those who
involved in the drug trade to look for other jobs. Otherwise, he added he would
apologize ahead to the families of the illegal drug peddlers and addicts who would
get killed in his campaign against illegal drugs.
As it turns out, Dutertes fierce threats have done their magic. In just his first week
in office, thousands of drug pushers and junkies have surrendered. They didnt have
to be arrested. Fearing for their lives, they themselves went to the authorities and
voluntarily surrendered. They were all repentant and ready to quit drugs and lead a
new life.
Negative Externalities
1. People are left traumatized.
Do you feel sick watching daily images on TV and newspapers of people killed, lying
lifeless on the sidewalks covered with newspapers or plastic with only their dirty
feet and worn-out rubber slippers seen? And, of course, near the corpse, the
cardboard sign Drug pusher ako, huwag tularan, which has now become a
standard accessory in President Dutertes war against illegal drugs.
Studies have shown the ill-effects of being exposed to traumatic images.
In an article in the website of Association for Psychological Science, psychological
scientist Roxane Cohen Silver of the University of California, Irvine and colleagues
said repeated exposure to vivid traumatic images from the media could lead to
long-lasting negative consequences, not just for mental health but also for physical
health.
The article said Silver and her colleagues speculated that such media exposure
could result in a stress response that triggers various physiologic processes
associated with increased health problems over time.

11

Thats for those who are exposed to disturbing images in media. How much more
with members of media who are up close to those gruesome scenes to capture
them for the people to know whats happening in the country.
Raffy Lerma, the Philippine Daily Inquirer photo-journalist, who took that heartwrenching La Pieta photo of Jennelyn Olaires cradling the dead body of her
pedicab driver partner, Michael Siaron, was quoted in an article written by Pocholo
Concepcion, that he is getting overwhelmed by the rising body count as the killings
intensify in Dutertes war against illegal drugs.
Hindi bumababa sa lima ang patay bawat araw, minsan 10, may araw na 18. If I
will add everything for that week, it would be more than the total for the year when
I first did the nightshift in 2005, he said.
Lerma related the anguish that he and his fellow photographers also go in covering
the Duterte administrations drug war. He said when he went to Pasay City Rotonda
in the early hours of July 22, it was the third death for that night that he had to
cover.
Lerma said Olaires was pleading for help as he and the photographers were taking
pictures but they couldnt do anything. The area had been cordoned by the police.
After that, they went to Leveriza St., also in Pasay, which is now being grimly
referred to as Patay City. Another killing. But the body of the victim said to be a
person with speech disability -- had already been removed from the crime scene.
Lerma related, We were quiet as we went back to the Manila Police District, the
office of graveyard-shift media workers. I lighted a cigarette to calm my nerves.
Another photographer took deep breaths. Together, we recounted moments from
the scene at Pasay Rotunda.
Another veteran photographer said, while shaking his head, no longer want to be
a photographer. We all had the same feeling of guilt.
In the end, Lerma said, they consoled themselves that its part of the job.
We may not have helped the victim and his partner but it is our job to show these
pictures. We have to show reality as it is and perhaps, get people to react and even
take action, he said.
Dr. Elana Newman, a licensed clinical psychologist who conducted a survey of 800
photojournalists, in an article at the Dart Centre website, said, "Witnessing death
and injury takes its toll, a toll that increases with exposure. The more such
assignments photojournalists undertake, the more likely they are to experience
psychological consequences."
2. Mistaken Identities

12

"There are a number of signs that people are beginning to be afraid. We have
clearance (documents) by National Bureau of Investigation, kids are walking around
the street wearing (these signs) so they don't get killed.
"Kids, maybe in their 20s, are walking around, saying, 'hey, I could be mistaken for
a pusher, please don't kill me.' People are getting more and more alarmed and this
could convert itself into anger."
President Duterte's war on drugs threatens the Philippines's rule of law
Government-led extrajudicial killings are endangering rule of law in the Philippines,
but the campaign is unlikely to stop anytime soon amid the President's widespread
popularity and a weak political opposition.
His actions are now sparking alarm that the country might spiral into lawlessness.
"Duterte is steamrolling the rule of law and its advocates both at home and abroad,"
said Phelim Kine, Asia deputy director at Human Rights Watch (HRW) in a statement
this week, noting that the President was breeding a violent society.
Domestic institutions are effectively powerless to stand up to the President,
strategists say.
In a statement last week, the United Nations (UN) said Duterte's policy effectively
gives the police and public "a license to kill." Intentional lethal use of force should
not be used for common policing objectives, the international body warned, calling
for an investigation into the deaths.
3. The Poor are Easier Targets than Vigilantes
The police are given incentive to act as brutal as they wish to handle alleged drug
users and pushers. Suspected users, most if not all live below the poverty line, are
compelled to come and turn themselves inunder threats that they will get shot in
the streetsand are reported in the media as an exodus of surrendering guilty
parties. They are compelled to surrender even if some of them have not even
used drugs in YEARS.
Some even end up getting shot anywaybut these are things that do not get
reported by the media.
I believe that these barbaric measures are ultimately ineffective and disturbingly
discriminatory against the poor. Quite ironic for a government who claims to have
the poor peoples welfare at heartand yet I am yet to read about a rich governors
son or some other rich fella who was shot like an animal, left for dead in the streets,
with a cardboard scribbled with unfounded accusations as substitute for due
process. It doesnt take a genius to know that there are drug users and pushers
amongst the rich as well, but hey, its easier to target those who live in the margins
right? We forget that these people we sneer at and so callously condemn to a death
13

so demeaning are somebodys son, brother, husband, father, and friend. And we
condemn these people to live with the unfounded accusations dealt to their loved
ones for the rest of their lives.
We can even disregard the fact that many of these people may be innocent. Our
president seems to forget that like it or not, as the head of our nation he also
represents the rights of these criminals. No matter who they are, they have a right
to due process and the right to be provided aid by the government of rehabilitation.
We will never, ever be able to eradicate drug use. It is time that we educate
ourselves and realize that strict and effective enforcement of the lawnot
vigilantismminimizes crime. But we have a long way to go. And sadly, more
bodies to count before that day comes.
It definitely isn't being waged largely against the poor. It just so happens that the
poor are the easier targets for these vigilantes. If rich people get meetings at
Malacanang, advanced notice in the press, the opportunity to clear their name, or
the chance to reform... and on the other hand, 99% of the people who have died are
poor and received none of the above, I have a hard time thinking the war isn't being
waged on the poor.
Same as what happened with the DDS. One or two "big" fish, in a pool of dead
guppies.

References:
Tordersillas, Ellen (2016) OPINION: Side effects of Dutertes war against illegal
drugs.

http://news.abs-cbn.com/blogs/opinions/08/05/16/opinion-side-effects-of-

dutertes-war-against-illegal-drugs
McKirdy, Euan (2016) Dead or alive: Is the Philippines' war on drugs out of control?
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/03/asia/philippines-war-on-drugs/
Chandran, Nyshka (2016) President Duterte's war on drugs threatens the
Philippines's rule of law http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/24/president-dutertes-war-ondrugs-threatens-the-philippiness-rule-of-law.html
Lema, Karen (2016) Beyond war on drugs, Philippines' Duterte seen setting up
economic

boom

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-economy-duterte-

idUSKCN10X2A2
Dagooc, Ehda (2016) Dutertes war against drugs deemed positive for tourism

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http://www.philstar.com/cebu-business/2016/08/27/1617660/dutertes-war-againstdrugs-deemed-positive-tourism
Co, Camille Ysabela (2016) https://www.quora.com/What-do-you-think-of-PresidentDutertes-war-on-drugs-in-the-Philippines

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