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G.R. No. L-62952

TodayisMonday,August29,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R.No.L62952October9,1985
SOFIAJ.NEPOMUCENO,petitioner,
vs.
THEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALS,RUFINAGOMEZ,OSCARJUGOANG,CARMELITAJUGO,
respondents.

GUTIERREZ,JR.,J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now
intermediateAppellateCourt)datedJune3,1982,asamendedbytheresolutiondatedAugust10,1982,declaring
as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated December 28, 1982 denying
petitioner'smotionforreconsideration.
MartinJugodiedonJuly16,1974inMalabon,Rizal.HeleftalastWillandTestamentdulysignedbyhimattheend
oftheWillonpagethreeandontheleftmarginofpages1,2and4thereofinthepresenceofCelestinaAlejandro,
MyrnaC.Cortez,andLeandroLeano,whointurn,affixedtheirsignaturesbelowtheattestationclauseandonthe
leftmarginofpages1,2and4oftheWillinthepresenceofthetestatorandofeachotherandtheNotaryPublic.
The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting
witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his sole and only
executorofhisestate.ItisclearlystatedintheWillthatthetestatorwaslegallymarriedtoacertainRufinaGomez
by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his
lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the
JusticeofthePeace.Thetestatordevisedtohisforcedheirs,namely,hislegalwifeRufinaGomezandhischildren
OscarandCarmelitahisentireestateandthefreeportionthereoftohereinpetitioner.TheWillreadsinpart:
Art.III.ThatIhavethefollowinglegalheirs,namely:myaforementionedlegalwife,RufinaGomez,and
ourson,Oscar,anddaughterCarmelita,bothsurnamedJugo,whomIdeclareandadmittobelegally
andproperlyentitledtoinheritfrommethatwhileIhavebeenestrangedfrommyabovenamedwife
forsomanyyears,IcannotdenythatIwaslegallymarriedtoherorthatwehavebeenseparatedupto
thepresentforreasonsandjustificationsknownfullywellbythem:
Art.IV.Thatsince1952,1havebeenliving,asmanandwifewithoneSofiaJ.Nepomuceno,whomI
declareandavowtobeentitledtomyloveandaffection,forallthethingswhichshehasdoneforme,
now and in the past that while Sofia J. Nepomuceno has with my full knowledge and consent, did
comportandrepresentmyselfasherownhusband,intruthandinfact,aswellasintheeyesofthe
law,Icouldnotbindhertomeintheholybondsofmatrimonybecauseofmyaforementionedprevious
marriage
On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the last Will and Testament of the deceased
MartinJugointheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,BranchXXXIV,CaloocanCityandaskedfortheissuancetoher
ofletterstestamentary.
OnMay13,1975,thelegalwifeofthetestator,RufinaGomezandherchildrenfiledanoppositionalleginginteralia
thattheexecutionoftheWillwasprocuredbyundueandimproperinfluenceonthepartofthepetitionerthatatthe
timeoftheexecutionoftheWill,thetestatorwasalreadyverysickandthatpetitionerhavingadmittedherlivingin
concubinagewiththetestator,sheiswantinginintegrityandthus,letterstestamentaryshouldnotbeissuedtoher.
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OnJanuary6,1976,thelowercourtdeniedtheprobateoftheWillonthegroundthatasthetestatoradmittedinhis
WilltocohabitingwiththepetitionerfromDecember1952untilhisdeathonJuly16,1974,theWill'sadmissionto
probatewillbeanIdleexercisebecauseonthefaceoftheWill,theinvalidityofitsintrinsicprovisionsisevident.
Thepetitionerappealedtotherespondentappellatecourt.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the
probateofthewill.TherespondentcourtdeclaredtheWilltobevalidexceptthatthedeviseinfavorofthepetitioner
is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
dispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:
WHEREFORE,thedecisionaquo is hereby set aside, the will in question declared valid except the
deviseinfavoroftheappellantwhichisdeclarednullandvoid.Thepropertiessodevisedareinstead
passedoninintestacytotheappellantinequalshares,withoutpronouncementastocost.
OnJune15,1982,oppositorsRufinaGomezandherchildrenfileda"MotionforCorrectionofClericalError"praying
thattheword"appellant"inthelastsentenceofthedispositiveportionofthedecisionbechangedto"appellees"so
as to read: "The properties so devised are instead passed on intestacy to the appellees in equal shares, without
pronouncementastocosts."ThemotionwasgrantedbytherespondentcourtonAugust10,1982.
OnAugust23,1982,thepetitionerfiledamotionforreconsideration.Thiswasdeniedbytherespondentcourtina
resolutiondatedDecember28,1982.
The main issue raised by the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction
whenafterdeclaringthelastWillandTestamentofthedeceasedMartinJugovalidlydrawn,itwentontopassupon
theintrinsicvalidityofthetestamentaryprovisioninfavorofhereinpetitioner.
The petitioner submits that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed upon and
decidedintheprobateproceedingsbutinsomeotherproceedingsbecausetheonlypurposeoftheprobateofaWill
istoestablishconclusivelyasagainsteveryonethataWillwasexecutedwiththeformalitiesrequiredbylawand
that the testator has the mental capacity to execute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the
provisionsofparagraph1ofArticle739oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippineswereapplicable,thedeclarationofits
nullitycouldonlybemadebythepropercourtinaseparateactionbroughtbythelegalwifeforthespecificpurpose
ofobtainingadeclarationofthenullityofthetestamentaryprovisionintheWillinfavorofthepersonwithwhomthe
testatorwasallegedlyguiltyofadulteryorconcubinage.
The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last Will and Testament itself expressly admits
indubitably on its face the meretricious relationship between the testator and the petitioner and the fact that
petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status of the
testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence, merits the application of the doctrine
enunciatedinNuguidv.FelixNuguid,etal.(17SCRA449)andFelixBalanay,Jr.v.Hon.AntonioMartinez,etal.
(G.R. No. L 39247, June 27, 1975). Respondents also submit that the admission of the testator of the illicit
relationshipbetweenhimandthepetitionerputinissuethelegalityofthedevise.Weagreewiththerespondents.
TherespondentcourtactedwithinitsjurisdictionwhenafterdeclaringtheWilltobevalidlydrawn,itwentontopass
upontheintrinsicvalidityoftheWillanddeclaredthedeviseinfavorofthepetitionernullandvoid.
Thegeneralruleisthatinprobateproceedings,thecourt'sareaofinquiryislimitedtoanexaminationandresolution
oftheextrinsicvalidityoftheWill.Theruleisexpressedthus:
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...Itiselementarythataprobatedecreefinallyanddefinitivelysettlesallquestionsconcerningcapacity
ofthetestatorandtheproperexecutionandwitnessingofhislastWillandtestament,irrespectiveof
whetheritsprovisionsarevalidandenforceableorotherwise.(Fernandezv.Dimagiba,21SCRA428)
ThepetitionbelowbeingfortheprobateofaWill,thecourt'sareaofinquiryislimitedtotheextrinsic
validity thereof. The testators testamentary capacity and the compliance with the formal requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law are the only questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any
inquiryintotheintrinsicvalidityorefficacyoftheprovisionsofthewillorthelegalityofanydeviseor
legacyispremature.
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Trueornot,theallegedsaleisnogroundforthedismissalofthepetitionforprobate.Probateisone
thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first decides the execution of the
documentandthetestamentarycapacityofthetestatorthesecondrelatestodescentanddistribution
(Sumilangv.Ramagosa,21SCRA1369)
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Toestablishconclusivelyasagainsteveryone,andonceforall,thefactsthatawillwasexecutedwith
the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the only
purposeoftheproceedingsunderthenewcodefortheprobateofawill.(Sec.625).Thejudgmentin
suchproceedingsdeterminesandcandeterminenothingmore.Inthemthecourthasnopowertopass
uponthevalidityofanyprovisionsmadeinthewill.Itcannotdecide,forexample,thatacertainlegacy
isvoidandanotheronevalid....(Castanedav.Alemany,3Phil.426)
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerlesstodowhatthesituationconstrainsittodoandpassuponcertainprovisionsoftheWill.
InNuguidv.Nuguid(17SCRA449)citedbythetrialcourt,thetestatorinstitutedthepetitionerasuniversalheirand
completelypreteritedhersurvivingforcedheirs.Awillofthisnature,nomatterhowvaliditmayappearextrinsically,
would be null and void. Separate or latter proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisionswouldbesuperfluous.
Evenbeforeestablishingtheformalvalidityofthewill,theCourtinBalanay.Jr.v.Martinez(64SCRA452)passed
uponthevalidityofitsintrinsicprovisions.
Invoking"practicalconsiderations",westated:
The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
beforerulingonitsallowanceorformalvalidity,andindeclaringitvoid.
Weareoftheopinionthatinviewofcertainunusualprovisionsofthewill,whichareofdubiouslegality,
andbecauseofthemotiontowithdrawthepetitionforprobate(whichthelowercourtassumedtohave
been filed with the petitioner's authorization) the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's
intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerationsdemandthattheintrinsicvalidityofthewillbepassedupon,evenbeforeitisprobated,
the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with
Sumilangvs.RamagosaL23135,December26,1967,21SCRA1369Cachov.UdanL19996,April
30,1965,13SCRA693).
ThereappearstobenomoredisputeatthistimeovertheextrinsicvalidityoftheWill.Bothpartiesareagreedthat
the Will of Martin Jugo was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator had the mental
capacity to execute his Will. The petitioner states that she completely agrees with the respondent court when in
resolvingthequestionofwhetherornottheprobatecourtcorrectlydeniedtheprobateofMartinJugo'slastWilland
Testament,itruled:
Thisbeingso,thewillisdeclaredvalidlydrawn.(Page4,Decision,AnnexAofPetition.)
OntheotherhandtherespondentsprayfortheaffirmanceoftheCourtofAppeals'decisionintoto.
Theonlyissue,therefore,isthejurisdictionoftherespondentcourttodeclarethetestamentaryprovisioninfavorof
thepetitionerasnullandvoid.
Wesustaintherespondentcourt'sjurisdiction.AsstatedinNuguidv.Nuguid,(supra):
Wepausetoreflect.Ifthecaseweretoberemandedforprobateofthewill,nothingwillbegained.On
thecontrary,thislitigationwillbeprotracted.Andforaughtthatappearsintherecord,intherecord,in
the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once
again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result, waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
that we might as well meet headon the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
(Section2,Rule1,RulesofCourt.Case,etal.v.Jugo,etal.,77Phil.517,522).Afterall,thereexistsa
justiciablecontroversycryingforsolution.
Weseenousefulpurposethatwouldbeservedifweremandthenullifiedprovisiontothepropercourtinaseparate
actionforthatpurposesimplybecause,intheprobateofawill,thecourtdoesnotordinarilylookintotheintrinsic
validityofitsprovisions.
Article739oftheCivilCodeprovides:
Thefollowingdonationsshallbevoid:
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(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation
(2)Thosemadebetweenpersonsfoundguiltyofthesamecriminaloffense,inconsiderationthereof
(3)Thosemadetoapublicofficerorhiswife,descendantsandascendants,byreasonofhisoffice.
InthecasereferredtoinNo.1,theactionfordeclarationofnullitymaybebroughtbythespouseofthe
donorordoneeandtheguiltofthedonoranddoneemaybeprovedbypreponderanceofevidencein
thesameaction.
Article1028oftheCivilCodeprovides:
TheprohibitionsmentionedinArticle739,concerningdonationsintervivosshallapplytotestamentary
provisions.
InArticleIIIofthedisputedWill,executedonAugust15,1968,oralmostsixyearsbeforethetestator'sdeathon
July 16, 1974, Martin Jugo stated that respondent Rufina Gomez was his legal wife from whom he had been
estranged "for so many years." He also declared that respondents Carmelita Jugo and Oscar Jugo were his
legitimatechildren.InArticleIV,hestatedthathehadbeenlivingasmanandwifewiththepetitionersince1952.
Testator Jugo declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. He stated that Nepomuceno
representedJugoasherownhusbandbut"intruthandinfact,aswellasintheeyesofthelaw,Icouldnotbindher
tomeintheholybondsofmatrimonybecauseofmyaforementionedpreviousmarriage.
ThereisnoquestionfromtherecordsaboutthefactofapriorexistingmarriagewhenMartinJugoexecutedhisWill.
ThereisalsonodisputethatthepetitionerandMr.Jugolivedtogetherinanostensiblemaritalrelationshipfor22
yearsuntilhisdeath.
ItisalsoafactthatonDecember2,1952,MartinJugoandSofiaJ.Nepomucenocontractedamarriagebeforethe
JusticeofthePeaceofVictoria,Tarlac.Themanwasthen51yearsoldwhilethewomanwas48.Nepomucenonow
contendsthatsheactedingoodfaithfor22yearsinthebeliefthatshewaslegallymarriedtothetestator.
Therecordsdonotsustainafindingofinnocenceorgoodfaith.Asarguedbytheprivaterespondents:
First. The last will and testament itself expressly admits indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationshipbetweenthetestatorandpetitioner,thedevisee.
Second. Petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
civilstatusofthetestator,whichledprivaterespondentstopresentcontraryevidence.
In short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to
petitionerbythedeceasedtestatoratthestartoftheproceedings.
WhetherornotpetitionerknewthattestatorMartinJugo,themanhehadlivedwithasmanandwife,
as already married, was an important and specific issue brought by the parties before the trial court,
andpasseduponbytheCourtofAppeals.
Instead of limiting herself to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to
present evidence on her alleged good faith in marrying the testator. (Testimony of Petitioner, TSN of
August1,1982,pp.5657andpp.6264).
Privaterespondents,naturally,presentedevidencethatwouldrefutethetestimonyofpetitioneronthe
point.
Sebastian Jugo, younger brother of the deceased testator, testified at length on the meretricious
relationshipofhisbrotherandpetitioner.(TSNofAugust18,1975).
Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the parties made a decisive issue right at the
inceptionofthecase.
Confrontedbythesituation,thetrialcourthadtomakearulingonthequestion.
WhenthecourtaquoheldthatthetestatorMartinJugoandpetitioner'weredeemedguiltyofadultery
orconcubinage',itwasafindingthatpetitionerwasnottheinnocentwomanshepretendedtobe.
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3.If areview oftheevidencemustbemadenonetheless,thenprivate respondents respectfully offer

thefollowinganalysis:
FIRST:ThesecrecyofthemarriageofpetitionerwiththedeceasedtestatorinatowninTarlacwhere
neithershenorthetestatoreverresided.Iftherewasnothingtohidefrom,whytheconcealment'?Of
course,itmaybearguedthatthemarriageofthedeceasedwithprivaterespondentRufinaGomezwas
likewise done in secrecy. But it should be remembered that Rufina Gomez was already in the family
wayatthattimeanditwouldseemthattheparentsofMartinJugowerenotinfavorofthemarriageso
muchsothatanactionincourtwasbroughtconcerningthemarriage.(TestimonyofSebastianJugo,
TSNofAugust18,1975,pp.2930)
SECOND:Petitionerwasasweetheartofthedeceasedtestatorwhentheywerestillbothsingle.That
wouldbein1922asMartinJugomarriedrespondentRufinaGomezonNovember29,1923(Exh.3).
Petitioner married the testator only on December 5, 1952. There was a space of about 30 years in
between.Duringthose30years,coulditbebelievedthatshedidnotevenwonderwhyMartinJugodid
notmarryhernorcontactheranymoreafterNovember,1923factsthatshouldimpelhertoaskher
groombeforeshemarriedhiminsecrecy,especiallysowhenshewasalreadyabout50yearsoldat
thetimeofmarriage.
THIRD:ThefactthatpetitionerbrokeofffromMartinJugoin1923isbyitselfconclusivedemonstration
thatshenewthatthemanshehadopenlylivedfor22yearsasmanandwifewasamarriedmanwith
alreadytwochildren.
FOURTH:HavingadmittedthatsheknewthechildrenofrespondentRufinaGomez,isitpossiblethat
shewouldnothaveaskedMartinJugowhetherornottheywerehisillegitimateorlegitimatechildren
andbywhom?ThatisunFilipino.
FIFTH: Having often gone to Pasig to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it
possible that she would not have known that the mother of private respondent Oscar Jugo and
Carmelita Jugo was respondent Rufina Gomez, considering that the houses of the parents of Martin
Jugo(wherehehadlivedformanyyears)andthatofrespondentRufinaGomezwerejustafewmeters
away?
Such pretentions of petitioner Sofia Nepomuceno are unbelievable. They are, to say the least,
inherentlyimprobable,fortheyareagainsttheexperienceincommonlifeandtheordinaryinstinctsand
promptings of human nature that a woman would not bother at all to ask the man she was going to
marrywhetherornothewasalreadymarriedtoanother,knowingthathergroomhadchildren.Itwould
beastorythatwouldstrainhumancredulitytothelimitifpetitionerdidnotknowthatMartinJugowas
already a married man in view of the irrefutable fact that it was precisely his marriage to respondent
RufinaGomezthatledpetitionertobreakoffwiththedeceasedduringtheiryoungeryears.
Moreover,theprohibitioninArticle739oftheCivilCodeisagainstthemakingofadonationbetweenpersonswho
arelivinginadulteryorconcubinage.Itisthedonationwhichbecomesvoid.Thegivercannotgiveevenassuming
thattherecipientmayreceive.TheverywordingsoftheWillinvalidatethelegacybecausethetestatoradmittedhe
wasdisposingthepropertiestoapersonwithwhomhehadbeenlivinginconcubinage.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.ThedecisionoftheCourtofAppeals,nowIntermediate
AppellateCourt,isAFFIRMED.Nocosts.
SOORDERED.
Teehankee(Chairman),MelencioHerrera,Plana,Relova,DelaFuenteandPatajo,JJ.,concur.
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