Pubcorp Midterms Digest

1.
General Principles
A. Corporation
strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by

international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.[24]
1. Definition
- an artificial being created by operation of law having the
right of succession and powers, attributes and properties
(SPAP) expressly authorized by law or incident to its
existence.
2. Classification
a. Public created by the state either by general
or special act for purposes of administration of local
government or rendering service in the public interest.
(AR)
b. Private established for private aim or benefit
c. Quasi-Public
Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned
or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as
succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15, 2009, so
much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion
does not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a private
corporation within the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code.
3. Criterion to determine public corporations

RELATIONSHIP OF The GOVERNMENT TO THE
STATE if created as its own agency to help the state in
carrying out its governmental functions
In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important

ally and auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian
field in accordance with its commitments under international
law.
4. Classes of Public Corporations

a. Quasi- Public Private corporation that
renders public service or supplies public wants
- created as agencies of the state for narrow and
limited purposes without the powers and liabilities of selfgoverning corporations
2.
Held: Not a public corporation but a Quasi-public

corporation. Applicable law; Philippine Bill of 1902.
There being neither a general law on the formation ad
organization of private corporations nor restriction o the
legislature to create private corporations by direct
legislation, the Philippine Commission was within its
powers in 1905 to constitute petitioner as a private
entity.
b. Municipal Corporation - body politic and

corporate (kaya siya dual nature, oks???) constituted by
the incorporation of inhabitants for purpose of local
government.
- established by law partly as an agency to assist
in the civil government of the country but chiefly to regulate
and administer the local and internal affairs if the city, town
or district which is incorporated.
- exercise powers as a political subdivision of the
National Government and as a corporate entity
representing its inhabitants
Cases:
1. Liban v. Gordon | Quasi-public corporation
Facts:
Gordon filed a motion for clarification and consideration
that respondent did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, as the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. [5] The
Decision, however, further declared void the PNRC Charter
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and
consequently ruled that the PNRC should incorporate under
the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation
Issue: WON PNRC is a private corporation
Held:
No. The PNRC, as a National Society of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be
classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose
its character of neutrality as well as its independence, nor
Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

Animals v COA | True criterion whether corporation
is public or private
The fact that a certain judicial entity is impressed with

public interest does not make an entity a public
corporation, inasmuch as a corporation may be prvate
although its charter contains provisions of a public
character, incorporated solely for public good. private
corporation that renders public service or supplies
public wants.
TRUE CRITERION WHETHER PUBLIC OR
PRIVATE: totality of the relation of the corporation
ti the state. If the corporation is created by the state
as the latters own instrumentality or agency to help
it carry out its governmental functions, PUBLIC.
Otherwise, PRIVATE.
3.
The Province of North Cotabato vs GRP

Held:
The BJE runs counter the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the republic and is contrary to the
constitution.
ART. X Sec 18: The creation of autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the
votes cast by constituents in the plebiscite; Provinces in
MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO
favor
Article XI Sec 22: Indigenous cultural communities
within the framework of the national unity and
development: IT DOES NOT UPHOLD NATIONAL
UNITY
II. Principles of Local Autonomy
1. Principle of Local Authority (Sec 25 Art II and
Sec 2, Art X 1987 Constitution)
Cases:
1. BASCO V PAGCOR
Facts:
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated
January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D.
1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate
and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was
originally conducted in the well known floating casino
"Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success
for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399
was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this
objective. Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was
created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law,
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of
the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal
fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of
the principle of local autonomy.
Issue:
WON Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be
violated by P.D. 1869
Held: No. The power of local government to "impose taxes
and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress
may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative"
law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII,
1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of local governments
to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative
but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987
Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of
the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited
in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make
local governments sovereign within the state or an
"imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary
system of government, such as the government under the
Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be
an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it
cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in
such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization
of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what
may be delegated to local government units remains a
matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a
political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection

v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or
otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and
hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or
delegate it to local governments.
2. LINA V PANO
Facts:
Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install
Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor
Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors
permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for
said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995 which prohibits gambling esp Lotto in the Province of
Laguna. Hence, respondent filed a TRO, ordering the
defendants
to
refrain
from
implementing
or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order
requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue
a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3)
an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg.
508, T. 1995.
Issue:
whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit
based thereon are valid
Held:
Yes. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized
by the national government through an Act of
Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended byBatas
Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the
PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. This statute
remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance,
the national government deems it wise and proper to permit
it. Hence, theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local
government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance
that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what
the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as
lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or
resolution.
The basic relationship between the national legislature and
the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy
of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that
policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the
local government units although in significantly reduced
degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The
power to create still includes the power to destroy. The
power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5,
Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
3. LIMBONA V MANGELIN
Facts: Limbona was appointed as a member of the
Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government,
Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. He was elected
Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). On

October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam,
Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House
of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook
Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in
his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, but the
invitation was rejected for the reason that "our presence in
the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic)
precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook ...
this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed
by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P.
LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG
PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds,
among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be
prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and
emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned
after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for
the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11,
elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will
show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever
made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying
Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from
the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of
the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused
withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly
resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and
emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had
"filed a case before the Supreme Court against some
members of the Assembly on question which should have
been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," 7 for
which the respondents now submit that the petition had
become "moot and academic". 8
Issue: WON the autonomous governments of Mindanao, is
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts
Held: Yes. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were
organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things,
the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two
regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and
its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery
to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified
therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to
"undertake all internal administrative matters for the
respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are
within the jurisdiction and competence of the National
Government. In relation to the central government, it
provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over the Autonomous
Regions ..." 22
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy
autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. 29
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy. 30
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the

Republic of the Philippines. 31
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and
accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy."
On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the
national government acting through the President (and the
Department of Local Government).32 If the Sangguniang
Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter
sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this
Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say,
of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our
jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category
only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,
their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services. Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And
if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's
removal as Speaker.
*** autonomy is either decentralization of administration or
decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process
to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social
progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central
government of the burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The
President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but
only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according
to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that
he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
xxx xxx xxx

See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
4. DISOMANGCOP V DATUMANONG
Facts:
On 20 May 1999, (DPWH) Secretary Gregorio R. Vigilar
issued D.O. 119
Subject: Creation of Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
Pursuant to Sections 6 and 25 of Executive Order No.
124 dated 30 January 1987, there is hereby created a
DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which

shall have jurisdiction over all national infrastructure
projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi
City and the province of Lanao del Sur.
SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act shall be included in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the maintenance and continued
operation of the engineering district office shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Almost two (2) years later, on 17 January 2001, then
President Joseph E. Estrada approved and signed into law
R.A. 8999. SEC. 3. The amount necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Act shall be included in the
General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the maintenance and continued
operation of the engineering district office shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
petitioners Arsadi M. Disomangcop (Disomangcop) and
Ramir M. Dimalotang (Dimalotang) addressed a petition to
then DPWH Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong, seeking the
revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-implementation of R.A.
8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition
Consequently, they filed an instant petition, in their capacity
as Officer-in-Charge and District Engineer/Engineer II,
respectively, of the First Engineering District of the
Department of Public Works and Highways, Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (DPWH-ARMM) in Lanao del Sur.
They allege that D.O. 119 was issued with grave abuse of
discretion and that it violates the constitutional autonomy of
the ARMM. They point out that the challenged Department
Order has tasked the Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office
with functions that have already been devolved to the
DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur.
Issue:
WON R.A. 8999 and D.O. 119 were issued with grave abuse
of discretion.
Held:
Yes. Although R.A. 9054 was enacted later, it
reaffirmed the imperativeness of the plebiscite requirement.
[37]
In fact, R.A. 9054 itself, being the second or later ARMM
Organic Act, was subjected to and ratified in a plebiscite.
The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as
implemented by E.O. 426, devolved the functions of the
DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao del Sur (minus
Marawi City at the time) [38] to the Regional Government. By
creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A.
8999, in essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The
amendatory law should therefore first obtain the approval of
the people of the ARMM before it could validly take effect.
Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A. 8999 has not
even become operative. Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to
and cannot be reconciled with both ARMM Organic Acts, R.A.
6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the antagonism and
disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the ARMM
Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the
other hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization
which is the essence of regional autonomy.
** Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic internal
government powers to the people of a particular area or
region with least control and supervision from the central
government.[57]
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit

determined groups, with a common tradition and shared
social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their ways
of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be in charge
of their own business. This is achieved through the
establishment of a special governance regime for certain
member communities who choose their own authorities
from within the community and exercise the jurisdictional
authority legally accorded to them to decide internal
community affairs.[58]
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy implies the
cultivation of more positive means for national integration.
It would remove the wariness among the Muslims, increase
their trust in the government and pave the way for the
unhampered implementation of the development programs
in the region
A
necessary
decentralization.[63]
prerequisite
of
autonomy
is
Decentralization is a decision by the central

government
authorizing
its
subordinates,
whether
geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority
in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational
units. It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger
government chooses to delegate certain authority to more
local governments. Federalism implies some measure of
decentralization, but unitary systems may also decentralize.
Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that
the sub-units that have been authorized to act (by
delegation) do not possess any claim of right against the
central government.[64]
Decentralization comes in two formsdeconcentration
and devolution. Deconcentration is administrative in nature;
it involves the transfer of functions or the delegation of
authority and responsibility from the national office to the
regional and local offices. This mode of decentralization is
also referred to as administrative decentralization.[65]
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political
decentralization, or the transfer of powers, responsibilities,
and resources for the performance of certain functions from
the central government to local government units. [66] This is
a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an
actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. [67] It aims to
grant greater autonomy to local government units in
cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them
self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities
The challenged law creates an office with functions
and powers which, by virtue of E.O. 426, have been
previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM, First Engineering
District in Lanao del Sur.
5. BATANGAS CATV, INC. VS CA

Facts:
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas enacted a Resolution
No. 210[7] granting petitioner a permit to construct, install,
and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of
the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to
charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein,
provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be
subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.[8]
Then on November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber

rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result,
respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter[9] threatening to
cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of
respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to
Resolution No. 210.
Hence, he then filed a petition alleging that
respondent has no authority to regulate the subscriber
rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive
Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications
Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the
CATV operation in the Philippines.
Issue:
WON THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AUTHORIZES
RESPONDENT SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD TO
EXERCISE THE REGULATORY FUNCTION SOLELY
LODGED WITH THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 205,
INCLUDING THE AUTHORITY TO FIX AND/OR APPROVE
THE SERVICE RATES OF CATV OPERATORS
Held:
No. Pres Aquino issued E.O. No. 205[22] opening the
CATV industry to all citizens of the Philippines. It mandated
the NTC to grant Certificates of Authority to CATV
operators and to issue the necessary implementing
rules and regulations.
On September 9, 1997, President Fidel V. Ramos
issued E.O. No. 436[23] prescribing policy guidelines to
govern CATV operation in the Philippines. Cast in more
definitive terms, it restated the NTCs regulatory powers over
CATV operations,
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light
of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC
exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to
the exclusion of other bodies.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in
statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs.[28] Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to
protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents
and maintain peace and order within their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Accordingly, we have upheld
enactments providing, for instance, the regulation of
gambling,[29] the occupation of rig drivers, [30] the installation
and operation of pinball machines, [31] the maintenance and
operation of cockpits,[32] the exhumation and transfer of
corpses from public burial grounds, [33] and the operation of
hotels, motels, and lodging houses[34] as valid exercises by
local legislatures of the police power under the general
welfare clause.
Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe
regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is
primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public
properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical
realities of constructing CATV system the use of
public streets, rights of ways, the founding of
structures, and the parceling of large regions allow
an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators.[35] This is the same regulation that it exercises
over all private enterprises within its territory.
But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the

general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No.
210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the
well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution
No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and
(2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV
industry.
Resolution No. 210 is an enactment of an LGU acting
only as agent of the national legislature. Necessarily, its act
must reflect and conform to the will of its principal. To test
its validity, we must apply the particular requisites of a valid
ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations. [36]
Where there is no express power in the charter of a
municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances
regulating certain matters which are specifically
covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance,
insofar as it attempts to regulate the subject which is
completely covered by a general statute of the
legislature, may be rendered invalid. x x x Where the
subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature
has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its
declaration is binding throughout the State.
2.
Powers of the President over the LGUs

Sec 4. Art. X, 1987 Constitution
Cases:
1. JUDGE DADOLE VS COA
Facts:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started
receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the
yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased
the amount to P1,500 for each judge. March 15, 1994, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the
disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which
delimits the additional allowances and benefitsm(1000 for
Provinces and 700 for cities) that may be given to national
govt officials and employees.
Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor
issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely,
Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete,
Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M.
Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in
excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Then, the
additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were
reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse
the amount they received in excess of P1,000.
Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for
infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by
dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can
disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed
therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by
any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers
of the President. They further allege that said circular is void
for lack of publication.
Issue: (1) whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going

beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not
having been published
Held:
Yes. This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the
power of control. The Chief Executive wielded no more
authority than that of checking whether local governments
or their officials were performing their duties as provided by
the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere
with local governments, so long as they act within the scope
of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
body; it does not include any restraining authority over such
body.
Under our present system of government, executive power
is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and
other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they
are subject to the power of control of the President, at
whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are
elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate
from the electorate, to whom they are directly
accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts
are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold
or alter any authority or power given them by the
Constitution and the law.
Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the
affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she
finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the
scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local
government units. Hence, the President or any of his or
her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters
of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by
the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter
the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of
a local government unit is a patent nullity because it
violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of
powers of the executive and legislative departments in
governing municipal corporations.
2.
PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE (IN REL TO SEC 284-294

LGC)
Facts:
December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued
AO 372. Petitioners assailed Sec. 1 and 4 of the
Administrative Order issued by Ramos.
SECTION
1. All
government
departments
and
agencies, including state universities and colleges,
government-owned and controlled corporations and
local governments units will identify and implement
measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total
expenditures for the year by at least 25% of
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal
services items,
SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation
by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee
of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment
to local government units shall be withheld.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO

372, was in effect exercising the power of control over
LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only
the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with
the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues
that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA
is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government
Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution,
providing for the automatic release to each of these units its
share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents,
claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to
alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the
peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the
President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly
does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it
merely directs local governments to identify measures that
will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal
services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of
10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory
prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their
revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in
nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Coordination Committee of the emerging
fiscal situation."
Issue: whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs"

LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b)
Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent
of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of
the President's power of general supervision over local
governments.
Held:
No. There are therefore several requisites before the
President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an
unmanaged public sector deficit of the national
government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the
presidents of the various local leagues;and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the
Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and
Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in
the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent
(30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current one.
The provision (Sec. 1) is merely an advisory to prevail
upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal
restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all
concerned would do well to heed the President's call to
unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It
is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be
imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow
such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor
general's contention in regard to Section 1.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A
basic
feature
of
local
fiscal
autonomy
is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national
internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.[28] The Local Government Code[29] specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU
concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the
year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that

may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose."[30]As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command
that must be given a compulsory meaning. [31] The provision
is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding,
effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA
"pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding
clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although
temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means
"something
held
back
or
withheld,
often
temporarily."[32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of the
retention by the national government does not matter. Any
retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an
advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4
thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision
effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was wellintentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA,
but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions
must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.
3. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO **

Facts: In 1998, then President Estrada issued EO No. 48
establishing the Program for Devolution Adjustment and
Equalization to enhance the capabilities of LGUs in the
discharge of the functions and services devolved to them
through the LGC.
The Oversight Committee under Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora passed Resolutions No. OCD-99-005, OCD99-006 and OCD-99-003 which were approved by Pres.
Estrada on October 6, 1999. The guidelines formulated by
the Oversight Committee required the LGUs to identify the
projects eligible for funding under the portion of LGSEF and
submit the project proposals and other requirements to the
DILG for appraisal before the Committee serves notice to
the DBM for the subsequent release of the corresponding
funds.
Hon. Herminaldo Mandanas, Governor of Batangas,
petitioned to declare unconstitutional and void certain
provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts
(GAAs) of 1999, 2000, and 2001, insofar as they uniformly
earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of
P5billion for the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the
Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) &
imposed conditions for the release thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000,
and 2001, and the OCD resolutions infringe the Constitution
and the LGC of 1991.
HELD:
Yes.
The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a withholding of a
portion of the IRA they effectively encroach on the fiscal
autonomy enjoyed by LGUs and must be struck down.
According to Art. II, Sec.25 of the Constitution, the
State shall ensure the local autonomy of local
governments. Consistent with the principle of local
autonomy, theConstitution confines the Presidents power
over the LGUs to one of general supervision, which has
been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Drilon
v. Limdistinguishes supervision from control: control lays
down the rules in the doing of an act the officer has
the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act,

or decide to do it himself; supervision merely sees to it
that the rules are followed but has no authority to set down
the rules or the discretion to modify/replace them.
The entire process involving the distribution & release of the
LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of
the IRA or just share of the LGUs in the national
taxes. Sec.6, Art.X of the Constitution mandates that
the just share shall beautomatically released to the
LGUs. Since the release is automatic, the LGUs arent
required to perform any act to receive the just share it
shall be released to them without need of further action.
To subject its distribution & release to the vagaries of the
implementing rules & regulations as sanctioned by the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999-2001 and the OCD
Resolutions would violate this constitutional mandate.
The only possible exception to the mandatory automatic
release of the LGUs IRA is if the national internal revenue
collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40% of the
collections of the 3rd preceding fiscal year. The exception
does not apply in this case.
The Oversight Committees authority is limited to the
implementation of the LGC of 1991 not to supplant or
subvert the same, and neither can it exercise control over
the IRA of the LGUs.
Congress may amend any of the provisions of the
LGC but only through a separate lawand not through
appropriations laws or GAAs. Congress cannot include in
a general appropriations bill matters that should be
more properly enacted in a separate legislation.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation,
whose content is limited to specified sums of money
dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal
unit any provision therein which is intended to amend
another law is considered an inappropriate provision.
Increasing/decreasing the IRA of LGUs fixed in the LGC of
1991 are matters of general & substantive law. To permit
the Congress to undertake these amendments through the
GAAs would unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the
LGUs.
The value of LGUs as institutions of democracy is
measured by the degree of autonomy they enjoy. Our
national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions in local autonomy but should also
appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions
are based.
4. ACORD VS ZAMORA **
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the
Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within
30 days before the opening of every regular session,
submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000.
The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This
became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTYONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also
known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year
2000. It provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS TO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading
UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that an amount of
P10,000,000,000
(P10
Billion),
apart
from
the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund
the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the
original revenue targets submitted by the President to
Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment
to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA
specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA

as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of
P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed
Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the
occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with
3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar,
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application
for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then
Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno,
then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of
provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A),
and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4
of
the
GAA
(the
GAA
provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the
LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by
10B and by withholding its release by placing the same
under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of
the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless
proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it
being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that
the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of
automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the
revenue targets originally submitted by the President,
rather
than
making
the
release
automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy
by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the
allotted
IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share,
as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically
released
to
them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional
mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on
whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather than making
the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the
above constitutional provision is addressed not to the
legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not
prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the
release
of
the
IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional
provision merely prevents the executive branch of the
government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not
the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to
withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This
essentially means that the President or any member of the
Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the
backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to
automatically release the just share of local governments in
the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from performing this
duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard
constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it
has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is
patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the
enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the
Constitution
would have been worded
differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the
just share of local governments is qualified by the words as
determined by law, and not the release thereof, the plain
implication is that Congress is not authorized by the
Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of
the
IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible
exception to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as
held
in
Batangas:
if the national internal revenue collections for the current
fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the
preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be
automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of

the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment
may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the
actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the
quarter
of
the
current
fiscal
year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA
provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable
intent to lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal
management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however,
must be echoed: [T]he rule of law requires that even the
best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of
the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must
be
carried
out
by
legal
methods.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV
Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby
declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion
of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the
UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
5. KIDA VS SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES **
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic
act that established the ARMM and scheduled the first
regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No.
9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular
elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second
Monday of September 2001. RA No. 9140 further reset the
first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No.
9333 reset for the third time the ARMM regional elections to
the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every
3 years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections
should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had
begun preparations for these elections and had accepted
certificates of candidacies for the various regional offices to
be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May
2013 to coincide with the regular national and local
elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the
Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality
of RA No. 10153.
ISSUE:
WON the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint
OICs constitutional
Held:
Yes, The Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
RA 10153 stating that there is no incompatibility between
the Presidents power of supervision over local governments
and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the
President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to
appoint
OICs.
The power of supervision is defined as the power of a
superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from
the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment
of
the
former
for
the
latter.
The petitioners apprehension regarding the Presidents
alleged power of control over the OICs is rooted in their
belief that the Presidents appointment power includes the
power to remove these officials at will. In this way, the
petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will be beholden
to the President, and act as representatives of the President
and
not
of
the
people.
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the
petitioners supposition. The provision states:
Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The

President shall appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of
the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and
Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who shall
perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. The wording of the law is
clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will
remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected
officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision
even hints that the President has the power to recall the
appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners
fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
GOV. VILLAFUERTE , JR. AND PROV. OF CAMSUR VS

ROBREDO
Facts:
1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an
examination and audit on the manner the local government
units (LGUs) utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA)
for the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded
an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the
20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually
utilized for development projects but was diverted to
expenses properly chargeable against the Maintenance and
Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of
Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC). On August 31, 2010, the
respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the
assailed MC No. 2010-83,9 entitled Full Disclosure of Local
Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings, which
aims to promote good governance through enhanced
transparency and accountability of LGUs.
On February 21, 2011, Villafuerte, then Governor of
Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of
Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari,
seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent
for being unconstitutional and having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
Issue:
WON assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles
of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution
and the LGC
Held:
No. All local authorities are further reminded that utilizing
the 20% component of the Internal Revenue Allotment,
whether willfully or through negligence, for any purpose
beyond those expressly prescribed by law or public policy
shall be subject to the sanctions provided under the Local
Government Code and under such other applicable laws. 45
Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for

sanctions. It did not particularly establish a new set of acts
or omissions which are deemed violations and provide the
corresponding penalties therefor. It simply stated a
reminder to LGUs that there are existing rules to consider in
the disbursement of the 20% development fund and that
non-compliance therewith may render them liable to
sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other
applicable laws. Nonetheless, this warning for possible
imposition of sanctions did not alter the advisory nature of
the issuance.
At any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local
autonomy granted to them does not completely severe
them from the national government or turn them into
impenetrable states. Autonomy does not make local
governments sovereign within the state.46 In Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals,47 the Court reiterated:
Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of

partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units, or otherwise, to
usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and
for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to
enhance self-government.48
Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being
enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the supervision of the
President and maybe held accountable for malfeasance or
violations of existing laws. Supervision is not incompatible
with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed must be construed to
authorize the President to order an investigation of the act
or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of
the
public
service
so
requires.49
Clearly then, the Presidents power of supervision is not
antithetical to investigation and imposition of sanctions. As
in MC No. 2010-138, the Court finds nothing in two other
questioned issuances of the respondent, i.e., MC Nos. 201083 and 2011-08, that can be construed as infringing on the
fiscal autonomy of LGUs.
D. Creation and Alteration of Municipal Corporations

1. Sema v COMELEC
assists the creation of any of the four local government units
provInce, city, municipality or barangay must comply with
three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant
of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to
regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with
any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has
delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal
councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the
plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.[26]
2. League of cities of PH vs COMELEC
Held:
assistsCongress Must Prescribe in the Local Government
Code All Criteria
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
(Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not
in any other law. There is only one Local Government
Code.18The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the
Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the
creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality
into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not
even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The
clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation
of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code
. Any derogation or
deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government
Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million
to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001.
Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to
become a city must satisfy the
P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the

Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption
to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood
bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA
9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of
RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from
the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such
exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional.
To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws
Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the

Constitution
Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari[8]

seeking to nullify R.A. No. 9355 for being unconstitutional.
They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province,
if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress,
and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigao del Norte
of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue
Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They
pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a
land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population
of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC,
Held:
When the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and
Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be
created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively.This exemption is absent in the enumeration of
the requisites for the creation of a province under Section
461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that
islands or group of islands would form part of the land area
of a newly-created province than in most cities or
municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the
genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section
442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component
cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section
461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was
expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the
inclusion was intended to correct the congressional
oversight in Section 461 of the LGC and to reflect the true
legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to
uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
This interpretation finds merit when we consider the basic
policy considerations underpinning the principle of local
autonomy.
4. Miranda v Aguirre
Issue: whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its
failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago
from an independent component city to a component city
should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite.
Held:
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the
Local Government Code fixed the said criteria and they
involve requirements on income, population and land area.
These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government
unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people.
3. Navarro v Ermita
Re: creation of Dinagat Islands
Facts:
petitioners, as taxpayers and residents of the Province of
Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there
will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income,
population and land area have been satisfied. On the
contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No
creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration
of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless
approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite
called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly
affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the

COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date."11
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines that the
plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.
12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of
the Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed
by the Local Government Code on income, population and
land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose.
They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code requires that these
"indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance,
the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to
achieve a political purpose --- to use the people's voice as a
check against the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess
committed by the political representatives of the people
themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As
well-observed by one commentator, as the creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are
"xxx basic to local government, it is also imperative that
these acts be done not only by Congress but also be
approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. xxx
By giving the inhabitants a hand in their approval, the
provision will also eliminate the old practice of
gerrymandering and minimize legislative action designed
for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the
autonomy of local government units
- R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional. The conversion of the
city of Santiago from an independent component city to a
component city should be submitted to its people in a proper
plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected. A close analysis of the said
constitutional provision will reveal that the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator
- material change in the political and economic rights of the
local government units directly affected as well as the
people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the
Constitution requires the approval of the people in the
political units directly affected. Section 10, Article X addressed
the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or
divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the
welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the
local government unit directly affected was required to serve
as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative
power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the
boundaries of local government units. It is one instance
where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them - direct democracy of the people as
opposed to democracy thru peoples representatives. This
plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy
of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local

government units. The changes that will result from the
downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be
characterized as insubstantial. Section 10, Chapter 2 of the
Local Government Code and Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f)
(1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local
Government Code is in accord with the Constitution. The
rules therein cover all conversions, whether upward or downward
in character, so long as they result in a material change in
the local government unit directly affected, especially a
change in the political and economic rights of its people.
4. ID.; ID.; ALTERATION OF BOUNDARY OF A LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNIT; CONDITIONS.- Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution imposes two conditions
-first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundary of a local government unit must meet
the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income,
population and land area and second, the law must be
approved by the people by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS THEREOF UNDER
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; DISCUSSED.- In
accord with Section 10, Article IX of the Constitution,
Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the
required criteria and they involve requirements on income,
population and land area. These requirements, however, are
imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. They were not imposed to
determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people.
Indeed, the Local Government Code does not state that there
will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income,
population and land area have been satisfied. On the
contrary, Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides for the
necessity of a plebiscite. Said plebiscite shall be conducted
by the COMELEC within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance
effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes
another date.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSES; DISCUSSED.- The two
requirements under Section 10 of Article IX of the
Constitution have different purposes. The criteria fixed by
the Local Government Code on income, population and land
area are designed to achieve an economic purpose. They are
to be based on verified indicators, hence, Section 7, Chapter
2 of the Local Government Code requires that these
indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance,
the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. In contrast, the peoples plebiscite is required to
achieve apolitical purpose - to use the peoples voice as a
check aganst the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess
committed by the political representatives of the people
themselves than the exercise of direct people power.
5. Samson v Aguirre
Re: assailing cinstitutionality of the law creatjngna separate
city of novaliches
Facts:
February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law

Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches out
of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S.
Samson, incumbent councilor of the first district of Quezon
City, is now before the Court challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of

a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. 11
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is
indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
7. Alvarez v Guingona
Petitioner also seeks to enjoin the Executive Secretary from
ordering the implementation of R.A. 8535, the COMELEC
from holding a plebiscite for the creation of the City of
Novaliches, and the Department of Budget and Management
from disbursing funds for said plebiscite. Lastly, he prays
for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, through a motion we duly noted.
Held:
a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established

by the Local Government Code particularly, Sections 7,
11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income,
population and land area; seat of government; and no
adverse effect to being a city of Quezon City, respectively,
and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1)
and (2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council
of barangay resolution; and
The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national

wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the general fund of the
local government and are used to finance its operations
subject to specified modes of spending the same as provided
for in the Local Government Code and its implementing
rules and regulations. For instance, not less than twenty
percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local
development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget
preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the
income of the local government unit, among others, the
IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization
proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should
be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code
to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming
the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit.10
Held: the creation of a new city shall not reduce the land
area, population, and income of the original LGU or LGUs
at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed
minimum requirements. All expenses incidental to the
creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit.
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the
local government unit.11They thus constitute income which
the local government can invariably rely upon as the source
of much needed funds.
Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:
. There is no need to consider the land area, given these

figures, since under the Local Government Code, the
proposed city must comply with requirements as regards
income and population or land area. Other than the income
requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite
number of inhabitants or land area. Compliance with either
requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial
notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly
urbanized.
6. Mariano v Comelec
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution 9 clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250)
members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded,
the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing
its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was
done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to
hold that reapportionment can only be made through a
general apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local government unit
nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a
new city or province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate period of
For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into

a city, the Department of Finance certified, among others,
that the municipality had an average annual income of at
least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department
of Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of
said average annual income.
Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code
provides that the average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. To reiterate,
IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a
basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer,
since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its
own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding
support from the national government, its instrumentalities
and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly
encapsulizes the full import of the above disquisition when
it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts
realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular
sources of the Local General Fund including the internal
revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections
284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of nonrecurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants,
financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and

similar others (Italics ours).14 Such order, constituting
executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by
an administrative agency charged with the task of
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect
and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless
such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict
with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other
laws.15
8. Cawaling v Comelec
Held:
Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code
is erroneous. The phrase A municipality or a cluster
ofbarangays may be converted into a component city is not a
criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may
be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted
earlier and which petitioner cited in support of his posture,
allows themerger of local government units to create a
Code
9. TAN V COMELEC
significant and pivotal issue in the present case
revolves around in the interpretation and application in the
case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution,
which being brief and for convenience, We again quote:
SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code, and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit
or units affected.
Held:
We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change
made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said
enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the
proposed new province which are the areas affected." We
are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the
unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be
diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities
and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby
ignoring the evident reality that there are other people
necessarily affected.
In the mind of the Court, the change made by those
responsible for the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885
betrays their own misgivings. They must have entertained
apprehensions that by holding the plebiscite only in the
areas of the new proposed province, this tactic will be
tainted with illegality. In anticipation of a possible strong
challenge to the legality of such a plebiscite there was,
therefore, deliberately added in the enacted statute a selfserving phrase that the new province constitutes the area
province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with

the criteria established by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the
Code distinctly provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of
existing local government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
in this Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit or units
shall not fall below its current income classification prior to
such division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit
through a division or a merger of existing local government
units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that
such merger or division shall comply with the requirements
prescribed by the
affected. Such additional statement serves no useful purpose
for the same is misleading, erroneous and far from truth.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an
area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of
the parent province, not to mention the other adverse
economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points
raised by the petitioners.
10. Aquino v Comelec
Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative
Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such
Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was
enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the
act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned
districts shall form additional district where the new first
district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum
population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative
district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners
that if population is less than that provided by the
Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance
with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise
fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of

two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail
R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners
have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A.
9716.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is
unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or
not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative district in a province.
Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The
plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was
explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the
Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a
representative, with nothing was mentioned about a
population. While in cities, a minimum population of
250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a
population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two
additional districts from the present of four. Based on
the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the
results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other
factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House
Bill No. 4264
II. General powers and Attributes of LGUs
A Sources of Powers
B Governmental Powers
1. Police Power aka General welfare clause
1
Dela Cruz v Paras

Facts:
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with
preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.
The grounds alleged follow:1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and
void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful
business, occupation or calling. 2. Ordinance No. 84 is
violative of the petitioners' right to due process and the
equal protection of the law, as the license previously given
to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial
hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as
amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to
license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including
night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of
Tourism." The cases were assigned to respondent Judge,
now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, who issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975.
The answers were thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: "
1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only
to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance
and operation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the
RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2.
The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of petitioners' right to
due process and the equal protection of the law, since
property rights are subordinate to public interests. 3. That
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive
Municipal Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or
prohibit night clubs."
the lower court dismissed the petitions. Its rationale

is set forth in the opening paragraph thus: "Those who lust
cannot last. This in essence is why the Municipality of
Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized as it has been by
innuendos of sexual titillation and fearful of what the
awesome future holds for it, had no alternative except to
order thru its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of
partial economic dislocation, the closure of its night clubs
and/or cabarets. This in essence is also why this Court,
obedient to the mandates of good government, and
cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal
and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of
police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance
No. 84, Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue,
Bulacan. Hence this petition
Held:
t is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare
clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powersand purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."
If night clubs were merely then

regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed
ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two leading
cases above set forth, this Court had stressed
reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency
with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that
such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable
under review refers to Republic Act No. 938 as amended. It
was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "AN
ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND
COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.'
Its first section insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal or
city board or council of each chartered city shall have the
power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing
schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within
its territorial jurisdiction: ...
2 Binay v Domingo
September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its
Council, approved Resolution No. 60
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance
Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose gross
family income does not exceed two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon fulfillment of
other requirements, would receive the amount of five
hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief from the Municipality
of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60.
Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement
fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the

implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. (Rollo,
Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission
on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in audit. Based
on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved
Resolution No. 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement
of finds for the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D",
P. 44)
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo,
pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by petitioners Mayor
Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent bc it is not within
the scope of police power.
Petitioner, through its Mayor, was constrained to file this
special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision
No. 1159 be set aside as null and void.
Issue:
whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under
Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid
exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
Held:
Yes. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad,
and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to
exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people
in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all
the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal
government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it
is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the
community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the
greatest welfare of the people by promoting public
convenience or general prosperity, and to everything
worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants
of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in
classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be
reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying
treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to
our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus,
statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the
disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage
of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of
the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of the continuing
program of our government towards social justice. The

Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though
not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful
experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be
financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60
vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon
Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a
precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of
inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
3 Tano v Socrates
A FACTS:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto
Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all
live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from
January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a
several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic
organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, praying that the court declare the said
ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground
that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of
law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the
practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII
and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions
baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not
suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of
the petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal
fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily
not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay
stress on the duty of the State to protect the nations marine
wealth. The so-called preferential right of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at
all absolute.
In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources
belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration,
development and utilization...shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State.
In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on
devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal
waters including the conservation of mangroves. This
necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to
effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal
waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and
devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted
therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise
of police power, the validity of the questioned ordinances

cannot be doubted.
4 White Light Corp vs City of Manila
Facts:
Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law an ordinance
Issue:
Won the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of the Police
power of LGU
Held:
No. the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate
depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police
power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private rights and the
means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private
rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private
rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and
those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty
or property is affected.73 However, this is not in any way
meant to take it away from the vastness of State police
power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity
5 SJS v Atienza (2008)
Facts:
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the ordinance on
November 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted
pursuant to the police power delegated to local government
units, a principle described as the power inherent in a
government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare
of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof
which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban
planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general
welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as
its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land
bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad
Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in
the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR
Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the
[n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L.
Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana
bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from
Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other
businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted
under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6)
months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within
which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses
which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease
and desist from operating their businesses within six months
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum
of understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which
they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting
July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the
validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits
to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called
for a reassessment of the ordinance
Held:
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City
of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No.
8027.
SJS Officers vs Lim and Atienza
2. Taxing Power (Sec. 5-7, Art. X, Constitution; Sec. 128196 LGC)
1. Manila Intl Airport Authority vs CA
Held:
MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with
corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested
with corporate power
When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government
instrumentality
exercising
not
only
governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA
exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain,12

police authority13 and the levying of fees and charges. 14 At
the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order."15
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section
133(o) of the Local Government Code, which states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of
Local Government Units. Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of
the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local
governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the
power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes
taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local
governments may only exercise such power "subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide."18
When local governments invoke the power to tax on
national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that
a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in
the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person,
article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This
rule applies with greater force when local governments seek
to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed
against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However,
when Congress grants an exemption to a national
government instrumentality from local taxation, such
exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national
government instrumentality.
Thus, Section 133 of the Local Government Code states that
"unless otherwise provided" in the Code, local governments
cannot tax national government instrumentalities. As this
Court held in Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation:
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard,
impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of
constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC
Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the
National Government over local governments.
Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code exempts from
real estate tax any "[r]eal property owned by the Republic of
the Philippines." Section 234(a) provides:
SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The
following are exempted from payment of the real property
tax:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines
or any of its political subdivisions except when the
beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person;
2. Mactan Cebu intl airport vs Marcos

Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption therefrom is
the exception.[20] However, if the grantee of the exemption
is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid rule of
construction does not apply because the practical effect of
the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that
has to be handled by the government in the course of its
operations.
As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or
presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including
government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193
of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those
granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered
under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in
the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234
which enumerates the properties exempt from real property
tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies
the retention of the exemption insofar as real property taxes
are concerned by limiting the retention only to those
enumerated therein; all others not included in the
enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the
LGC. Moreover, even as to real property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of
Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial
use of such property has been granted to a taxable person for
consideration or otherwise.
3. City govt of qc vs bayantel
Held:
the power of the Quezon City Government to tax is
limited by Section 232 of the LGC which expressly provides
that a province or city or municipality within the
Metropolitan Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem
tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and
other improvement not hereinafter specifically exempted.
Under this law, the Legislature highlighted its power to
thereafter exempt certain realties from the taxing power of
local government units. An interpretation denying Congress
such power to exempt would reduce the phrase not
hereinafter specifically exempted as a pure jargon, without

meaning whatsoever. Needless to state, such absurd situation
is unacceptable.
4. Drilon vs Lim | constitutionality of sec 189 lgc;

procedural requirements
Held:
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance
and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its
annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad
law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners
were performing their functions in accordance with law, that
is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.
5. Batangas City vs Pilipinas Shell

Issue: whether a LGU is empowered under the LGC to
impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the
business of manufacturing and distribution of petroleum
products.
Held:
it must be emphasized that although the power to tax is
inherent in the State, the same is not true for LGUs because
although the mandate to impose taxes granted to LGUs is
categorical and long established in the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, the same is not all encompassing as it is
subject to limitations as explicitly stated in Section 5,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution
Strictly speaking, as long as the subject matter of the taxing
powers of the LGUs is the petroleum products per se or
even the activity or privilege related to the petroleum
products, such as manufacturing and distribution of said
products, it is covered by the said limitation and thus, no
levy can be imposed.16
3. Sec 19 eminent domain
1. City govt of qc ericta
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of
at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually
a taking without compensation of a certain area from a

private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden
to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of
private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to
provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and
cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law
or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own
city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties
to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and
practise in the past. It continues to the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from
laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other
public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which
are intended to insure the development of communities with
salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries
of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision
developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners.
2. CITY OF CEBU VS SPS ANTONIO
Issue of whether just compensation should be determined as
of the date of the filing of the complaint.
Held:
In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of
reckoning for the determination of just compensation is
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that
just compensation shall be determined as of the time of
actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. -- A local government unit
may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated:
Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper
court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property.
3. Republic vs ca (2002)
In insisting on the return of the expropriated property,

respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in
Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de
Villaroya[14] where the unpaid landowners were allowed
the alternative remedy of recovery of the property there in
question. It might be borne in mind that the case involved
the municipal government of Sorsogon, to which the power
of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely delegated and
of limited application. The grant of the power of eminent
domain to local governments under Republic Act No.
7160[15] cannot be understood as being the pervasive and
all-encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of
government. For local governments to be able to wield the
power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the
national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of
eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of
eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or
confined as the real authority would want it to be.[16]
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic[17] where the private
landowners had remained unpaid ten years after the
termination of the expropriation proceedings, this Court
ruled -
petitioners have already complied with the standard

requirements laid down under the applicable rules and
regulations of the DAR....20
The conversion of agricultural lands into non-agricultural
uses shall be strictly regulated and may be allowed only
when the conditions prescribed under R.A. No. 6657 are
present.2
Closure and opening of roads

1. Sangalang v iac
heir mother case, G. R. No. 71169 is, on the other hand, a
petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala Corporation
(formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for
tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had
therefore closed its commercial section from the residences
of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the
full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in violation of the
very restrictions it had authored.
The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be

made and, if so, in what amount. Said lots have been the
subject of expropriation proceedings. By final and executory
judgment in said proceedings, they were condemned for
public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold to the
government. x x x It follows that both by virtue of the
judgment, long final, in the expropriation suit, as well as the
annotations upon their title certificates, plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots which are still devoted to the public use for which they were
expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of
the same.
As We indicated, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five

appeals on the basis primarily of its ruling in AC-G.R. No.
66649, "Bel-Air Village, Inc. v. Hy-Land Realty
Development Corporation, et al.," in which the appellate
court explicitly rejected claims under the same 'deed
restrictions" as a result of Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the
Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by
the Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances
allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for
residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held
that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise
of police power.
Reclassification of Lands
Held:
Dar vs Saranggani
nstruing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the
subsequent administrative issuances implementing the same,
we are of the opinion that while the DAR retains the
responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for
land use conversion filed by individual landowners on their
landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be
confined to compliance with the requirements and
limitations under existing laws and regulations, such as the
allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified,
ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for
conversion and those falling under environmentally critical
areas or highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS
law. Definitely, the DARs power in such cases may not be
exercised in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of
the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve
social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate
towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is
required to use the comprehensive land use plans and
accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as
primary references in evaluating applications for land use
conversion filed by individual landowners. In this case,
mong other things, there is a recognition under both

Ordinances Nos. 81 and 8 1-01 that Jupiter Street lies as the
boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's
commercial section. And since 1957, it had been considered
as a boundary not as a part of either the residential or
commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate
development projects. Thus, the Bel-Air Village
Association's articles of incorporation state that Bel-Air
Village is 'bounded on the NE., from Amapola St., to de los
Santos Ave., by Estrella St., on the SE from Extrella St., to
Pedestrian Lane by E. De los Santos Ave., on the SW., from
Pedestrian Lane to Reposo St., by Jupiter Street
. . . . 40 Hence, it cannot be said to have been "for the
exclusive benefit" of Bel-Air Village residents.
We come to the perimeter wall then standing on the
commercial side of Jupiter Street the destruction of which
opened the street to the public. The petitioners contend that
the opening of the thoroughfare had opened, in turn, the
floodgates to the commercialization of Bel-Air Village. The
wall, so they allege, was designed precisely to protect the
peace and privacy of Bel-Air Village residents from the din
and uproar of mercantile pursuits, and that the Ayala
Corporation had committed itself to maintain it. It was the
opinion of the Court of Appeals, as we said, that Ayala's
liability therefor, if one existed, had been overtaken by the
passage of Ordinances Nos. 81 and 82-01, opening Jupiter

Street to commerce.
It is our ruling, we reiterate, that Jupiter Street lies as a mere
boundary, a fact acknowledged by the authorities of Makati
and the National Government and, as a scrutiny of the
records themselves reveals, by the petitioners themselves, as
the articles of incorporation of Bel-Air Village Association
itself would confirm. As a consequence, Jupiter Street was
intended for the use by both -the commercial and residential
blocks. It was not originally constructed, therefore, for the
exclusive use of either block, least of all the residents of
Bel-Air Village, but, we repeat, in favor of both, as
distinguished from the general public.
2. MMDA vs Bel Air
act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned

districts shall form additional district where the new first
district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum
population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative
district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners
that if population is less than that provided by the
Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-compliance
with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise
fixed
by
law.
Issue: won mmda may order the opening of neptune road?

Held:
No. MMDA is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a
"special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated
in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of
a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.[56] R. A. No. 7924 was not
submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite.
The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the
people, but appointed by the President with the rank and
privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function
is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by
the President,[57] whereas in local government units, the
President merely exercises supervisory authority. This
emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
Newmiso
MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of
the community. It is the local government units, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling. We desist from ruling on the other issues as they are
unnecessary.
3. Lucena Grand Terminal, inc. v JAC liner
Facts:
Facts: The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative
Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District from such
Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was
enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of

two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail
R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners
have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A.
9716.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is
unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or
not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable
constitutional requirement for the creation of a new
legislative
district
in
a
province.
Held: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The
plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was
explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the
Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a
representative, with nothing was mentioned about a
population. While in cities, a minimum population of
250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a
population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two
additional districts from the present of four. Based on
the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the
results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other
factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House
Bill No. 4264.
6. Legislative Power
A. REQUISITES OF A VALID ORDINANCE
1. City of Manila vs Laguio
Facts:
Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses.[5] It built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as
a hotel.[6] On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction
and/or
Temporary
Restraining
Order[7] (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as

defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo
S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of
the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.[8]
12. Inns
Enacted by the City Council[9] on 9 March 1993 and

approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is entitled
the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property

rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes
statutes;
it
is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not
sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the
City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
AN
ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING
THE
ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE
ERMITA-MALATE
AREA,
PRESCRIBING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.[
no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the
Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr.
Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street
in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to
P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage
in, any business providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities where women are
used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb
the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
Issue:
WON
the
ordinance
is
valid
Held:
No. The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the
latter merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
NOTA BENE:
The tests of a valid ordinance: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.[37]
2. SJS vs Atienza
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid
Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement
of Ordinance No. 8027, we now proceed to make a
definitive ruling on its constitutionality and validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not
be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6)
must not be unreasonable.115
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people.116 This power flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of
the people is the supreme law).117 While police power rests
primarily with the national legislature, such power may be
delegated.
B. Local Initiative and Referendum (Sec. 120-127, LGC)`
- COMELEC to enforce and administer laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of initiative and
referendum
* Local Initiative is a legal process whereby the registered

voters of a Local government Unit may directly propose,
enact, or amend any ordinance.
REMEMBER that initiative siya if what is proposed is a
Law, Ordinance, or Resolution which only the Legislative
Bodies of the Governments of the Autonomous Regions,
Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barangays can pass.
*Local Referendum is a legal process whereby the
registered voters of the Local Government Units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the
Sanggunian through an election held for the purpose.
It shall be held under control and direction of the
COMELEC within 60 days in case of Provinces and Cities,
45 days in case of Municipalities and 30 days in case of
Barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of said
referendum.
provided that in cas of barangays, the period shall

bee eighteen months after approval thereof.
7. Authority over Police Units
Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police
force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character, to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of local executives over
the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.
C. Corporate Powers (Sec. 22, Ra 7160)
- must be construed in strctissimi juris and any doubt or
ambiguity must be construed against the municipality.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
NOTE: ALL REGISTERED VOTERS MAY EXERCISE

POWER
OF
LOCAL
INITIATIVE
AND
REFERENDUM
Limitations on Local Initiative
1. Power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year
2. Shall extend only to subjects or matters which are
within the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact
3. If at anytime before the initiative is held, the
Sanggunian concerned adopts in toto the
proposition presented and the Local Chief
Executive approves the same, the initiative shall be
cancelled. However, those against such action may,
if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner
herein provided.
Limitations upon Sanggunians in Local Initiative and

Referendum
- Shall not be repealed, modified or amended by the
sanggunian concerned within 6 months from the
date of the approval thereof, and may be amended,
modified, or repealed by the Sanggunian within 3
years thereafter by a vote of of all its members:
6.
To have continuous succession in its corporate

name
To sue and be sued (relate sa municipal liability)
To have and use a corporate seal
To acquire and convey real or personal property
To enter into contracts
a. Requisites
1. LGU has the express, implied or inherent
power to enter into a particular contract
2. Entered into by the proper department,
board, committee or agent
3. Must comply with substantive requiremets
4. Must
comply
with
the
formal
requirements of written contracts &
5. In case entered into by the Local chief
executive on behalf of LGU, prior
authorization
by
the
Sanggunian
concerned is needed
b. Ultra Vires Contracts
When a contract is entered into without compliance
with the first and third requisites above, the same is
ultra vires and is NULL AND VOID; cannot be
ratified and validated
Ratification of defective municipal contract is
possible only when there is non- compliance with
the second and/or fourth requirements above.
To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations, subject to the limitations provided in
this code and other laws.

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1.

strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by

Although it is neither a subdivision, agency, or

3. Criterion to determine public corporations

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important

4. Classes of Public Corporations

Held: Not a public corporation but a Quasi-public

b. Municipal Corporation - body politic and

Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

The fact that a certain judicial entity is impressed with

The Province of North Cotabato vs GRP

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). On

the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the

xxx xxx xxx

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office which

The objective of the autonomy system is to permit

Decentralization is a decision by the central

5. BATANGAS CATV, INC. VS CA

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

Then on November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber

But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the

Powers of the President over the LGUs

Issue: (1) whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE (IN REL TO SEC 284-294

Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO

Issue: whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs"

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that

3. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V ROMULO **

the discretion to order his subordinate to do or redo the act,

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA

automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. The

GOV. VILLAFUERTE , JR. AND PROV. OF CAMSUR VS

Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for

Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of

D. Creation and Alteration of Municipal Corporations

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the

Surigao del Norte, filed another petition for certiorari[8]

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the

of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

February 23, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law

time. 10 The intolerable situations will deprive the people of

a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established

The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national

Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:

. There is no need to consider the land area, given these

For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into

MATEO | PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AY 16-17 | ATTY PASCASIO

financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and

province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with

10. Aquino v Comelec