[G.R. No. 118464.

December 21, 1998]

HEIRS OF IGNACIO CONTI and ROSARIO CUARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and LYDIA S. REYES as Attorney-in-Fact of JOSEFINA S. REYES,
BERNARDITA S. PALILIO, HERMINIA S. PALILIO, REMEDIOS A.
SAMPAYO, ILUMINADA A. SAMPAYO, ENRICO A. SAMPAYO, CARLOS A.
SAMPAYO, GENEROSO C. SAMPAYO, MYRNA C. SAMPAYO, ROSALINO
C. SAMPAYO, MANUEL C. SAMPAYO, DELIA A. SAMPAYO, CORAZON C.
SAMPAYO, NILO C. SAMPAYO, and LOLITA A. SAMPAYO in her own behalf
and as Attorney-in-Fact of NORMA A. SAMPAYO, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 30 March 1994 Decision and 21 December
1994 Resolution of respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the right of private respondents as heirs of
Lourdes Sampayo to demand partition under Art. 494 of the Civil Code.
Lourdes Sampayo and Ignacio Conti, married to Rosario Cuario, were the co-owners of the property in
litigation consisting of a 539-square meter lot at the corner of Zamora and Abellanosa Streets, Lucena City,
covered by TCT No. T15374, with a house erected thereon. [1] On 17 March 1986 Lourdes Sampayo died
intestate without issue.[2] Subsequently, on 1 April 1987 private respondents Josefina S. Reyes, Bernardita S.
Palilio, Herminia S. Palilio, Remedios A. Sampayo, Iluminada A. Sampayo, Enrico A. Sampayo, Carlos A.
Sampayo, Generoso C. Sampayo, Myrna C. Sampayo, Rosalina C. Sampayo, Manuel C. Sampayo, Delia A.
Sampayo, Corazon C. Sampayo, Nilo C. Sampayo, Lolita A. Sampayo and Norma A. Sampayo, all
represented by their Attorney-in-Fact Lydia S. Reyes, with Lolita A. Sampayo acting also in her own behalf
and as Attorney-in-Fact of Norma A. Sampayo, all claiming to be collateral relatives of the deceased Lourdes
Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTC Br. 54, Lucena City.[3]
The spouses Ignacio Conti and Rosario Cuario refused the partition on the ground that private
respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo.
[4]
On 30 August 1987 Ignacio Conti died and was substituted as party-defendant by his children Asuncion,
Francisco, Milagros, Joselito, Luisito, Diego and Teresita, all surnamed Conti.[5]
At the trial, private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes and Adelaida Sampayo to prove that
they were the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and therefore entitled to her rights as coowner of the subject lot. Bringing with her the original copy of her certificate of live birth
showing that her father was Inocentes Reyes and her mother was Josefina Sampayo,[6] Lydia Sampayo Reyes
testified that she was one of the nieces of Lourdes Sampayo, being the daughter of Josefina Sampayo, the
only living sibling of Lourdes. Lydia also testified that Lourdes had another sister named Remedios J.
Sampayo who died in 1948, and two brothers, Manuel J. Sampayo and Luis J. Sampayo who died in 1983
and 1960, respectively. To prove that Josefina, Remedios, Luis and Manuel were siblings of Lourdes, their
baptismal certificates together with a photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel Sampayo were offered in
evidence. These documents showed that their father and mother, like Lourdes Sampayo, were Antonio
Sampayo and Brigida Jaraza.

The certificates of baptism presented as part of the testimony of Lydia Sampayo Reyes were prepared by
Rev. Franklin C. Rivero who duly certified that all data therein written were in accordance with the church
records, hence, the lower left portion of the documents bearing the seal of the church with the notation as to
where the documents were logged in particular.[7] The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the
birth certificates because the repository of those documents, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City,
had been razed by fire on two separate occasions, 27 November 1974 and 30 August 1983, thus all civil
registration records were totally burned.[8] On the other hand, a photocopy of Manuel's birth certificate dated
25 October 1919 (Exh. "I")[9] showed that it was issued by the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena, Tayabas (now
Lucena City).
Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel Sampayo, testified that her husband Manuel was the brother of
the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis and Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes
was Josefina.[10]
To rebut whatever rights the alleged heirs of Lourdes had over the subject lot, petitioners presented
Rosario Cuario Conti, Rosa Ladines Malundas and Rodolfo Espineli. Rosario testified that the subject
property was co-owned in equal shares by her husband Ignacio Conti and Lourdes Sampayo and that her
family (Rosario) had been staying in the subject property since 1937. [11] In fact, she said that her late husband
Ignacio Conti paid for the real estate taxes[12] and spent for the necessary repairs and improvements
thereon[13] because by agreement Lourdes would leave her share of the property to them.[14]
However, as correctly found by the trial court, no will, either testamentary or holographic, was presented
by petitioners to substantiate this claim.[15]Rosario also disclosed that when Lourdes died her remains were
taken by her relatives from their house.[16] When cross examined on who those relatives were, she replied that
the only one she remembered was Josefina since there were many relatives who came. When asked who
Josefina's parents were, she said she could not recall. Likewise, when asked who the parents of Lourdes
were, Rosario denied having ever known them.[17]
Another witness, Rosa Ladines Malundas, narrated that she used to be the neighbor and hairdresser of
the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who told her that upon her death her share would go to Ignacio Conti whom
she considered as her brother since both of them were "adopted" by their foster parents Gabriel Cord and
Anastacia Allarey Cord,[18] although she admitted that she did not know whether Lourdes had other relatives.
[19]

According to another witness, Rodolfo Espineli, he took pictures of the tombs bearing the tombstones of
Gabriel Cord and Anastacia Allarey Cord and Ignacio Conti as well as that of Lourdes Sampayo who was
supposed to have been interred beside her "adoptive" parents. However, as revealed by Rosario during her
direct examination, Lourdes was not in fact interred there because her relatives took her remains.[20]
On 4 April 1991 the trial court declared private respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. It
further ordered private respondents and petitioners to submit a project of partition of the residential house
and lot for confirmation by the court.[21]
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in finding that
private respondents were the heirs of Lourdes Sampayo and that they were entitled to the partition of the lot
and the improvements thereon.[22]
On 30 March 1994 the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed RTC decision and held[23]-

In the instant case, plaintiffs [now private respondents] were able to prove and establish by
preponderance of evidence that they are the collateral heirs of deceased Lourdes Sampayo and
therefore the lower court did not err in ordering herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] and
defendants [now petitioners] to submit a project of partition of the residential house and lot
owned in common by the deceased Lourdes Sampayo and defendant spouses Conti for

confirmation by the court x x x x Considering our earlier finding that the lower court did not err
in declaring herein plaintiffs [now private respondents] as heirs of deceased Sampayo and
therefore entitled to inherit her property, the argument of the appellants [now petitioners] that the
plaintiffs [now private respondents] are not entitled to partition is devoid of merit (insertions in [
] supplied).
Respondent court also ruled, citing Hernandez v. Padua[24] and Marabilles v. Quito[25], that a prior and
separate judicial declaration of heirship was not necessary[26] and that private respondents became the coowners of the portion of the property owned and registered in the name of Lourdes Sampayo upon her death
and, consequently, entitled to the immediate possession thereof and all other incidents/rights of ownership as
provided for by law including the right to demand partition under Art. 777 of the Civil Code,[27] and Ilustre v.
Alaras Frondosa[28] holding that the property belongs to the heirs at the moment of death of the decedent, as
completely as if he had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death.
The appellate court subsequently denying a motion for reconsideration upheld the probative value of the
documentary and testimonial evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners for not having
subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital witness in the case. [29] Hence, petitioners pursued
this case arguing that a complaint for partition to claim a supposed share of the deceased co-owner cannot
prosper without prior settlement of the latter's estate and compliance with all legal requirements, especially
publication, and private respondents were not able to prove by competent evidence their relationship with the
deceased.[30]
There is no merit in the petition. A prior settlement of the estate is not essential before the heirs can
commence any action originally pertaining to the deceased as we explained in Quison v. Salud [31] Claro Quison died in 1902. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are next of kin and heirs, but it
is said by the appellants that they are not entitled to maintain this action because there is no evidence that any
proceedings have been taken in court for the settlement of the estate of Claro Quison, and that without such
settlement, the heirs cannot maintain this action. There is nothing in this point. As well by the Civil Code as
by the Code of Civil Procedure, the title to the property owned by a person who dies intestate passes at once
to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the claims of administration and the
property may be taken from the heirs for the purpose of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent
an immediate passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without some
showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle the estate of Claro Quison,
the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.
Conformably with the foregoing and taken in conjunction with Arts. 777 and 494 [32] of the Civil Code,
from the death of Lourdes Sampayo her rights as a co-owner, incidental to which is the right to ask for
partition at any time or to terminate the co-ownership, were transmitted to her rightful heirs. In so demanding
partition private respondents merely exercised the right originally pertaining to the decedent, their
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners' theory as to the requirement of publication would have been correct had the action been for
the partition of the estate of Lourdes Sampayo, or if we were dealing with extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs and the summary settlement of estates of small value.[33] But what private
respondents are pursuing is the mere segregation of Lourdes' one-half share which they inherited from her
through intestate succession. This is a simple case of ordinary partition between co-owners. The applicable
law in point is Sec. 1 of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court -

Sec. 1. Complaint in an action for partition of real estate. - A person having the right to compel
the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed, setting forth in his complaint the
nature and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is
demanded and joining as defendants all the other persons interested in the property.

A cursory reading of the aforecited rule shows that publication is not required as erroneously maintained
by petitioners. There are two (2) simultaneous issues in an action for partition. First,
whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned, and second, if answered in
the affirmative, the manner of the division of the property, i.e., what portion should go to which co-owner.
[34]
Thus, in this case, we must determine whether private respondents, by preponderance of evidence, have
been able to establish that they are co-owners by way of succession as collateral heirs of the late Lourdes
Sampayo as they claim to be, either a sister, a nephew or a niece. These, private respondents were able to
prove in the trial court as well as before respondent Court of Appeals.
Petitioners
however
insist
that
there
was
no
such
proof
of
filiation because: (a) mere photocopies of birth certificates do not prove filiation; (b) certifications on nonavailability of records of birth do not prove filiation; (c) baptismal certificates do not prove filiation of
alleged collateral relatives of the deceased; and, (d) the testimonies of Lydia S. Reyes, alleged daughter of
Josefina Reyes, and Adelaida Sampayo, alleged sister-in-law of Josefina and Lourdes, were incompetent as
Lydia was made to testify on events which happened before her birth while Adelaida testified on matters
merely narrated to her.[35]
We are not persuaded. Altogether, the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted are competent
and adequate proofs that private respondents are collateral heirs of Lourdes Sampayo. Private respondents
assert that they are co-owners of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share of the subject property by way of legal or
intestate succession.
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent
of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his
will or by operation of law.[36] Legal or intestate succession takes place if a person dies without a will, or with
a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its validity. [37] If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
decedent.[38] It was established during the trial that Lourdes died intestate and without issue. Private
respondents as sister, nephews and nieces now claim to be the collateral relatives of Lourdes.
Under Art. 172 of the Family Code,[39] the filiation of legitimate children shall be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, in the absence of a record of birth or a parents
admission of such legitimate filiation in a public or private document duly signed by the parent. Such other
proof of ones filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses
and
other
kinds
of
proof admissible under
Rule
130 of the Rules ofCourt.
[40]
By analogy, this method of proving filiation may also be utilized in the instant case.
Public documents are the written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. [41] The
baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are public documents. Parish priests
continue to be the legal custodians of the parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.[42]
The
admissibility
of
baptismal
certificates
offered
by
Lydia
S.
Reyes, absent the testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in People v. Ritter,
citing U.S. v. de Vera (28 Phil. 105 [1914]),[43] thus -

x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made in the course of
the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The
baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the exercise of ecclesiastical
duties and recorded in the book of the church during the course of its business.

It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the administration of the sacrament, but
in this case, there were four (4) baptismal certificates which, when taken together, uniformly show that
Lourdes, Josefina, Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents, as indicated therein.Corroborated by the
undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes and her brothers Manuel, Luis
and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was Josefina Sampayo Reyes, such baptismal certificates have
acquired evidentiary weight to prove filiation.
Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the certificate of birth of Manuel Sampayo was properly
discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals. According to Sec. 3, par. (1), Rule 130, of the
Rules of Court, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself except when the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the original
certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the certification issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27
November 1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil registration records
were totally burned.
Apparently, there seems to be some merit in petitioners contention that the testimony of Adelaida
Sampayo cannot prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no declaration ante litem
motam as required by the rules, i.e., that the declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy
occurred. Nonetheless, petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in open court when she was
mentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes were. As correctly observed by the trial court in explicit
terms, "the documentary and testimonial evidence were not disputed by defendants" (now petitioners).
[44]
Notably, when Rosario Cuario Conti took the witness stand, she admitted that she was not aware of the
identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs counter to the relationship akin to filial bonding
which she professed she had enjoyed with the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly
a "sister-in-law" of the deceased Lourdes Sampayo who regarded Ignacio as a brother. However, in sum, we
rule that all the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to the right of private
respondents to maintain the action for partition.Absent any reversible error in the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, this petition for review on certiorari will not lie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 30 March 1994 and Resolution
dated 21 December 1994 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3404

April 2, 1951

ANGELA I. TUASON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ANTONIO TUASON, JR., and GREGORIO ARANETA,
INC., defendants-appellees.
Alcuaz & Eiguren for appellant.
Araneta & Araneta for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother Antonio Tuason Jr., held a
parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in
common, each owning an undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common
property, but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was offered for sale to her
sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The offer was later made to their mother but the old lady also
declined to buy, saying that if the property later increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken
advantage of her daughter. Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic
corporation, and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911 covering the
same property. The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel subdivided into small lots and then sold,
the proceeds of the sale to be later divided among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6)
entitled "Memorandum of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30, 1941.
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta was acting as the
attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the
same time he was a member of the Board of Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc.
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three co-owners agreed to
improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs on the same and then subdivide it into small
lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of
prices and conditions of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other co-owners; it was invested
with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be subdivided, and execute the corresponding
contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to pay the real estate taxes due on the property or of any portion thereof
that remained unsold, the expenses of surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising expenses, salaries of
personnel, commissions, office and legal expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to eject all
tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to furnish each of the two co-owners, Angela and
Antonio Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and the monthly sales and rents and collections made thereon.
In return for all this undertaking and obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it was
to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of the lots, and any rents that may be collected from the property,
while in the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners
so that each will receive 16.33 per cent of the gross receipts.
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for purposes of reference we are
reproducing them below:
(9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may be necessary for the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said property in small and subdivided lots and to fully
collect the purchase prices due thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented
while there are no purchasers thereof;
(11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby given full power and authority
to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale
of the lots into which this property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE
SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its powers under this contract
to any of its officers, employees or to third persons;
(15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell, alienate or dispose of his
ownership, interest or participation therein without first giving preference to the other co-owners to
purchase and acquire the same under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other
prospective purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this contract
exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such sale to a third party shall be
made subject to all the conditions, terms, and dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF
THE FIRST PART (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the PARTY
OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is controlled by the members of the

Araneta family, who are stockholders of the said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract
and/or their lawful heirs;
On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J.
Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946, Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged
breach of the terms of the "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted to it in the
document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property held in common be
partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila asking
the court to order the partition of the property in question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents
collected during the time that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered
said property.
The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio Tuason Jr., one of the coowners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he evidently did not agree to the suit and its
purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive
evidence introduce, oral and documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Pea in a long and
considered decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff appealed from that
decision, and because the property is valued at more than P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court.
Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) declared null and void or
rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she was given to understand by Antonio Araneta
acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of
subdivision of a parcel into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D.
Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed from each other, the terms of contract
Exh. "L" being relatively much more favorable to the owners therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty.
Antonio Araneta was more or less disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of the
officials of Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms of the contract (Exh. 6) by
not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the schedule of prices and conditions of the sale, in not
introducing the necessary improvements into the land and in not delivering to her her share of the proceeds of
the rents and sales.
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we agree with the trial court
that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by
the trial court, the copies of both contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and
both had every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or disadvantage in
entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a
member of the Board of Directors of the Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party
with which Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the evidence Araneta, the
pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the same; and that as a matter of fact, at the time
of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent about P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of
the lots the respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the decision appealed
from on these points:
The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio Araneta in connection with
the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above board. He committed nothing that is violative of the
fiduciary relationship existing between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving the
plaintiff a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure of the facts, for
said copy contains all that appears now in exhibit 6.
Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the terms of the contract in that the
defendant corporation has failed (1) to make the necessary improvements on the property as required by
paragraphs 1 and 3 of the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule of prices and
conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be sold; and to furnish the plaintiff a copy of the
subdivision plans, a copy of the monthly gross collections from the sale of the property.
The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has substantially
complied with obligation imposed by the contract exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements
alone, it has disbursed the amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes, commissions and other
expenses incidental to its obligations as denied in the agreement.
With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to submit to plaintiff a copy of
the subdivision plains, list of prices and the conditions governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly
statement of collections form the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no basis. The

evidence shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the plaintiff periodically all the data relative to
prices and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots, together with the amount corresponding to her.
But without any justifiable reason, she refused to accept them. With the indifferent attitude adopted by the
plaintiff, it was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her statement of
accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various occasions that she did not want to have
any further dealings with the said corporation. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of
the subdivided lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under the correct
impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the
three.
The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations of the terms of the
agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach of the
contract, but only for such breaches as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the
parties in making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821).
As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation from 1942 and up to 1946,
the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable to obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for
filling the low places within the parcel. As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped
selling the lots during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid in Japanese
military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be thankfull because otherwise she would
have received these notes as her share of the receipts, which currency later became valueles.
But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared null and void because its
terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the
Civil Code, which for the purposes of reference we quote below:
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. Each may, at any time,
demand the partition of the thing held in common.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of time, not exceeding ten
years, shall be valid. This period may be a new agreement.
We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not applicable. The contract
(Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-owner being obliged to remain a party to the
community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by
selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The obligation
imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall have been sold, is a mere incident to
the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and
substantially entered into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually
dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its creation shall have been
attained.
This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other agreement or contract (Exh.
"L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in express terms entered into partnership, although this
object is not expressed in so many words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil
Code in the parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not applicable.
Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid ground for the partition
insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m.
which is the total area of the parcel held in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained
unsold at the time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been sold. As
well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being dissolved and is about to be
dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code were applicable, under which the parties by
agreement may agree to keep the thing undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear
that the remaining 1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period fixed by
Art. 400.
We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal and which counsel for
appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing numerous authorities. As we have already said, we have
viewed the case from a practical standpoint, brushing aside technicalities and disregarding any minor violations
of the contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced that the trial court and this Tribunal are
carrying out in a practical and expeditious way the intentions and the agreement of the parties contained in the

contract (Exh. 6), namely, to dissolve the community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the said
parties.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Paras, C. J., I certify that Mr. Justice Feria voted to affirm.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed SANTERO, and
FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate
heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988
denying the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court, in a
resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the request of the petitioners for oral argument before the
court en banc, and the case was set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term
"relatives" in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children or relatives of
his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited to discuss as amici
curiaeduring the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno,
Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who
together with Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe
Pamuti and Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were
born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo Santero
was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero;
5) that Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero and his six
minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with
Felixberta Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)

Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this who are the legal heirs of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren (the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. In
connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo
Santero who is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil Code of Spain) by
Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely
a formal change, which grants illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the
New Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never before enjoyed by
them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely entitled to support. In fact, they are now
considered as compulsory primary heirs under Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate
succession). Again, We do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code
to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code provisions, especially Articles
902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their
parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time
does not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon
their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation and if
any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be
divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of
anotherillegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by
right ofrepresentation. (940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children shall
be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right
of representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which rights are
transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who may
inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should
not overlook the fact that the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions
are very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may be argued, as done by petitioners, that
the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982,
which provides that "the grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the legitimate parent of his
father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to
instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that Article 982 is the
general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of
representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end
that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
illegitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article
992. Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening antagonism
and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; and the
family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product

of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110 cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on Articles 939 to 944 of the
old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further
argue that the consistent doctrine adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil.,
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by former Justice Minister
Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to
succeedab intestato the legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already
abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to apply to the instant
case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial changes in our law of
succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, by the said substantial change, Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code of
Spain, should have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the subject of the
present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children,
those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised
where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the legitimacy
or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is
legitimate, his illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate
descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992. In this wise,
the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even though based on the old Civil Code, are still very
much applicable to the New Civil Code because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving
illegitimate children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession of their
grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three aforecited cases may be said to be
still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which also find support from
other civilists. We quote:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within the
legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can
not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and mother. The
Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it reproduced Article 943 of
the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate
issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide
either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in which case Art.
992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article and modify Articles 992 and 998.
The first solution would be more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate
children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, First Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196,
Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend
all the kindred of the person spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11,
Third Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the only parties who
claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of
Article 992, the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin
to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof.
Ruben Balane has this to say:

The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance
therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general
and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda.That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia definesparientes as "los que estan relacionados por los vinculos de la sangre, ya
sea por proceder unos de otros, como los descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de
una misma raiz o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p. 377, Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than it is used
and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends
to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and
1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only collateral relatives
but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive
or limited sense which as already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which goes back very far in
legal history, have been softened but not erased by present law. Our legislation has not gone so
far as to place legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even the Family
Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation between legitimate and illegitimate
children (although it has done away with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and
'spurious'). It would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those rights which
are expressly or clearly granted to them by law (vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973
ed., vol. III, p. 291). (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least amended to clarify the
term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision
of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-known author of
many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben
Balane together with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.
It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court. But it is
perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy and methodical
neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our own version of the Civil
Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the illegitimate families have been
relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer
as overwhelming as before. The wall is no longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission
and the Congress to make our civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino
people and with modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations

from the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to
follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in
the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own grandmother,
simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother. There are no other direct
heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral relative her niece. If the niece is no
longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will inherit as against the
grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the order of
intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in Art. 970 of
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.
I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate children and
legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to
inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see
no reason why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation
should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances given in
preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate child's legitimate offspring.
I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents Simona and
Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority view of this Court states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an illegitimate child the
right of representation, which he did not have under the old Code. But in retaining without change
provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an injustice,
because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate
descendant of a legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been preserved.
And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex, sed
lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III,
1987 ed., p. 330.)
The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not impress me as
correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because the Code has been amended.
The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various provisions upon which the word's effectivity is
dependent.
My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on considerations of
justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just. Unless the opposite is proved, I
will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren legitimate or illegitimate more than the
second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the
indiscretions of her son but why should the law include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger.
"Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own
grandparents.
I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and a well-known author of
many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice

Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben
Balane together with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.
It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before the Court. But it is
perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition and in the usually tidy and methodical
neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I discern a change effected by our own version of the Civil
Code. The orthodox rules which earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the illegitimate families have been
relaxed a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the disadvantages they suffer in law are no longer
as overwhelming as before. The wall is no longer as rigid as it used to be. The efforts of the Code Commission
and the Congress to make our civil law conform "With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino
people and with modern trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations
from the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I, therefore, do not feel bound to
follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in
the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant, their own grandmother,
simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to marry their mother. There are no other direct
heirs. Hence, the properties of their grandmother goes to a collateral relative her niece. If the niece is no
longer alive, an even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will inherit as against the
grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court disregards the order of
intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and the right of representation in Art. 970 of
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.
I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as illegitimate children and
legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and their legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to
inherit from one another. But I must stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see
no reason why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a firm wall of separation
should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the Code which provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)
The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the circumstances given in
preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was reserved to the illegitimate child's legitimate offspring.
I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their grandparents Simona and
Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino, while supporting the majority view of this Court states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by giving an illegitimate child the
right of representation, which he did not have under the old Code. But in retaining without change
provisions of the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an injustice,
because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child can represent, the illegitimate
descendant of a legitimate child cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy has thus been preserved.
And this is unfair to the illegitimate descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex, sed
lex. (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III,
1987 ed., p. 330.)
The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law, does not impress me as
correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for reinterpretation because the Code has been amended.
The meaning of relatives must follow the changes in various provisions upon which the word's effectivity is
dependent.
My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on considerations of
justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right and just. Unless the opposite is proved, I
will always presume that a grandmother loves her grandchildren legitimate or illegitimate more than the
second cousins of said grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the
indiscretions of her son but why should the law include the innocent grandchildren as objects of that anger.

"Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to members of a separate group of kins but not to one's own
grandparents.
I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R.
Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J.
CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years. His will dated August 29,
1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of
probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941 decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the
will is quoted in that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R.
Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and
Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of
his half brother Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus.
Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom
were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26, 1945 was submitted by the
administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R.
Yangco whose counsel contended that an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an
institution of heir. It was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro Martinez
and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with the will because the
testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que
declare que el finado no dispuso en su testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession
intestadocon respecio a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la
declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It held that in certain
clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not in the sense of disposing of them after his
death but for the purpose of Preventing that "tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los
legatarios" and that if the testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be
regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o morales para que la
sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which
cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L28734, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco
aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947
after the legatees and the appellants entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7,
1947 the legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of Isabel
Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed that compromise settlement as
the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R. Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the

resolution dismissing the appeal became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of
judgment were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October 24, 1947 wherein he
acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in
full of my share of the compromise agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this
case" (Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and physical partition of the
Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro
tanto modified. That did not set at rest the controvery over the Yangco's estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate estate. He alleged in his complaint that the
dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of
the old Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be distributed
according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res judicata and laches. It
held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special
Proceeding No. 54863 approving the project of partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January 23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No.
18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves real property valued at more than fifty thousand
pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that Teodoro R. Yangco was a
natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3) that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and
laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had been duly legalized and
whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de
whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a
cause of action to recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court found that Yangco "a su
muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco, hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre
natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged
natural child and not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June
14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos, Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y
Luis, los cuales son mis unicos herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as Exhibit 1 herein, which he
says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He
contends that it should not prevail over the presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old
Rules of Court and over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis
Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a first marital venture with
Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as reproduced in Exhibit I
herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in
incontestable. The said will is part of a public or official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A
marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It
is disputably presumption "That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from
bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was
the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause

of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in
Yangco's estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession
between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint of Tomas
Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen derecho a suceder
abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni
al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate
relatives" 16 Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279, 287.
See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas Corpus) would have no
legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that "an illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family
while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or legitimated child should die
without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or mother who acknowledged such child shall
succeed to its entire estate; and if both acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share
alike. In default of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate brothers and sisters."
Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who were legitimate, had no right to succeed to
his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot
succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs.
Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two acknowledged natural
children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88
Phil. 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate
of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil. 585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde
vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate brother of her natural
mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12957

March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.

Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale executed by
Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering
the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan),
Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00
as damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding
the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale
was made, the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth
being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death of Francisco Yaeso.
By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of
adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid
deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale of Lot No.
3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void,
and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and
they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and must be
reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the
death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions being,
firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable
property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding
that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named
Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named
Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the
date of which does not clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot
3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to
Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was
issued in the name of Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon
(Exhs. B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold
the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her
husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession
the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The
same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of
Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951 executed a deed of
sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for
tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs.
5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable
property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death,
unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was,
therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line

from which said property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang
died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13,
1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory conditions,
namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6
Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title
and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of
the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting
only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan,
25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 65 Phil. 279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the vendees
would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without being survived by
any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso
was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of
appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive
ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of the
spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The reserve instituted
by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came,
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being
that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person
obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea
Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable
property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event,
became effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse
the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without prejudice to
whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the
reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Paredes,
JJ.,concur.