ILUSORIO v BILDNER

FACTS: Wife filed for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and for grant of visitation rights to her husband who did not anymore reside live with
her. She also filed for authorization to be the sole administrator of their properties stating that Atty. Potenciano was already
incapacitated due to his frail health. She based her petition of Writ of Habeas Corpus on Art 68 of the FC which states that: The
Husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity and render mutual help and support.
ISSUE: Can the court compel Atty. Potenciano to live with his wife Erlinda?
HELD: No. The sanction of Art 68 is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order to enforce consortium
ARCABA v TABANCURA
FACTS: Francisco Comille was a widower, Cirilia his caregiver who his niece Leticia claims is also his lover. Before Francisco died, he
donated part of the house and lot to Cirilia. His nieces and his heirs b intestate succession allege that Cirilia is Franciscos commonlaw wife and therefore the dnation was void by virtue of Art 87 of the FC.
ISSUE: WON the donation was valid?
HELD: No. the donation was VOID. The prohibition on donations between husband and wife during marriage also applies to commonlaw spouses during cohabitation. Since it was sufficiently proven that Cirilia was indeed Franciscos lover, the donation is void.
Cohabitation is a public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation and dwelling together as husband and wife,
thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.

MUNOZ, JR. v CARLOS

FACTS: A residential lot was inherited by Erlinda from her parents and was registered in the name of Erlinda Ramirez married to
Eliseo Carlos. Erlinda executed a Deed of Absolute Sale which transferred the tittle to petitioner Francisco Munos. Respondents asked
for the nullification of the deed alleging that there was no sale but only a mortgage and showed that the signature of Eliseo was
forged therefore no consent. Petitioner presented evidence of the paraphernal nature of the lot and claimed that Eliseos signature is
immaterial thus, the sale is valid.
ISSUE: WON the subject lot is conjugal
HELD: No. Subject lot is the exclusive or paraphernal property of Erlinda whch she can dispose of or encumber without the consent of
Eliseo, therefore the fact that his signature was forged is immaterial because it was not required for the sale to be valid.
As a general rule, properties acquired during marriage is presumed to be part of the conjugal partnership whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted, or registered in the name of one or both spouses, unless contrary is proved.

AYALA INVESTMENTS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP v CA

FACTS: Mr. Ching signed as a surety of a loan obtained by Philippine Blooming Mills from AIDC. PBM failed to pay its load. AIDC filed a
case for collection for sum of money against PBM and Ching, RTC issued a writ of execution upon SPS Chings 3 conjugal properties.
Private respondents filed a case of injunction alleging that judgment cannot be enforced against the CP levied on the ground that the
subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the CP.
ISSUE: WON the CP of SPS Ching can be held liable for the loan obtained by PBM where husband Ching signed as a surety?
HELD: No. Art 121 of the FC provides that debts incurred before or during marriage shall only be charged against the CP in so far as
it redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute involves a family home. The loan obtained was a corporate
one, and not a personal loan of Mr. Ching. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
CHING v CA
FACTS: PBM obtained a loan from Allied Banking Corp. Alfredo Ching and 2 others bound themselvesto jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of such loans. PBMCI defaulted in the payment. The sheriff of the TC levied on attachment 100,000 common
shares of City Corp Stocks in the name of Alfredo Ching. Wife Ching filed a motion to set aside levy on attachment alleging that the
shares were acquired by her and her husband during their marriage out of their conjugal funds, and that the loan obtained by PBMCI
did not redound to the benefit of the family.
ISSUE: WON the CP is liable for the debt obtained by PBMC
HELD: NO. For the Co to be liable for a liability that should pertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some
advantage accrued to the spouses. Private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership was benefited by the husbands
act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the respondent and in behalf of PBMCI. Only when the
husband borrows money for the exercise of his career, business and profession can the CP be liable.

FRANCISCO v GONZALES
FACTS: Michele Francisco and Cleodualdo Franciscos marriage was declared a nullity and both entered into a compromise
agreement and it was stipulated that the Conjugal Home (Taal Property) was transferred by way of deed of donation to their
daughters.
Michele was living with Matrai when SPS Gonzales filed a case against them for unpaid rentals and issued a notice of sale by
execution on the Taal Property.
The grandmother of the children filed with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale but was
denied. Petitioners on review argued that the obligation of Michele did not redound to the benefit of the family.
ISSUE: WON the Taal Property may be held liable
HELD: No. Michele was already living with Matrai when she rented the house therefore it was for her and Matrais benefit. By no
stretch of imagination can it be concluded that said debt was incurred for the benefit of the CP or that some advantage accrued to
the welfare of the family.

PANA v HEIRS OF JUANITE

FACTS: Melecia Pana was held guilty of murder and was ordered to pay the heirs of Juanite civil indemnity and moral damages. A
notice of levy and notice of sale on execution against Panas property was issued. SPS Pana filed a motion to quash the writ of
execution claiming that the levied properties were conjugal properties and not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
ISSUE: WON the conjugal properties can be levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability?
HELD: YES. The civil liability may be enforced against the conjugal properties by virtue of Art 122 if all the liabilities under art 121
have been covered. No prior liquidation is required and it is not unfair since it is provided under Art 122 that at the time of liquidation
of the partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purposes mentioned in Art 121.
ISSUE 2: Heirs of Juanite contended that the property regime of Pana was converted into ACP after the effectivity of the FC.

HELD: False. The SC denied that contention, stating that by virtue of the immutability of the property regime during marriage,
there are only five ways for modification of the property regime. If not found in the enumeration, it is not allowed.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where:
(a) the absolute community or conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation;
(b) the spouses who were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime;
(c) judicial separation of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to comply with his
obligations to the family;
(d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135;
(e) the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains. None of these
circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
BA FINANCE v CA
FACTS: Agusto Yulo obtained a Loan from BA finance secured by a promissory note signed by Yulo as representative of A&L Industries
and presented an alleged special power of Atty executed by his wife Lily which purportedly authorized the husband to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. When the obligation became demandable, Agusto failed to pay the same.
BA Finances petition for issuing a writ of attachment and was issued by the TC.
Lily filed her answer alleging that although Yulo is her husband, the former had abandoned her and their 5 chidren, five months
before filing the complaint and that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed.
ISSUE: WON A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband as the admninstrator?
HELD: A&L Industries is a single-proprietorship, whose registered owner was Lily. While it is true that the property was established
and its assets were acquired during the marriage thus it gives rise to the presumption that it belongs to the CP, the obligation
contracted by Yulo must have redounded to the benefit of the family for it to be liable. Agusto contracted the obligation for his own
benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family

HEIRS OF AYUSTE v CA (NCC VOIDABLE)

FACTS: Rafael Ayuste was married to Christina. On 1987, Rafael executed a deed of absolute sale without Christinas knowledge in
favor or Malabonga with the forged signature of Chirstina. After Rafaels death, Chirstina learned about the sale and files a complaint
for annulment of the sale and cancellation of tct. CA said that Christinas petition was barred by laches because of hr failure to file it
during the existence of their marriage.
ISSUE: WON Heirs of Ayuste are entitled to the annulment of the contract of sale entered into by Rafael
HELD: No. Art 173 of NCC states that The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulmet of any contract of the husband enterend into without her consent. Shouldthe wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage may demand value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

HEIRS OF REYES v MIJARES (voidable in its entirety)

FACTS: Vicente and Ignacia were married n 1960. Ignacia learned on 1983 that Vicente sold the subject property to SPS Mijares.
Vicente contended that what he sold was only his share in the property, excluding the share of his wife.
ISSUE: 1. What is the staus of the sale
HELD: 1. VIODABLE (NCC)
ISSUE 2: Assuming that the sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the share of Ignacia?
HELD 2: Citing Bucoy v Paulino: Entire property that was sold because the conjugal partnership is liable for many obligations while it
exists. Not only that. The conjugal property is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered
(Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby, should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient. These are considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough
for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the
fact that the nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract
under Article 166.

PELAYO v PEREZ
FACTS: David Pelayo sold to Melki perez aparcel of land. The wife,; Lorenza Pelayo and another witnessed the execution of the deed.
SPS Pelayo contend that the sale was void absent the signature of Lorenza in the deed.
ISSUE: Is the sale null and void for lack of marital consent?
HELD: Applying the provisions on sale in general, sale being a consensual contract is perfected by mere consent; consent may be
given expressly or impliedly so there is this perfection of the contract even if the consent of the husband or the wife is given orally or
by acts of the parties agreeing to the contract. Also, under the CC, if indeed Lorenza did not consent to the conveyance, the sale
would be merely voidable not void following art 173. The contract iv valid until the court annuls the same.