Arcaba vs Tabancura Vda de Batocael

Arcaba vs. Tabancura Vda De Batocael

GR No. 146683, November 22, 2001
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No.
437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in
January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco and his mother in law executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of of
the property in favor of Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him
after his retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticias cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila Arcaba,
the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Franciscos house as well as the store
inside.
According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room. On the
other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco claimed that the latter told her that
Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila defensed herself that she was a mere helper who could
enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for
her. She denied having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila
who was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as househelper though her family was provided
with food and lodging. Franciscos health deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura
testified that Franciscos only source of income was the rentals from his lot near the public
streets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos where he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house
to Cirila who accepted the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This
was made in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya
notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market value of
P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in Arcabas favor
was valid.

HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship wherein donation
is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of Cirila Comille such as application for business permit, sanitary permit

and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an
indication that she was not simply a caregiver employee.
Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already
old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very least, cohabitation is a public assumption
of men and women holding themselves out to the public as such.
Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family
Code.

Ayala Investments vs CA
Ayala Investments vs CA
GR No. 118305, February 12, 1998
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM,
executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and
severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan hence
filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and
Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal
of the judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff,
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff sale on 3 of
their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against petitioners
on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal
partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the
scheduled auction sale of respondent spouses conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was
issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.
ISSUE: Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and is it chargeable.
HELD:
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM and not for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains. PBM has a personality
distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the fact that they happened to be
stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse
to Ching as surety is only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or services are given
to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety orguarantor, that contract
cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit

of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the
principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession, it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should
not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of PBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the family may have
resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation
of shares of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil
Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off
of the loan itself.

Wong vs. IAC

GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991
FACTS:
Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during
the early years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During
the marriage or on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his
father using the money borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered
an agreement with Anita Chan where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded
payment of their value. Katrina issued in September 1972, check of P55,000 which was
dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for
collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband Romarico. The reply with
counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of the Wongs then a
writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name of
Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito
Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico
filed an action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.
ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through
the conjugal property.
HELD:
The spouses had in fact been separated when the wife entered into the business deal with
Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina nor authorized
her to enter into such. The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with unclear
proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the loan. Hence, it is presumed to belong
in the conjugal partnership in the absence of proof that they are exclusive property of the
husband and even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the conjugal
partnership only when she purchases things necessary for support of the family. The writ of
execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only over

properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for
Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband
nor they did redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said
obligations were incurred. In as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and
the conjugal properties concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personally and exclusively.

Carlos vs. Abelardo

GR No. 146504, April 4, 2002
FACTS:
Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for recovery of the
$25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989
when the petitioner issued a check worth as such to assist the spouses in conducting their married
life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July
1991, the petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses
pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement. Thereafter, respondent
expressed violent resistance to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner. In
1994, petitioner made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the
obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the
complaint hence spouses filed separate answers. Abelardo contended that the amount was never
intended as a loan but his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm
and that the petitioner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC
decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision
for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth $25,000 paid to the
owner of the Paranaque property which became the conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife
executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.
ISSUE: WON a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be charged against the
conjugal partnership.
HELD:
Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the same served as
their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the spouses are jointly and severally
liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardos contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share
in the construction firm is untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders
that will entitle him to the profits and income of the company.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in the amount of
$25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012

FACTS:
Brigido Quiao (petitioner) and Rita Quiao (respondent) contracted marriage in 1977. They had
no separate properties prior to their marriage. During the course of said marriage, they produced
four children. In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting
with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal
separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55. Save for one child (already of legal age), the
three minor children remains in the custody of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.
The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the
respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigidos share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article
129 of the FC.
A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court.
By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.
After more than 9 months later, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define
Nets Profits Earned. In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes the remainder of the
properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.
Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that NET
PROFIT EARNED shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the FC.
However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regime of conjugal partnership of gains governs the couples
property relations.

HELD: Yes. Brigido and Rita tied the knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of exchange of
martial vows, the operative law was the NCC and since they did not agree on a marriage
settlement, the property relations between them is the system of relative community or the
conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work and industry.
The husband and wife also own in common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

SABALONES V CA 230 SCRA 79

FACTS: As an ambassador petitioner Samson Sabalones was assigned to different countries and
as such, he left the administration of their conjugal properties to his wife Remedios GaviolaSabalones

1985 Sabalones retired as ambassador to live in the Philippines but did not return to his
family. In 1989, he filed judicial authorization to sell their Greenhills property. He
alleged that he was 68 yrs old, very sick and living alone with no income.
Remedies opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation.
She alleged that the Greenhills property was occupied by her and their 6 children
and they were dependent on the rentals of their other properties. She also informed
the court that despite Sabalones retirement, he did not return to his legitimate family and
instead maintained a separate residence with Thelma Cumareng and their 3 children.
Remedios prayed for a decree of legal separation and liquidation of their conjugal
properties, with forfeiture of her husbands share. Also prayed for preventing the
Sabalones from disturbing the tenants in the Forbes Park property and disposing any of
the conjugal properties
After trial, Judge Mariano Umali found that the petitioner had indeed contracted a
bigamous marriage on October 5, 1981 with Thelma Cumareng. The court, then, decreed
the legal separation of Sabalones and Remedios , forfeiture of his share in the conjugal
properties and non-entitlement to support
Pendente lite, Remedios filed a motion for issuance of a write of preliminary injunction
preventing Sabalones from interfering in the administration of their properties. Petitioner
opposed motion
April 7, 1992 CA granted the preliminary injunction
Petitioner argued that the law provides of a joint administration of the conjugal properties
by the husband and wife, citing Art. 124 FC. Also the court failed to appoint an
administrator pursuant to Art. 61 FC

ISSUE: Whether or not the wife, pendente lite, can enter into a contract of lease of a conjugal
property without the consent of both spouses

HELD: While the law does indeed grant the spouses joint administration over conjugal
properties under Art. 124 FC, Art. 61 of the same code is to be applied in the instant case since
the legal separation case filed by the wife is still pending.
Pending the appointment of an administrator over the conjugal assets, CA was justified in
allowing the wife to continue with her administration pursuant to Art. 61 FC. This provision
states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the
absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a
third person to act as the administrator.

While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation
was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal
properties (and thus also disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in
effect approved by the Court of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the
preliminary injunction now under challenge.

The primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the
things subject of the action or the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the
plaintiff respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Otherwise, the defendant may,
before final judgment, do or continue doing the act which the plaintiff asks the court to restrain
and thus make ineffectual the final judgment that may be rendered afterwards in favor of the
plaintiff.

[G.R. No. 125172. June 26, 1998.]

Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ, respondents.
Topic: Ownership, administration, and enjoyment > Joint administration, FC124 cf. FC 96, 142
FACTS:
1. Gilda Corpuz and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses. They have 3 children named
Junie, Harriet, and Joji.
2. On Feb 14, 1983, Spouses Corpuz bought a 421 sq meter lot from Manuel Callejo who signed
as vendor through a conditional deed of sale.
3. On Apr 22, 1988, the spouses Corpuz sold one-half portion of their lot to spouses Antonio and
Luzviminda Guiang.
4. Gilda left for Manila in June 1989 to look for work abroad. Unfortunately, she became a
victim of an illegal recruiter.
5. Sometime in Jan 1990, Harriet learned that her father intended to sell the remaining half
portion of the lot, including their house, to the Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother.
6. Gilda replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet did not inform Judie about this but
instead gave the letter to Mrs. Guiang so that she would advise her father.
7. Judie pushed through the sale of the remaining one-half portion. They executed a document
Deed of Transfer of Rights.
8. On March 11, 1990, Gilda returned from Manila. Her children informed her that their father
had a wife already.
9. For staying in their house sold by her husband, Gilda was complained against by Spouses
Guiang before the Barangay authorities.
10. On March 16, 1990, the parties signed an Amicable Settlement to wit: That respondent,
Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily
the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any
charge, on or before April 7, 1990.
11. Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff went to the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement.
12. Gilda filed for the nullification of the Deed of Sale executed by Judie in favor of the Spouses
Guiang.
13. RTC Decision: RTC rendered judgment in her favor.
14. CA Decision: CA affirmed the RTC ruling pursuant to Art 124 of the Family Code.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Contract of Sale was merely voidable.
2. Whether or not the Contract of Sale was ratified by Gilda when she entered into an amicable
settlement with the spouses Guiang.
DECISION:
1. Petitioners contend that the absence of Gildas consent merely rendered the Deed voidable
under Art 1390 of the Civil Code
"ART. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties: xxx xxx xxx (2) Those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.

Gildas consent was not obtained thru mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud but her consent was TOTALLY INEXISTENT.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the
Family Code, which was correctly applied by the two lower courts
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private
respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last
element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

2. Petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the "amicable
settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38.

The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private
respondent. The trial court correctly held: 'Art. 1422. A contract which is the direct result
of a previous illegal contract, is also void and inexistent.' (Civil Code of the Philippines).
In summation therefore, both the Deed of Transfer of Rights and the 'amicable settlement'
are null and void.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged
Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.

Art 124 (FC).

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the

third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
Art 173 ( CC)
The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n)

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA

G.R. No. 147978. January 23, 2002.
FACTS:
Petitioner, Thelma A. Jader-Manalo made an offer to buy the properties of the respondents from
the husband of Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa, respondent Edilberto Camaisa. After some
bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price and terms of payment. The
agreement handwritten by the petitioner was signed by Edilberto, with assurance from him that
he would secure his wifes consent. Petitioner was later on surprised when she was informed that
respondent spouses were backing out of the agreement. Hence, she filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the wife's written
consent.
HELD:
Under Art. 124 of the Family Code: In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other
spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void.
The properties subject to the contract in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to
be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must be obtained. Respondent Norma
Camaisa did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her
written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. She may have been aware of the

negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties, however that is not sufficient to
demonstrate consent.

Vda. De Ramones Vs. Agbayani

Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision[1] dated May 8, 1998 and the Resolution dated February 16,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49807, entitled AURORA AGBAYANI, assisted
by her husband, FILEMON AGBAYANI versus ALDEGONDA VDA. DE RAMONES, BEATRIZ
AND MARGARITA, both surname RAMONES.
Spouses Santos and Aldegonda Ramones are the registered owners of a 358-square meter lot
located at Calamagui, Ilagan, Isabela, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T43468 of the Registry of Deeds, same province.
On May 23, 1979, Santos Ramones, without the knowledge of his wife, Aldegonda, sold to
Aurora P. Agbayani a 100-square meter portion of the lot for P5,000.00. The Deed of Sale was
annotated by the Register of Deeds as Entry No. 90 at the back of TCT No. T-43468.
On March 7, 1980, Santos Ramones died. Subsequently, Aldegonda and her daughters Beatriz
and Margarita, herein petitioners, had a restroom and a concrete septic tank built on the area sold
by Santos Ramones to respondent without the latters knowledge. This prompted respondent to
bring the matter to the barangay authorities but no settlement was reached by the parties.
On June 27, 1983, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Isabela, Branch 17, a
complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against petitioners on the basis of the
Deed of Sale executed by Santos Ramones.
In their amended answer, petitioners averred that the 100-square meter lot subject of the Deed of
Sale is the conjugal property of spouses Santos and petitioner Aldegonda Ramones. Even if
Santos, during his lifetime, sold the property to respondent, the sale is void since it was executed
without the consent of his wife, Aldegonda Ramones.
On October 11, 1995, the trial court rendered a Decision[2] in favor of petitioners and against
respondent, holding that the Deed of Sale is void because it was executed without the consent of
his wife Aldegonda.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision reversing that of the trial court,
thus:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the
lower court dated October 11, 1995 is REVERSED, and a new judgment is
rendered in favor of plaintiff-appellant Aurora P. Agbayani, confirming the Deed

of Sale executed by Santos P. Ramones in her favor and declaring plaintiffs as

absolute owners of the lot sold to them by the aforenamed vendor. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

In ruling that the Deed of Sale between Santos Ramones and herein respondent is valid,
the Appellate Court held: Article 166 of the Civil Code prohibits alienation or encumbrance of
real property by the husband without the consent of the wife. This provision should be read with
Article 173 of the same Code providing that the wife may, during the marriage and within ten
(10) years from the questioned transaction, ask the courts for annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent. In other words, the lack of consent by the wife will
not make the alienation of the conjugal property by the husband void. It is merely voidable. In
the instant case, however, petitioner Aldegonda Ramones, wife of Santos, did not ask the courts
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale involving a portion of their conjugal property within ten
(10) years from the transaction. Thus, the sale is valid.
The only issue in this case is whether the sale of real property belonging to the conjugal
partnership by the husband without his wifes consent is void.

In Villaranda v. Villaranda, et al.,[4] this Court, through Mr. Justice Artemio V.

Panganiban, ruled that without the wifes consent, the husbands alienation or encumbrance of
conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void, but merely voidable.
However, the wifes failure to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract during
the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction shall render the sale valid. In the
present case, the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Santos Ramones on May 23,
1979.[5] The Family Code took effect much later, or only on August 3, 1988. Laws should be
applied prospectively, unless a legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is expressly
declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.[6] This exception is not present here.
Therefore, the provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code, apply to the present case.
There is no dispute that the lot sold is the conjugal property of spouses Ramones. In this
connection, Article 166 of the Civil Code, provides:
Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
without the wifes consent. x x x

Clearly, Article 166 is categorical that the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes consent. This provision, however, must be
interpreted in conjunction with Article 173 of the same Code, quoted as follows:
Article 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any
act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she
or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the
property fraudulently alienated the husband.

The above provision states that an action to annul an alienation or encumbrance by the
husband may be instituted by the wife during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned. Consequently, the lack of consent on her part will not make the husbands
alienation or encumbrance of real property of the conjugal partnership void, but
merely voidable.[7]
Here, there is no proof that petitioner Aldegonda Ramones filed any complaint to annul
the Deed of Sale entered into by her husband. As held by this Court inVillaranda,[8] her right to
bring an action to invalidate the contract has thus prescribed. Hence, the assailed Deed is still
valid and enforceable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, PETITIONER, VS. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA,

RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 193038, MARCH 11, 2015
THE FACTS:
In 1988, when Shirley and Rogelio were still engaged, Shirley (respondent, then working as a
domestic helper in Israel, sent money to Rogelio, upon his request, for the purchase of a
residential lot in Marikina which they will use as their residence when they eventually marry
each other. On September 13, 1989, Rogelio purchased the house and lot. Upon her arrival in

1989, Shirley settled the balance of the equity through SSS financing and paid the succeeding
monthly amortisation. On October 31, 1989, TCT No. 171963 was issued by the Registry of
Deeds in Rogelios name. They were married in 1990 and lived on the same property. Shirley
then returned to Israel for work; thereat, she received information that Rogelio brought home
another woman in the conjugal house, and she also learned that Rogelio introduced the woman as
her wife. She then filed two cases against Rogelio, one for Concubinage, and one for Legal
Separation and Liquidation of Property; the latter she withdrew but later re-filed on January 29,
1993. In between, she learned of Rogelios intention to sell the property. She thus advised the
interested buyers, including Josephine Nobleza of the pendency of the cases she filed against
Rogelio. Still, Rogelio sold the property to Josephine Nobleza (petitioner) thru a Deed of
Absolute Sale on December 29, 1992, without Shirleys consent in the deed. In a Decision
rendered on May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a decision granting the petition for
legal separation and the dissolution of the community property of Shirley and Rogelio. On
August 27, 1996, Shirley filed a Complaint for Rescission of Sale and REconveyance against
Josephine before the RTC to reconvey the property the latter bought from Rogelio. After trial,
the RTC rendered judgment in favour of Shirley, rescinding the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 29, 1992 between Rogelio and Josephine, and for Josephine to reconvey the property
to Shirley. Josephine appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter affirmed with modification
the RTC judgment. Hence, Josephine sought recourse with the Supreme Court via petition for
review on certiorari.

THE ISSUE:
Whether or not Josephine is a buyer in good faith of the property.

THE RULING:
We deny the petition.

Petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another, without notice that
some other person has a right or interest in the property, for which a full and fair price is paid by
the buyer at the time of the purchase or before receipt of any notice of claims or interest of some
other person in the property.1 It is the party who claims to be an innocent purchaser for value
who has the burden of proving such assertion, and it is not enough to invoke the ordinary
presumption of good faith.2 To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith,
the presumption is that first and foremost, the buyer in good faith must have shown prudence
and due diligence in the exercise of his/her rights. It presupposes that the buyer did everything
that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her rights and interests
against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The prudence required

of a buyer in good faith is not that of a person with training in law, but rather that of an average
man who weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of our technical
rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil.'3 A buyer in good faith does his homework
and verifies that the particulars are in order such as the title, the parties, the mode of transfer and
the provisions in the deed/contract of sale, to name a few. To be more specific, such prudence
can be shown by making an ocular inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership with
the proper Register of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the
minutiae such as the parameters or lot area, the type of ownership, and the capacity of the seller
to dispose of the property, which capacity necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil status of
the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is secured when necessary. In fine, for a
purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith, he must exercise due
diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances like what
any prudent man in a similar situation would do.4

In the case at bar, petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good faith of the subject property which
is titled under the name of the seller Rogelio A. Nuega alone as evidenced by TCT No. 171963
and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724.5 Petitioner argues, among others,
that since she has examined the TCT over the subject property and found the property to have
been registered under the name of seller Rogelio alone, she is an innocent purchaser for value
and she is not required to go beyond the face of the title in verifying the status of the subject
property at the time of the consummation of the sale and at the date of the sale.6
We disagree with petitioner.
A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the
seller while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.
In the case of Spouses Raymundo v. Spouses Bandong,7 petitioners therein as does petitioner
herein were also harping that due to the indefeasibility of a Torrens title, there was nothing in
the TCT of the property in litigation that should have aroused the buyers suspicion as to put her
on guard that there was a defect in the title of therein seller. The Court held in the Spouses
Raymundo case that the buyer therein could not hide behind the cloak of being an innocent
purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT which showed that the registered owner of the
land purchased is the seller. The Court ruled in this case that the buyer was not an innocent
purchaser for value due to the following attendant circumstances, viz.:
In the present case, we are not convinced by the petitioners incessant assertion that Jocelyn is an
innocent purchaser for value. To begin with, she is a grandniece of Eulalia and resides in the
same locality where the latter lives and conducts her principal business. It is therefore impossible
for her not to acquire knowledge of her grand aunts business practice of requiring her biyaheros
to surrender the titles to their properties and to sign the corresponding deeds of sale over said
properties in her favor, as security. This alone should have put Jocelyn on guard for any possible
abuses that Eulalia may commit with the titles and the deeds of sale in her possession.8
Similarly, in the case of Arrofo v. Quio,9 the Court held that while the law does not require a
person dealing with registered land to inquire further than what the Torrens Title on its face

indicates, the rule is not absolute.10 Thus, finding that the buyer therein failed to take the
necessary precaution required of a prudent man, the Court held that Arrofo was not an innocent
purchaser for value, viz.:
In the present case, the records show that Arrofo failed to act as a prudent buyer. True, she asked
her daughter to verify from the Register of Deeds if the title to the Property is free from
encumbrances. However, Arrofo admitted that the Property is within the neighborhood and that
she conducted an ocular inspection of the Property. She saw the house constructed on the
Property. Yet, Arrofo did not even bother to inquire about the occupants of the house. Arrofo
also admitted that at the time of the sale, Myrna was occupying a room in her house as her
lessee. The fact that Myrna was renting a room from Arrofo yet selling a land with a house
should have put Arrofo on her guard. She knew that Myrna was not occupying the house. Hence,
someone else must have been occupying the house.

Thus, Arrofo should have inquired who occupied the house, and if a lessee, who received the
rentals from such lessee. Such inquiry would have led Arrofo to discover that the lessee was
paying rentals to Quino, not to Renato and Myrna, who claimed to own the Property.11

An analogous situation obtains in the case at bar.

The TCT of the subject property states that its sole owner is the seller Rogelio himself who was
therein also described as single. However, as in the cases of Spouses Raymundo and Arrofo,
there are circumstances critical to the case at bar which convince us to affirm the ruling of both
the appellate and lower courts that herein petitioner is not a buyer in good faith.

First, petitioners sister Hilda Bautista, at the time of the sale, was residing near Rogelio and
Shirleys house the subject property in Ladislao Diwa Village, Marikina City. Had petitioner
been more prudent as a buyer, she could have easily checked if Rogelio had the capacity to
dispose of the subject property. Had petitioner been more vigilant, she could have inquired with
such facility considering that her sister lived in the same Ladislao Diwa Village where the
property is located if there was any person other than Rogelio who had any right or interest in
the subject property.

To be sure, respondent even testified that she had warned their neighbors at Ladislao Diwa
Village including petitioners sister not to engage in any deal with Rogelio relative to the
purchase of the subject property because of the cases she had filed against Rogelio. Petitioner
denies that respondent had given such warning to her neighbors, which includes her sister,
therefore arguing that such warning could not be construed as notice on her part that there is a
person other than the seller himself who has any right or interest in the subject property.

Nonetheless, despite petitioners adamant denial, both courts a quo gave probative value to the
testimony of respondent, and the instant petition failed to present any convincing evidence for
this Court to reverse such factual finding. To be sure, it is not within our province to secondguess the courts a quo, and the re-determination of this factual issue is beyond the reach of a
petition for review on certiorari where only questions of law may be reviewed.12

Second, issues surrounding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale also pose question on the
claim of petitioner that she is a buyer in good faith. As correctly observed by both courts a quo,
the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and dated on December 29, 1992. However, the
Community Tax Certificates of the witnesses therein were dated January 2 and 20,
1993.13 While this irregularity is not a direct proof of the intent of the parties to the sale to
make it appear that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed on December 29, 1992 or before
Shirley filed the petition for legal separation on January 29, 1993 it is circumstantial and
relevant to the claim of herein petitioner as an innocent purchaser for value.

That is not all.

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, the civil status of Rogelio as seller was
not stated, while petitioner as buyer was indicated as single, viz.:

ROGELIO A. NUEGA, of legal age, Filipino citizen and with postal address at 2-A-2 Ladislao
Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the VENDOR
And
JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, of legal age, Filipino citizen, single and with postal address at No. L2-A-3 Ladislao Diwa St., Concepcion, Marikina, Metro Manila, hereinafter referred to as the
VENDEE.14

It puzzles the Court that while petitioner has repeatedly claimed that Rogelio is single under
TCT No. 171963 and Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724, his civil status as
seller was not stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale further creating a cloud on the claim of
petitioner that she is an innocent purchaser for value.

As to the second issue, we rule that the appellate court did not err when it modified the decision
of the trial court and declared that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992 is void in
its entirety.

The trial court held that while the TCT shows that the owner of the subject property is Rogelio
alone, respondent was able to prove at the trial court that she contributed in the payment of the
purchase price of the subject property. This fact was also settled with finality by the RTC of
Pasig City, Branch 70, and affirmed by the CA, in the case for legal separation and liquidation of
property docketed as JDRC Case No. 2510. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:

xxx Clearly, the house and lot jointly acquired by the parties prior to their marriage forms part of
their community property regime, xxx

From the foregoing, Shirley sufficiently proved her financial contribution for the purchase of the
house and lot covered by TCT 171963. Thus, the present lot which forms part of their
community property should be divided equally between them upon the grant of the instant
petition for legal separation. Having established by preponderance of evidence the fact of her
husbands guilt in contracting a subsequent marriage xxx, Shirley alone should be entitled to the
net profits earned by the absolute community property.15

However, the nullity of the sale made by Rogelio is not premised on proof of respondents
financial contribution in the purchase of the subject property. Actual contribution is not relevant
in determining whether a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what
constitutes community property.

Article 91 of the Family Code thus provides:

Art. 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community
property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of
the marriage or acquired thereafter.
The only exceptions from the above rule are: (1) those excluded from the absolute community by
the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement.

Under the first exception are properties enumerated in Article 92 of the Family Code, which
states:
Art. 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as
well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall form part of
the community property;

(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.

As held in Quiao v. Quiao:16

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the
marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the
Family Code) form the common mass of the couples properties. And when the couples
marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the
value each one may have originally owned.

Since the subject property does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92, it
therefore forms part of the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of
their respective contribution to its acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only
Rogelios name appears in the TCT as owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses
Shirley and Rogelio.

Respondent and Rogelio were married on September 1, 1990. Rogelio, on his own and without
the consent of herein respondent as his spouse, sold the subject property via a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 29, 1992 or during the subsistence of a valid contract of marriage. Under
Article 96 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines,
the said disposition of a communal property is void, viz.:

Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the
date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without
the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction
shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.17
It is clear under the foregoing provision of the Family Code that Rogelio could not sell the

subject property without the written consent of respondent or the authority of the court. Without
such consent or authority, the entire sale is void. As correctly explained by the appellate court:

In the instant case, defendant Rogelio sold the entire subject property to defendant-appellant
Josefina on 29 December 1992 or during the existence of Rogelios marriage to plaintiff-appellee
Shirley, without the consent of the latter. The subject property forms part of Rogelio and
Shirleys absolute community of property. Thus, the trial court erred in declaring the deed of sale
null and void only insofar as the 55.05 square meters representing the one-half (1/2) portion of
plaintiff-appellee Shirley. In absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge
and consent of the wife, sells (their) property, such sale is void. The consent of both the husband
Rogelio and the wife Shirley is required and the absence of the consent of one renders the entire
sale null and void including the portion of the subject property pertaining to defendant Rogelio
who contracted the sale with defendant-appellant Josefina. Since the Deed of Absolute Sale x x x
entered into by and between defendant-appellant Josefina and defendant Rogelio dated 29
December 1992, during the subsisting marriage between plaintiff-appellee Shirley and Rogelio,
was without the written consent of Shirley, the said Deed of Absolute Sale is void in its entirety.
Hence, the trial court erred in declaring the said Deed of Absolute Sale as void only insofar as
the 1/2 portion pertaining to the share of Shirley is concerned.18

Finally, consistent with our ruling that Rogelio solely entered into the contract of sale with
petitioner and acknowledged receiving the entire consideration of the contract under the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Shirley could not be held accountable to petitioner for the reimbursement of her
payment for the purchase of the subject property. Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the
absolute community of property shall only be liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations contracted
by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited x x x. As correctly stated by the appellate court, there being no evidence on record
that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the benefit of the family, respondent cannot be
made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.19

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 2010 and July 21, 2010, respectively, in CAG.R. CV No. 70235 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68873, March 31, 1989Lucilda Dael v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, ET. Al.

FACTS:
Cesario Cabutihan was married to Beinvenida Durana, whom he had five children, upon the
death of the wife; Cesario contracted a second marriage with his former wifes sister Victorina.
Private respondents filed settlement over the property of their deceased parents. Trial Court
rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no paraphernal properties brought to her
marriage with Cesario. That the copra business was formed during the first marriage and
Victorina used the same facilities, credit and capital in managing the business, and the main
source of the income not only of Cesario and also of Victorina during their respective lifetimes
was the copra business. Hence, the extent of the Estate of Victorina shall consist only of her
share in the inheritance of the Estate of Cesario Cabutihan. Intermediate Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Is the marital community of proprietary interest continued to exist in the second marriage, even
after the Cesario-Beinvenida conjugal partnership has been dissolved by the death
of Bienvenida?
HOLDING:
The first conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved because of death of Bienvenida and it
was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership. There should be liquidation of properties
before contracting another marriage. Since there was none, the total mass of the partnership
property shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
and to the property belonging to the respective spouses. One-half (1/2) of the properties that
pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while
the other half shall be considered as inherited by him and his five children as the heirs
of Bienvenida. The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided,
one-half (1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their
conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his heirs, namely,
Victorina and his five (5) children. To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for distribution to her heirs
shall consist of her one-half (1/2)share in the conjugal properties of the aforesaid second
marriage and her one-sixth (1/6) share in the estate of Cesario as an heir.

Vda. De Delizo vs Delizo (1976)

Facts:
Nicolas Delizo married Rosa Villasfer in 1981. She died in 1907.
He remarried. The second marriage with Dorotea de Ocampo lasted 46 years (1911-1957) until
Nicolas death.
The act of partition was filed by Nicolas two children from his first marriage, and the heirs of
his other deceased child (also from the first marriage).
Lower court divided the properties in the following way:
3 children of first marriage
of both marriage (divided in 13 parts)

CA: Point of contention was Caanawan lands in Nueva Ecija. Other lands belong to second
marriage
proof property owned by second marriage
of Dorotea not persuasive
Patricio places acquisition sometime after the revolution: Rosa was still alive at this
time
LC: conjugal partnership of first marriage transformed into co-ownership by Nicolas and his
children, thus fruits belong to co-ownership.
CA disagrees with LC: HOWEVER, IT WAS DOROTEA AND NICOLAS WHOCULTIVATED THE
LAND, HENCE THE FRUITS OF THE LAND SHOULD GO TO THESECOND MARRIAGE

Dorotea elevated case to SC. According to her, Canaawan properties were not part of first
marriages CPG as lands were homesteads. First marriage had possessory rights, but second
marriage had exclusive right over it as it was during the second marriage that it was registered
pursuant to Act 926.
Issue: To which CPG does the Caanawan lands belong to (1st or 2nd marriage)?
Held:
Property belongs to the CPG of the 2nd marriage as land was only registered during second
marriage.
Act 926 (Homestead Act): Rights of homesteader to land does not become absolute until the
following requirements of law are fulfilled:
a. Person filing application backed by two credible witnesses has to prove he hasresided and
cultivated the land for 5 years after filing application
b.Person filing has to make affidavit attesting that the land is not
encumbered/alienated.
Lands were only distributed by cabecillas in 1905.
When Dacquel, Antolin, and Pascua conveyed the land to Nicolas, they could not have fulfilled
the requirements of Act 926 before conveyances to Delizo.
less than a year,
Antolin 2 years,
Pascua years
The 3 did not have legal rights to transfer to Delizo. What they transferred were inchoate rights,
not ownership rights.
PRINCIPLE: Deciding factor where homestead belongs to
of registration NOT when homestead patent is issued as registration is the only time all
requirements have been fulfilled.