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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER


JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
1. Generality - If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court because of
the unique characteristic of his person (e.g. he is a foreigner, military, ambassador,
President), the applicable principle is generality. If the accused attacks the
jurisdiction of the court due to the unique characteristic of the place where the crime
was committed (e.g. foreign vessel, embassy or high sea), the applicable principle is
territoriality.
Consular officers are immune from criminal prosecution of acts performed in
the exercise of function (1967 Convention on Consular Relation). Immunity does not
cover slander(Liang vs. People, GR No. 125865, January 28, 2000), or reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide for not being function-related. A Chinese diplomat,
who killed another Chinese diplomat in Cebu, is immune from criminal prosecution
(The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations). Unlike consular officers, diplomatic
agents are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits
(Minucher vs. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).
The presidential immunity is subject the following conditions: (1) the immunity
has been asserted during the period of his incumbency and tenure; and (2) the act
constituting the crime is committed in the performance of his duties.This immunity
will assure the exercise of presidential functions free from any hindrance, considering
that the Chief Executive is a job demands undivided attention (Estrada vs. Desierto,
G.R. No. 146710-15, March 2, 2001).
It is submitted that a Vice-President even during his tenure could not invoke
immunity from criminal prosecution for plunder on the following reasons: (1) plunder
are not his official conducts as Vice-President; (2) the job of the Vice-President unlike
the head of the executive department does not demands undivided attention; (3) and
the implementation principal penalty of imprisonment for plunder is not inconsistent
with the constitutional provision on non-removal of impeachable officer except through
impeachment since he can function as Vice-President while serving sentence in
prison.However, accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from
office, is not implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend the
constitutional provision on non-removal of impeachable officer.
An incumbent Senator is not immune from suit for being a protector or coddler
of trading of dangerous drugs under RA No. 9165. Legislators immunity is confined to
parliamentary privilege from arrest while the Congress is in session in all offenses
punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment and parliamentary immunity from
prosecution for libel in connection with any Congressional speech or debate.

2. Territoriality - The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the territory


of the USA to which the premises belong through possession or ownership. A person
who committed a crime within the premises of an embassy will be prosecuted under
the law of Philippines because of the principle of territoriality (Reagan vs. Commission
on Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968).

Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the flag state of foreign merchant
vessel passing through the territorial sea of another state has jurisdiction over crimes
committed therein. However, a coastal state such as the Philippines can exercise
jurisdiction over any crime committed on board such ship in the following cases: (1) if
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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
its consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the country
or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a diplomatic or
consular officer of the flag State requested assistance from the local authorities; or (4)
if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a foreign vessel anchored in a
Philippine port against a passenger thereof is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
court since this crime disturb the peace of the country.
Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also jurisdiction over crime
committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal because the Baseline Law (RA
No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over it.
Under the principle of territoriality, the court has jurisdiction over concubinage
involving illicit relationship maintained in the Philippines; but it has no jurisdiction
over bigamy involving subsequent marriage contracted in Taiwan.

3. Extraterritoriality Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has


jurisdiction over hijacking of PAL airplane in an American territory since it its
registered in the Philippines but not over murder committed in vessel registered in
Panama while on high seas although it is owned by a Filipino. Under the protective
principle, the court has jurisdiction over forgery of Philippine money committed in
Taiwan whether by a Filipino or an alien but not over forgery of US dollars committed
therein. Under the extraterritoriality rule, the court has jurisdiction over plunder,
direct bribery and falsification of document by a public officer in a Philippines
consular premises stationed in America but not corruption of public officer and
falsification of document committed by private individual as principal by inducement.
Under the universality principle, the court has jurisdiction over piracy committed on
high seas for being a universal crime but not over murder qualified by the
circumstance of taking advantage of the calamity brought about by piracy on high
seas. The 12-mile territorial water of Taiwan or Sabah may be considered as high
seas; hence, piracy committed therein can be prosecuted in the Philippines (People vs.
Lol-Lo and Saraw, G.R. No. L-17958, February 27, 1922).
4. Prospectivity -If the court in trying an accused, who committed a crime
prior to the passage of the law, should give retroactive effect to the law provided that:
(1) it is favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a habitual delinquent
(Article 22 of RPC). If the law repeals a previous law or provision defining a crime, the
applicable principle is not Article 22 of RPC but nullum crimen poena sine lege. Since
the intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law,
the accused should be acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he
is a habitual delinquent.
Reclusion perpetua, which has duration of 40 years under Article 27 of RPC
and 30 years under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592if the convict has
undergone preventive imprisonment, is a lighter penalty than life imprisonment, which
has no duration. Amendatory law, which prescribes reclusion perpetua instead of life
imprisonment, shall be given a retroactive effect for being favorable to the accused
(People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833, February 5, 2014).

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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
5. Decriminalization - RA No. 10158 has decriminalized vagrancy by omitting
portions of Article 202 of RPC involving this crime. Vagrants are victims of poverty and
that the law on vagrancy serves to oppress the very people that the government sought
to protect. RA No. 10655 has decriminalized premature marriage by repealing Article
351 of RPC. This provision is discriminatory because it is not applicable to men.
Moreover, Article 351, which was sought to prevent a possible confusion as to who is
the father of the child born within the period of 301 days after the dissolution of the
marriage, is not anymore necessary since paternity and filiation can now be easily
determined through modern technology.
6. Repeal RA No. 10655 has repealed Article 351 of RPC on premature
marriage without reenactment. This is a total repeal in which the intention of the new
law is to decriminalize an act punishable of old law. Atotal repeal deprives the courts
of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to
its repeal (Sindiong and Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000). RA 8353 expressly repealed Article
336 of RPC on rape but re-enacted it redefining this crimeunder Article 266-A. This is
a partial repealin which the intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act
punishable of old law but to introduce changes. The effect of the new law is
amendatory. This partial repeal of Article 336 does not deprive the courts of
jurisdiction to try and punish offender for rape committed prior to RA No. 8353 (U.S.
vs. Cana, 12 Phil. 241). RA No. 8353 shall be given prospective effect since it is not
favorable to the accused.
7. Mistake of fact - Authorities, who manned a checkpoint because of
information that there are armed rebels on board a vehicle, have the duty to validate
the information, identify them, and to make a bloodless arrest unless they were placed
in real mortal danger. If they shot the suspected vehicle, which did not stop after have
been flagged down and killed the occupants therein, who turned out be unarmed
civilians, they are liable for multiple homicides. The mistake of fact principle is not
applicable since there is negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 120744-46, June 25, 2012).
The accused shot with a firearm and killed by mistake a thief in the toilet, who
turned out to be his girlfriend. Invasion of property is considered as unlawful
aggression under Article 12 of the RPC because of the self-help doctrine under the
Civil Code (People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983). Even though
there is no actual invasion of property, unlawful aggression as an element of defense of
property will be considered as present because of the mistake of fact principle.
However, the means employed by him firing shots through the toilet door is not
reasonable; and hence, he is only entitled to privilege migrating circumstance of
incomplete defense of property (US vs. Apego, G.R. No. L-7929, November 18, 1912).
8. Proximate cause - There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of
the stabbing and the date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of
tetanus infection. Since infection is severe, he died the next day. The incubation period
of severe tetanus infection is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have been infected
at the time of the stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the symptoms
manifested. The infection was an efficient intervening cause breaking the connection
between the physical injuries and death. Hence, the crime committed is physical
injuries (Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011). If the victim was
infected by tetanus at the time of stabbing, and the infection is the proximate cause of
death, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16,
1947).
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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Suicide is not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC; hence, a pregnant
woman who attempted to commit suicide is not liable for abortion due to the
consequent death of the infant. Vexatious act (e.g. pouring gasoline) made as part of
fun making is not felony within the contemplation of Article 4. The accused is not liable
for homicide. However, such act is considered as culpable, and thus, he is liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (People vs. Pugay, No 74324, November 17,
1988). Vexatious act made out of hate (such as putting a robber snake inside the bag of
the victim) is unjust vexation, which is a felony within the contemplation of Article 4.
The accused is liable for homicide if the victim died due to heart attack caused by
seeing a snake in his bag.
Practicing medicine without license is an offense punishable under special law
but not afelony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC. Hence, a quack doctor, who
killed his patient while treating him, is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide (People vs. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001).
If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in the
aggravated form. If the victim accidentally killed is not the owner, driver or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are simple carnapping and
homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft and robbery (People
vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, Nov. 21, 2001). Although not punishable under RPC, it can
be treated as a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs. People,
G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for homicide, which
is the direct and natural consequence of simple carnapping.

In case of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the SC did not appreciate
evident premeditation since the victim, who was actually killed, is not contemplated
in the premeditation of the accused (People vs. Trinidad, G.R. NO. L-38930, June 28,
1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967). However, praeter intentionem and evident
premeditation can be independently appreciated. there is no incompatibility between
evident premeditation and no intention to commit so grave a wrong since the latter is
based on the state of mind of the offender while the former manner of committing the
crime (Reyes; People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536).

If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery shall be


appreciated even if the killing is due to error in personae (People vs. Del Castillo, Sr.,
G.R. No. L-32995, April 30, 1984) or aberratio ictus (People vs. Mabug-at, G.R. No.
25459, August 10, 1926, En Banc) or with the circumstance of praeter intentionem
(People vs. Cagoco, G.R. No. 38511, October 6, 1933)

If a person in committing threat, murder, rape or robbery creates in the mind of


the victim an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape,
and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the resulting injuries or death (US vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March
22, 1921; People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975; People vs.
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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997; People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789,
April 25, 1969).
9. Impossible crime - The crime committed is impossible crime if the offense
sought to be committed is factually or legally impossible. Killing a dead person is
impossible crime because of legal impossibility. Putting the hand inside an empty
pocket with intention to steal a wallet is impossible crime because of factual
impossibility (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992).
Gender is an element of all crimes against chastity except acts of
lasciviousness. In seduction and consented acts of lasciviousness, and abduction, the
offender must be a man, while the victim must be a woman. The offender in adultery
must be a married woman, while in concubinage a married man. If the element of
gender is not present in a crime against chastity, it is impossible to commit this crime
(e.g. it is impossible to commit abduction against a person, who is gay). Despite the
impossibility of its commission, the accused is not liable for impossible crime. To be
held liable for impossible crime, the act which is impossible to commit must
constitutes crime against person or property.However, abduction is a crime against
chastity. But the accused may be held liable for illegal detention.
A person, who has sexual intercourse with a woman not knowing that she was
already dead,is liable for impossible crime since rape is now a crime against person.
However, if he is aware that the woman is already dead, he is not liable for impossible
crime since criminal intent or propensity to rape, which is the basis of penalizing
impossible crime, is wanting.
If the gender element in rape through sexual intercourse is not present, the
offender is not liable for impossible crime. Although it is impossible to commit rape
through sexual intercourse where the victim is a gay, such acts constitute acts of
lasciviousness.
If the check is unfunded, stealing the checkand presenting it for payment with
the bank constitute impossible crime. It is factually impossible to accomplish the
crime of qualified theft since the check is unfunded(Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No.
162540, July 13, 2009). If the check is funded, stealing the check and presenting it for
payment with the bank is not impossible crime. Even if the accused failed to encash
the same due to external cause such as apprehension by police or stop payment, he will
be held liable for consummated theft. In theft, taking property with intent to gain
consummates the crime. Actual gain is not an element thereof. Thus, failure to gain
will not prevent the consummation of the crime (See: People vs. Seranilla, G.R. No. L54090, May 9, 1988);
Kidnapping for ransom consummates at the precise moment when the victim
was abducted. Receiving ransom payment is not an element of this crime. What is
important is that the victim was kidnapped for purpose of ransom. Since the crime is
already consummated, there is no basis to say that it is impossible to commit this
crime (People vs. Tan, G.R. No. 95322, March 1, 1993). Moreover, kidnapping is a
crime against liberty and not against person or property.
Firing a gun at the unoccupied bedroom with intention to kill a victim
constitutes impossible crime because it is factually impossible to kill a victim, who
was not in the bedroom (Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21,
1992). But throwing grenade at the unoccupied bedroom, where the victim is
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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
supposed to be sleeping, constitutes arson if the bedroom was burned as a
consequence.
A discharged shotgun at B from a distance of 300 yards; but because of the
limited range of the firepower of the shotgun, it would be impossible for A to harm
B. A is liable of discharge of firearm and not impossible crime. Where the offender
unlawful entered the house and took a watch that turned out to be his own, he is
liable for trespass to dwelling and not impossible crime (Criminal Law Conspectus by
Justice Florenz Regalado). If the accused administered abortive drugs upon his
girlfriend whom he believed to be pregnant, which turned out not to be true, but the
woman became ill for more than 30 days, the accused will be liable for serious
physical injuries and not impossible crime of abortion (Criminal Law Reviewer by
Gregorio).
10. Indeterminate offense - Climbing on top of the naked victim, touching her
genitalia and mashing her breastsaresusceptible of double interpretation (People v.
Lamahang). His intention is either to rape or seduce her. Hence, the accused cannot
be held liable for attempted rape because intent to have sex is not clear. He is only
liable for acts of lasciviousness (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014).
Inflicting non-mortal woundupon the victim by shooting him constitutes
physical injuries if the accused did not further shoot him to inflict mortal wounds.
The crime is not attempted homicide because failure to shoot him further shows lack
of intent to kill. Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting to victim to
inflict mortal wounds is a defense in attempted homicide(Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People,
GR No. 167766, April 7, 2010). But inflicting mortal woundupon the victim
constitutes frustrated homicide even if the accused desisted from further shooting
him. The fact that the wounds are mortal indicates intent to kill. Moreover,
spontaneous desistance from further shooting is not a defense in frustrated homicide
(People vs. Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).

11. Battered woman syndrome -The essence of this defense of Battered


Woman Syndrome as a defense is that battered woman, who suffers from physical and
psychological or emotional distress, is acting under an irresistible impulse to defend
herself although at the time of commission of the crime the battererhad not yet
committed unlawful aggression. That is why Battered Woman Syndrome is a defense
notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense such as unlawful aggression (Section 26 of RA No. 9262). This Syndrome
refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative
abuse(Section 3).

The three phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome are: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving or non-violent
phase (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004). The basis of the
irresistible impulse to make a defense against the batterer is the womans experiencing
two battering episodes.
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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

The elements of Battered Woman Syndrome as a defense are as follows: (1) the
woman is subjected to cumulative abuse by the victim, with whom she has marital,
sexual or dating relationship; and (2) the cumulative abuse or battery is the act of
inflicting physical harm resulting to physical and psychological or emotional distress.
Since the abuse must be cumulative, there must be at least two episodes involving the
infliction of physical harm. If the first episode is infliction of physical harm and the
second episode is verbal abuse, the accused cannot avail Battered Woman Syndrome
as a defense.

12. Imbecility and minority In exempting circumstance of imbecility, what is


important is the mental ageof the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is 2 years, and
imbecile, whose mental age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932,
October 19, 2011) are exempt from criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose mental
age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal liability since he is not an imbecile
(People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is entitled to mitigating
circumstance of mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29,
1950). In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is
important is the chronological or actual age of the accused. If the actual age of the
accused is 18 years and mental age is 9, the exempting circumstance of minority and
imbecility shall not be appreciated (People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04,
2014).
13. Insanity - The presumption, under Article 800 of the Civil Code, is that
every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity
bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence (People vs. Tibon,
G.R. No. 188320, June 29, 2010, Justice Velasco). There are two tests (People vs.
Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950) to determine whether the mental
condition of the accused is exempting or mitigating:
a. Test of cognition Under the test of cognition, the mental condition of
the accused is an exempting circumstance of insanity if there was a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the criminal act (People vs. Bulagao, G.R.
No. 184757, October 05, 2011); or mitigating circumstance of mental illness if
there was only a partial deprivation of intelligence (People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L33211, June 29, 1981). After satisfying his lust, accused threatened the victim.
This implies that accused knew what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted
to keep it a secret. It also indicated that the crime was committed during one of his
lucid intervals. Accused is not exempt from liability for failure to pass the cognition
test (People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5. 2009, Justice Velasco).
b. Test of volition Under the test of volition, the mental condition of the
accused is a mitigating circumstance of mental illness if there is complete or partial
deprivation of freedom. In sum, if a sex maniac or homicidal maniac had merely
passed the volition test but not the cognition test, he will only be given the benefit
of mitigating circumstance of illness. Diminution of freedom is enough to mitigate
the liability of the offender suffering from illness (See: People vs. Rafanan, Jr.

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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
November 21, 1991, G.R. No. 54135, November 21, 1991). Thus, kleptomania is a
mitigating circumstance of mental illness.
Irresistible homicidal impulse in People vs. Bonoan G.R. No. 45130,
February 17, 1937, which is an exempting circumstance is not anymore
controlling. Irresistible homicidal impulse, which is based on the volition test, is
only a mitigating circumstance. To exempt a person from criminal liability due to
insanity, the controlling rule is cognition testand not the volition test(People vs.
Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004). In several Supreme Court cases,
the pleas of insanity of accused who are suffering from schizophrenia or psychosis
were rejected because of failure to pass the cognition test. (People vs. Medina, G.R.
No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029, March 24,
1993).
14. Child in conflict with the law -The rights and privileges of a child in
conflict with the law are as follows:
1. If the accused is 15 years of age or below, minority is an exempting
circumstance (Section 6 of RA No. 9344). Lack of discernment is conclusively
presumed. If the child is above 15 years of age, minority is an exempting circumstance
if he acted without discernment, or privilege mitigating circumstance if he acted with
discernment. This privilege mitigating circumstance shall be appreciated even if
minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly
presented on appeal (People vs. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, January 7, 2013) and even if
the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death (People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270,
October 21, 2015).
2. Ifthe accused is 15 years of age or below but above 12 years, shallbe
considered as a neglected child. Neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in a youth
care facility or BahayPag-asa in the following instances: (a) If the child commits
serious crimes such as parricide, murder, infanticide, rape, kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide or rape, robbery with homicide or rape, destructive
arson, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or offenses
involving dangerous drugs punishable by more than 12 years of imprisonment; and (b)
In case of repetition of offenses and the child was previously subjected to a
intervention program and his best interest requires involuntarily commitment.
In case of commission of serious crime, a petition for involuntarily commitment
shall be filed by social worker in court. In case of repetitionof offenses, his parents or
guardians shall execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment.
However, if the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute
such authorization, the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be
immediately filed social worker in court; but the child may be subjected to intensive
intervention program supervised by the local social officer instead of involuntary
commitment (Section 20-A and 20-B of RA 9344 as amended by RA 10630).
3.If the child is found guilty, the court shall place him under suspended
sentence, without need of application instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction
(Section 38 of RA 9344). The law makes no distinction as to the nature of offense by
the child. The Senate debate discloses that the suspension is applicable to heinous
crime (People vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011; People vs. Ancajas, G.R.
No. 199270, October 21, 2015).

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PRE-WEEK REVIEWER (NOVEMBER, 2016)


UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
An accused, who is under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime, is a child in conflict with the law. He will not be deprived of privileges under the
law even though he reaches age of majority at time of rendition of judgment. Exception:
While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides suspension of sentence can still be applied even
if the child is already 18 years of age at the time of conviction. However, Section 40
limits the suspension of sentence until the child reaches the age of 21 (People vs.
Gambao, GR No. 172707, October 01, 2013; People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270,
October 21, 2015).
3.If the accused is an adult, application for probation must be filed within the
period of perfecting an appeal (Section 4 of PD No. 968 or Probation Law). However, the
accused is a child in conflict with the law, application for probation may be filed at any
time (Section 42 of RA No. 9344). In sum, it can be filed even beyond the period of
perfecting an appeal or even during the pendency of an appeal.
Under Section 9 of PD 968, one, who is sentenced to suffer a penalty (or
maximum indeterminate penalty) of more than 6 years, is not qualified to apply for
probation. However, under Section 70 of RA No. 9165, a first time minor offender can
apply for probation for the crime of possession or use of dangerous drug even if the
penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment. But Section 70 of RA 9165 is not
applicable sale of dangerous drugs. Section 24 of RA No. 9165 disqualifies drug
traffickers and pushers for applying for probations although the accused is a minor.
The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as victims while the drug
traffickers and pushers as predators (Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23,
2008).
4. The child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities in accordance with
Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011;
People vs. Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015).
5.A convict is entitled to a full or 4/5 credit of his preventive imprisonment
(Article 29 of RPC). However, if the convict is a child in conflict with the law, he shall
be credited in the services of his sentence the full time spent in actual commitment
and detention (Section 41, RA 9344; Atizado vs. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13,
2010).
15. Status offense Status offenses such as curfew violationrefers to offenses
which discriminate only against a child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for
committing similar acts (Section 3 of RA No. 9344). In sum, a status offense is a crime
where minority of the offender is an element. A child shall not be punished for
committing a status offense (Section 57). Under Section 57-A, local ordinances on
status offenses shall be for the protection of children. For committing status offense,
children recorded as a child at risk shall be brought to their residence or to any
barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents
instead of being penalized.
16. Exempting circumstance of relationship - The absolutory cause of
relationship under Article 332 of RPCapplies to theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply to theft through falsification or estafa through falsification.
It includes step-relationship and in-laws relationship.There are two viewson whether
death of his wife dissolves the relationship by affinity of the husband with his mother9 | Page

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
in-law for purpose of absolutory cause. The first holds that relationship by affinity
terminates after the death of the deceased spouse, while the second maintains that
relationship continues. The principle of pro reocalls for the adoption of the continuing
affinity view because it is more favorable to the accused (Intestate estate of Gonzales
vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).The term spouses in Article 332
embraces common-law spouses. The basis of this ruling is the rule on co-ownership
over properties by common-law spouses (People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR,
September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603).

17. Voluntary confession - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had
begun presenting its evidence cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only
after the accused realized that the evidence already presented by the prosecution is
enough to cause his conviction (People vs. Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-57, July 9, 2001).

18. Allegation - It is now a requirement that the aggravating or qualifying


circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information.
Otherwise, they cannot be considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they
are subsequently proved during trial (Sombilon, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175528,
September 30, 2009). This procedural rule has a retroactive application because of pre
reo (People vs. Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011).

19. Nighttime - Nighttime is aggravating if the accused took advantage of the


darkness of the night (People vs. Banhaon, G.R. No. 131117, June 15, 2004) or silence
of the night e.g. the accused take advantage of the fact that the victims and neighbors
were sleeping (People vs. Ventura and Ventura, G.R. No. 148145-46, July 5, 2004).

20. Band - In robbery, band is a special aggravating circumstance under Article


295 of RPC. In robbery with homicide or rape, band is an ordinary aggravating
circumstance under Article 14.

21. Exploitation of minor Thespecial aggravating circumstance of


exploitation of minorunder RA No. 9344is present if the accused makes use, takes
advantage of, or profits from the use of children, or abuses his authority over the child
or takes advantage of the vulnerabilities of the child with abuse of confidence or
induce, threaten or instigate the commission of the crime. The concept of exploitation
of children is comprehensive enough to cover the circumstance of with the aid of minor
under 15 years of age under RPC.
22. Conspiracy - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a principal or as
an accomplice because the conspiracy and his participation therein have been
established. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be
held equally liable for the crime (People vs. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010).

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an
overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof (People vs. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635 November 15, 2010).
A conspirator, who ran away from the scene of the crime prior to the commission of
robbery with homicide by his co-conspirator, is not liable because the former
dissociated himself from the conspiracy.
Conspirators are all liable for robbery although not all profited and gained from
the robbery. When a conspirator committed homicide by reason of or on the occasion
of the robbery, his co-conspirators are liable for special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, unless they endeavored to prevent the killing (People vs. Ebet, GR No.
181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009;
People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013) or they cannot prevent the killing since
they are not aware thereof (People vs. Corbes, G.R. No. 113470, March 26, 1997). This
rule is applicable to special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (People vs.
Anticamaray, GR No. 178771, June 08, 2011) or robbery with rape (People v. Suyu,
G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006; People v. Canturia, G.R. No. 108490 June 22,
1995).
If there is conspiracy to commit rape, each of conspirators is responsible not
only for the rape committed personally by him but also for the rape committed by the
other as well (People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012).

B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary application of the
provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule may be applied
supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held liable for violation of
BP Blg. 22 on the basis of conspiracy. (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066,
February 17, 2005). The principle of conspiracy may be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus,
a person (such as mother-in-law), who has no marital, sexual or dating relationship
with the victim, can be held liable for violence against woman on the basis of
conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008)

If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No. 3019 is
imputable to the private individual although there are not similarly situated in relation
to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides penalty for public officer or
private person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a private individual can be
prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even if the public officer, with whom the private
individual allegedly conspired, died, the latter can still be prosecuted for violation of
RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the criminal liability but not the crime. Hence, if
there is proof of the crime and conspiracy between the dead public officer and private
individual, the latter can still be convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go,
GR NO. 168539, March 25, 2014). However, if the public officer with whom the private
individual allegedly conspired is acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
Mayor, treasurer and planning coordinator approved the overpayments in favor
of a private individual for the construction of public market. The public officers caused
undue injury to the government through manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. The private individual, who was overpaid, is
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
also liable on the basis of conspiracy and Go vs. Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan
(Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010, Justice Velasco;
Uyboco vs. People, G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014,Justice Velasco).
23. Accomplice - Lending weapon such a gun to a killer for purpose of killing
a specific person such as Pedro is an act of accomplice. But if the killer used the
weapon in killing a different person such as Juan, the lender is not liable as an
accomplice. To be held liable as an accomplice, it is important that that he knows and
concurs in the criminal design of the principal (community of design) and participates
before or during the commission of the crime by supplying moral or material aid in an
efficacious way. In this case, the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro but not
Juan. Hence, he is not liable as an accomplice. If the killer used another weapon such
as knife instead of the gun borrowed in killing Pedro, the lender is not liable as an
accomplice. Although the lender concurred in the killing of Pedro, he did not supply
the killer material or moral aid in an efficacious way since the weapon used is not the
one borrowed from him.

24. Fencing In fencing, the property, which the accused possesses with intent
to gain, must be derived from the proceeds of theft or robbery (Ong vs. People, GR No.
190475, April 10, 2013). The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft or
robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, November 21, 2001). Thus, carnapping can
be considered as within the contemplation of the word theft or robbery in PD No.
1612 (Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). If the property is derived
from the proceeds of malversation or estafa, fencing is not committed. But the accused
can be held liable as an accessory if he profited or assisted other to profit from this
misappropriated property.
Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is
committed is the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken into
consideration the attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the property is so
cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in a street; (3) accused
knew that the car he bought was not properly documented (Dimat vs. People, supra);
or (4) new tires are being peddled in the streets by an unknown seller (Ong vs. People,
supra). Furthermore, mere possession of stolen property shall be prima facie evidence
of fencing (Section 6 of PD No. 1612).
25. Obstruction of justice Obstruction of justice can only be committed by a
person other than the one being investigated or tried in a criminal proceeding.
Although this is not expressly required in PD No. 1829 to make one liable for
obstruction of justice, a principal himself cannot be held liable for obstruction of
justice (Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R No. 165276, November 25, 2009).
The criminal actor, who threwthe body of murdered victim into the river to
destroy the corpus delicti, is liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of
employment of means to afford impunity.The one who assisted in in throwing the body
is liable as an accessory to murder for destroying the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery (People vs. Devaras, G.R. Nos. 100938-39, December 15, 1993)or a principal
in the crime of obstruction of justice for destroying it to impair its availability as
evidence in a criminal proceeding.

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
The accused cannot be prosecuted both as an accessory for murder and as
principal for obstruction of justice. The penalty prescribed for obstruction of justice
under PD No. 1829 is prision correccional in its maximum period unless other law
prescribed a higher penalty. Thus, the offender may be prosecuted for murder as
accessory with the penalty of prision mayor or for obstruction of justice as principal
also with the penalty of prision mayor, since this penalty is higher than that
prescribed under PD No. 1829. The intention of the law in prescribing a fixed penalty
or that provided by other law such as RPC, whichever is higher, is not to prosecute the
offender for obstruction of justice and for other crime arising from the same act such
as destroying the body of the crime.
After the discoveryof illegal possession of lumber, the accused unlawfully took
the truckused to commit the crime from the authorities. He is not liable as an
accessory since he did not conceal the instrument of the crime for the purpose
of preventing the discovery thereof. Crime was already discovered when the
concealment was made. However, he is liable for obstruction of justice for concealing
the truck to impair its availability as evidence in the criminal proceeding for illegal
possession of lumber (Padiernos vs. People, G.R. No. 181111, August 17, 2015).
To be held liable as an accessory, the person harbored, concealed, or assisted to
escape must be principal of the crime and the crime committed must be treason,
parricide, murder,or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or other crime
where act was committed with abuse of public function or the principal is a habitual
delinquent. To be held liable as a principal in obstruction of justice, the one harbored,
concealed, or assisted to escape is any person(such as principal or accomplice)and the
crime committed is any offense under existing law.
The exempting circumstance of relationship under Article 20 of RPC can be
appreciated in favor of an accessory to a felony but not in favor of an accused in the
crime of obstruction of justice since he is being prosecuted as principal and not as an
accessory.
Light felony is punishable except when the accused is merely an accessory
(Article 16 of RPC) or when it is at the attempted or frustrated stage unless it is a
crime against property or person (Article 7). However, obstruction of justice can be
committed even though the crime under investigation is a light felony.
An accused can be convicted as an accessory to a felony although the principal
was not convicted because the latter was at large, unidentified or dead (Vino vs.
People, G.R. No. 84163, October 19, 1989). The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the
commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of
the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal (People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015).

26. Credit of preventive imprisonment Credit for preventive imprisonment is


full if the detention prisoner executed detainees manifestation, which is a written
declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his
willingness to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a convicted prisoner
for the purpose of availing the full credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment.

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

Credit for preventive imprisonment is 4/5 if the detention prisoner executed


detainees waiver, which is a written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the
assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final judgment.

There is no credit if the accused is recidivist; has been convicted previously


twice or more times of any crime; or has failed to surrender voluntarily before a court
of law upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence (Article 29 of RPC as
amended by RA No. 10592).

If the offender is a child, the applicable rule for crediting the period of
commitment and detention is not Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344, which
provides that the full time spent in actual commitment and detention of juvenile
delinquent shall be credited in the services of his sentence.
27. Immediate release If the period of preventive imprisonment is equal to
the imposable maximum imprisonment of the offense charged, the detention prisoner
shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the case, except
for the following: 1) recidivist; 2) habitual delinquent; 3) escapee; and 4) person charged
with heinous crimes. Such period shall include good conduct time allowance (Article 29
of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592).

28. Special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) If detention prisoner or


convicted prisoner escapes during the calamity, and subsequently surrenders within
48 hours from the time the President announces the passing away of such calamity,
he is entitled to 1/5 special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) under Article 98 of RPC
as amended by RA No. 10592; if the convicted prisoner did not surrender within the
period, he is liable for evasion of sentence under Article 158 of RPC punishable by
penalty equivalent to one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under the
original sentence, which in no case shall exceed six months; if the detention prisoner
did not surrender within the period, he is not liable for evasion of sentence. Only
convicted prisoner can commit evasion of service of sentence because a detention
prisoner is not serving sentence, which he can evade.
In case of the prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
notwithstanding the existence of a calamity, he is entitled to 2/5 STAL (Article 98 of
RPC as amended by RA No. 10592). A prisoner who did not escape despite of the
calamity manifests a higher degree of loyalty to the penal system than those who
evaded their sentence but thereafter gives themselves up upon the passing away of the
calamity.Hence, prisoners, who did not escape, are entitled to a higher special time
allowance.
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
However, prisoner is not entitled to STAL if he has committed other offense or
any act in violation of the law.
29. Special complex crime Raping the victim or inserting instrument in her
anal orifice after treacherously inflicting mortal wounds is not a special complex crime
of rape with homicide because the original design of the victim is kill and not to rape
the victim. The crime committed is murder qualified by treachery and rape shall be
regarded either as ignominy or cruelty (People vs. Laspardas, G.R. No. L-46146, Oct.
23, 1979) or sexual assault shall be treated as cruelty (People vs. Bernabe, G.R. No.
185726, October 16, 2009).
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless
of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
accused is liable for a special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide (People vs.
Mercado, G.R. No. 116239, November 29, 2000; People vs. Ramos, G.R. No.
118570, October 12, 1998; People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004;
People vs. Montanir, GR No. 187534, April 04, 2011; People vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No.
207949, July 23, 2014). However, if the derivation of liberty is just incidental to the
transportation of the victim to the place where he will be executed, the crime is
murder. Kidnapping with homicide is not committed because of lack of intent to
deprive liberty (People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009).
The phrase by reason of the rape obviously conveys the notion that the killing
is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally designed to commit. The
victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. In contrast, the phrase on the
occasion of the rape as shown by Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs
immediately before or after,or during the commission itself of the rape, where the
victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim (People vs.
Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012; People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321,
October 5, 2011).
Ordinarily, homicide means killing another person. In sum, the person
responsible for the death of the victim must be the offender. But in the case of People
vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969, the victim himself, who jumped from boat,
is responsible for his own death, and yet, the SC convicted the accused of robbery with
homicide. In other words, death caused by the victim himself is considered as
homicide, which is a component of robbery with homicide. Hence, suicide or death
caused by the victim herself can be considered as homicide as a component of special
complex crime of rape with homicide.
In robbery with homicide, all other felonies such as rape, intentional mutilation,
usurpation of authority, or direct assault with attempted homicide are integrated into
this special complex crime. This special complex crime is committed as long as death
results by reason or on occasion or robbery without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime(People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No.
202124, April 05, 2016).
In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a
bystander (People vs. Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding police
(People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the robbers (People vs.
De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009;People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April
05, 2016).
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that victim is killed by the responding
policeand not by the robber (People vs. Ombao, G.R. No. L-30492, February 26, 1981).
But in attempted robbery with homicide, the offender must be guilty of both crimes.
Hence, attempted robbery with homicide is not committed where the victim was killed
by a co-passenger and not by the robber (People vs. Manalili, G.R. No. 121671, August
14, 1998).
If the taking of property is not committed by means of violence or intimidation,
Article 294 of RPC is not applicable. Taking without violence or intimidation
constitutes theft. If after the taking of property by means of violence or intimidation,
the robber killed a responding police officer, the former is liable for robbery with
homicide (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967). If after the taking of
the roasters without violence or intimidation, the thief killed responding police officer,
he is liable for theft and direct assault with homicide (People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L28547, February 22, 1974). If after the snatching of the complainants bag without
violence or intimidation, a co-robber crashed the getaway motorcycle and died, the
accused is only liable for theft (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 200922, July 18,
2012).
After consummation of robbery, passengers reported the matter to the police
authorities. During the manhunt operation, one of the police officers was killed by a
robbery. The crime committed is not robbery with homicide since the connection
between the two crimes was not a direct connection" (People vs. Quemeggen, G.R. No.
178205, July 27, 2009).
In simple robbery under Article 294 of RPC, violence and intimidation is
employed to take property. In occupation of real property under Article 312, violence or
intimidation is employed to occupy the real property. If the accused has already
occupied the house of the complainant, and he used violence or intimidation to
prevent the said owner from reoccupying the property, the crime committed is not
occupation of real property. The accused may be held liable of grave threat, grave
coercion or discharge of firearm depending upon the circumstance of the case.

Breaking the window of a house and taking property inside without entering
constitutes theft. Breaking the window is not a circumstance that will qualify the
taking into robbery by using force upon thins since this crime requires that the
breaking of window is a means to enter the building (People vs. Adorno, CA 40 O.G.
567; People vs. Jaranilla. G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974). Breaking the window
to commit theft is an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Using picklock to open a locked cabinet and taking property therein is not
robbery by using force upon thing. To constitute robbery by using force upon thing,
the picklock must be used to open the building and not merely a lockedfurniture (US
vs. Macamay, G.R. No. 11952, September 25, 1917). Entrusted key is not a false key in
robbery by using force upon thing.
In Sebastian case, when the elements of both robbery by means of violence and
intimidation and robbery by using force upon thing are present, the accused shall be
held liable of the former since the controlling qualification is the violence and
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
intimidation. However, the penalty for robbery in inhabited house if the robber is
armed is graver than simple robbery. Hence, by hurting the victim, the offender shall
be penalized with a lighter penalty. Since Sebastian principle defies logic and reason,
People vs. Napolis, G.R. No. L-28865, February 28, 1972 abandoned it. Under the
present rule, when the elements of both robbery by means of violence and intimidation
and robbery by using force upon thing are present, the crime is a complex one under
Article 48 of said Code. Hence, the penalty for robbery in inhabited house shall be
imposed in its maximum period (People vs. Disney, G.R. No. L-41336, February 18,
1983; Fransdilla vs. People, GR No. 197562, April 20, 2015). If the entry into the
dwelling is without force upon thing, and the property was taken by means of violence
or intimidation, the crime committed is robbery by means of violence or intimidation
with aggravating circumstance of disregard of dwelling (People vs. Tejero, G.R. No.
128892 June 21, 1999; People vs. Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011).
When the elements of both robbery with homicide and robbery by using force upon
thing (unlawful entry) are present, the former shall absorb the latter. In sum, robbery
by using force upon thing shall be integrated into the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide (People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta,
G.R. No. 202124, April 05, 2016). But aggravating circumstances of disregard of
dwelling and unlawful entry shall be both appreciated (People vs. Lamosa, G.R. No.
74291-93, May 23, 1989).
30. Compound crime - The single act of rolling the hand grenade on the floor
of the gymnasium which resulted in the death of victims constituted a compound
crime of multiple murders (People vs. Mores, GR No. 189846, June 26, 2013).
Wherethe use of grenade render the victim defenseless, use of explosives shall be
considered as a qualifying circumstance because this is the principal mode of attack.
Thus, treachery will be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance (People
vs. Comadre, et al., G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004). The single act of running over the
victims with a van constitutes compound crime of multiple murders (People vs.
Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012).
Single act of pressing the trigger of Thompson or armalite is treated as several
acts as many as there are bullets fired from gun. Because of special mechanism of
Thompson, the single act of pressing its trigger will cause the continuous firing of
bullets. Thus, accused is liable as many homicides as there are victims (People vs.
Desierto, (C.A.) 45 O.G. 4542; People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 131116, August, 27, 1999;
People vs. Tabaco, G.R. Nos. 100382-100385 March 19, 1997; People v. Vargas, Jr.,
G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990; People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312 July 5,
1999).
The body of the information charged the accused of compound crime with
murder and attempted murder since two victims were hit by a single shot. The
evidence shows that murder and attempted murder are separate crimes since the two
victims were hit by several shot. Under the variance rule, if the crime alleged in the
information varies with the crime proven with evidence, the accused shall be convicted
of the crime alleged or proven whichever the lesser. Thus, accused shall be convicted
of complex crime, which is lesser compared to two crimes (People vs. Bernardo, GR No.
198789, June 03, 2013).
Several acts in killing several victims do not constitute a compound crime.
Article 48 requires a single act constituting two or more crimes (People vs. Toling, G.R.
No. L-27097, January 17, 1975). Exceptions: Several acts in killing several victims
under a single criminal impulse (People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955) or under
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
single criminal purpose (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. L-32205 August 31, 1979) shall be
considered as a single act. Hence, it is a compound crime.
The single criminal impulse rule under the Lawas doctrine is more of an
exception than the general rule (People vs. Remollino, G.R. No. L-14008, September
30, 1960). Article 48 on compound crime speaks of single act, but not single criminal
impulse (People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-26222, July 21, 1967). In Lawas case, the SC
was merely forced to apply Article 48 because of the impossibility of ascertaining the
number of persons killed by each accused (People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No.
184500. September 11, 2012). Thus, the Lawas doctrine should not be applied if there
is conspiracy since the number of victims actually killed by each conspirator is not
anymore material if there is conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June
29, 2010, Justice Velasco).
The single criminal purpose rule under the Abella case was adopted in
consideration of the plight of the prisoners; hence, it is only applicable if killings were
commit by prisoners against their fellow prisoners (People vs. Pincalin, G.R. No. L38755, January 22, 1981; People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012
31. Complex crime proper - Stabbing after the rape is a separate crime of
frustrated homicide. This is not a complex crime proper since the latter is not
necessary to commit the former (People vs. Isla, G.R. No. 199875, November 21, 2012).
If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim, the crime committed is
rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705, July 30, 1993; People
vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal detention (People vs. Nuguid,
G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004), which is incidental to the commission of rape, is
absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Article 48 of RPC is applicable since
forcible abduction or illegal detention is an indispensable means to commit rape.
If forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit rape, this is a complex
crime proper under Article 48 of RPC. However, if multiple rapes were committed,
forcible abduction will be considered as a necessary means to commit the first rape
but not the subsequent rape. Hence, with respect to the first rape, the crime
committed is complex crime of rape though forcible abduction while the subsequent
rapes will be treated as separate crimes (People vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-28232, February
6, 1971; People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002, En Banc; People vs.
Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
As a rule, forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape; hence,
the latter absorbs the former. However, if the victim was brought in a house or motel
or in a place with considerable distance from the place where she was abducted,
forcible abduction will be considered as a necessary means to commit rape; hence, the
crime committed is complex crime proper.
If the accused abducted the victim without clear showing of lewd design, the
crime committed is kidnapping since it will appear that the intention of the accused is
to deprive victim of his liberty. If as a consequence of illegal detention, the victim was
rape, the crime committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with rape. This is
the crime committed regardless of the number of rapes. Multiple rapes will be
considered as a component of this special complex crime (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr.,
G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011; People vs. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8,
2011). If as a consequence of illegal detention, the victim was rape and then killed, the
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crime committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping with homicide. Rape will be
considered as a component of this special complex crime (People vs. Larranaga,
138874-75, February 3, 2004, En Banc).
The difference between rape through forcible abduction and kidnapping with
rape lies on the criminal intention of the accused at the precise moment of abduction.
If the abduction is committed with lewd design, the crime committed is rape through
forcible abduction. On the other hand, if the abduction is committed without lewd
design, the crime committed is kidnapping with rape (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R.
No. 186417, July 27, 2011). Even if the victim was detained for one week and in the
course thereof, she was rape, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction
if the abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100,
July 18, 2014).
If the accused was molesting the victim immediately upon abduction, that is
proof that abduction is committed with lewd design (People vs. Jose, supra). After
eating the food given by accused, the victim became dizzy and thereafter, she passed
out. When she regained consciousness, she notices that she and accused are naked
inside a room. She was raped and detained for 6 days. The crime committed is rape
through forcible abduction (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
32. Doctrine of absorption - If murder, kidnapping or arson committed in
furtherance of rebellion, they will be divested of their character as common crimes and
will assume the political complexion of rebellion. Hence, rebellion absorbs these
crimes (People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956; People vs.
Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956; Enrile vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990). Doctrine of absorption is applicable to coup detat for being a political
crime because the purpose of coup plotter is to seize or diminish state power (Gonzales
vs. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 8, 2006, concurring opinion by Justice Callejo).
Membership in CPP-NPA alone will not establish political motivation behind the
killing for purpose of convicting the killers for rebellion (People vs. Lovedioro, G.R. No.
112235, November 29, 1995; People vs. Solongan, G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003).
But membership in a liquidation squad and killing a government officer is sufficient to
establish political motivation (People v. Dasig,G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993).
Doctrine of absorption is not applicable to sedition. There is neither law nor
jurisprudence which can allow the absorption of murder and kidnapping by sedition.
The absorption principle in the cases of Hernandez and Geronimo cannot properly be
invoked as authority since those two cases involved rebellion and not sedition (People
vs. Hadji, G.R. No. L-12686, October 24, 1963). Moreover, public and tumultuous
uprising for political or social purpose, which is the essence of sedition, does not
require killings, burning of properties and extortions.
RA No. 6968 eliminated the phrases "engaging in war against the forces of the
government", "committing serious violence" and destroying property in Article 135 of
RPC. These modes of committing rebellion deleted by RA No. 6968 were used by the
SC in justifying the doctrine of absorption. The amendment of Article 135 does not
affect the accepted concept of rebellion and these overt acts of violence are deemed
subsumed in the provision on public and armed uprising, which is an element of
rebellion in Article 134 (Regalado). Hence, the doctrine of absorption is still good. The
incidents in Lovedioro case, and Solongan case happened after RA No. 6968, and yet,
the SC is still applying the doctrine of absorption.
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If the principal intention of the offenders is to rob the victims, and the
deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the responding police
officers from arresting them, the crime committed is robbery, which absorbed
kidnapping and serious illegal detention (People vs. Astor, G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29
April 1987).If the accused committed robbery, but thereafter, they detained the victims
to demand additional money, and later forestall their capture by the police, the crime
committed is complex crime of robbery through kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of
the robbery. The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the
malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional amount.
Hence, the Astor principle is not applicable (People vs. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163 April
26, 1990). If the accused committed robbery by band, but thereafter, they took one of
the victims and detained him for seven days in another place for purpose of
demanding ransom, they are liable of separate crimes of robbery by band and
kidnapping for ransom (People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012).
33. Delito continuado - In order that continuous crime may exist, there
should be: (1) plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time; (2) unity
of criminal intent and purpose and (3) unity of penal provision infringed upon or
violated (Santiago vs. Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2, 1993). The
following are delito continuado: (1) several acts of taking roasters owned by different
owner under a single criminal impulse to take them all in violation of a single penal
provision, and that is Article 308 of RPC (Note: This is also called single larceny rule;
People vs. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974); and (2)several acts of
taking away by force the valuables of the employees working in Energex gasoline
station committed under a single criminal intent to commit robbery in that place in
violation of a single penal provision, and that is Article 294 of RPC (People vs. De Leon,
GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of
changing position. The three penetrations motivated by a single criminal intent to
satisfy his lust in violation of single penal provision (Article 266-A of RPC) constitute a
continued crime of rape (People vs. Aaron, G.R. Nos. 136300-02, September 24,
2002). Accused inserted his penis thrice into the private part of victim for purpose of
resting for five minutes. He satisfied his lust every time he would withdraw his penis to
rest. Since the three penetrations were motivated by separate three criminal impulse
to satisfy his lust, three separate crimes of rape are committed (People vs. Lucena, GR
No. 190632, February 26, 2014).
There is no delito continuado where the accused when he committed the first
threat against the victim has no foreknowledge that he will chance upon the second
and third victims to commit the second and third threat. Without such
foreknowledge, three threats could not be said to have been committed under a single
criminal impulse, which is the basis of applying delito continuado principle. Several
threats can only be considered as continued crime if the offender threatened three
individuals at the same place and at the same time (Paera vs. People, G.R. No.
181626, May 30, 2011).
34. Penalty - Two degrees higher than reclusion temporal prescribed for
qualified theft shall be death penalty. Since death penalty was not specifically
prescribed for qualified theft, the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties for death shall be imposed pursuant to Article 74 of RPC. However, the
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
period of imprisonment should be fixed at forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
Otherwise, there would be no difference at all between reclusion perpetua imposed as
the penalty next higher in degree and reclusion perpetua imposed as the penalty fixed
by law (Celestial vs. People, G.R. No. 214865, August 19, 2015, Justice Velasco).
Accused was found guilty of parricide punishable by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying rules for application of indivisible penalties (Article 63),
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied if there are two mitigating
circumstance. The penalty cannot be lowered to reclusion temporal, no matter how
many mitigating circumstances are present. The special mitigating circumstance is
found in rules for application of divisible penalties (Article 64), which is not applicable
because the penalty is not divisible (People vs. Takbobo, G.R. No. No. 102984, June
30, 1993). The Takbobo principle is also applicable if the penalty prescribed by law for
the crime committed is a single indivisible penalty such as reclusion perpetua.
If there are three mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance,
special mitigating circumstance for purpose of graduating the penalty shall not be
appreciated. Although there are two remaining mitigating circumstances after
applying the off-set rule, the penalty shall not be lowered by one degree because the
appreciation of special mitigating circumstance requires that there is no aggravating
circumstance.
If the penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal (e.g. penalty for homicide)
and there is one mitigating circumstance, this penalty shall be imposed in its
minimum period. In such case, the indeterminate minimum penalty shall be fixed
anywhere within the full range of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years), which
is the penalty next lower in degree, while the indeterminate maximum penalty shall be
fixed anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years
and 1 day to 14 years and 8 months). Hence, the court may sentence the accused to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of: 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to
14 years of reclusion temporal as maximum (People vs. Placer, G.R. No. 181753,
October 09, 2013).

Only ordinary aggravating and mitigating circumstances are subject to the


offset rule. Privileged mitigating circumstance of minority cannot be offset by ordinary
aggravating circumstance (Aballe vs. People, G.R. No. L-64086, March 15, 1990). If
privileged mitigating circumstance and ordinary aggravating circumstance attended
the commission of felony, the former shall be taken into account in graduating
penalty; the latter in applying the graduated penalty in its maximum period (People vs.
Lumandong, GR NO. 132745, March 9, 2000, En Banc). Quasi-recidivism is a special
aggravating circumstance and cannot be offset by a generic mitigating circumstance
(People vs. Macariola, G.R. No. L-40757 January 24, 1983). The circumstance of
treachery, which qualifies the killing into murder, cannot be offset by a generic
mitigating circumstance voluntary surrender (People vs. Abletes and Pamero, GR NO.
L-33304, July 31, 1974).

If the penalty for possession of dangerous drugs is 12 years and 1 day to 20


years of imprisonment, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum of which shall not exceed 20 years while the minimum shall
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
not be less than 12 years and 1 day. Thus, the court can sentence the accused to
suffer 15 years of imprisonment as minimum to 18 years as maximum. The court
cannot impose a straight penalty of 12 years and 1 day since the application of
indeterminate sentence law is mandatory (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005,
September 12, 2011; Escalante vs. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013).
RPC is not generally applicable to malum prohibitum. However, when a special
law, which punishes malum prohibitum, adopts the technical nomenclature of the
penalties in RPC, the provisions under this Code shall apply (People vs. Simon, G.R.
No. 93028, July 29, 1994) such as: (1) Article 68 on the privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority; (2) Article 64 on application of penalty in its minimum
period if there is a confession; and (3) Article 160 on special aggravating circumstance
of quasi-recidivism.
RA No. 7080 and RA No. 10591 adoptthe nomenclature of the penalties in RPC.
Hence, minority, confession (Jacaban vs. People, GR No. 184355, March 23, 2015;
Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007) or quasi-recidivisim shall be
considered in plunder and illegal possession of loose firearm.
Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165, the provisions of RPC shall not apply except
in the case of minor offenders. Hence, if the accused is a minor, privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011;
People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No.
195005, September 12, 2011, Justice Velasco), confession or quasi-recidivisim(People
vs. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997) shall be considered in crime involving
dangerous drugs. In this case, life imprisonment shall be considered as reclusion
perpetua. If the accused is an adult, these circumstances shall not be appreciated.
If the special law (such as RA No. 6235 on hijacking and RA No. 3019 on
corruption) did not adopt the technical nomenclature of penalties in RPC, the latter
shall not apply. Mitigating circumstance of confession shall not be appreciated since
the penalty not borrowed from RPC cannot be applied in its minimum period. The
crime has not attempted or frustrated stage since penalty not borrowed from RPC
cannot be graduated one or two degrees lower.
If the convict has no property with which to meet the fine, he shall be subject to
a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of
judgment of conviction by the trial court (Article 39 of RPC as amended by RA No.
10159).
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus, convict could serve
simultaneously arresto mayor and fine, prision correccional and perpetual absolute
disqualification, or reclusion perpetua and civil interdiction. In sum, while lingering in
prison, convict could pay fine, return the property confiscated, be disallowed to cast
his vote or to act function as a public officer.
When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them
successively if the nature of the penalties will not permit simultaneous service.
Convict must serve multiple penalties successively: (1) where the penalties to be
served are destierro and imprisonment; and (2) where the penalties to be served are

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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
imprisonment. However, the successive service of sentences is subject to the three-fold
rule and 40-year limitation rule.
The three fold rule is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the
penalty but in connection with the service of the sentence imposed (People vs.
Escares, G.R. No. L-11128-33, December 23, 1957; Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987). Thus, the court cannot dismiss criminal cases in
excess of three on the basis of three-fold rule.
35. Modes of criminal extinction The modes of extinguishing criminal
liability are: death of the offender; service of the sentence; amnesty or absolute
pardon; prescription of crime, or penalty; marriage between the offender and the
offended in crimes against chastity (Article 89 of RPC) or in rape; or forgiveness in
marital rape (Article 266-C); and probation (PD No. 968 as amended by RA No. 10707.
Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of RPC as a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability incurred by a public officer prior to his reelection
(Oliveros vs. Villalulz, G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1974). But a re-elected public official
could not be removed for administrative offense committed during a prior term, since
his re-election to office operates as a condonation of his misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor (Aguinaldo vs. Santos, G.R. No. 94115
August 21, 1992). However, the doctrine of condonation of administrative offense by
reason of reelection has been abandoned for being inconsistent to Section 1, Article X1
of the 1987 Constitution on public office is a public trust and public accountability
(Morales vs. CA and Binay, GR No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015).
Novation is not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability but it can extinguish
the old contract, which may be the basis of criminal liability. In estafa through
misappropriation, receiving the property in trust is an element thereof. In sum,
contract is an ingredient of this crime. Novation may convert the contract of trust into
creditor-debtor situation, or put doubt on the true nature of the original transaction
(People vs. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964). In these situations, the
accused will be acquitted for failure to prove the element of receipt of property in
trust. Thus, novation is a defense in estafa through misappropriation where the
contract of agency is converted into sale (Degaos vs. People, GR No. 162826, October
14, 2013). However, partial payment and promise to pay the balance of obligation
under contract of agency will not convert it into sale. There is no novation since the
obligation of the accused in making a partial payment is not incompatible to the
obligation to give the proceeds of sale of the property under the contract of agency
(Degaos vs. People, supra).
Novation cannot be used as a defense in case where the existence of contract is
not an element. In theft case, there was no contractual relationship or bilateral
agreement which can be modified or altered by the parties (People vs. Tanjutco, G.R.
No. L-23924, April 29, 1968, En Banc).In estafa through falsification of public
documents, the liability of the offender cannot be extinguished by mere novation (Milla
vs. People, G.R. No. 188726, January 25, 2012).
Death of an accused pending appeal shall extinguish his criminal liability and
civil liability arising from crime (Article 89 of RPC); but not his civil liability arising
from a source other than crime (e.g. quasi-delict, contract, quasi-contract or law). Civil
liability arising from a source other than crime is not deemed included in the
institution of criminal action. Hence, the private complainant must file a separate civil
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
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action against either the executor or administrator, or the estate of the accused.
During the pendency of the criminal case, the statute of limitations on this surviving
civil liability is deemed interrupted (People vs. Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, September 2,
1994). However, in violation of BP Blg. 22, civil liability arising from a source other
than crimeis mandatorily included in the institution of criminal action. Hence, the
court, despite the death of the accused pending appeal, must determine his civil
liability arising from contract (Bernardo vs. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 05,
2015). In sum, the private complainant is not required to file a separate civil action
based on contract involving a dishonored check.
Person, who was pardoned for the crime punishable by reclusion perpetua,
cannot run in the Senatorial race if the terms of the pardon has not expressly restored
his right to hold public office (Article 36 of RPC) or expressly remitted the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification (Article 41). GMA pardoned President
Estrada with express restoration of his civil and political rights. Hence, he is eligible to
run as Mayor (Risos-vidal vs. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
The State and private complainant should not be blame for failure to institute
the case immediately after the commission of the crime if they are ignorant or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a crime. Under "blameless ignorance"
doctrine (Section 2 of Act 3326 and Article 91 of RPC), the prescription runs only upon
discovery of the crime by offended party or State through a person in authority or his
agent. Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies such as behest loan, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible
prior to 1986 (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65,
September 11, 2013). Hence, the prescriptive period for violation of RA No. 3019
commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an
exhaustive investigation (Presidential Ad hoc fact-finding committee vs. Hon. Desierto,
G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011).
Prescription runs only upon discovery of the crime by offended party or person
in authority or his agent. For purpose of prescription of crime, the offended party
includes the person to whom the offender is civilly liable. Thus, the widow of the
murdered victim is an offended party (Garcia vs. CA, G.R. No. 119063, January 27,
1997). Discovery of crime by a mere witness, who is not an offended party, will not
commence the running of prescription.
The 10-year prescriptive period for falsification of document shall commence to
run on the date of recording of the falsified deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds
because of the constructive notice rule under the Torren system (People vs. Reyes, G.R.
No. 74226, July 27, 1989). The 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy shall commence
to run on the date of actual discovery of the bigamous marriage and not from the
registration of bigamous marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar. The law on Civil
Registry and the Family Code, which governed registration of marriage, do not provide
a rule on constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454, June
14, 1994).

As a rule, period of prescription commence to run from the date of discovery of


its commission. However, if the crime is not yet actionable at the time of its
commission, period of prescription will commence to run from the time it becomes
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
actionable. In false testimony, the period of prescription commences to run from the
date of the finality of judgment of a case in which the offender testified falsely. Prior to
the date of finality, the crime is not yet actionable (People vs. Maneja, G.R. No. 47684,
June 10, 1941). In violation of BP Blg. 22, the crime is consummated upon the
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
143375, July 6, 2001). However, in violation of BP 22, the four-year period of
prescription for such crime commences to run from the date of the expiration of the
five-day period from receipt of notice of dishonor by the drawer. Prior to that date, the
crime is not yet actionable (People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012). It
would be absurd to consider the prescriptive period for false testimony or violation of
BP Blg. 22 as already running before it becomes actionable, and yet, the complainant
could not cause its interruption because he is not yet allowed to file a complaint.

If the crime is punishable bythe Revised Penal Code or a special law, the
institution of judicial proceeding(e.g. filing of complaint or information in court) or
executive proceeding (e.g. filing of complaint for preliminary investigation) interrupts
the running of prescription such as the filing of complaint: (1) for violation of BP Blg.
22 in the prosecutors office - People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13,
2012;Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008; (2)
for violation of Revised Securities Act in Securities and Exchange Commission - SEC
vs. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No. 135808, October 6, 2008; or (3) violation
of RA No. 3019 in the Ombudsman - Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24
and 174764-65, September 11, 2013.
The PCGG has no power to investigate cronies of Marcos for violation of RA No.
3019 not involving ill-gotten wealth. Such investigation for being voidab initiowould not
interrupt the running of prescription (People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 166510, April 29, 2009).
Ifthe crime is punishable by an ordinance, only the institution of judicial
proceeding shall interrupt itstwo-month prescriptive period. The provision in the Rules
on Criminal Procedure regarding the interruption of prescription by institution
criminal action is not applicable to violation of ordinance because it is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. Hence, the filing of complaint involving violation of
ordinance for preliminary investigation will not interrupt the running of the
prescription (Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., GR No. 169588, October
7, 2013).
36. Probation -Probation shall suspend the execution of principal penalty of
imprisonment, and accessory penalty of disqualification(Villareal vs. People, G.R. No.
151258, December 01, 2014) but not the implementation of the civil aspect of the
judgment (Budlong, vs. Palisok, GR No. 60151, June 24, 1983).
When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is
appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a
probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation based on
the modified decision before such decision becomes final. This notwithstanding, the
accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek a review of the modified
decision which already imposes a probationable penalty (Section 4 of PD 968 as
amended by RA No. 10707). In Colinares vs. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13,
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2011, the accused, who was convicted by the lower court of a non-probationable
offense of frustrated homicide, but on appeal was found guilty of a probationable
offense of attempted homicide, may apply for probation. In Villareal vs. People, G.R.
No. 151258, December 1, 2014, accused was convicted of homicide, a nonprobationable crime, by the trial court. However, the SC found them liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, which is a probationable crime, because of lack of
dolo. They can still apply for probation.
Under PD No. 968 as amended, crimes against public disorder are nonprobationable. However, under RA No. 10707, crimes against public disorder such as
alarm and scandal and direct assault are now probationable.
The period of probation of a defendant sentenced to a term of imprisonment of
not more than one year shall not exceed two years, and in all other cases, said period
shall not exceed six years. When the sentence imposes a fine only and the offender is
made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the period of probation
shall not be less than nor to be more than twice the total number of days of
subsidiary imprisonment (Section 14 of PD No. 968).
37. Direct assault Simple assault (such as punching) upon an agent of a
person in authority (e.g. police officer) while engaged in the performance of duty
constitutes simple resistance and not direct assault because there is no intent to defy
the law and its representative at all hazard, which is an element thereof (U.S. vs.
Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 13083,
December 11, 1917; People vs. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226, November 17, 1933). But
serious assault upon agent of a person in authority while engaged in the performance
of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs. Cox, G.R. No. 1406, January 6, 1904; U.S.
vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910).
Simple assault (such as punching) upon a person in authority (e.g. mayor or
chief of police) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes qualified direct
assault. The law does not distinguish between serious and simple laying of hands
upon a person in authority as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, a simple laying of
hands upon a person in authority constitutes qualified direct assault. The Tabiana
principle is only applicable if the victim is an agent of a person in authority (U.S. vs.
Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, November 9, 1918).
If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance of
duties at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is immaterial. Direct
assault is committed even if the motive (such as non-payment of loan) was totally
foreign to victims official function (Sarcepuedes vs. People, G.R. No. L-3857, October
22, 1951).
The phrase "on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148 of RPC means
"by reasonof the past performance of official duty because the purpose of the law is to
allow them to discharge their duties without fear of being assaulted by reason thereof
(People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974). Attacking a judge on the
street by reason of past performance of duty (such as citing the accused in contempt)
constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. vs. vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16,
1911). But attacking a retired judge by reason of past performance of duty is not direct
assault since he is not anymore a person in authority at the time of the assault. Note:
The mandatory retirement age of a judge is 70 year.

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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
The status of lawyer as persons in authority remains even the assault is
committed outside the court room as long as it is perpetrated by reason of the
performance of their professional duties (Records of the Batasan, Volume Four, 19841985 of BP Blg. 873, which amended Article 152 of RPC).
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in authority, who is a
victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in
authority, who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect direct assault.
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in authority, who
is a victim of simple resistance, is liable for physical injuries.
38. Evasion - In evasion of service of sentence, the accused must be a
convicted prisoner and not merely a detention prisoner. In delivery of prisoner from
jail, the person, who escaped through the help of the accused, is either a detention
prisoner or convicted prisoner. In infidelity in the custody of prisoner, the person, who
escaped in connivance with or consent of or through negligence of the accusedcustodian, is either a detention prisoner or convicted prisoner. Evasion in the service
of sentence and delivery of prisoner from jail are committed by means of dolo.
Infidelity in the custody or prisoner is committed by means of dolo or culpa; if this
crime is committed by means of dolo, it is called conniving with or consenting to
evasion; if committed by means of culpa, it is called evasion through negligence.
Brother of a detention prisoner and convicted prisoner bribed the clerk of court
to falsify release order and their custodians to release his brothers. Convicted prisoner
but not the detention prisoner is liable for evasion of service of sentence. Brother and
clerk of court are liable for delivery of prisoner from jail with respect to the escape of
detention prisoner and convicted prisoner. Custodians are liable for infidelity in the
custody of prisoners with respect to the escape of detention prisoner and convicted
prisoner. Brother is liable for two counts of corruption of public officer. Clerk of court
and custodians are liable for direct bribery. Clerk of court and brother are liable for
falsification of document as principal by direct participation and as principal by
inducement, respectively.
39. Bribery - Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration thereof
subsequently rendered an unjust decision in favor of the former. The judge is liable of
direct bribery and rendering unjust decision, while the plaintiff is liable of corruption
of public officer. But if the plaintiff gave money to the judge, who subsequently
rendered a decision against the former, the crime committed by the judge is indirect
bribery while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. The judge is not liable
of direct bribery since rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates that the
former did not receive the money in consideration of rendering a decision in favor of
the latter. It seems that the plaintiff merely gave the money to the judge by reason of
his position as such.
40. Abortion and infanticide If the fetus is killed inside the womb of his
mother, the crime is abortion regardless of whether he is viable or not ( People vs.
Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008; People vs. Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884,
March 30, 1988). If the victim is killed outside the womb of the mother, the crime is:
(1) abortion if the victim is not viable e.g. intrauterine life is only 6 months (People vs.
Detablan, 40 O.G. No. 9, p. 30; People vs. Paycana, Jr. G.R. No. 179035, April 16,
2008); or (2) infanticide, if the victim is viable e.g. his intrauterine life is more than 6

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
months and his life is less than 3 day old; or (3) murder if the victim is viable and his
life is 3 day old or more.
If the accused maltreated his wife and as a consequence, his wife and unborn
child died, the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and unintentional
abortion (People vs. Robinos, G.R. No. 138453, May 29, 2002; People vs. Villanueva,
G.R. No. 95851, March 01, 1995). If the accused maltreated his pregnant wife and as a
consequence, his wife died, and his child was expelled, and died thereafter within 3
days, the crime committed is compound crime of parricide and infanticide. If the
accused maltreated his pregnant wife and as a consequence, his wife died, and his
child was expelled, and died thereafter on the third day, the crime committed is
compound crime of double parricides.
In abortion and infanticide, concealment of dishonor is a special mitigating
circumstance that can be appreciated in favor of the mother and maternal
grandparents but not in favor of the father or fraternal grandparents.
41. Parricide - In parricide, if the victim is his parent or child, the relationship
can either be legitimate or illegitimate; if the victim is the spouse, grandparent or
grandchild, the relationship must be legitimate (People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847,
October 23, 2013). Relationship in parricide is by blood except where the victim is
spouse (Regalado). The qualifying circumstance of relationship in parricide is personal.
Hence, it can be appreciated against the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is
not related to her husband, the victim (People vs. Bucsit G.R. No. 17865, March 15,
1922).
42. Death under exceptional circumstance -Death under exceptional
circumstance is a not crime but a defense (People vs. Puedan, G.R. No. 139576,
September 2, 2002), or an absolutory cause (People vs. Talisic, G.R. No. 97961,
September 05, 1997) since instead of imposing the penalty for parricide, murder or
homicide, the accused shall only suffer destierro, which is just a measure designed to
protect accused from acts of reprisal principally by relatives of the victim (People vs.
Araquel, G.R. No. L-12629, December 9, 1959). Hence, death under exceptional
circumstance is not a felony within the contemplation of Article 4 (People vs. Abarca,
G.R. No. 74433, September 14, 1987) and aggression under exceptional circumstance
is not an unlawful aggression within the contemplation of self-defense (US vs. Merced,
G.R. No. 14170, November 23, 1918).
Killing his wife after surprising her in the act of committing homosexual
intercourse with another woman is not death under exceptional circumstance. Sexual
intercourse mentioned in Article 247 is different from homosexual intercourse. Killing
his mistress after surprising in the act of committing sexual intercourse with a man is
not death under exceptional circumstance(U.S. vs. Versola, G.R. No. 10759, January
25, 1916). The offender in Article 247 must be a legally married person. Killing his
wife under the circumstance indicating that she had just finished having sexual
intercourse with another man is not death under exceptional circumstance. He did not
catch his wife in the very act of sexual intercourse, but after such act (People vs.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 46310, October 31, 1939).
43. Death in a tumultuous affray -The elements of death caused in a
tumultuous affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each
other reciprocally (Note: If there is conspiracy, this element is not present; conspirators
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
are liable for homicide or murder; People vs. Corpuz, G.R. No. L-36234 February 10,
1981); (c) that these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a
confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed in the course of the
affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased (Not: If the
killers are identified, this element is not present; since they are identified, they are
liable for homicide or murder; Wacoy vs. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015); and
(f) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used
violence can be identified.

44. Rape - If the relationship between the accused and the victim of rape is
uncle and niece, the Information must alleged that the offender is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree because there are niece-uncle
relationships which are beyond the third civil degree.

However, a sister-brother

relationship is obviously in the second civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary


that the Information should specifically state that the accused is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree of the victim (People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No.
167179, January 28, 2008,Justice Velasco).

Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape


(People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the
qualifying circumstance of mental disability, which must be alleged in the information
(People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014; People vs. Lascano, G.R. No.
192180, March 21, 2012).
In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in rape and special
aggravating circumstance in sexual abuse under RA No. 7610, the guardian must be a
person who has legal relationship with his ward. He must be legally appointed was
first (People vs. Flores G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010).
If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is absorbed
by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002). But the
doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape through sexual assault. Inserting
lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the victim and raping her
constitutes two counts of rape by sexual assault and rape through sexual intercourse
(People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis into
the mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes rape through sexual
assault and organ rape (In People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013).
If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of lasciviousness, the
accused will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule. Acts of
lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of rape. If
the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, but the crime proven is rape
through sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance
rule is not applicable since rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in
the charge of rape through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are
materially and substantially different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of
acts of lasciviousness, which is necessarily included in the charge of rape through
sexual intercourse (People vs. Pareja, GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014; People vs.
Cuaycong, G.R. No. 196051, October 02, 2013; People vs. CA, G.R. No. 183652,
February 25, 2015).
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A of RPC uses the term
man in defining rape without regard to the rapists legal relationship with his victim.
Under Article 266-C of RPC, in case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist
because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wifes body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed (People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014),
Rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot be
prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by
the offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the
offender's criminal liability (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June 06, 2011).
45. Perjury - Person cannot be held liable for perjury involving a complaint
affidavit for theft based on the execution of affidavit of desistance. There is no perjury
solely on the basis of two contradictory statements. There must be further evidence
that will show which of the two sworn statements is false (U.S. vs. Capistrano 40 Phil.
902).
In a verified answer, accused denied the allegation in the complaint for
collection on his loan obligation. He is not liable for perjury since verification is not
required in answer in a civil case. He cannot be prosecuted for perjury on the basis of
an alleged falsehood made in a verified pleading, which is not mandated by law to be
verified (Saavedra, Jr. vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 93178, September 15, 1993;
Flordelis vs. Himalaloan, G.R. No. L-48088, July 31, 1978).
The fact that subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in RPC does not
mean that the direct induction of a person by another to commit perjury has ceased to
be a crime, because said crime is fully within the scope of provision on principal by
inducement (People vs. Pudol, G.R. No. 45618, October 18, 1938).
Making untruthful statement (failure to disclose previous criminal conviction) in
a sworn application for the patrolman examination constitutes perjury (People vs.
Cruz, 108 Phil. 255). Making untruthful statement (failure to disclose pending
criminal case) in unsworn PDS constitutes falsification of document (Sevilla vs. People,
G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014). If there are several mistakes the PDS including
those which are not important, accused cannot be convicted of falsification of
document since it appears that failure to disclose pending criminal case is not
deliberate. Hence, accused is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting in
falsification (Sevilla vs. People, supra).
Making it appears that a person participated in an act or proceeding where in
fact he did not is not the actusreus in perjury. Hence, a mayor, who made it appear
that affiants swore and signed the affidavit before him where in fact they did not, is
liable of falsification of document and not perjury (Lonzanida vs. People, G.R. Nos.
160243-52, July 20, 2009).
46. Falsification - Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the
execution of the false document. What is punished in falsification of public document
is principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as
solemnly proclaimed therein. The fact that accused did not benefit from, or that the
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
public was not prejudiced by the falsified resolution is not a defense (Goma vs. CA,
G.R. No. 168437, January 08, 2009,Justice Velasco).
When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial
document as a necessary means to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas, G.R. No.
L-41265, July 27, 1934), estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85667, February
23, 1995; Intestate Estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11,
2010; Ambito vs. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, Tanenggee vs. People,
G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013) or theft (People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June
21, 2001), the crime committed is complex crime proper under Article 48 of RPC.
When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial
document as a means to conceal malversation (People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L33252-54, January 20, 1978; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047, October 31, 1933,
En Banc), estafa (People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002; People vs.
Benito, G.R. No. 36979, November 23, 1932) or theft, the crimes are separate. This is
not complex crime proper since one is not a necessary means to commit another.
Other view: If falsification is committed for purpose of enabling the accused to commit
malversation (People vs. Silvanna, G.R. No. L-43120, July 27, 1935; Zafra vs. People,
G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014) or estafa (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 06,
20140) with less risk of being detected, the accused is liable for complex crime proper.
If the falsification of a private document (demand letter, letter of guarantee) is
committed as a means to commit estafa, the crime committed is falsification only.
Under the common element doctrine, the use of damage as an element in falsification
of private document precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa.
Hence, estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not
present(Batulanon vs. People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006); U.S. vs Chan
Tiao, G.R. No. 12609, October 30, 1917; People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-34516, November
10, 1931). There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private
document.
If a person commits falsification of private document to conceal malversation or
estafa, the crime is estafa only. Under the common element doctrine, the use of
damage as an element in estafa precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements
of falsification. Hence, estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not
present (See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G. 1913).
47. Malversation - For purpose of malversation, national officer shall be
considered as an accountable officer if he has custody or control of public property by
reason of the duties of his office (Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. The
Local Government Code expanded the concept of accountable local officer. Local officer
shall be considered as an accountable officer if he has possession or custody of local
government funds because of the nature of their functions such a treasure or has
participated in the use or application of thereof (Zoleta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
185224, July 29, 2015) such as a mayor, whose signature is needed to disburse
municipal funds (Manuel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 08,
2012).
48. Estafa In offenses against property (theft or estafa), if the subject matter of
the offense is generic and not identifiable (e.g. money), an error in the designation of
the offended party is fatal. However, if the subject matter of the offense is specific and
identifiable (e.g. check or jewelry), an error in the designation of the offended party is
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
immaterial (Senador vs. People, G.R. No. 201620, March 06, 2013, Justice Velasco).
In oral defamation, a crime against honor, the identity of the person against whom the
defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an erroneous designation
of the person injured is material (People vs. Uba, 106 Phil. 332).
Demand is not an element of estafa through misappropriation. Demand is only
important if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation because failure to account
for the property in trust upon demand is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
In this connection, verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused is
tantamount to a demand (Asejo vs. People, G.R. No. 157433, July 24, 2007, Justice
Velasco). On the other hand, demand is not necessary where there is direct evidence
of misappropriation (People vs. Arambulo, G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015). This rule
on demand is applicable to malversation (Munib vs. People, G.R. Nos. 163957-58,
April 07, 2009, Justice Velasco).
Where the borrower is importers acquiring goods for resale, goods sold in retail
are often within his custody until they are purchased. This is covered by trust receipt
agreement. Failure to return the unsold good or deliver the proceeds of sale to the
bank is estafa in relation to PD No. 115 (Trust Receipt Law). Where the borrower is
engaged in construction, the materials are often placed under custody of his clients,
who can only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay. Since the bank
and the contractor know that the return of the materials is not possible, this is not
covered by trust receipt agreement. This transaction becomes a mere loan, where the
borrower is obligated to pay the bank the amount spent for the purchase of the goods.
The accused is not liable for estafa because of the constitutional provision of nonimprisonment for nonpayment of debts (Yang vs. People, G.R. No. 195117, August 14,
2013, Justice Velasco).
In order to constitute estafa through issuance of bouncing check, the
postdating or issuing a check must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. In sum,
the offender must be able to obtain property from the offended party by reason of the
issuance of the check (People vs. Reyes, GR No. 157943, September 4, 2013). Issuance
of bouncing check to cover pre-existing obligation is not estafa.
To be guilty of this crime the accused must have used the check in order to
defraud the complainant. However, prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon
proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor (People vs. Reyes,
supra). But receipt of notice of dishonor is not an element of this crime.
In other forms of swindling under Article 316, (1) and (2) of RPC, offender made
false representation involving real property and act of ownership such as selling it,
which causes damage to third person. In paragraph 1, the accused represents that he
owned the property, while in paragraph 2, he expressly represents in the deed of
conveyance that the property is free from encumbrance (Estrellado-Mainar vs. People,
G.R. No. 184320, July 29, 2015) or "comolibre". These words "comolibre" in the
Spanish Penal Code are deemed incorporated in the RPC (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No.
146770, February 27, 2003).
49. Theft - If the property is not accessible to the employee, taking it is simple
theft (Viray vs. People, G.R. No. 205180, November 11, 2013, Justice Velasco). On the
other hand, if the property is accessible to the employee, taking it is qualified theft
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
because of the circumstance of abuse of confidence (Yongco vs. People,G.R. No.
209373, July 30, 2014, Justice Velasco).
To "take" under theft the Revised Penal Code does not require asportation or
carrying away (Medina vs. People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015). It is not an
indispensable requisite of theft that a pickpocket should carry, more or less far away, a
wallet taken from its owner (People vs. Mercado, G.R. Nos. L-45471 and L-45472,
June 15, 1938).
The term "personal property" in RPC should be interpreted in the context of the
Civil Code. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Business may be
appropriated under Bulk Sales Law. Thus, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone service is a personal property (Laurel vs.
Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009). Since asportation is not an element of
theft, a personal property can to be the object of theft as along as it is capable of
appropriation although it is not capable of "asportation" (Medina vs. People, G.R. No.
182648, June 17, 2015). Intangible property is not capable of asportation, and yet, it
can be an object of theft since is capable of asportation.
If the property is tangible, taking is deemed complete from the moment the
offender gains possession over the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of
the same (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004). If the property is
intangible, taking includes controlling the destination of this property stolen to deprive
the owner of the property (e.g. the use of a meter tampering, use of a device to
fraudulently obtain gas, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity). Using device to
control the destination of international telephone call under the telecommunication
system of PLDT without its consent to earn by charging user of the phone at the
expense of PLDT is taking the property of PLDT of providing telecommunication
service (Laurel vs. Abrogar, supra).
If the bulky goods are taken by the accused inside a compound (such as SM),
theft is consummated even if the accused failed to bring out the stolen goods from the
compound, which makes him unable to freely dispose it. Inability to dispose the stolen
property is not an element of theft. Unlawful taking is the element which produces the
felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful taking, the offense could only be
attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft cannot have a frustrated stage (Valenzuela vs.
People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007). If the accused is charged with frustrated
theft, he could not be convicted of the crime charged because theft has no frustrated
stage. Neither could he be convicted of consummated theft since it was not alleged in
the information. But he could be convicted of attempted theft because this is a lesser
crime, which is necessarily included in the charge of frustrated theft (Canceran vs.
People, G.R. No. 206442, July 01, 2015).
Misappropriation of personal property received by the accused with consent of
the owner is theft or carnapping if his possession is physical or de facto, or estafa
through misappropriation if it is legal or de jure.
If the accused received the car from the owner for repair the possession is
physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (Santos vs. People, G.R.
No. 77429 January 29, 1990).If the accused received the property to bring it to a
goldsmith for examination and to immediately return it back to the owner, his
possession is physical, and thus, misappropriation thereof is theft (U.S. v. De Vera,
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921). If the accused received the property with
authority to sell it (Guzman vs. CA, 99 Phil. 703), or money with authority to use it to
buy palays (Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014), or with full
freedom and discretion on how to use it to facilitate its remittance to BIR as payment
of tax and reduce the amount due (Velayo vs. People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26,
2014), his possession is juridical. Thus, failure of the agent to return it is estafa
(Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil. 703; Tria vs. People, G.R. No. 204755,
September 17, 2014).
A franchise holder must personally operate the motor vehicle. That is the reason
why government regulation prohibits operator of motor vehicle from leasing it. In the
eye of the law the driver of taxi or passenger jeepneyunder boundary arrangement was
only an employee of the owner rather than a lessee. For being an employee, his
possession of the jeepney is physical (People v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955),
and thus, misappropriation thereof is carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No.
148233, June 8, 2004)
As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller, collector or cash
custodian is only physical possession. Hence, misappropriation of property is qualified
theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is accessible to the employee
(People v. Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18, 1932; Matrido vs. People, G.R. No.
179061, July 13, 2009; Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015;
Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; Balerta vs. People, G.R. No.
205144, November 26, 2014). However, if the employee is an officer of the companywith
discretion on how to use property or fund of the company,his possession is juridical;
hence, misappropriation thereof is estafa. Thus, the following officers are liable for
estafa through misappropriation (1) a corporate officer with discretion option on how
to use bending machine without the participation of the corporation(Aigle vs. People,
G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012); (2) bank President with discretion on how to administer
fund (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014), and (3) Liaison Officer of a
pawnshop with discretion on how to secure or renew licenses and permits (Gamboa vs.
People, G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014).
In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in creating
fear in the mind of a person in view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or
imagined. Such fear of injury to person or property must continue to operate in the
mind of the victim at the time of the delivery of the money. Threat of prosecution and
confiscation of the logs by DENR officers is an intimidation within the meaning of
robbery (Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 150873, February 10, 2009).
Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the
local authorities or to its owner, is liable for theft. If the finder surrenders the property
found to a policeman, who fails to deliver it the owner, the policeman is liable for theft.
He acquired the position occupied by the actual finder. Appropriating the property is
of the same character of that made by one who originally found the same (People vs.
Avila, G.R. No. L-19786, March 31, 1923).
50. Arson Destructive arson is characterized as heinous crime; while simple
arson under PD No. 1613 is a crime manifesting a lesser degree of perversity. Simple
arson contemplates the malicious burning of property not included in Article 320 of the
RPC (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31, 2013). Burning of inhabited
house or dwelling or personal property is simple arson under Section 3 of P.D. No.
1613 because it is not included in Article 320 of RPC.
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and fire is resorted to as
the means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed is murder only. Murder
qualified by means of fire absorbs arson since the latter is an inherent means to
commit the former (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994). Single act of
burning the building to kill two persons constitutes compound crime of double
murders (People vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008).
One has deliberately set fire to a building is presumed to have intended to burn
the building (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009). Since intent to
burn is presumed, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Failure
to show intent to kill, the accused shall be convicted of arson with homicide and not
murder (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010).
If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by reason or on
the occasion of arson, the crime is arson with homicide, and the resulting homicide is
absorbed (People vs. Villacorta, 172468, October 15, 2008).
If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so, and arson
is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the offender may be convicted of two
separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No.
93485, June 27, 1994).
51. Bigamy X contracted three marriages. His first wife is already dead when
X contracted his third marriage. X is liable for bigamy involving the second marriage
on the basis of his first marriage. X is not liable for bigamy involving the third
marriage on the basis of the first marriage since the first has already been
extinguished by reason of death of the first wife when he contracted the third. He is
not liable for bigamy involving the third marriage on the basis of the second marriage
since the latter is null and void for being a bigamous marriage.
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended
parties depending on the circumstances. But if the second spouse had knowledge of
the previous marriage of the accused, the former is liable as an accomplice (Santiago
vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015).
Contracting second marriage without previous declaration of nullity of the first
marriage consummates the crime of bigamy. Once the crime consummates, criminal
liability will attach to the accused and will not be extinguished except through a mode
mentioned in Article 89 of RPC as death, pardon etc. After the consummation of
bigamy or celebration of the second marriage, the criminal liability shall not be
extinguished by subsequent events not mentioned in Article 89 such as subsequent
declaration of nullity of first marriage and second marriage (Jarillo vs. People, GR No.
164435, September 29, 2009).
Declaration of nullity of the first marriage subsequent to the consummation of
bigamy is not a defense whether the ground for nullity is psychological incapacity
(Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000) or lack of license and affidavit of
cohabitation (Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014) or even though the
declaration is obtained before the filing of the complaint for bigamy (People vs.
Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July 17, 2013). Exception: Declaration of nullity of first
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage ceremony previous or subsequent to the
celebration of the second marriage is a defense. The mere private act of signing a
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Hence, bigamy is not committed (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No.
145226, February 06, 2004).
To avoid criminal liability, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage must be
made previous to the consummation of bigamy, which is required by Article 40 of the
Family Code (People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011).Even though the
first marriage was contracted prior to the Family Code, the rule is the same since
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively (Jarillo vs.
People, GR No. 164435, June 29, 2010).
Declaration of nullity of the second marriage subsequent to the consummation of
bigamy is not a defense. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape liability for bigamy
(Tenebro vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004;
Walter vs. People, GR No. 183805, July 03, 2013).
52. Illegal marriage A priest, who performed a marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the couple had no marriage license, is liable for illegal marriage. The
law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there
should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing
officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife (Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438,
July 02, 2014).
53. Libel - Under Article 360 of the RPC, the publisher, and editor of
newspaper, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof. The publisher and editors cannot disclaim
liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no
participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone
in the publication of Remate, on which the defamatory articles appeared. It is not a
matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject
articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as if they were the
author (Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008, Justice Velasco).
Comment is not fair if there is reckless disregard of knowing whether the
defamatory imputation is false or not. Hence, the accused cannot use the fair
comment principle as a defense. In Erwin Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032,
September 16, 2008, Justice Velasco - Journalists bear the burden of writing
responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures
or matters of public interest. The report made by Tulfo describing a lawyer in the
Bureau of Customs as corrupt cannot be considered as "fair" and "true" since he did
not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these
allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports," but merely wild
accusations. He had written and published the subject articles with reckless disregard
of whether the same were false or not.
Under Article 355 of RPC, a libel is committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. Libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private
individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime. Online
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
defamation constitutes similar means for committing libel in Article 355 (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February 18. 2014).

The place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the
internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is printed and first
published. To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the
amendment to Article 360, and that was the indiscriminate laying of the venue in
libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to harass an accused. At any rate,
Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for internet
libel in their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149,
G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).
54. Incriminating an innocent person - As a general rule, planting of
evidence to incriminate an innocent person constitutes the crime of incriminating an
innocent person under Article 363 of RPC. However, if the incriminatory evidence
planted is dangerous drugs or unauthorized explosives, loose firearm or ammunition,
the crime committed is planting of evidence under RA 9165 for the dangerous drug,
PD 1866 as amended by RA 9516 for the explosive and RA No. 10591 for loose
firearm.
If unlawful arrest is committed to plant incriminatory evidence, the crime
committed is complex crime of incriminating innocent person through unlawful arrest
(People vs. Alagao, G.R. No. L-20721, April 30, 1966). If incriminatory evidence is
planted to justify an unlawful arrest, the crime committed is complex crime of
unlawful arrest through incriminating an innocent person. But if the incriminatory
evidence is dangerous drugs, explosive or loose firearm, unlawful arrest and planting
of evidence are separate crimes. Complex crime is not committed since planting of
evidence, which is punishable under special law, cannot be made a component of a
complex crime.
Stealing property and planting the stolen property to impute to the victim the
crime of theft constitutes complex crime of incriminating an innocent person through
theft.
Planting of live bullet by NAIA personnel to extort money from a passenger of
an airline constitutes separate crime of planting of evidence and consummated or
attempted robbery.
55. BP 22 - Demand letter was given with the security guard without proof
that it reached accused and through registered mail which was returned with the
notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05". Since there is proof that accused received the
notice of dishonor, he was acquitted However, he is still civilly liable (San Mateo vs.
People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013).

Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required where
the drawer has no right to expect that the bank will honor the check. Since bank
account of accused was already closed even before the issuance of the subject check,
he had no right to expect the drawee bank to honor his check. Hence, he is not
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
entitled to be given a notice of dishonor (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26,
2008, ).The crime involved in Lopez vs. People is estafa through issuance of bouncing
check. However, it is submitted the Lopez principle can be applied to violation of BP
22.

Payment of check before the filing of information is a defense. The spirit of B.P.
Big 22, which is to protect the stability of the banking system, would not be served by
penalizing people who have corrected their mistakes and restituted damages even
before charges have been filed against them. In sum, by making payment of the check
before the filing of the information, the purpose of the law has already been attained.
Payment of check after the filing of informationis not a defense. Since there is no
showing of intention to mitigate the bad effects of his issuance of the unfunded check,
then there is no equitable reason to preclude the prosecution of accused. In such a
case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent (Lim vs. People, G.R. No.
190834, November 26, 2014).

The essence of estafa through issuance of bouncing check is to punish fraud


and not to protect the integrity of the check. Damage and deceit are elements of estafa,
and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying
the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal liability. It
will merely satisfy the civil liability (Lim vs. People, supra).

Suspension of payment order issued by SEC before the check was presented for
payment is a defense in BP Blg. 22. Considering that there was a lawful Order from
the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. Thus, the accused has no obligation to
fund the check and the complainant has no right to present it for payment (Gidwani
vs. People, GR No. 195064, January 15, 2014).Suspension of payment order issued by
SEC after three months from receipt of notice of dishonor is not a defense in BP Blg.
22. The accused has the obligation to make good of the check after he received the
letter prior to the issuance of suspension order (Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No. 133608,
August 26, 2008).

56. RA No. 7610 - The Family Code prohibits the infliction of corporal
punishment by teacher. A schoolteacher in employing unnecessary violence on her
minor student, who even fainted, is liable for child abuse under RA No. 7610 (Rosaldes
vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014). Accused saw the victim and his
companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the
back with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the
spur of the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth
and dignity" as a human being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such
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JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
intent, the crime committed is not child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight
physical injuries (Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013).

Having sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child constitutes child


prostitution if committed for money, profit, or any other consideration (People vs.
Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001); or sexual abuse is committed
under coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. In child prostitution, the
victim is called child exploited in prostitution while in sexual abuse the victim is called
child subjected to other abuse (Section 5 of RA No 7610). Coercion is either physical or
psychological. Taking advantage of ascendency as a swimming instructor over student
is psychological coercion (People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998). The
assurance of love, guarantee that she would not get pregnant by using the "withdrawal
method" and the promise of marriage were classified as "psychological coercion" and
"influence" within the purview of Section 5 of RA 7610. Hence, accused is guilty of
sexual abuse (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013).
If the child is 12 years old and above, and the acts of the accused constitute
sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 and rape through sexual assault or acts of
lasciviousness, he shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610 since this law prescribed a
grave penalty (Dimakuta vs. People, G.R. No. 206513, October 20, 2015). However, if
the acts constitute sexual abuse and rape through sexual intercourse, he shall be
prosecuted under RPC since this law prescribed a graver penalty. He cannot be
prosecuted for compound crime of rape and sexual abuse because the latter is
punishable under special law. He cannot be prosecuted for both rape and sexual abuse
because of the rule on double jeopardy (People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469, June 13,
2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013).
If the child is under 12 years old, and the acts of the accused constitute sexual
abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the latter shall be prosecuted penalized as
follows: (1) rape through sexual intercourse; (2) acts of lasciviousness with the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period (Section 5 of RA No. 7610).Prior to RA No.
8353 (Rape Law), inserting finger into genital orifice is acts of lasciviousness. Hence,
reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610 should be imposed. Under
RA No. 8353, inserting finger into genital orifice is rape through sexual assault where
the penalty is prision mayor. To impose the lighter penalty under RPC as amended by
RA 8353 is unfair to the victim. It is not the intention of RA No. 8353 to disallow the
imposition of penalty under RA No. 7610 if the victim is child subjected to sexual
abuse, who isunder 12 years of age (People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16,
2011). If the crime is qualified rape through sexual assault, the Chingcase is not
applicable since RA No. 8353 prescribed a grave penalty of reclusion temporal for it
(People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011).
57. Terrorism - Terrorism is committing a predicate crime which creates a
condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among populace in order to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful e.g. demand by Al Queda against the
US not to interfere with the affairs of the Muslim (Section of RA No. 9372). The
predicate crimes of terrorism are: Piracy, highway robbery, hijacking, rebellion, coup
etat, murder, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, crimes involving destruction,
arson, unlicensed firearm and explosives, violation of Toxic Substances and Hazardous
and Nuclear Waste Control Act and violation of Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability
Act.

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
58. Trafficking in person - Accompanying a child and offering her sexual
services in exchange for money constitutes child prostitution. The accused who offered
the victim to the one who raped her is not liable for rape as principal indispensable
cooperation since bringing the victim to the rapist is not indispensable to the
commission of the crime of rape (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24,
2012). If the accused is regularly offering the sexual service of the child in exchange for
money, the crime committed is not anymore child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring
the child as purpose of prostitution constitutes qualified trafficking in person because
the former took advantage of vulnerability of the latter as a child and as one who need
money. Minority is qualifying circumstance (People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465,
December 03, 2014). Recruiting without license a person, child or adult, to work as a
prostitute abroad constitutes the crime of trafficking in person and illegal recruitment.
Syndicate is qualifying circumstance in both crimes. Even if the accused is less than
three, but the allegation and evidence shows that there are at least three traffickers
and recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as qualifying circumstance (People vs.
Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011; People vs. Hashim, G.R. No. 194255, June
13, 2012).
59. Illegal recruitment - An employee may be held liable with his employer, if
the former actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The employee
cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not aware that before working for her
employer in the recruitment agency, she should first be registered with the POEA.
Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is
not a defense (People vs. Valenciano, G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008 Justice
Velasco).
60. RA No. 9165 - Accused were caught by police authorities on board a
speedboat carrying shabu. Since it was not proven that the drugs came from China or
foreign country they were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, which is
necessarily included in the charge of importation (People vs. Chan Liu, G.R. No.
189272, January 21, 2015).
Where residue of dangerous drugs is found and there is a positive confirmatory
test result, the accused should be charged with use rather than possession of
dangerous drugs. This would be in keeping with the intent of the law to rehabilitate
first time offenders of drug use and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a
second chance at life (People vs. Matinez, G.R. No. 191366, December 13, 2010).
Positive confirmatory test is an element of use of dangerous drugs. However, the
absence of such test cannot be raised as an issue for the first time on appeal (Ambre
vs. People, G.R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012).

Possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion


constitutes a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs (David vs. People, G.R.
No. 181861, October 17, 2011).

For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish that
the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority.
However, mere possession of dangerous drug constitutes prima facie evidence of

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any
satisfactory explanation (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011).
Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The sale was aborted
when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The crime
committed is attempted sale (People vs. Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012).
Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust
operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust
operations (People vs. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012)
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 on
inventory and photograph will not necessarily render the items seized or confiscated in
a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is
not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items have been preserved (People vs. Ladip, GR No. 196146, March 12,
2014; People vs. Bis, GR No. 191360, March 10, 2014).
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs
seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No.
199689, March 12, 2014).
Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime involving
dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of
the provision on plea-bargaining.
61. RA No. 3019 - To apply the Arias rule for purposes of exonerating an
accused or respondent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the public
officer in approving the release of public fund must be relying to a reasonable extent
on his subordinates (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013); (2) that the
documents involving the release of funds must be so voluminous so as to preclude him
from studying each one carefully (Santillano vs. People, G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March
03, 2010); (3) that the public officer has no foreknowledge of existing anomaly (Escara
vs. People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005); and that there is not deviation from
ordinary procedure in the release of fund, which necessitate further investigation
(Cruz vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005; Rivera vs.
People, G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014).
City treasurer, city accountant and city administrator allowed the release of
cash advance in favor of a paymaster despite the fact that she has previous
unliquidated cash advances. They are liable because of conspiracy of silence or
inaction. Public officers omissions to question irregularities indicate a common
understanding and concurrence of sentiments respecting the commission of the
offense of causing undue injury to the government through gross inexcusable
negligence. This is called conspiracy by silence (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967,
January 28, 2013).

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Under Section 3 (a) of RA No. 3019, a public officer, who persuades, induces or
influences another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, shall be
punished for corruption. However, the deliberation in the Senate regarding the bill on
anti-graft shows that the mode of committing the crime under Section 3 (a) is
persuading, inducing or influencing a public officer by another public officer to
commit an offense or to violate rules and regulations by means of consideration,
reward, payment or remuneration (Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, Oct. 12, 2006).

Section 3 (b) of RA No. 3019 is limited only to contracts or transactions


involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the authority to
intervene under the law. Preliminary investigation is not a contract or transaction
within the contemplated of Section 3 (b). Hence, requesting or receiving money in
connection with a preliminary investigation is not a violation of this provision (Soriano,
Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952, July 31, 1984; People vs. Sandiganbayan. and
Justice Secretary Perez, G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013).

Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section 8 of RA No. 6713


and Section 7 of RA No. 3019 (Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada, A.M. No. P-99-1342,
June 8, 2005). Since both laws provide a penalty for failure to file SALN, the offender
should only be prosecuted and punished either under one or the other.

62. Money laundering - Money laundering is committed by any person who,


knowing that any monetary instrument or property represents, involves, or relates to
the proceeds of any unlawful activity:(a) transacts said monetary instrument or
property;(b) converts, transfers, disposes of, moves, acquires, possesses or uses said
monetary instrument or property;(c) conceals or disguises the true nature, source,
location, disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to said
monetary instrument or property;(d) attempts or conspires to commit money
laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c);(e) aids, abets, assists in or
counsels the commission of the money laundering offenses referred to in paragraphs
(a), (b) or (c) above; and(f) performs or fails to perform any act as a result of which he
facilitates the offense of money laundering referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) or (c)
above. Money laundering is also committed by any covered person who, knowing that
a covered or suspicious transaction is required under this Act to be reported to the
Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), fails to do so (Section 4 of RA No. 9160 as
amended by RA No. 10365).
Unlawful activity refers to any act or omission or series or combination thereof
involving or having direct relation to the following: (1) piracy, murder, distructive
arson, kidnapping for ransom, crimes involving dangerous drugs; (2) hijacking,
carnapping, fencing, robbery, qualified theft, and estafa; (3) bribery and corruption of
public officers, frauds and Illegal exactions, malversation, graft and corruption, and
plunder; (4) forgeries and counterfeiting; and (5) child pornography, photo-video
voyeurism, child abuse, crimes involving explosives and unlicensed firearm, trafficking

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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
in person, illegal recruitment, terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism, and
financing of terrorism and; smuggling, and illegal gambling.
63. Plunder - The elements of plunder are:
First - That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons; (Note: Senator Pogi can be held liable for plunder even if
the principal offender, who masterminded the plunder of pork barrel, is a private
individual, the Pork-barrel Queen. What is important is that Senator Pogi in
connivance with Pork-barrel Queen acquired ill-gotten wealth). On the other hand,
Pork-barrel Queen can be held liable for plunder on the basis of conspiracy.
Second - That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (Example: Misuse of funds in the amount P10
million by awarding contract to a close relative, who is not the lowest bidder; Misuse of
funds or fraud disposition of government asset to P100 million by diverting the
construction of road leading to his farm instead of the poblacion).
Can the Senator use the defense in malversation that he is not responsible for
the misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the appropriate implementing agency of
the government to check that the recipient of the fund is not bogus? No. Assuming
that the duty to check that the recipient of the Senators PDAP is not bogus belongs to
the appropriate agency of the government, the Senator is still liable since malversation
can be committed through culpa.
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer; (Example: Collecting or receiving commission from the
sales of Belle Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00 which was deposited in the
Jose Velarde account and receiving bi-monthly collections from jueteng, a form of
illegal gamblingin the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00 of which was deposited in
the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation (People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No.
26558, September 12, 2007).
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
government (Example: Ordering the GSIS and the SSS by President Estrada to
purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation (People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal
Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007);
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or

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6. By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
Note: The word combination means at least two different predicate crimes;
while the term series means at least two predicate crimes of the same kind (Ejercito
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006). Thus, a single
predicate crime amounting to 50 million pesos is not plunder. The intention of the
lawmakers is that if there is only one predicate crime, the offender has to be
prosecuted under the particular crime, which is already covered by existing laws. What
is punishable under the law is "acts of plunder", which means that there should be at
least, two or more, predicate crimes (See deliberation of the Bicameral Committee on
Justice, May 7, 1991).
Third - That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth
amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
If a Senator, his assistant and private individuals conspires in acquiring illegotten wealth by misappropriating the pork barrel amounting to P172 million of the
former, the total amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the conspirators including the
private individuals shall be considered for purpose of determining if plunder has been
committed (Enrile vs. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015).
The damages suffered by the government in diverting the road from the
poblacion to the farm of the accused shall not be considered in determining if plunder
is committed. What is important is the amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the
public officer and not the amount of damage suffered by the government.
In People vs. Joseph Estrada, Criminal Case No. 26558, September 12, 2007
-One of the predicate crimes alleged in the information is misappropriation of the
excise tax share of Ilocos Sur. This was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. However,
the following predicate crimes were alleged and proven by evidence (1) series of acts of
receiving collections from "jueteng" in the aggregate amount of P545,291,000.00; and
(2) series consisting of two acts of ordering the GSIS and the SSS to purchase shares
of stock of Belle Corporation and collecting or receiving commission from the sales of
Belle Shares in the amount of P189,700,000.00. This pattern of criminal acts
indicates an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass ill-gotten wealth in the
amount of more than P50 million. Estrada was convicted of plunder.
There are two structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle
conspiracy and chain conpiracy. Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is a single
person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the "spokes"). Under the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of
narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and
consumer (Fernan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007, Justice
Velasco). An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy
involved was the conspiracy alleged in the information for plunder filed against former
President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former President Estrada was the hub
while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the
spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing,
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (GMA vs. People, G.R. No. 220598,
July 19, 2016).
64. Wire-tapping - MMDA officer is extorting money from a driver of a vehicle,
who committed trafficking violation along Edsa. The officer threatened the driver that
he will confiscate her drivers license unless she will give him P500.00. However,
MMDA officer is not aware that his act of extorting money is being video-recorder by a
passenger. The passenger violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Law. The recording of private
conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of RA No.
4200. The law covers even those recorded by persons privy to the private
communications. The law is applicable even if the conversation being recorder pertains
to criminal extortion (Mamba vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1110, June 25, 2001).
Passenger is criminally liable for violating law. On the other hand, MMDA officer is
liable for attempted robbery. However, in proving attempted robbery, the driver cannot
use the recording since the same is not admissible in evidence.
65. Hazing - The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following
essential elements are established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or
humiliating situation or subjected to physical or psychological suffering or injury; and
(2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite for the persons admission or entry into
an organization (People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18, 2015).
Failure to allege that the physical or psychological harm were employed as a
prerequisite for admission or entry into the organization would prevent the successful
prosecution for the crime of hazing (People vs. Bayabos).
In homicide or murder, what is criminal is the killing of person. Hence, intent to
kill is an indispensable element. Death of the victim consummates the crime. In
hazing, what is prohibited is the infliction of the infliction of physical or psychological
suffering on another in furtherance of the latters admission or entry into an
organization (People vs. Bayabos). Hence, intent to kill is not material. Death of the
neophyte is only important to determine the proper imposable penalty.
Homicide or murder is malum in se. Consent of the victim to the infliction of
harm may negate dolo or criminal intent, which would make the killing punishable as
reckless imprudence (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012). Hazing
is malum prohibitum. Consent of the neophyte is not a defense (Senate deliberation).
In homicide or murder, praeter intentionem is appreciable as a mitigating
circumstance. In hazing, the law expressly disallows the appreciation of this
circumstance. In homicide or murder, the basis of criminal liability is the actual and
conspiratorial participation of the offender in killing the victim.
In hazing, criminal responsibility is based on (1) actual participation in
inflicting physical harm, (2) presumed participation (of those who are present during
the hazing), (3) the presence of adviser, (4) participation in the planning (by officers,
former officers and alumni of the fraternity); (5) knowledge (of the parent of frat
member in the home of whom hazing occurred, owner of the place commission, and
school authorities).
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown
that (1) hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are
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UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER
JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
school authorities or faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take
preventive action against hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof (People vs. Bayabos).

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