Arigo vs Swift

Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et al. (representation of:respective sector/org, including

minors or generations yet unborn, v. Scott H. Swift, et al.,
Respo: Scott H. Swift as Commander of the US 7th Fleet and others Philippine
Respondents: President Benigno S. Aquino III as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DFA Secretary Albert F. Del Rosario and others
FACTS: On the status of Tubbataha before the incident:
- 1988. Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of
Proclamation No. 306 issued by Pres. Corazon on August 11, 1988. the global center of
marine biodiversity > 1993. Tubbataha was inscribed by (UNESCO) as a World Heritage
Site- one of the Philippines' oldest ecosystems of pristine reefs and a high diversity of
marine life.>- April 6, 2010. Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067,3
otherwise known as the "Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure
the protection and conservation xxx enjoyment of present and future generations.
December 2012. The US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic
clearance for the USS Guardian "to enter and exit the territorial waters of Philippines
and to arrive at Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment." January 15,
2013. The USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar,
Indonesia
January 17, 2013 (2:20 a.m.). While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about
80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. [No one was injured in the incident, and there
have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.] January 20, 2013. Scott Swift, expressed
regret for the incident in a press statement. February 04, 2013. US Ambassador to the
Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA), "reiterated his regretsthat the United States will provide appropriate
compensation for damage to the reef.- March 30, 2013. The US Navy-led salvage
team finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral
reef.
1. W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case. >But The US
government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident under the
customary laws of navigation.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Purisima (CFI MANILA)
September 7, 1972- a motion to dismiss a pending civil suit, in the sala of respondent
Judge for a collection of money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, was
filed by defendant Rice and Corn Admin against plaintiff Yellow Ball Freight Lines,
inc.At that time, in a leading case of Mobile Philippines Exploration, Inc. v Customs
Arrastre Service, Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on
the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the
national government unless consent be shown. This doctrine had been applied to 53
other cases of similar nature.Judge Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
denied the motion to dismiss the said civil suit on Oct 4, 1972. Thus the petition for
certiotari and prohibition.
Whether or not the respondent Hon. Purisimas decision is valid
The respondents decision is not valid as the state cannot be sued without its
consent. And for the consent to be effective, must come from the state acting
through a duly enacted statute. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn
Administration agreed to had no binding force in the government.
The Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED: restrining respondent Judge from
acting on civil Case.
SAYSON (Highway Auditor, Bureau of Public Highways) v. SINGSON sole owner of Singkier
Motor Service

January 1967, the Office of the District Engineer (Fernandez) requisitioned spare
parts for the repair of a D-8 bulldozer signed off by its Requisitioning Officer (Lepatan)
A canvass of public bidding proceeded, where Singkier Motor Service of Mandaue,
Cebu participated and won for the sum of P43, 530. In due course, the purchase order
(Voucher No. 07806) which was signed by the District Engineer, the Requisitioning
Officer and the Procurement Officer, reached the Highway Auditor (Lorenzo Sayson) for
pre-audit. Sayson inquired about the reasonableness of the prices but upon the
endorsements of the undersigned officials, he approved it for the payment of the sum
P34, 824. He withheld 20% or the P8,706 for submission to the Supervising Auditor
with the supporting documents. In June 1967, the General Auditing Office sent a letter
to Sayson directing all highway editors to refer to the GAO payments. A canvass made
by the GAO showed that suppliers in Manila like USI, the exclusive dealer of caterpillar
tractors sold parts for P2, 529 only. The quotations submitted by Singkier was
overpriced by P40,000 more.
> Secretary of Public Works and Communications also charged Fernandez and Lepatan
with malversation.
Felipe Singson, the sole proprietor of the Singkier Motor Service claims that it is still
entitled to collect the remaining balance of P 8,700 because the contract was still
upheld. >Court of First Instance of Cebu granted the petition by Singson thus the
appeal by certiorari of the respondent government officials involved.
Is the mandamus suit for the payment of the alleged balance of P8, 700
valid?
The mandamus suit is dismissed, the appeal granted. Singson's cause of action of a
money claim is void for the cause or consideration is contrary to law, morals or public
policy. Mandamus is not the remedy to enforce the collection of such claim against the
State but an ordinary action for specific performance. The suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment, is a suit
against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the Court except with the
consent of the State. The lower court did not have jurisdiction to act on the matter.
Commonwealth Act 37 prescribes how money claims can be filed
Commonwealth Act 37 prescribes how money claims can be filed:
"In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of accountable
officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays
and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons,
office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the
last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him.
The party aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or
claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing: (a) To the
President of the United States, pending the final and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over
the Philippines, or (b) To the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity."

Dept. of Agri. (DA) vs NLRC

Petition for certiorari to nullify a resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission.
Facts:
DA entered into a contract with Sultan Security Agency (SSA) for security services.
Several guards of the (SSA) filed a complaint against DA to the Regional Arbitration
for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances,
night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay.>Executive Labor Arbitrer
found DA liable with SSA for payment of the money claims.Labor Arbitrer issued a
writ of execution, commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property. City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the
petitioner
A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary writ of injunction, was filed by the petitioner with the National Labor
Relations Commission.>NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution.
Issue(s)/Holding:WoN the DA can be sued.
oNot all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its nonsuability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise

of its sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. DA has
not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity
not any act proprietary in character. DA did not impliedly waive its immunity in
contract.
oAct No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant to
Commonwealth Act 327, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission
on Audit. DA can be sued for money claims but it should first be brought to
CoA.
Social Security System vs Court of Appeals, David Cruz, Socoro Concio Cruz,
Lorna Cruz
Facts: A petition for Review on certiorari was filed by SSS on the Decision of Court of
Appeals
1963 - Spouses David and Socorro Cruz granted a real estate loan by SSS with their
residential lot as collateral. They complied with their monthly payments sometimes
where they paid late July 14, 1968 - SSS filed an application for foreclosure grounds
that the spouses failed to pay mortgage since October 1967. July 24, 1968 Spouses
with their daughter Lorna Cruz filed damages and attorneys fees against SSS stating
that they have been religiously paying their monthly amortizations SSS filed a
counterclaim stressing its right to foreclosure of mortgage (by virtue of automatic
acceleration clause) even after paid their amortizations.Trial court decided in favour
of mortgagors and directed SSS to pay for actual, moral, and exemplary damages in
addition to attorneys fees. (amounting to P52 000) 1975 - Court of Appeals affirmed
but P47 500
Issues and Holding: 1. W/N the spouses had violated their real estate mortgage
contract by failing to pay amortization: No, the spouses did not err in paying
amortizations. There was negligence in the part of the SSS employee when they
mistook the loan account of Socorro J Cruz for that of respondent Socorro C. Cruz.
2. Whether or not the SSS can be held liable for damages -SSS is a juridical entity with
a personality of its own therefore it can sue and be sued thus it can be held liable for
violating their right but not for moral, actual and exemplary damages.
Ruling:Judgement reviewed is modified: SSS should pay respondents P8 000 for
nominal damages and attorneys fees only.
*IMPORTANT: (From Prof Yu)-The Supreme Court may be supreme but SC still errs (see
dissenting opinion).
Dissenting Opinion:Macasiar
-It is wrong for the Supreme Court to allow the case under Aticle 2180 since SSS did not act
through a special agent. Hence, the Social Security System cannot be liable for the damages
caused by the tortious acts of its officers and employees while in the performance of their regular
functions. The remedy therefore of private respondents is to proceed against the guilty officers and
employees of petitioner Social Security System as mandated by Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.

PNB v Court of Industrial Relations

1. May 1970: A notice of garnishment was served upon PNB Quezon City by the
authorized deputy sheriff of the trial court. -money of the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation,deposited at PNB QC, to satisfy a decision of the CIR which had
become final and executory. 2. A writ of execution in favor of private resp Gabriel V.
Manansala previously issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
Homesite
Employees and Laborers Association [vs. PHHC] 3. PNB assailed the validity of the
order [writ of execution of the garnishment] on two grounds: that the funds subject of
the garnishment "may be public in character." It filed for a motion to quash the order.
4. August 1970: (CIR) issued an order denying the motion to quash [garnishment] of
PNB - was denied for lack of merit. PNB was ordered to comply.
ISSUES: Does the GOCC (PHHC) have a distinct and separate personality
from that of the government? YES. It had a juridical existence enabling it to sue

and be sued. Whatever defect could be attributed therefore to the order denying the
motion to quash could not be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion. Can the
People's Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), then, be sued?
YES. One of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that
governmental funds are immune from garnishment (Merritt v. Insular Government). It
is an entirely different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v.
Court of Industrial Relations, the office or entity is "possessed of a separate
and distinct corporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its
funds may be levied upon or garnished so writ of exec valid. -implied own
charter, which allows itself to be sued
NASSCO vs. CIR (National Shipyards and Steel Corporation vs. Court of Industrial Relations, and
Jose Abiday, et al.)
As a GOCC, the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government, and the Government cannot be held liable
April 15, 1957: 39 workers filed a petition with (CIR) for (NASSCO) to pay them overtime pay. 29
additional workers later November 27, 1957: CIR ordered NASSCO to pay said workers 25% more
of regular > The CIR computed the overtime pay: 41 laborers: total P37,867.2l. CIR approved
amount then writ of execution. March 11, 1958: Sheriff of Manila served a notice of
garnishment.March 19, 1958: (PNB) forwarded to the Sheriff the sum taken from the current and
savings account of the NASSCO.The amount turned over to the laborers' counsel, Atty. Onofre P.
GuevaraMeanwhile, NASSCO brought to SC, but the petition was dismissed "for lack of
merit."The CIR's chief examiner submitted a second partial report 52 :laborers :P147,274.00
-turned over to Atty. Guevara.
Arguing that the company's funds were certified by its accounting department as public funds
exempt from garnishment, under Republic Act No. 1000 and Republic Act No. 1396,

ISSUE: W/N NASSCO's funds are public funds of the government that cannot be
garnished?
The alleged exemption from attachment and execution of the proceeds of said bonds is
not borne out by law. RA No. 1000 only exempts from "taxation", as well as from
"attachment, execution or seizure" merely "the bonds issued under this Act," not the
proceeds of said bonds. Also, E.O. 356 explicitly states that the Government shall not
be liable for any debt, liability, obligation or damage that NASSCO might cause as a
GOCC. Ruling: Denied

Rayo vs CFI of Bulacan

-26 Oct 1978, midnight: During height of typhoon KADING, NAPOCOR, acting through
plant superintendent Benjamin Chavez, opened or caused to be opened
simulatenously all three floodgates of the Angat Dam. This caused the flooding of
several towns in Bulacan. Hardest-hit was Norzagaray. An estimated 100 residents died
or were reported to have died and properties worth millions of pesos were destroyed.
-Petitioners, among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused flood, filed with the
respondent Court 11 complaints for damages against NAPOCOR and the
Chavez.-performing a purely governmental function, hence it cannot be suedPetitioners contend that the corporation is performing not governmental but merely
proprietary functions and that under its own organic act, Section 3(d) of RA No. 6395,
it can sue and be sued in any court-29 July 1980: petitioners complaints against
respondent corporation are dismissed leaving Chavez as the sole party-defendant>CFI Bulacan denies motion.
Whether respondent NAPOCOR performs a governmental functionGovernment has organized a private corporation, put money in it, and has allowed it to
sue and be sued in any court under its charter. As a government owned and controlled
corporation, it has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the
Government. Ruling: Petition is granted.
SM Land v BCDA

SM LAND, INC., petitioner, vs. BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and ARNEL
PACIANO D. CASANOVA,
Republic Act No. (RA) 7227:(BCDA) opened for disposition and development its Bonifacio South
Property. > December 14, 2009: Petitioner SM Land, Inc. (SMLI) submitted to BCDA an (3)
unsolicited proposals for the development of the lot through a public-private joint venture
agreement. > BCDA created a Joint Venture Selection Committee (JV-SC)
following the procedures promulgated by the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA). >
May 12, 2010: the BCDA communicated to petitioner its acceptance. > BCDA clarified that its act
should not -to bind the agency to enter into a joint venture agreement with the petitioner but only
constitutes an authorization granted to the JV-SC to conduct detailed negotiations. > August 6,
2010: A Certification of Successful Negotiations (Certification) was issued by the BCDA and signed
by both. Through the said Certification, the BCDA undertook to subject SMLIs Original Proposal to
Competitive Challenge: (whether or not there are other Private Sector Entities (PSEs) that can
match)>> September 3, 2010: Pre-eligibility Conference with the participation of SMLI, as the
Original Proponent, and three (3) PSEs>> BCDA repeatedly postponed the deadline of eligibility
requirements until two (2) years have already elapsed from the signing>> Then, instead of
proceeding Challenge, the BCDA addressed a letter to Jose T. Gabionza, Vice President of SMLI,
stating that
it will welcome any voluntary and unconditional proposal to improve the original offer, with the
assurance that the BCDA will nonetheless respect any right which may have accrued in favor of
SMLI. >> SMLI replied by increasing the total
secured payments to Php22.436 billion in over fifteen (15) years > the BCDA sent a memo to the
Office of the President (OP) categorically recommending the termination of Challenge.>alarmed,
SMLI asked to proceed the Challenge > the BCDA informed SMLI of the OPs decision to subject the
development of the subject property to public bidding.> the BCDA issued in favor of SMLI
Philippine National Bank Check> SMLI attempted to return the check but to no avail.>> BCDA
likewise caused the publication of an Invitation to Bid>(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction
ISSUE: Did the BCDA gravely abuse its discretion in issuing Supplemental Notice No. 5,
in unilaterally aborting the Competitive Challenge, and in subjecting the development
of the project to public bidding? YES
The court cannot sustain the BCDAs arguments that its withdrawal from the negotiations is
permissible and was not done with grave abuse of discretion. Being an instrumentality of the
government, it is incumbent upon the BCDA to abide by the laws, rules and regulations, and
perform its obligations with utmost good faith. It cannot, under the guise of protecting the public
interest, disregard the clear mandate of the NEDA JV Guidelines and unceremoniously disregard the
very commitments it made to the prejudice of the SMLI that innocently relied on such promises.((A
scrutiny of the NEDA JV Guidelines reveals that certain rights are conferred to an Original Proponent
(SMLI), i.e. the right to the conduct and completion of a competitive challenge o The Reservation
Clause (Qualif and Waivers) only covers the Third Stage and cannot prejudice SMLIs rights
stemming from the first two stages. Provisions of the TOR cannot prevail over the NEDA JV
Guidelines)
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion: competitive challenge where the first offer is lower
than n the potential floor for open competitive bidding may be disadvantageous to the
publics interest.

PVTA vs CIR
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
Appeal by certiorari from an order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is
one of constitutional significance-it deals with the question of whether (PVTA),
discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.
oChief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) v.
Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and offices interpreted the then fundamental
law as hostile to the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept.
It does not necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather
than proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now

defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the
coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. We cannot then grant the reversal sought. We
affirm.

December 20, 1966 - claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent Court
a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in
excess of the regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them
overtime compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444. >
differential between the amount actually paid to them and the amount allegedly due
them.
oPVTA denied the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.o Then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of respondent
Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime
services
ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions. P:
govt func exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. COURT: does not
mean that respondent CIR is devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the challenged order be
set aside on the additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law (BOTH PUB AND
PRIV) is not applicable to it.Enactments creating PVTA suffices to demonstrate the
performs governmental and not proprietary functions. o distinction between the
constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become obsolete. The
government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing for a
distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering
the needs of the present time: The growing complexities of modern society have
rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete.
ACCFA v Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations
oChief Justice, Makalintal in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration (ACCFA) v. Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and
offices interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile to the view of a limited or
negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept. It does not necessarily
follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than n
proprietary functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the
now defunct respondent Court. Nor is the objection raised that petitioner does not
come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law persuasive. We cannot then
grant the reversal sought. We affirm.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH, vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
October 21, 2003 In accordance with Section 28(A) (5) of (NIRC) of 1997, petitioner
withheld and remitted to CIR PHP 67,688,553.51, (15%) branch profit remittance tax
(BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted to Deutsche Bank
Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years. October4, 2005overpayment, petitioner filed with BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment and Investigation
Division an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit certificate in the
total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. and requested from (ITAD) a confirmation of its
entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RPGermany Tax Treaty.
October 18, 2005.-inaction of BIR - filed a Petition for Review with (CTA) ---denied
since application for a tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by
the former of its BPRT and actual remittance or prior to its availment. oThe court a quo
held violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under Section III paragraph (2) of
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 12000.oFurther, the CTA relied on Mirant
(Philippines) Operations Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Asia-Pacific
Operations [Phils.], Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Mirant) where the CTA
En Banc ruled that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the provisions
of the tax treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the corporation.
ISSUE: WON the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 12000 will deprive
persons or corporations of the benefit of a tax treaty.No. The filing of a tax
treaty relief application is not a condition precedent to the availment of a preferential

tax rate. A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make
in its legislations those modifications that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment
of the obligations undertaken. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that
would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements.
RPGermany Tax Treaty does not provide any prerequisite for the availment. nothing in
RMO No. 12000 indicate a deprivation of entitlement for failure to comply with the 15day period. Petitioner is granted the refund.
Republic of the Philippines v. Mupas
Petitioners: Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, The Department of
Transportation and Communications, and Manila International Airport
Authority// Respondent: RTC NRC.
consolidated eminent domain cases involving the construction, operation and
management of the NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA-IPT III). July 12,
1997 Paircargo Consortium (PIATCO) won the bid to construct and operate the NAIAIPT III project -25 yrs- a Concession Agreement under a build-operate transfer scheme.
On March 31, 2000, PIATCO contracted the services of Japanese companies Takenaka
and Asahikosan for the construction of the NAIA >>near completion> November 29,
2002, President Arroyo declared in a speech that the Government would not honor
PIATCO contracts. Takenaka and Asahikosan likewise notified PIATCO that they were
suspending for PIATCOs failure to provide adequate security. After proceedings in
Agan v. PIATCO (May 5,2003), the contracts with PIATCO were voided for being
contrary to law and public policy, contained provisions that substantially departed
from the draft Concession Agreement. > the Court held that the Government cannot
take over without first paying just compensation to PIATCO >nn January 7, 2005, the
RTC appointed three Commissioners to determine just compensation without
consulting the Government and PIATCO. Takenaka and Asahikosan filed two collection
cases against PIATCO before the HighCourt of Justice in London, England. >> SC
stated that Philippine courts cannot recognize the London awards in favor of Takenaka
and Asahikosan, because the Rules of Court, a foreign judgment would not bind
Philippine courts unless the judgment is recognized and enforced in this jurisdiction.>
Omnibus Order dated October 11, 2011, PIATCO is the sole entity entitled. > The
Government services of Gleeds: $300,206,693.00,PIATCO-$905,867,550.00 and
Takenaka and Asahikosan: $360,969,790.82.>xxxamnt determination.> RTC later
appointed DG Jones and Partners as an independent appraiser of the NAIA-IPT III.
Whether the CA legally erred in computing just compensation in the
expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III?
Eminent domain is a fundamental state power, to appropriate private property within
its territorial sovereignty to promote public welfare. <1987: first, private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; and second, no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.>The property
owner is entitled to compensation only for what he actually loses. The measure is not
the taker's gain but the owner's loss.
Whether the owner of the property sought to be expropriated shall solely
receive the just compensation due? NO payment to->Takenaka and Asahikosan
(subcontractors) actually built the NAIA-IPT III does not make them the owner of the
terminal building. separate case pending, so the Court cannot conclusively rule that
Takenaka and Asahikosan are unpaid creditors.
Ruling: SC held that the Philippine government may continue to operate
NAIA-IPT III, but the terminals ownership would have to remain with the
consortium until Piatco was fully compensated.
Senate vs. Ermita (exec sec of Pres)
Facts: In 2005, the Senate conducted a public hearing to investigate overpricing of the
North Rail Project.
September 28, 2005 The President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued E.O. 464,
"Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule

on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient
provisions of the Order are as follows: Appearance by Heads of Departments Before
Congress. shall secure the consent of the President priorSection 2: The rule of
confidentiality based on executive privilege is rooted in the separation of powers.
Executive privilege covers all confidential: Conversations bet President and the public
official, Military, diplomatic and other national security matters (some), Information
between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements, Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings , Matters affecting national
security Section 3 Said executive order prohibits any official without the approval of
the President
Is the EO 464 constitutional? EO 464 is PARTLY constitutional. We can ascertain
the Congresss power of inquiry through Section 21, Article VI of the 1987. The
requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI
of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear.
Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. No infirmity, however, can
be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the headsnot conclusive on the other branches of government - mere expression of opinion by
the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato
The state, specifically the executive and the legislative has authorized the holding of lottery for
charity in lieu of PCSOs charter relating to the purpose of providing funds for health programs,
medical assistance and services and charities national in character. Gambling is not immoral per
se. Its morality is not a justiciable issue. The court holds that the Congress is tasked to see to the
activities surrounding gambling pertinent to the nature of PCSO.

previous case, the Court ruled that the assailed contract of PCSO with PGMC void.
PCSO, new contract with PGMC With the introduction of two new justices upon the
retirement of prev, the court, upon review, reversed its ruling finding that the new
contract has been purged of the features which made it objectionable in the initial
caseThe present petition is a motion for reconsideration which assails the reversal of
the initial ruling
Issues/Holdings: WON the court should reverse its previous ruling reversing the courts
earlier decision regarding the contract entered into by PCSO? NO. a.The petitioners
argue that the PCSO cannot enter into a collaboration, association or joint venture with
any other party. However, the present contract is substantially different from the
contract judged void in the first case. The Court affirms its previous finding that the
provisions of the first contract relating to features of a joint venture agreement had
been removed in the new contract.b.Petitioners argue that the contract entered into by
PCSO with PGMC should have been substantiated through a public bidding. However,
the court finds the applicability of E.O. 301 which the petitioners herein relies on, as
untenable with regard to the present contract. The court finds that the EO relates to
the purchase and sale of supplies, materials and equipment to public biddings which is
not applicable to the present case.Ruling: The motion for reconsideration is
DENIED with finality.
Calalang vs. Williams et. al.
Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen r, prays that a writ of
prohibition be issued to invalidate the National Traffic Commissions resolution (July 17,
1940) recommending to the Department of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public
Works and communications that animal-drawn vehicles [kalesa] be restricted from
using the road in this manner:

-No passing along Plaza Calderon de la Borca to Dasmarinas St. from 7:30am-12:30pm; 1:30pm5:30pm for one year.No passing along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo
St. to Echague St. from 7:00am-11:00pm for one year. Petitioner contends that

Commonwealth Act No. 548, Sec. 1 does not give the DPW & SPWC do not have the
power to create traffic laws; legislature merely delegated them the power to
temporarily close roads to traffic when necessary for public interest or convenience.
Moreover, petitioner contends that disallowing the animal-drawn vehicles from
operating would interfere with legitimate business
Issues and Holding: W/N defendants can implement the proposed resolution
restricting the flow of animal-drawn vehicles pursuant to CWA No. 548. YES.
The delegation of power to restrain traffic accordingly by the legislature to the DPW is
an exercise of police power and it is meant to promote safe, convenient and fast
transit.W/N the proposed resolution impinges the constitutional precepts
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all people.NO. The legitimate business of those using animaldrawn vehicles would be restricted, but the convenience in exchange for the same is
of greater significance than the loss of their liberties. DISMISSED

Magkalas vs NHA
Plaintiff have been occupying lot (TAG-77-0063) for the past 39 years. March 26, '78
Issuance of P.D. 1315 naming NHA was named administrator of the Bagong Barrio
Urban Bliss Project. Studies :plaintiffs building classified as area center (open space).
Plaintiff filed :decision to use their area as an Area Center.
>Appeal of plaintiff was denied by NHA. sent Notice of Lot Assignment to plaintiff
recognizing the latter as a Censused Owner for relocation. Plaintiff was assigned Lot
77, Block 2, Barangay 132 Sometime in March '94, plaintiff received letter dated Mar.
8 '94 from Inez Gonzalez, OIC of District II-NCR. Plaintiff was advised that her previous
request to stay put in her house was denied per resolution of the NHA. Plaintiff was
told to remove her structure within 30 days, and that no judicial order was required
pursuant to P.D. No. 1472. March 25, '94, Court issued TRO, but prayer for prelim.
injunction was denied in an Order dated Apr. 14 '94.
Issues and Holding: W/N the petitioner can claim vested rights by way of Social Justice
Clause of the
No. Since the order was mandated pursuant to P.D. 1315 and P.D. 1472, the petitioner
cannot disregard the lawful action of the NHA which was merely implementing P.D.
1315. NHA's order to relocate petitioner and demolish her property was consistent
with the laws fundamental objective of promoting social justice in the manner that will
inure to the common good.
W/N R.A. 7279 repeals P.D. 1315 and P.D. 1472
No. Upon careful reading of the said provisions, R.A. 7279 does not necessarily repeal
the two PDs as it does not contain any provision which categorically repeals the
provisions of the two PDs. It is a well-settled rule that repeals by implication are not
favored, and as there is no irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy, rather, they can be
read together and harmonized to give effect to their provisions. DENIED
Oxales vs United Laboratories Inc.
Facts:This is an appeal by certiorari of the Decision dismissing petitioner Alberto P.
Oxales complaint for additional retirement benefits, recovery of the cash equivalent of
his unused sick leaves, damages, and attorneys fees, against respondent United
Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB).>(September 1, 1968) Petitioner joined UNILAB
>(September 7, 1994) Petitioner retired on his 60th birthday, after 25 years, 11
months
URP Provision: Retirement benefits calculated based on the 1 months for every year
of service using only basic monthly salary. It did not include as part of the salary base

the permanent and regular bonuses, reasonable value of food allowances, 1/12 of the
13th month pay, and the cash equivalent of service incentive leave. Thus, Oxales
received from Trust Fund A P1,599,179.00, instead of P4,260,255.70. He also received
P176,313.06, instead of P456,039.20 as cash equivalent of his unused sick leaves.
Lastly, he received P397,738.33 from his contributions to Trust Fund B. In sum, Oxales
received the total amount of P2,173,230.39as his retirement benefits.(August 21,
1997) Oxales wrote UNILAB that he should have been paid P1,775,907.23 including
bonuses (September 9, 1997) UNILAB wrote back and reminded Oxales about the
provision of the URP excluding any commissions, overtime, bonuses or extra
compensations.
CA Dismissed Grounds: 1) URP clearly excludes; 2) provisions of R.A. No. 7641 do not
apply in view of the URP; 3) NLRC :benefits granted to Oxales by virtue of the URP was
even higher than R.A. No. 7641.
Issue:
WON UNILAB should have factored benefits like bonuses, etc in compu? NO
oWe rule that Oxales is not entitled to the additional retirement benefits he is asking.
The URP is very clear: basic monthly salary for purposes of computing the retirement
pay is the basic monthly salary.
WON R.A. No. 7641 is applicable for purposes of computing petitioners retirement
benefits.
oR.A. No. 7641, otherwise known as The Retirement Pay Law, only applies in a
situation where (1) there is no collective bargaining agreement (CBA) (2)CBA below
required. Lower courts and CA - Affirmed
Pamatong vs. COMELEC
petition for writ of certiorari to reverse the resolutions, in violation of Pamatongs
right to equal access to opportunities for public service under Section 26, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution.
17 Dec 2003 The petitioner filed his COC for president, but COMELEC refused to
give due course.
15 Jan 2004 the petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558 in
which COMELEC declaring nuisance candidates - not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are not nominated by a party or are not supported by a registered political
party with a national constituency.
Issue/Holding: Did the COMELEC err in declaring the petitioner as a nuisance
candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code?
No decision yet; COMELEC to submit documents for further evaluation.
Constitutional/Legal Dimension: petitioner : right to equal access to opportunities for
public office as stated in Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution has been
violated. >the article does not bestow any right but rather a privilege subject to
limitations imposed by law. These valid limitations are found in the provisions of the
Omnibus Election Code on Nuisance Candidates and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452.
not self-executing
Factual Dimension: the court cannot review the facts because the pieces of evidence
presented does not merit such judgment merely photocopies .insufficient to determine
as a nuisance candidate. remanded to the COMELEC Section 69 of the Omnibus
Electoral Code: Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified
petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it
is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or
to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or
by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent
a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

MANILA WATER COMPANY, v. CARLITO DEL ROSARIO,

May 2000: Manila Water discovered that 24 water meters were missing in its
stockroom. >Del Rosario and his coemployee, a certain Danilo Manguera, were

involved in the pilferage . Del Rosario confessedand pleaded for forgiveness.29 June
2000: Manila Water conducted a hearing and dismiss Del Rosario
Del Rosario filed an action for illegal dismissal :without just cause.> averred that his
admission to the misconduct was coerced by the company.Invoking of the Companys
Code of Conduct, Manila Water averred that such act of stealing the companys
property is punishable by dismissal. confessed : letter and during investigation30
May 2002: Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint but his length of service for 21
years, without previous derogatory record, warranted separation pay The NLRC
dismissed Manila Waters appeal due to failure to append a certification against forum
shopping On certiorari, the CA held that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it dismissed Manila Waters appeal on mere technicality. However, CA
affirmed the LAs decision and refused to reconsider.
ISSUES/HOLDING: Should the respondent awarded separation pay in spite of being
dismissed for stealing the companys property? No. As a general rule, an employee
who has been dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of
the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the
Court has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of social
justice or on equitable grounds." In both instances, it is required that the dismissal
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of
the employee. The admitted cause of his dismissal amounts to serious misconduct. He
is not only responsible for the loss of the water meters in flagrant violation of the
companys policy but his act is in utter disregard of his partnership with his employer
in the pursuit of mutual benefits. If an employees length of service is to be regarded as a

should always be resolved in favor of labor rights. Release and Quitclaim signed by
Angus is invalid-- cannot be used by petitioners to legalize the denial of Angus' rightful
claims. As aptly observed by the CA, the terms of the quitclaim authorizes Angus to
receive less than what she is legally entitled to. "Under prevailing jurisprudence, x x x
a quitclaim cannot bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally
entitled." It was held to be "ineffective in barring claims for the full measure of the
worker's rights and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to
estoppel".

justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal, such gesture will actually become a prize for
disloyalty, distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse
its ranks of undesirables

courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not
on technicalities. 2.Is there an employer-employee relationship between the

Goodyear Philippines Inc. and Remegio Ramos vs. Marina L. Angus

Facts: Angus was employed by Goodyear Philippines Inc. on Nov. 16, 1966 and held
the position of Secretary to the Manager of Quality and Technology.>On Sept. 19,
2001, Angus received a letter which told her that her position is no longer necessary
>The company gave her termination benefits on Oct. 18, 2001:
o47 days pay per year of service (which will come for the pension fund) and others
>Angus:not agree: premium of additional 3 days /total of 50 days under Philippine
industrys practice to give premium to encourage early retirement benefit.Nov. 20,
2001, Angus accepted the checks computed at 47 days w/annotation in the
acknowledgement under protest. Because of Angus refusal to sign a release and
quitclaim, petitioners took back the checks.>Goodyear : most favourable separation
and under CBA and the parties Employment contract, Angus is entitled only to certain
kinds of separation pay.Angus reiterated her claim for both termination pay and early
retirement benefits. demanded that a copy of the Notice of Redundancy filed with the
DOLE and a copy of the specific provisions in the Retirement Plan, CBA and
Employment Contract >Ramos did not provide and reminded Angus to claim her
checks.Angus finally accepted a check and signed a Release and Quitclaim on Jan. 17,
2002On Feb 5, 2002, Angus filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal
dismissal with claims of separation pay, damages and attorneys fees against
petitioner.termination by reason of redundancy was effected in violation of the Labor
Code for it was not timely reported to the DOLE and no separation pay was given to
her; that the separation pay to which she is entitled by law is entirely different from
the retirement benefits that she received
Petitioners filed a partial motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA
Whether or not Angus is entitled to collect both retirement benefits and
separation benefits despite the fact that the CBA only allows Angus to one
type of benefit.
Angus is entitled to collect both types of benefits.-absence of a specific provision in the
CEA prohibiting the recovery of both.-absence of an express or implied prohibition
against it, collection of both retirement benefits and separation pay upon severance
from employment is allowed as grounded on the social justice policy that doubts

Reyes v Glaucoma Research Foundation, GR no. 189255, June 17, 2015

Facts:>Eye Referral Center engaged Jesus Reyess services as a ConsultantJesus
Reyes designated himself as administrator: reports for work at anytime of the day and
leaves as he pleases.February 2005, ERC withheld Reyes's salary without
notice.April 11, 2005, Reyes wrote a letter to Manuel Agulto, Executive Director of
Glaucoma :not received his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th month
pay for 2004.
April 21, 2005, no longer the Administrator of the ERC; subsequently, office was
padlocked April 29, 2005 he was no longer allowed by the security guard January 20,
2006, Reyes filed a complaint on Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal,> the LA dismissedfailed to establish employer-employee relationship May 30, 2008, the NLRC reversed
LA. August 25, 2009, CA annulled NLRC and reinstated LA..
1.Is the case affected by the fact that respondents submitted a verification
that fails to comply with the 2004 rules on notarial practice? No, the rule is that

petitioner and the respondent?Employer-employee relationship doesnt exist. Mere

title or designation in a corporation will not, by itself, determine the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
The court tests for employer-employee relationship through control test and
economic test. >never subject to definite working hours, in fact, on December 1-31, 2004, he
went on leave without seeking approval from the officers . not subject to a set of rules and is not
required to report for work at any time, nor to devote his time exclusively for the company.
economic reality test - economic dependence of the worker on his employer. resume :he
concurrently held consultancy positions with the Manila International Airport Authority (from 04
March 2001 to September 2003 and from 01 November 2004 up to the present) and the AntiTerrorist Task Force for Aviation and Air Transportation Sector (from 16 April 2004 to 30 June 2004)
during his stint with the Eye Referral Center (from 01 August 2003 to 29 April 2005). Accordingly, it
cannot be said that the [petitioner] was wholly dependent on [respondent] company.34

CENTRO PROJECT MANPOWER SERVICES CORPORATION, v.AGUINALDO

NALUIS AND CA
> Centro Project, a local recruitment agency, engaged Naluis to work abroad as a
plumber under Pacific Micronesia Corporation(Pacific Micronesia) in Garapan,
Saipan>The work was covered by the primary Employment Contract dated March 11,
1997, last for 12 months, and commence upon arrival.
Naluis left for Northern Mariana on September 13, 1997, until June 3, 1998 allegedly
due to the expiration of the employment contract.>Not 12 months of work, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.> must repatriate complainant or be liable for violation
of the Commonwealths Immigration Rules>NLRC dismissed: lack of merit. CA
reversed and Centro Project breached by ordering his repatriation.
The appeal lacks merit.-feared that Naluis declared as illegal alien not supported by
records. did not submit evidence that the Northern Marianas authorities had ever
moved to declare him an illegal alien. Moreover, had Centro Project been aware of
likelihood should be advised him and explained in due course. >Denying participation
in the fixing of the expiration date, Resp:Philippine representative in Northern Marianas
who had inserted by hand the date of expiration in the Employment Contract.The
argument has no basis no proof.We concur with the CA. And, secondly, assuming

that Centro Project did not have any participation it did not amend the employment
contract despite: aware that the term, in bad faith.
Ruling: affirm CA.
Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa v Nestle Philippines, Inc.
January 13, 1997. IBM union staged a strike against Nestles Ice Cream and Chilled
Products Division due to Nestles alleged violation (CBA), dismissal of union officers
and members, discrimination and other unfair labor practice(ULP) acts.Nestle filed
with the (NLRC) a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order, othersFebruary 26, 1997. Nestle filed a Petition to Declare Strike
Illegal.
April 2, 1997. (DOLE) Acting Secretary, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the
strike and certifying the same to the NLRC.June 2, 1997. IBM union filed a petition for
certiorari with SC, questioning the Acting DOLE Secretary. August 4, 1998. A (MOA)
between both parties was made.August 6, 1998. Both parties filed a Joint Motion to
Dismiss no longer interested in pursuing injunction October 12, 1998. The NLRC
approved dismissJanuary 25, 2010. After more than 11 years from the MOA execution,
IBM filed with the NLRC a Motion for Writ of Execution :not been paid the amounts they
are entitled fr MOA.
Nestle contends that IBMs remedy has already prescribed. < the 2005 Revised Rules of
the NLRC, a decision or order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the date it becomes
final and executory and that the same decision or order may only be enforced by independent
action within a period of 10 years from the date of its finality.> November 18, 2010. The NLRC

denied IBMs petition due to prescription. June 30, 2011. The CA dismissed IBMs
petition -should have directly brought the appeal to the SC
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining that the IBM unions
demand to be paid has prescribed
No, the CA did not err in sustaining that the IBM unions demand to be paid has
prescribed.
IBM should have moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. When a compromise
agreement is given judicial approval, it becomes more than a contract binding upon
the parties, i.e. a decision on a compromise agreement is final and executory (Oct. 12,
1998). Moreover, NCC Art. 1144 provides that an action upon a written contract must
be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
exception in the 5-year delay caused by debtor (Nestle) and/or is incurred for his
benefit or advantage. not proven Ruling: Dismissed Court cannot, however, alter or
amend the law on prescription to relieve petitioners of the consequences of their
inaction.
CHREA vs CHR
>February 14, 1998 Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy
October 19, 1998 CHR issued Reso lution No. A98055, providing for the upgrading
or raising of salary grades of selected positions in the Commission. This also led to the
creation and upgrading of new positions. To implement this, CHR authorized the
augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings under Personnel
Services. November 17, 1998 In Resolution No. A98062, the CHR collapsed the
vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing
modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV,
one Chemist III,
three Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II. The staffing
modification and upgrading scheme was submitted to DBM Secretary Benjamin
Diokno, who denied the request. CSCRegional Office recommended in a
memorandum (March 29, 1999), the censure of the upgrading, retitling, and
reclassification scheme (SCHEME). This was supported by CHREA, claiming that DBM
is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and

approve matters of reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

CSCCentral Office > CA affirmed the validity of the SCHEME.
Can the Commission on Human Rights validly implement an upgrading,
reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management? RA No. 6758, SEC 2 and 4 (July 1, 1989): An Act Prescribing a
Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law that it is the DBM that shall
establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System
The regulatory power of DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted in
jurisprudence as well. Philippine Retirement Authority vs Jesusito L. Buag Victorina
Cruz vs Court of Appeals Intia, Jr. vs Commission on Audit DBMs function is to ensure
that the actions taken with regards to the matter adhere to the requirements of law:
salary standard. need approval b4 reclassification or upgrading of positions in
government under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3,Chapter 1, Title
XVII. it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, The CHR is
not a Constitutional Commission , no fiscal autonomy.-consti grant not acquired priv..
GRANTED
Adkins vs. Childrens Hospital
Facts:>Act of September 19, 1918: providing for the fixing of minimum wages for
women and children in the District of Columbia > unlawful for employer to violate in
this regard oThe purposes :"to protect the women and minors of the Distiict from conditions
detrimental to their health and morals, resulting from wages which are inadequate to maintain
decent standards of living, and the Act in each of its provisions and in its entirety shall be
interpreted to effectuate these purposes." oStatute now under consideration is attacked

upon the ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference with the freedom of
contract included within the guaranties of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Appellee a hospital for children - employs a large number of women in
various capacities-agreed upon rates of wages and compensation satisfactory but less.
the appellee, a woman twenty-one years of age, was employed by the Congress Hall
Hotel Company as an elevator operator, at a salary of $35 per month and two meals a
day. Hotel Company was obliged to dispense with her services by reason of the order
of the board and on account of the penalties prescribed by the act.Whether or not
the Act of September 19, 1918, providing for the fixing of minimum wages
for women and children in the District of Columbia, is unconstitutional. YES>
Employer and employee had a constitutional right to contract in whatever manner
they pleased.>a statute which prescribes payment without regard to any of these
things and solely with relation to circumstances apart from the contract of
employment, the business affected by it and the work done under it, is so clearly the
product of a naked, arbitrary exercise of power that it cannot be allowed to stand
under the Constitution of the United States.
Dissenting Opinion:Mr. Chief Justice Taft:The right of the legislature under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to limit the hours of employment on the score of the health of the
employee, it seems to me, has been firmly established. I assume that the conclusion in this case
rests on the distinction between a minimum of wages and a maximum of hours in the limiting of
liberty to contract. I regret to be at variance with the Court as to the substance of this distinction.
In absolute freedom of contract, the one term is as important as the other, for both enter equally
into the consideration given and received, a restriction as to one is not any greater, in essence,
than the other, and is of the same kind.
If it be said that long hours of labor have a more direct effect upon the health of the employee than
the low wage, there is very respectable authority from close observers, disclosed in the record and
in the literature on the subject quoted at length in the briefs, that they are equally harmful in this
regard. Congress took this view, and we cannot say it was not warranted in so doing.Mr. Justice
Holmes: It will need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there
are no differences between men and women, or that legislation cannot take those differences
into account.

West Coast vs. Parrish

The petitioner is an employer: a hotel. Elsie Parrish, was employed in the hotel as a
chambermaid. >earlier case, Parrish sued the employer diff. bet. her wage and the
minimum wage set by the state at 14.5$ be awarded to her. Elsie was denied her
petition in the trial court. However, said decision was reversed by the State Supreme
Court and sustained the statue (Minimum Wages for Women)The case is then brought
to an appeal to the Supreme Court by the employer, arguing that the present case is
similar to a previous case, Adkins.1.WON the Court should uphold its ruling in
Adkins --NO. In building towards an argument towards a reversal of the Adkins
precedent, the court dicusses the following considerations:
i. Capitalist exploitation of the working class (i.e the employees having no choice but to take the
job despite its low/meager pay) characterized by an unequal position with regard to their
bargaining power
ii. The concept that the welfare and betterment of the living conditions of women are generally
beneficial to the community/society in general
iii.The argument that exclusively fixing the minimum wage for women, and not extending such
liberty to men, constitutes as arbitrary discrimination is found untenable by the court. Legislature
can constitutionally single out women in the exercise of State power.

2.WON the Minimum Wages for Women act of the district of Washington is
constitutional
a.YES. The constitutionality of the statute was affirmed as the court reversed
Adkins.
Ruling: Adkins is reversed. The judgement of the Supreme Court of
Washington is affirmed.
Dabalos vs RTC (Pampanga)
1. According to ABC (private respondent), on July 13, 2009, she sought payment of the
money she had lent to Dabalos but he could not pay. asked him if responsible for
spreading rumors about her, he admitted. >ABC slapped Dabalos > inflict on her the
physical injuries alleged in the Information.
2.Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 before the RTC of
Angeles City, Branch 59, in an Information which states: 13th day of July, 2009, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Dabalos, the boyfriend of the complainant
wilfully, use personal violence: pulling her hair, punching complainants back, shoulder
and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainants intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being. 3.The RTC found probable cause and issued a warrant of
arrest >He posted a cash bond >He filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause with Motion to Quash the Information. He stated that at the time of the
alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a dating relationship with ABC;
hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable. 5.ABC admitted that her relationship w/ Dabalos had
ended prior to the subject incident. >RTC Ruling: denied. >admitted a prior dating
relationship (only req), the infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of
violence against women and their children as defined in Sec. 3(a) of RA
9262>7.Dabalos filed not covered by RA 9262
RULING: Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262: specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or
series of acts to be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical
harm, namely: 1) it is committed against a woman or her child and the woman
is the offenders wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had sexual or
dating relationship or with whom he has a common child; and 2) it results in or is
likely to result in physical harm or suffering.-- having sufficiently alleged the
necessary elements of the crime. The Court cannot construe the statute in favor of
petitioner using the rule of lenity because there is no ambiguity in RA 9262 that would
necessitate any construction. DISMISSED
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262 reads:
SEC.3.Definition of Terms.As used in this Act,
(a)Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom

he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. x x x.
Tablarin, , v. Gutierrez,
Petitioners are students wishing to take up medicine but did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education
and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement(CEM). On March 5,
1987 petitioners filed : enjoin the Secretary of Education, the Board of Medical
Education and the CEM from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of RA 2382 and MECS
Order No. 52 and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT and from
administering the same.
The RTC dismissed RA 2382 or the Medical Act of 1959 created the Board of Medical
Education.Section 5 gives the Board the ability to determine the admission requirements to a
recognized medical school. Section 7 of the act provides the requirements for admission to a
certified medical school. Among these requirements is a certificate of eligibility for
admission.MECS Order No. 52 established a uniform admission test called the NMAT as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools
of the Philippines.

Pursuant to the order CEM conducted the NMAT for the school year 1986-1987
Petitioners : unconstitutional based on the following provisions of the 1987
Constitution: Art II Section 11, Art II Section 13, Art II Section 17, Art XIV Section 1 and
Art XIV Section 5 (3)
1.W/N RA 2382 and MECS Order No. 52 violate any of the provisions cited by
the petitioners? No, The petitioners failed to demonstrate to what extent or in what
manner the questioned statute and administrative order collided with Article II section
11, 13 and 17, the petitioners have failed to even make their case a prima facie case.
The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who
qualify under fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.
2. W/N NMAT is an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement? No. The
petitioners again fail to specify what factors of the NMAT make it unfair. political
question . NMAT is a valid exercise of police power to ensure the quality of
education and protect the health and safety of the people.
3. W/N the NMAT is a violation of the equal protection clause? No. Petitioners
claim that the Board having the ability to change the passing grade for every year of
the NMAT violates equal protection cannot stand as different years may have different
conditions that may affect the passing percentage for that year alone and this does
not violate equal protection.

UP v Ayson, GR no. 88386, August 17, 1989

In 1978, UPCBHS was established under particular conditions. Some of these
conditions are: self-supporting; as a feeder for UP at Baguio and; as laboratory and
demonstration school for prospective teachers. Failure to comply in these conditions
the University can order its abolition on academic grounds.
January 30,1989, the UP Board of Regents approved the proposed phase-out of
UPCBHS on the grounds, that only an insignificant number of UPCBHS graduates
qualified for admission and actually enrolled in UPCB and that UPCBHS is not serving
as a laboratory or demonstration school for prospective teachers much less a selfsupporting unit. May 25, 1989, respondent UPCBHS filed phase out is without legal
basis and unconstitutional. The court issued the assailed Orders restraining
petitioners from implementing the Board's decision to phase out UPCBHS and the
memorandum of Dean Patricio Lazaro. Petitioners' motion to dismiss was denied.1.Is

secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning

such as the University of the Philippines?No, although the constitution has
provided that there is a right to quality education and free public secondary education,
this is not directed to certain institutions but rather towards the government to provide
it, and as such UP, being an institution of higher learning cannot be compelled to
provide for secondary education. GRANTED
Garcia vs. Faculty Admission Committee
In summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Garcia for studies leading to an M.A. in
Theology.
1st sem 75-76, The faculty decided to bar her from re-admission. They felt that your
frequent questions and difficulties were not always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down
the progress of the class; they felt you could have tried to give the presentation a chance and
exerted more effort to understand the point made before immediately thinking of difficulties and
problems. Father Lambinos letter >Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by

respondent to take some courses for credit but not an admission to a degree program
because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make
such admission- X by dean. oGarcia wasnt charged a single centavo during her stay.
inquired at UST and was told that she could enrol at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties.
However, if she chooses to study in UST, she will have to study longer.
Petitioner prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enrol in
the current semester.
W/N the respondent has discretion to admit petitioner in Loyola School of Theology.
Respondent has no clear duty to admit Garcia. The school has clearly the discretion to
turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors
and optimum classroom size and component considerations.-->DISMISSED

President of the Queens University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby:The internal conditions for academic
freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following
functions: (i) the admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii)
the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the
different categories of expenditure.

Justice Frankfurter:the four essential freedoms of a universityto determine for itself

on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study.
President of the Queens University in Belfast, Sir Eric Ashby:
The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic
staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (i) the admission and
examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of study; (iii) the appointment
and tenure of office of academic staff; and (iv) the allocation of income among the
different categories of expenditure.
Justice Frankfurter:
the four essential freedoms of a universityto determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.
Alcuaz vs PSBA (Academic Freedom - School Discipline
Facts: Petitioners are all bonafide students of PSBA-QC who conducted demonstrations.
enrolment period, petitioners- blacklisted and denied admission for the second
semester of SY 1986-1987.The President of the Student Council filed a complaint with
the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrolment of Student
Officers and student leaders. The SC wrote to the administration requesting for a
written statement of the schools decision regarding their enrolment.
Another demand letter and to enroll his clients within 48 hours.No relief
Whether students were denied due process for failing to give notice and
hearing and failing to decide substantively.PETITION DISMISSED. Student

admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Par
137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in
school, it is understooo - only for the semester. PSBA-QC no longer has any existing
contract with the students/teachers. Due process does not hold. The school cannot be
compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers.
Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
the minimum standards by Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are:
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against
them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the
evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Records show that
the proceedings in the case at bar, at the outset satisfied conditions No. 1 and 2, but,
without a hearing, conditions No. 3, 4 and 5 had evidently not been completed with.
Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs Court of Appeals
Chi-Rho (MCs school paper) and Ang Magasing Pampanitikan nf Chi-Rho (MCs
magazine) published in their Sept-Oct 1994 issue contents that were called obscene,
vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, injurious to young readers, and devoid of all
moral values. >received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the MC Discipline
Committee - complaint filed against them by the Miriam Community and a concerned
Ateneo grade five student. They have been told that they violated regulations in the
student handbook.>Students req written statement of their answers>Instead, they
requested that the case be transferred to the Regional Office of the Department of
Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) >Their lawyer wrote to Dr. Sevilla arguing that
the works were in their capacity as campus journalists. Hence, RA No 7079 (Campus
Journalism Act) applies to them.>The Discipline Committee imposed disciplinary
sanction on the students. >filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction/restraining order before the RTC which the RTC denied. > CA
ruled that the RTC order and the suspension and dimissisal of the students as void. (1)
Is the case moot and academic since its been a year since TRO was issued?
TRO automatically expired since no preliminary injunction has been issued.
(2) Does Sec 7 of the Campus Journalism Act preclude the schools right to
discipline its students?
The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds:(1) Who may teach,(2) What may
be taught,(3) How it shall be taught, and(4) Who may be admitted to study.
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the
third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot
function in an atmosphere of anarchy.
If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has
the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose
lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.
Thus, to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. Constitution
allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the
deprivation of their rights. -- materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. The right to free speech must always
be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.
Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a
student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such articles
materially disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

Ruling: The court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. MC is
ordered to admit Joel Tan.
UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS v COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Respondent Jennifer C. Lee, who was enrolled in the College of Architecture,
University of San Carlos obtained a grade of I.C. (incomplete) in Architecture 121,
and grades of 5s (failures) in Architecture 122 and 123, at the end of her second
semester in her first year, prompting her to shift to the College of Commerce.
Dec 10, 1981: respondent wrote to the USCs Council of Deans, as well as the Ministry
of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS), requesting that her grades of 5s in
Architecture 121 and 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade
average.Feb 4, 1982: the President of the USC informed MECS that university policy
was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the
student for honors; injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed
to graduate with honorsMarch 17, 1982: While the USC President was out of town,
respondent wrote to the USC Registrar requesting that her failing grades be
changed which was approved by the MECSMarch 24, 1982: Mr. Marcelo Bacalso
of MEGS Higher Education Division discovered that the change of the grade of private
respondent from IC to 1.9 did not have the supporting class record requiredMarch
28, 1982: USC held its graduation exercises; graduated in Commerce, major in
Accounting, without honors March 31, 1982: Respondent demanded from Dean
Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate cum laude No records. May 27,
1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the
revocation of the change of grades of private respondent; request was denied as no
positive proof of fraud existedRespondent filed an action for mandamus with damages against
petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, to compel them-cum laude, retroactive
to March 28, 1982,.Lower court rendered in favour of respondent.

Can then school be compelled to award Ms Lee as cum laude?

No, it not the proper remedy. It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are
given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for
purposes of graduation. Private respondent should know and is presumed to know
those University policies and is bound to comply therewith.
The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying
the honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the
aforesaid change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of
honors.Ruling: Petition is GRANTED
Camacho v Coresis, Jr.
Camacho is the Dean of the College of Education of the University of Southeastern
Philippines (USP). >Sometime in June 1995, several doctoral students complained to
Camacho that during the first semester of school year 1994-1995, there were ghost
students in the Ed.D. 317 class of the respondent, Dr. Sixto Daleon. ghost students:
Agulo, Alaba and Tecson were given passing grades not attending classes. Camacho
demanded explanation from Daleon, who admitted that he made "special
arrangements"
Consequently, Camacho filed a Complaint-Affidavit against Dr. Daleon before the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The complaint for gross incompetence,
insubordination and violation of R.A. 6770
On June 3, 1997, Atty. Coresis, Jr., graft investigator in the Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao,dismissed
W/N the Office of the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
absolving Daleon from administrative as well as criminal liability NO, the
Ombudsman was not wrong. The Supreme Court agreed with the OSG's argument that
there is no provision in the University Code of USP which prohibits a professor or
teacher from giving a special program or arrangement tailored to meet the
requirements of a particular course.Institutional academic freedom: It encompasses the
freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The right of the school : the teaching

method of Dr. Daleon is at once apparent in the third freedom DISMISSED.

UP Board of Regents vs n Court of Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret
Celine

Feb 5, 1993 oral defense of Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celines dissertation

(Doctoral, Department of Anthropology)Before the defense, Dr. Medina(P) informed
CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz(P) that a portion of the dissertation was plagiarized.
(lifted, without proper acknowledgement) However, the respondent was allowed to
defend her dissertation. 4 of 5 panelists gave her a passing mark for her defenseManuel, Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. 1.Dr. Quiason :must incorporate
suggestions 2.Dr. Medina did not sign : only upon revisions.3.Dr. Teodoro added that
substantial revisions be presented to the panel.Mar 5, 1993 Dr. Manuel requested a
meeting :majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass, even
without the consent of the Deans representative.Mar 24, 1993 CSSP Faculty
Assembly approved Arokiaswamys graduation pending dissertation.Apr 1993
Arokiaswamy submitted her supposedly revised dissertation to 3 panelist -approved itdid not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members.>Apr 15, 1993
Arokiaswamy submitted to the CSSP without the approvals of Drs. Medina and Teodoro,
relying on Dean Pazs remark on March 5. Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval,
Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form. Dean Paz accepted Arokiaswamys
dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course requirements.Apr 17, 1993
Arokiaswamy sent a letter to Dean Paz, charged Dr. Maria Serena Diokno (Associate
Dean and Graduate Program Director) and Dr. Medina with maliciously working for the
disapproval.> Apr 21, 1993 Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Ibe, Vice Chancellor for
Academic Affairs, requesting that Arokiaswamy be excluded from the list of grad and
to Arokiaswamy saying that she -no clearance unless she substantiated her
accusations on Apr 17.This didnt reach the Board of Regents on time. Apr 24, 1993
Arokiaswamy graduated Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. Apr 27, 1993
Arokiaswamy sent a letter, claiming Dr. Medinas attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction
to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the
revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro; that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment . May

1, 1993 Dr. Medina formally charged Arokiaswamy of plagiarism and recommended

that her degree be withdrawn.May 13, 1993 Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee
to investigate the plagiarism charged. recommended to UP Diliman Chancellor Dr.
Roman, that the Ph.D degree be withdrawn.June 13, 1993 Ventura Committee
reported that they found at least 90 instances in the thesis which were lifted without
proper acknowledgement.CSSP College Assembly and Univ Council unanimously
approved withdrawal of doctorate degree-> endorsed the same recommendation to
the BOR. And a third meeting was scheduled on Oct 27, however, Arokiaswamy did
not attend it, alleging that the BOR had already decided her case before she could be
fully heard.Oct 11, 1993 Arokiaswamy wrote to Dr. Emil Javier, UP President,
alleging that members of the UP admin were playing politics with her case.
Dec. 14 she wrote to Dr. Fabella, Chairman of the BOR, complaining that she was not
given due process, and claiming that UP cannot withdraw her degree anymore since
her dissertation was already accepted by the CSSP.>Zafaralla Committee(another nonDiliman investigation) reported, recommending the withdrawal of Arokiaswamys
degree. >CA in favor of Arokias
Issues: Was Arokiaswamy denied of due process in the proceedings of the
university?
NO. The fact is that various committees have been formed to investigate the charge
and, in all the investigations, she was heard in her defense.
W/N UP still has the right to withdraw Arokiaswamys degree
YES. What UP seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing
an academic agree obtained through fraud.A university has the right to revoke
or withdraw the honor or distinction it has conferred. This freedom of a university does
not terminate upon the graduation of a student since it was the graduation itself in
question.
According to the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, the jurisdiction of the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal extends only to disciplinary actions. UP is not seeking to discipline the respondent.
She is not anymore within the disciplinary powers of UP and cannot even be punished (since the
punishment is suspension for a year and she isnt a student anymore).

Non vs. Dames II

Students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc., were not allowed to re-enroll
by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student
mass actions against the school.
Petitioners filed a petition in the court a quo seeking their readmission, but the trial
court dismissed the petition in an order dated August 8, 1988Petitioners claim of lack
of due process cannot prosper in view of their failure to specifically deny respondents
affirmative defenses that they were given all the chances to air their grievances multiple
times and that the date of resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their
rally picketing even though without renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their
classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of
their right to be present in their classes.

Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission - discredits the institution whose activities unduly disrupts or interferes with the operation of the college. They
also signed pledges that require them to abide and comply with all the rules and
regulations laid down by the institution.
Petitioners were not afforded due process before they were refused re-enrollment.
due to failing grades was a mere afterthought.What incurred the ire of the school
authorities was the students mass actions conducted in February 1988.This does not
mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken against petitioners for breach
of discipline. Penalty that could have been imposed commensurate to offense
committed and imposed ONLY AFTER the requirements of procedural due process have
been complied with, according to the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. have
already been sufficiently penalized.
To subject petitioners from disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose
and would strain relations.Whether students were denied of due process.Yes,
students were denied due process. Undisputed is the fact that the refusal to readmit or
re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a
reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. While exercise of the
rights to free speech and assembly must be afforded to the students, but this should
not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline
students. Penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed.
Ruling:WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge
dated August 8, 1988 and February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent
Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit
Colegio del Sto. Nio vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Private respondents were employed by Colegio del Sto. Nino Cebu.May 6, 1988 - they
were advised by the School Rector of the termination of their services: incompetence,
misconduct and insubordination. June 2, 1988 respo filed with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu a joint complaint:reinstatement plus refund of
illegal deduction and payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys
fees.
The labor arbiter found in favour of the complainants: reinstatement.Both parties
appealed of the NLRC.
Petitioner insisted that the dismissals were justified.June 14, 1990 NLRC dismissed
petitioners appeal
Whether or not the dismissal was illegal. The dismissal was illegal.
The private respondents were not accorded proper notice and hearing before they
were notified of the termination of their services. They were simply dismissed without
being informed of the charges against them or being accorded the opportunity to
refute them. Their dismissal must be struck down as an inexcusable and disdainful
rejection of due process. - supposed report of an evaluation committee which found
the private respondents guilty - no attempt from the petitioner to inform the private
respondents the charges. The Court does not deny petitioner its academic freedom,
which includes the power to choose its own faculty. that freedom does not give it
absolute authority over its employees or exempt it from the requirements of due
process in its dealing with them.

PTA ST. MATTHIEW CHRISTIAN ACADEMY VS METROPOLITAN BANK

In 2001, Denivin and Josefina Ilagan granted a loan by the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
in the amount of P4,790,000 oUpon default, extrajudicial foreclosure was conducted
with Metropolitan Bank being the highest bidder. oDuring redemption, Respondent filed
an ex-parte petition for writ of possession oJune 30,2005 St. Mathew of Tarlac (owned
by mortgagors) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for restraining order against
the bank and provincial sheriff of Tarlac.>CA dismissed.
1.WoN St. Matthew Christian Academy is a third person that cannot be
bound by the writ of possession issued by the court.-NO- Petitioners cannot be
considered a third party because they are not claiming a right adverse to the judgment
debtor. Petitioner-Teachers possession is based on employment in the school,
petitioner-students possession is characterized by the contractual nature of a schoolstudent relationship. Petitioners do not have superior rights to that of SMC over subject
part because their possession emanated only from the latter
Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135 authorizes the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to apply for writ of
possession during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath This obligation
ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of property

2.WoN the trial court order violated the petitioner-students right to quality
education
Trial Court order did not violate the petitioner-students right to quality education . Except for the
petitioners allegation that if the school will be ejected by the writ of possession the students will
necessarily be ejected as well (thereby disrupting the learning process), they fail to show relevance
of the right to quality education and academic freedom to their case or how they were violated by
granting writ of possession to the winning bidder in the foreclosure sale

3.WoN petitioners were given due process

Petitioners were given due process. Issuance of writ of possession is a ministerial duty of court and
the purchaser of the property has the right to acquire possession of the foreclosed property. No
need for trial prior to issuing order denying motion to intervene. The law does not require that a
petition for writ of possession be granted after being admitted by court.

Guingona v Carague,
The budget for 1990 was P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as GAA, and Department of Education, Culture and Sports,
meanwhile, amounted to P27,017,813,000.00.The said automatic appropriation for debt
service was authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by P.D.
No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary
Innovations of the New Society, and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent Liabilities
Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioners sought the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81,
Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. They said these were higher than the
budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution
which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.The petition
also sought to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget
pursuant to said decrees.
1.IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION (FOR DEBT SERVICE) IN THE P233
BILLION 1990 BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
NO. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" does not thereby follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. As aptly observed by
respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and improve the facility
of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of
P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all
department budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate
according highest priority to education.

2.ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
YES. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with
the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. This transitory
provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the social order
so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in
force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended,
repealed or revoked.

3.ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION?

NO. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular
form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by
Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as precisely the
authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words,
in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting
legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present
Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act
or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate public funds for
specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if
the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.

Joya v PCGG
On January 11, 1991, the PCGG and Christie's of New York launched an auction sale of
82 Old Masters Paintings and 71 cartons of 18th and 19th century silverware seized
from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila.The petition was filed on
January 7. 1991 (4 days before the auction). The SC denied the petition on the ground
that Joya et al had not presented a clear legal right to a restraining order .

On 11 January 1991, public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of

$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. Although the issue had
become moot and academic, Joya et al filed another petition, urging the SC to exercise
its power of judicial review : Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are
embraced in the phrase "cultural treasure of the nation" (ART XIV Sec 16).
1.Do the petitioners have legal standing to file this suit?
NO, they do not. The paintings were donated by private persons , the ownership
belongs to the foundation
>similarly, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts
from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries -The confiscation should not be
understood to mean that the ownership automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and
just compensation.
2. Are the paintings and silverware part of the Republic's cultural treasures?
NO, they are not. The cultural properties of the nation which are covered by the
protection of the state are classified as the "important cultural properties" (exceptional
historical cultural significance to the Philippines but are not sufficiently outstanding to
merit the classification of national cultural treasures )and the "national cultural
treasures." (unique objects found locally, possessing outstanding historical, cultural,
artistic and/or scientific value which is highly significant and important to this country
and nation)
> Italian paintings and silverware do not constitute protected cultural properties not
listed in the Cultural Properties Register of the National Museum. DISMISSED.