US vs Carlos

G.R. No. 6295, 21 Phil 543September 1, 1911

FACTS:
Ignacio Carlos has been a consumer of electricity furnished by the Manila
Electric Railroad and Light Company for a building containing the residence
of the accused and 3 other residences. Believing that more light is consumed
than what is shown in the meter installed, the company installed an
additional meter on the pole outside Carloss house to compare the actual
consumption. They found out that Carlos used a jumper. Further, a
jumper was found in a drawer of a small cabinet in the room of the
defendants house where the meter was installed. In the absence of any
explanation for his possession of said device, the presumption raised
was that Carlos was the owner of the device whose only use was
to defl ect the fl ow of electricity, causing loss to the Meralco of over 2000
kilowatts of current. Accused of theft, Carloss defense was that electricity
was an unknown force, not a fluid, and being intangible, could not be the
object of theft.
ISSUE:
Whether the court erred in declaring that electricity can be the object of
theft.
HELD:
While electric current is not a fluid, still, its manifestations and effects like
those of gas may be seen and felt. The true test of what may be stolen is not
whether it is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether, being possessed of value,
a person other than the owner may appropriate the same. Electricity, like
gas, is a valuable merchandise and may thus be stolen. (See also U.S. v.
Tambunting, 41 Phil. 364).The court further ruled that electricity, the same as
gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property and is capable of appropriation by another. It is also susceptible of
being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported
from place to place. Hence, no error was committed by the trial court in
holding that electricity is a subject of larceny.
Luis Marcos Laurel vs Hon. Zeus Abrogar
GR No. 155076
January 13, 2009
FACTS
Laurel was charged with Theft under Art. 308 of the RPC for allegedly
taking, stealing, and using PLDT's international long distance calls by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR) a method of outing and
completing international long-distance calls using lines, cables, antennae,
and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local/domestic
exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined. PLDT alleged

that this service was stolen from them using their own equipment and
caused damage to them amounting to P20,370,651.92.
PLDT alleges that the international calls and business of providing
telecommunication or telephone service are personal properties capable of
appropriation and can be objects of theft.
ISSUE
WON Laurel's act constitutes Theft
HELD
Art.308, RPC: Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things, shall take personal property of another without the latters consent.
Elements of Theft under Art.308, RPC:
1.

There be taking of Personal Property;

2.

Said Personal Property belongs to another;

3.

Taking be done with Intent to Gain;

4.

Taking be done without the owners consent;

5.

No violence against, or intimidation of, persons or force upon things

Personal Property anything susceptible of appropriation and not included

in Real Property
Thus, the term personal property as used in Art.308, RPC should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and personal
property. Consequently, any personal property, tangible or intangible,
corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation may be the subject of
theft (*US v Carlos; US v Tambunting; US v Genato*), so long as the same
is not included in the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code.
The only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that it be
subject to appropriation.
Art. 416 (3) of the Civil Code deems Forces of Nature which are brought
under the control of science, as Personal Property.
The appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by
science can be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for
generating or measuring such forces of nature, wrongfully redirecting such
forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently
obtain such forces of nature.

In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally

connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDTs telephone system,
through which petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long
distance calls using PLDTs facilities constituteSubtraction.
Moreover, interest in business should be classified as personal property since
it is capable of appropriation, and not included in the enumeration of real
properties.
Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication or telephone service
are personal property which can be the object of theft under Art. 308 of the
RPC. The act of engaging in ISR is an act of subtraction penalized under the
said article.
While international long-distance calls take the form of electrical energy and
may be considered as personal property, the said long-distance calls do not
belong to PLDT since it could not have acquired ownership over such calls.
PLDT merely encodes, augments, enhances, decodes and transmits said calls
using its complex communications infrastructure and facilities.
Since PLDT does not own the said telephone calls, then it could not validly
claim that such telephone calls were taken without its consent.
What constitutes Theft is the use of the PLDT's communications facilities
without PLDT's consent. The theft lies in the unlawful taking of the telephone
services & businesses.
The Amended Information should be amended to show that the property
subject of the theft were services and business of the offended party.

MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE V. ROJAS G.R. NO. 9069

Facts:
The municipal council of Cavite by Resolution No. 10, leased to Rojas some
70 or 80 square meters of Plaza Soledad, on condition that she pay rent

quarterly in advance according to the schedule fixed in Ordinance No. 43,

series of 1903 and that she obligate herself to vacate said land within 60
days subsequent to notification to that effect. Upon such notification,
however, she refused to vacate the land, forcing the municipality to file a
complaint before the CFI to order her to vacate the land. After a hearing of
the case, the CFI dismissed the complaint.
Issues:
(1) Is the contract valid?
(2) If in the negative, what are the obligations of the parties?
Held: (1) No. Article 1271 of the Old Civil Code, prescribes that everything
which is not outside the commerce of man may be the object of a contract,
and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce. Communal things that
cannot be sold because they are by their very nature outside of commerce
are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets, common lands, rivers,
fountains, etc.
(2) Rojas must restore and deliver possession of the land described in the
complaint to the municipality of Cavite, which in its turn must restore to her
all the sums it may have received from her in the nature of rentals just as
soon as she restores the land improperly leased.
Maneclang v. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Adriano Maneclang in this case filed a complaint for quieting of title over
a certain fishpond located within the 4 parcels of
land belonging to them situated in Pangasinan but the trial court
dismissed it by saying that the body of water is a creek constituting a
tributary to Agno River therefore public in nature and not subject to
private appropriation.
They appealed it to the IAC which affirmed the aforementioned decision.
Hence, this review on certiorari.
However, after having been asked to comment to the case thereon, they
manifested their lack of interest and the parties to the case (the complainant
and the awardee in the public bidding Maza) decided to amicably settle the
case saying that judgment be rendered and that the court recognize the

ownership of the petitioners over the land the body of water found
within their titled properties.
They say that there would be no benefit since the NIA already constructed a
dike and no water now gets in and out of the land.
Issue:
Whether or not the fishpond is public in nature.
Ratio:
Yes.
A creek is defined as a recess or arm extending from a river and
participating in the ebb and flow of the sea.
It is a property belonging to the public domain and is not
susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
The mere construction of the dikes by NIA nor its conversion to a fishpond
altered or changed the nature of the creek as property of the public domain.
The compromise agreement is null and void and of no legal effect because it
is contrary to law and public policy.
IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND VALERIANO
108 SCRA 335
FACTS
Faustino Ignacio filed an application to register a parcel of land (mangrove)
which he alleged he acquired by right of accretion since it adjoins a parcel of
land owned by the Ignacio. His application is opposed by the Director of
Lands, Laureano Valeriano, contending that said land forms part of the public
domain. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that said land
formed part of the public domain. Thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the land forms part of the public domain
HELD: YES

1. The law on accretion cited by Ignacio in inapplicable in the present case

because it refers to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers while this
refers to action in the Manila Bay, which is held to be part of the sea

2. Although it is provided for by the Law of Waters that lands added to shores
by accretions caused by actions of the sea form part of the public domain
when they are no longer necessary for purposes of public utility, only the
executive and the legislative departments have the authority and the power
to make the declaration that any said land is no longer necessary for public
use. Until such declaration is made by said departments, the lot in question
forms part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership.
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi
Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the
Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the
former during the war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property
of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it
cannot be alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to
the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the
principle of lex situs applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion

unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the
Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of
law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a
dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity
to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential
validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a
conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership
and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same
matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no
question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging
to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale.
This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the

alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the

existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are
capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the
foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that
the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to
Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable.
CHAVEZ VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked
to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and
selling functions of the DENR (Department of Environmental and Natural
Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development
Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged
areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be
transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the
constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands
comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the
name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares
of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA
also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to

Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.