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301
DEVELOPMENTS in RESEARCH
H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON, Editor
Administrative Corruption
Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden, University of Southern California
daily press brings, it seems, fresh examples of allegedly corrupt behavior on the part of responsible
in which it might elicit approval rather than condemnation. Although this approach contains much
that is appealing, and has paved the way to more
public and private figures. This growing prominence of corruption has coincided with increased
academic interest in a subject long deemed inappropriate for serious research, and still not regarded as a respectable topic for study in certain
circles. Fortunately, obvious objections to research
into corruption - problems of measurement, difficulties of access, bias, and evaluation - have been
largely attenuated, if not overcome. It is accepted
now that it is the responsibility of social scientists
to choose for their research subjects which touch
on or embrace problems central to human society,
and not merely those convenient to the tools they
have to hand.
tion, condemned it a priori, and looked for explanations in individual behavior. Social scientists
States, suspicion was growing that these phenomena did not exist in isolation. The arch-muckraker,
Gerald E. Caiden is a professor of public administration at
at Berkeley.
MAY/JUNE 1977
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302
Lincoln Steffens himself, late in his career drewfamily, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of privateattention to the role of incentives fostering corrup-
(30).
national aid and development encountered apparent and blatant corrupt administrative practices in
poor countries. It was natural to ask "Why do certain societies at particular times appear especially
able).
The first problem was "what is corruption?"
Definitions have been classified into three types
(20): public interest, public duty, and market centered. The first, which has largely been rejected by
the revisionists, regards corruption as arising:
whenever a powerholder .. . i.e., a responsible functionary or office holder, is by monetary or other rewards not
it pertains, the revisionists have dissolved corruption. In their conception, corruption is by definition exceptional, the departure from the normal
ways of doing business: corruption cannot itself be
the norm. Once corruption, in other words, becomes sufficiently widespread as to constitute a
normal rather than an exceptional mode of behavior, it ceases to exist.
event only when the public interest can be clarified and judged.
tion:
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303
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
the latter a stipulated institutionalized decision-inability to provide the services demanded of it.
The centralized allocative mechanism breaks down
making process. But again, the standard is purely
because of disequilibrium between supply and derelative, since these institutions are regarded as so
mand, and the market reasserts itself (31). In poor
inadequate to fulfill the demands placed upon
factors, rising expectations and demands, the preing. Once again corruption is legitimized in termsdominance of government as a supplier of reof its prevalence and of faulty working of West-sources, and lack of alternatives. Similarly, one can
ern-style norms and institutions.
refer to the inability of morally approved strucThese definitions provide the under-pinning for tures to fulfill essential social functions (25).
The "political" aspect of the explanation reexplanations of why corruption is allegedly more
prevalent in certain places, notably poor countries.lates corruption to access to power and political
The "cultural" explanation starts from the
institutionalization. Corruption is seen as primarily
assumption that in "developing" countries there
related to inadequate political channels, and as
exists a gap between law (as imposed Western and
such simply a special case of political influence
for corruption because of the disproportionate impact of government on society, bureaucratic dom-
and legitimacy, and corruption fills the gap. Corruption is the equivalent of pressure group influence in more politically developed countries, but
taking place after the passage of legislation rather
family system, otherwise he violates a stronger norm regarded as the result of modernization in the ab-
to his duties to his family and his kin, some of whom may
he imbibes Weberian ideas in school, including possible ence is made to the disruptive effects of changes in
post-graduate studies abroad, he faces a conflict in regard values (e.g., ascription to achievement; acceptance
have helped him bear the cost of an expensive education wealth and power, the expansion of governmental
(19).
reaucratic role is only one open to the official, and function as violence (and acts as an alternative). Its
not necessarily the most compelling (13). So-called emergence is inversely related to the degree of
corruption appears to be consistent with customs social stratification in the society. The lack of
and traditions, whereas the laws and ethics that
opportunities outside government leads to the use
make it illegal and immoral are alien, imported, or of public office to build private fortunes, and
super-imposed (1). It is also suggested that tradi- foreign business activities tend to encourage local
tional values pre-dispose toward corruption, which corruption (29).
in turn eases the gap between citizen and governAs these explanations have strong functional
ment (29). A variation on this theme is the view overtones, they stress the positive effects of cor-
that corruption is "dislocated" behavior resulting ruption. Since attention is on "developing" counfrom a lag in the value system of the community tries, the main issue raised is the probable effect of
in relation to institutional change (32).
corruption on economic, political, and, to a lesser
The "cultural" explanation blurs into consid- extent, administrative, development. On the
erations of governmental capacity, which have two whole, considerations relating to administrative
major emphases. The first of these might be called development are the most pessimistic, for obvious
"economic," since it relates to the government's reasons, since corruption undermines bureaucratic
MAY/JUNE 1977
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304
pensity may be added a breakdown in the allocacriteria in decisions (5). On the other hand, cortive mechanisms of society, or economic, political,
ruption is also regarded as a means of surmounting
and administrative reasons, so that corruption
either traditional laws and/or bureaucratic regulasteps in to fulfill the missing functions. Corruption
tion (21) and considered as a means of cutting
is thus legitimized in terms of its prevalence, and
down uncertainty in decision making (29). Nepoof its functionality: indeed, given the inappropritism may even result in the appointment of more
ateness of Western norms and inadequacy of Westcompetent bureaucrats (2).
contribution to political development, usuallyBefore the clear distinction between public and
standards of behavior which emerged with
viewed in terms of national integration and private
the
the ideas of the French Revolution, the argument
strengthening of political parties. Corruption is
runs, many practices now regarded as corruption,
cited as an acceptable alternative to violence (21)
(28) and as aiding national unification and stabilsuch as venality and nepotism, were not against
the law and were even exploited to their own
ity, helping integration by bringing in groups
otherwise alienated, and increasing participationbenefit
in
by rulers. Corruption, in accordance with a
public affairs (21) (2). It is also argued that corpublic duty definition, did not and could not exist
MAY/JUNE 1977
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305
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
as opposed to sporadic, dilatory judicial interThe problem is to what exactly the revisionists
vention (11).
are referring. They link "corruption" defined in
It is also true that before this transformation
practices now thought of as corrupt provided the opment," a concept which has come to mean all
basis of government. Nepotism, venality, exploita- things to all men (12). Further, the relationship
tion of public function for private profit, were not may be far from positive, i.e., rather than "corruponly usual but also served needs of the crown tion" (whatever it might be) aiding "development"
which could not be fulfilled through more legiti- (in mythic terms of whatever one would like it to
mate channels. But even while such practices were be), a particular kind of development may tend to
commonplace, they were by no means accepted. be accompanied by corruption. Often there is an
As long ago as the ancient empires, before even uneasy ambivalence regarding which is to be the
money was in common use, corruption was recog- dependent variable, development (or modernizanized and vigorous attempts made to combat it, as tion) or corruption.
for example in the bureaucracy of Mauryan India
Beyond the semantic problem, however, lies the
fortune - one to pay off his debts, one to provide system cannot accommodate change - it is thus a
a nest-egg for himself, and one to bribe his judges functional dysfunction, whereby the new (and
when he returned to Rome (4) ), awareness of cor- therefore functional) norms it represents replace
ruption existed and orators such as Cicero spoke
outmoded norms. Exactly where this fits into the
out against it. Machiavelli attempted to analyze argument regarding cultural norms or propensity
corruption in the Italy of his day (8). The monar- to corruption is unclear: for here the new norms
chies of Europe all instituted some machinery to
are, in fact, the old (pre-development, non-Westcombat corruption, even though to serve their own ern) norms. There is a further ambiguity in the
needs, they sometimes acquiesced in its subversion "cultural" argument, which does not make it al-
purposes of the regime or participants, did not upon by Western-type development. There is also a
mean that corruption did not exist. Though wide- missing link in the analysis, which should explain
spread and prevalent, the phenomenon of corrup- the actual dynamic whereby new norms are
tion was well recognized and its consequences evolved, and what kind of norms these will be.
ception from the norm: it was the norm itself, accommodate the needs of societal change. In the
MAY/JUNE 1977
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306
failed to do so. In the end the old ways of conducting state business simply could not cope with
the state's needs for increased mobilization of re-
continuing development and modification of accepted and corrupt means of administration, but
disappear when it becomes entrenched and accepted: rather it assumes a different form, that of
systemic as opposed to individual corruption.
Individual and Systemic Corruption
definitions they suggest are well suited to individual corruption - the individual who strays from
temic corruption occurs whenever the administraa prevailing norm of official public behavior. Sevtive system itself transposes the expected purposes
eral of the hypotheses they put forward may even
of the organization, forces participants to follow
be plausible as long as they are thought of in indiwhat otherwise would be termed unacceptable
vidual terms - informal organizational short-cuts;
MAY/JUNE 1977
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307
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
tices;
(e) non-violators suffocate in the venal atmosphere; they find no internal relief and much external disbelief;
(f) prospective whistle-blowers are intimidated
and terrorized into silence;
(g) courageous whistle-blowers have to be protected from organizational retaliation;
(j) those formally charged with revealing corruption rarely act and, when forced by external
pressure to do so, excuse any incidents as isolated,
rare occurrences.
corruption prevents
interest.
vacuums left by inadequate public laws,
to get
MAY/JUNE 1977
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308
imited to a specific case: there is an accumulator11. Caiden, G.E., The Dynamics of Public Administra-
temic corruption. In contemporary public adminis- 16. Durand, Y., Les Fermiers Generaux au XVIII Siecle
tration, the issue is not so much individual mis(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971).
conduct in public office, serious as that is, as the 17. Friedrich, C.J., "Political Pathology," Political Quarterly, Vol. 37 (1966), reproduced in A.J. Heiden-
heimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
18. Gopal, M.H., Mauryan Public Finance (London:
References
Allen and Unwin, 1935).
19. Guzman, R.P., et al., "Graft and Corruption: Issues
in and Prospects for a Comparative Study of a Speci1. Abueva, J., "What Are We in Power For? The Sociolfic Type of Bureaucratic Behavior," paper prepared
ogy of Graft and Corruption," Philippine
for the IDRC Project Development Meeting on BuSociological Review, VoL 18 (July-October 1970),
reaucratic Behavior and Development, Baguio City,
pp. 203-210.
January 26-30, 1975.
2. ' "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and
20. Heidenheimer, A.J., Political Corruption: Readings
Graft to Political Development," East-West Center
in Comparative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart
Review, VoL 3 (June 1966), pp. 45-54, reproduced
and Winston, 1970).
in A.J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings
21. Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Societies
in Comparative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart
(New Haven: Yale University Press), reproduced as
and Winston, 1970).
"Modernization and Corruption" in A.J. Heiden3. Alatas, S.H., The Sociology of Corruption: The Naheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparature, Function, Cause and Prevention of Corruption
tive Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wins(Singapore: Donald Moore, 1968).
ton, 1970).
4. Arnott, P.D., The Romans and Their World (London: St. Martin's Press, 1970).
5. Bayley, D.H., "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," Westeri Political Quarterly, Vol.
19 (December 1966), reproduced in A.J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).
1961).
23. Leff, N., "Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption," American Behavioral Scientist,
Vol. 8 (November 1964), pp. 8-14.
MAY/JUNE 1977
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30
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS
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