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LACSON vs.

LACSON
G.R. No. 150644 GARCIA, J.:
FACTS: The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate
daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was
born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after
the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home
in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial
reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia
Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some
time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of Leas mother. As the
trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period
of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not their own. It
appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated
December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however,
Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill
the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children
meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of
1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling
of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College
in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a
complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch
33, Maowee was about to graduate. In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as
amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother,
averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several
pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged
that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time,
borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had
received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00. As applied
for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and Maonaa
support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment and
other conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996. Following
trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as
represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate
formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific
sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the grant of support in arrears from
1976 to 1994
HELD: The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner
to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice,

factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most
compelling and cogent reasons. Not one of the wellrecognized exceptions to this rule on
conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court
cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the CAs findings bearing on the
actuality that, as basis for an award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for
support had been made on the petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note
adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as
here, is generally limited to correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is
the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below, except when, as earlier indicated,
compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such
evidence.

DAVID vs. CA
G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four
children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private
respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J.,
was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children,
both girls, namely Christine and Cathy Mae.
The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took
Christopher J. to Villar's house in Angeles City and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but
after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher
J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. Hence, Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner ruling that the custody of the child
shall be given to the mother and directing respondent to give a temporary support of P
3,000.00 a month. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC`s judgment holding that
habeas corpus case was not the proper remedy in that the latter contemplate a situation
where the parents are married to each other but are separated. Moreover, it ruled that
in an adulterous relationship, the question of custody shall be brought in a case singularly
filed for the purpose and that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other
minor children. It ruled that it is for the best interest of Christopher J. That he should
temporarily remain under the custody of respondent until the issue on custody and
support shall have been determined in a proper case. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of the child shall be given to the child.
Held: Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus shall
extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto."
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of the right to
the custody of minor children is relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to
each other, are for some reason separated from each other. It does not follow, however,
that it cannot arise in any other situation.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than

the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under
the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of
such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the
fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of
her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on
her own since they were born. Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000
per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She augments her income by
working as secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a monthly income
of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with her employer so that she can personally
attend to her children. She works up to 8:00 o'clock in the evening to make up for time
lost during the day. That she receives help from her parents and sister for the support of
the three children is not a point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern
for every member of the family are characteristics of the close family ties that bind the
Filipino family and have made it what it is.
Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of
support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed
willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be
conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child.
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out, Christopher J., being less than seven
years of age at least at the time the case was decided by the RTC, cannot be taken
from the mother's custody. Even now that the child is over seven years of age, the
mother's custody over him will have to be upheld because the child categorically
expressed preference to live with his mother. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts
must respect the "choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen
is unfit" and here it has not been shown that the mother is in any way unfit to have custody
of her child. Indeed, if private respondent loves his child, he should not condition the
grant of support for him on the award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is
ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T. David to the custody of his mother, the
herein petitioner, and to give him temporary support in the amount of P3,000.00, pending
the fixing of the amount of support in an appropriate action.

Libi vs IAC
G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992
Facts:
Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who was an 18yearold first year commerce student of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi who was then a minor between 18 and 19
years of age living with his parents.
Julie Anne Goting and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until after two years when Julie Ann
broke up with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible.
During the first and second weeks of their break up, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands of reconciliation but the latter persited with her refusal prompting the former
to resort to threats against her. Hence, Julie Anne stayed at the house of her bestfriend
to avoid
Wendell. Julie Ann and Wendell died each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with
the sme firearm, a revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi which was
recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents.
Private respondent submitted that Wendell caused their daughter`s death by shooting
her with the firearm and then turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. Petitioner`s,
however contended that an unknown third person, whom Wendell may have displeased
or antagonized by reason of his work as narcotics informer must have caused their death.
Julie Ann`s parents filed a case to recover civil damages arising from the vicarious liability
of Wendell`s parents under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for vicarious liability.
Held: In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent
court cites Fuella cs Callado, et al. Which supposedly holds that the subsidiary liability of
parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code covers obligation arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,
followed by an extended quotation ostensibly from teh same case explaining why under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code parents should
assume subsidiary liability for the damage cause by their minor children. Now, we do not
have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding the parents liable, but the
categorization of their liability being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard
second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analysis. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the
parents for crimes or quasidelict of their minors is subsidiary, then the parents can neither
invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability
imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary, that diligence could constitute
a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or
omission , in this case the minor and the father , in cas of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are solidary liable.
Under the foregoing rule, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by theri minor
children under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is
proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
such damages.
In the case at bar, whether the death of hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a
felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendel Libi, respondent court did not err in holding
petitioner liable for damages arising therefrom. Subject to the preceding modifications
of the premises relied upon by it therefor and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein
explained, we conjoin with its findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the
requisite diligentissimi patris familias to prevent such damages.

Espiritu vs. CA
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in
1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was employed by the National Steel Corporation and
Teresita was employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for Los Angeles,
California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later.
In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a
common law relationship of husband and wife. Subsequently, Rosalind Therese was born.
While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married,
and upon their return to the U.S.A., Reginald Vince was born.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in
1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her
about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was a
spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of attending to
household
expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She
claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep
in constant touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in
Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He
had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed
a criminal case for bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. Teresita,
meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children. The RTC dismissed
the petition for habeas corpus suspendeding Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind
and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with
rights of visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the custody of the two children.
Held: In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by
the Family Code to take into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven
years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is
strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by "compelling reasons". If a child is
over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In
its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances. In the present

case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated
her seventh birthday on August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on
January 12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be fairly
intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining the parent with whom they
would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to
investigate if the parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and custodial
responsibility.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the regional trial court because
it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in detail all the
relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a child psychologist, Rita
Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects of uprooting her from the Assumption College
where she was studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the tests are
quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her mother were very negative causing
the psychologist to delve deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and kissing a "bad" man
who lived in their house and worked for her father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother
even on the telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of constant
fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's family to go back to the United
States to live with her mother.
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted for the purpose of
securing the travel clearance required before minors may go abroad. Social Welfare
Officer Emma D. Estrada Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the
United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved and uncared for.
Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did everything for her and Reginald. The
child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity.
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7year age reference in the law applies
to the date when the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a
decision is rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the choice made
by a child must be ascertained at the time that either parent is given custody over the
child. The matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. Then too, it must be noted
that both Rosalind and Reginald are now over 7 years of age. They understand the
difference between right and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability
and a certain degree of material sufficiency. There is nothing in the records to show that
Reynaldo is an "unfit" person under Article 213 of the Family Code.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto Lustado on December 17,
1984 in California. Less than a year later, she had already driven across the continental
United States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo, in Pittsburgh.
The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course, to dilute this disadvantage on her
part, this matter of her having contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo,
Teresita tried to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told Reynaldo about

her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly,
Judge Harriet Demetriou of the Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this
story were given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of this Court
about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime against privacy.
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one man to another does not
fall under "compelling reasons" is neither meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only
are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or
immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to
mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records appears to have
become final.
The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court. The children are now
both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is
clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The
presumption under the second paragraph of said article no longer applies as the children
are over seven years.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the
Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the
minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No
special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SANTOS vs. CA
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. From
the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been
in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, private respondents Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the
latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter alleged that they paid for all the
hospital bills, as well as the subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not
afford to do so. Julia Bedia-Santos left for the U.S.A. in 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged
that he is not aware of her whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States
proved futile. PR`s claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending
financial support to them for her son. PR`s contended that petitioner abducted the boy
when petitioner along with his two brothers visited the Bedia household, where three-year
old Leouel Jr. was staying.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward
Leouel Santos Jr., before the RTC which was granted on the same day and was affirmed
by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the custody of minor Leouel Santos, Jr. shall be awarded to the petitioner.
Held: The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated children,
are dutybound and entitled to keep them in their custody and company.The child's
welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and
custody.
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall
continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The situation obtaining in the case at bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos,
Jr., is working
in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present. Not only are they
physically apart but are also emotionally separated. There has been no decree of legal
separation and petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under

Art. 214 of the Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is proper
only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner's unfitness, according
to him, has not been successfully shown by private respondents.
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner's parental
authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the
legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a
deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner
is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his
in-laws without permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent
right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and
merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of
the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody
may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody
would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a
chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support
which a father can give.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to his
legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.

NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Division) and RAY C. PEREZ
255 SCRA 661 ROMERO, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Ray Perez is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while
petitioner Nerissa, his wife is a registered nurse. They were married on December 6, 1986.
After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave
birth to Ray II in New York on July 20, 1992. Petitioner who began work in the US in October
1988, used part of her earnings to build a model house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also
sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. In February 1992,
petitioner became a resident alien. Private respondent stayed with her in the US twice
and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only
a tourist visa and was not employed. In January 1993, the couple and their baby arrived
in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the US. When Nerissa came home a
few days before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. Petitioner
did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husbands meager income of
P 5,000.00. She longed to be with her only child but her husband was keeping him away
from her. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay here , where he could raise his son even
as he practiced his profession. Petitioner was forced to move to her parents home in
Mandaue. Nerissa filed a petition for Habeas Corpus asking respondent to surrender the
custody of their son to her. The court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one
year old child to his mother, citing paragraph 2, of Art. 213 of the Family Code which
provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. On appeal, the CA reversed
the trial courts order and awarded custody of the boy to his father. Holding that granting
custody to the boys father would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
ISSUE: As between father and mother, who should have rightful custody of a child who
bears in his person both their genes?
HELD: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable law.
Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation
decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such petitioner and private
respondent, are covered within its terms. The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar
provision . Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors). The provisions of law
mandate that a child under 7 years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a
mandatory character. The general rule that a child under 7 years of age shall not be
separated from his mother finds its raison d' etre in the basic need of a child for his
mothers loving care. Only the most compelling reasons shall justify the courts awarding
the custody of such a child to someone other than his mother, such as her unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority. In the past the following grounds have been considered

ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and parental authority: neglect,


abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity and being sick with a communicable disease. It has
long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare
and best interest of the child.

VANCIL vs. HELEN G. BELMES


G.R. No. 132223 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
FACTS: Bonifacia Vancil is the mom of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died
in US in 1986. Reeder had a common-law wife, Helen Belmes, with whom he had two kids,
Valerie & Vincent. Bonifacia instituted guardianship proceedings over person &
properties of Valerie (6 yrs old) & Vincent (2 yrs old). Estate consists of proceeds from their
dads pension benefits worth P100k. RTC Cebu appointed Bonifacia as legal & judicial
guardian. Natural mother Helen opposed claiming she already filed a similar petition for
guardianship. She later on filed a motion for Removal of Guardian &Appointment of New
One claiming that shes the natural mom in actual custody of & exercising parental
authority over children. She further asserted that Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado,
USA &that shes a naturalized US citizen. Regional Trial Court rejected & denied motion.
The Court of Appeals reversed. FC 225: parents, father or in his absence, mother are
considered as natural guardian of minor children. Revised ROC Rule 93 Sec. 7 confirms
designation of parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor kids w/o need of court
appointment & such can only be transferred to another person for a good reason. CA
found no reason why biological mom should be deprived of her legal right. Affirming RTC
would abdicate & violate the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law & the constitution
on family solidarity. Bonifacia claims that she should be appointed as the guardian based
on the undisputed proof that Helens livein partner has raped Valerie seven times while
under Helens custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bonifacia should be appointed as the guardian
HELD: No. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The case is moot. Valerie since already turned
18 on Sept. 2, 1998. Only thing in dispute is guardianship of Vincent. Art. 211 (FC): Father
& mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over their common children. Fathers
decision shall prevail in cases of disagreement unless theres a judicial order to the
contrary. Thus, Helen, being the natural mom of Vincent has the natural & legal right to
his custody. Such right is inherent & not created by state/decision of courts but derives
from nature of parental relationship (Sagala-Eslao vs. CA). Art. 214 (FC) allows substitute
parental authority of surviving grandparent only in case of death, absence or unsuitability
of parents. Helen is very much alive & has continuously exercised parental authority over
Vincent. Helens unfitness was only asserted Valerie & since shes already of major age,
such cannot be appreciated anymore. Even if Helen were unfit, Bonifacia still wont
qualify considering that shes a US citizen & resident. She wont be able to perform the
responsibilities &obligations required of a guardian. Most probably shell just delegate
those duties to another person who might not be qualified. Shes been out of the country
since 1987 and considering that shes old & was previously convicted of libel, its not likely
that shell come back here to fulfill her duties. Besides, only2 yrs are left for her to exercise
guardianship over child. True that law does not require courts to only appoint residents
as guardians but court should not appoint guardians

who are not within our courts jurisdiction for it will be difficult to protect the wards in such
instances.
VITUG, CONCURRING: Law & jurisprudence recognizes deep ties that bind parent & child.
Parents are placed 1st in rank in matters of parental authority. Childs legitimacy doesnt
affect the order of priority in exercise of parental authority. FC176 states that illegitimate
child shall be under parental authority of mom who should be entitled for the childs
custody.

ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. WILLIAM CARPITANOS


G.R. No. 143363 PARDO, J.
FACTS: In February 1995, defendant-appellant St Marys Academy of Dipolog City
conducted an enrollment drive for the SY 1995-96.Part of the campaign was the visitation
of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. A student of that school and
part of the campaign, Sherwin Carpitanos along w/other high school students were riding
in a Mitsubishi jeep driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school.
En route to Larayan Elem School, it was alleged that minor James drove the jeep in a
reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a
result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. The Regional Trial Court held St Marys
liable for indemnification for loss of Sherwins life, actual damages for burial and sorelated expenses, attorneys fees and moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
decision but absolved from any liability the driver-minor James and jeeps owner
Vivencio Villanueva. St. Marys appealed. The Court of Appeals reduced actual
damages to PhP25K but affirmed the rest of its previous decision. School filed Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding St. Marys liable for said
death 2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award of moral
damages against the school
HELD:1. Yes.CA held school liable under Arts 218 & 219 FC, pointing out that petitioner
was negligent inallowing a minor to drive in the campaign to visit public schools to solicit
enrollment. School was also liable in not having a teacher accompany the minor students
in the jeep. However, for petitioner to be liable, it must be shown that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident. But respondent-spouses
Daniel and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the accident was not the
negligence of the school or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. This was confirmed by the testimony of the traffic
investigator who instituted a report of the accident. Hence, reliance on Art 219 FC that
those given the authority and responsibility under Art 218 shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts oromissions of the unemancipated minor
was unfounded. Liability, whether caused by the negligence of the minor-driver or
mechanical detachment of the jeeps steering wheel guide, must be pinned on the
minors parents primarily. The negligence of St Marys was only a remote cause of the
accident, an event that the school had no control over.
2. Yes. Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was
respondent Villanueva for he even admitted this fact. The Court has held that the
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be
responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets. It is not the schools but the registered owned
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin

Carpitanos. Judgment reversed. Case remanded to TC for determination of liability of


defendants excluding St Marys.

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