Global Discourse

An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied

Contemporary Thought

ISSN: 2326-9995 (Print) 2043-7897 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20

Building an empire or not? Athenian imperialism

and the United States in the twenty-first century
Alexandros Koutsoukis
To cite this article: Alexandros Koutsoukis (2013) Building an empire or not? Athenian
imperialism and the United States in the twenty-first century, Global Discourse, 3:1, 12-30, DOI:
10.1080/23269995.2013.808847
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2013.808847

Published online: 27 Jun 2013.

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Date: 17 November 2016, At: 03:44

Global Discourse, 2013

Vol. 3, No. 1, 1230, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23269995.2013.808847

RESEARCH ARTICLE
Building an empire or not? Athenian imperialism and the United
States in the twenty-first century
Alexandros Koutsoukis*
Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Penglais, Aberystwyth, Wales, UK

In order to assess whether the United States is an empire and what we could learn from
such an analysis, we embark on a dual task. We evaluate American imperial tendencies
based on Michael Doyles criteria and then compare them to the Athenian informal empire
of the fifth-century BC. In our comparison, we focus on how the Athenian empire was
created and what are its commonalities with the US world order. We also explore their
various differences at the level of international and domestic politics and their plausible
consequences. The criteria we use are economic inequalities and military interventions
and motives and national style. We suggest that the United States is a republic with
imperial tendencies but not yet a Machiavellian imperial republic. Were this to happen, it
would endanger the future of globalisation and the stability of the world.
Keywords: empire; the United States; Athens; Sparta; Thucydides; tribute; economic
exploitation; military interventions; state building; tyranny; instability; motives;
national style; civic spirit; globalisation; rising powers; Russia; China
Over-reaching by the powerful would not surprise Thucydides or his heirs.

Robert Jervis1

Is the United States an empire and, if it is, which past empire does it resemble? Both
scholars and pundits ask this question repeatedly. They often do that with the aim of either
castigating America2 and its hypocrisy or extracting lessons for its foreign policy. When they
answer on the affirmative they frequently compare the United States to ancient Rome. In this
article, we depart from both answers. We argue instead that the United States today is not an
empire but should it become one it would most likely resemble ancient Athens. We go back to
the Hellenic world because the Athenian empire of the fifth-century BC has many resemblances to the post-World War II United States. The Athenian empire was created after a
major war, it was formed gradually and relatively peacefully without imperial conquests
initially and it was a democratic commercial power. Similarly, the United States became a
superpower with global reach after World War II, it rose relatively peacefully without
resorting to imperial territorial conquests and last but not least it is a democracy and a
commercial power. However, America still remains distinct from ancient Athens due to the
central differences such as the relative stability of the American world order in contrast to the
instability of the Athenian empire, the lack of an overarching adversary like Sparta with whom
to fight a war and the lack of an imperial national style as it was typical of ancient Athens. The
tension between the similarities and the differences between Athens and the United States will
be the building blocks of our analysis.
*Email: alk15@aber.ac.uk
2013 Taylor & Francis

Global Discourse

13

Such a comparison is germane because it could caution the United States about how
closely it resembles to ancient Athens and recommend what to avoid in order not to
follow the trail blazed by Athens. Athenian imperialism and the savage conflict with its
major adversary led to its demise. America is fortunate enough to lack an arch-enemy but
its policies of regime changes, military interventions and economic inequalities that
disproportionately favour the United States dangerously approximate Athenian imperialism. America has an exceptional opportunity to make the most of its historically unique
world order, but it can also ruin its chance. Athens tells the United States that tyranny
incites revolts and a polarised international system compounded with American tyranny
could reinforce instability and conflict. If the United States wants to learn from Athens,
then it should avoid imperial hubris against smaller states and should try to engage the
rising powers into a collaborative global system. To that end, it should not cultivate an
imperial civic spirit. Should it fail to do so, the danger of populism, authoritarianism and
imperialism would be visible.
It is worth stating from the outset that the aforementioned differences between Athens
and the United States did not exist from the beginning of the first Athenian empire, but came
about gradually. Will this reality continue to differentiate Athens from the United States or
will it change and make these two polities look more alike? The answer to this crucial
question is concealed in the future. What we already know is that the path from peaceful
beginnings to violent endings has historical precedence. The Delian League or the
Athenian empire was created relatively peacefully but, nonetheless, it later started to
dissolve violently. It managed to initially do so because the security, economic and cultural
benefits it offered to its allies. Unlike other past empires, like Alexander the Greats, the
Ottoman empire, the colonial empires and many others, it was not created through the
violent conquest of its subordinates. Instead, it became a pole of attraction by liberating
them and benefiting them. Athens liberated the Greeks who were under Persian rule and
then they joined Athens. Security was the primary incentive that led to the creation of the
Athenian empire. Athens wanted to secure itself against Persia and the allies needed a leader
to assure them they would not be conquered by Persia again (Meiggs 1975, 43, 47).
Economic considerations were also important, but at a later stage. The commercial and
economic benefits of the empire contributed to its integration. Of course Athens would
benefit militarily and economically disproportionally more from its allies but up to a point
this situation was perceived as a win-win situation from both parties (Meiggs 1975, 46).
Other incentives the allies had were the cultural pull of Athens and its prestige as a leader
during the Persian Wars. The Delian League started to progressively become unbearable,
unstable and fracture violently when Athens became tyrannical. When the Greek passion for
autonomy was not met, when the tribute was collected under pressure, when revolts by allies
commenced and Athens resorted to military actions, garrisons and governors, and when the
Peloponnesian War intensified those pressures by making Sparta more attractive an ally of
Athens was on its road to tyranny (Meiggs 1975). In fact, the Athenians were self-conscious
of that but they thought they could endure. Subsequently, the empire became increasingly
violent and interventionist. Athens did not shy away from this attitude and was confident
when speaking the language of power, self-interest and imperial mission. At the same time
though, it became increasingly insecure and did not want or could not afford to lose any ally.
This violent Athenian struggle to keep its empire intact, unlike its early stages, was
characterised by an overly arrogant, militaristic and oppressive foreign policy. Benign
beginnings ended up in imperial hubris.
Such similarities, real and potential, between the United States and Athens should be
emphasised in order to come up with conclusions. Nevertheless, like in every historical

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A. Koutsoukis

comparison, we must be careful and explicit about the criteria we use if we intend to make
the past intelligible and relevant to our concerns. This is the focus of the next section. We
will then proceed by articulating our theoretical approach, which is that of Doyles,
evaluate contemporary American foreign policy based on these criteria and then conclude
with the historical comparison.
Debating American imperialism: four fundamentally different views
Getting an overview of the basics of the four competing views on American imperialism is
useful for that reason. Not only will it help us to understand where and why they disagree,
but also constructively force us to reflect on our premises and the criteria we use in order to
avoid contradictions and form a more coherent and consistent analysis. We have divided the
contending approaches based on their exponents. Those are the leftists, the imperialists,
the behaviourists and the alarmists and the imperial historiographers.3
According to the leftists, the United States is an empire because of its nature. Despite
variations in their analyses, they agree on the imperialist nature of the United States.
Three main categories of leftist scholars are those who endorse the Leninist dogma of
imperialism, the theorists of dependence and the American revisionist scholars who
belong to the New Left school of US foreign relations history. According to the first,
imperialism is the highest stage of capitalism, as Lenin put it, and capitalism is therefore
imperialistic by definition. According to the second, the American-led global economic
system impoverishes the poor countries and disproportionally benefits the rich countries,
the United States and their economic elites. This inequality is structural and is reproduced
by the capitalist economic system. In the Untied States, the New Left academics put
forward an analysis focusing on the expansion of the US fundamental interests. For the
revisionist historians, America was an expansive empire and that was integral to its liberal
ideology (Kramer 2011, 1348, 1359, 1362, 13741378, 13881389). It had an expansionist impulse but it was not a communist one, like in the Soviet Union, it was a liberal one.
In other words, the DNA of the American foreign policy was imperialistic. Liberalism
was compatible with the imperial logic they had discerned, which was the extension of
global capitalism and democracy. Both of them insured American prosperity and security
and they reflected the American interests and values. Prominent scholars of this position
have been Beard and Williams (Bacevitch 2002, 1131). What is common among leftists
of different strands is deep scepticism or distrust towards liberalism. They also share a
dispositional view of imperialism which stems from the economic forces within capitalism; hence prejudging the sources of empire (Doyle 1986a, 24, 33).
According to the imperialists, America needs to become an empire. The United
States should stop shying away from what better serves Americas as well as everybody
elses interests; global order. The United States enjoys unprecedented military, diplomatic,
economic and cultural power, but does not use this power effectively. Denying its imperial
mission weakens its global role, endangers its international interventions and makes it illprepared to enforce them. Acting like an empire will make it think like an empire, amass
the necessary resources and be effective like an empire. Besides, America is nearly or
already an empire and denying the reality will not make it change. The US tradition of
military interventions and regime changes in Latin America, the Balkans, the Middle East
and Central Asia testifies to that. The differences among the imperialists vary among those
who, like the neo-conservatives (Sterling-Folker 2008, 322326), relish the unipolar
moment, favour its preservation and have a missionary agenda (Kagan and Kristol
2001; Krauthammer 2002; Sterling-Folker 2008, 322), and those, like the British historian

Global Discourse

15

Niall Ferguson, who avoid the overt defence of imperialism but underline the necessity of
global policing by an imperial America. This America, according to Ferguson, will
resemble to an empire functionally but not in name and it will still be cooperating with
other powers (Ferguson 2004a, 2004b). Both categories of the imperialists favour a
voluntaristic foreign policy and downgrade the possible reaction by other powers
which, according to them, will either be kept in check or will be willing to cooperate.
According to the behaviourists and the alarmists, the foreign policy of the United
States either is or resembles an imperial one. Acknowledging this reality will require
America to respond better to current and future imperial challenges or avoid the dangers
of becoming an empire (Lebow and Kelly 2001; Bacevitch 2002, 244). There are two
main strands of these non-dispositional analyses. The first focuses on America as an
empire because it maintains global order (Litwak 2002, 8081; Bacevitch 2002, 243). The
second is related to the extent of American influence upon the domestic politics of other
countries (Doyle 1986a; Hoffmann and Bozo 2004). In line with the first point of view,
the maintenance of a global order is an imperial task. Sustaining it equals the nourishing
of an empire.4 For instance, according to Litwak, global terrorism is a problem that no
longer permits America to remain reluctant. It must assert itself so as to maintain order.
That is both an imperial problem and an imperial task. However, authors of this strand are
less overt in their imperial policy suggestions than the imperialists. They pinpoint with
different degrees of emphasis on the difficult but necessary task of balancing between
unilateralism and multilateralism, between timidity and hubris and between necessity and
righteousness (Litwak 2002, 82; Bacevitch 2002, 244). In keeping with the second point
of view, the extent and type of political control over other societies is what distinguishes
imperial control from other forms of political influence. This second standpoint represents
the current authors stance and will be further developed in the following section. In short,
this category of authors points out the fluctuating character of America and its foreign
policies and foregrounds caution (Kramer 2011, 13901391).
Last but not least, according to the imperial historiographers empire is the name of
a category of analysis, not a kind of entity. Its utility lies in offering an alternative reading
of history and disclosing nuances, perspectives and comparisons that would otherwise
remain concealed or unimaginable. According to a recent perceptible and detailed review
essay by Kramer:
Foregrounding power, narrating connection, and engaging in comparison, efforts aided
greatly by the concept of the imperial, are all necessary for making sense of the United
States global history. The study of U.S. imperial histories is relevant to those who focus
their attention on the United States and those who do not, for both historiographic reasons
that studying U.S. imperial history raises methodological questions that may spark fresh
inquiries in other settings and historical ones namely the long shadow cast by U.S.
power in the past and present. Specifically, the imperial foregrounds the analysis of power
and politics on a global scale, the interconnection and mutual imbrications of societies, and
the comparison of hegemonic systems in history. There may well be other concepts that can
accomplish these goals, but the imperial helps more in pursuing them than it hinders. For a
robust imperial history of the United States to move forward, it will have to detach itself
from the rhythms, if not from the content, of public-political discourse to which it has
traditionally been bound, and separate itself from jeremiads that proceed, ultimately, from
an urgent sense of the United States imminent or incipient imperial career that is not borne
out by either historical or present-day realities. It would indeed be ironic if empire,
sharpened for occasional use as a weapon against egregious violence and tyranny, rendered
ongoing imperial processes invisible to history. Only a sustained U.S. imperial historiography, one that is already well under way, can shed necessary, critical light where American
power seeks exception. (Kramer 2011, 1391)5

16

A. Koutsoukis

By making these four distinctions, we do not aim to discredit any of them but to show the
different perspectives and world views underlying each of the aforementioned categories,
and to make a meeting of minds feasible. A dialogue among leftists and liberals is difficult
because of the different understanding and attitude towards liberalism. A conversation
among pro-imperialists such as neo-conservatives and liberals is easier but still not easy
enough. The first often advocate the dictum might makes right whereas the second are
more reserved and offer contingent analyses. All of them nevertheless grasp the same
facts. Therefore, if we cannot and we should not instruct everybody to change their
opinion, then the least we can do to enhance a dialogue among them is to make the criteria
of each analysis clear. This would also be particularly helpful for the third category, the
behaviourists and the alarmists, which includes a variety of authors whose views do not
always coincide and the criteria they use are not always explicit or similar. To this task we
now turn.

Defining empire
Michael Doyle provides the following definition of empires in his homonymous 1986
book Empires:
Empires are relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the
effective sovereignty of other political societies. They include more than just formally
annexed territories, but they encompass less than the sum of all forms of international
inequality. Imperialism is the process of establishing and maintaining an empire. (Doyle
1986a, 19).

Doyle goes also to great lengths to clarify what is the specific kind of political control
over the sovereignty of other political societies that could be considered effective enough.
It is this particular type of control that can be categorised as imperialism. To that end, he
uses criteria which are both distinguishable and measurable and thus helpful, and include
the following five: domain, scope, range, weight and duration. They are summarised in
this extract:
Imperial control is distinguished by its domain. It controls the lives of individuals without
necessarily sharing their values. It is also distinguished by its scope. [It does not engage
merely in] war and diplomacy. The agents of empire shape, formally or informally, the
political life of the subordinate periphery. Those agents control both the domestic and the
foreign issues that affect the populations subject to imperial rule. In governing those
populations, they employ a range of rewards and punishments considerably beyond
those of conventional international relations. They thereby achieve more weight than
influence or constraint; they control the effective sovereignty. Empire, moreover, is
distinguished by duration [] [and includes more than temporary surrendering to] foreign
control. (Doyle 1986a, 45)6

Despite the fact that these criteria are not unambiguous, as even Doyle himself admits,
they are quite detailed and specific (Doyle 1986a, 30). For that reason, they are very
useful for our analysis and for any analysis that attempts to judge whether the United
States is an empire or of what type. For example, based on Doyles criteria, inequality and
dependency are not imperialism as dependency theorists argue. The imperial state must
control the domestic politics of the subordinate country not just impose costs on it in
order for dependency to constitute evidence of imperialism (Doyle 1986a, 33, 4344). Of
course even this definition, like every definition, leaves areas of ambiguity, including

Global Discourse

17

economic domination so effective that it is never resisted (Doyle 1986a, 44).7 This does
not mean though that it is not helpful. As far as it concerns those who assert or describe an
American empire, a good definition like this one is useful because it can discipline
researchers to be more precise on the extent and type of political control they are
discerning and not just narrate the sequence of intermittent American expansionism.
Clear-cut definitions are analytical tools that help us to navigate through the wealth of
information and historical events. We will now offer a brief examination of the extent to
which America is an empire based on Doyles definition. We will then compare America
to imperial Athens of the fifth-century BC and try to discern lessons.
American imperial tendencies in the twenty-first century
We will assess the United States imperial tendencies distinguishing allies from allies.
The criterion is the political control of the effective sovereignty. We perceive three
categories of allies; true allies, subordinate allies and potentially subordinate allies
(and non-allies).8 The first category consists of Americas Western Allies. The second one
is composed of occupied countries or countries that are under the US-led state-building.
The third one contains countries where a US intervention might take place if its strategic
interests are under threat.
Some of the closest allies of the United States are the countries of Western Europe and
Japan. These are real allies and their relation with the United States is not imperial. They
are influenced by the United States, but they are not subordinated to it. Instead, they have
created a resilient community of states that has not erupted into war despite the fact that it
consists of some of the great powers of the world. In addition, the prospects of war among
these powers are diminished or non-existent although historically great powers were often
fighting or were expected to fight. This understanding has led scholars like Robert Jervis
to argue that these countries have formed a pluralistic security community after the term
Karl Deutsch used (Deutsch, Burrell, and Kann 1957) that is a community of states were
war is not even contemplated (Jervis 2002, 1). But even if someone disagrees with the
terminology of the Western Security Community that Jervis employs, the sense of
imperial control is absent. For example, according to Charles Krauthammer, the United
States is a superpower attended by its Western Allies (Krauthammer 2002, 5).9 In other
words, the United States may try to influence the foreign policy of these states, but its
effect is not guaranteed. The most intense and characteristic case is the French opposition
to the US-led war in Iraq in 2003. The divisive statement by the US Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld distinguishing between old and new Europe is memorable and
depictive of the extent of the transatlantic crisis. Had America been an empire it would
have imposed its will. It would not be bitter.
Apart from Americas Western allies and other close allies such as Canada
and Australia, there are many countries where Americas influence may approach
imperial control, dependence or interdependence. Among these states there are two
categories that make the United States resemble an empire: countries under state-building
and US(-led) intervention, and states where the United States has its own primary
interests.
The typical contemporary examples of imperial interventions and imperial missions
are Afghanistan and Iraq. To these recent ones one must not forget the interventions in the
former Yugoslavia and later in Kosovo in the 1990s. Despite the reasons and the
rationalisations before each intervention, the fact remains that they are medium- to
long-term military interventions that changed and are still changing the face of these

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A. Koutsoukis

countries. The political control is imperial.10 For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina exists
as a country due to the American-inspired Dayton accords. The democratisation of Iraq
and Afghanistan, no matter how imperfect it is, is a US(-led) project. Domestic politics are
shaped by the imperial power and are not independent to evolve based on the interactions
and conflicts of local elites. That is not an argument against intervention, but simply its
description. For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and in Iraq
have a mission that most closely resembles a colonial one. They aim to assist governments
to govern, promote political and economic development, and provide provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population (Quainton 2012, 10).
Whether unilateral or multilateral, this mission has the impact of imperial control, and it
is no wonder that it is perceived as such by many Afghans and Iraqis (Quainton 2012, 10).
Nevertheless, these cases are not isolated. The sequence of interventions might continue in
Syria and Iran. Furthermore, there is an uncertainty concerning the future reaction of
America towards an unstable Libya and a recalcitrant North Korea.
The last category of states where the United States role may be considered as or
become imperial is the oil-rich Middle East region where the United States has important
interests. America has not intervened there recently. The only new invasion has been that
of Iraq in 2003. However, since the end of the Cold War, the American military presence
has been significant. It has stationed massive military force in the Middle East to secure
Western access to Persian Gulf oil supplies and to bolster pro-American regimes there
(Craig 2004, 164). This generates important influence, but it is a matter of judgement to
decide whether it provides solid evidence of imperialism. In case of instability or regime
change in Saudi Arabia for example, will the United States intervene militarily or will it
react like in Egypt? How much time does it have to pass without intervention in order
for the presence of troops not to be considered an act of imperialism and what if a new
regime arises that is not anti-American? For instance, to take another example, American
troops in Germany are still stationed there, but they are no longer considered occupation
forces. A concomitant question concerns how the United States will react if Iran closes
the Strait of Hormuz. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the Strait
of Hormuz is the worlds most important chokepoint (a narrow channel along widely
used global sea routes). The oil that flowed daily there in 2011 amounted to almost
17 million barrels, which represented almost 20% of oil traded worldwide (US
Government 2011). Will it intervene like it did in Iraq? Will it create another imperial
mission? Will it create more allies?
The United States, therefore, cannot be categorised as a traditional empire. It is a
republic with imperial tendencies, which imposes temporarily imperial control over
foreign countries. Offering a name to that is less important because the literature already
abounds in names and titles such as The Imperial Republic, The Reluctant Empire,
The Compulsive Empire, The Liberal Empire, The Post-Modern Empire, An Empire
of Bases and many more (Aron 1975; Coker 2003; Jervis 2003; Ferguson 2004b;
Ikenberry 2004). What is more important is to understand what is the nature and shape
of the American imperial characteristics. The United States does not conquer. It chooses to
control informally through local collaborators and temporarily (i.e. Afghanistan and Iraq).
After some time, it recedes; its transformational impact though remains (big or small is
simply a matter of judgement (McDonald 2009, 66)). In this way, it changes the world and
increases its influence. Actually its goal is to imperialise without creating an empire. It
imperialises temporarily, but not permanently. When its interests are at stake, it does not
hesitate to intervene. Its imperial missions are recurrent. In fact, American history is full
of them whether one looks at the Cold War interventions or goes further back to the

Global Discourse

19

Monroe doctrine that heralded the exclusive US sphere of influence in America for
example. Having sketched an outline of the imperial in recent US foreign policy (since
the American history before World War II has specific differences, e.g., indigenous
Americans, the Philippines, etc.), we can now turn to history and make use of the
comparison between another democratic empire Athens of the fifth-century BC in
order to discern lessons and to draw parallels where appropriate.
Comparing Athens to America: similarities and differences
Athens of the fifth-century BC was a powerful democracy holding an empire. The similarities
with the United States are essential. It was a democracy with many parallels with the
contemporary liberal spirit. It had created a regional order based on its own rules. It controlled
and intervened in the domestic politics of some city-states under its influence. It was a
commercial and not a mercantilist power. Its culture was dominant and admired. It provided
benefits to its allies, such as public security in the Aegean Sea and club economic goods.11 It
initially did not annex territories.12 It was an informal empire that was created gradually and
after a major war. Moreover, its political regime was different from its principal adversary,
Sparta. All these similarities are accompanied with specific differences in relation to the
United States such as the absence of nuclear weapons, the degree of its military superiority in
relation to other states, the amount of wealth generated by its regional order, the instability of
its order and the hostility with the other great power of Hellas, Sparta, which did not partake in
its regional order. Elaborating on those similarities and differences will help us to better
understand, in historical perspective, the American imperial tendencies.
In order to do that we also need a short account of the evolution of the Athenian
empire because it was neither static nor purposive initially. Accordingly, we can understand important questions such as why the empire was created, how it was sustained, what
the role of the consent of the allies was, when and why it started diminishing and how
democracy became compatible with empire. These questions are meaningful because we
can ask the same things about the United States today. Looking at the past is a good way
to shed light on the present.
Everything, it could be argued, took place in the range of a few years during the fifthcentury BC in the context of the misfortunes and reactions to the Greco-Persian Wars. The
Greco-Persian Wars or simply the Persian Wars were a turning point in ancient Greek
history. They brought Athens to eminence in the Greek world, made its leadership
necessary and acceptable and laid the ground for it to become an empire. A few years
later, at the time of Pericles Funeral Oration, Athens was no longer another city-state
among many, but an empire with some 250 dependent communities.
The Persian Wars started with the rebellion of Ionian Greeks (499493 BC) in the region
of Asia Minor against the Persian rule. Athens had then supported the Greeks by sending 20
ships. This was a first and reluctant step towards opposing the Persians. However, the Greeks
had not yet realised their real power and that they could defeat the Persians. It took quite a few
years for this perception to change and with that many things transformed.
The Ionian rebellion was suppressed and, as a consequence, the first Persian invasion
of Greece followed (492490 BC). The end of this invasion was victorious for Greeks,
who finally came to realise that they could defeat the Persians. At Marathon [Greeks]
discovered, to [their] own intense surprise, that the spear and the shield could conquer the
bow, even against superior numbers (Zimmern 1915, 182). The same happened again
10 years later at the second Persian invasion of Greece (480479 BC) that ended with the

20

A. Koutsoukis

Persian defeat in the battles of Salamis and Plataea. In both cases, Athens was a leading
power. The other leading power was Sparta.
This period was important for the transformation of Athens because it gradually
became a naval power and the Greeks started respecting it because of the amount of its
troubles and courage. In both invasions, the Athenian contribution was instrumental. The
Athenians abandoned their city which was set on fire by the Persians during the second
invasion, became sailors and helped to defeat the common enemy. The Athenians won the
admiration of the Greeks, increased their power, became a maritime nation and came to be
the leaders of one of the two parties in which the Hellenes13 were grouped. The other was
organised around Sparta (Thucydides, 1.18).14
After the defeat from the second Persian invasion the Greeks counter-attacked and
fought many successful battles until approximately 449 BC (1.89118). Then the Greeks
returned home (1.112). However, a fundamental difference occurred in the very beginning
of this period. The Spartan general Pausanias became excessively authoritarian and as a
result the Greek allies were irked by him, did not want him and stopped acknowledging
Spartan authority. As Thucydides informs us, at that point the Spartans changed their
minds and decided not to further take part in the war with Persia and the Athenians
assumed the leadership with the full consent of the allies (1.96). The smoothness of this
transition is a matter of debate and according to Meiggs it is virtually certain that the
[other Peloponnesians] did not remain when Spartan leadership was finally rejected
(Meiggs 1975, 4041). In any case though, that was the moment when the Delian
League, the Athenian-led alliance against the Persians, was formed and which soon
degenerated into an informal empire. Its goals were not defence, but the maintenance of
the allies independence, freedom for their enslaved brothers, revenge and booty. The
united Greeks were confident they could fight back successfully, wanted it and had a
strong leader, Athens. So, they did.
These events changed the course of history. The Hellenic world was striking back
and Athens had become its leader. This is how the Athenian empire was formed. As
Zimmern puts it the Athenian Empire was the child of necessity, and its creators did
not know what they were doing (Zimmern 1915). Of course they would soon realise
and cherish and protect what they progressively acquired. The famous Melian
Dialogue15 is depictive of this change in attitudes but there are many indicative
passages in Thucydides history like in Alcibiades oration before the Sicilian
Expedition where he said:
We cant, like bean counters, decide how much empire we want. We must, seeing that we
have gone this far, pre-emptively attack some and hold onto the rest, because the danger for
us is that if we dont rule over others, they will over us. Inaction doesnt mean the same thing
for you as it does for others not unless you change your ways and become like them. (6.18)

The points we are making are four. First, a democracy can become an empire. There is
nothing impossible in that scenario. There is historical precedence. Second, the Athenian
empire was created gradually. It was not announced 1 day at the Agora of Athens; and
even when that happened, the empire had already come to life. Third, no imperial motive
is prerequisite to build an empire. Imperial states are not necessarily built because they
desire to swarm -their people, trade or investments- or to change the status quo, or to
promote the special interests of slaveholders (Doyle 1986a, 60). They can be created
without plan and out of necessity; just like the Athenian one. Last but not least, they can
be created with the consensus of its subordinates. The security, stability and prosperity

Global Discourse

21

provided and produced by the Athenian empire was benefiting its allies and was
sufficient a reason to hold the empire together.16
Athens benefited from the Empire and so did its allies. The empire had not only
driven off the Persians from the Aegean Sea but also liberated most Greeks, secured free
maritime roots from pirates and evil-doers, supported international commerce hence
providing prosperity to its allies spread a standardised and credible coinage, the Attic
Drachma, which facilitated economic transactions, generated and sustained a system of
quite homogeneous commercial treaties and rule of law among its allies, was culturally
as Thucydides writes an education to Greece, and finally excluded major economic
competitors.17 These competitors of course were members of the opposing league, the
Peloponnesian League.
Initially that served Athens allies very well and made them accept Athenian leadership. They had become free, secure and more prosperous, and the prospects for the
sustainability of this order were positive; Athens was strong enough and its authority
accepted. According to Zimmern Athens stood, not only for freedom from the barbarian [the Persians], but for freedom of intercourse and freedom of trade; and it was to the
interest of the allies to encourage her in promoting them (Zimmern 1915, 187).18 It
was an obvious corollary to add to traders convenience by simplifying the procedure in
business disputes (Zimmern 1915, 187188). That led to further and stronger unification of the empire and affected the allies domestic politics because they were relying on
Athens courts for specific juridical issues (Zimmern 1915, 187190). Despite any
complaints though, we hear little or nothing of practical grievances (Zimmern 1915,
189).19 The process was so gradual, and the control so wisely exercised, that the
allies could not easily put their hand on any particular cause of complaint (Zimmern
1915, 189).
Apparently, we can so far discern many similarities between Athens and the United
States especially during the stable, glorious and prosperous days of the Athenian empire.
The American world order is a liberal one based on free commerce, rule of law,
democracy and American security providence. The United States, during the Cold War,
protected Western Europe from the USSR and communism, and now proceeds with
further spreading liberal values. NATO continues its existence and is the strongest
politico-military alliance in history. Globalisation has been working so far, has generated
unprecedented wealth for the West and other countries and has also influenced the
domestic politics of other countries that had to adapt in order to take part and be
competitive. The US dollar is the currency most used in international transactions and
is one of the worlds dominant reserve currencies. During the course of history, since the
aftermath of World War II US authority has been accepted by its allies.
Another parallel between Athens and post-World War II US is that neither designed an
empire nor tried to create one20 and that, in due course, this reality and the relevant
perceptions started to change. Athens ended up creating an empire unintentionally and out
of necessity as we previously mentioned. The American case is similar. The United States
despises the term empire but, partially as a response to Cold War and post-Cold War
challenges, has created a world order that resembles imperial.21 In essence, both countries
were not perceived as empire initially despite various characteristics that were pointing
towards this direction.22 However, that changed for Athens and a relevant debate is
ongoing about the so-called American Empire. Can Athens elucidate our thoughts
about when and why it started to be perceived as an empire and how does this relate to
the United States today in an age of financial crisis and rising powers?

22

A. Koutsoukis

The history of Athens can shed light on our contemporary debates about American
imperialism and world order. The parallels we can draw are both important and limited.
They are important because of the similarities between the two countries and their
imperial tendencies are limited because of the significant differences. Athens can point
towards a plausible future scenario of international politics if the course of history comes
to resemble that of the past: a polarised and divided world among different camps
organised around regional hegemonic powers.
The Delian League became the Athenian empire in stages while Athenian control over
its allies domestic politics and overbearing behaviour increased steadily (Doyle 1986a, 55
56). The allies had initially accepted Athens as their leader consciously and they were not
in a suspicious mood (Meiggs 1975, 46). At first, they had taken their autonomy for
granted and they did not even envision an end in the alliance. Two were the key factors that
made the allies loathe the Athenian empire, tribute23 and military interventions, and two
that made Athens to sustain its empire, motives and its national style (Doyle 1986a, 6069).
All four elements will help us do the comparison with the United States.
First of all, the tribute the allies had to pay became an important cause of rebellion.
The tribute generated a sense of inequality and exploitation and the subsequent Athenian
harsh repression intensified this mood (1.99). In our era, tribute does not exist but there
is another sense of inequality and exploitation of the global economic system that is
currently taking place; the American debt which is large and distinguishable from that of
other debtor countries. America is able to do that because of its dominance in the global
capitalist system and although it is trying to reduce it, the fact remains that we are
talking about the richest country in the world and that should have precluded such an
outcome (Craig 2004, 167). The creation of the debt was no accident. It was the
outcome of domestic economics in the United States that were instrumental in sustaining the American standard of living in the context of the US position of preponderance
at the international system. This resembles the disproportionate economic benefits that
the citizens of Athens enjoyed, thanks to the creation of their empire. The American
debt brings images of imperialism and for a good reason.
Another issue of economic importance that could directly lead to imperialism and
military interventions is the US stake in the smooth operation of the global capitalist
system. A case in point is oil and the Middle East. The American stakes in global
capitalism make the oil-rich Middle East important to US interests given the lack of a
broadly accepted alternative to oil and of satisfactory technology for clean and cheap
energy. In case of local or regional instability, it is possible that the United States will
intervene to reassure that there will be no supply disruptions with adverse effects for the
international economy. This would be another imperial mission. Similarly, Athens intervened in unstable city-states or created cleruchies in key points to secure the supply of
grain from the Euxine Sea (the Black Sea).
Nevertheless, military interventions, and that is the second key contributing factor to
both tyranny and empire, do not come without cost. Not only do they increase debt but
they also create a sense of tyranny and lead to instability. Military interventions to rebelled
allies of the Delian League, regime changes and democracy-protection garrisons
imposed to some of them represent significant reasons why Athens became progressively
unpopular among some of its allies and was perceived as a tyrant. The same takes place
today (notwithstanding that Afghanistan and Iraq were not allies) only that instead of
rebellions it leads to anti-Americanism and global terrorism targeting the United States
(Craig 2004, 164). Moreover, such interventions create frictions between the United States
and the rising powers, especially Russia and China. Although now these differences are

Global Discourse

23

limited, they may nurture larger ones and develop distrust the more these powers grow.
This could result in instability in the international system. The recent events in Libya and
in Syria are two poignant cases that have generated friction.24
These two factors, economic exploitation and military interventions, had created
increasing allied grievances, a sense of tyranny and instability in the Athenian empire.
They also threaten the United States, the more it acts likewise. The two factors that made
Athens sustain its empire were motives and its national style.
Of the various motives that supported Athenian imperialism, we will concentrate on
gain and fear because they relate directly to this age of financial crisis and to the rising
powers. To state that Athens and the United States have been aware of the importance of
their economic order to their prosperity is to state the obvious (Doyle 1986a, 63). To argue
that they would defend this privilege, it is also apparent. However, if the current economic
crisis deepens the outcome will be more severe than just slower growth or recession in the
American economy and that will be different. The current world order is based on the
unprecedented wealth generated by American globalisation. If that pillar of the world
order is threatened, so it will be the resilience and the existence of the Western Security
Community and the reasons for which Russia and China (and the other rising powers) are
partaking in globalisation (Jervis 2002, 23). Economics will become once more a
centrifugal force instead of a centripetal force.25 Instability will ensue and the rising
powers will be less reticent to creating regional hegemonic orders and exclusive spheres
of influence. That, in turn, will accentuate American security fears.
The case of imperial Athens provides avid evidence of why imperialism is reinforced
when broader security fears are combined with increased discord with the major adversary. The history of Athens teaches us that increased fear and discord lead to instability,
further economic extraction from the allies, imperial oppression, more dissatisfaction,
more oppression and that consecutively reinforces instability and defection to the opponent. The rebellions by Athens allies endangered the stability of the Delian League.
However, although Athens might have tackled this issue based on utilitarian calculations
that would allow insignificant allies to leave, the Peloponnesian War made this choice a
near impossibility. This is made explicit in the Melian Dialogue where Athens considers
that it cannot afford to accept not even the existence of a neutral little island city-state like
Melos (5.95). The Peloponnesian War altered the cost-benefit calculations of Athens and
the impact its decisions could have. The war necessitated more ships and more money.
The Athenians, who had already become oppressive, increased the tribute of their allies,
this further amplified the sense of inequality among the allies, dissatisfaction built up
and some allies tried to defect from the alliance. Given that any defection would
probably turn out to Spartas gain, the outcome generated a vicious circle. Athens trying to
avoid the dissolution of its empire and being afraid of the strengthening of Sparta and its
alliance, became more tyrannical, more imperial, more interventionist and that made
Sparta more attractive an ally to those thinking to defect; hence encouraging them to do
so (either by its actions or by its mere existence). The various revolts by Athenian allies
during the Peloponnesian War, such as those by Samos and Mitylene, testify to that
(Doyle 1986a, 58). Eventually, not only was the Delian League transformed into an
empire but also the international system and the pattern of alliances. Sparta emerged as a
pole of attraction and political subversion (Doyle 1986a, 61). Will the same thing happen
if the economic crisis becomes harsher and political relations between the United States
and Russia and China get tensed?
There is no one answer to this question. Certainly though, Athens provides indications
about specific patterns of behaviour if we draw the appropriate parallels. First of all, we

24

A. Koutsoukis

have to remember that there is no contemporary equivalent of Persia that could tip the
balance in favour of one or the other adversary in case of a conflict. Second, Russia and
China do not seem ready to launch unprovoked attacks against the United States and start
another world war; that could be considered an equivalent of the Peloponnesian War
(Jervis 2002, 2). Moreover, both of them and the United States have nuclear weapons and
mutual second-strike capabilities. That does not rule out war but it does make it much less
likely (Jervis 2001, 290). However, these powers could become a pole of attraction and
political subversion if the United States behaves increasingly imperially like Athens.
Given factors such as the unparalleled amount of the US prosperity, the unprecedented
wealth generated by its world order, the liberal character of its global order and its
unrivalled armed forces it seems highly unlikely that this may happen.26
Nevertheless, Athens history is valuable and has something more to tell us. Not only
economic crisis27 and conflict matter but also tyranny and changing perceptions of friends
and enemies. Sparta, just a few years before the Peloponnesian War, was the discredited
leader of Hellas, then became the enemy of the Delian League and eventually the
liberator of Hellas. Sparta during the Peloponnesian War and despite previous Greek
grievances gradually, forcefully and successfully presented itself as the liberator of
Hellas. Although one may argue that this is mere war propaganda this is not the essence of
the point. The crux of it is that such an argument found fertile ground in the realities of
Greece and became appealing to Greek city-states. The reason for the appeal of such an
argument is that Athens had become a tyrant and there was a feeling of oppression by
Athens subordinates. Sparta, by playing up this theme, not only did exploit the preexisting tendencies among the Hellenic states but also solidified them, intensified them
and, even worse, redefined them. In this way Sparta both legitimised its cause and started
naturalising ideas about fundamental differences in inherent natures and ethnic identities
among Greeks which were undermining Athens position even more (Price 2001, 127).28
If the United States wants to sustain its world order, it must avoid the Athenian hubris.
Athens paid dearly for its tyranny and the one who benefited was Sparta. Apart from the
aforementioned possibilities, there is also another danger related to rising powers; that of
Russia and China changing their attitudes towards globalisation. If they perceive that they
are not respected29 properly by the United States and if globalisation threatens their
regimes stability or territorial integrity, then they may come to desire an exclusive sphere
of influence. Such existential fears might dampen the sensitivity to the losses that would
ensue from undertaking such a decision. Moreover, if the Americans believe that such an
arrangement is inappropriate in todays world -at least for others- this will reinforce the
revisionist aspirations from the two most significant rising powers like a self-fulfilling
prophecy (Jervis 2002, 2; Craig 2004, 162). In addition, if other countries, for reasons of
discontent towards American domination or belief in the success of the regional orders of
Russia and China, start aligning with them, then this could destabilise the American world
order. Yet, even that scenario seems distant provided that both Russia and China have
started modernising and already take part in globalisation; unlike Sparta that neither
modernised nor participated in the Athenian order.
The successful modernisation of these countries is crucial for solidifying the stability
of the liberal order30 and feasible but as Kagan has cautioned: in the long run, rising
prosperity may well produce political liberalism, but the long run may be too long to
have any strategic or geopolitical relevance.31 Behind liberal analyses of gradual liberalisation lies the belief in cumulative progress.32 However, nothing excludes the possibility
of crises and although some of them are expected by liberals there is one kind of them that
is problematic. How can diverging norms be reconciled? For instance, how can one agree

Global Discourse

25

on humanitarian intervention if one disagrees about the meaning of human rights? Norms
are slow to change because they reflect each societys interpretation of its values and that
does not change quickly, i.e., during a crisis. Thucydides once more provides a relevant
statement on the issue. In a dialogue between the revolted Mytilenians and Sparta, the first
try to convince Sparta to help them and emphasising their differences from Athens point
out: for differences in action arise from discrepancy in minds (3.10; Price 2001, 134).
That is the equivalent of our discussion of norms which complicates reality. Rules can be
negotiated but how easily can norms be adjusted? A Western emphasis on rule-making has
ignored the setbacks this aspect of change may generate. This is something that the West
and the United States will eventually have to confront the more the rising powers increase
their power and assert themselves.33
The second and the last factor that sustained the Athenian empire and its will for
imperialism was its imperial national style (Doyle 1986a, 65, 6469). Imperial policies in
Athens emanated from the fact that imperialism benefited directly its citizens, who could
influence democratic domestic politics to generate more wealth for themselves.
Commercial expansionism had required imperial expansionism and in the Athenian
democracy that had created an adventurous spirit that Thucydides identified as a source
of Athenian imperialism. That is to be contrasted to Spartan isolationism that precluded
empire.
The American national style lies traditionally between isolationism and internationalism. For America, to become an empire like Athens it would need for the American spirit
to be transformed into a solely internationalist one which would not be counterbalanced
by isolationist tendencies (Hoffmann and Bozo 2004, 140141). Those who identify
America as an empire focus mostly on American internationalism. Those who advocate
imperialism nurture the adventurist spirit of America. If this were to prevail then
America would become an empire, a tyranny and it would resemble Athens even more.
Although this tension between isolationism and internationalism is probable to continue, it
is not assured. The danger though remains and it is real. It can be seen in the unanimity
for the war in Afghanistan [and] the relative ease with which Americans followed the lead
of those who insisted on the need to drive Saddam Hussein from power (Hoffmann and
Bozo 2004, 136; Craig 2004, 165167). The United States is an imperfect liberal
democracy that faces the dangers that Tocqueville highlighted, namely, individualism
and conformity (Hoffmann and Bozo 2004, 144, 146). If this trend continues and is
supported by the imperial aspirations then it will lead to a kind of populist authoritarianism typical of what Doyle labelled the liberal imperialism of Machiavellian republics
(Doyle 1986b, 11541155; Hoffmann 2002, 16; Hoffmann and Bozo 2004, 144146).
Then America would become a true imperial republic.
Conclusion
The United States is a liberal republic with imperial tendencies and, arguably, a civic spirit
in decline which could become an imperial spirit.34 We have used the history of imperial
Athens of the fifth-century BC to draw lessons and parallels. Athens points towards the
unprecedented inclusiveness of the liberal world order, the challenges that can arise in the
context of this order as well as the unique opportunity the United States and the rising
powers have to create for the first time in the history of a global order not divided in
exclusive spheres of influence. However, the last remains to be seen and represents the
greatest contemporary challenge that will determine the future of world politics.

26

A. Koutsoukis

Articles like this one are, hopefully, useful because they are cautioning against the
creation of an imperial spirit but may counter-intuitively and inadvertently lead to more
imperialism if they blind us to supposed imperial processes (Kramer 2011, 1391). It is a
matter of judgement and of assessing the whole US history to argue whether the repetitive
American imperial tendencies feed off an underlying idea or imperial vision which equals
to an imperial national style (Coker 2003, 1415). Nevertheless, this would necessitate
broader considerations and more space to do justice to them.
One last remark remains to be made. According to Doyle Athens [] encouraged,
sustained and protected recent democratic revolutions (products of the demise of the
Persian empire) and then actively controlled them. These democratic societies appeared
to be less stable than were Spartas oligarchic dependents, and consequently they seemed
to require more active control (Doyle 1986a, 59). Had Athens allied with stable democracies like contemporary democracies and had its imperial ascendance taken place in a
unipolar world, would it resemble the United States of the twenty-first century? In other
words, is imperialism a characteristic of the imperial state or a strategy of states when
they have the opportunity to manipulate unstable domestic politics? If it is closer to the
second then it would confirm Lord Actons dictum that power corrupts and absolute
power corrupts absolutely as Jervis was pointing out in the phrase that comes after the
epigraph with which we started this article.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Christopher Coker, Campbell Craig, Florian Edelmann and the two anonymous
reviewers for their pieces of advice, comments and suggestions. The usual clause applies.

Notes
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Epigraph. From Robert Jervis contribution to the H-Diplo roundtable on Tony Smiths book
A Pact With the Devil: Washingtons Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the
American Promise (Jervis 2007).
I am aware of the problems involved in using the name of a continent for a national one but I
will use US and American interchangeably in order to avoid repetition.
This division is not exhaustive but it is helpful to understand the contemporary debate over
America as an empire by those who use the term. For a more detailed and comprehensive
analysis see Kramers Power and connection (Kramer 2011). See also footnote 115 at page
1391 about the past empire/not-empire divide based on the left/right political division.
Although this distinction is not the only one, it is still partially valid. Doyle also offers an
overview of different approaches to imperialism in his work Empires (Doyle 1986a, 1930).
Many contemporary realists provide relevant analyses but avoid focusing on the terminology
of empire arguing for a systemic or structural analysis and using terms such as hegemony,
primacy, empire or great power interchangeably (Waltz 1979, 1937; Doyle 1986a, 2629;
Jervis 2003, 83; Sterling-Folker 2008). For a perceptive and balanced comparison between
American imperialism and American realism from a realist perspective, see Craigs review
article American realism versus American imperialism. Craig assesses American imperialism
based on the idea of exercising power beyond any possible security interest and on the US
domestic politics and political culture (Craig 2004).
This is an ambiguous point. According to Ikenberry, the United States cannot be an empire
because it is liberal. This would be a structural impossibility. Moreover, the American-led
world order is unique and acceptable by other states (Ikenberry 2000; Litwak 2002, 79).
We would like to thank Campbell Craig for directing us towards this article.
Our italics.
See, for example, Cokers argument in his Empires in Conflict according to which the
Washington consensus has imperial impact (Coker 2003, 16).

Global Discourse
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.

27

Of course there are more countries than those. We focus on those ones relevant to the analysis
of empire based on our criterion of imperial control.
Our italics.
The only criterion offered by Doyle that is not unambiguously fulfilled is duration. However,
duration is conceptualised vaguely by Doyle and he does not specify a very specific time
horizon; he mentions 1020 years (Doyle 1986a, 45). He provides though a metaphorical
distinction between a stick-up and slavery. This makes understandable the global concern
about George W. Bushs national security doctrine about Americas role in the universal war
against terrorism, in which deterrence would be replaced by preventive war and which
Hoffmann identified as an imperial vision (Hoffmann and Bozo 2004, 137).
It is rather club than public economic goods because Athens prevented outsiders from
enjoying the fruits of membership in the Delian League. The Megarian decree, for example,
forbade Megara from trading with the Athenian empire.
Athens would gradually change this attitude. In cases of revolts or insubordination, it would
either establish a cleruchy, a type of colony that was not independent but linked to the
metropolis, or would outright colonise the city-state like it did with Melos. Although cleruchies were not exactly colonies they would still amount to loss of territory for the ally and
would represent Athenian imperialism and control since the cleruchs formed military garrisons
to check the potential behaviour of the ally. I would like to thank one anonymous reviewer
for bringing this to my attention given my initial oversight.
We use the terms Greece and Hellas, and Greeks and Hellenes interchangeably to avoid
repetition.
All references and quotations from Thucydides come from Blancos translation (Blanco and
Tolbert 1998). Subsequent references will be made into brackets including the book and the
chapter from Thucydides text.
There are various passages where Thucydides depicts the range of Athenian motives for
creating and retaining their empire such as when the Athenians make the case against war
with Sparta in front of the Spartan assembly (1.76) or in the Melian Dialogue (5.84116).
See also Doyle (1986a, 6064).
Athens empire was facilitated by its gift of honour or time. More on that, see Lebow and
Kelly (2001).
On the Athenian soft power and the allies benefits, see also Cokers 2003 book Empires in
Conflict (Coker 2003, 1516).
See Doyles Empires for more on the benefits of the Athenian empire to Athens and its allies
(Doyle 1986a, 63).
The amount of popularity and unpopularity towards Athens was mixed and not constant
(Doyle 1986a, 57).
Americas role since the Cold War has been one of cooperation and multilateralism. Although
it did so both by choice and by necessity, its goal was not imperialism but cooperation against
a common enemy (Hoffmann and Bozo 2004, 149).
The logic behind the argument is that tackling problems leads to interventions. Of course the
assessment of the problems may be disputable but that is evidence of wrong strategic beliefs
and not of imperialism. For that check, Jervis The compulsive empire and the idea of the
turbulent frontier. See also the edited volume Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs
and Superpower Competition in the Eurasian Rimland and in particular Jervis and Snyders
contributions and their analysis of domino theory (Jervis 2003, 84; Jervis and Snyder 1991).
Of course the word initially is relevant as far as the United States is concerned because it
depends on someones historical time frame. However, given our description of the United
States as a republic with imperial tendencies and not as an empire, this word serves the
paragraphs argument well.
Thucydides also mentions shortfalls in ship production and, in some cases, refusal to serve in
the army (1.99). I recognise them but I concentrate on tribute because of its relevance to the
comparison between Athens and the United States.
This issue also relates to how the United States plans to engage rising powers. Will it take their
interests or reservations into serious consideration or it will only expect them to adjust to the
American-led global order?

28
25.
26.

27.

28.
29.
30.

31.
32.
33.

34.

A. Koutsoukis
One can draw parallels and judge the plausibility of the argument by analysing the current
crisis of the Eurozone which is much more economically, socially and politically integrated
than the global economy.
For an extended discussion of the issue see Deudneys and Ikenberrys article The myth of
the autocratic revival: why liberal democracy will prevail (Deudney and Ikenberry 2009).
For a more reserved view, see Azar Gats reply Democracys victory is not preordained
(Gat 2009). Hoffmann makes a few cautious remarks in his article The crisis of liberal
internationalism where he states that the assumption that free economies must ultimately
lead to free politics may turn out to be correct, but it is fair to say that the jury is still out
(Hoffmann 1995, 174175).
Economic crisis should be seen in perspective. Even though the current crisis may be overcome, what would really represent a grave economic crisis would be the return of the workings
of the law of diminishing returns. Technological innovation provides source for optimism but
neglecting such an eventuality would amount to wishful thinking.
On the liberation of Hellas theme check Prices Thucydides and Internal War (Price 2001,
127147).
Hoffmann reflects on a parallel argument and identifies two ways of leadership with divergent
repercussions: ultimate command versus true partnership (Hoffmann and Bozo 2004, 143).
Hobson advocates the pluralisation of the way democracy is conceived by those promoting it
in his The limits of liberal-democracy promotion (Hobson 2009). The implications are many
such as whether the great powers will agree or not on which type of democracy they will
promote and what are going to be the repercussions for world order in the case of disagreement, which can take place in a global order that is either united or divided in exclusive
spheres of influence.
The quotation comes from (Deudney and Ikenberry 2009). For a view revolving around the
importance of values and how they complicate modernisation but more optimistic about their
overcoming see (Skidelsky 2012).
See, for example, Hoffmanns criticism of the fallacy of the liberal vision (Hoffmann 1995, 167).
On the importance of commonly accepted rules and in particular of the values that will
underpin them see James The Roman Predicament: How the Rules of International Order
Create the Politics of Empire (James 2008). See also a brief topical and seminal analysis
published for Chatham House in 2011 by Coker who addresses the following question: which
of these visions [liberal internationalism or cosmopolitanism], if any, are sustainable, and
which is most likely to sustain a cultural dialogue between different societies in the twentyfirst century [that is characterised by a changing balance of power]? (Coker 2011).
See also for example, the general point made by Etzioni and others about the Wests diminishing
sense of obligation to the common good in favour of individualism (Etzioni 2004, 18).

Notes on contributor
Alexandros Koutsoukis is second-year PhD candidate at the Department of International Politics,
Aberystwyth University. He is doing research on logics of surrendering in ancient Greece. His work
applies heuristically the second image reversed. He has previously worked as visiting research
fellow at the Luxembourg Institute for European and International Studies.

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