1. San Juan v.

CSC
Facts: The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal
Governor San Juan, petitioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter
quickly assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private
respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified. This
appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the
appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both
dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right
and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee
should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of
Executive Order No. 112.
Issue: Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly
nominated by the provincial governor.
Held: Under the cited Sec 1 of EO 112, the petitioner's power to recommend is subject to
the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in
the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required
standards, the appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the
same. In the event that the Governor recommends an unqualified person, is the
Department Head free to appoint anyone he fancies?
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state
policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25
and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot validly
be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM reserving to
itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's nominees do not
meet the qualification requirements as embodied in public respondent DBM's Local
Budget Circular No. 31 dated February 9, 1988.
This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a
law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy.
The 1935 Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to
"general supervision . . . as may be provided by law." The President controls the
executive departments. He has no such power over local governments. He has only
supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed by statute. The

exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 provides: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments"
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may
appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none
is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one
meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.
2. City of General Santos v. COA
NATURE:
This is a special civil action for certiorari filed by the city of General Santos asking to
find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit (COA) which
affirmed the findings of its Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as illegal.
FACTS:
Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and
regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health
reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement
package."6
This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not
contested by respondent Commission on Audit.
In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commissions
regional director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to
respondent Commissions Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.
The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent
Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by
Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor.26 Moreover, nowhere in Section 76
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does it
provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early retirement
program.
ISSUE:
WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES
OF 2009, IN THE NATURE OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING
A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS VALIDITY

HELD:
The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity
of Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned.
Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits Any personnel qualified and
approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement
benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.
Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided
under this program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employees latest
basic salary for every year of service in the City Government.9
Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the
beneficiarys years of service in the city government. The ordinance provides that only
those who have rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years may apply.
75 Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying
the definition in Conte, it is a form of reward for an employees loyalty and service to the
city government, and it is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his
or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.
Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any
insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS for government officers and
employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x.
To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other
government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan
under the guise of such "financial assistance.71
The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.
FALLO:
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on
Audit decision dated January 20, 2011 and resolution dated October 17, 2011 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of
2009, as amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
3. Province of Negros Occidental v. COA
Facts
21 December 1994 - the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed
Resolution No. 720-A4 allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the
hospitalization and healthcare insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the
province.
Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental and Philam Care entered into a Group Health

Care Agreement involving a total payment of P3,760,000

23 January 1997 the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension No. 97-001-1015
suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of
thePresident (OP) as provided under Administrative Order No. 1036 (AO 103), and that
the premium payment violated Republic Act No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law).
President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the
amount of P100,000.
The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President and instead issued Notice
of Disallowance
Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA.
COA affirmed the Provincial Auditors Notice of Disallowance
oCOA: under AO 103, no government entity, including a local government unit, is
exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to its
personnel.
oFurther, Section 468(a)(1)(viii)11 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) or the Local
Government Code of 1991 has to be harmonized with Section 1212 of RA 6758.
oThe insurance benefits from Philam Care, a private insurance company, was a
duplication of the benefits provided to employees under the Medicare program
which is mandated by law.
The Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating 4million of its retained earnings for the healthcare of the employees of the province. The
insurance coverage was awarded to Philam Care. The Provincial Auditor, however, issued
a Notice of Suspension for the agreement between Philam Care and the Province of
Negros for lack of approval from the President (see note 1 for AO 103). The President
then ordered that the suspension be lifted up to the amount of 100,000, however, the
Commission on Audit ignore the presidential directive.
ISSUE:
WON the administrative order applies also to LGUs
Whether or not the act of the COA of disallowance valid?
Held:

No, the President, pursuant to Art X Sec. 4 of the Constitution can only exercise general
supervision, which is the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform
their functions according to law. This is different from the power of control , which is to
alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate has done in performance of his duties. Thus,
an administrative order does not apply to LGUs but only to government offices /agencies,
and GOCCs which are under the control of the President. The grant of additional
compensation like health insurance benefits do not need the prior approval of the
President.
NO The grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance
does not require approval of the President to be valid.
NOTE 1: What was in AO 103? No government entity, including a local
government unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the President
granting additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of
standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758.
4. Alternative Center v. Zamora
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the President to submit to Congress
a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session,
submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an
IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS
FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO
THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations
Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS TO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local government units shall amount
to P111,778,000,000.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is
provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the
P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall
be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress
can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees
which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House
of Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it
appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of
Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the
condition stated in the GAA.

On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed
with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With
Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII
(ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as
Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and
4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully
reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same
under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has
ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present
case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the
constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally
submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
On August 22, 2000, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), peoples
organization, and three barangay officials filed a petition for certiorari against
respondents challenging the constitutionality of Special Provision 1 and 4,
particularly the, Unprogrammed Funds found in the GAA of 2000. Petitioners
contend that such:
1.) violates the autonomy of local governments by reducing by P10 billion
from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) due to local governments by
placing such under unprogrammed funds;
2.) places the control of such funds to central authorities;
3.) constitutes undue delegation of legislative power to respondents
4.) constitutes an amendment of the Local Government Code of 1991
5.) undermines the foundation of our local governance system
6.) transgresses the constitution and the local government codes
prohibition on any invalid reduction and withholding of the local
governments IRA.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically
releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the

national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.

Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the
release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets
originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.
Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the
legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from
imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the
executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the
legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of
respondents, This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive
Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release
of the IRA.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just
share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass
laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the
executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by
statute a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow
the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local
governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the release
thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to
hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic
release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:
if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40
percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be
automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current
fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the
actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal
year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was
motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal
management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: [T]he rule of
law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal
methods.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4
of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a
portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED
FUND.

5. Villafuerte v. Robredo
A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision
in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive
stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development
projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they have been
complying with the law.
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the
manner the local government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for
the calendar years 1993-1994. The examination yielded an official report, showing that a
substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized
for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of
R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC).
In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed
Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, entitled Full Disclosure of Local Budget and
Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings, which aims to promote good governance
through enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. The MC requires the posting
within 30 days from the end of each fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly accessible
and conspicuous places in the local government unit a summary of all revenues collected
and funds received including the appropriations and disbursements of such funds during
the preceding fiscal year. The foregoing circular also states that non- compliance will be
meted sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations.
On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued another MC, reiterating that 20% component
of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes
essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. It also
enumerated a list for which the fund must not be utilized.
Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of
Camarines Sur, filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed
issuances of the respondent for being unconstitutional for violating the principles of local
and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
ISSUE:
Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy

Held:
No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing
provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the
directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for
development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if they
have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was
issued in response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20%
development fund of some LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but
was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Section
287 of the LGC.
Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.s posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to
restrict the discretion of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at liberty
to map out their respective development plans solely on the basis of their own judgment
and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that 20% thereof be expended
for development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of the enumerated
items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects.
Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the provision of
sanctions therein is a clear indication of the Presidents interference in the fiscal
autonomy of LGUs. Significantly, the issuance itself did not provide for sanctions. It did
not particularly establish a new set of acts or omissions which are deemed violations and
provide the corresponding penalties therefor. It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that
there are existing rules to consider in the disbursement of the 20% development fund and
that non-compliance therewith may render them liable to sanctions which are provided in
the LGC and other applicable laws.
Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents in the mentioned
issuances went beyond the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184,
otherwise known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets,
expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans of LGUs be publicly posted as
well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that Local treasurers, accountants, budget
officers, and other accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of the
fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the
local government unit. R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires the posting of the
invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to proceed, and approved contract in the
procuring entitys premises, in newspapers of general circulation, and the website of the
procuring entity. In particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full
disclosure of information on all matters relating to official transactions and those
involving public interest. Pertinently, Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of
the Constitution.

6. Borja v. COMELEC

Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco was elected and served
as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served as Mayor for 3
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to serve for another
term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco disqualified but
the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for
mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for
the purpose of the three-term limit.
Held:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be
elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office,
he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before
the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to run again as mayor in the next
election because he was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply
found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term
because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor.
The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship in the event of the vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in
the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not only to prevent the
establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance the freedom of choice of the
people. A consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution
reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with
preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason
of election. To consider Capco to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible
to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly

restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
7. Adormeo v. COMELEC
Facts:
Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and
1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However,
before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000
wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When
Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit
rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for
reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.
Issue:
Whether Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two
full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections.
Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected
as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the
recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as
contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC.
Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was
defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a
continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby
barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the
voluntary renunciation contemplated by the law.

8. Socrates v. COMELEC

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of
the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.
Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the
disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC
on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term,
having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post.
COMELECs First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And
COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is
qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.
Held:
Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution, which states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.
The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining
the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for
any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of
service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent
election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution
prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive
terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth
term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive
term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a
subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to
run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not
an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30,
2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking
referred to the regular elections in 2001.
9. Latasa v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the
elections of 1992, 1995, and 1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible therefor, and
likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the
Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a
petition to deny petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served
for three consecutive terms. Petitioner countered that this fact does not bar him from
filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will be the first time that
he will be running for the post of city mayor.
The Comelecs First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his
motion for reconsideration was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election
day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the proclamation did the Comelec en banc
issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of Digos City,

and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.
Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a
city, it attained a different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos.
So when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor, it should not be construed as
vying for the same local government post.
Issue:
WON petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the
newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos?
Held:
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose
those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to
this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local
government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of
the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the
subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As
stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in
the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to
be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants
over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples
freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result

of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he
be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner
would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Note:
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC
that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party's
remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days
after the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are
only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is
empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in
favor of what is fair and just.
10. Ong v. Alegre
FACTS:
Alegre and Ong were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent
mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed the petition to disqualify Ong which was predicated on
the three-consecutive term rule. Francis ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001
mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof
for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
The May 1998 elections, both Alegre and Ong ran for the office of mayor, with Ong was
proclaimed winner.
Alegre filed an election protest. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor
in that 1998 mayoralty contest, but the decision came out only when Francis had fully
served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayorelect.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy
for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March

31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre.

Alegre filed a motion for reconsideration.
The COMELEC en banc issued, a resolution reversing the resolution of the COMELECs
First Division and thereby
(a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run for mayor in the May 10, 2004"
(b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates;
(c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his
favor.
The following day, May 8 at about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the
deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel Ong filed his own certificate of
candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis.
However, it is recommended that the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong
should be denied due course and the election officer be directed to delete his
name from the list of candidates.
ISSUE:
a) whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office for the mayoralty term 1998 to
2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
b) whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run
c) whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due
course to Rommels certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute
for his brother Francis.
HELD:
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. The three-term limit
rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official

#
11. Dizon v. COMELEC
Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with the
COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on the
ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive terms
in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that Morales
was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should not have been
allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position
and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as
mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998 elections.
Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term should be
reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took
judicial notice of SCs ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it
was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then proclamation
of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-term limit
under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004
elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run
again for the same position in 2007 elections.

Issues:
1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May 16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term
2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

Held:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during
his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This
cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The
votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government
Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the

disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified
Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit.
Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales proclamation for the 1998-2001
term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales service with
respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial courts ruling was promulgated only on 4
July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time

short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayors office of our decision. The
vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may
seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold
office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term in office. NO. Morales
occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:

1995-1998
1998-2001
2001-2004
2004-2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the
2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he
was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales occupancy of
the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for
purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30
June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1
July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales first term for purposes of the
three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009)

12. Bolos v. COMELEC

Petitioner Bolos was elected as the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol
for 3 consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, during his incumbency, he ran
for Municipal Councilor of Dauis and won. He assumed office on July 1, 2004 leaving
his post as Punong Barangay. After serving his term as a councilor he filed his candidacy
for the position of Punong Barangay in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.

Cinconiegue, then incumbent Punong Barangay and also a candidate for the same office,
filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Bolos Jr. has already served the

maximum limit of three term hence no longer eligible to run and hold the position in
accordance with Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991. Cinconiegue contended that Bolos relinquishment of
the position of Punong Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be
presumed that it was his personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14,
2004 National and Local Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and
assumed the position, there would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong
Barangay.

In his Answer, petitioner argued that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, it must
be considered as an involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.
Pending the resolution of the case before the Comelec, Bolos Jr. won in the election.

The Comelec resolved the petition in favor of Cinconiegue ruling that Bolos Jr. has
already served the maximum three consecutive term for an office and thus disqualified to
run for the same office. It further ordered that the proclamation of Bolos Jr. be annulled
and that the office will be succeeded based on Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code.

Issue:
Whether or not there was a voluntary renunciation of the office of Punong Barangay by
Bolos when he assumed the post of Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have
served for three consecutive terms.

Held:
The three-term limit for elective official is contained in Sec. 8, Article X of the
Constitution states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
The Local Government Code provides for the term of office of Barangay Officials:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. x x x (b) No local elective official shall serve for more than
three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for
five (5) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the

second Monday of May 1997: Provided, that the sangguniang kabataan members who
were elected in the May 1996 elections shall serve until the next regular election of
barangay officials.
Socrates vs. Comelec held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied in the
Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts: x x x The first part provides
that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.
The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does
not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service
or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term.

In Lonzanida vs. Comelec, the Court stated that the second part of the rule on the threeterm limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution to bar any attempt to
circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time
respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term. The
Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In this case, it is undisputed that petitioner was elected as Punong Barangay for three
consecutive terms, satisfying the first condition for disqualification. What is to be
determined is whether petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily renounced his position as
Punong Barangay during his third term when he ran for and won as Sangguniang Bayan
member and assumed said office.

The Court agrees with the Comelec that petitioners relinquishment of the office of
Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption to office
as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary
renunciation.
When petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan,
he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the acts attending his pursuit of his election
as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up his post as Punong

Barangay once elected to the higher elective office, for it was very unlikely that
respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Sangguniang Bayan post,
campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for him as such and then after
being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He knew that his election as
municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and he intended to
forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.

Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully
serve his third term as Punong Barangay.

The term "operation of law" is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as "a term
describing the fact that rights may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule without
any act of the person affected." Black's Law Dictionary also defines it as a term that
"expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person
by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law,
without the act or cooperation of the party himself.

In this case, petitioner did not fill or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He instead
relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and
assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a
voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay. (Bolos vs Comelec, G.R. No.
184082, March 17, 2009)

13, Aldovino v. COMELEC

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during
his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive
suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was
subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of
his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected
and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional
limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government
Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007
elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the
Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension
imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service
within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,
held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat more potent
than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the threeterm limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been
imposed.

14. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines

FACTS:
These cases are motions for reconsideration assailing the SCs Decision dated October 18,
2011, where it upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to
the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the regional
elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) (which were
scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of
May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to
temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected
officials.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with
national and local elections?

2. Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply
with the supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?
3. Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
4. Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?
5. Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?
6. Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President's
supervisory powers over autonomous regions?

HELD: The constitutionality of RA No. 10153 is upheld

1. The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective more clearly
there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective officials from the President down
to the municipal officials. Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate. That the ARMM elections
were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on
synchronization cannot be interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered
by the constitutional mandate of synchronization. The ARMM had not yet been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in
mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few
years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the
people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what
actually is a continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding
events of the indefinite future. Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain
fixed and unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a
dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not
static.

2. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first
ARMM elections; it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM
elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise
any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to
the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No.
9054.

Even assuming that RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054, however, it is well-settled that
the supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 is
unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws.

Similarly, the petitioners contention that the plebiscite requirement applies to all
amendments of RA No. 9054 for being an unreasonable enlargement of the plebiscite
requirement set forth in the Constitution is incorrect. Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution provides that the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when
approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose. This means that only amendments to, or revisions of, the Organic Act
constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions i.e., those aspects
specifically mentioned in the Constitution which Congress must provide for in the
Organic Act require ratification through a plebiscite.

3. The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section 7(1), Article VII of
RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to remain in their positions in a
holdover capacity. The petitioners essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials
should be allowed to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections
since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits regional elective
officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.

The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all
elective local officials can occupy their offices. Since elective ARMM officials are also
local officials, they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution. It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly
prohibit elective officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a
holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.

4.The Constitution has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.Although the legislature, under
the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the
COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another date, this power is confined to the
specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law. Both Section 5 and Section 6 of
BP 881 address instances where elections have already been scheduled to take place but
do not occur or had to be suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen

circumstances, such as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances. In

contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in furtherance of the constitutional
mandate of synchronization of national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall
under any of the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.

5. The President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government
from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents
appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.

6. There is no incompatibility between the President's power of supervision over local

governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the
specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. The power of supervision is defined
as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law. This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.

The petitioners apprehension regarding the President's alleged power of control over the
OICs is rooted in their belief that the President's appointment power includes the power
to remove these officials at will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed
OICs will be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the President and not
of the people. This is incorrect. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices
of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly,
these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected
officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President
has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in
this regard are more apparent than real.