SAN JUAN V CSC

Facts
Petitioner, a governor of Rizal Province wants R
esolution No. 89-868 o
f the CSC to be
nullified
This resolution dismisses the petitioners appeal for reconsideration of the
appointment of Cecilia Almajose as the P
rovincial Budget Officer
Petitioner wanted Dalisay Santos, among other recommendees, to be the Local Budget
Officer for the province
Dalisay Santos was the acting PBO during the time, but DBM said that the
recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements for the position
Because of lack of good candidates, D
BM appointed someone else for the PBO
position
Petitioner contends that DBM has no power to recommend possible candidates
for the position, it is the governor who has the power to do so - Local Budget
Circular No 31 and under EO 112
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THE POWER OF THE GOVERNOR TO RECOMMEND
Does the Governor (petitioner San Juan) have the sole right and privilege to recommend
the nominees to the position of PBO?
RULING - YES, pursuant to LG autonomy
The constitution clearly limited the executive power o
ver local governments to g
eneral
supervision
Supervision means to simply ensure that the laws are being faithfully executed
The higher department cannot compel the lower to change their
discretionary duties - especially in this case concerning a Local
Government Unit
Article X, Sections 2 and 3
The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy l ocal autonomy
... allocate among the different LGUs their powers responsibilities and resources
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment of local officials
The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated
by the Governor.
If ever none was qualified - t hey ask for a new list
Section 6 of the Local Budget Circular 31 giving DBM the discretion to appoint officials in
case the Governor recommended no one qualified simply cannot hold and is u
ltra vires

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS V COA

Facts
Mayor of GenSan, Pedro Acharon Jr. issued EO 40 which created management teams
pursuant to its organization development program
This executive order was patterned with E
O 366
EO 13 was the main law regarding the organization program of the whole LGU
Ordinance No 8 was the law providing for the rules and regulations of the whole
program which was designed t o give incentives to unproductive employees
by way of retirement benefits
For sickly employees below the retirement age
COA took cognizance of Ordinance No 8 and questioned its legality as it seemed to be
against CA 186 - which prohibits LGUs from making supplementary retirement
benefits
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO LOCAL AUTONOMY
Can COA take cognizance of an ordinance issued by a citys own LGU reorganizing its
public offices?
RULING - YES
First of all, the court held that this cannot be a reorganization program pursuant to
Section 76 of the LGC
Unfortunately, these allegations showing good faith is n
ot enough to declare the
program created by petitioner city as a r eorganization that justifies the
creation of a retirement benefit plan.
Petitioners argument rests on the fact that this whole thing is a
reorganization - n
ot a supplementary retirement plan
Problem is that the SC declared that it is not a reorganization
A reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or
abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions... r eorganization
must pass the test of good faith
The thing is, the whole program does pass the test of good faith - t he problem
is, the people being laid off are retiring, their positions are not being
abolished or merged in order to streamline the whole service
This simply means that they werent reorganized - they voluntarily
resigned and the r etirement plan is not simply a provision under
reorganization

PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V COA

Facts
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed R
esolution No 720-A which
allocated money for the h
ospitalization and healthcare insurance benefits of 1949
officials and employees
They awarded the insurance coverage to Philam Care after bidding
Eventually, the premium payment was s
uspended by the provincial auditor as it
lacked the approval of the president as provided in A
O 103
Furthermore, the auditor said that the resolution was a violation of R
A 6758
Petitioner asked the President to revoke the suspension and the latter did so, but only
partially - even so the provincial auditor fully disallowed the resolution and ignored
the president
Petitioner appealed to COA and the commission did only affirmed the disallowance
Under AO103 - no government entity can secure additional benefits to its people
w/o securing consent from the president
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO GENERAL SUPERVISION (Section 4)
Is the disallowance of the premium payment made by the COA committed in grave
abuse of discretion? Can they intercede with the LGU program?
RULING - NO
We disagree with the COA, from a close reading of the provisions of A
O 103, petitioner
did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President
Section 2 of AO 103 provides that o
nly the GOCCs as well as their boards are
prohibited to give out benefits
Nowhere is it indicated in section 2 that the prohibition a
lso applies to
LGUs
Being an LGU, petitioner is merely under the P
residents general supervision
pursuant to Section 4, Article X of the Constitution
The President of the Philippines shall exercise g
eneral supervision o
ver local
governments
The Presidents power of general supervision means the power of a
superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions
according to law
Neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the
rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like
hospitalization and healthcare insurance benefits in the
present case does not need approval of the President to be
valid
Petitioner correctly relied on the CSC Memorandum Circular 33 which provided for the
framework for working conditions at the workplace
That is why they decided to provide an insurance policy for the workers program is pursuant to this memorandum

ALTERNATIVE CENTER V ZAMORA

Facts
President Estrada issued an IRA in the amount of around P122 Billion
(P 111,778,000,000) pursuant to Section 284 of the LGC which provided for the LGUs
share of the internal revenue taxes
However, a portion of the IRA - P
10 Billion was written under u
nprogrammed
funds while what is left is written under p
rogrammed funds ( P
111,778,000,000)
The P10 Billion set aside is to be released only upon o
ccurrence of the
condition stated in the GAA
Condition: when the revenue collections exceed the original
revenue targets submitted by the President to congress
Petitioners contend that the DBM cannot do this as it is violative of the autonomy of
local governments
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED TO THEM (Section 6)
Is the condition in the GAA for the unwritten P10 Billion constitutional? (Special
Provisions 1 and 4)
RULING - NO as it sets apart a portion of the IRA
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides
LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes w
hich
shall be automatically released to them
So it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from
performing this duty
The Congress cannot, through the GAA provide for a condition that will hold
a portion of the automatic share of the LGUs
If the commission wanted the allowance of conditions for the share of the
LGUs, they would have worded the law differently
Under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments
is qualified by the words determined by law and not the release thereof
Section 4 of AO372 cannot, however, be upheld.
A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the a
utomatic release of the shares
of LGUs in the national internal revenue
If tinanong ni Maam yung exception:
The only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of IRA is, as held in
Batangas: if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal
year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal
year

VILLAFUERTE V ROBREDO
Facts
COA conducted an examination and audit on the manner the LGUs utilized their IRA for
the years 1993-1994
They found out that 20% of the development fund of some LGUs were not
utilized for development projects but was diverted to M
aintenance and Other
Operating Expenses
This is a stark violation of S
ection 287 of the LGC
In light of this, DILG released Memorandum Circular No. 95-216 which enumerated the
policies for the use of the development fund portion of the IRA
Years later, DILG issued Memorandum Circular 2010-83 which provides for full
transparency of the budget utilization of the LGUs
Petitioner wants the MC nullified as it has been issued with grave abuse of discretion
ISSUE WITH REGARD LOCAL AUTONOMY OF LGUs
Do the MCs transgress the local and fiscal autonomy of the LGUs?
RULING - NO
Section 2 of LGC
The state shall provide for a more responsive and a
ccountable local
government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
There are two kinds of decentralization as provided in this case
1) Decentralization of a
dministration
Central government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivision to m
ake them more responsive and accountable
2) Decentralization of p
ower
Abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
The reading of MC No 2010-138 (First MC) shows that it is a mere reiteration of an
existing provision in the LGC - a reminder, not a restriction
The first memorandum is a policy which should serve as a guide for the LGUs
regarding their expenditure - i t did not restrict anything which means there
was no disruption of LG autonomy
The same clarification may be said in the enumeration of expenses in M
C No 2010-138
(Second MC)
It is erroneous to call them exclusions because such a term signifies compulsory
disallowance of a particular item or activity
To curb the alleged misuse of the development fund, the respondent deemed it
proper to remind the LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision for the IRA
through the [first MC]
To illustrate his point, he wanted the expenses enumerated in the [Second MC]
which the COA perceived to have been wrongly spent (Development Funds)

BORJA V COMELEC
Facts
Private respondent Capco Jr. is the vice-mayor of Pateros w
ho became the mayor by
operation of law upon the death of the incumbent
After his term, he won the elections for two more times, serving three years
per term
After the supposedly third term, he continued to file his candidacy the next election
His opponent, petitioner (Borja) was sought Capcos disqualification as he has
already served three terms, including the term of the dead former mayor
COMELEC, 2nd Division ruled in favor of the petitioner then reversed the decision upon
motion for reconsideration, en banc
COMELECs reason here is that the unexpired portion of the dead mayors term
did not constitute one term for private respondent
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THE TERM OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS (Section 8)
Is serving the unexpired portion of the term of the former elected mayor be considered
one term?
RULING - NO
Article X, Section 8
Term of elective local officials shall be three years and no such official shall
serve three consecutive terms. Voluntary resignation is not considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the f ull term for which he was
elected
The section provides two ideas through the two sentences
First sentence - term of the elective l ocal officials and bars s
uch officials from
serving more than three consecutive terms
Second sentence - when an official may be deemed to have served his full term
of office
Voluntary renunciation shall not be considered as an interruption of the
full term which he was elected
If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is
simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such
official c
annot be considered to have fully served the term
To be elected is to be different from to succeed
The constitution provides a limit to ones election, however, there is no limit to
when a person succeeds anothers former position through operation of
law
This is the reason why even the vice-president is still eligible for election
after succeeding the former President should the latter die, become
incapacitated, be impeached or resigns
Its because the VP succeeds through operation of law, not
through election

ADORMEO V COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner and private respondent are the only candidates for mayor in Lucena City
during the 2001 elections
Private respondent (Talaga Jr.) was the incumbent mayor
Private respondent had won the election in 1992 - f irst term
He also won the 1995 elections - 2
nd term
For the third term, private respondent l ost to a Tagarao, but during the recall election,
he won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao - third term (supposedly)
In the present election, petitioner wants to disqualify private respondent as he had been
elected mayor already for t hree consecutive terms
Private respondent contends that he was not elected for three consecutive terms
as he lost during the third elections (1998)
COMELECs rulings
1st division: private respondent is disqualified
En banc: private respondent is q
ualified, ruling retracted
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS (Section 8)
Did COMELEC err in ruling that Talaga Jr. is qualified?
RULING - NO
SC cites Borja Jr. V COMELEC
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position
There is a cycle - one cycle = one term
Person must have been elected for three consecutive terms
and m
ust have fully served the office to which he was elected
- absence of one means there is no full term
In this case, he was not elected for the full term, but for
the unexpired portion only, therefore no full term
Basically, since petitioner only took over the unexpired term of the former mayor, that
term did not constitute a full one

SOCRATES V COMELEC
Facts
Majority of the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa made a preparatory recall assembly
to initiate the recall of petitioner Socrates who is the mayor during the time
PRA issued Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of confidence in
Socrates and wanted him to get recalled through recall election from
COMELEC
COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners petition and went on with the recall election
In this recall election, an Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
His opponents filed petition to disqualify him based on the allegation that h
e has
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms prior the ongoing
particular recall election
ISSUE WITH REGARD THE THREE CONSECUTIVE TERM LIMIT
Is Hagedorn qualified to run for the recall election?
RULING - YES
These constitutional and statutory provisions have t wo parts.
First - elective official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms
Second - involuntary severance for any length of time interrupts the continuity
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term
Any subsequent election, l ike a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition (immediate reelection) for two reasons: (1) Recall election is n
ot an
immediate reelection, (2) The intervening period constitutes an i nvoluntary
interruption in the continuity of service
Even the constitutional commission wanted the explicit wording of n
o immediate
reelection with regard to the words - consecutive terms
SC cited Lozanaida, Borja, Adormeo cases which had the same ruling with regard to the
issue of three consecutive terms

LATASA V COMELEC
Facts
Latasa is elected mayor of Digos, Davao del Sur in the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections
During his third term, the municipality of Digos became a component city
pursuant to RA 8798
It is important to note that because of S
ec 53, Article IX of the Charter
mandated petitioner to serve i n a hold-over capacity as the mayor of the
new city of Digos
Petitioner once again filed his petition for candidacy for the 2001 elections
His opposing candidate (Sunga) filed for petitioners disqualification as he a
lready
served for three consecutive terms as mayor
COMELEC, first division issued the resolution that petitioner is not qualified to run for
mayor
Petitioners main argument is that he served as a municipal mayor and he is now
running as a city mayor for the first time
ISSUE WITH REGARD THE THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS RULE
Is petitioners logic correct? On the event that a municipality is converted into a city, does
the 3-year prohibition for the incumbent mayor reset?
RULING - NO, it does not reset
The SC began its ruling by stating that there is a substantial difference between a city
and a municipality - even citing the L
GC and the Charter for the City of Digos
This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject
Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be
construed as a different local government post
Even though legally, a city and a municipality is extremely different, the
office of both its mayors cannot be construed as different from each other
as this is not the intent of the commission
Furthermore, the territorial jurisdiction of Digos is the same as that of a municipality
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality a
re the same as those in the
city
This court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the peoples freedom to choose who will govern them.
To allow petitioner to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for
three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would o
bviously defeat the very
intent of the framers.
But still, private respondent cannot take the position of mayor as it is obvious from the
election results that he does not have the favor of the people
The court interprets the event as a permanent vacancy in the contested office
and by law, the vacancy is filled by succession (vice-mayor)

ONG V COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner and private respondent (Alegre) are candidates for mayor in San Vicente
Camarines Norte for the 2004 elections - petitioner is the incumbent mayor
Private respondent then filed a petition to disqualify petitioner alleging that he violated
the three-consecutive term rule
Petitioner supposedly ran and won in the 1
995, 1998, and 2001 elections for
mayor
During the 1998 elections, the two were still opponents for the mayorship
Upon receiving the election results, private respondent filed an election contest
with the COMELEC
They declared that private respondent was the winner of the elections,
but this ruling was issued after the 1998 term of petitioner and to
add, he is now serving his 3rd term as a result of the 2001 elections
However, since he is simply a presumptive winner he only
assumed office which means that it does not count as a full,
real term
Private respondent filed for reconsideration and the COMELEC, e
n banc reversed the
decision finally declaring petitioner not qualified to run for the 2004 elections
(present election)
After this ruling, petitioner hurriedly filed a substitute in the form of his brother
(Rommel)
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THE THREE TERM RULE
Should petitioners victory in the 1998 elections be considered a full term as he is only
the presumptive winner of the elections?
RULING - YES
The error in the citing of Lonzanida
The difference between the case at bench and L
onzanida is that the result of the
mayoralty election w
as declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of
election
This resulted in the order of Lonzanida to vacate the office - w
hich in
turn made his relinquishment, involuntary (Not counted as full term)
This case had no failure of election a
nd petitioner was never unseated
Therefore the presumptive victory should still be counted
Two requisites to prohibit a mayoral candidate
That the official concerned has been elected for t hree consecutive terms
That he has fully served these consecutive terms

DIZON V COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner is filing the disqualification case as a r esident of the municipality of
Mabalacat
Private respondent (Morales) is the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga
Petitioner alleges that private respondent has already served for 4
terms - 1995, 1998,
2001, and 2004 elections
Therefore, pursuant to the rule on three consecutive terms, private respondent
cannot run for candidacy
Respondent, on the other hand, alleges that h
e was not elected in the 1998 elections
as there was an RTC decision declaring another candidate (Dee) as the duly
elected mayor of Mabalacat - the R
ivera case
Therefore, his three-term rule should start from 2001
Ruling of COMELEC
2nd Division - private respondent is e
lected only as a de facto officer in the
1998 elections
meaning there were no three consecutive terms as the 1998 elections did
not count
En banc - affirms the 2nd division decision
ISSUE WITH REGARD THE THREE TERM LIMIT
Is private respondent running for his 4th consecutive term?
RULING - NO
It is significant to note here that for his term during 2004-2007, he was declared as a d
e
facto officer
The reason to this is if including the elections in 1
995, 1998, 2001, h
is election in
the 2004 election will be his 4
th term
Because of this, in Rivera the Supreme Court involuntary removed
Morales from his post - declaring the position vacant
Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution provides
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall n
ot be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
This means involuntary renunciation will i nterrupt the three term rule
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance f rom office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term
The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, n
o matter how
short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service
Based from this statement alone, it can be said that his term during the
2004 elections d
id not count
Therefore, there was a break of continuity b
etween the 2001
elections and the 2007 elections
In conclusion, Morales is filing his candidacy for mayor of Mabalacat f or the first term

BOLOS V COMELEC
Facts
Petitioner used to be the Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking b
ut for a term he ran
as the municipal councilor for Dauis, Bohol and won
He served as such in the year 2004, l eaving his post as as the P
unong
Barangay of Biking and d
elegating the former post to the Vice Punong
Baranggay by virtue of succession
It is also important to note that he served the full term of the councilorship
In the 2007 Punong Barangay and SK elections, petitioner o
nce again f iled for the
position of Punong Barangay
Private respondent (Cinconiegue), the incumbent P
unong Barangay filed for the
disqualification of petitioner as he has violated the t hree term limit
therefore he cannot run for the position as private respondent cited
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160
Petitioner answers that he did not finish the 2004-2007 term as his transfer from
Punong Barangay to councilor was to be interpreted as involuntary renunciation
This argument implies that the three term rule cannot apply to him yet
COMELEC rulings
First Division - petitioner disqualified
En Banc - affirmed division decision
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO INVOLUNTARY RENUNCIATION THROUGH BEING ELECTED
FOR A DIFFERENT POSITION IN A DIFFERENT PLACE (Section 8)
Was there involuntary renunciation when petitioner was transferred as he was elected to
a different position while being the incumbent p
unong baranggay?
RULING - NO, there was voluntary renunciation
The court agrees with the COMELEC resolution as all the acts attending his pursuit of
his election as municipal councilor point to an i ntent and readiness to give up his post
as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office
Petitioner cannot argue that he was forced to leave his former position to be a
councilor for Bohol as he already knew that if he was elected for the
councilor position, he needed to give up his P
unong Barangay position
Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term thus, v
oluntarily relinquishing his
office as Punong Barangay which the court deems as v
oluntary renunciation of said
office
As this is a voluntary renunciation, t hird term rule still continues and the
relinquished term is still to be counted as the third term
To end the case, SC cites the case of Borja Jr. which highlighted a succession through
operation of law
In this case, there was no succession as there was no vacancy i n the
municipal councilor position in Bohol, he was elected and did not fill in for
someone

ALDOVINO V COMELEC
Facts
Private respondent (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena city for t hree consecutive
terms specifically: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007
During the last term (2004-2007), he was s
uspended from office for 90 days
due to a criminal case that was charged against him
Eventually, the court l ifted his suspension and the respondent finished
his term
During the 2007 election, private respondent filed his COC for the same position
Petitioners filed a disqualification request for the private respondent due to violation of
the three-term rule in A
rticle X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
LGC
COMELECs rulings
2nd Division - private respondent was qualified
Three term limit did not apply as the respondent failed to render
complete service for the term 2004-2007 due to his suspension
En banc - denied reconsideration essentially affirming the decision
ISSUE REGARDING PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION DURING TERM OF OFFICE
Is preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term
limit rule?
RULING - NO, term wherein there was preventive suspension is still counted
We conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the
three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the i nvoluntary loss of title to
office
On the other hand, temporary inability or d
isqualification of a term because it
does not involve the loss of title to office the office holder, while retaining title,
is simply barred from exercising the functions
An official under preventive suspension d
oes not lose his title to office
What the term voluntary renunciation contemplates is the loss of
title by his act of relinquishing his position
On the other hand, the p
reventive suspension is simply a bar to
exercise ones office functions - his title is not relinquished
nor removed by operation of law
Preventive suspension is a t emporary incapacity to render service d
uring an
unbroken term; interruption of service occurs after there has been a b
reak in the term
If one looks at the procedure in succession in the case of a preventive suspension: what
happens is that the vice-x does not succeed as a p
ermanent replacement but only a
temporary one - this means there is no vacancy, which further means there was no
loss of title, but a suspension of capacity to render service

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts
2 years after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, Congress passed R
A 6374 which
established the ARMM
This law was supplemented by R
A 9054 w
hich strengthened and expanded the
ARMM as well as set the regular elections for ARMM to the 2nd monday of
Sept. 2001
Laws were passed further adding provinces and cities into the administrative region
What is important in this case is the passing of the three laws providing for the
elections in ARMM
RA 9054 - 2nd Monday of Sept. 2001
RA 9140 - November 26, 2001
RA 9333 - Next election: 2nd Monday of Aug 2005
Take note that a plebiscite was held for RA 9054 - the main
law for the elections in ARMM, the next laws had no plebiscite
Pursuant to RA 9333 the next elections should be held on A
ugust 8, 2011
However RA 10153 was enacted by congress postponing the elections to M
ay
2013
Petitioners assail the validity of the following RAs - 9
140, 9333, and 10153 as they
conducted no plebiscite even though they, in essence amended R
A 9054 which
required a plebiscite, among other things
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO A HOLDOVER POSITION IN RA 9054
RA 9054 provides for an option to have a holdover position for people who were elected
in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM, is it valid?
RULING - NO, that is the reason why congress removed the provision in R
A 10153
A holdover position can be compared with a
cting capacity
In this case - since the term for LG officials is strictly 3
years, the people elected
by virtue of RA 9054 shall remain in office in a h
oldover capacity until the next
elections, the date thereof has to be mandated by law first since RA 9054
provides for no date with regard to the next elections - kumbaga, since wala pang
naeelect, sila na muna since bawal walang tao sa gobyerno ng ARMM
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound b
y the
three year term limit; they cannot extend their term through a holdover
American jurisprudence provides that the legislature c
annot, by an act of
postponing the election extend the term o
f the incumbent b
eyond the
period as limited by the constitution
General rule regarding holdovers - when there is n
o express or implied legislative
intent to the contrary
Congress, in passing R
A 10153 made it explicitly clear that it had the intention
of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under R
A 9054 by removing
its provision

NAVAL V COMELEC
Facts
From 2004 to 2007, 2007 to 2010, petitioner had been elected and served as m
ember
of the Sanggunian, 2nd District, Province of Camarines Sur
RA 9716 was also enacted, r eapportioning the legislative districts i n Camarines Sur
In the 2010 elections, petitioner won again as a member of the S
anggunian, 3rd District
until 2013
He won once again for the 2013 elections for the s
ame district
Julia, another member of the S
anggunian filed for the cancellation of petitioners COC on
the ground that petitioner h
ad already served for three years as a S
anggunian
member
He is contending that w
hatever division one is working for is immaterial - if
you are elected for three consecutive times, regardless of division, you are
already barred from participating
COMELECs decisions
2nd Division: disqualified
En banc: Affirmed 2nd divisions decision
ISSUE WITH REGARD TO WHICH DIVISION AS A SANGGUNIAN MEMBER WAS ELECTED
BEING MATERIAL TO THE THREE TERM RULE
Is the division wherein a s anggunian member was elected material to the three term
rule?
RULING - NO, petitioner cannot hold office - D
ivision immaterial
The required gap after three consecutive terms is s
ignificant. Thus, the rule cannot be
taken with a grain of salt. Nothing less that its strict application is called for.
The Supreme Court cited the deliberations of the commission for the three-term
rule - the fact that they have exhaustively deliberated o
n the matter and have
conducted a vote just to get a decision s hows how important the three term
rule is
With that in mind its strict implementation is necessary as to give
respect to its importance considering how the commission treated the
issue
Court cited Aldovino case
There is a clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional
objective whose terms must be strictly construed