ROMUALDEZ VS.

COMELEC
553 SCRA 370
FACTS:
The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections
to the House of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of
the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position)
applied to Commission on Elections [COMELEC] to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcoss
application rejected on the grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The constitutional requirement for residency for election purposes stated that
in order to contest a position, the candidate must have resided in the location for which
they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to
prevent the possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the
needs of a community standing for office. In her original application form, Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In
response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended the time of residency
in her application from seven months to since childhood. She claimed that the entry of
the word seven in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was the result of an honest
misinterpretation, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had
always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence.
COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the
petitioners original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC
rejected the petitioners application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed
that she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a
voter in different places, and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident
of Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in Tacloban she
had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in other places. Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a
declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections.

She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the
requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that
she had domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile and she had
not acted to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage and
changes of residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not result
in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that

section 69 of the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly
fix the family domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize
the rights of women. She claimed therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she
automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year residency for election purposes.
The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950
was the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year
residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos,
they argued, had changed her residency to that of her husband upon her marriage and
at the same time automatically gained her husbands domicile. After returning to Leyte
she had resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one
year requirement for candidacy.

HELD:
The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes,
and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a
candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term
residence in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is synonymous with
the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends
to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can
abandon one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must
demonstrate three (3) requirements:
1. actual removal or actual change of domicile
2. a bonafide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one
3. and one must act in accordance with that intent
Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met
will the residence of origin be lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to
continue.
The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code,
which states that the husband shall fix the residence of the family, is different
therefore to the meaning of residence in the Constitution. The term residence
may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another
different meaning in political law as represented in the election requirements

identified in the Constitution. Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a

person establishes that they intend to leave a place when the purpose for which
they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for
pleasure, business, or health and a person may have different residences in
various places. However, residency in the Constitution as opposed to the Civil
Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of
the petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos. The Court held that Article 110 does
not create a presumption that a wife automatically gains a husbands domicile
upon marriage. When the petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in
1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her
husbands actual place of residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband to
fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any
one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they
may live together.
The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the
Civil Code, confirmed the petitioners argument that marriage does not
automatically change a wifes domicile to that of her husband. The Family Code
replaced the term residence (used in the Civil Code) with the term domicile.
Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the
family domicile. The provision recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of
womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a
product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the
right of women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer
of a husbands domicile to his wifeever, the term residence in Article 110 of the
Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued
that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be illogical for the
Court to assume that a a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death
of her husband, if she has not positively selected a new one during the
subsistence
of
the
marriage
itself.
The Court held that the new Family Code was introduces to replace the Civil
Code confirmed that petitioners argument that marriage does not automatically
change a wifes domicile to theat of her husband. The Family Code replace the
term residence with the term domicile Article 69 of the Family Code gives a
husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision
recognized revolutionary changes in the concept of a womens rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual
agreement between spouses. The provision recognized the right of women to

choose trheir own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a husbands
domicile
to
his
wife.

Villanueva vs. Judicial Bar Council

GR 211833 April 7, 2015

Facts:

After about a year from being appointed as a MCTC judge, Judge Villanueva applied for
the vacant position of presiding judge in some RTC branches. The JBC however
informed him that he was not included in the list of candidates for such position because
the JBCs long-standing policy requires 5 years of service as judge of first-level courts
before one can apply as judge for second-level courts. Before the SC, he assailed via
Rule 65 and Rule 63 with prayer for TRO and preliminary injunction the policy of JBC on
the ground that it is unconstitutional and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Allegedly, the policy also violates procedural due process for lack of publication and
non-submission to the UP Law Center Office of the National Administrative Register
(ONAR), adding that the policy should have been published because it will affect all
applying judges.
On the other hand, one of the JBCs arguments was that the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under
the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function.
Issue 1: W/N the policy of JBC requiring 5-year service is constitutional
Yes. As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially
transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as justice or judge in the
judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public
interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While
the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this
does not preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and
providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.
Issue 2: W/N JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in laying down such policy
No. The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental
to the JBCs principal function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies
in the judiciary for appointment by the President. However, the Constitution did not lay
down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject
only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every
position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
Issue 3: W/N the violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
No. The equal protection clause is not violated because the classification created by
the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test.

Substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience
and those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the
classification enshrined in the assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate
purpose. The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court,
which is five years experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the
qualities prescribed by the Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial
experience, the JBC is merely applying one of the stringent constitutional standards
requiring that a member of the judiciary be of proven competence. In determining
competence, the JBC considers, among other qualifications, experience and
performance.

ELENA P. DYCAICO, G.R. No. 161357

Petitioner,
versus
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM CHICO-NAZARIO
*and
and SOCIAL SECURITY GARCIA, JJ.
COMMISSION,
Respondents. Promulgated:
November 30, 2005
his
Bonifacio
S. Dycaico
a member
of the SSS
on January
24, 1980. In
self-employed
data became
record (SSS
Form RS-1),
he named
the petitioner,
Elena P. Dycaico, and their eight children as his beneficiaries. At that time,
Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage.
monthly
In Junepension
1989, Bonifacio
retired
and began
receiving
his
from the was
SSS.considered
He continued
to receive
the monthly
pension
until he passed away on June 19, 1997. A few months prior to his death,
however, Bonifacio married the petitioner on January 6, 1997.
application
Shortly after
death, the
filedhowever,
with the SSS
an
for Bonifacios
survivors pension.
Herpetitioner
application,
was denied
on
the ground that under Section 12-B(d) of Republic Act (Rep. Act) No. 8282
or the Social Security Law she could not be considered a primary
beneficiary of Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement. The said proviso
reads:

Sec. 12-B. Retirement Benefits.

(d) Upon the death of the retired member, his primary beneficiaries as of
the date of his retirement shall be entitled to receive the monthly pension.
petitioners
the SSC promulgated
its Resolution
thecontention
denial of the
claim. The SSC
refuted theaffirming
petitioners
that
primary beneficiaries need not be legitimate family members by citing
the definitions of primary beneficiaries and dependents in Section 8 of
Rep. Act No. 8282. Under paragraph (k) of the said provision,
primary beneficiaries are [t]he dependent spouse until he or she
remarries, the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted,
and illegitimate children Paragraph (e) of the same provision, on the
other hand, defines dependents as the following: (1) [t]he legal spouse
entitled by law to receive support from the member; (2) [t]he
legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who
is unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one
(21) years of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is
congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated
and incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and (3) [t]he
parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
entitlement
Based on to
thethe
foregoing,
toones
the SSC,
it has
ruled that
survivorsaccording
pension in
capacity
asconsistently
primary beneficiary
is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for
support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime.
beneficiaries
Under Section
of Rep.
Act No. 8282,
the are
primary
who12-B(d)
are entitled
to survivors
pension
those who
qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member.
Hence, the petitioner, who was not then the legitimate spouse of
Bonifacio as of the date of his retirement, could not be considered his
primary beneficiary.
review.
Aggrieved,
the petitioner
with the
a petition for
the appellate
court filed
dismissed
theCA
petition
1997,
The petitioner
maintains
when she
andthey
Bonifacio
got
marriedtoinlegalize
January
a few months
beforethat
he passed
away,
merely
intended
their relationship and had no intention to commit any fraud. Further, since
Rep. Act No. 8282 is a social legislation, it should be construed liberally in

favor of claimants like the petitioner. She cites the Courts pronouncement
that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries,
and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in
their favor.
[5]
pension
The SSS
posits
that the
statutes intent
is to
giveofsurvivorship
only
to primary
beneficiaries
at the
time
the retirement of
the deceased member. Rep. Act No. 8282 itself ordains the persons
entitled thereto and cannot be subject of change by the SSS.
ofIssue:
wonas
petitioner
wife,ofwho
was not then
the be
legitimate
spouse
Bonifacio
of the date
his retirement,
could
considered
his
primary beneficiary.
Ruling:
12-B(d)
The Court
holds
proviso
asqualifies
of the date
his primary
retirement in Section
of Rep.
Actthat
No.the
8282,
which
theof
term
beneficiaries, is unconstitutional for it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
[7]
Montesclaros
In an analogous
case,
Government
Service
Insurance System
The
proviso,
which denied
a dependent
spousesv.claim for
survivorship pension if the dependent spouse contracted marriage to the
pensioner within the three-year prohibited period, was declared offensive to
the due process clause. There was outright confiscation of benefits due the
surviving spouse without giving him or her an opportunity to be heard. The
proviso was also held to infringe the equal protection clause as it
discriminated against dependent spouses who contracted their respective
marriages to pensioners within three years before they qualified for their
pension.
retirement
For reasons
which shall
be discussed
the similarly
proviso as
of the the
date of his
in Section
12-B(d)
of Rep. Actshortly,
No. 8282
violates
due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
The proviso infringes the equal protection clause
marriage
the petitioner
belongs
to the
second after
grouphis
of retirement.
dependent She
spouses,
i.e., her
to Bonifacio
was
contracted
and those
similarly situated are undoubtedly discriminated against as the proviso as of
the date of his retirement disqualifies them from being considered primary
beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension.
the proviso was apparently intended to prevent sham marriages or those

contracted by persons solely to enable one spouse to claim benefits upon the
anticipated death of the other spouse.

and
This
concern istheir
concededly
valid.
dependent
spouses
determining
entitlement
toHowever,
survivors classifying
pension based
on whether
the
marriage was contracted before or after the retirement of the other spouse,
regardless of the duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the
achievement of the policy objective of the law,i.e., provide meaningful

protection to members and their beneficiaries against the hazard of

disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death and other
contingencies resulting in loss of income or financial burden."
[14]
Put
differently, such classification of dependent spouses is not germane to the
aforesaid policy objective.
respective
Further, the
classification
dependent
on the basis
their
marriages
to theof
SSS
memberspouses
were contracted
prioroftowhether
or after the
latters retirement for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension does
not rest on real and substantial distinctions. It is arbitrary and discriminatory.
The proviso infringes the due process clause
requirements,
Thus, it was ruled
that, where
the employee
retiresthat
andismeets
the eligibility
he acquires
a vested
right to benefits
protected
by the
due process clause and [r]etirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
[20]
Further, since pursuant to the pertinent law therein, the dependent spouse
is entitled to survivorship pension, a widows right to receive pension
following the demise of her husband is also part of the husbands contractual
compensation.
[21]
who
Even
thebeen
retirement
benefits
self-employed
individuals,
have
included
in theof
compulsory
coverage
of Rep.like
ActBonifacio,
No.
8282
[25]
are not mere gratuity because they are required to pay both the
employer and employee contributions.
pension
under Rep.
Act No.
8282,
the of
surviving
spouse
is entitled
to survivors
accruing
on the
death
the member;
hence,
the surviving
spouses
right to receive such benefit following the demise of the wife or husband, as
the case may be, is also part of the latters contractual compensation.
No.
The
proviso
of the
datedue
of his
retirement
Section
12-B(d)
of Rep.the
Act
8282
runsas
afoul
of the
process
clauseinas
it outrightly
deprives
surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members
were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There

is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without

giving them an opportunity to be heard.
Bonifacio
In the petitioners
case,
for example,
she asserted
thattheir
when
she and
got married
in 1997,
it was merely
to legalize
relationship
and not to commit fraud. This claim is quite believable. After all, they had
been living together since 1980 and, in fact, during that time their eldest
child was already twenty-four (24) years old. However, the petitioner was
not given any opportunity to prove her claim that she was Bonifacios bona
fide legal spouse as she was automatically disqualified from being
considered as his primary beneficiary.
Conclusion
Even as the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) is
nullified, the enumeration of primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to
survivors pension is not substantially affected since the following persons are
considered as such under Section 8(k) of Rep. Act No. 8282:
(1) The dependent spouse until he or she remarries; and
(2) The dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate
children.

In relation thereto, Section 8(e) thereof qualifies the dependent spouse and
dependent children as follows:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
(2) The legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is
unmarried, not gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21)
of age, or if over twenty-one (21) years of age, he is congenitally or while still
a minor has been permanently incapacitated and incapable of self-support,
physically or mentally.
Finally, the Court concedes that the petitioner did not raise the issue of the
validity of the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) of Rep.
Act No. 8282. The rule is that the Court does not decide questions of a

constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.

[29]
However, the question of the constitutionality of the proviso is absolutely
necessary for the proper resolution of the present case. Accordingly, the Court
required the parties to present their arguments on this issue and proceeded to pass
upon the same in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and in order to render
substantial justice to the petitioner who, presumably in her advanced age by now,
deserves to receive forthwith the survivors pension accruing upon the death of her
husband.