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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150206

March 13, 2009

Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, namely:

LOLITA GABATAN, POMPEYO GABATAN,
PEREGRINO GABATAN, REYNALDO
GABATAN, NILA GABATAN AND JESUS
JABINIS, RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and
FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and LOURDES
EVERO PACANA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in the
instant petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 dated April 28, 2000, and
Resolution2 dated September 12, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No.
52273. The challenged Decision affirmed the
decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 19, dated
October 20, 1995 in Civil Case No. 89-092, an
action for Recovery of Property and Ownership
and Possession, thereat commenced by
respondent Lourdes Evero Pacana against
petitioners, heirs of Teofilo Gabatan, Jesus
Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado.
Subject of the present controversy is a 1.1062
hectare parcel of land, identified as Lot 3095
C-5 and situated at Calinugan, Balulang,
Cagayan de Oro City. This lot was declared for
taxation in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the
complaint before the RTC, respondent alleged
that she is the sole owner of Lot 3095 C-5,
having inherited the same from her deceased
mother, Hermogena Gabatan Evero
(Hermogena). Respondent further claimed that
her mother, Hermogena, is the only child of
Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
Respondent alleged that upon the death of
Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was entrusted to
his brother, Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and
Teofilos wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration.
It was also claimed that prior to her death
Hermogena demanded for the return of the
land but to no avail. After Hermogenas death,
respondent also did the same but petitioners
refused to heed the numerous demands to

surrender the subject property. According to

respondent, when Teofilo and his wife died,
petitioners Jesus Jabinis and Catalino
Acantilado took possession of the disputed
land despite respondents demands for them to
vacate the same.
In their answer, petitioners denied that
respondents mother Hermogena was the
daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana
Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is
the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. Petitioners
maintained that Juan Gabatan died single in
1934 and without any issue and that Juan was
survived by one brother and two sisters,
namely: Teofilo (petitioners predecessor-ininterest), Macaria and Justa. These siblings
and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land
from Juan Gabatan and have been in actual,
physical, open, public, adverse, continuous
and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years
and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements
thereon, to the exclusion of the whole world
including respondent. Petitioners clarified that
Jesus Jabinis and Catalino Acantilado have no
interest in the subject land; the former is
merely the husband of Teofilos daughter while
the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners added
that a similar case was previously filed by
respondent against Teofilos wife, Rita Vda. de
Gabatan, on February 21, 1978, docketed as
Civil Case No. 5840 but the case was
dismissed on May 3, 1983 for lack of interest.
Finally, petitioners contended that the
complaint lacks or states no cause of action or,
if there was any, the same has long prescribed
and/or has been barred by laches.
On June 20, 1989, the complaint was amended
wherein the heirs of Teofilo were individually
named, to wit: Lolita Gabatan, Pompeyo
Gabatan, Peregrino Gabatan, Reynaldo
Gabatan, Nila Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis,
Riorita Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an amended
answer, additionally alleging that the disputed
land was already covered by OCT No. P-3316
in the name of the heirs of Juan Gabatan
represented by petitioner Riorita Gabatan
(Teofilos daughter).
On October 20, 1995, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, declaring the plaintiff the owner of
Lot No. 3095 C-5 situated at Calinugan,
Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City; and ordering
the defendants represented by Riorita Gabatan
Tumala to RECONVEY Original Certificate of
Title No. P-3316 in favor of plaintiff Lourdes
Evero Pacana, free of any encumbrance;
ordering the defendants to pay P10,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
Attorneys fees; and P2,000.00 for litigation
expenses.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA
whereat their recourse was docketed as CAG.R. CV No. 52273.
On April 28, 2000, the CA rendered the herein
challenged Decision affirming that of the RTC.
Dispositively, the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
questioned decision of the lower court dated
October 20, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED. With
costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Discounting petitioners argument that
respondent is not related to Juan Gabatan, the
CA declared that respondents claim of filiation
with Juan Gabatan was sufficiently established
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long line of
jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial
court are entitled to great weight and are not
disturbed except for cogent reasons, such as
when the findings of fact are not supported by
evidence.
The CA likewise gave weight to the Deed of
Absolute Sale5 executed by Macaria Gabatan
de Abrogar, Teofilo, Hermogena and heirs of
Justa Gabatan, wherein Hermogena was
identified as an heir of Juan Gabatan:
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of legal age,
married, Filipino citizen and presently residing
at Kolambugan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines,
as Heir of the deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x
x.
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on July
30, 1966 containing such declaration which
was signed by Teofilo and the latters nearest
relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof

that they acknowledged Hermogenas status as

the daughter of Juan Gabatan. Applying
Section 38, Rule 1306 of the Rules of Court on
the declaration against interest, the CA ruled
that petitioners could not deny that even their
very own father, Teofilo formally recognized
Hermogenas right to heirship from Juan
Gabatan which ultimately passed on to
respondent.
As to the issue of prescription, the CA ruled
that petitioners possession of the disputed
property could not ripen into acquisitive
prescription because their predecessor-ininterest, Teofilo, never held the property in the
concept of an owner.lawphil.net
Aggrieved, petitioners are now with this Court
via the present recourse principally contending
that the CA committed the following reversible
errors:
FIRST ERROR: The lower court erred in
not declaring that Juan Gabatan died
single and without issue;
SECOND ERROR: The lower court
erred in declaring the plaintiff-appellee
(respondent) as the sole and surviving
heir of Juan Gabatan, the only child of a
certain Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN";
THIRD ERROR: The lower court erred
in declaring that a certain Hermogena
Clareto "GABATAN" is the child and sole
heir of Juan Gabatan;
FOURTH ERROR: The lower court
erred in failing to appreciate by
preponderance of evidence in favor of
the defendants-appellants (petitioners)
claim that they and the heirs of Justa
and Macaria both surnamed Gabatan
are the sole and surviving heirs of Juan
Gabatan and, therefore, entitled to
inherit the land subject matter hereof;
FIFTH ERROR: The lower court erred in
not declaring that the cause of action of
plaintiff-appellee (respondent) if any, has
been barred by laches and/or
prescription.7
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we
must pass upon certain preliminary matters.
In general, only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule

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45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact

cannot be the subject of this particular mode of
appeal, for this Court is not a trier of facts.8It is
not our function to examine and evaluate the
probative value of the evidence presented
before the concerned tribunal upon which its
impugned decision or resolution is
based.91avvphi1
However, there are established exceptions to
the rule on conclusiveness of the findings of
fact by the lower courts, such as (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings
of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.10
Moreover, our rules recognize the broad
discretionary power of an appellate court to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors
and to consider errors not assigned. Thus, the
Court is clothed with ample authority to review
rulings even if they are not assigned as errors
in the appeal in these instances: (a) grounds
not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (b) matters not
assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently
plain or clerical errors within contemplation of
law; (c) matters not assigned as errors on
appeal but consideration of which is necessary
in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case or to serve the interests
of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice; (d) matters not specifically assigned as
errors on appeal but raised in the trial court
and are matters of record having some bearing
on the issue submitted which the parties failed

to raise or which the lower court ignored; (e)

matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
closely related to an error assigned; and (f)
matters not assigned as errors on appeal but
upon which the determination of a question
properly assigned, is dependent. 11
In the light of the foregoing established
doctrines, we now proceed to resolve the
merits of the case.
The respondents main cause of action in the
court a quo is the recovery of ownership and
possession of property. It is undisputed that the
subject property, Lot 3095 C-5, was owned by
the deceased Juan Gabatan, during his
lifetime.12 Before us are two contending parties,
both insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the
decedent.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination
of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary
suit for recovery of ownership and possession
of property. This must take precedence over
the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a
special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action
is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong
while a special proceeding is a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively
clear that the declaration of heirship can be
made only in a special proceeding inasmuch
as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.13
In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera,14 this
Court ruled that the declaration of heirship
must be made in a special proceeding, and not
in an independent civil action. This doctrine
was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of
Appeals15 where the Court held:
xxx where despite the pendency of the special
proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Rafael Litam, the
plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which
they claimed that they were the children by a
previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his

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one-half share of the conjugal properties

acquired during his marriage to Marcosa
Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared
that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children
of the deceased, that the properties in question
were paraphernal properties of his wife,
Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his
only heir. On appeal to this Court, we ruled that
such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was
the only heir of the decedent) is improper, in
Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the
exclusive competence of the court in Special
Proceedings No. 1537, in which it is not as yet,
in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue
until the presentation of the project of partition.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v.
Lourdes Reyes,16 the Court reiterated its ruling
that matters relating to the rights of filiation and
heirship must be ventilated in the proper
probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such
rights. Citing the case of Agapay v.
Palang,17 this Court held that the status of an
illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a
decedents estate could not be adjudicated in
an ordinary civil action which, as in this case,
was for the recovery of property.
However, we are not unmindful of our decision
in Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,18 where the
Court relaxed its rule and allowed the trial court
in a proceeding for annulment of title to
determine the status of the party therein as
heirs, to wit:
It appearing, however, that in the present case
the only property of the intestate estate of
Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still
subject it, under the circumstances of the case,
to a special proceeding which could be long,
hence, not expeditious, just to establish the
status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration
proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case subject
of the present case, could and had already in
fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon
the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present
case, there being no compelling reason to still
subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in

the civil case filed by petitioners (Vide Pereira

v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 [1989];
Intestate Estate of Mercado v. Magtibay, 96
Phil. 383 [1955]), the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision
thereon upon the issues it defined during pretrial, x x x. (emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in the present case, there appears to
be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as their inheritance from
Juan Gabatan. It would be more practical to
dispense with a separate special proceeding
for the determination of the status of
respondent as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan,
specially in light of the fact that the parties to
Civil Case No. 89-092, had voluntarily
submitted the issue to the RTC and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of
heirship in these proceeding. Also the RTC
assumed jurisdiction over the same and
consequently rendered judgment thereon.
We GRANT the petition.
After a meticulous review of the records of this
case, we find insufficient and questionable the
basis of the RTC in conferring upon respondent
the status of sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to
possession and ownership of the property,
pinned her claim entirely on her alleged status
as sole heir of Juan Gabatan. It was incumbent
upon her to present preponderant evidence in
support of her complaint.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of legitimate
children is established by any of the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is
proved by the record of birth appearing in the
Civil Register, or by an authentic document or
a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated
in the preceding article, the filiation shall be
proved by the continuous possession of status
of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth,
authentic document, final judgment or
possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.

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Here, two conflicting birth certificates 19 of

respondent were presented at the RTC.
Respondent, during her direct testimony,
presented and identified a purported certified
true copy of her typewritten birth certificate
which indicated that her mothers maiden name
was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Petitioners,
on the other hand, presented a certified true
copy of respondents handwritten birth
certificate which differed from the copy
presented by respondent. Among the
differences was respondents mothers full
maiden name which was indicated as
"Hermogena Calarito" in the handwritten birth
certificate.
In resolving this particular issue, the trial court
ruled in this wise:
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic) each
other by presenting two conflicting Certificate
(sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff herein, Lourdes
Evero Pacana, which are Exhibit "A" for the
plaintiff and Exhibit "1" for the defendants.
Which of this (sic) is genuine, and which is
falsified. These (sic) issue is crucial and
requires serious scrutiny. The Court is of the
observation that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff
which is a certified true copy is in due form and
bears the "as is and where is" rule. It has the
impression of the original certificate. The forms
(sic) is an old one used in the 1950s. Her
mothers maiden name appearing thereof is
Hermogina (sic) Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit
"1", the entries found thereof (sic) is
handwritten which is very unusual and of
dubious source. The form used is of latest
vintage. The entry on the space for mothers
maiden name is Hermogena Calarito. There
seems to be an apparent attempt to thwart
plaintiffs mother filiation with the omission of
the surname Gabatan. Considering these
circumstances alone the Court is inclined to
believe that Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff is far
more genuine and authentic certificate of live
birth.20
Having carefully examined the questioned birth
certificates, we simply cannot agree with the
above-quoted findings of the trial court. To
begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial court noted,
was an original typewritten document, not a
mere photocopy or facsimile. It uses a form of
1950s vintage21 but this Court is unable to
concur in the trial courts finding that Exhibit
122 was of a later vintage than Exhibit A which
was one of the trial courts bases for doubting

the authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the contrary,

the printed notation on the upper left hand
corner of Exhibit 1 states "Municipal Form No.
102 (Revised, January 1945)" which makes it
an older form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial
courts finding regarding which form was of
more recent vintage was manifestly
contradicted by the evidence on record. No
actual signature appears on Exhibit A except
that of a certain Maximo P. Noriga, Deputy
Local Civil Registrar of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City, who
purportedly certified on July 6, 1977 that
Exhibit A was a true copy of respondents birth
certificate. The names of the attendant at birth
(Petra Sambaan) and the local civil registrar
(J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were typewritten with the
notation "(Sgd.)" also merely typewritten
beside their names. The words "A certified true
copy: July 6, 1977" above the signature of
Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear to be
inscribed by the same typewriter as the very
entries in Exhibit A. It would seem that Exhibit
A and the information stated therein were
prepared and entered only in 1977.
Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was never
presented as a witness to identify Exhibit A.
Said document and the signature of Maximo P.
Noriga therein were identified by respondent
herself whose self-serving testimony cannot be
deemed sufficient authentication of her birth
certificate.
We cannot subscribe to the trial courts view
that since the entries in Exhibit 1 were
handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of dubious
credibility. Verily, the certified true copies of the
handwritten birth certificate of respondent
(petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly
authenticated by two competent witnesses;
namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Vidal), Assistant
Registration Officer of the Office of the City
Civil Registrar, Cagayan de Oro City and
Maribeth E. Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of
the National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. Mesa,
Manila. Both witnesses testified that: (a) as
part of their official duties they have custody of
birth records in their respective offices, 23 and
(b) the certified true copy of respondents
handwritten birth certificate is a faithful
reproduction of the original birth certificate
registered in their respective offices.24 Ms.
Vidal, during her testimony, even brought the
original of the handwritten birth certificate
before the trial court and respondents counsel
confirmed that the certified true copy (which
was eventually marked as Exhibit 1) was a

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faithful reproduction of the original. 25 Ms. Vidal

likewise categorically testified that no other
copy of respondents birth certificate exists in
their records except the handwritten birth
certificate.26 Ms. Cacho, in turn, testified that
the original of respondents handwritten birth
certificate found in the records of the NSO
Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was photocopied)
was the one officially transmitted to their office
by the Local Civil Registry Office of Cagayan
de Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
testified and brought their respective offices
copies of respondents birth certificate in
compliance with subpoenas issued by the trial
court and there is no showing that they were
motivated by ill will or bias in giving their
testimonies. Thus, between respondents
Exhibit A and petitioners Exhibits 1 and 8, the
latter documents deserve to be given greater
probative weight.
Even assuming purely for the sake of argument
that the birth certificate presented by
respondent (Exhibit A) is a reliable document,
the same on its face is insufficient to prove
respondents filiation to her alleged
grandfather, Juan Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if
it had been credible and authentic, would have
proven was that respondents mother was a
certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." It does
not prove that same "Hermogena Clarito
Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
Even the CA held that the conflicting
certificates of live birth of respondent submitted
by the parties only proved the filiation of
respondent to Hermogena.28
It was absolutely crucial to respondents cause
of action that she convincingly proves the
filiation of her mother to Juan Gabatan. To
reiterate, to prove the relationship of
respondents mother to Juan Gabatan, our
laws dictate that the best evidence of such
familial tie was the record of birth appearing in
the Civil Register, or an authentic document or
a final judgment. In the absence of these,
respondent should have presented proof that
her mother enjoyed the continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the
absence of these two classes of evidence is
the respondent allowed to present other proof
admissible under the Rules of Court of her
mothers relationship to Juan Gabatan.
However, respondents mothers
(Hermogenas) birth certificate, which would
have been the best evidence of Hermogenas

relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never

offered as evidence at the RTC. Neither did
respondent present any authentic document or
final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogenas relationship to Juan Gabatan.
Respondent relied on the testimony of her
witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima Nagac
Pacana and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who
testified that they personally knew Hermogena
(respondents mother) and/or Juan Gabatan,
that they knew Juan Gabatan was married to
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena was the
child of Juan and Laureana. However, none of
these witnesses had personal knowledge of
the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the
fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and
Laureana. They were not yet born or were very
young when Juan supposedly married
Laureana or when Hermogena was born and
they all admitted that none of them were
present at Juan and Laureanas wedding or
Hermogenas birth. These witnesses based
their testimony on what they had been told by,
or heard from, others as young children. Their
testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.
Other circumstances prevent us from giving full
faith to respondents witnesses testimonies.
The records would show that they cannot be
said to be credible and impartial witnesses.
Frisco Lawan testified that he was the son of
Laureana by a man other than Juan Gabatan
and was admittedly not at all related to Juan
Gabatan.29 His testimony regarding the
relationships within the Gabatan family is
hardly reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana
and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are children of
Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this Court is wary of
according probative weight to their testimonies
since respondent admitted during her crossexamination that her (respondents) husband is
the son of Felicisima Nagac Pacana.31 In other
words, although these witnesses are indeed
blood relatives of petitioners, they are also the
mother and the aunt of respondents husband.
They cannot be said to be entirely disinterested
in the outcome of the case.
Aside from the testimonies of respondents
witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied
heavily on a photocopy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by respondent and
which appeared to be signed by the siblings
and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan.
In this document involving the sale of a lot
different from Lot 3095 C-5, "Hermogena

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Gabatan as heir of the deceased Juan

Gabatan" was indicated as one of the vendors.
The RTC deemed the statement therein as an
affirmation or recognition by Teofilo Gabatan,
petitioners predecessor in interest, that
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same
statement as a declaration against interest on
the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34
However, the admission of this Deed of
Absolute Sale, including its contents and the
signatures therein, as competent evidence was
vigorously and repeatedly objected to by
petitioners counsel for being a mere photocopy
and not being properly authenticated.35 After a
close scrutiny of the said photocopy of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot
uphold the admissibility of the same.
Under the best evidence rule, when the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself.36 Although the best
evidence rule admits of exceptions and there
are instances where the presentation of
secondary evidence would be allowed, such as
when the original is lost or the original is a
public record, the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence must still be established.
Thus, in Department of Education Culture and
Sports v. Del Rosario,37 we held that a party
must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort
to secondary evidence. A party must first
present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of
the original instrument.
In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of
the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana
(who identified the photocopy of the Deed of
Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no
testimony regarding the whereabouts of the
original, whether it was lost or whether it was
recorded in any public office.
There is an ostensible attempt to pass off
Exhibit H as an admissible public document.
For this, respondent relied on the stamped
notation on the photocopy of the deed that it is
a certified true xerox copy and said notation
was signed by a certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr.,
Assessment Officer, who seems to be an
officer in the local assessors office. Regarding
the authentication of public documents, the
Rules of Court38 provide that the record of

public documents, when admissible for any

purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy.39 The attestation of the certifying
officer must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be.40
To begin with, no proof whatsoever was
presented by respondent that an original of
Exhibit H was registered or exists in the
records of the local assessors office.
Furthermore, the stamped certification of
Honesto P. Velez is insufficient authentication
of Exhibit H since Velezs certification did not
state that Exhibit H was a true copy from the
original. Even worse, Velez was not presented
as a witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true
copy from the original. Indeed, it is highly
doubtful that Velez could have made such an
attestation since the assessors office is not the
official repository of original notarized deeds of
sale and could not have been the legal
custodian contemplated in the rules.
It is the notary public who is mandated by law
to keep an original of the Deed of Absolute
Sale in his notarial register and to forward the
same to the proper court. It is the notary public
or the proper court that has custody of his
notarial register that could have produced the
original or a certified true copy thereof. Instead,
the Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by
Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite
appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not a
disinterested witness and as can be gleaned
from her testimony, she had no personal
knowledge of the preparation of the alleged
certified true copy of the Deed of Absolute
Sale. She did not even know who secured a
copy of Exhibit H from the assessors
office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and
defective manner of authentication of Exhibit H
renders it inadmissible for the purpose it was
offered, i.e. as proof that Teofilo Gabatan
acknowledged or admitted the status of
Hermogena Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan.
Even if we are to overlook the lack of proper
authentication of Exhibit H and consider the
same admissible, it still nonetheless would
have only provided proof that a certain
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan. Exhibit H does not show the filiation
of respondent to either Hermogena Gabatan or
Juan Gabatan. As discussed above, the only

Page 8 of 29

document that respondent produced to

demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena
Gabatan" (respondents Exhibit A) was
successfully put in doubt by contrary evidence
presented by petitioners.
As for the issue of laches, we are inclined to
likewise rule against respondent. According to
respondents own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan
died sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of
action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to recover
the decedents property from third parties or to
quiet title to their inheritance accrued in 1933.
Yet, respondent and/or her mother Hermogena,
if they were truly the legal heirs of Juan
Gabatan, did not assert their rights as such. It
is only in 1978 that respondent filed her first
complaint to recover the subject property,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita
Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo
Gabatan.43 However, that case was dismissed
without prejudice for failure to
prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited until
1989 to refile her cause of action, i.e. the
present case.45 She claimed that she waited
until the death of Rita Gabatan to refile her
case out of respect because Rita was then
already old.46
We cannot accept respondents flimsy reason.
It is precisely because Rita Gabatan and her
contemporaries (who might have personal
knowledge of the matters litigated in this case)
were advancing in age and might soon expire
that respondent should have exerted every
effort to preserve valuable evidence and
speedily litigate her claim. As we held in
Republic of the Philippines v. Agunoy:
"Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura
subveniunt, the law aids the vigilant, not those
who sleep on their rights[O]ne may not sleep
on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
pristine purity."47
All in all, this Court finds that respondent
dismally failed to substantiate, with convincing,
credible and independently verifiable proof, her
assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property
under litigation. Aggravating the weakness of
her evidence were the circumstances that (a)
she did not come to court with clean hands for
she presented a tampered/altered, if not
outright spurious, copy of her certificate of live
birth and (b) she unreasonably delayed the
prosecution of her own cause of action. If the

Court cannot now affirm her claim, respondent

has her own self to blame.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
52273, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
and amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89092 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Page 9 of 29

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174975

January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAER, ALEJANDRO

MONTAER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAERBARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR
MONTAER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH
SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI
CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND
ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia
District Court, Fourth Sharia Judicial District,
Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and
September 21, 2006.2
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho
Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married
Alejandro Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate
Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon
City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montaer, Jr.,
Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora
Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their
children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. died.5
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling
Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen
Liling S. Montaer, both Muslims, filed a
"Complaint" for the judicial partition of
properties before the Sharia District
Court.6 The said complaint was entitled
"Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of
Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho
Montaer, Lillibeth K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho
Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K.
Montaer," and docketed as "Special Civil
Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private
respondents made the following allegations: (1)
in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2)
the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim;
(3) petitioners are the first family of the
decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow
of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S.

Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and

(6) the estimated value of and a list of the
properties comprising the estate of the
decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the
Sharia District Court to order, among others,
the following: (1) the partition of the estate of
the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent.9
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to
Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1)
the Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction
over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer,
Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2)
private respondents failed to pay the correct
amount of docket fees; and (3) private
respondents complaint is barred by
prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation
between Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the
decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code.10
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District
Court dismissed the private respondents
complaint. The district court held that Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its
jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and
distribution of the estate of deceased
Muslims.11
On December 12, 2005, private respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 12 On
December 28, 2005, petitioners filed an
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration,
alleging that the motion for reconsideration
lacked a notice of hearing.13 On January 17,
2006, the Sharia District Court denied
petitioners opposition.14 Despite finding that
the said motion for reconsideration "lacked
notice of hearing," the district court held that
such defect was cured as petitioners "were
notified of the existence of the pleading," and it
took cognizance of the said motion.15 The
Sharia District Court also reset the hearing for
the motion for reconsideration.16
In its first assailed order dated August 22,
2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its
order of dismissal dated November 22,
2005.17 The district court allowed private
respondents to adduce further evidence. 18 In its
second assailed order dated September 21,
2006, the Sharia District Court ordered the
continuation of trial, trial on the merits,
adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.19

Page 10 of 29

Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners

raise the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER
PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN
CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.
II.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER "THE ESTATES AND
PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A
NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH
CAPACITY TO BE SUED.
III.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER
THE COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS
DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND
DOCKETING FEES.
IV.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE
OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS
LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS
FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A
"NOTICE OF HEARING."
V.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT
MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL
ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE
COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT
RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM
ALEJANDRO MONTAER, SR. WHICH
CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON
THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAER,
SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari,

private respondents stress that the Sharia
District Court must be given the opportunity to
hear and decide the question of whether the
decedent is a Muslim in order to determine
whether it has jurisdiction.20
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of
Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the
Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is
dependent on a question of fact, whether the
late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim.
Inherent in this argument is the premise that
there has already been a determination
resolving such a question of fact. It bears
emphasis, however, that the assailed orders
did not determine whether the decedent is a
Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set
a hearing for the purpose of resolving this
issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083,
otherwise known as the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines, provides that
the Sharia District Courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The
Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution
and settlement of the estate of deceased
Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrators
or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding is controlled by the averments and
character of the relief sought in the complaint
or petition.21 The designation given by parties
to their own pleadings does not necessarily
bind the courts to treat it according to the said
designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa
descriptio or defective caption," courts are
"guided by the substantive averments of the
pleadings."22
Although private respondents designated the
pleading filed before the Sharia District Court
as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of

Page 11 of 29

letters of administration, settlement, and

distribution of the estate of the decedent. It
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro
Montaer, Sr.s death as well as the allegation
that he is a Muslim. The said petition also
contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the
properties left by the decedent, which are the
very properties sought to be settled before a
probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed
for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the
estate of the decedent.24 These include the
following: (1) the prayer for the partition of the
estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for
the appointment of an administrator of the said
estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the
petitioners that the district court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because of an
allegation in their answer with a motion to
dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a Muslim.
Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the
action and its subject matter does not depend
upon the defenses set forth in an answer 25 or a
motion to dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction
would depend almost entirely on the
defendant27 or result in having "a case either
thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the
"defense of lack of jurisdiction which is
dependent on a question of fact does not
render the court to lose or be deprived of its
jurisdiction."29
The same rationale applies to an answer with a
motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the
Sharia District Court is not deprived of
jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised
as a defense the allegation that the deceased
is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has
the authority to hear and receive evidence to
determine whether it has jurisdiction, which
requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the
Sharia District Court determines that the
deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district
court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners

second argument, that the proceeding before
the Sharia District Court is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person, rests on an
erroneous understanding of the proceeding
before the court a quo. Part of the confusion
may be attributed to the proceeding before the
Sharia District Court, where the parties were
designated either as plaintiffs or defendants
and the case was denominated as a special
civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings
before the court a quo are for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased,
which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of
the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special
proceeding as "a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." This Court has applied the
Rules, particularly the rules on special
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of
a deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of
the decedent and later to be duly recognized
as among the decedents heirs, which would
allow them to exercise their right to participate
in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of
the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to
establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s
death and, subsequently, for private
respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be
recognized as among his heirs, if such is the
case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition
against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action33 applies to a
special proceeding such as the settlement of
the estate of the deceased, is misplaced.
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse
parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. The definitions of a civil action
and a special proceeding, respectively, in the
Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
which "a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong"34necessarily
has definite adverse parties, who are either the
plaintiff or defendant.35 On the other hand, a
special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to
establish a status, right, or a particular
fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or
applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In
the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the

Page 12 of 29

estate of the decedent is not being sued for

any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of
the decedent is to determine all the assets of
the estate,37 pay its liabilities,38 and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.39
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was
not validly acquired for non-payment of docket
fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private
respondents petition in the proceeding before
the court a quo, which contains an allegation
estimating the decedents estate as the basis
for the conclusion that what private
respondents paid as docket fees was
insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially
involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of
court correctly assessed the docket fees; and
(2) whether private respondents paid the
correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and
the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less
than the correct amount for the docket fees
because that was the amount assessed by the
clerk of court, the responsibility of making a
deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk
of court.41 In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose
jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on
the clerk of courts insufficient assessment of
the docket fees.42As "every citizen has the right
to assume and trust that a public officer
charged by law with certain duties knows his
duties and performs them in accordance with
law," the party filing the case cannot be
penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient
assessment.43 However, the party concerned
will be required to pay the deficiency.44
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present
the clerk of courts assessment of the docket
fees. Moreover, the records do not include this
assessment. There can be no determination of
whether private respondents correctly paid the
docket fees without the clerk of courts
assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private
respondents motion for reconsideration before
the Sharia District Court is defective for lack of
a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique

circumstances in the present case constitute

an exception to this requirement. The Rules
require every written motion to be set for
hearing by the applicant and to address the
notice of hearing to all parties concerned.45 The
Rules also provide that "no written motion set
for hearing shall be acted upon by the court
without proof of service thereof."46 However,
the Rules allow a liberal construction of its
provisions "in order to promote [the] objective
of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive
disposition of every action and
proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld
a liberal construction specifically of the rules of
notice of hearing in cases where "a rigid
application will result in a manifest failure or
miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in
the questioned final and executory judgment is
not apparent on its face or from the recitals
contained therein."48 In these exceptional
cases, the Court considers that "no party can
even claim a vested right in technicalities," and
for this reason, cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on the merits rather than
on technicalities.49
The case at bar falls under this exception. To
deny the Sharia District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has
jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of
the estate of a decedent alleged to be a
Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a
court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction
such a situation simply because of a lapse in
fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal
construction of the rules on notice of hearing,
because the rights of the petitioners were not
affected. This Court has held that an exception
to the rules on notice of hearing is where it
appears that the rights of the adverse party
were not affected.50 The purpose for the notice
of hearing coincides with procedural due
process,51 for the court to determine whether
the adverse party agrees or objects to the
motion, as the Rules do not fix any period
within which to file a reply or opposition. 52 In
probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is
not the absence of previous notice, but the
absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard."53 In the case at bar,
as evident from the Sharia District Courts
order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners

Page 13 of 29

counsel received a copy of the motion for

reconsideration in question. Petitioners were
certainly not denied an opportunity to study the
arguments in the said motion as they filed an
opposition to the same. Since the Sharia
District Court reset the hearing for the motion
for reconsideration in the same order,
petitioners were not denied the opportunity to
object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken
together, these circumstances show that the
purpose for the rules of notice of hearing,
procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again,
the Sharia District Court has not yet
determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle
the estate of the decedent. In the event that a
special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a decedent is pending, questions
regarding heirship, including prescription in
relation to recognition and filiation, should be
raised and settled in the said proceeding. 54 The
court, in its capacity as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
decedent.55 In the case at bar, the
determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the
question of whether the Sharia District Court
has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated
August 22, 2006 and September 21, 2006
respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 164108

May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR

CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX
JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S.
Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He
was survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix
Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino.1 At the time of his death,
there were two pending civil cases against
Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first,
Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City,
Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as
one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil
Case No. 11178, was then pending with the
RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First
Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the
plaintiffs therein.2
On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita
Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila
a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor, pursuant to Section
6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by
respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition
acknowledged the value of the assets of the
decedent to be P5 Million, "net of
liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC
issued an order appointing private respondent
as administrator of the estate of her deceased
husband, and issuing letters of administration
in her favor.4 In January 2001, private
respondent submitted an Inventory of the
Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties,
and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached to
the inventory, private respondent included as
among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two
pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated
that the amounts of liability corresponding to
the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil
Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for
Civil Case No. 11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila
RTC required private respondent to submit a
complete and updated inventory and appraisal
report pertaining to the estate.8
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with
the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela,9praying that they be
furnished with copies of all processes and
orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.

Page 14 of 29

Private respondent opposed the

manifestation/motion, disputing the personality
of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the
Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion,
petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that
the Manila RTC set a deadline for the
submission by private respondent of the
required inventory of the decedents
estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings
or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her
administration of the estate, and assailing the
inventory that had been submitted thus far as
unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an
order denying the manifestation/motion, on the
ground that petitioners are not interested
parties within the contemplation of the Rules of
Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration,
a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court
of Appeals. The petition argued in general that
petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the latter being the defendant in the civil cases
they lodged with the Bacolod RTC.
On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision12 dismissing the
petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of
a motion to intervene, according to the
appellate court, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals
cited the fact that the claims of petitioners
against the decedent were in fact contingent or
expectant, as these were still pending litigation
in separate proceedings before other courts.
Hence, the present petition. In essence,
petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in
denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto
Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure
they cite in support of their argument is not the
rule on intervention, but rather various other
provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.13
To recall, petitioners had sought three specific
reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth

furnished "copies of all processes and orders

issued" by the intestate court as well as the
pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with
the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the
intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof, order the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of
the fair market value of the same.15 Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by the
administrator of her verified annual account,
and, upon submission thereof, set the date for
her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other
parties interested in the collation, preservation
and disposition of the estate.16
The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter
from a perspective solely informed by the rule
on intervention. We can readily agree with the
Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both,
or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in
the custody of the court x x x" While the
language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not
literally preclude petitioners from intervening in
the intestate proceedings, case law has
consistently held that the legal interest required
of an intervenor "must be actual and material,
direct and immediate, and not simply
contingent and expectant."17
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special
proceedings. The settlement of estates of
deceased persons fall within the rules of
special proceedings under the Rules of
Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the
absence of special provisions, the rules
provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far
as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding
Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth
under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a
decedent whose credit is based on a
contingent claim. The definition of

Page 15 of 29

"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not

accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us
that they have the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto,
the reliefs they had sought then before the
RTC, and also now before us, do not square
with their recognition as intervenors. In short,
even if it were declared that petitioners have no
right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it
would not necessarily mean the disallowance
of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC
since the right to intervene is not one of those
reliefs.
To better put across what the ultimate
disposition of this petition should be, let us now
turn our focus to the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
In several instances, the Rules on Special
Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or
"any persons interested in the estate" to
participate in varying capacities in the testate
or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these
provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1,
Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any
person interested" to oppose the issuance of
letters testamentary and to file a petition for
administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which
mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the
petition for letters of administration to the
known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the
estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a
"person interested in the estate" to petition for
the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule
87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the
court of the concealment, embezzlement, or
conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of
evidence of the decedents title or interest
therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which
requires notice of the time and place of the
examination and allowance of the
Administrators account "to persons
interested;" (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which
requires the court to give notice "to the persons
interested" before it may hear and grant a
petition seeking the disposition or
encumbrance of the properties of the estate;
and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows "any
person interested in the estate" to petition for
an order for the distribution of the residue of
the estate of the decedent, after all obligations
are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto

been based on contract, whether express or
implied, then they should have filed their claim,
even if contingent, under the aegis of the
notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the
administrator immediately after the issuance of
such notice.19 However, it appears that the
claims against Benedicto were based on tort,
as they arose from his actions in connection
with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal
Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not
fall within the class of claims to be filed under
the notice to creditors required under Rule
86.20These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records
indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto,
as represented by its administrator, was
successfully impleaded in Civil Case No.
11178, whereas the other civil case21 was
already pending review before this Court at the
time of Benedictos death.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims
against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil
cases where they were raised, and not in the
intestate proceedings. In the event the claims
for damages of petitioners are granted, they
would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate. Yet until such time, to what
extent may they be allowed to participate in the
intestate proceedings?
Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling
in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide
us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief
narration of the facts therein is in order.
Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance
and damages against respondents, and during
a hearing of the case, learned that the same
trial court was hearing the intestate
proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan
had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan
thus amended his complaint to implead Ang
Chia, administrator of the estate of her late
husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-inintervention, manifesting the pendency of the
civil case, praying that a co-administrator be
appointed, the bond of the administrator be
increased, and that the intestate proceedings
not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the
increase of the bond and took cognizance of
the pending civil case, the administrator moved

Page 16 of 29

to close the intestate proceedings, on the

ground that the heirs had already entered into
an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial
court refused to close the intestate
proceedings pending the termination of the civil
case, and the Court affirmed such action.
If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in
the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant
to their desire to protect their interests it
appearing that the property in litigation is
involved in said proceedings and in fact is the
only property of the estate left subject of
administration and distribution; and the court is
justified in taking cognizance of said civil case
because of the unavoidable fact that whatever
is determined in said civil case will necessarily
reflect and have a far reaching consequence in
the determination and distribution of the estate.
In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331
the court does not assume general jurisdiction
over the case but merely makes of record its
existence because of the close interrelation of
the two cases and cannot therefore be branded
as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in

holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate
proceedings pending determination of the
separate civil action for the reason that there is
no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the
separate action pertaining to its general
jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be
entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of
Court, expressly provides that "action to
recover real or personal property from the
estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions
to recover damages for an injury to person or
property, real or personal, may be commenced
against the executor or administrator." What
practical value would this provision have if the
action against the administrator cannot be
prosecuted to its termination simply because
the heirs desire to close the intestate
proceedings without first taking any step to
settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a
corollary to the ruling which declares that
questions concerning ownership of property
alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by
another person should be determined in a
separate action and should be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
These rules would be rendered nugatory if we
are to hold that an intestate proceedings can
be closed by any time at the whim and caprice
of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied)
[Citations omitted]
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention
filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-inintervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
but we can partake of the spirit behind such
pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the
Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of
this court have always been to the effect that in
the special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person, persons not
heirs, intervening therein to protect their
interests are allowed to do so to protect the
same, but not for a decision on their action." 24
Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto
may be inchoate interests, but they are viable
interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the
Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just
creditors, but also "any person interested" or
"persons interested in the estate" various
specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate. Anybody with a
contingent claim based on a pending action for
quasi-delict against a decedent may be
reasonably concerned that by the time

Page 17 of 29

judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate

of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the
judgment could no longer be enforced against
it.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any
person interested in the estate, the right to
participate in every aspect of the testate or
intestate proceedings, but instead provides for
specific instances when such persons may
accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem
that while there is no general right to intervene
on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from
the intestate court not explicitly provided for
under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is
necessary to protect their interest in the estate,
and there is no other modality under the Rules
by which such interests can be protected. It is
under this standard that we assess the three
prayers sought by petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with
copies of all processes and orders issued in
connection with the intestate proceedings, as
well as the pleadings filed by the administrator
of the estate. There is no questioning as to the
utility of such relief for the petitioners. They
would be duly alerted of the developments in
the intestate proceedings, including the status
of the assets of the estate. Such a running
account would allow them to pursue the
appropriate remedies should their interests be
compromised, such as the right, under Section
6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if
property of the estate concealed, embezzled,
or fraudulently conveyed.
At the same time, the fact that petitioners
interests remain inchoate and contingent
counterbalances their ability to participate in
the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of
respondents submission that if the Court were
to entitle petitioners with service of all
processes and pleadings of the intestate court,
then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether
contingent or otherwise, would have the right to
be furnished such pleadings, no matter how
wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to
impose a precedent that would mandate the
service of all court processes and pleadings to
anybody posing a claim to the estate, much
less contingent claims, would unduly
complicate and burden the intestate
proceedings, and would ultimately offend the

guiding principle of speedy and orderly

disposition of cases.
Fortunately, there is a median that not only
exists, but also has been recognized by this
Court, with respect to the petitioners herein,
that addresses the core concern of petitioners
to be apprised of developments in the intestate
proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the
Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by
the same petitioners herein against the RTC
judge, praying that they be allowed access to
the records of the intestate proceedings, which
the respondent judge had denied from them.
Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the
provision stating that "the records of every
court of justice shall be public records and shall
be available for the inspection of any interested
person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners
were "interested persons" entitled to access
the court records in the intestate proceedings.
We said:
Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing
the records tomonitor prompt compliance
with the Rules governing the preservation and
proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of
the Inventory and the submission by the
Administratrix of an annual accounting
appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto
Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the
outcome of the settlement of his estate. They
are in fact "interested persons" under Rule
135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise,
access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable
precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them. In either
case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it
that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be
duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to
access the records, rather than entitling them
to the service of every court order or pleading
no matter how relevant to their individual claim,
will be less cumbersome on the intestate court,
the administrator and the heirs of the decedent,
while providing a viable means by which the
interests of the creditors in the estate are
preserved.1awphi1
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on
Special Proceedings do require notice to any

Page 18 of 29

or all "interested parties" the petitioners as

"interested parties" will be entitled to such
notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1)
Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and
place of examining and allowing the account of
the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of
Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule
90 regarding the hearing for the application for
an order for distribution of the estate residue.
After all, even the administratrix has
acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the
existence of the pending cases filed by the
petitioners.
We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by
petitioners; that a deadline be set for the
submission by administratrix Benedicto to
submit a verified and complete inventory of the
estate, and upon submission thereof: the
inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue be required to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same;
and that the intestate court set a deadline for
the submission by the administratrix of her
verified annual account, and, upon submission
thereof, set the date for her examination under
oath with respect thereto, with due notice to
them and other parties interested in the
collation, preservation and disposition of the
estate. We cannot grant said reliefs.
Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator
to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of
the deceased within three (3) months from
appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85
requires the administrator to render an account
of his administration within one (1) year from
receipt of the letters testamentary or of
administration. We do not doubt that there are
reliefs available to compel an administrator to
perform either duty, but a person whose claim
against the estate is still contingent is not the
party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of
these duties in the context of dissipating the
assets of the estate, there are protections
enforced and available under Rule 88 to
protect the interests of those with contingent
claims against the estate.
Concerning complaints against the general
competence of the administrator, the proper

remedy is to seek the removal of the

administrator in accordance with Section 2,
Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who
may seek with the court the removal of the
administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor,
even a contingent one, would have the
personality to seek such relief. After all, the
interest of the creditor in the estate relates to
the preservation of sufficient assets to answer
for the debt, and the general competence or
good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless,
as we have explained, petitioners should not
be deprived of their prerogatives under the
Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in
this decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject
to the qualification that petitioners, as persons
interested in the intestate estate of Roberto
Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and
rights as provided for such interested persons
in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of
Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special
Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18799

March 31, 1964

HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, Judge of the

Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental,
ASUNCION MARAVILLA, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HERMINIO MARAVILLA, respondent.
Jose Gutierrez David, A. Aveto, A. Mirasol and
P. C. Ramos for petitioners.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for
respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
Petitioners herein appeal by certiorari from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (in CA-G.R.
No. 27200-R) wherein, over their objection,
raising the question of jurisdiction petition, the
appellate court took cognizance of the petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by Herminio

Page 19 of 29

Maravilla and, in consequence thereof, set

aside the appointment of petitioner Eliezar
Lopez as a special co-administrator of the
estate of the deceased Digna Maravilla. The
pertinent antecedent facts are as follows:
On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio
Maravilla filed with he Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the
will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of his deceased
wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of
that same year. In the will the surviving spouse
was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and
Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of the
deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition
to the probate of the will, on the ground, inter
alia, that the will was not signed on each page
by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting
witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent
Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court
issued an order appointing him special
administrator of the estate of the deceased, for
the reason that:
... all the properties subject of the will
are conjugal properties of the petitioner
and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and
before any partition of the conjugal
property is done, the Court cannot
pinpoint which of the property subject of
the Will belongs to Digna Maravilla,
exclusively, that shall be administered
by the special administrator. Hence,
although it is true that the petitioner
Herminio Maravilla has an adverse
interest in the property subject of the
Will, the Court finds it impossible for the
present time to appoint any person other
than the petitioner as special
administrator of the property until after
the partition is ordered, for the reason
that the properties mentioned in the Will
are in the name of the petitioner who is
the surviving spouse of the deceased.
On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a
decision denying probate of the will, as it was
not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in
the presence of the attesting witnesses and of
one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and
Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition

for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of

Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-administrator
to protect their interests, on the ground that the
will, having been denied probate, they are the
legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was
heard on February 20, at which hearing,
respondent's counsel orally moved for
postponement, because respondent's principal
counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and
was not present. The court ordered
presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the
testimonies of Eliezar Lopez, and Regina and
Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with
the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and
record on appeal, from the decision denying
probate of the will. Some devisees under the
will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and
Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a petition
for the removal of respondent as special
administrator, as he failed to file an inventory
within 3 months from his appointment and
qualification as special administrator, as
provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules
of Court. To this petition, respondent filed an
opposition, on the ground that said provision of
the Rules of Court does not apply to a special
administrator, and an inventory had already
been submitted by him, before said petition for
his removal was filed.1wph1.t
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita
and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Conchita as special
co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina Sajo,
likewise, filed a similar petition February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint
hearing the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar
Lopez as special administrator, (2) approval of
respondent's record appeal and appeal bond,
(3) petition to remove respondent as special
administrator, (4) petition to appoint Conchita
Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5)
petition to appoint Adelina Sajo as special coadministrator. At said hearing, respondent
objected to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez
was special co-administratrix, on grounds that
(a) the law allows only one special coadministrator (b) the order of March 16, 1959
estops the court from appointing Eliezar Lopez
as special co-administrator (c) such
appointment is unfair to respondent, because
owns at least 3/4 of the whole property,

Page 20 of 29

conjugal nature, which would be subjected to

the administrate of a stranger, and (d) a
deadlock between two special administrators
would ruin the management of the property,
including those of respondent. On crossexamination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's
counsel elicited the facts that (1) Lopez was
employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in
Manila. and could not discharge the functions
of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely
intention on Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed
Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in an
order dictated open court, to protect the
interests of Pedro, Asuncion and Regina
Maravilla.
From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960,
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for
preliminary injunction) to annul the order
appointing Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator, and to prohibit the probate court
from further proceeding with the petition for the
removal of respondent as special administrator.
The Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary injunction on March 9, 1960 which
was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it
more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina
Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition to certify the case to the Supreme
Court, on the grounds that the principal amount
in controversy in this case exceeds
P200,000.00, and the writs (of certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
since the probate case is not on appeal before
it. To this petition, respondent filed an
opposition. on the grounds that the amount in
controversy is less than P200,000.00 and the
decision of the probate court (of February 8,
1960) is now on appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the
writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, and the present case does not
involve title to or possession of real estate
exceeding in value P200,000.00.1
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision granting the writs
(certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by
respondent, and declaring null and void the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator.

Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed a

motion for reconsideration of said decision, but
it was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had
no jurisdiction to issue the writs
of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by
respondent, the same not being in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
We agree with petitioners. The Court of
Appeals, in the decision appealed from,
assumed jurisdiction over the present case on
the theory that "the amount in controversy
relative to the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator to protect the interests
of respondents (herein petitioners) is only
P90,000.00 more or less, i.e., one fourth of the
conjugal property" (of respondent and the
deceased Digna Maravilla) which, is per
inventory submitted by respondent as special
administrator is valued at P362,424.90. This
theory is untenable. Note that the proceedings
had on the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as
special co-administrator are merely incidental
to the probate or testate proceedings of the
deceased Digna Maravilla presently on appeal
before the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No.
27478-R) where petitioners' motion to elevate
the same to the Supreme Court, on the ground
that the amount herein involved is within the
latter's exclusive jurisdiction, is still pending,
resolution. That the Court of Appeals has no
appellate jurisdiction over said testate
proceedings cannot be doubted, considering
that the properties therein involved are valued
at P362,424,90, as per inventory of the special
administrator.
Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of
Court, the property to be administered and
liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of
the deceased spouse is, not only that part of
the conjugal estate pertaining to the deceased
spouse, but the entire conjugal estate. This
Court has already held that even if the
deceased had left no debts, upon the
dissolution of the marriage by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall
be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et
al., L-2211, December 20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407;
see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco,
et al., L-10663, October 31, 1958). In a number
of cases where appeal was taken from an

Page 21 of 29

order of a probate court disallowing a will, this

Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or
value involved or in controversy therein is that
of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087,
July 31, 1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vano v. Vda. de
Garces, et al., L-6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G.
3045). Not having appellate jurisdiction over
the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No.
27478-R), considering that the amount
involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals cannot also have original
jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent in the
instant case, which are merely incidental
thereto.
In the United States, the rule is that
"proceedings in probate are appealable where
the amount or value involved is reducible to a
pecuniary standard, the amount involved being
either the appellant's interest or the value of
the entire estate according as the issues on
appeal involve only the appellant's rights or the
entire administration of the estate. ... In a
contest for administration of an estate the
amount or value of the assets of the estate is
the amount in controversy for purposes of
appeal." (4 C.J.S. 204). In line with this ruling, it
is to be observed that respondent's interest as
appellant in the probate proceedings (CA-G.R.
No. 27478-R) is, according to his theory, the
whole estate amounting to P362,424.90, or, at
least more than 3/4 thereof, or approximately
P270,000.00. Such interest, reduced to a
pecuniary standard on the basis of the
inventory, is the amount or value of the matter
in controversy, and such amount being more
than P200,000.00, it follows that the appeal
taken in said proceedings falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
should, therefore, be certified to it pursuant to
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.
Note also that the present proceedings under
review were for the annulment of the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator and to restrain the probate court
from removing respondent as special
administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the
administration of the estate and, consequently,
the amount or value of the assets of the whole
estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S.
204). It appearing that the value of the estate in
dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the
Court of Appeals clearly had no original
jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.

The Court of Appeals, in the decision appealed

from, arrived at the amount of "P90,000.00
more or less", as the amount involved in the
case, upon authority of the case of Vistan v.
Archbishop (73 Phil. 20). But this case is
inapplicable, as it does not refer to the question
of administration of the estate, nor to an order
denying probate of a will, but only to the
recovery of a particular legacy consisting of the
rentals of a fishpond belonging to the estate. In
an analogous case involving the administration
of a trust fund, the United States Supreme
Court held:
Where the trust fund administered and
ordered to be distributed by the circuit
court, in a suit to compel the
stockholders of a corporation to pay
their subscriptions to stock to realize the
fund, amounts to more than $5,000.00,
this court has jurisdiction of the appeal,
which is not affected by the fact that the
amounts decreed to some of the
creditors are less than that sum (Handly
et al. vs. Stutz, et al., 34 Law Ed. 706).
Respondent also contends that appeals in
special proceedings, as distinguished from
ordinary civil cases, are within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of
the Judiciary Act, as amended.
Granting, arguendo, that a special proceeding
is not a civil action, it has never been decided
that a special proceeding is not a "civil case"
(Carpenter v. Jones, 121 Cal. 362; 58 p. 842).
On the other hand, it has been held that the
term "civil case" includes special proceedings
(Herkimer v. Keeler, 100 Iowa 680, N.W. 178).
Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil
actions are applicable in special proceedings
where they are not inconsistent with, or when
they may serve to supplement the provisions
relating to special proceedings. Consequently,
the procedure of appeal is the same in civil
actions as in special proceedings. (See
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
II, 1957 Ed., p. 326.)
The cases cited by respondent where this
Court ruled that the separate total claim of the
parties and not the combined claims against
each other determine the appellate
jurisdictional amount, are not applicable to, the
instant case, because Section 2, Rule 75 of the
Rules of Court is explicit that the amount or

Page 22 of 29

value involved or in controversy in probate

proceedings is that of the entire estate.
Assuming, arguendo, that the rule in the cases
cited by respondent is here applicable, it
should be noted that respondent claims the
whole estate of at least more than 3/4 thereof.
Said claim, reduced to a pecuniary standard,
on the basis of the inventory, would amount to
more than P200,000.00 and, consequently,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.
The case of Ledesma v. Natividad (L-6115,
May 10, 1954) cited by respondent in his brief,
is also inapplicable, because unlike the instant
case, it did not involve a contest in the
administration of the estate.
While it is true that questions of fact have been
raised in the probate proceedings (Spec. Proc.
No. 4977, CFI of Negros Occidental) which
was appealed by respondent to the Court of
Appeals, it becomes immaterial, in view of
Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme
Court shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over "all cases in which the value in
controversy exceeds two hundred thousand
pesos, exclusive of interests and costs", and
that "all cases which may be erroneously
brought to the Supreme Court, or to the Court
of Appeals shall be sent to the proper court,
which shall hear the same as if it had originally
been brought before it".
On the question of the appointment of
petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special
administrator, we agree with respondent that
there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of
Court contain no provision on special coadministrator, the reason being, that the
appointment of such special administrator is
merely temporary and subsists only until a
regular executor or administrator is duly
appointed. Thus, it would not only be
unnecessary but also impractical, if for the
temporary duration of the need for a special
administrator, another one is appointed aside
from the husband, in this case, upon whom the
duty to liquidate the community property
devolves merely to protect the interests of
petitioners who, in the event that the disputed
will is allowed to probate, would even have no
right to participate in the proceedings at all.
(Roxas v. Pecson, 82 Phil. 407.)

In view of the conclusion herein reached, in

connection with the amount involved in the
controversy, it is suggested that appropriate
steps be taken on the appeal pending in the
Court of Appeals involving the probate of the
will (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R) to comply with the
provisions of the Judiciary Act on the matter.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals of May 16, 1961 is set aside and
another one entered also setting aside the
order of the trial court of March 5, 1960,
appointing Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator. Without costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 129242

January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S.

MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and
ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
(BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M.
ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO
S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO,
AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA
MANALO, respondents.
DE LEON, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al.,
seeking to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court
of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the
Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which
denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:
Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara
Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his
wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11)
children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio
Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano,
Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo
Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo,
Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are
all of legal age.1wphi1.nt

Page 23 of 29

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992,

Troadio Manalo left several real properties
located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac
including a business under the name and style
Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19
Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at
NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents,
who are eight (8) of the surviving children of
the late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita,
Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto,
Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of
the judicial settlement of the estate of their late
father, Troadio Manalo, and for the
appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.
On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued
an order setting the said petition for hearing on
February 11, 1993 and directing the publication
of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila, and further directing service by
registered mail of the said order upon the heirs
named in the petition at their respective
addresses mentioned therein.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing
of the petition, the trial court issued an order
'declaring the whole world in default, except the
government," and set the reception of evidence
of the petitioners therein on March 16, 1993.
However, the trial court upon motion of set this
order of general default aside herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De
Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who
were granted then (10) days within which to file
their opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by
herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating
in the filling of an Omnibus Motion8 on July 23,
1993 seeking; (1) to seat aside and reconsider
the Order of the trial court dated July 9, 1993
which denied the motion for additional
extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for
preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses
as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to
declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;
and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the
presiding judge.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an
order9 which resolved, thus:

A. To admit the so-called Opposition

filed by counsel for the oppositors on
July 20, 1993, only for the purpose of
considering the merits thereof;
B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors
for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the
dismissal of this proceeding, said
affirmative defenses being irrelevant and
immaterial to the purpose and issue of
the present proceeding;
C. To declare that this court has
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
the oppositors;
D. To deny the motion of the oppositors
for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;
E. To set the application of Romeo
Manalo for appointment as regular
administrator in the intestate estate of
the deceased Troadio Manalo for
hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00
o'clock in the afternoon.
Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No.
39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated
September 15, 1993. In their petition for
improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2)
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons; (3) the share of the surviving
spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of
the same family; and (5) no certification of nonforum shopping was attached to the petition.
Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in
its Resolution11promulgated on September 30,
1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for
reconsideration of the said resolution was
likewise dismissed.12
The only issue raised by herein petitioners in
the instant petition for review is whether or not
the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their
motion for the outright dismissal of the petition
for judicial settlement of estate despite the
failure of the petitioners therein to aver that
earnest efforts toward a compromise involving
members of the same family have been made

Page 24 of 29

prior to the filling of the petition but that the

same have failed.
Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary
civil action involving members of the same
family. They point out that it contains certain
averments, which, according to them, are
indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:
X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons,

ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of
his father, TROADIO MANALO, had not
made any settlement, judicial or extrajudicial of the properties of the deceased
father TROADIO MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son
continued to manage and control the
properties aforementioned, without
proper accounting, to his own benefit
and advantage xxx.
X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO

is managing and controlling the estate of
the deceased TROADIO MANALO to his
own advantage and to the damage and
prejudice of the herein petitioners and
their co-heirs xxx.
X

Par. 14. For the protection of their rights

and interests, petitioners were
compelled to bring this suit and were
forced to litigate and incur expenses and
will continue to incur expenses of not
less than, P250,000.00 and engaged
the services of herein counsel
committing to pay P200,000.00 as and
attorney's fees plus honorarium of
P2,500.00 per appearance in court
xxx.13
Consequently, according to herein petitioners,
the same should be dismissed under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides that a motion to dismiss a
complaint may be filed on the ground that a
condition precedent for filling the claim has not
been complied with, that is, that the petitioners
therein failed to aver in the petition in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made

involving members of the same family prior to

the filling of the petition pursuant to Article
222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The instant petition is not impressed with merit.
It is a fundamental rule that in the
determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments15 and the character
of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be
controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for
Issuance of Letters of Administration,
Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners'
claim that the same is in the nature of an
ordinary civil action. The said petition contains
sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person such as the fat of death of
the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992,
as well as his residence in the City of Manila at
the time of his said death. The fact of death of
the decedent and of his residence within he
country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration
of the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of
the names of his legal heirs including a
tentative list of the properties left by the
deceased which are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek
judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo, to wit;
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:
a. That after due hearing, letters of
administration be issued to petitioner
ROMEO MANALO for the administration
of the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO upon the giving of a bond in
such reasonable sum that this
Honorable Court may fix.
b. That after all the properties of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO have
been inventoried and expenses and just
debts, if any, have been paid and the
legal heirs of the deceased fully
determined, that the said estate of
TROADIO MANALO be settled and

Page 25 of 29

distributed among the legal heirs all in

accordance with law.
c. That the litigation expenses of these
proceedings in the amount of
P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in the
amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium
of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in
the hearing and trial of this case and
costs of suit be taxed solely against
ANTONIO MANALO.18
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 9263626 contains certain averments which may
be typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein
petitioners, as oppositors therein, took
advantage of the said defect in the petition and
filed their so-called Opposition thereto which,
as observed by the trial court, is actually an
Answer containing admissions and denials,
special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and
costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a
case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately
seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j)
of the Rules of Court vis--vis, Article 222 of
civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be
allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of
the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that
as irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition.
It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting
as a probate court, has limited and special
jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of
collateral matters and issues which may be
properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil
action. In addition, the rule has always been to
the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well
as the concomitant nature of an action, is
determined by the averments in the complaint
and not by the defenses contained in the
answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of
court or its proceedings unduly delayed by
simple strategem.21 So it should be in the
instant petition for settlement of estate.
Herein petitioners argue that even if the
petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be
considered as a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person,
Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a

ground for the dismissal of the same by virtue

of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which
provides that the 'rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote their object and
to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the
term "proceeding" is so broad that it must
necessarily include special proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners
may not validly take refuge under the
provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of
Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines for the
dismissal of the petition for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo
inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough. To wit:
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained
between members of the same family unless it
should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22
The above-quoted provision of the law is
applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is
clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an
action by one person or persons against
another or other in a court of justice in which
the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law
affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in
equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a
court of justice, whereby a party sues another
for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt
form the Report of the Code Commission
unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision
applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of
the same family, thus:
It is difficult to imagine a sadder and
more tragic spectacle than a litigation
between members of the same family. It
is necessary that every effort should be
made toward a compromise before
litigation is allowed to breed hate and
passion in the family. It is know that
lawsuit between close relatives
generates deeper bitterness than
stranger.25

Page 26 of 29

It must be emphasized that the oppositors

(herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 for any cause of action
as in fact no defendant was imploded therein.
The Petition for issuance of letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of
Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special
proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. 26 the petitioners therein (private
respondents herein) merely seek to establish
the fat of death of their father and subsequently
to be duly recognized as among the heirs of
the said deceased so that they can validly
exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate
court.1wphi1.nt

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of
public respondent Court of Appeals, the
decretal portion of which declares:

WHEREFORE, the petition in the aboveentitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit,
Costs against petitioners.

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana

Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of
land with an area of 9,322 square meters
located in Manila and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death
of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with
his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,
Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered
into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and
dividing among themselves the real property
subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the
agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the six children received 1/14
share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT
No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of
Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 133000

October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR
OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA
DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO
MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES
LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO
FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and
EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of
general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages,
adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made
by the decedent to any of the heirs?

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing

considerations, judgment appealed from
is reversed and set aside and another
one entered annulling the Deed of Sale
executed by Graciano Del Rosario in
favor of defendant-appellee Patricia
Natcher, and ordering the Register of
Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and
reinstate TCT No. 107443 without
prejudice to the filing of a special
proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a
proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs

executed and forged an "Agreement of
Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property
with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided
among themselves the parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share
alike, a portion of his interest in the land
amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving
only 447.60 square meters registered under
Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No.
35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT
No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot with a land area
of 80.90 square meter was registered under
TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered

Page 27 of 29

under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano

sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained
ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein
petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their
marriage, Graciano sold the land covered by
TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result
of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the
latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano
died leaving his second wife Patricia and his
six children by his first marriage, as heirs.
5

In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075

before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, herein private respondents alleged
that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT
No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June
19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of
Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a
consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein
petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally
married to Graciano in 20 March 1980 and
thus, under the law, she was likewise
considered a compulsory heir of the latter.
Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's
lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence,
herein private respondents may not anymore
claim against Graciano's estate or against
herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26
January 1996 holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the
late Graciano del Rosario in favor of
Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and
thus a complete nullity. There being no
evidence that a separation of property
was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or that there has been
decreed a judicial separation of property
between them, the spouses are
prohibited from entering (into) a contract
of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise

regarded as a valid donation as it was
equally prohibited by law under Article
133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be
regarded as such or as a donation, it
may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of
Patricia Natcher being a compulsory
heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the lower court's decision
ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and legal
distribution of the estate. The court a
quo, trying an ordinary action for
reconveyance / annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed
the acts proper only in a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate
of a deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in
regarding the subject property as
advance inheritance. What the court
should have done was merely to rule on
the validity of (the) sale and leave the
issue on advancement to be resolved in
a separate proceeding instituted for that
purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge
under our protective mantle through the
expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and assails the appellate court's decision "for
being contrary to law and the facts of the
case."
We concur with the Court of Appeals and find
no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement
or protection of a right, or the prevention
or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or
special. Both are government by the
rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to

Page 28 of 29

specific rules prescribed for a special

civil action.

specific rules as provided for in the Rules of

Court.

"XXX

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and

distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate
court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by

which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right or a particular fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there
lies a marked distinction between an action
and a special proceeding. An action is a formal
demand of one's right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It
is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The
term "special proceeding" may be defined as
an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal
pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In special proceedings,
the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted
authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
"It may accordingly be stated generally
that actions include those proceedings
which are instituted and prosecuted
according to the ordinary rules and
provisions relating to actions at law or
suits in equity, and that special
proceedings include those proceedings
which are not ordinary in this sense, but
is instituted and prosecuted according to
some special mode as in the case of
proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without
regular pleadings, which are
characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX
A special proceeding must therefore be
in the nature of a distinct and
independent proceeding for particular
relief, such as may be instituted
independently of a pending action, by
petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for
reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is a civil action, whereas matters
relating to settlement of the estate of a
deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of

Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the
word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision11contemplates a probate court
when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the
instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is
devoid of authority to render an adjudication
and resolve the issue of advancement of the
real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075
for reconveyance and annulment of title with
damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle
to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila,
Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a
probate court so as to validly pass upon the
question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is
elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and
distribution of the estate of a deceased,
it must first settle the estate in a special
proceeding instituted for the purpose. In
the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of
the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned
the subject property owned by the
estate of the deceased to defendantappellee without observing the proper
proceedings provided (for) by the Rules
of Court. From the aforecited
discussions, it is clear that trial courts
trying an ordinary action cannot resolve
to perform acts pertaining to a special
proceeding because it is subject to

Page 29 of 29

specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court

a quo erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance."12

estate that would have invited the

exercise of the limited jurisdiction of
a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not

unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that
whether a particular matter should be resolved
by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First
Instance) in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is
not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of
procedure. In essence, it is procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which
may be waived".15

Of equal importance is that before any

conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is
necessary that certain steps be taken
first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable
obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of
his death; then, all donations subject to
collation would be added to it. With the partible
estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established;
and only thereafter can it be ascertained
whether or not a donation had prejudiced the
legitimes.19

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on

the part of herein private respondents
inasmuch as the six children of the decedent
even assailed the authority of the trail court,
acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the
decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court
has consistently enunciated the long standing
principle that although generally, a probate
court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court
and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to decide
the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had
occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of
estate is involved, but merely an
allegation seeking appointment as
estate administratrix which does not
necessarily involve settlement of

A perusal of the records, specifically the

antecedents and proceedings in the present
case, reveals that the trial court failed to
observe established rules of procedure
governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no
cogent reason to sanction the non-observance
of these well-entrenched rules and hereby
holds that under the prevailing circumstances,
a probate court, in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to
ventilate and adjudge the issue of
advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del
Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.