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1. Planning
Guidelines for developing HSE Policy and
procedures
This article presents some guidelines for setting up HSE policy and procedures for
exploration projects.
1. General
1.1 Policy
"Health, Safety and Environment" are the aspects of activities which relate to how
work is carried out rather than to what is done. They must be given equal priority
with the technical aspects of any operation. This is a primary responsibility of the
Management to ensure that all the contractors involved, as well as all staff
members, are aware and adhere to this policy.
1.2 Implementation
A specific HSE policy document must be prepared and communicated, based on the
Company Guidelines. It should demonstrate commitment, understanding of HSEcritical areas, and control mechanisms. It should be signed by the Country Manager,
displayed in premises and sites, and distributed.
Key features of an HSE policy:
1. Clearly identifies the company and the business areas to which it refers.
2. Should be produced in a bold, easy to read format.
3. Should be consistent in appearance with other company policies.
4. Should be restricted to one A4 page display of concise, action-oriented
statements.
5. For an HSE policy to work it must have the following characteristics:
High HSE awareness, understanding and commitment.
Supervisory capabilities and skills appropriate to the job.
Consistency, clarity, and realism in standards and procedures.
Pragmatic HSE management structures for each business area.
In addition to the general HSE policy, a new Company will need to establish specific
policies for drugs and alcohol abuse, smoking, road safety and others.
2. Health
2.1 Medical care requirements
For general medical services, consider a staff doctor or a contract with a local
doctor.
For specialized medical services, a contract with local hospitals/clinics and an
evacuation plan must be in place. Generally, organizations like embassies have
private clinics and it might be possible to get an arrangement for their use by
Company staff.
In the field the medical support to be provided depends on the operation. For an
onshore operation, depending on the situation (seismic or drilling), activities can be
concentrated in one site, or spread out during road construction or mobilization. The
type of medical support required for each worksite will depend on specific health
risks, risk of injury, communications and access.
In some areas the provision of doctors on offshore drilling units is covered by local
regulations.
As a rule, each working group must contain someone who has had first aid training.
This can be met by means of training courses given on site by the Company doctor
or paramedic.
As a guideline, first aid should be available to all staff within four minutes, advanced
first aid within one hour, and there should be access to a fully qualified doctor or
hospital within four hours.
There must be a fully reliable telecommunications system, 24 hours/day availability
of ambulance transport and doctor. If this cannot be guaranteed a qualified doctor
must be on site with facilities to stabilize a badly injured patient to enable a medical
evacuation even under difficult circumstances. The doctor should have at least five
years relevant experience.
Replacement of the doctor(s) should be addressed.
Requirement for paramedics in addition to the doctor depends on the spread of the
operation and the ease of movement between sites. If it is decided not to have a
doctor on site, then there should certainly be one on call from the office.
Remember that "part-time" doctors have different priorities except for obvious lifeor-death situations.
A water filter of the type which filters the water through earthenware candles is
commonly used. If this is done the water should be boiled after filtering rather than
before.
Water condensing out of air-conditioners gives a useful supply of safe water, as long
as the container is covered, and it has the advantage of being free of color and
sediment.
Avoid salads, peel fruit and eat well cooked meat.
The quality of local restaurants can only be judged by experience, and the advice of
other expatriates and senior local staff should be sought in the first instance.
3. Safety
3.1 Safety management
The HSE Case, in addition to documenting SMS, provides a description of the
hazards associated with the particular installation or operation and the means by
which they have been assessed and are controlled. It details emergency
preparedness and contingency planning measures aimed at safeguarding life, the
environment and the asset as well as recovering from any emergency situation.
The HSE Case concludes with a Statement of Fitness which explains that the
hazards associated with the installation or operation have been evaluated and
measures have been, or will be taken, to reduce the risks to the lowest level that is
reasonably practicable. The Statement of Fitness must affirm that conditions are
satisfactory to carry out the operation.
The Safety Management System should be in place, and the HSE Case documented,
before any operation can commence.
3.2 Implementation
Visible consistent management commitment is essential. Weekly meetings must be
held between the Country Manager, the Department Heads and the major
contractors (drilling, transport, engineering, etc.). These meetings should inculcate
a team approach to operations and ensure that procedures involving more than one
company are jointly discussed and agreed. Weekly site safety meetings should be
reviewed and action agreed.
Some tenderers know that they wont be able to comply with all the conditions of
contract but, to improve their chance of being awarded the contract, says that they
will comply. Regular inspections may not work as the contract will pretend that he
has everything in order will be ready on the required date. To counter this, consider
including a provision in the contract award notification that the award is subject to
orders for equipment being placed or delivered by a certain date, and key personnel
to be in place by a given time. Penalty for missing items should also be considered.
In practice even if the Company has the option to terminate the contract, there is
never enough time to re-tender and re-award - and the contractor knows this. He
has to be persuaded that compliance with the standards is in his best interest,
which in the short term is not always the case. The best method is good
communication from the beginning, using the assurance that non-compliance with
contractual standards will reduce profits.
The translation of safety procedures and guidelines into practice is the greatest
challenge to the Management Team.
In the context of an operation in a remote area it has to be remembered that the
objective of safety management is the reduction/elimination of accidents.
A policy which creates a major problem in every land-drilling operation in bush
areas is that of wearing protective footwear. Laborers may be tripping all the time,
which is counter-productive. The solution is to identify the risk and use the locally
accepted method of small scale bush clearance. The most common injuries among
bush clearers are likely to be cuts on the lower leg caused by their machetes being
deflected. They may also be at risk from snake bites or scorpion stings. Some
foot/lower leg protection is thus required, but not necessarily safety boots. The
optimum "protective footwear" is thus jungle boots with the lightest possible sole
and foot, and canvas upper sections. If possible, a representative of the laborers
should be involved in the discussion. If the wearing of special footwear can be
associated with the status of the wearer there will be much less resistance to
wearing them.
Note that laborers may "lose" the boots every night. Positive steps should be taken
to prevent this.
It is likely that a transport contractor will not have seat belts in his trucks, or
reversing alarms, or roll-over bars on his personnel carriers. This must be checked
early so that these items can be imported and their fitting supervised. Alternatively,
vehicles should be imported on a temporary basis.
3.4 Reporting
All incidents, including environmental incidents and occupational illnesses must be
reported through the "line", in exactly the same way as for technical operational
data. The Company site representative must generate an atmosphere in which he is
informed about even first aid incidents from the contractor supervisors, rather than
hearing about them from the site doctor or medic.
Minor accidents should be included in the morning report; significant medical
treatment cases, and lost time accidents, should be reported immediately to the
Department Head concerned.
3.5 Incentives
The question of safety bonuses is a difficult subject. People do not deliberately have
accidents so payment for avoiding accidents will not affect their behavior - it is only
training which can do that. However, the publicity attached to the bonuses will raise
general safety awareness.
If the bonus is not earned individually but by groups, it should encourage laborers to
watch over each other, but if one has an accident, the others may be upset for
losing their bonus. There could also be incentive not to report accidents.
If only one of the contractors have a bonus scheme, the others will be unhappy and
so will company workers.
Disputes may also arise that the accident is caused by factors outside the control of
the contractor.
In general, no accident bonus payments are not recommended. A better approach
may be to give out prizes (preferably in kind) for safety-related suggestions,
mutually agreed training targets, etc. The management of this process will take a
lot of administrative effort as all suggestions must be followed through and
discussed with their originator. In any case, the system adopted must be simple and
visible.
3.6 Audits
External Audit
Technical HSE Audit of the Company operations (transport, seismic, drilling, etc.)
should be carried out by a combined team of external auditors, a Company
representative and a representative of the relevant Contractor. Not only the
hardware and the procedures should be audited, but also the supervisory and
management control.
Pre-start-up audit
A pre-start-up audit of each aspect of the operation (drilling, transport, finance, etc.)
must be conducted to enable the General Manager to sign a "Statement of Fitness".
This audit will be carried out by the Country Manager and Department Heads, with
equivalent levels of the relevant contractors. This audit should cover hardware and
procedures.
Weekly Audit
The second type of internal audit is a weekly audit of a specific aspect of the
operation. This is carried out during the weekly inspection visit from the head office
by whoever makes the visit. Normally there is a team of three - the Company visitor,
the contractor visitor, and the contractors site safety adviser. The objective is to
confirm continued compliance with procedures and practices. It is not just a walk
around to check cleanliness of the site, although it must also check that controls in
place to ensure that hardware and housekeeping standards are maintained.
Follow up is essential and every audit should be reported in a document that
describes what was done, when, by whom and include a list of deficiencies. The
findings will be presented at the weekly safety meeting to decide on the action
parties and deadlines. Progress should be reviewed in the subsequent weekly
meetings.
4. Environment
It must be addressed during the preliminary and preparation phases e.g.
road network selection
whether the rig move/ mobilization will be by road, river, rail, or helirig.,
location of the operations base/ office.
choice of drilling prospects
There is a requirement to make an Environmental Assessment in the very early
stages of preparation. It is necessary to estimate what the effects of the operation
might be and, afterwards, evaluate exactly what they were.
There should also be consultation at an early stage with local authorities and or
government. Consultation with the local community may also be appropriate.
Always consider reducing the hole and casing diameters in exploration wells - i.e.
towards slim hole drilling.
ton expendable bags. The use of small bulk tanks should be investigated for
consumables which would otherwise be provided in 25-kg sacks.
Offshore, pallets and empty sacks should be stored in neat bundles and sent ashore
regularly. The most hazardous chemical is usually caustic soda. This should always
be purchased in drums and empty drums should be rinsed out, punctured, and sent
ashore.
On land the packaging of mud chemicals, must be disposed of in such a way that
the local residents cannot be harmed and in agreement with local regulations.
Caustic drums should be flattened by a bulldozer and disposed of in a deep pit, so
that they cant be used for roofing material, cooking, etc.
Sacks and pallets should be burnt daily, along with kitchen waste.
4.2.2.5. Sump oil and similar products
It is recommended to investigate the possibility of sale to local industries or
workshops for re-use. Otherwise construct a small cement lined burning pit and
burn the waste oil, along with the kitchen rubbish.
4.2.2.6 Metallic waste
Waste such as thread protectors, used bits, scraps produced by the welder, should
preferably be taken to town and sold for re-cycling. If that is impractical because of
the remoteness of the location, the best is to dump them in the cellar after
abandonment and fill with cement.
4.3 Rehabilitation
The aim of rehabilitation is to leave the environment in such a state that it can
recover to a situation similar to what it was prior to the operation. These should
have been addressed in the Environmental Assessment.
Offshore there is normally little to be done other than cutting the casing below the
mud-line level and leaving the sea-bed clear of large objects in order to prevent
damage to fishing nets.
Onshore, the liquid contents of the waste pit have to be disposed of. The most
convenient method is to pump it down the hole but this can only be done if it is
certain that there will be no contamination of water sources. If this is not feasible
the alternative is to fence the pit and leave until the liquid has evaporated. The
cuttings can then be covered or treated further. Additional costs for mobilization and
demobilization should not be ignored when budgeting for the operation.
Onshore, drilling locations should be cleaned up, debris should be buried into the
mud pit or transported to a recycling site. The wellhead should be removed and a
plate welded over the conductor. A vertical beam should be welded, extending
above ground level, with the company name, well name and date. The cellar should
be filled with cement and other metallic waste products. Pictures of the area must
be taken and the local authorities must be informed of the position for inclusion on
maps.
Any natural drainage which has been disturbed should be restored to the original
channels, and any dams removed.
Generally, roads constructed should be removed, however the national or local
authorities should be consulted as people may want it left to assist in development
of the area.
Roads may also give access for poachers and settlers to previously inaccessible or
protected areas. If an area has an international protection status, consultation at
local level may not be sufficient
Permits in force are not kept in a visible place such that all work being
performed under the permit system can be seen together in one location
(e.g. toolpusher's office).
1.3. Induction
A system of induction for new arrivals of personnel should cover:
Site rules.
Emergency alarms and response required.
Who is in charge, who to report to?
Safety requirements, e.g. hard hats, ear defenders, boots, goggles, etc.
Information concerning specific hazards, e.g. H2S, chemicals, heat hazards.
Deficiencies
System for recording arrival and departure of personnel on site (POB) is often
unreliable.
No information for new arrivals who to report to or who is in charge.
Alarm signals and muster station locations are often left to the imagination of
the new-comer.
Site-specific hazards are not highlighted during induction briefings.
1.4. Communications
Good communication between rig supervisors and crew is essential. In areas where
English is not commonly used, front-line supervisors should know sufficient of the
local language to be of practical value. Where this is not possible a bilingual
foreman should be appointed to each crew.
Deficiencies
Crews have to be employed with no language in common with their
supervisors.
Crews are unaware of the basic site rules, the meaning of many notices and
do not understand information supplied to them in writing. Often because of
the language problem there is no information supplied at all (particularly subcontractors).
Warning signs with written messages used with illiterate crews.
1.5. Drills
Drills are used to train and optimize response to emergency situations. To be
effective, there must be a concise report logged down on the type of drill, the
response achieved and any shortcomings. Copies of such reports are sent to the
drilling office where the quality of response as well as the significance of any
shortcomings should be discussed at scheduled safety meetings. Unsatisfactory
drills should be repeated at the earliest opportunity and rehearsed until successful.
Drills should be planned to include different scenarios at different times of the day.
It is good practice to 'take out' a key supervisor to test fallback plans. Above all,
drills should be as realistic as possible.
Deficiencies
Most drills held are reported, but there is rarely any comment on the quality
of response or shortcomings
1.6.
Accident reporting
All companies have an accident reporting system. The need for a parallel system of
near-miss reporting and unsafe act auditing is becoming increasingly evident. The
key product of accident investigation procedures is to take appropriate action to
prevent recurrence.
Deficiencies
Identification of accident causes is often lacking in reports.
Results/minutes of accident investigation meetings are not passed down the
line to front-line supervisors.
Many near-miss events are not recorded at all - a key element in accident
prevention.
Contractor/subcontractor accident reporting, investigation, and follow-up
procedures are often of poor standard, if they exist at all.
After many cases of accident reports, much time (and money) is invested in
the invested in the investigation but nothing changes as a result.
1.7.
Contracts
The majority of work carried out in a drilling operation is by contract. Some of the
work or services are done under sub-contract. It is therefore most probable that in
addition to the main drilling contractor are several service contractors and a
number of sub-contractors (e.g. catering staff, transports, drilling crew, general
laborers, male nurse, radio operator, etc.). The content and quality of contracts
entered into by the Company remains the responsibility of Company management,
however, the sub-contracts entered into by contractors vary in quality and content
considerably.
Deficiencies
Contract supervisors and contractor representatives do not have copies of
the relevant parts of their respective contracts.
Sub-contractors do not have copies of their contracts, neither do the
contractor site supervisors or the Company drilling supervisor. In most cases
a copy of the sub-contract is not available in the Company office.
Work schedules, relief schemes and required levels of skills and language
ability are frequently omitted in the text of the sub-contract.
Relevant safety clauses and compliance with Company/contractor safety
standards is often not mentioned. This is particularly evident in relation to
personal protective equipment such as helmets, overalls, and safety boots.
1.8.
Contingency plans
2.
2.1.
Operations
Lifting equipment
All equipment used for lifting must have the safe working load clearly marked on it.
This essential detail is valid even for consumable items such as slings and shackles.
Additionally, lifting equipment should be carefully inspected monthly and thoroughly
NDT tested every 12 months.
It is also necessary to keep a register of all slings and shackles with latest inspection
dates on the rig. So that individual slings can be easily identified, each sling should
be tagged/marked with its unique identity code. (Similar to a movable number).
Deficiencies
No register of slings and shackles kept on the rig.
Newly purchased slings and shackles are uncertified and are not proof tested.
The SWL is not marked on lifting equipment, e.g. BOP lifting trolleys, air
winches.
Pre-slung cargoes are manifested without including the slings - e.g. 'l lot'
slings is not adequate.
Damaged and potentially dangerous slings are mixed up with good slings.
Deficiencies
Materials are loaded and consigned with the wrong weight on consignment
notes. In some cases, the weight is not mentioned at all.
Most material yards have scales for verifying loads. However, this equipment
is often not used and load weighs are overestimated instead.
Crane drivers offshore are obliged to pick up loads 'blind' if there is no weight
given on the consignment note.
Rig stability calculations are incorrect due to overestimated weighs quoted on
consignment notes.
2.4. Chemicals
At any time on a rig there are a large variety of chemicals which are used for:
drilling muds;
completion fluids;
formation stimulation;
cement slurry additives;
maintenance solvents and cleaning fluids;
water treatment agents.
As many chemicals are harmful if used incorrectly, it is clearly a requirement that
data sheets are available for all chemicals on site. Such data sheets should also be
available at the material/transport yard, to any contractor handling the chemicals,
and to any driver or supply vessel captain transporting chemical to and from the rig.
Chemical data sheets should include all relevant properties of each substance, the
known hazards, e.g. harmful vapors, inflammability First aid and subsequent
medical attention recommended in the event of contact with the chemical should
also be stated on the data sheet. Personnel handling and transporting hazardous
chemicals should be fully informed and should be aware of first aid treatment
necessary in case of an accident.
The use of protective equipment when handling and mixing chemicals should be
mandatory with provision of deluge shower and eye wash facilities easily accessible.
High corrosive, toxic and flammable chemicals must be kept separate and identified
with suitable warning signs. Oxidizing agents (e.g. potassium dichromate) must be
kept away from any form of combustible material (e.g. grease). In areas where local
labor may be of particularly low educational standards and with no industrial
background, it is often better to prohibit local labor from handling particularly
dangerous chemicals (e.g. caustic soda). It is almost impossible to explain to an
uneducated person what a caustic or corrosive chemical is.
Deficiencies
Data sheets on all chemicals stored or in use are not available.
The rig medic does not have a copy of chemical data sheets.
Eye wash and douche facilities are not available in the mud mixing area.
Mud mixing crews are not warned of the hazards of particularly dangerous
chemicals, e.g. caustic soda, soda ash.
The use of protective equipment is not enforced.
Little is done about significant residues of chemicals left in 'empty' sacks and
drums.
Information concerning chemical hazards is almost always lacking during
transport.
2.6.
Mud-gas separators
hazard with this equipment is the possibility of gas venting via the mud line to the
rig mud tank and shale shaker area - there being usually no provision in the design
of the mud gas separator to prevent this.
It is essential therefore that details of the design of the separator are scrutinized to
verify that there is a mechanism to prevent gas escape via the mud line. In the past,
serious injury has resulted from hydrocarbon gases entering the shale shaker area a problem even more lethal if H 2S is involved.
Deficiencies
Inadequately designed mud-gas separator.
Drawings and specifications for the separator are not available.
Overall separator dimensions are below the sizes recommended in Pressure
control manual for drilling and workover operations.
2.7.
Gas cylinders
Gas cylinders are used and stored on all drilling locations. In the industrialized world
the rules for handling and using gas cylinders are well known. In some remote
areas, codes of practice and standards applied to the use of gas cylinders may be
inadequate and it is under such conditions that special attention must be paid to
the standards of local welders and local suppliers of compressed gases and gas
cylinders.
Deficiencies
Oxygen cylinders are stored together with acetylene cylinders.
Cylinders are not kept upright in a shaded area.
Caps of bottles are missing
Full and empty bottles are mixed.
Bottles are wrongly color coded.
2.8.
ESD systems
Emergency shut-down systems are generally used to isolate all power from
hazardous areas including the drill floor, mud pits and slush pumps. The system is
normally function-tested once per well or per rig-up.
Toolpusher, drillers and assistant drillers must all know the location and function of
the ESD actuator situated in the immediate vicinity of the drawworks.
Deficiencies
Most supervisory staff on the rig, including drillers do not know exactly what
happens when the ESD function is actuated.
There are rarely any documents anywhere describing ESD procedures.
ESD systems should include isolation of AC power to the rig floor and derrick
area.
2.9.
Alarm systems
The same can be observed with alarm systems as with ESD systems. Although the
major fire and muster alarms are generally known through drills, the many other
alarms such as gas, H2S, Halon release, etc.) are not always known or understood.
It is essential that new-comes and visitors are initially trained to recognize alarms
and know the required response. It is especially important that all staff on a drilling
installation are fully aware of the functioning of all types of alarm.
Deficiencies
Key staff do not know all the different alarms or what they mean.
Crews, contractors and sub-contractors do not know sound of all alarms or
the response required.
Alarm systems often conflict, e.g. PA system used for alarm signal but must
be used to give directions at the same time.
Visitors and new staff are not briefed on the alar signals used on site.
3.
Questionnaire
The following questions are produced under headings to fit with parts of the
standard audit check list. Common audit findings listed in sections A and B of this
paper are addressed by the questions in this section.
3.1.
3.2.
Work permit
Does the work permit system cover all aspects of hazardous work?
Are the requirements known to all the work force & supervisors?
Are permits in force on display in a central location?
Is the location reserved for this purpose?
Is there any system of review of the use of the permit system?
Who in the organization sees copies of permits issued?
3.3.
3.4.
3.5.
3.6.
Contingency plans
Are reports of drills prepared and distributed after each drill?
Is the drill performance reviewed?
Is there a system of shortcoming correction?
Do the drills follow published procedures - how is this checked?
Is the quality of drills discussed by management?
What are the instructions in the event of an unsatisfactory drill?
Are the contingency plans available to all key staff?
Including those involved in the plan?
Has there been feedback from all personnel involved?
Have the plans been changed and the changes distributed?
Do the contractors have their own contingency plans?
Any conflict?
Are there dry runs of contingency plans?
Is so, how is the exercise reviewed?
Who is focal point for amendments, to contingency plans?
Does the head count check with meal sheets?
How are short-term visitors including in POB at all times?
Is the POB list available to the person responsible for the head count?
What other duties/responsibilities does he have?
Accident investigation
Is accident reporting and investigation procedures fully described?
Are they distributed to all supervisory staff?
Does contract oblige participation in accident investigation?
How are contractors informed of others near miss accidents?
Are procedures, rules or specifications changed as a result of accident
investigations?
Contractor safety
Are copies of all contracts with site supervisors?
With contractor representatives?
3.7.
3.8.
Maintenance procedures
Is a register kept on the rig of all slings and shackles in use?
Is lifting equipment marked with the SWL?
Are slings marked with an ID number?
Is there a system for regular inspection of lifting equipment?
Is there certification of inspection of lifting equipment?
Is responsibility for sling selection clearly understood?
Are the rules pertaining to lifting procedures known to all crews at all levels?
Weight control
3.9.
Fork-lift trucks
3.16. Telecommunications
2. Quality
Deficiencies in Safety Management
Systems
1 Safety meetings
Rig site meetings held on a weekly basis with short 'toolbox' meetings subject to
operational requirement. 5-10-minute safety briefing before each shift or between
each job phase (e.g. tripping and logging or casing running and cementing).
2 Permit to work
The most commonly used is the hot work permit. The company drilling supervisor is
the ultimate signatory for the permit to become effective. The system is intended to
provide proper control of work under hazardous conditions and to ensure adequate
supervision of such work after necessary precautions have been taken and to
establish that the correct procedures are followed.
Deficiencies
The permit to work system is used only for hot work. Operations which
involve vessel entry, working at height, unusual operations/tasks, diving
operations are not included in the system.
Many personnel employed on site remain ignorant of the purpose, use and
application of the permit to work system
Only the principal signatories of work permits are aware of the need for the
permit; the work force is ill-informed as to the permit system.
Permits (hot work) are being written for time spans exceeding one shift.
Permits in force are not kept in a visible place such that all work being
performed under the permit system can be seen together in one location
(e.g. toolpusher's office).
3 Induction
A system of induction for new arrivals of personnel should cover:
1. Site rules
2. Emergency alarms and response required
3. Who is in charge, who to report to?
4. Safety requirements, e.g. hard hats, ear defenders, boots, goggles, etc.
5. Information concerning specific hazards, e.g. H2S, chemicals, heat hazards.
Deficiencies
System for recording arrival and departure of personnel on site (POB) is often
unreliable.
No information for new arrivals who to report to or who is in charge.
Alarm signals and muster station locations are often left to the imagination of
the new-comer.
Site-specific hazards are not highlighted during induction briefings.
4 Communications
Good communication between rig supervisors and crew is essential. In areas where
English is not commonly used, front-line supervisors should know sufficient of the
local language to be of practical value. Where this is not possible a bilingual
foreman should be appointed to each crew.
Deficiencies
Crews have to be employed with no language in common with their
supervisors.
Crews are unaware of the basic site rules, the meaning of many notices and
do not understand information supplied to them in writing. Often because of
the language problem there is no information supplied at all (particularly subcontractors).
Warning signs with written messages used with illiterate crews.
5 Drills
Drills are used to train and optimize response to emergency situations. There must
be a concise report logged down on the type of drill, the response achieved and any
shortcomings. Copies of such reports are sent to the drilling office where the quality
of response as well as the significance of any shortcomings should be discussed at
scheduled safety meetings. Unsatisfactory drills should be repeated at the earliest
opportunity and rehearsed until successful. Drills should be planned to include
different scenarios at different times of the day. It is good practice to 'take out' a key
supervisor to test fallback plans. Drills should be as realistic as possible.
Deficiencies
Most drills held are reported, but there is rarely any comment on the quality
of response or shortcomings
Performance and shortcomings of drills are not reviewed by management
safety meetings
Drills held are found to be of poor realism and do not follow stated
procedures.
The head count on location does not tally with the reported personnel on site.
The duties of the person responsible for the head count conflict with other
duties during an emergency. E.g. often the medic is responsible for the head
count, with no deputy in case of an injury.
Drills are held at the same time each week to the same scenario.
6 Accident reporting
All companies have an accident reporting system. The need for a parallel system of
near-miss reporting and unsafe act auditing is becoming increasingly evident. The
key product of accident investigation procedures is to take appropriate action to
prevent recurrence.
Deficiencies
Identification of accident causes is often lacking in reports.
7 Contracts
Some of the work or services are done under sub-contract. It is therefore most
probable that in addition to the main drilling contractor are several service
contractors and a number of sub-contractors (e.g. catering staff, transports, drilling
crew, general laborers, male nurse, radio operator, etc.). The content and quality of
contracts entered into by the Company remains the responsibility of Company
management, however, the sub-contracts entered into by contractors vary in
quality and content considerably.
Deficiencies
Contract supervisors and contractor representatives do not have copies of
the relevant parts of their respective contracts.
Sub-contractors do not have copies of their contracts, neither do the
contractor site supervisors or the Company drilling supervisor. In most cases
a copy of the sub-contract is not available in the Company office.
Work schedules, relief schemes and required levels of skills and language
ability are frequently omitted in the text of the sub-contract.
Relevant safety clauses and compliance with Company/contractor safety
standards is often not mentioned. This is particularly evident in relation to
personal protective equipment such as helmets, overalls, and safety boots.
Similarly, the requirements for able swimmers offshore is frequently not
mentioned.
Contractors do not include or enforce safety clauses in their subcontracts.
8 Contingency plans
Comprehensive contingency plans are often prepared well ahead of drilling
operations. Routine matters such as weekend duty rosters, emergency contact
numbers, local emergency contact numbers are normally all contained in the
contingency manual. In some cases, plans are tested with a dry run to check
procedures, communications and to iron out any bugs in the procedures. A dry run
exercise often takes considerable time to review as there are many personnel
involved (medivac).
Deficiencies
Contingency plans are in the hands of the key line supervisory staff but are
not available to other staff (e.g. radio operator, medic, chief pilot, duty pilot,
stand-by boat captain, etc.).
3 Aircraft inspection
Company invited to tender must have been audited, and be approved. In some case
the legislation requires obligatory use of military aircraft or national air carriers
where auditing may not be possible. In such circumstances, ensure all possible
steps are taken in planning and arranging procedures to control these situations.
5 Vehicles inspection
Special attention should be paid to roadworthiness and safety equipment (in
particular to compliance with Group recommendations with respect to seat belts,
reversing alarms and roll-over bars), together with the proposed scheduled
maintenance programme.
6 Consumables inspection
7 Casing inspection
New casing is inspected as part of the purchase formalities. Second hand casing
(pre-owned but unused) is normally sold on an as-is, where-is basis. Unless the staff
of the current venture are personally familiar with the up-to-date history of the
casing it should be properly inspected by one of the specialist service companies
prior to finalizing the purchase.
Note that the number of times the casing will have to be handled, and the
skill/experience of the transporters, may be more relevant than its initial condition.
Used and recovered casing should only be considered in very exceptional
circumstances.
8 Wellheads inspection
In general wellheads should be assembled and tested prior to delivery. If the
wellhead supply is the responsibility of the company rather than the drilling
contractor the test should preferably be witnessed by one of the future well-site
staff
1 Lifting equipment
All equipment used for lifting must have the safe working load clearly marked on it.
This essential detail is valid even for consumable items such as slings and shackles.
Additionally, lifting equipment should be carefully inspected monthly and thoroughly
NDT tested every 12 months (see EP-5500 Section 3433).
It is also necessary to keep a register of all slings and shackles with latest inspection
dates on the rig. So that individual slings can be easily identified, each sling should
be tagged/marked with its unique identity code. (Similar to a movable number).
Deficiencies
No register of slings and shackles kept on the rig.
Newly purchased slings and shackles are uncertified and are not proof
tested.
The SWL is not marked on lifting equipment, e.g. BOP lifting trolleys, air
winches.
Pre-slung cargoes are manifested without including the slings - e.g. 'l lot'
slings is not adequate.
Damaged and potentially dangerous slings are mixed up with good slings.
2 Weight control
Consignments of materials to and from the rig are commonly loaded onto and from
transport vehicles by crane. It is essential that crane drivers, supervisors and rig
stability staff know the weight of each lift. Unusually heavy lifts should be done
under the permit to work system using certified lifting slings.
Deficiencies
Materials are loaded and consigned with the wrong weight on consignment
notes. In some cases, the weight is not mentioned at all.
Most material yards have scales for verifying loads. However, this equipment
is often not used and load weighs are overestimated instead.
Crane drivers offshore are obliged to pick up loads 'blind' if there is no weight
given on the consignment note.
Rig stability calculations are incorrect due to overestimated weighs quoted
on consignment notes.
3 Fork-lift trucks
Most palletized materials are handled with fork-lift trucks. The truck used should be
suitable for working in hazardous Zone 2 areas or the permit system is required for
work in a classified area. There are many instances of accidents associated with
fork-lift trucks and they are usually caused by one or more of the deficiencies listed
below.
Drivers of fork-lift trucks should always be experienced and verified competent. To
avoid unauthorized drivers 'having a go', there must be a visible list of authorized
drivers on the notice board with published rules stating clearly that persons not on
the authorized list may not use the vehicle for any purpose.
A reversing alarm should be fitted to the vehicle though care should be taken to
select equipment suitable for hazardous Zone 2 area classification.
Deficiencies
The fork-lift truck is unsuitable for hazardous area Zone 2 use (e.g. electric
starter motor with battery).
Reversing alarm not fitted.
Unauthorized persons driving the vehicle (e.g. the contract mud technician).
List of authorized drivers not published and visible.
The fork-lift is used for lifting personnel.
4 Chemicals
At any time on a rig there are a large variety of chemicals which are used for:
drilling muds;
completion fluids;
formation stimulation;
cement slurry additives;
maintenance solvents and cleaning fluids;
6 Mud-gas separators
The minimum recommended dimensions for a mud-gas separator is given in
Pressure control manual for drilling and workover operations. The most significant
hazard with this equipment is the possibility of gas venting via the mud line to the
rig mud tank and shale shaker area - there being usually no provision in the design
of the mud gas separator to prevent this.
It is essential therefore that details of the design of the separator are scrutinized to
verify that there is a mechanism to prevent gas escape via the mud line. In the past,
serious injury has resulted from hydrocarbon gases entering the shale shaker area a problem even more lethal if H 2S is involved.
Deficiencies
Inadequately designed mud-gas separator.
Drawings and specifications for the separator are not available.
Overall separator dimensions are below the sizes recommended in Pressure
control manual for drilling and workover operations.
7 Gas cylinders
Gas cylinders are used and stored on all drilling locations. In the industrialized world
the rules for handling and using gas cylinders are well known. In some remote
areas, codes of practice and standards applied to the use of gas cylinders may be
inadequate and it is under such conditions that special attention must be paid to
the standards of local welders and local suppliers of compressed gases and gas
cylinders.
Deficiencies
Oxygen cylinders are stored together with acetylene cylinders.
Cylinders are not kept upright in a shaded area.
Caps of bottles are missing
Full and empty bottles are mixed.
Bottles are wrongly color coded.
8 ESD systems
Emergency shut-down systems are generally used to isolate all power from
hazardous areas including the drill floor, mud pits and slush pumps. The system is
normally function-tested once per well or per rig-up.
Toolpusher, drillers and assistant drillers must all know the location and function of
the ESD actuator situated in the immediate vicinity of the drawworks.
Deficiencies
Most supervisory staff on the rig, including drillers do not know exactly what
happens when the ESD function is actuated.
There are rarely any documents anywhere describing ESD procedures.
ESD systems should include isolation of AC power to the rig floor and derrick
area.
9 Alarm systems
The same can be observed with alarm systems as with ESD systems. Although the
major fire and muster alarms are generally known through drills, the many other
alarms such as gas, H2S, Halon release, etc.) are not always known or understood.
It is essential that new-comes and visitors are initially trained to recognize alarms
and know the required response. It is especially important that all staff on a drilling
installation are fully aware of the functioning of all types of alarm.
Deficiencies
Key staff do not know all the different alarms or what they mean.
Crews, contractors and sub-contractors do not know sound of all alarms or
the response required.
Alarm systems often conflict, e.g. PA system used for alarm signal but must
be used to give directions at the same time.
Visitors and new staff are not briefed on the alar signals used on site.
10 Radioactive sources
For wireline logging operations radioactive source have to be used. Radioactive
materials are therefore often stored on or close to the drilling location. Levels of
radioactivity around the storage area should be carefully monitored and verified to
be within acceptable levels (see EP 55000 Section 3441), and warning signs used to
control access.
It is also necessary that a register available of radioactive substances is kept on the
rig and updated when there are any changes to the radioactive source inventory.
Updated copies of the register should be forwarded to the senior operations
engineer.
Deficiencies
There is no register available giving a description of radioactive sources on
the location.
The level of radioactivity around the storage box is not known, either above
or below SSC acceptable limits.
No signs warning of radioactivity.
No boundary fence to indicate a no-go area.
11 Radio silence
The procedure for radio silence whilst connecting and handling armed explosive
devices is fully described and documented in EP 55000. The need for radio silence is
well-known and all radios must be accounted for including portable radios.
In addition, DC power should be isolated along with any welding sets or
transformers. Such equipment must be electrically disabled and a clearly visible
notice attached to prohibit use. It is important to eliminate all potential sources of
stray current around the rig floor area; this includes electrically driven cathode
protection systems.
Other sources of radio transmission must be warned in adequate time before
operations with electrically detonated explosives commence, e.g. helicopters,
police, militia, etc.
Deficiencies
There is no register of portable radio transmitters on the location.
Notices to indicate isolated equipment not in use.
DC power isolation sometimes omitted.
12 Electrical earthing
Proper earthing of electrical equipment and drilling equipment throughout the mud
system is important. Without an effective earth, dangerous potentials could build up
and result in electrical discharge in areas classified as hazardous. Such a potential
source of ignition can be eliminated by interconnecting all tanks and mud mixing
systems and ensuring that resistance to earth is low (< 1 ohm). Sensitive
equipment such as computer, instrument logic boards and digital recorders can also
be adversely affected by poor earthing. Concern on these problems is usually
restricted to dry desert environments.
Deficiencies
Mud tanks and mixing skids are not interconnected or earthed.
The quality of earth is not checked with a Mega insulation tester
Audit questionnaire
1 Communication and motivation
2 Work permit
Does the work permit system cover all aspects of hazardous work?
Are the requirements known to all the work force & supervisors?
Are permits in force on display in a central location?
Is the location reserved for this purpose?
Is there any system of review of the use of the permit system?
Who in the organization sees copies of permits issued?
4 Contingency plans
5 Accident investigation
6 Contractor safety
7 Maintenance procedures
8 Weight control
9 Fork-lift trucks
10 Industrial hygiene
13 Gas cylinders
14 ESD systems
15 Radioactive sources
16 Telecommunications
17 Electrical earthing
18 Service contractors
Implementation, Supervision,
Verification and Control
Responsibilities for the implementation, supervision, verification and control of
drilling operations are listed in the following table:
Action
Execution
Quality Control
Provide input to the
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
preparation of the Drilling
Programme
Prepare the drilling /
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
completion / workover
Engineer Head of
programme
Onshore/Offshore
Prepare amendments to
Drilling Programme
Operations Engineer
Equipment selection
Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor
Logistics Supervisor
Drilling Contractor
Logistics Supervisor
Drilling Contractor
Drilling Contractor
Drilling Contractor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Contractor
Cement Contractor
Drilling Supervisor
Directional Drilling
Contractor / Operations
Engineer
Drilling
Drilling
Operations
Approval : Drilling
Manager
Senior Operations
Engineer Head of Onshore/
Offshore Operations
Senior Operations
Engineer Head of Onshore/
Offshore Operations
Head of Onshore/ Offshore
Operations
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
Engineer
Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
Engineer
Head of onshore/offshore
operations
Drilling Supervisor
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Head of Onshore/Offshore
Operations
Supervisor/
Operations Engineer
Contractor
Senior Operations
Engineer
Head of Onshore/ Offshore
Operations
Contractor
Drilling Supervisor
Contractor & Mud Drilling Supervisor
Loggers
Operations Engineer
Formation evaluation
Petroleum Engineer
Logging Contractor
Geologists/ Petro
physicists
Drilling Contractor / Mud
Contractor / Mud Logger
Drilling Contractor
Senior Operations
Engineer
Head of Onshore/Offshore
Operations
Petroleum Engineering
Petroleum Engineering
Drilling Supervisor
Contractor Tool Pusher
Drilling Supervisor
Operations Engineer
Drilling Supervisor / Mud Drilling Supervisor
& Cementing
Operations Engineer
Contractor/Logistics
Drilling Supervisor
Senior Operations
Logistics Supervisor
Engineer Head of
Onshore/Offshore
Operations
Drilling Supervisor/
Operations Engineer
Drilling Contractor
Senior Operations
Engineer
Operations Engineer
Senior Operations
Engineer Head of
Onshore/Offshore
Operations
3. Safety
Safety of Drilling Operations/Key Safety
Standard in Drilling Operations
1 Personnel
Work shall be restricted in all areas below other work being carried out at higher
levels.
Work vests shall be worn by all personnel working over or near water, and where
there are no guard rails in elevated positions. A safety belt and lifeline shall be worn
by all personnel working above the first girt of the mast. The lifeline shall be
secured to both the belt and the structure.
Personnel shall not be raised or lowered by the catlines, nor shall they "ride the
elevator".
All tools and materials shall be raised to work platforms by a hand line, toolbar, or
other means. Both hands shall be free when climbing ladders.
All safety belts, lifelines, stop chutes, and the Derrickman's emergency breathing
apparatus shall be tested at regular intervals. The tests shall be included in the
fortnightly inspection report.
Eye protection shall be worn at all times.
3.3 Hoists
All hoists shall be marked with their Safe Working Load (SWL), and this shall be
visible at all times.
The Weight Indicator shall be visible to the Driller at all times.
Wirelines shall be checked in the fortnightly inspection report. After the maximum
allowed ton mileage the lines shall be slipped or slipped and cut.
Lines shall always have sufficient wrap on the drum to prevent the load being
applied directly to the fastening clamps.
When greasing the crown and block, the Driller shall stay at the brake throughout
the operation.
Use of the catline is prohibited.
The designated Stabbing Board Operator shall be trained in the operation of the
equipment, and shall check it independently as soon as possible after coming on
board.
3.8 Drawworks
The drawworks "crown-o-matic" (crown block protection device), shall be tested
(and recorded on the IADC report) each shift, and each time the drill line has been
slipped or cut.
The Driller shall be at the controls whenever work is being carried out on the
drawworks. A wok permit is also necessary for this work.
The rat-hole and mouse-hole shall be covered when not in use, unless the protective
casing extends above the level of the rig floor.
The guards over the drum and rotary table gears shall always be in place when the
machinery is in use.
4.3 Cementing
Detailed information on use and handling of cementing chemicals is given in the
"Safety Procedure Manual".
All equipment shall be designed for the operation and test pressure it will be
subjected to in the operations.
All personnel working on cement mixing shall wear the appropriate protective
clothing, as detailed on the toxicological data sheets and in the Chemical Product
Index. The cement room should be well ventilated.
The pipelines from the cement pump to the wellhead shall be tested before cement
mixing commences.
5 Hazardous Zones
Discharges give rise to Hazardous Zones depending on the frequency of discharge
and the ventilation available. Wherever there is a risk of explosion, all potential
sources of ignition, principally electrical equipment, shall be adequately protected,
isolated, or removed.
Hazardous zones are also established when explosives operations are in progress.
The Senior Drilling Supervisor is responsible for ensuring that the requirements to
Zone Classification within the drilling unit are being implemented. The Offshore
Installation Manager shall ensure that all precautions are taken, and warning notices
are posted for work in Hazardous Zones.
The Zones are classified as follows:
Zone 0 - Area with an explosive atmosphere continuously or for long periods.
Zone 1 - Area where an explosive atmosphere must be expected occasionally
during normal operations.
Zone 2 - Area where an explosive atmosphere occurs only exceptionally and
for short periods of time.
The types of discharge giving rise to explosion risk are:
The Hazardous zones that shall be implemented are determined by the ventilation
available, and can be determined from the following table:
Continual Discharge ==== With all types of ventilation, zones 0, 1 and 2
required
Primary Discharge ==== With natural or mechanical ventilation, zones 1 and
2 required.
With no ventilation, zones 0, 1 and 2 required.
Secondary Discharge ==== With natural or mechanical ventilation, zone 2
required.
With no ventilation, zones 1 and 2 required.
4. The MWD/ Electric Wireline Logging Engineer shall, when arriving on the
platform, leaving the platform and when stock changes, fill out a Radioactive
Inventory List. The list shall be distributed in the same way as above.
5. The Offshore Co-coordinator/ Well Site Drilling Engineer shall ensure that these
essential tasks are completed accurately.
6. The Materials Man will be notified of the arrival of any Dangerous Goods on
board by the manifest and warning fax from the dispatching Company. The
Materials Man shall upon notification inform the Senior Drilling Supervisor and the
Offshore Co-coordinator.
1 Responsibilities
Safety is the responsibility of everyone associated with the drilling operation. In
order to conduct safe operations, Contractor and Company personnel must clearly
understand and effectively discharge their respective responsibilities.
and any emergency responsibility associated with his/her position on the station bill,
and the use and maintenance of personal protective equipment.
Guidelines should be in place for key contractor personnel to observe the new
employees work performance until he/she is satisfied that the employee can fill the
position in a safe and effective manner.
The employee orientation programme should also be designed to instruct Company,
visitor and third party personnel new to the rig on procedures and safe practices,
the station bill and any emergency responsibility associated with his/her position on
the station bill, and the use and maintenance of personal protective equipment.
The use of training aids (videos, posters, viewgraphs, etc.) is encouraged.
The completed accident reporting form should include the date of the accident,
number of fatalities resulting from the accident, job title of injured personnel, type
of accident, medical cause of death (if applicable), a brief narrative of the accident,
and recommended corrective action.
Responsibility for follow-up action should be identified. Any changes in procedures,
rules, equipment replacement, etc. as a result of the accident should be identified in
the follow-up report and should be discussed during appropriate safety meetings.
A list of personnel/offices to receive copies of the accident reports should be
included.
In addition, the Contractor must report all lost time accidents sustained by
Contractor's or subcontractor's personnel to the Company on the day such accident
occurs. and the Contractor must provide the Company with a full written report of
the investigation of each such accident within seven days after the occurrence of
the accident.
In the first work day of each month, the Contractor must provide the
Company with a monthly safety report which includes the following
information:
No. of personnel (both rig site and support staff) assigned full time to provide
the Contract Services.
Number of man-hours worked by personnel (both rig site and support staff)
assigned full time to provide the Contract Services.
No. of fatalities.
No. of lost time accidents (LTA).
No.
No.
No.
No.
of
of
of
of
8 Safety adviser
A shore based safety adviser (employed by the drilling contractor) should maintain
regular contact with the rig site Safety Coordinator. The role and responsibilities of
the safety adviser should be clearly defined and known to personnel on the rig site.
Duties of a safety adviser typically include:
Formal safety training (scheduling personnel into firefighting schools, first aid
classes, H2S training, survival at sea, etc.).
Rig site drill evaluation.
Follow-up on safety inspection and drill deficiencies (Verification of
satisfactory close-out of safety inspection and drill deficiencies).
Addressing relevant issues involving environment, health and industrial
hygiene.
The Contractor will be expected to designate a senior executive with responsibilities
for safety management and loss prevention. Safety advisers should report directly
to the executive.
11 Safety manual
Every Contractor should have a manual which addresses safety procedures and
practices. This manual should include:
Liaison with the company drilling supervisor, the contractor site manager and
the sub-contractor cementer to ensure that cement formulations and volumes
are adequate for the job.
Liaison with the mud engineer to ensure that mud properties are adequate
for well control, cuttings removal and formation stability.
Hazard
Dropped
object
Consequences
Damage to
process
equipment,
Intersection release of
with
hydrocarbons,
adjacent
H2S exposure,
wells,
injury to
shallow gas personnel
working in the
vicinity.
Possible fire or
explosion
Heavy lift Dropped
Damage to
Operations object
process
over
equipment,
wellbay
release of
e.g., risers,
Hydrocarbons,
BOPs,
Fire /
H2S exposure,
wellheads Explosion
injury to
and Xmas
personnel
tree
working in the
Welding
vicinity
Torch
cutting
Perforating Premature
Stuck Pipe detonation
Fishing
of explosive
charge
Serious
explosion,
personnel
injury
References
COMPANY Drilling
Manual
H2S Contingency
plan
Well Control
Manual
Contingency
Plan and
Emergency Well
Control Manual
Instructions
Acidizing
Loss of well Release of
No hot work on WHJ or Completion
Nitrogen
control
hydrocarbons, cantilever
Programme
lifting
Splash/spill H2S, exposure, superstructure
COMPANY
release
fire or
Closure of adjacent wells Contingency Plan
explosion
Safety clothing
and Emergency
Injury to
Emergency wash
Procedure
personnel
stations
H2S Contingency
Area access restriction Plan
Wellbay area to be
marked area to be
marked with Hazard
tape.
Well testing Relief valve Release of
This operation only
COMPANY
on separator hydrocarbons permitted with written Contingency
pops out
from
approval from Drilling
Plans and
extinguishin atmospheric
Department
Emergency
g flare from vent boom H2S
Procedure
burner
exposure, fire
or explosion
Pressure
Failure of
Liquid jet
P.A. announcement.
Drilling Manual
testing and mechanical impact,
Area defined by
COMPANY
BOP testing component projectiles,
components under test Contingency Plan
except
injury to
to be restricted by use and Emergency
testing
personnel
of Hazard tape.
Manual
equipment
Utilization of certified fit
lines
for purpose
components
Drilling
Loss of well Release of
Not hot work on WHJ or Drilling Manual
12.1/4in
control
Hydrocarbons cantilever substructure. COMPANY
hole
H2S Exposure, Should the BOPs be
Contingency Plan
Setting
possible fire or activated in the event of and Emergency
9.5/8in
explosion
an emergency then the Procedure
casing
producing wells should H2S Contingency
Drilling
be closed immediately Plan
8.1/2in
by activating the ESO.
hole
beyond
100ft
radius of
collision
Running
tubing
Operations Release or Injury of illness Area access restriction, COMPANY
with
exposure to to personnel
monitor area
Contingency Plan
Radioactive radiation
exposed to
Pre-job safety meeting and Emergency
Sources
hazard
P.A. announcement
Procedure
Open hole
logging
Responsibilities of the rig team in case of emergency and provide definition for the
different Emergency levels.
2. OIM
Ensure that drilling contractors requirement are followed, provided that they
do not conflict with those of the Company drilling supervisor, national
legislation or any other instructions issued by a government or superior
authority
Responsible for the direct supervision of the drilling crew, work in close
cooperation with Company drilling supervisor
Notify the Company drilling supervisor the occurrence of emergency/incidents
immediately, and give all available information regarding the situation
including whatever action is being taken by the drilling crew. Assist Company
drilling supervisor in evaluating the situation and shall give all possible
Advice aid and assist in bringing the abnormal situation under control.
Has the right to perform trouble shooting and take all precautions to avoid
total disaster including the loss of human life during the Emergency, even
without Company approval such approval shall be obtained soonest possible
Degree of
Definitions
Emergency
Level-1(Abnormal No immediate danger of life, environment or properties
situation)
Can be dealt with totally by Company normal operating
procedures
Level-2
Where it may cause limited danger to life, environment and or
(Emergency
equipment
situation)
Requires implementation of special emergency response
procedure of Company
Level-3 (Major
Where it may develop into and cause danger to life, environment
disaster Situation) or equipment
Requires mobilization of emergency resources from external
sources such a Government bodies and associated emergency
services
Have a good pre-job meeting with the whole crew, inform the crane driver
and check with him the correct signs for crane movements. Run together
through the program, shortly explain the purpose.
Make sure all necessary surface equipment is available, check the last
pressure certificates of BOPs, lubricator and other pressure vessels (not older
than one year).
As long as safety valve is closed and before opening a well to the lubricator
visually inspect the Xmas tree, pay attention to the control line system,
including outlet, lines and pump. Inform the crew for emergency access.
Set up good access to the Xmas tree and pressure control equipment. Check
and secure installation of ladders and scaffolds.
Check availability of communication means and devices. Show and explain
the use of the system.
Check pressure setting of the safety valve pump.
All thermal engines (i.e. diesels) must to be installed in non-hazardous areas
(10 meters from the well center-line) around the wellhead), unless fitted with
the following safety equipment, in which case they may be located within 3 to
7 meters from the well center-line:
- exhaust with anti-spark device and cooling
- automatic shutdown by over speed detector system
- auto-closing of air intake and auto-shut-down in the event gas
is detected
- conspicuous and easily accessible shut-down control
Ensure that effective firefighting capabilities are in place throughout the
wireline operations and that all personnel are aware of the procedures.
Locate portable foam extinguishers near the wellhead and ensure that they
are full and operational.
Ensure that all personnel are familiar with the operation of firefighting
equipment; ensure that everybody in your crew knows what his duties are
going to be.
Ensure that your working stations are clean and tidy.
Transport related accidents are responsible for the larger percentage of lost time
accidents and fatalities. To ensure a safe operation it is essential to prepare
procedures and guidelines for staff, contractors and visitors in the field.
Safety must be assigned a line responsibility. The following guide-lines provide a
basis for the development of transport safety procedures:
Emergency procedures inclusive of Medevac are required, which should be
tested through table-top exercises in order that lines of communication,
responsibilities and action parties are already defined and understood. Such
procedures should identify medical resources and hospitals which have been
nominated in the event of an emergency.
All passenger vehicles are to be fitted with inertia type seat belts for all
passengers and driver. All passenger seats are to be forward facing. Bench
seats fitted longitudinally are not permitted.
Seat belts are to be worn at all times by driver and passengers. Drivers to
ensure that passengers are "belted up" prior to starting journey.
No night driving to be permitted. Restricted departure times calculated from
given location to given destination must ensure that the vehicle arrives at the
destination prior to darkness with a margin of thirty minutes.
Field vehicles are to be equipped with safety equipment. In the event of a
vehicle breakdown it is imperative that the driver and passengers remain
with the vehicle until a secondary or search vehicle arrives.
A search and rescue procedure is to be prepared for vehicles that have failed
to report at their nominated destination.
All company drivers are to undergo a medical and eyesight examination prior
to engagement.
All transport (haulage) vehicles, cranes and civil engineering equipment/
vehicles are to be fitted with reversing alarms.
All cargo handling equipment required for the safe handling and
transportation of a large assortment of items of all shapes sizes and weight
must have valid certification. Such equipment is to be regularly checked and
maintained. Adequate replacement back-up should be available for items
which are used frequently.
In view of the remoteness of drilling locations, the drilling contractor should
provide a 4WD ambulance.
4x4 driving. Hazards include both poor drivers and challenging road conditions
(steep grades, sharp corners, uneven roads, poor road visibility, etc.). Travel routes
in remote areas are frequently on poor public gravel roads which pass through small
villages which are occupied by unwary children and seniors. To reduce the risk of
motor vehicle and pedestrian accidents, vehicles must be sound and be driven
carefully at appropriate speeds by competent, unimpaired and alert drivers.
Purpose
The purpose of the RSP is to reduce the risk associated with motor vehicle travel
and to define practical actions which can be put in effect to mitigate road safety
risk. This document does not include detailed procedures, but specifically highlights
the methods which will be employed by Company to mitigate the risk of MVAs. All
Company personnel must accept full responsibility for managing our own road
safety and that of our contractors and subcontractors.
Company has identified high risk activities and subsequently developed a strategy
to highlight these activities (The 10 Golden Rules) with the goal of reducing future
incident frequency. The Golden Rule which highlights vehicle safety is:
Company personnel have a right and a duty to intervene (i.e. Stop the Job) if these
requirements are not being met.
All Company vehicle operators and Contractors must be informed of the
requirements of the Road Safety Plan prior to their commencement of work. Such
orientation must be documented and concluded with the agreement that the
requirements of the RSP are understood and will be followed.
Responsible: Company contract owner.
All Company's operations are required to follow a Journey Management Plan (JMP).
The JMP is a requirement for all personnel, equipment and supplies movements. The
purpose of the JMP is to regulate motor vehicle journeys, to assist vehicles if
incidents occur while travelling, to ensure that all vehicles arrive safely and
according to schedule at the work site, to enforce the no night driving policy and for
security control purposes.
Responsible: Company Logistics Coordinator, in cooperation with the onsite
logistics and security team and with Company Security Office.
Vehicle Inspections
All vehicle operators (drivers) will be required to conduct a documented pre-trip
vehicle inspection prior to commencement of any journey or start of shift. The pretrip walk around will inspect for any deficiencies such as fuel, oil, tires, water, lights
(headlights, brake lights, signal lights), brakes, seatbelts, etc.
All vehicles must be mechanically sound and fit for purpose. Vehicles that arrive on
site in poor mechanical condition are to be refused entry and will not be used under
any circumstances.
Vehicles are to be maintained and inspected according to the requirements
stipulated in the Contract, in the Project HSE Plan, or as a minimum, all vehicles
must be inspected on a monthly basis by a qualified inspector.
Company and all Contractors are required to use a documented vehicle inspection
process. Company will review/audit Contractors inspection procedures and
inspection records.
Responsible: Vehicle operators.
meet or exceed all requirements herein defined. Any inspections or audits shall
comply with this RSP in every respect. Minimum vehicle inspection standards or
operator competency standards will not be lowered because the vehicles or
operators are from the local community.
Responsible: Company supervisory, HSE & community relations (CR) personnel.
Required Documentation
All vehicles must have valid vehicle registration and all drivers must have valid
drivers licenses to meet minimum Iraqi requirements. All inspections or
assessments must be recorded on paper and the information filed for future
reference.
Any vehicles carry hazardous goods are required to carry a copy of the Material
Safety Data Sheet(s).
Responsible: Vehicle operators.
Training
Company contracts include the requirement for Contractors to ensure equipment
operators (drivers) are trained in off road driving, highway driving, defensive driving
and vehicle recovery. Company may also conduct additional Defensive Driving
training for contracted vehicle operators.
Assessments
All vehicle operators (drivers) are required to pass a driver assessment prior to
commencing work. A designated Company or third party assessor will perform
driver assessments as required. The format of the assessment will be as follows:
Pre-departure vehicle checks.
Driver competence (road test).
Minimum vision requirements.
Duty time exceeded?
Identification of future training requirements.
Confirmation of valid driver`s license for vehicle type.
All operator (driver) assessments will be documented. All tested operators will
receive a final competency rating according to the following scale:
Distinction
Credit
Pass
Weak pass
Fail
A written report for each operator will summarize the assessment, and will include
individualized assessment information such as strengths, weaknesses and
requirements for additional training. The minimum requirement to pass the operator
assessment is Weak Pass. Operators achieving a Fail assessment will not be allowed
to operate vehicles on Company work sites until a minimum passing grade is
obtained.
Enforcement
All vehicle operators (drivers) are required to meet the minimum competency
assessment. Failure to meet the requirements herein contained will result in
immediate dismissal.
Responsible: Company vehicle contract owner.
Vehicles will make use of either benzene or diesel fuel in their vehicles. All vehicle
operators (drivers) or designated re-fueling personnel shall be familiar with safe refueling procedures and hazards, including flammability hazards, and environmental
spill hazards.
Responsible: Company vehicle contract owner.
In the event of a spill of environmentally sensitive products, there are limited
resources available for cleanup. If the spilled products are deemed hazardous, the
Company Emergency Response Plan will be activated and followed accordingly. All
vehicles transporting hazardous substances are required to have in the same
vehicle the relevant MSDS.
Responsible:
To maintain clear communication and to provide contractors with the minimum
requirements necessary to mitigate the risk of road traffic incidents the following
information, which forms the Road Safety Plan, will be provided to contractors
operating vehicles on Company work sites.
Companys 10 Golden Rules with specific reference to Golden Rule #9
Operate Vehicles Safely.
Orientation
Journey Management Plan.
Vehicle Inspection
Road Safety Hazards & Risk Assessment.
Driver Assessment and Training.
Fuel Management and Hazards.
Environmental Hazards.
All contractor vehicle operators should be qualified and trained to carry out their
duties in a safe and effective manner.
The compliance to the RSP will be audited every 6 months to ensure the
requirements are being followed by Company and its contractors. The verification
process is required to ensure compliance to this RSP and most importantly to reduce
the risk of motor vehicle accidents.
Responsible: Company HSE Team Lead.
This Road Safety Plan is to be reviewed and revised on an annual basis.
Responsible: Company HSE Manager.
1 Extreme Temperatures
Extreme temperatures affect the safety of personnel through loss of concentration.
2.2 Deicing
In addition to the above precautions if ice does form then several methods for
deicing are available:
Steam. The use of steam for de-icing should be carefully evaluated in case
too low a temperature causes the steam condensate to freeze and quickly
form solid ice. All steam hoses shall be drained properly after use and stored
in heated areas.
Compressed air. The use of compressed air is a clean method of removing ice
but it may be necessary to mechanically break the ice before applying the
compressed air. Alternatively, compressed air may be used with steam deicing to remove the water and condensate after defrosting with steam. All air
hoses should be stored in heated areas after use.
Seawater. Flushing with seawater is in most circumstances the best method
although it is less efficient than steam. Its advantages are that seawater has
a lower freezing point than steam condensate, does not freeze as fast, and
also the ice crystals are smaller. The effect of wind causing additional water
spray over the surrounding area should be considered.
Vibration. Ice may be removed by mechanical vibration by hammering with
pneumatic percussion tools etc. on all types of structure including the derrick
and crane booms. If large amounts of ice are formed on the derrick, (e.g.:
during logging runs, then between runs) the travelling block may be used if
necessary to cause shocks or vibrations through the derrick to remove the
ice; having first cleared the area of personnel.
2.3 Precautions
Further precautions may be necessary for particular systems or areas likely to be
affected by icing or freezing, and are as follows:
2.3.1 Emergency Exits and External Escape Routes
All emergency exits leading to the open and external escape routes shall be
continuously accessible and have non-slip surfaces during any weather conditions. If
necessary emergency exits
and escape routes should be de-iced.
2.3.2 Fire and Wash-down Systems
The fire and wash-down systems shall be continuously operable and all exposed
parts shall be protected by heat tracing, insulation, water circulation or drainage as
applicable.
2.3.3. Seawater Systems
All exposed parts of seawater systems shall be heat traced and insulated.
2.3.4. High Pressure Mud and Cement Systems
The mud system standpipe and Kelly hose shall contain anti-freeze treatment liquid,
or be properly drained when not in use.
The choke manifold, the kill and choke lines from the choke manifold to the BOP and
the cementing lines shall be similarly treated.
2.3.5. Closed Circuit Cooling Systems
All cooling systems shall have anti-freeze added to accept temperatures down to
-20C.
All exposed seawater-cooled equipment shall be equipped with drainage facilities
and should be drained when not in use.
2.3.6. Lubrication and Hydraulic Oil
Lubrication and hydraulic oils shall be changed before the winter season to types
suitable for arctic conditions. To prevent increased viscosity problems, a low
temperature tolerant oil should be used.
2.3.7. Engines
All engines not in daily use shall be operated at least once a day during the coldest
periods. The diesel fuel should be kept free of water contamination and at above
0oC.
3 High Wind
High winds can cause the following hazards:
Damage to crane.
Note: There are no restrictions to skidding of the drilling mast with maximum set
back load with regards to wind speed
1 Implementation process
Introduction
As required by HSE standards; hazard identifications, risk analyses, emergency
preparedness analyses and HSE-cases are performed and prepared for each drilling
and well operation.
The results from these activities are cascaded into an Emergency Preparedness
Program. This programme will be either a free standing (controlling) document, or
form part of the Drilling or Well Operations Programme for the activity in question,
dependent on timing and practicalities.
The complete HSE-Case on the activity may be studied for clarification on the
background and assumptions for the measures to be implemented. The HSE-Case
shall be available on the installation.
Procedure
The measures specified in this programme are in addition to the regular and routine
safety related activities specified in other sections of this manual.
Action by
Ste Activity
p
Senior
1
Receives / requests the Emergency Preparedness Program
Drilling
before operations start.
Supervisor
Prepares the detailed scheduling and distribution of
responsibility for the implementation and verification of the
tasks specified in the programme, in co-operation with the OIM,
Drilling Section Leader, and other potential relevant parties
(executors) on the installation. The required actions shall be
discussed with the executors in order to reach a mutual
understanding and agreement on how and why to perform the
activity.
Executor
2
Performs the implementation, including checking the efficiency
of the measure. Performs verification of existing and
implemented measures. Documents the results and reports to
the Senior Drilling Supervisor.
Senior
3
Compiles the results, and reports to shore according to the
Drilling
reporting schedule specified in the Emergency Preparedness
Supervisor
Program.
Rig Supt.
4
Reviews and approves report. Distributes as per Companys
procedure.
2 Documentation of results
Documentation of the activities should be according to a standardized / tabulated
format:
Measure
Relevant
Verification
Dat Results
implemented or Standard
method
e
verified
Rescue man
a) MOB-boat in Actual launching of
overboard within water within 5 MOB-boat, timing
15 minutes
minutes.
the action. Pull
b) Man inside
man into boat,
MOB-boat within timing the action.
another 10
minutes.
Potential H2S
victims must be
evacuated from
the drill floor
within 5 minutes
H2S Rescue
Actual H2S alarm
Team 1 must be and team
able to evacuate mobilization
two persons to a practice with
Safe Breathing breathing
Area within 5
apparatus and
minutes
stretchers, timing
the action.
3 Hazard Register
The activity related Hazard Register (HR) is established and maintained according to
the description in the Hazard Identification and Risk Analyses procedures.
The activity related Hazard Register contains all details of the hazards identified to
be the target of risk reduction efforts. If specified assumptions are incorrect, or if
risk reduction measures as specified in the Emergency Preparedness Program are
not possible to implement in practice, such information must be included in the
Emergency Preparedness Program Report, for updating of the hazard registers, and
a non-conformity report must be filled out for further investigations for future
projects of similar nature.
The Company is responsible for the implementation of safe operating procedures for
both Company and Contractors' operations. The Contractors are responsible for
developing procedures that apply to their primary work tasks, while ensuring that
these comply with the Company procedures. In case of non-compliance the
Company Representative shall be made aware of the situation, in order that the
discrepancy is resolved.
To liaise and report directly to the OIM with a view to keeping him fully
abreast of current drilling and associated activity and to make him aware of
anything which may require certain operating conditions or priority setting.
The submission of accident / injury / incident reports to the OIM and Base on
both Company and Contractors' personnel within the drilling unit.
Ensuring that procedures proposed by Contractors within the drilling unit
comply with those applicable. The Senior Drilling Supervisor shall obtain
authorization from OIM and Base for all exceptions to this.
Providing one of the approval signatures on Permits to Work within the drilling
unit.
Attending when required and possible, all inspections, discussions and
meetings on the installation as the Drilling Department Representative,
although this responsibility may be delegated to a nominated representative.
Conducting unsafe act audits, at least one per tour of duty.
The Drilling Supervisor will act as the deputy of the Senior Drilling Supervisor on
nightshift, and is consequently responsible for the above mentioned activities
during night hours.
5 Safety Supervisor
The Safety Supervisor reports to the Offshore Installation Manager and is assisting
the OIM in all safety related matters.
4. Health
Ergonomic principles in the design of
work systems
Technological, economic, organizational and human factors affect the work behavior
and well-being of people as part of the work system. The design of the work
systems shall satisfy human requirements by applying ergonomic knowledge in the
fight of practical experience.
1 Scope
This Standard establishes ergonomic principles as Basic guidelines for the design of
work systems.
2 Field of application
The ergonomic guiding principles specified in this International Standard apply to
the design of optimal working conditions with regard to human well-being, safety
and health, taking into account technological and economic efficiency.
NOTES
1 This international Standard shall be used in conjunction with other pertinent
standards, regulations or agreements.
2 Adaptation of this International Standard may be necessary in order to meet
additional requirements of some categories of individuals, for example. in view of
age or handicap, or in the case of exceptional working situations, or emergencies.
3 While the principles in this International Standard are oriented to industry, they
are applicable to any field of human activity.
3 Definitions
3.1 Work System: The work system comprises a combination of people and
work equipment. Acting together in the work process, to perform the Work &Task, at
the workspace, in the work environment, under the conditions imposed by the work
task.
3.4 Work Process: The sequence in time and space of the interaction of
people. work equipment, materials, energy and information within a work system.
3.5 Work Space: A volume allocated to one or more persons in the work
system to complete the work task.
3.8 Work Strain (or internal reaction): The effect of the work stress
upon a person in relation to his/her. individual characteristics and abilities.
a) The nature and number of signals and displays shall be compatible with the
characteristics of the information.
b) In order to achieve clear identification of information where displays are
numerous, they shall be laid out in space in such a way as to furnish reliable
orientation clearly and rapidly. Their arrangement may be a function either of the
technical process or of the importance and frequency of use of particular hems of
information. This may be done by grouping in accordance with the functions of the
process, the type of measurements, etc.
c) The nature and design of signals and displays shall ensure unambiguous
perception. This applies especially to danger signals. Account shall be taken, for
instance, of the intensity, shape, size, contrast, prominence, and the signal to-noise
ratio.
d) Rate and direction of change of display of information shall be compatible with
rate and direction of change of the primary. source of that information.
e) In protracted activities in which observation and monitoring predominate,
overload and underload effects shall be avoided by design and layout of signals and
displays.
4.1.3.2 Controls
Controls shall be selected designed and laid out in such a way as to be compatible
with the characteristics (particularly of movement) of that. pan of the body by which
they are operated. Skill, accuracy', speed and strength requirements shall be taken
into account. In particular:
a) Type. design and layout of controls shall correspond to the control task, taking
into account human characteristics, including learned and innate responses.
b) Travel of controls and control resistance shall be selected on the basis of the
control task and of biomechanical and anthropometric data.
c) Control movement. equipment response. and display information shall be
mutually compatible.
d) Function of the controls shall be easily identifiable to avoid confusion.
e) Where controls are numerous they shall be laid out so as to ensure safe,
unambiguous and quick operation. This may be done similarly as for signals by
grouping them according to their functions in the process, to the order in which they
are used, etc.
f) Critical controls shall be safeguarded against inadvertent operation.
health, as well as their capacity and readiness to work. Account shall be taken of
objectively measurable phenomena and of subjective assessments.
Depending on the work system it is necessary to pay attention in particular to the
following points:
a) The dimensions of the work premises (general layout, space for work, and space
for work related traffic) shall be adequate.
b) Air
-
renewal shall be adjusted with regard to the following factors, for, example:
number of persons in the room;
intensity of the physical work involved;
dimensions of the premises (taking account of work equipment);
emission of pollutants in the room;
appliances consuming oxygen;
thermal conditions.
c) Thermal conditions at the work place shall be adjusted in accordance with local
climatic conditions, taking into account mainly:
- air temperature;
- air humidity;
- air velocity;
- thermal radiation;
- intensity of the physical work involved
- properties of clothing, work equipment, and special protective
equipment.
d) Lighting shall be such as to provide optimal visual perception for the required
activities. Special attention shall be paid to the following factors:
- luminance,
- color;
- distribution of light;
- absence of glare and undesirable reflections;
- contrast in luminance and color;
- age of operators.
e) In the selection of the colors for the room and for the work equipment, their
effects on the distribution of luminance, on the structure and quality of the field of
vision. and on the perception of safety colors, shall be taken into account.
f) The acoustic work environment shall be such that noxious or annoying effects of
noise are avoided, including those effects due to outside sources. Account shall be
taken in particular of the following factors:
- sound Pressure level;
- frequency spectrum;
- distribution over time;
- perception of acoustic signals;
- speech intelligibility.
g) Vibrations and impacts transmitted to man shall not attain levels causing
physical damage. physio-pathological reactions or sensorimotor disturbances.
h) Exposure of workers to dangerous materials and harmful radiations shall be
avoided.
j) During outdoor work, adequate protection shall be provided against adverse
climatic effects (for example against heat, cold, wind, rain. snow, ice).
5. Environment
Waste management - Transport of
cuttings to shore for disposal
The option of transporting drill cuttings from the rig has a number of
attractions. Unlike the use of WBM or CRI, the skip and ship option can in principle
be applied to any drilling operation from platform or MDU.
Rig upgrades required to allow this containment option are minimal and may be
implemented quickly and cheaply. Since the rig site equipment is simple and
reliable, equipment failure is less likely than for CRI. A number of process
technologies have been developed for treating the cuttings which recover and
recycle base oil from the cuttings leaving an inert material such that the whole
process is environmentally sound. Use of the processed cuttings for projects such as
construction material is possible, representing further scope for a completely
"green" process.
The transport of drill waste to shore has been practiced successfully in numerous
operations worldwide.
The disadvantages of transporting material to shore is that the quantities of cuttings
involved can be very large and the logistics problematical. The process is most
suitable where volumes of cuttings generated are small and the distance they need
to be transported short. For offshore operations weather conditions are also
significant and may have an impact on the ability to move waste material. Because
of the heavy demand on deck space for storage of cuttings, it may not be feasible
to ship cuttings from 16" or more unless drilling rates are restricted.
The process of transport to shore, known as skip and ship, is very simple. Cuttings
are collected from the cuttings ditch and transferred, usually by screw auger, to a
suitable location for loading. As well as collecting cuttings the system should handle
liquid over spill from the shakers and waste from centrifuges. The drill waste is
loaded, normally into specially designed skips of around 8 T capacity, via a
steerable chute. For onshore operations, the skips can be placed directly below the
shale shakers. Empty and full skips are stored on the rig and depending on the
drilling program filled skips may be off loaded either onto a dedicated collection
vessel or to a standard platform supply vessel (PSV).
Once back loaded the drilling waste is disposed of onshore. Land-filling or
incineration of untreated cuttings are acceptable solutions depending on the local
legislation. Another option is to fix the oil to the cuttings using fly ash, leaving a
relatively stable, but still potentially hazardous, product. It is also possible to employ
a technique to clean the cuttings and recover the base oil, leaving a benign solid
waste and re-usable oil. This generally the best option, as the additional costs for
treatment of the cuttings are not prohibitive and the advantages are clear.
The critical considerations in planning the feasibility of a skip and ship operation
relate to the quantity and rate of cuttings generated, the space available on the rig
to store cuttings, the cost and availability of the necessary vessels for transport and
the likely impact of weather on operations.
8"
2000
25
55
42
77
20
250
446
816
204
500
213
390
98
400
10
20
2000
80
12
8
2000
20
8
3
500
5
These skips will hold a maximum load of approximately 8 tones but actual loads for
cuttings are often nearer to 4 tones. More efficient loading practice should allow
better utilization and a reduction in the number of skips required.
Wherever possible the 16" or 17.5" should preferably be drilled with WBM and
discharging the cuttings overboard.
To manage the lower hole-sections, in the order of 100 - 150 skips will be required
depending on the well. The number of skips that can be stored on the rig will clearly
be specific to the particular installation. Capacities in the range 20 - 80 skips might
be expected. In many cases the rig's deck capacity will be limited and for the 12 "
hole a dedicated vessel will be required to stand by the rig and handle the cuttings.
Typical PSVs have capacity for 50 - 100 skips, which may be sufficient to handle the
entire hole section. If not, turnaround times must be considered and the possible
requirement for a second vessel to cover the changeover period. For 8 " sections
it is likely that a single visit from a collection vessel at the end of the section or
even the regular supply boat services will suffice.
The number of days sailing / turnaround time between trips to the rig will clearly
depend upon the location of the cuttings treatment plant.
The option of transferring cuttings to another drilling installation with the facility for
cuttings re-injection should be considered. This would have the advantage of
reducing transportation distances but would involve a second offshore handling
operation to transfer cuttings from the transport vessel to the CRI platform.
Demand for vessels can be very high and consequently so are day rates - it would
be very difficult even to find available vessels to match potential demand. It is
therefore important to plan ahead for expansion of the PSV fleet to match
anticipated demand over a suitable time frame.
2. Weather effects
The possibility of bad weather is a major concern for skip and ship operations.
Loading operations will be suspended when either wind speeds and / or wave
heights are excessive. Lifting operations will stop if wind speeds exceed 40 knot, or
possibly 30 for floating installations. Critical wave height is less well defined but for
lifts in the order of 10 tones, such as full cuttings skips, a limit of 3.5m is
recommended as a guideline. Even in conditions less severe than this it should be
recognized that handling operations to move substantial volumes of cuttings will
represent an increased exposure to hazardous operating conditions for deck crews.
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
55%
44%
44%
19%
7%
3%
1%
3%
20%
33%
42%
53%
For Northern North Seas operations, the annual average time that the 40 knots wind
speed is exceeded is only 2.2% (about 12% for the 30 knots limit), but the wave
height is exceeded more often. The percentage of the time the significant wave
height exceeds 3.5 m varies strongly throughout the year:
The year round average is 27% but if the year is divided between summer, Apr-Sep
inclusive and winter, the averages are 9% and 45% respectively, highlighting the
seasonal variation. Based on these figures an estimation of likely down time may be
made. If the expected drilling time for the 12" section is 12 days, 45%
downtime would correspond to about 5 days. However, if the rig can hold 25
skips loading would only be necessary every third day and the expected downtime
would be reduced by a third to two days. It must be recognized that this calculation
is very approximate - the impact of bad weather depends strongly on the duration
and timing of the bad spells as much as the average percentage of the time. It is
also important to appreciate the sensitivity of this calculation to the rig's capacity
for storage of skips. In order to best estimate likely down time for a specific
operation this capacity and the expected drilling program should be used to repeat
this evaluation.
For the purpose of first look comparisons, an estimated weather down time for
winter operations will be of the order of 3 rig days per well.
The possibility of transporting cuttings in bulk, would have the benefit of reducing or
removing this downtime cost.
3. Cuttings treatment
Although there is currently only one commercial operation in the UK for the
treatment of drill cuttings (the Enaco plant in Lowestoft) there are a number of
solids handling and waste companies very keen to develop this market. As a result,
a number of processing technologies are expected to be available at a range of
locations by the end of 1997. This enthusia-synthetic mud within the service
industry will clearly benefit attempts to extend the application of skip and ship
operations. The willingness within the waste handling companies to invest in this
market is also a clear indication that there is a strong expectation that demand for
such services will be high.
The processes available for cleaning cuttings are based on controlled thermal
treatment to drive off any hydrocarbons, without causing cracking, such that
recovery of the base oil is possible. The Enaco unit uses a process licensed by Soil
Recovery a/s of Denmark. A number of similar process technologies are available,
however, and it is likely that as the number of companies operating in this market
increases a range of these processes will be employed.
In addition to the oil from drilling mud, drill cuttings will typically also have a high
salt content and traces of other contaminants such as barites and heavy metals. In
the Lowestoft operation the de-oiled cuttings can be washed to remove these
contaminants producing a saturated brine which may be re-used offshore.
Dependent upon the final application for the cuttings this washing process should
be repeated in other treatment operations.
Given the level of competition within the service industry, provision of adequate
treatment capacity is likely to keep pace with demand. In the short term cuttings
may be stock piled pending the development of new plant and there is little or no
constraint on the rate at which the skip and ship option might be adopted. Of more
relevance to operational planning is the range of locations likely to become
available.
In addition to the Lowestoft facility, Burgess and Garrick on Shetland own
processing plant which is expected to be operational Q1 1997. Although this plant
may not be the most efficient, its existence offers Lerwick as a possible processing
location. Burgess and Garrick have also expressed an interest in purchasing further
plant as necessary and have the support of the Shetland Council to develop a waste
treatment facility. Further processing facilities will almost certainly be developed in
Peterhead and or Aberdeen, according to discussions with likely suppliers. Currently
waste handling in Aberdeen is limited to land fill, lime fixation and land spreading or
incineration.
4. Cost analysis
A number of elements must be considered in the cost of ship to shore operation. To
assist in this appraisal a spreadsheet has been developed which reproduces the
calculations below. An indication of typical skip and ship costs is given:
Installation costs (approx.): 10K
Conveyor rental (operational): 160/day
Conveyor rental (stand by): 100/day
Skip weigh frame rental 50/day
Skip rental (per skip per day) 14
Operational personnel 300/man/day
(expect 2-3 crew)
Dock charges 90
(per skip sent out)
A number of the above costs, such as dock charges, are higher than might be
expected and should be considered as a starting point in negotiating terms with any
solids control / waste handling service provider. The largest cost components are
less easy to determine. Firstly, vessel costs for transport will vary according to
demand levels. Current prices are high - of the order of 11K per day, but assuming
long term contracts can be arranged for dedicated cuttings handling vessels a sum
more like 6 - 7K would be expected. The option of transporting cuttings as a bulk
waste using a dedicated vessel would aim to reduce this cost significantly.
The last cost is for the treatment of the oily cuttings. This processing cost is
190/ton. For amounts greater than 5000 tones prices would be negotiable. It is
reasonable to expect that as more companies compete for this business prices will
be driven down. The cost of washing the de-oiled cuttings to remove salt will add to
the total treatment charges.t.
An example of applying these costs for a typical well program for 12" and sections
is given below.
12" hole - 12 days drilling time, including 2 days sailing gives 14 days vessel hire.
400 tones cuttings - 100 skips (reserve 150 for safety margin) for 20 days to include
mobilization time.
Equipment and crew charges 11,500
Skip rental 42,000
Dock fees 9,000
Boat rental 91,000
Cuttings treatment 60,000
Total 213,500
8" hole - 8 days drilling time, 80 tons of cuttings - 20 skips (30 reserved) for 16
days, 4 days vessel hire to deliver skips and collect cuttings.
Equipment and crew 8,000
Skip rental 7,000
Dock fees 3,000
Boat rental 26,000
Cuttings treatment 12,000
Total 56,000
This gives a total cost for the well of approximately 270,000. It should be
appreciated that where such a containment schemes are operated it is possible to
use cheaper OBM rather than the synthetic mud currently most common and that
associated mud bill savings may be substantial. Similarly, the recovered base oil
may offset the above cost by something in the order of 10K.
As described in above, operations carried out during the winter months should
expect a significant cost associated with weather related down time, perhaps in the
order of 250K per well.
Given the scale of the potential demand for cuttings treatment the possibility of
negotiating preferential rates with a preferred supplier might be investigated.
This process of cuttings re-injection or CRI has some major benefits compared to the
alternative containment option of transporting cuttings to shore for treatment and
disposal. Firstly, the CRI process is able to handle volumes of drill cuttings
compatible with the fastest realistic rates of drilling even in the larger 16" or 17 "
hole-sections (this can be 30 - 40 tones per hour), unlike the ship to shore option.
Furthermore, because there is no requirement to move the cuttings off the rig there
are no demands on crane facilities, deck space or supply vessels and perhaps most
importantly no vulnerability to weather related downtime. The last factor is the
largest uncertain variable in the planning of containment operations, and may
correspond to drilling shut downs where the ship to shore option is used in the
winter months. Finally, the re-injection option has the benefit that where the reinjection facility is available it may be further employed for the disposal of other
problematical waste streams such as low radioactivity LSA scale or even produced
water.
The limitations of CRI are partly cost related - injection units have a fairly high capex
and operating cost which can only be justified for a drilling installation with a
reasonably active drilling schedule. Furthermore, the installation of a CRI unit will
place certain weight and space requirements on the platform, as well as extra crew,
which may pose problems for synthetic modal installations. The reliability of CRI
equipment is also an important factor. Experience has shown that properly designed
and managed re-injection operations may be carried out with little down time, but
wherever problems do occur drilling shutdowns will result. Lastly, in order to carry
out a CRI operation it is necessary to have access to a suitable well head to receive
the waste slurry and this in effect restricts the application to permanent platforms.
The technology for re-injection into a subsea well head has been demonstrated but
is not available for operational use.
mill such as the Statoil wet autogenous mill (WAG). The latter has the advantage
that the positive action can result in faster more effective grinding but has the
disadvantage that wear and maintenance requirements of the mill are typically
higher.
A third approach being pursued is the use of ultrasonic technology to produce a
cuttings slurry. In this application the cuttings are pumped through an ultrasonic
processing chamber in which a fast and efficient particle size reduction may be
achieved. The basic processing unit has been built and tested but its incorporation
in a fully functional unit is still in the development phase. With each of these
systems the processed cuttings are passed through a classification stage with
oversize material being re-circulated through the grinding stage.
A lists of commercial suppliers of CRI equipment including the ultrasonic unit is
presented at the end.
3. CRI economics
The economic viability of CRI is heavily dependent upon the drilling sequence and
the level of activity of a given installation and in order consider this properly an
evaluation exercise must be carried out to determine which installations will favor
CRI and of the effective costs.
For this exercise to be successful, however, it will clearly be important to have
accurate input data for the cost of installation and operation of re-injection units on
the platforms considered. Whilst approximate costs are available from the various
companies offering CRI units, accurate figures will depend both on the installation
specific considerations listed above and on the degree of commercial competition at
the tender stage. To realize the best quality input possible for the economics
evaluation a preliminary study is being carried out for a number of candidate
platforms.
As an indication of CRI costs, package prices are likely to be in the 1,000Ks range
depending on whether or not a dedicated injection pump skid is required. The
option of using the cement pump for injection is therefore quite important to the
overall cost as well as space requirements. In addition to this overhead, installation
costs are likely to be in the order of 1,000K depending on platform requirements.
Finally, during drilling operations a CRI crew of 2 - 4 men will be required at a day
rate of approximately 700 each. During top hole drilling 4 men would probably be
required whereas later in the well when cuttings generation rates are lower 2 might
be sufficient. It is possible that the development of increasingly automated and
reliable units will reduce the crew requirements.
Another option for reducing CRI costs would be to exploit the increasing mobility of
CRI units to time share a unit between installations. An alternative to mobile CRI
units would be to transport cuttings from installations without CRI capability for
injection at some central location. This would clearly have the advantage of
reducing CRI overheads but has associated problems. Firstly, there is legislation
restricting the movement of waste material for disposal remote from the site of
origin. This legislation has recently been relaxed to allow transfer of waste
material within a single field for disposal by re-injection and the current climate
seems to be of an increasingly open minded approach to such operations. The
second problem with transporting cuttings for re-injection is that all of the logistical
problems associated with ship to shore are immediately encountered. The economic
implications need to be evaluated, but the expectation is that if cuttings are to be
moved from the rig on which they originate it will be more efficient to return them
to shore than to another platform. An exception might be in the case of a mobile rig
drilling beside a platform where cuttings transfer might be possible without
requiring a vessel.
4. Subsea re-injection
Whilst the process of subsea injection is not an established operation, work has
been done to prove the feasibility of the concept. As part of DEA project 026 a CRI
permanent guide base (PGB) and wellhead for subsea injection have been built and
successfully tested. The DEA project involved an injection test at the end of an MDU
drilling operation. After completion of the well a drill pipe stinger was run and
engaged with a stab connector on the PGB allowing a quantity of stored cuttings to
be injected into the 20" 13 3/8" annulus.
Whilst this trial was a successful proof of concept, a number of areas would need
considerable development before the process could be considered for routine
application offshore. Firstly, the development PGB would need considerable
improvement to meet Company standards. More importantly, a satisfactory method
of pumping the slurry from the CRI unit at surface to the PGB during drilling
operations needs to be found. Furthermore, on single well sites the disposal of
cuttings generated before the 13 3/8" casing has been set represents a serious
problem.
Despite these problems, however, given the requirement to use OBM in many of the
wells drilled from MDU and the difficulties of shipping cuttings off the rig, the value
of a subsea CRI facility could be very high.
Other technologies to consider are: high performance water based mud; equipment
for sub-sea Cuttings Re-Injection; bulk transport of cuttings to shore; improved onsite cleaning technology and slurrification and discharge.
1. Introduction
In order to reduce the impact of cuttings discharged to sea, a considerable effort
has been made over a number of years to develop drilling muds with an
environmentally acceptable base fluid. Initially diesel base muds were replaced with
low toxicity oil based muds (LTOBM). Although this represented an improvement,
the slow rate of degradation of mineral oil based muds results in cuttings piles on
the sea bed with a very long lifetime. As a result, increasingly stringent legislation
on the discharge of all OBM cuttings has been introduced, leading to the situations
whereby no cuttings may be discharged if the level of OBM relative to the weight of
dry cuttings exceeds 1%.
The principal methods for eliminating OBM discharges are by the containment of
drilling waste for subsequent disposal, the use of water based muds (WBM) and the
development of synthetic or pseudo oil based muds (synthetic mud / POBM) with
similar performance characteristics but faster degrading than OBM.
The high cost of the synthetic base fluid makes pseudo muds considerably more
expensive than mineral oil based muds. This has been justified by the fact that for
many drilling operations the cost of a total containment system for drill cuttings
disposal has been even higher and because the drilling performance of WBM is too
low. However, the environmental performance of the synthetic mud has not
matched expectations. In fact, laboratory tests indicate that the environmental
behavior of the majority of synthetic mud is very similar to that of OBM. With this
evidence the continued use of costly drilling fluids is increasingly becoming
insupportable both on economic and environmental grounds.
It is necessary to assess the environmental impact of all drilling muds in use and to
design a practical solids control schedule for phasing out the discharge of any found
unacceptable. This must be done without compromising the need for drilling fluids
able to drill demanding wells. This involves identifying the current forecast for the
discharge activity in question, and analysis of the reduction drivers impacting that
activity: environmental effects, public perception, asses-synthetic mudent of legal
trends, bench marking (nationally and internationally), best available technology,
cost, etc.
The alternatives to disolids controlharging contaminated cuttings to the sea are: the
use of genuinely low impact drilling fluids; employing an effective cuttings cleaning
technique prior to dumping or containing the drill cuttings and either returning them
to shore for treatment and disposal or re-injecting them in a disposal well offshore.
These options each have technical limitations as well as economic implications
which will differ between specific operations. In order to recognize this a method of
comparing and ranking the possible solutions on a case specific basis should be
found.
It should be recognized that a number of important factors in considering the
handling of drilling waste are changing quite quickly. Such factors include the
legislation in place, the level of understanding of the genuine impact of drilling
2. Environmental effects
The environmental effects of disolids controlharging cuttings to sea are well
understood. The practical significance of such effects is determined by the nature
and composition of contaminants in the discharge, which determine the rate at
which organisynthetic muds are able to re-colonise impacted areas. For water based
muds, re colonization typically proceeds rapidly - generally beginning when
discharge has ceased.
OBM discharges have longer term effects, since elevated concentrations of
hydrocarbons associated with cuttings and surrounding sediments have severe
impacts on marine life - either by direct toxicity or by creating anoxic conditions.
The rate at with the oil degrades determines the duration of effects. Degradation is
typically slow under North Sea conditions, and effects can last for decades.
Environmental concerns with synthetic muds (synthetic muds) also focus on their
persistence in the marine environment, and thus on the duration of environmental
effects. The muds were developed in response to increasing restrictions on the
discharge of oil based mud (OBM) to sea, with their use and discharge supported by
claims from mud companies that their products degraded significantly faster in the
marine environment than OBM. These claims are based on limited - and sometimes
questionable - data sets.
Results from sea bed surveys and other environmental studies have provided
increasing evidence that synthetic muds do not degrade rapidly under field
conditions. This has been confirmed by results of laboratory biodegradation tests,
carried out by SOAEFD, which indicate that synthetic mud base oils (other than the
ester, Petrofree) cannot be differentiated from mineral oils on grounds of
persistence.
Following on from this, discharges of OBM and synthetic muds also contribute to
overall levels of contamination of the sediments. The significance of this last points
needs to be considered against a broader background of reducing inputs of
contaminants to the Sea, particularly from land based sources.
4. Future liability
The question of future liability and the possible requirement to remove the tens of
thousands of tons of contaminated cuttings already on the sea bed is a major issue.
Although this problem is considered as a decommissioning issue, it is important to
recognize that current practices may have longer term implications. Although there
is little or no evidence to suggest that oil free cuttings pose any serious threat to
the sea bed, if clean cuttings are dumped on top of dirty cuttings it would aggravate
any future problems in removing the oily waste. Also, if a commitment is made to
remove cuttings in place it become less critical to avoid adding to existing piles in
the short term. Likewise, whilst cuttings pile removal is a possibility it would be
sensible to make extra efforts to avoid dumping any remaining synthetic mud
cuttings on virgin sites. In this context, of the options disolids controlussed below,
cuttings re-injection and ship to shore disposal have an advantage over cuttings
cleaning techniques or the use of water based mud in that they have no impact on
the sea bed.
5. Available techniques
There are a number of possible options for reducing the effect of waste drill cuttings
on the environment, falling in three main categories.
1. The ideal solution would be to use a drilling fluid which is genuinely non - harmful
to the environment such that cuttings might be discharged with impunity. The
synthetic muds were produced with this aim but are now seen to have fallen short
of their goal. Irrespective of environmental performance, the application of ester
muds is restricted by their temperature limit of 320 F. Mud companies are
continuing to work on new high performance drilling fluids and as long as their
environmental acceptability can be positively demonstrated and is consistent with
new legislation this work should be encouraged. Currently WBM is the only
environmentally acceptable option allowing the discharge of untreated cuttings. The
disadvantage of using WBM is that it has inferior drilling performance to OBM in a
number of respects, principally maintaining formation stability and providing good
lubrication for high deviation or extended reach wells.
2. The second option is to use OBM and to implement a total containment system
allowing disposal of drill cuttings in an environmentally acceptable manner.
Currently available methods are either transportation to shore for treatment and
disposal or the grinding of cuttings to a slurry which is then pumped back into the
ground either in a dedicated disposal well or into the annulus of a standard well. The
main advantage of this approach is that it allows continued use of the highest
performance and relatively low cost OBMs. The disadvantage is that the costs
associated with containment and disposal are substantial.
3. The last option is to continue to use OBM but rather than contain the waste, to
clean drill cuttings prior to discharge overboard. A number of approaches to
cleaning drill cuttings have been pursued and several have demonstrated
technology capable of the required quality of cleaning. None of the existing systems
have yet been developed to a commercial stage for offshore applications, however,
although the availability of shore based facilities is important in option two above.
There is a considerable ongoing effort to develop such technology for offshore use.
The advantage of onsite cleaning is in eliminating the expensive process of
The option of cleaning drilling waste at the rig site and then disolids controlharging
to sea is not currently available, although there is a considerable effort being made
within the industry to develop the necessary technology to achieve this. This and a
number of other technologies are reviewed below.
7. Strategy implementation
The process of identifying the preferred containment option for each drilling
operation is to collate drilling sequence, mud performance and containment cost
data. Platforms where Cuttings Re-Injection is the best option are identified and for
remaining operations the skip and ship option has to be compared with the use of
WBM. Where hole sections of 16" or larger require OBM the limitations of skip and
ship will be problematical and the use of ester muds may be considered against the
option of drilling at reduced speeds.
It should also be recognized that having identified the choice of drilling fluid or
containment system for a particular project there will in many cases be a
substantial amount of work required to implement this solution. This is particularly
true in the case of cuttings re-injection where the installation of a unit requires
detailed appraisal of platform facilities, a tender bid to select one of the several
suppliers and in most cases a significant amount of engineering work to install and
commission the unit. Similarly, in the case of shipment of cuttings to shore, if this
policy is to be adopted on a significant solids control ale, as will be required,
detailed attention must be given to considerations such as the capacity of the
company's platform supply vessel resources and the ability of the waste handling
industry to cope with the consequent increase in volume of material to be treated
on shore. The impact on rig contracting strategy should also be considered.
9. Cuttings re-injection
The process of grinding drill cuttings to form a slurry which is then pumped
downhole, either into a dedicated disposal well or into the annulus of an existing
well, has been used since the early 90's and is a mature technology. This process of
Cuttings Re-Injection has some major benefits compared to the alternative
containment option of transporting cuttings to shore for treatment and disposal.
Firstly, the Cuttings Re-Injection process is able to handle volumes of drill cuttings
compatible with the fastest realistic rates of drilling even in the larger 16" or 17 "
hole sections (this can be 30 - 40 tones per hour), unlike the ship to shore option.
Furthermore, because there is no requirement to move the cuttings off the rig there
are no demands on crane facilities, deck space or supply vessels and perhaps most
importantly no vulnerability to weather related downtime. The last factor is the
operation with low maintenance. A dedicated operator is required initially but the
responsibility for unit maintenance should go to the Drilling Contractor.
The unit was developed in Norway where a number of systems are in use and is now
marketed in the UK by two companies, Sea Force Engineering and Apollo Services
UK Ltd.
TORBED
The toroidal bed reactor or TORBED is an established technology with a number of
applications, particularly in the food processing industry.
The basic principal of the process is the use of high temperature steam directly in
contact with the cuttings to produce highly efficient thermal cleaning of the drilling
waste. The process is controlled such that hydrocarbons are recovered without
cracking for re-use. A prototype unit has been built and used in a proof of concept
trial which successfully demonstrated cleaning performance in excess of the 1% oil
on cuttings (OOC) target and a second reliability and versatility trial is in its final
planning stage.
The TORBED project has attracted firm interest within the service industry and if the
current trials are successful it is expected that commercial development of an
onshore facility could be quite rapid. The evolution of the process for offshore
application is still at a conceptual stage.
vacuum of 21 inches of mercury. This has the effect of increasing the efficiency of
the hydrocarbon distillation process at lower temperature. The system also
incorporates a condensing and secondary filtration stage to recover and clean
hydrocarbons in the vapor phase exhaust.
Ultrasonic cleaning
The field of ultrasonic is an area in which there is potential for cuttings cleaning
applications.
Furthermore, although the area over which the cuttings are dispersed will be much
greater, the resulting in very thin cuttings layers on the sea bed will be likely to
continue to degrade quickly and have a minimal and short lived effect on the sea
bed.
The process of slurrification prior to discharge has already been practiced, primarily
to avoid the production of cuttings piles which can be problematical to subsea well
heads. The ultrasonic slurrification unit is ideal for this application and can easily be
installed between the cuttings ditch and discharge chute.
Very little is known, however, about the impact of slurrification on degradation rates
and the process may be criticized for dispersing the cuttings waste over a wider
area, possibly into foreign waters, and a parallel with the banned process of sewage
discharge has been drawn. It is possible, however, that this process may represent a
cheap solution with very low environmental impact and a study to determine the
actual behavior of slurrified cuttings on the sea bed is strongly recommended.
1 Introduction
WBM systems are ranging from the classic Water-Bentonite suspension via the
highly dispersive Lignosulphonate drilling fluids to the KCl-Polyglycol drilling fluid
probably the most inhibitive WBM. Silicate Mud, may be the ultimate WBM system
with the same inhibitive properties as OBM. Also, it is assumed that no performance
difference exists between OBM and synthetic mud, hence OBM is used as reference
to OBM or synthetic mud.
In this article we present evidence that in the North Sea the usage of conventional
WBM systems in many hole sections is possible without the fear that drilling
performance is adversely effected.
Performance Indicators
Quantifying the success of a drilling fluid is difficult as many factors play a role in
successfully drilling a well section. The time-depth graph is widely used as a
Performance Indicator (PI). The shorter the time to complete a well section the
better, provided the agreed drilling programme is executed effectively. A second PI
may be the Stuck Pipe Frequency and the associated time to free the pipe: Recovery
Time (RCT). Instances of stuck pipe will then require the section to be re-drilled,
effectively doubling the Open Hole Time.
2 Results
Analysis of the historical performance data for WBM and OBM indicates that in 17.5"
sections the following variables effect the drilling performance derived from drilling
fluids: shale reactivity, section length, mud type.
For the analysis, the 17.5" footage planned was used as the base case. Sections
drilled with WBM were then compared with the same sections drilled with OBM. The
results indicate that a section less than 4400ft drilled in unreactive shale with WBM
will have a 90% expectation of having an Open Hole Time (OHT) exceeding the
average Open Hole Time (OHT) for drilling the section in a reactive shale with OBM
by 17%.
From the historical results it becomes apparent that 17.5" sections in unreactive
shales can be drilled with WBM without incurring a performance penalty. The
performance seems to be slightly dependent of section length (4,400ft is proposed
as a critical length) although this is considered as less significant. Hole angle does
not seem to play a major role mainly although that could not be assessed properly
as the data set is synthetic modal.
From the analysis it could also be concluded that the value for the critical Open Hole
Time (OHT) currently in use for 17.5" sections (7 days) is far too conservative and
longer Open Hole Time (OHT) can be allowed, in particular for sections that will be
drilled through medium or non-reactive shales.
rather than conventional WBM, lies in improved hole stability and hence reduced
Stuck Pipe Frequency (SPF) and Recovery Time.
Logging results from these trial sections, however, have shown much improved
shale stabilization, with good in gauge hole. The expectation is, therefore, that the
silicate WBM may show a significant performance improvement for drilling the
highly reactive shales currently incompatible with WBM.
4 Conclusion
From statistical analysis of mud performance data from 17.5" sections it has been
established that:
a split should be made between reactive and non-reactive shales. Reactive shale
areas have been identified as Dunlin, Osprey, Fulmar and Auk (highest Stuck Pipe
Frequency for WBM). Medium or non-reactive shales may be drilled with
conventional WBM systems or with the Silicate mud.
reactive shales need to be drilled with OBM, unless field trials with the silicate mud
system show improved performance when compared to conventional WBM.
Continued silicate mud development and support for field trials is strongly
recommended.
hole angle is not seen to play a major role: this needs to be further assessed.
indications are that in 17.5" sections a critical section length (4400 ft.) plays a role.
This needs to be further investigated.
UK regulatory developments
The results described above challenge the scientific robustness of the regulatory
framework governing synthetic muds, and the DTI has responded by proposing the
following controls on their discharge to sea:
Discharges of synthetic muds above a 1% oil on cuttings limit to be
phased out over a four-year period.
All classes of synthetic mud base oils will be subject to the same phase
out programme, with the possible exception of esters;
Pending further evidence from seabed surveys the discharge of ester
based muds will continue to be permitted;
Reduction targets will be applied on a company-by-company basis,
with operators free to determine how targets shall be achieved.
DTI have discussed and agreed these controls with other Government Departments,
UKOOA and EOSCA (European Offshore Specialty Chemicals Association), and they
were presented to a PARCOM meeting in February 1997 as the UK strategy for
regulating synthetic mud discharges. These proposals were provisionally accepted
by Parcom pending a workshop on the impact of synthetic muds to be hosted in the
UK in November 1997. Following this workshop, a final position on legislation will be
decided by Parcom in February 1998.
As noted above, a decision about the esters has been deferred until results from sea
bed survey studies are available. Company carried out such a study several years
ago, and results showed little degradation. If other studies on the UKCS confirm this,
then the esters will be subject to the same controls as other synthetic muds. Note in
this context that studies have been carried out in both Norway and the Netherlands
which appear to show that esters degrade relatively rapidly under field conditions.
However, the experimental design of the Norwegian study has been widely
criticized, and the relevance of the Dutch study to conditions in the Central and
Northern North Sea is questionable.
Following on from this, there are indications that the Government will define criteria
to determine the environmental acceptability of new drilling muds, based on
persistence in the environment. This would provide an opportunity for mud
companies to develop new products.
6. Security
Guidelines for developing Security Policy
and Procedures
Guidelines for preparing security policy and procedures for exploration projects.
A Company can be affected by four main types of security problems:
- general political unrest;
- organized political unrest/terrorism;
- "petty" crime in residential areas;
- serious theft of material/equipment.
personal risk one room in the house can be strengthened into which to retreat while
waiting for assistance to arrive.
Communication between residences and between residences and office should be
ensured. If the telephones are not reliable (or wires are exposed and can be cut)
then it is recommended to use mobile phones or VHF radios.
The risk to cars can be minimized by installing alarms, and by avoiding parking in
areas which are known to be prone to car theft. If the risk is significant then
company drivers should be used, who can stay with the car.
A sense of proportion should be kept about the risk of mugging/rape. It is often no
higher than it is in Europe, and it can be minimized by the use of common sense.
Staff, especially wives and children, should not walk alone in areas known to be
risky, and attacks should not be invited by flaunting jewelry. Important documents
should not be carried in shoulder bags so that there is little inconvenience when
they are snatched.