FACULTY OF LAW

SUBMITTED BY:
BY:

SUPERVISED

PAVITRA SHIVHARE
PRABHAT SAHA

DR.

SUBJECT INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

TOPIC: COURTS & INTENT OF LEGISLATURE ENACTING
THE STATUTE

SESSION: 2016-17
14137LA044

ROLL NO.

BANARAS HINDU UNIVERSITY

Page | 1

VARANASI (INDIA)
2016
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Every work accomplished is a pleasure-a sense of satisfaction. However, a
number of people also motivate, criticize and appreciate a work with their
objective ideas and opinions. Hence, I would like to use this opportunity to
thank all, who have directly or indirectly helped me to complete this
project study.
Firstly, I would like to thank my professor Dr.Prabhat Saha, for giving me
this opportunity to do this wonderful project and for his helpful comments
that helped me to improve my project on the topic: Courts and Intent
of Legislature enacting the Statute, which also helped me in doing a
lot of research and I came to know about so many new facts and rules
related to Interpretation of Statutes.
The study related to this project has indeed helped me to explore more
knowledgeable avenues related to my subject of Interpretation of Statutes
and I am sure it will help me in future.
I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me in
finalizing this project, without whom this project completion would not be
possible and I feel fortunate enough to get their constant support and
encouragement.
Lastly, I cant ignore the Law School Library staff which helped me in
successfully completing this project work.

Page | 2

SR.NO TITLE

PAGE NO.

.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
LIST OF ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

2
3
4
5-6
7-8

VI.
VII.
VIII.

COURTS &INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE

CONCLUSION
BIBLIOGRAPHY

9-17
18
19

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page | 3

INTRODUCTION
We are living in a democratic world where people have rights and obligations toward
the state as well as the society. But, How is this order maintained in the society? It
is done because of the presence of Law. The Law maintains an order for just and
stable existence of the mankind because it is evident from the human tendency that
some kind of sanctions is necessary to regulate the behavior and it is done only by
the presence of Laws. This fact can also be proved if we go by the history of the
mankind starting from Stone Age to the Cyber Age. Law is that element which binds
the members of the community together in their adherence to recognized values and
standards.
The Law derives its presence in society from various source like Customs, Precedents
and Legislations. But, the most authentic and reliable source among all sources, is
Page | 4

Statutes or popularly known as Enacted laws, Modern acts and rules. These are
made by the parliament in consideration of the demand of the hour and the need of
the society. These are used as the primary source by any judicial authority for
dispensing justice in their day to day operation ranging from the smallest Magistrate
Court to the Supreme Court of India. Each and every judicial and administrative
body works as per the enacted laws, prescribed rules and regulations.
But, there is a problem with this source of law and that is with the change of time,
the society changes and this finally changes the mindset, leading to a need for its
interpretation by the courts. These enacted laws, specially the Modern Acts and
rules, are drafted by legal experts and it is expected that the language used in that
particular statute will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But, the
reality is different as those persons who bear this task of application of law, finds
difficulty in interpreting the meaning of the ambiguous words and expressions while
resolving the inconsistencies. The main reason for such problem is the indifference
in the person who drafts the law and the person who applies the law in working.
Thus, to address this problem of application of enacted laws certain rules of
Interpretation or construction has been formulated and one is Intention of
Legislature.
This interpretation or construction of statute by the court is done when it cannot go
through the ordinary rules of interpretation then the court do it by just looking at the
intention of legislature and it is derived from the words of the statute which was
used while enacting the statute.

But, if we go by the Indian context, courts have often gone beyond the words of the
statute and interpreted statutory provisions in a manner as to what they considered
as be socially and morally sound. This is the main reason that judicial activism has
been praised and the slight circumvention of the canons of interpretation has been
ignored in the Indian Judicial system. But, such activism brings into question as
to, what is the theoretical binding value of legislative intent? This gave rise to an
issue that whether the role of legislative intent in statutory construction has over the
years dwindled considerably or not. But, we will do it later on; first of all we will look
what is the concept behind this intention of legislature and interpretation of statutes.
We all know that, a statute is understood as the edict of the Legislature. However,
the extent to which the legislatures intent shapes the understanding and
implementation of a statute is indeterminate. The binding value of legislative intent
varies with time as well as across jurisprudences. In India, in a time where judicial
activism is hailed as the protective force behind the rights of the citizenry, it becomes
Page | 5

necessary to evaluate the role of legislative intent in statutory interpretation. So, in

this project study, we will look toward the issue for understanding how court is using
this intention of legislature for doing interpretation.

INTERPREATATION OF STATUTE
We all know that, Words spoken or written are the means of communication.
Where they are possible of giving one and only one meaning there is no problem. But
where there is a possibility of two meanings, a problem arises and the real intention
is to be sorted out by the court. If two persons communicating with each other are
sitting together; they can by subsequent conversation clear the confusion and make
things clear. But what will happen if a provision in any statute is found to convey
more than one meaning? The Judges and the Lawyers whose duty it is to interpret
and to aid in interpretation of statutes have no opportunity to converse with the
Legislature which had enacted a particular statute. The Legislature, after enacting
statutes becomes functus officio so far as those statutes are concerned. It is not their
function to interpret the statutes. Thus two functions are clearly demarcated.
Legislature enacts and the Judges interpret.
Page | 6

The difficulty with Judges is that they cannot say that they do not understand a
particular provision of an enactment. They have to interpret in one way or another.
They cannot remand or refer back the matter to the Legislature for interpretation.
That situation led to the birth of principles of interpretation to find out the real
intent of the Legislature. Consequently, the Superior Courts had to give us the rules
of interpretation to ease ambiguities, inconsistencies, contradictions or lacunas. The
rules of interpretation come into play only where clarity or precision in the
provisions of the statute are found missing.
Good enactments are those which have least ambiguities, inconsistencies,
contradictions or lacunas. Bad enactments are gold mine for lawyers because for half
of the litigation the legislative draftsmen are undoubtedly the cause.
The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the
Legislature. For such unlocking, keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed
as aids for interpretation and principles of interpretation. The aids for interpretation
may be divided into two categories, namely, Internal and External aids for
interpretation.
The Internal Aids are those which are found within the statute. They may be as
follows: - 1. Long title 2. Preamble 3. Chapter Headings 4. Marginal Notes to every
section of statute. 5. Punctuations. 6. Illustrations given below the sections. 7.
Definitions. 8. Provisos. 9. Explanation. 10. Saving Clauses and non-obstante
Clauses.

External Aid for interpretation are those which are not contained in the statute but
are found else-where. They may be as follows: - 1. Historical background. 2.
Statement of objects and reasons. 3. The original Bill as drafted and introduced. 4.
Debates in the Legislature. 5. State of things at the time a particular legislation was
enacted. 6. Judicial construction. 7. Legal dictionaries. 8. Commonsense.
Now, we can say that it is this process of Interpretation which court applies to find
out the true meaning of the ambiguous word or any phrase in the Legislation. This
whole process is done between the situation, when the law is drafted and when it
reach the court in the manner of a dispute. Then at this juncture of time the act is
sent to the court for Interpretation of that particular ambiguous word or phrase.
Judges here try to ascertain what meaning the parliament had thought of for that
particular ambiguous or uncertain word while in the process of drafting. This
process itself makes the interpretation rigorous because there could be different
Page | 7

interpretations by different judges as the strategy taken by one judge in interpreting

the same word could be different by the second judge. Thus, this process is done by
care and caution because you might not know in what dimensions you might venture
while interpreting the vague and undefined word of the statute. It is also one
important fact that judges should not pursue his own ideologies to interpret a statute
and he should interpret that only according to the objectives of statute.
But, What is this Interpretation? Literally speaking Interpretation is, how judges
look into the word with matter or the principle, which means that when court seeks
to look into the word which is difficult to interpret this process is called as
Interpretation.
Now, if we go by the legal definition of this term Interpretation then this is defined
by SALMOND in his Jurisprudence as, the process by which the court seeks to
ascertain the meaning of the Legislature through the medium of authoritative
forms in which it is expressed.
But, COOLEY has defined this in much simple sense, he said Interpretations is the
art of finding the true sense which their author is intended to convey, and of
enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to
convey.
There is an another word for this process of clearing ambiguity of statute called
Construction which WHITE J. has defined synonymous to the word Interpretation
and so in this study we are going to use these two expressions in a common sense.
This was all about the Interpretation and now we will study the Intention of
legislature and various principles of construction related to this rule.

COURTS&INTENTION OF LEGISLATURE
The first and the foremost step to understand this topic is to understand, what the
Intention of Legislature island how court uses this for interpretation of statutes. If
we define it in a general sense, Legislative intent as such is nothing more than the
purpose the legislature had in mind as to the meaning and implication of the words
of a statute while framing it. In general the purpose behind framing any statute is to
curb some public evil or effectuate some public benefit.1 With this in mind, the
legislature is presumed to garner certain meaning to the words of a statute. A statute
must be rendered in accordance with such meaning.
When we interprets a statute we go by the Rules of Interpretation and these rules are
used to gather the facts which are later processed to clear the vagueness of the
statute and giving a meaning to the ambiguous word or phrase. In general parlance
1United Bank of India, Culcutta v. Abhijit Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 2000 SC 2957.
Page | 8

this process of interpretation is done going just by the words of the statute but
sometimes the statute itself is open to more than one interpretations. Then, what is
the resort to the court. In this situation the Court has to choose the Intention of
Legislature used in enacting a statute and specifically that interpretation which
represents the true intention of the legislature,2 so court will always look to the legal
meaning or true meaning of the statutory provision. Under these conditions the
legislative intent of the legislature in enacting legislation is considered.
The judiciary does so in the following provided reasons:
When the Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are
ambiguous and change in meaning over time, does not appear to be directly or
adequately addressing a particular issue and when there appears to have been
a legislative drafting error.3
Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make
application of existing laws difficult.
Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as
the need for compromise or catering to special interest groups.
But, when a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts have said, repeatedly, that
the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point.

Thus, we can say that the intention of the legislature is to be construed only when
there is a possibility that two different interpretations are arising otherwise not and
this intention has to be essentially constructed of two aspects: the concept of
meaning, i.e., what the words mean and in the another aspect, it conveys the
concept of purpose and object or the reason and spirit pervading through the
statute. The former connotes an understanding derived from the literal meaning of
the words of a statute. The latter points to the spirit and reason pervading through
the statute.4The process of construction, therefore, combines both the literal and
purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention, i.e., the true or legal
meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in
the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends
2Venkataswami Naidu, R v. Narasarn Naraindas,AIR 1966 SC 361.
3Legislative Intent in Interpretation of Statutes, available at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legislative_intent (Visited on October 26, 2016).
4Guru Prasanna Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Ed., 12 (2010).
Page | 9

the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. Thus, the courts
have to keep these aspects in mind while reading a statute; and are aided in this task
by certain sources of legislative intent. These popularly include: 5
1. The text of the statute as proposed to the legislature.
2. Proposed amendments to the statute, whether accepted or rejected, with
reasons thereof.
3. The record of hearings on the topic.
4. Legislative records or journals.
5. Speeches and parliamentary debates made prior to the vote on the bill.
6. Legislative subcommittee (such as Standing Committee) minutes, factual
findings, and/or reports
7. Other relevant statutes that can be used to understand the definitions in the
statute on question; for example the General Clauses Act, 1897.
8. Other relevant statutes which indicate the limits of the statute in question;
such as previous statutes on the same matter.
9. Legislative files of the executive branch, such as the governor or president.
10.
Case law prior to the statute or following it which demonstrates the
problems or issues the legislature was attempting to tackle with the statute.
11. Constitutional determinations
12.Legislative intent, which is the reason for passing the law

So, it can be said that this expression Intention of legislature is a shorthand

reference to the meaning of the words used by the Legislature objectively determined
with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of interpretation. This is
crucial because if one may gather the true intent behind something then it might
become easy for doing interpretation of that particular word or phrase of the statute.
This is done by judges when they place themselves into the situation when that
legislation was being drafted because we know that a statute is an edict of the
Legislature6 and if they could ascertain the mind map of the legislature only then it
becomes possible in what sense that word or phrase in the statute which is important
to impart justice fairly. So, it is the prime reason that this conventional way of
interpretation of a statute is done according to the intention of those persons who
make it. Salmond has also said that, it is the duty of the judicature to act upon the
true intention of legislature- the mens or sentential legis. By this he tried to convey
that, the object of interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature enacting it. Thus, we can say that this expression intention of legislature
5Yule Kim, CRS Report for Congress, Statutory Interpretation: General Principles and Recent
Trends (2008).
6Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (Pvt) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamp, AIR 1968 SC 102.
Page | 10

is a shorthand reference to the meaning of the words used by the legislature

objectively determined with the guidance furnished by the accepted principles of
interpretation.7
Now, the importance of this subject is considerable because the primary function of
modern appellate courts is the interpretation of statutes, and it is conventional for
courts to make use of the rules in the course of interpretation. Our law has gradually
developed a vast body of authority pertaining to statutory interpretation. Some of
the rules in this law are very ancient, others rather recent. Most of this authority is
applicable to statutes in any field; some of it only to one field, such as criminal law or
constitutional law. Nearly all of it is entirely judge made, although a few rules of
interpretation appear in the general statutes of most states.8
The words "rules of statutory interpretation" are used loosely in this article to
include any of the legal principles and concepts devoted to the meaning of statutes.
Some of these rules are frequently referred to by the courts as canons of
construction. The ostensible purpose of every rule is to clarify statutory meaning.
The appellate courts of all the states have used substantially all of these rules at one
time or another.
Most rules of statutory interpretation can be classified in one of two ways: those
concerned with relations between the words of a statute; and those concerned with
the relation of the words in a statute to outside materials. In addition, there is a
scattering of rules that do not fit either of these major categories.

Thus, as stated above, certain principles of interpretation as formulated by the

Superior Courts to find out the real intent of the Legislature may be enumerated as
follows: 1. Literal construction: In construing a statutory provision the first and the
foremost rule of construction is that of literal construction. All that the Court has to
see at the very outset is, what does the provision say? The Courts are bound by the
mandate of the Legislature and once it has expressed its intention in words which
have a clear significance and meaning, the Court is precluded from speculating.
If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the legislative intent is
clear, the other rules of construction of statutes need not be called into aid. They are
called into aid only when the legislative intention is not clear. But the courts would
7R. v. Secretary of State for the Environment exparte Spath Holme, [2001] 1 All ER 195.
8Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 2 YLJ 1-2 (1954).
Page | 11

not be justified in so straining the language of the statutory provision as to ascribe

the meaning which cannot be warranted by the words employed by the Legislature.
If the words are clear, they must be applied, even though the intention of the
legislator may have been different or the result is harsh or undesirable. The literal
rule is what the law says instead of what the law was intended to say.
2. No external aid Where words plain and unambiguous:
Where the words of a statute are plain, precise and unambiguous, the intention of
the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no
external aid is admissible to construe those words. It is only where a statute is not
exhaustive or where its language is ambiguous, uncertain, clouded or susceptible of
more than one meaning or shades of meaning that the external aid may be looked
into for the purpose of ascertaining the object which the Legislature had in view in
using the words in question.
3. Mischief rule (Heydon's case):
When a question arises as to the interpretation to be put on an enactment, what the
Court is to do is to ascertain "the intent of them that make it," and that must of
course be gathered from the words actually used in the statute. That, however, does
not mean that the decision should rest on a literal interpretation of the words used in
disregard of all other materials. The literal construction, then, has, in general, but
prima facie preference. Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary
sources, such as committee reports, treatises, law review articles and corresponding
statutes.
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and the
golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent. It can be
argued that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and is undemocratic as it takes
law-making decisions away from the legislature.
To arrive at the real meaning, it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the
aim, scope and object of the whole Act; to consider:
1. What was law before the Act was passed?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the law had not provided?
3. What remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease? And
4. The true reason of the remedy and then the judges have to make such construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief.
4. Words coupled together to take colour from each other:
The rule is when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are
coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense and they
take their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general being restricted
to a sense analogous to that of the less general. This rule, however, does not apply
Page | 12

where the Legislature has deliberately used wider words in order to widen the scope
of the provision.
5. The golden rule: No hypothetical considerationsArgument on hypothetical considerations should not have much weight in
interpreting a statute. However, if the language so permits, it is open to the Court to
give to the statute that meaning which promotes the benignant intent of the
legislation. A Court has the power to depart from the grammatical construction, if it
finds that strict adherence to the grammatical construction will defeat the object the
Legislature had In view. No doubt, grammar is a good guide to meaning but a bad
master to dictate.
6. Absurdity or hardship:
If a literal interpretation of a statute leads to absurdity, hardship or injustice,
presumably not Intended, then a construction may be put upon it which modifies the
meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. Again, however, the
Court has no power to give the language of the statute a wider or narrower meaning
than the literal one, unless there is compelling reason to give such other meaning. If
the language is plain the fact that the consequence of giving effect to it may lead to
some absurd result is not a factor to be taken into account in interpreting a
provision, as it is for the Legislature to step in and remove the absurdity. If on either
of two possible views hardship must result to one or the other party, then the
considerations of hardship ought to be ignored.

7. Contextual interpretation:
Although the meaning of the statutory provision has to be ascertained only from the
words employed by the Legislature, the set up' and context are also relevant for
ascertaining what exactly was meant to be conveyed by the terminology employed.
The same words may mean one thing in one context and another in a different
context. In ascertaining the true intention, of the Legislature, the Court must not
only look at the words used by the Legislature but also have regard to the context
and the setting in which they occur, The exact colour and shape of the meaning of
words in an enactment is not to be ascertained by reading them in isolation, The
provisions of the statutes which bear upon the same subject-matter must be read as
a whole and in their entirety, each throwing light on and illumining the meaning of
the other. The Court must have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to
be read in its entirety. It must ascertain the intention of the Legislature by directing
its attention not merely to the clause to be construed but to the entire statute; it must
compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the
Page | 13

clause to be Interpreted occurs. If the context clearly suggests that a particular rule
of grammar is inapplicable then the requirement of context must prevail over the
rule of grammar.
8. Liberal construction:
In construing a provision of a statute the Court should be slow to adopt construction
which tends to make any part of the statute meaningless or ineffective. An attempt
must always be made to reconcile the relevant provision as to advance the remedy
intended by the statute. Where the literal meaning of the words used in a statutory
provision would manifestly defeat its object by making a part of it meaningless and
ineffective, it is legitimate and even necessary to adopt the rule of liberal
construction so as to give meaning to all parts of the statute and to make the whole
of it effective and operative. Whether the narrower or the wider sense of a term
should be adopted depends not only on the provisions of the statute in which that
term occurs but also on facts and circumstances of each case. But again if the words
used in the statutory provision are reasonably capable of only one construction the
doctrine of liberal construction can be of no assistance. Procedural enactments
should be construed liberally in such a manner as to render the enforcement of
substantive rights effective. But the requirements as to the time-Limit within which
an administrative act is to be performed are to be liberally construed. Provisions
ensuring the security of fundamental human rights must, unless the mandate be
precise and unqualified, be construed liberally so as to uphold the right. This rule
applies to the interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions alike. Welfare,
social and beneficial statutes are not to be construed strictly. Doubts are resolved in
favour of the class of persons for whose benefit the statute is enacted. On the other
hand penal and taxing statutes and statutes excluding Court's jurisdiction should be
strictly construed.
9. Harmonious construction:
Every statute has to be construed as a whole and the construction given should be a
harmonious one. It is a cardinal rule of construction that when there are in a statute
two provisions which are in such conflict with each other, that both of them cannot
stand together, they should possibly be so interpreted that effect can be given to both
and that a construction which renders either of them inoperative and useless should
not be adopted except in the last resort. It is the duty of the Courts to avoid conflict
between two provisions, and whenever it is possible to do so to construe provisions
which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. This rule of harmonious
construction applies not only to different provisions in one Act but also to different
cognate Acts such as the Court Fees Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. Where,
however, the words of the statute are not reasonably capable of the construction
canvassed, then It would be unreasonable and illegitimate for the Court to limit the
Page | 14

scope of those words - arbitrarily solely for the purpose of establishing harmony
between the assumed object and the scheme of the Act.
10.
Construction to avoid invalidity:
It is the duty of the Court to endeavour as far as possible to construe a statute in such
a manner that the construction results in validity rather than its invalidity and gives
effect to the manifest Intention of the Legislature enacting that statute. An
interpretation leading to the failure of the plain intention of the Legislature by
reason of a slight in exactitude in the language of the provision should be avoided. A
statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a Court should
be to secure that object, unless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end
unattainable.
The reason behind the maxim is that it is to be presumed that the Legislature or
other legislative authority would not make an infructuous or unconstitutional
provision. The words of a statute must be construed so as to give sensible meaning to
them. An interpretation which would defeat the purpose of the statutory provision
and, in effect obliterate it from the statute book should be eschewed. If more than
one construction is possible, the one which preserves its workability and efficacy
should be preferred to the other which would render it otiose or sterile.
Thus, an Act of Legislature must be so interpreted, wherever possible, so as to make
it constitutional rather than unconstitutional. Likewise, a rule, i.e. a piece of
delegated legislation, should be so interpreted as to make it not only constitutional
but also within the authority conferred by the Legislature on the Government while
conferring on it the power to make rules.
11. Reading down:
While making such construction it is permissible for the Court even to "read down" a
provision in order to so understand it as not to attempt something beyond the
competence of the legislative body. This is called the principle of "reading down".
12.Ejusdem generis:
The ejusdem generis rule is explained in Halsbury's Laws of England thus'"As a rule, where in a statute there are general words following particular and
specific words, the general words must be confined to things of the same kind as
those specified, although this, as a rule of construction;, must be applied with
caution, and subject to the primary rule that statutes are to be construed in
accordance with the intention of Parliament. For the ejusdem rule to apply, the
specific words must constitute a category, class or genus; if they do constitute such a
category, class or genus, then only things which belong to that category, class or
genus fall within the general words".
Page | 15

13.Same words, same meaning:

Where a Legislature uses same expression in the same statute at two places or more,
then the same interpretation should be given to that expression unless the context
otherwise requires. But the application of the rule of "same word, same meaning"
may be excluded by the context. If one construction will lead to an ambiguity while
another will give effect to what common sense would show was obviously Intended,
the construction which would defeat the ends of the Act must be rejected even if
same words used in the same section and even in the same sentence have to be
construed differently.
14.
Later law abrogates earlier laws not consistent with It:
This principle is expressed in the Latin maxim posteriores leges priores contrarias
abrogant. This principle has been applied by the Supreme Court in several cases.
After discussing the principles of interpretation it would also be useful to discuss
about mandatory and directory provisions.
Mandatory and Directory Provisions: The study of numerous cases on this
topic does not lead to formulation of any universal rule except this that language
alone most often is not decisive. The use of words 'shall' and 'may' is not the
determinant factor. Regard must be given to the context, subject matter and object
of the statutory provision in question, in determining whether the same is
mandatory or directory.

But, Court has to always took into consideration that they didnt start doing
legislative function in the form of the interpretation or in the disguise of
interpretation and they must avoid the danger of an a prioridetermination of the
meaning of a provision based on their own preconceived notions of ideological
structure or scheme into which the provision is to be interpreted is somewhat how
fitted.9
This only means that judges cannot interpret statutes in the light of their views as to
policy; but they can adopt a purposive interpretation if they can find in the statute
read as a whole or in the material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids
to interpretation an expression of Parliaments purpose or policy.
As warned by LORD SCARMAN that, Judges have no doubt a genuine creative role
but the Constitutions separation of powers, or more accurately functions, must be
observed if the judicial independence is not to be put at risk. For if the people and
Parliament come to think that the judicial power is to be confined by nothing other
9D.A. Venkatachalam v. Dy. Transport Commissioner, AIR 1977 SCC 842, page 853, 854.
Page | 16

than the judges sense of what is right, confidence in the judicial system will be
replace by the fear of it becoming uncertain and arbitrary in its application.
Thus, the judges have to be conscious in their task of interpreting and applying a
statute, that in the end the statute is the master and not the servant of the judgement
and that no judge has choice between implementing the law and disobeying it.

CONCLUSION
Errors are committed by the humans and Errors are corrected by the humans, so
better to learn from the past and make future better because Justice is all what
humanity wants from the Judicial System.
Hence, we can conclude that the usage of intention of the legislature by the court
should be justified by proper reasons and its usage should not be left open to each
and every statute. We all know that court is assigned this task of statutory
interpretation but it should always be done with proper care and caution taking care
of all the rules of construction. This is because the court can always go to interpret in
its own way as to what considers to them right. So, it should always be taken in care
that the statute gets that interpretation which first derives from the word used under
it and then a recourse can always be made toward the object and reason for finding
out the intention of legislature in enacting the statute.
There can be different statutes where intention can be looked upon but in the case of
Taxation and Penal Code statutes the intention is never looked by the court. The
interpretation of these statutes is different from the ordinary statutes because here
Page | 17

we have clear provisions as to what impose tax or liability on certain subjects and if it
is not so, then it is better to left it on the legislature because the matter of Taxation
and Penal Statute is directly related to public policy and the people will be the
ultimate sufferer in case the interpretation goes in the wrong way. This is the main
reason that both of these statutes should be clear for interpretation because if it is
ambiguous or unclear then there will be no interpretation. In these statutes the court
does not give effect to each and every word and court will only interpret if that is
Crystal clear and thus in case of ambiguity the court doesnt looks toward the aim &
objective of the statute but will always look into the enacting provisions of the
statute. In these statutes the court only applies the Literal interpretation by
restraining the words of the statute and by taking a popular or ordinary meaning of
that word in the statute but in otherwise the court does not apply any canon of
construction for interpretation of statute.
Thus, it is to be taken care of by the court that they should move at that path where
justice is provided taking care of the all the care of all the rules of construction. In
Law every word has a meaning and we all know that law is a world of words. So, you
cannot expect to interpret in that way that the interpretation itself becomes outside
the scope and beyond the reach of the objectives and reasons for which the statute
was enacted in the legislature. So, this task of the court should be rest on the
shoulders of the learned council and the judges because of whom suggestions and
understanding this all construction is possible in case of any statute or constitutional
provision.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:
1. Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th edn, Lexis Nexis
Publications 2016).
2. Dr. M.P. Tandon, Interpretation of Statutes & Legislation (12th edn, Allahabad Law
Agency 2016).

Website references:
Page | 18

1. Legislative Intent in Interpretation of Statutes, available at: https(Visited on

October 26, 2016).
2. Judicial Interpretation, available at:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_interpretation (Visited on October 27,
2016).
3. Statutory Interpretation, available at: http://www.ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdf
(Visited on October 29, 2016).
4. Google Scholar-Legislative Intent, available at:
https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?
start=10&q=courts+and+intention+of+the+legislature+in+enacting+the+statut
e&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5 (Visited on October 30, 2016).

Page | 19